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THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION AND OUT OF NATO ISSUE

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It is in itself evident that security concerns have increasingly become, among other issues, one of the top priorities for European governments. What is far less clear is the European willingness and capability both to transform that issue into a homogeneous and actual security policy and to set up a credible common mechanism to deal with it.

As far as growing European interest in security issues is concerned, some of the major reasons have already been pointed out several times:

a) long-lasting divergences with the US, affecting the whole range of common policies (economic, monetary, military, international, etc.).
b) a parallel, subsequent and growing perception of a European "specificity" in the solution to be given to international crises and problems (post-detente, M.E., Central America, Eureka vs. Sdi, etc.).

It is mainly in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East that Europeans and Americans have come up against the greatest obstacle to coordinating a common action. The very first signs of this reluctance go back to 1973, to the time of the oil crisis and the start of the difficult but meaningful Euro-Arab dialogue.

Distances between the allies have grown with the Venice Declaration and following initiatives in the Middle East. The same four European countries' participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force, in support of the American presence, has been publicly kept separated from the Camp David peace process. More generally, Europeans have tried:

a) to underline their own vocation for an autonomous role in the area;
b) to avoid any overlapping between the concept of East-West confrontation, in which NATO has strict competence, and other questions, both global or regional, having at least an open chance for alternative interpretation in terms of threats and possible responses to be given.

## The global dimension of European security concerns

From a strategic point of view, Europeans have therefore enlarged their concerns from the Central Front and Eastern Threat to other neighbouring areas, like the M.E. and the Persian Gulf. Under the pressure of the growing number of crises arising in those regions, some European countries have adapted both their military doctrines and army structure. In addition to that, Europeans do not neglect to deal with local conflicts in other parts of the world like, for example, Central America or the Falkland Islands, sometimes taking a distance from the solutions proposed by their American ally.

This atittude has reversed Kissinger's old statement of Europeans being responsible only for regional problems. On the contrary, political and economic interests in addition to strategic ones have pressed European countries to take care of events in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, with the aim of protecting either unilaterally or multilaterally their own positions.

The emerging European tendency to deal with issues clearly outside NATO's competence area has been underlined in some European Parliament reports, namely the 1981 Diligent Report on the protection of maritime lines of communication in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf and the 1982 Haagerup Report on European security policy. In this last report Haagerup points out that the relations between the European Community and several Third World countries are usually considered of a political and economic nature; this does not mean that they cannot affect strategic and even military interests, particularly when one considers Europe's dependence in the field of raw materials.

In Haagerup's judgement, it would be wrong to deny a strategic role to the European Community, even if not supported by military means, due to the great commercial and economic importance that it holds in the world. In addition - he continues - single member states are free to act in the military field and launch military actions; a case in point is the initiatives taken by France in Africa or Great Britain in the Falklands. Those initiatives do not require previous approval by the other EC partners. A further proof of some European countries' willingness to use military means with the aim of preventing conflicts has been their participation in some peace forces in Cyprus, the M.E. and Beirut.

## The enlargement of the range of priorities after Spain's accession to the EC

Spain's entry (and to a lesser extent that of Portugal) into the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism is going to bring a new dimension to the list of European interests in the world and, particularly, in the Mediterranean. Special Spanish attitudes towards Latin and Central America, the Maghreb and Arab countries will add further responsibility to Europe. In the past, EPC had underestimated the importance of candidate countries' perceptions and priorities on single foreign policy issues, consequently running the risk of undermining common European positions on international questions (as shown in the Greek case).

That implies from now on a better knowledge of Spanish concerns in the world. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, for example, Spain's prioritary interest in the Maghreb is not shared to the same degree by Europe. First of all, Northern European countries' interests diverge from those of the south. Secondly, also among southern countries, the variety and complexity of

domestic interests towards the Maghreb have prevented the EPC in the past from making any kind of declaration.

From a political and strategic point of view, the entry of Spain into the Community is nevertheless going to produce a greater involvement on the part of Europea in the region; directly or indirectly, EPC and single member states will be involved in local crises which could arise from the existing Spanish contentious with Morocco or other states.

If on the one hand Spain could contribute towards better clarifying the political and strategic reasons for the tension in the area, on the other, a lack of response and "political coverage" from European partners could equally lead towards a more autonomous Spanish policy, with the aim of protecting her own vital strategic interests in the Maghreb. This could further weaken the role and image of EPC as a political tool for solving crises outside the NATO area.

## Interests at stake and possible threats. Available forces.

One of the main difficulties encountered in management of crises in the Middle East is the near impossibility of defining the nature of the threat. In fact, both with regard to extension (global, regional or local) and with regard to implications (economic, politial or military), the critical criteria and perceptions of Western governments are profoundly different. The web of political, religious, nationalistic, irredentist and economic factors relative to the Middle Eastern situation is such as to render problematic both identification of the threat and, naturally, formulation of an appropriate response.

Application of labels such as "high intensity threat" or "low intensity threat" is rather risky and response to crises may well depend on other circumstances such as the urgency of the problem to be solved, the national perception of it or the concrete possibility of reaching a positive result. In other words, the decision to resort to a military solution does not necessarily depend on extension of the problem (for example, global) nor on its meaning (for example, military), but rather on the national perception of a vital interest to be defended or the conviction of being in possession of the means to rapidly solve the problem unilaterally.

Therefore, analysis of concrete intervention possibilities in the Middle East is complicated by various factors and circumstances that are difficult to classify in a very rigid manner.

For example, in recent years, military-type interventions have mostly been isolated episodes in the fight against terrorism (relatively marginal, but more easily countered militarily) rather than large-scale actions aimed at protecting, for example, Western oil supplies in the Persian Gulf or enforcement of a ceasefire in a subregional conflict like that raging between Iran and Iraq.

Furthermore, it must also be observed that, even if threat perception was homogeneous on several occasions, choice of instruments for intervention was not. Therefore, it does not follow that similar perceptions result in the same kind of reaction on the part of the countries in question.

Finally, one of the reasons that can lead to the decision to resort to the use of the military instrument seems closely linked to the interrelationship between the scope of the military instrument available and foreseeable political effects. In other words, the use of force is closely tied to the predictions of the possible success of the operation. The use of limited

forces, on the other hand, does not achieve significant political results, unless both the objective itself and the time of intervention are limited.

First of all, one must have a rather precise idea of the military forces being fielded and the concrete possibilities of their integration.

Of all Western countries, only the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy have set up rapid intervention forces or have used the military instrument for actions in the Middle East. Other countries have served for support or indirect intervention in the area.

Among other things, this military capacity has, in recent history, been used in different ways, depending on the kind of conflict situation:

        a) law and order enforcement operations;
        b) dissuasion operations;
        c) multilateral and multinational buffer operations;
        d) coercion operations;
        e) anti-terrorist operations.

There is nothing to rule out that the range of actions may increase and diversify in extent and roles in the future. But it is clear that intervention forces must be appropriately dimensioned. Factors such as rapidity, mobility and surprise may not be sufficient to face more extensive crises.

Moreover, on the basis of the peace-keeping experience accumulated up until now, it can be said that the use of force can, within the bounds and in the forms employed to date, give negative results in the long run. The fundamental problem is that actions of that kind have strong political motivations and since the political reasons behind the use of force are liable to change with time and with the development of the situation, the military instrument can prove inadequate or even counter-productive at a certain point in solving the crisis.

## Criteria for common management of an out of area crisis.

Before returning to analysis of the political factor that can influence the decision to undertake out of area military actions, the objective criteria allowing for collaboration and the success of a military operation must be determined.

Crisis handling calls for the ability to evaluate the threat, the possibility of foreseeing it to some extent and access to the greatest possible number of sources of information. Generally, there is not enough time during a crisis for complete information - a necessary condition for correct action. In fact, the crisis alters response times to an event and increases the difficulty of straightening out errors. Lastly, it causes shifts in the aims that a government or a group of states initially had in the area.

Crisis management, therefore, requires a series of pre-conditions making possible a positive conclusion:

        a) the mandate given to a government or a group of states must be clear and sufficiently broad, both in terms of means provided and implementation time;
        b) in loco operations require very strong political support. Furthermore, it must be continuous and must prevent rapid erosion of consensus;

c) an operation must have the support of the threatened host country of the government involved;
d) the financial burden of the operation must be well distributed among the allied countries and generous enough to allow for freedom of action and a massive initial action;
e) the size of the military force must be commensurate to the type and foreseeable length of the threat;
f) the tasks of the (integrated) military commands must be clearly defined and must respond to unambiguous political objectives.

These are only a few of the guiding criteria which would allow for a reasonable response both to unexpected events and, above all, to crisis situations of a certain importance that seriously jeopardize Western interests in the Middle East. It is necessary to think of long-lasting crisis situations of a more serious nature than those experienced until today in order to formulate a more precise idea of future obligations.

## Out of area experiences. Lack of coordination.

The difficulty must be understood in applying even the minimum criteria mentioned above in the light of the out of area experiences had up to now in the Mideast.
If we take into consideration some of the rare cases of multilateral cooperation in the Middle East in recent years (for example, the multinational operation in Lebanon), limiting ourselves to the purely operational aspects, it is easy to realize that the major drawbacks to lasting success derive from:

a) insufficient forces in the field for the tasks assigned them;
b) gradual changes in the political reasons for intervention and the relative tasks assigned;
c) paucity of coordination among military commands;
d) insufficient exchange of information;
e) collapse of the support of the host country;
f) lack of clear political instructions.

Almost none of the critera listed above as being necessary for success has been respected. The same kind of reasoning can be extended to more recent cases, such as management of the Achille Lauro affair. The most evident deficiency is the practical impossibility to coordinate effectively out of area (the only exception being the multinational peace-keeping force in the Sinai). Despite attempts made up till now, coordination has escaped any precise regulation and has been almost exclusively left up to the goodwill and interests of the parties in question. Each country personally manages its own special intervention forces on the basis of different criteria, thus making operational integration difficult. On the other hand, in a common out of area action, there is a vital need to create a unified command structure able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. Efficiency of an operation also calls for a considerable degree of harmony among the various parts, constant and reliable communication adn the operational compatibility of the military forces in the field.

The role of governments and political factors in out of area actions.

Naturally, the problem of organizational coordination cannot be explained without referring to the political context which made it possible. Behind the practical problems implicit in an out of area action, there is the question of the political factors conditioning it.
These factors work at three levels:

A. National
B. Multilateral
C. Institutionalized international.

A. The national context. It is obvious that the will of a nation to take on a problem outside of the NATO area is required to give rise to an action. In a famous report on Western security (Western security: What has changed? What should be done?) mention is made of a "Principal National Approach", meaning that only those nations in a position to take on the political and military risk of a specific action can be taken into consideration. Past experience indicates that, at least for the Middle East, the main actors are the USA, the UK, France and Italy. It would be interesting to study what kind of role neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Greece and Spain can plan and to study the limits of the "rearguard" role assumed by the German Federal Republic which has sometimes (in the fight against terrorism) stepped into the forefront.

However, the fact that decisions concerning out of area matters are taken mainly in the national sphere points ot the difficulties that coordination of an action of this kind may encounter. Each government basis its policy on strictly national strategic and military security considerations and its reactions to external threats are dictated by defence of individual rather than common interests. This make both the means and the modalities of out of area intervention hardly comparable.

B.          The multilateral factor. Despite objective difficulties in surpassing the national level, there is a kind of conditioned reflex in favour of and some political convenience in undertaking certain actions in a multilateral context. This is true, above all, for operations with strong popular backing such as buffer forces or peace-keeping forces in crisis areas. Cooperation becomes more difficult in strictly military actions or in the case of incidents due to terrorist acts.

Nevertheless, even in the event of political consensus to pursue a common end, cooperation among countries can deteriorate. The principal factors determining the survival (or breaking-up) of consensus are the following:
- length in time of the operation. The longer it is, the more difficult cooperation becomes;
- stability of the causes requiring the action; if they change, the interests in collaboration vanishes;
- a constant cost/benefits ratio for each party concerned;
- achievement of a few concrete successes in terms of field operations.

Obviously, calculations relative to multilateral cooperation also depend on the sharing of some fundamental ideological values and the concrete possibility of agreeing on political strategies with regard to specific problems. But these factors generally play a role in the initial phases and are later overcome by the concrete effects of the action being carried out.

D.        The institutionalized international factor. The role of international institutions and agencies to which countries interested in the out of area action belong in decision-making is much more ambigious. NATO, lacking authority n the area, European Political Cooperation (EPC), lacking authority in the matter (politico-military and security) and the Western European Union (WEU), lacking any real power and means, are essentially additional political covers for out of area intervention.

        Nevertheless, they can, at least indirectly, be operationally involved in actions:

        - for NATO, the main problem is use of its bases for operations; subordinately it could hypothetically also offer information and communications support;
        - for the EPC, the main supportive instrument is constituted by common declarations; nevertheless, in the past, economic instruments have sometimes been resorted to (sanctions, for example) in support of actions independently carried out by an EEC member state.

        In general, therefore, the problem of political coordination of these three factors represents a conditioning factor for all out of area actions. Without it, integrated actions at a political-operational level among responsible nations is inconceivable.

        Let us take a close look at the problem of coordination in the Out of Area among Europeans, with reference to the already existing institutions.

## A future for WEU in the Out of Area?

        It seems therefore that the Europeans have only one alternative: either to move on a single basis, as France seems inclined to do, or to look for a European "cover" for multilateral, or even single-handed actions in peripheral zones.

        The first context that is usually taken into consideration is the WEU, given its competence in the military field. In theory, nothing seems to obstruct its direct involvement in out of area operations. In fact, Art. 8, par. 3 of the treaty modified in Brussels specifies that, upon the request of a member country, the Council can be immediately called to consult on any situation that might pose a peace threat, in whichever area that threat may arise. This is obviously the thesis of the WEU Assembly which, especially now that the restrictions on Germany have been dropped, believes that no clause is left that might prevent the Seven from moving freely outside their confines.

        This thesis, however, is a particularly weak one, for mainly political reasons. In fact, the WEU failed in its attempt at a relaunching and redefining of its tasks. It should not be forgotten, in fact, that the WEU was created to deal with internal problems (control of German rearmament) rather than to take on eminently external responsibilities. The attempted reform of the last two years has brought about neither a new definition of the aims of the WEU, nor a modification or substantial adaptation of its decision-making mechanisms. What is more, for traditional constitutional reasons, Germany does not accept military actions outside its own territory (except to conduct anti-terrorist actions or to send its own ships on "courtesy" visits to the Gulf area).

## European political cooperation and the Out of Area

What is more interesting, although objectively not less difficult, is the recourse to the EPC in order to solve problems regarding Europe's involvement in peripheral zones, and especially in the Mediterranean.

In these last years many attempts have been made to include the policy of European security in the EPC. Despite those efforts, all that has been obtained for the moment is a mention in various reports of the concept of political and economic security. Both in the 1981 London Report, which aimed at improving the EPC procedures, and in the solemn declaration at Stuttgart in 1983, and also more recently in the European Act approved by the European Council at Luxembourg in December 1985, mention is made of the need to deal at least with security aspects, leaving aside the military ones for the time being.

In the past, however, the EPC has dealt, albeit in a pragmatic way, with situations that had a direct link with security problems, as when it decided to support Great Britain during the first phase of the Falklands affair, or when it took economic sanctions against Iran during the imprisonment of the American diplomats. What must be determined now is to what extent the European Community is able to make use of the few instruments at its disposal. Obviously the natural vocation of present collaboration within the EPC is to deal with the political aspects of international crises. This is also due to the reluctance on the part of a few member countries, for various reasons, to adhere to actions that imply a recourse to "security" instruments, from sanctions to military tools.

Nevertheless, even just working out a common political declaration could be of great importance at the international level. The support and "blessing" given to the British, French, Italian and Dutch troups during their participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force was very important both in making it easier for the governments involved to reach a decision in that sense, and in distinguishing between European participation "as such" and that of the other countries. On the contrary, the lack of a similar "blessing" during the Italian, French and British intervention in Lebanon represented an objective element of weakness, highlighting the fact that the decision was taken by a single member country and was not the fruit of a solid and unanimous agreement between the Seven.

Despite this and given that a greater level of involvement on the part of the EPC in crisis management is unthinkable, the only practicable way is the intermediate one dictated by experience, i.e. to differentiate the role of the governments in the EPC's activities with relation to managing out of area crises. The ideas is to give groups of countries the concrete responsibility, from time to time, to intervene in determined situations and regions. What is more, Spain's entry into the EPC makes the definition of a overall policy towards the Mediterranean even more urgent and probably the constitution of a group of Communitarian countries which can agree on the line of action to be taken in eventual crises in the area even more necessary.

Thus, without creating a decision-making system at two or more speeds, one could think of modulating the participation of the member states on what is the qualifying factor of a foreign policy action: the use of direct instruments. There should therefore be two levels: a _political_ one which adopts the common positions within the EPC, on which _all_ the member countries could participate; and an _operative_ level, involving the use of economic, financial and military instruments (for the moment national but which could also be common in case the WEU's tasks were redefined) which would be used only by _some_

member states able to take on the responsibility of the action (whereas the others would be exempted).

The EPC would therefore act as a political cover for the action of a few states in sectors and areas that are particularly delicate for the Twelve's foreign policy. In this case there must be a precise communitarian <u>devolution</u> for those member states intending to take on the weight and responsibility of such initiatives. The EPC's political cover must also be total and "a priori" and, above all, continuous in time, demonstrating effective control over the actions carried out by some of its members.

Finally, it is necessary to think of a possible financial cover and of an "ad hoc" fund in order to support those initiatives (participation in peace corps; negotiations, etc.) to be shared by the entire Community. This financing should not directly regard the military operations conducted by the delegated member states but rather act parallelly through the use of common financial instruments and economic policies (food aid, finance for development, etc.). In this way this would give a stronger image of a desire on the part of the entire Community to sustain the direct actions undertaken by a few of its members.

In our modest opinion, only by following from the start, this gradualist, but global strategy can the conceptual and practical bases for direct responsibility of the Community in the field of defence be predetermined and, thereby contribute towards crisis management outside the area in a coordinated and effective way.