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MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES OF POLITICAL COOPERATION:
MORE THAN TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY?

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From the very beginning, in 1970, when the results of the task given by the Den Haag '69 Summit Meeting to the EC's foreign ministers (and by then to Viscount Davignon) were made known and the Six decided, with the agreement of the candidate countries, to create a new mechanism of coordination in the field of foreign policy, one of the questions which troubled political scientists had been regarding the nature of European Political Cooperation (EPC).

Subordinate to this first curiosity was also the open question of the effectiveness of the new political process and of its additional impact on the already existing European role in world affairs (1).

A first way of trying to give an answer to both questions was to analyse and judge the content and substance of EPC, measuring the results of common actions in world affairs in terms of credibility and importance for the solution of international problems. Methods used were mainly the careful interpretation of the texts of common declaration; the analysis of the European presence in various areas and events, the consideration of the enlargement of European interests in the world and, more generally, the study of the European capacity of speaking with one voice (2).

A second way was, on the contrary, more concerned with the analysis of the EPC decision-making process rather than with the substance. In this case, basic questions were the specificity, if any, of the new decisional structure in comparison with both the already-existing EC System and those of other international fora, its capacity to work together with the instruments and tools provided by the EC and, finally, the interrelations between national apparatus and policies and those offered at EPC level (3).

Before discussing this second way, some preliminary considerations are needed in order to clarify the theoretical and political framework in which EPC was generated and presently operates.

A first point concerns the ultimate aim of EPC. In all EPC reports and declarations, including those for example of the heads of government and state in Paris '72 and in Stuttgart '83, it is clearly stated that European cooperation in the foreign policy field is meant to contribute to the creation of the so-called European Union. The use of a political way, in addition to the existing cooperation in the economic field can - it is stated - usefully help to obtain the declared goal. The weakness of this reasoning is that the final goal, i.e. European Union, lacks a clear definition in terms of both content

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and, especially, structure and procedures. This indefinite goal, in effect, immediately undermines the feasibility and value of a strategy - in principle of a positive nature - which can be defined, as Lindberg did, of "political determinism" (4).

The second consideration is that the method used to reach European Union in the field of foreign policy has in itself evident elements of intergovernmentalism and its existence has constituted a challenge to the parallel decision-making process in the economic field, as the history of their difficult confrontation has shown. This competition, without having provided a clarification between the two traditional souls of Europeanism, has also contributed very little to the advancement of the process of European integration. It has certainly helped to enlarge Europe's range of activities, but has not increased its efficacy and credibility either inside or outside the Community's frontiers (5).

Finally, EPC is more the outcome of an experimental praxis than of a legal agreement among member states. This special "status", which had reversed the premises on which the Europeans had started their attempts towards continental integration - agreeing first on a Treaty and only successively on a policy - has given a high degree of flexibility to EPC. So that, from a very light initial "protocol" in 1970 establishing the minimum procedures needed, a step-by-step strategy has had, on the basis of experience, to adjust EPC decision-making mechanisms and procedures to political circumstances and agreed perceptions on the progress to be made in the common foreign policy field.

More than the EC decision-making structure, EPC represents a political process of a dynamic character, strictly bound, for that reason, to the precarious willingness of member states to proceed towards more advanced stages of integration. But, at the same time, it can be adapted - at least in principle - with a greater flexibility to the needs and goals of European integration, as has been shown in various occasions.

1. The growing complexity of EPC procedural system. Potentials and limits

Following the indications of praxis, EPC has added - like a Chinese box - to the very thin and limited initial procedures, a series of organs and rules with the clear aim of either spreading around the consensus-building process in the forming of a European foreign policy or of improving the capabilities of better answering the external challenges. This has lead, naturally, towards a more complex and sophisticated institutional mechanism, which has both increased the importance of EPC inside and outside the Community, and contributed to the definition of the "ad hoc" character of a method of cooperation that, at the very beginning, did not distinguish itself from the well-known loose intergovernmental coordination, typical of the greater part of International Organizations (and even more informal and less binding than that, for example, experimented in the NATO or UN frameworks).

The Three Successive Reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), plus some European Council declarations like that of Stuttgart in 1983 have been analysed in detail several times (6). We will therefore limit ourselves to a description of the main changes brought about and to the tendencies which have emerged in terms of procedures and decision-making mechanisms.

Among the most evident tendencies which have emerged inside EPC, one of the first regards the growing number of meetings both in the preparatory and the decisional phase. They have multiplied throughout the years and presently it has been calculated that the presidency-in-office has the task of providing for the organisation, during a semester, of about 60 to 80 meetings, from those already scheduled by rules, of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Political Committee, to the more frequent meetings of various working groups (7). In addition, one must add the frequent gatherings of the Ten's ambassadors, often together with the EC Commission's officials, in Third countries or at International Organizations and Conferences.

This natural growth of meeting and discussion activities has clearly implied a greater effort of coordination and a better elaboration of the information. The recourse to technical help, a network of telexes (called Coreu), and a growing propensity to intensify the exchange of information in all possible seats, including those external to the Community, have partially matched this need and filled up the absence of a stable center of coordination and diffusion of information.

As we will see later on, the growth in the number of meetings to be organized and the connected need of a more sophisticated treatment of the information, have placed a greater weight on the member country who has the task of chairing the EPC semester. This has created several problems for the smallest countries and those lacking sufficient and burocratic technical resources.

To face successfully both the multiplication of meetings and the enlargement of the fields of interest and actions of the Ten in world affairs, a great, positive contribution came from the working groups, definitely recognised in the II Report on EPC. Their activity has allowed to deal with certain issues in a more homogeneous and lasting way than would have been requested by the contingent interest. Following this line, in 1983, under the German Presidency, it was decided to set up a kind of planning group with two main tasks. The first, as the name indicates, is to project in the long run the elaboration of certain topical interests of the Ten. The second, to deal unofficially with matters outside the present EPC competence like, for example, the security problems even if limited to the political and economic aspects. This has been in fact to touch on subjects, which usually are still "out of bound" at other EPC levels.

A second important innovation has affected the dynamic process which marks EPC: a progressive evolution of the role of old and new actors in the decision-making system. Apart from the greater frequency of the ministerial and political committee's meetings, some organs, like the Group of Correspondants and the European Council, have played an increasingly important role in improving the internal EPC procedures and extending the consensus-building function.

As far as the organizational aspects of the EPC works is concerned, the body which can be considered to have most contributed to their improvement is the Group of Correspondants, composed of national officials, who permanently follow EPC business from their own Foreign Affairs Ministries. They are not only responsible for the management of the Coreu network, but also help to

coordinate EPC activities both at a European level and at a national one, between various sections of Foreign Affairs Ministries. It is around the figure of the correspondent, often a young functionary of a not high bureaucratic rank, that the whole information and elaboration of decisions activity rotates. This special figure is also the one which best underlines the flexibility and peculiar character of the EPC decision-making structure; paradoxically, its presence has proved to be one of the major obstacles in the setting up of a permanent secretariat, with the inherent risk of a further bureaucratisation of a mechanism which wants to maintain its light profile.

The creation of the European Council at the end of 1974 has produced a rather different effect on EPC. The fact that some declarations and EPC policies have received the "imprimatur" of the agreement of the Heads of Government and State has clearly contributed towards upgrading the importance and the international echoes of European initiatives; the most well known example is that of the Venice Declaration of 1980 on the Middle East, a declaration which even today, plays a more or less important role in the international relations of the Ten. Nevertheless, as it has partially happened in the parallel EC structure, the presence of the European Council has raised two kinds of problems.

First, the elaboration of EPC common positions has objectively become more complex, mainly for the reason that Heads of Government want to maintain for themselves a certain freedom of judgement until the day of their meeting.

Secondly, also in the EPC context the same kind of phenomenon has appeared which falls under the name of "deresponsabilization" of the role of foreign affairs ministers, who on the most crucial issues, show a certain tendency to leave to their more important political colleagues the task of reaching an agreement. This has sometimes delayed or even paralyzed the possibility of reaching a common position.

In addition to that, there is also a kind of psychological factor which should be taken into consideration. EPC is considered by the Heads of Government (especially by some of them) a typical intergovernmental machinery, so that they want to maintain in this sector that margin of informality and confidentiality which is objectively more difficult to follow in the communitarian field, where rules are more complex and rigid. It has so happened that since the European Council of Stuttgart of 1983 the Heads of governments have failed to approve any common declaration, due particularly to the French President Mitterrand's refusal to prepare those declarations in advance. Therefore, the preparatory work done by the Political Committee and by Foreign Ministers has proved useless, due to the Heads of Government preference to exchange point of views and information instead of adopting common declarations (2).

The growing complexity of EPC machinery and its intergovernmental character have shown the need to attribute an increasingly central role to the Presidency-in-office. In fact, the vital rule for functioning in an acceptable way for a decision-making structure deprived of a well established bureaucratic base is that of individuating a center capable of assuring the coordination of its activity and the impulse for new initiatives.

There is also another element which can contribute, paradoxically, towards the reinforcement of the role of the Presidency: the absence of an EPC common budget. This leaves each member state, depending on its financial capacity, the decision on how to utilize its semester of EPC presidency, giving more or less emphasis to the management of common affairs during its term.

More generally, if on the one hand it can be said that the reinforcement of EPC Presidency reflects a tendency towards a "summitry" decision-making system, common both in the European Community (with, for example, the creation of the European Council) and in other international contexts (the Summits of the Seven, etc.), on the other hand it has, for the above mentioned reasons, a more accentuated character. The central role played by the Presidency, being a typical outcome of the praxis, has been gradually fixed in various documents: in the 1975 Paris Summit conclusions, in the London Report of 1981 (with particular reference to the tasks of external representation) and in the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983 (9).

In the London Report, particularly, it was decided to create a new procedure of fundamental importance for the life of EPC and for the reinforcement of the Presidency: the so-called Troika system which links the previous and succeeding Presidency to that-in-office has tried to solve two different problems. First, to permit a better coordination of the Ten's activities; second, to give a certain character of continuity and homogeneity to an EPC initiative when moving from one Presidency to another.

The Presidency, then, plays an extremely important role, implementing several tasks and functions. It fixes the issues to be put on the agenda; tries to coordinate various initiatives; gives impulse to new ones; controls the respect of the "acquis politique"; contributes to the final drafting of common declarations; finally and most important, it plays the role of mediator among governments and fills up the crucial consensus building function.

This last function is probably the most difficult and time-consuming to carry out: it implies a great bargaining attitude and a strong effort both in terms of time and money, due to frequent travel of bureaucratic and political representatives to the capitals which put obstacles on the way of an agreement.

Parallel to those of the Presidency is the strengthening of the instruments of "external representation" of EPC. This "external" projection, which also represents the European attempt to extend the consultation procedure towards Third Countries, is the consequence of an already well-established capacity of reaching common positions inside EPC beforehand. In fact, an improved role of EPC in Third Countries and in international organizations can be analysed under two different points of view. On the one side it regards the procedures and mechanisms which allow the Ten to reach homogeneous positions among themselves, on the other side it deals with the Ten's capacity to extend the agreements also towards the Third Countries. Both functions have been satisfactory accomplished by EPC, in that it contributes to the spreading of a more concrete image of Europe in the world (10).

Typical, under this point of view, have been the good initial results of the European participation in the CSCE, where some rather effective techniques of consultation among Europeans and with other Western Countries had been

experimented: they had given a rather good example to be followed for other similar initiatives. At the same time, Europeans have reached a good degree of cohesion at the UN (even though, for some years, statistics on voting behaviour do not give signs of further improvement). But, more than that, what really has improved its functioning is the network of coordination and exchange of information among European embassies in Third Countries, often, where it exists, with the contribution of the Commission's representative. The high importance of this external activity has been recognized by the II EPC Report, which has stressed the extension of the role of the Ten's embassies.

The second function, concerning the consultation procedure with Third Countries, has also developed considerably. Besides ad hoc contacts that every President-in-office has with Third Countries wishing to get in touch with the EPC, especially during the period and in the capital of the country of the presidency, a whole network of institutionalized contacts has been established, both with groups of countries inside and outside of international organizations and conferences and with individual Third Countries. Among the latter are the United States (with its "Gymnich Formula" procedure), Norway (which, after having decided against entry into the EC, has gone out of its way to keep close ties), Japan and other countries.

From this point of view, the economic and commercial agreements negotiated by the EC form a good framework and are of great assistance in establishing institutionalized relations between the EPC and Third Countries (such as the EC-Asean agreements or those with the Andean Group). In general, it can be said that the formalizing of relations between the EPC and Third Countries is one of the most important and least known novelties in recent years and without a doubt constitutes a positive element in the affirmation of Europe's role in the world.

Throughout the years, relations with Community institutions have also been refined (11). Much has been said and written about the improvement of relations between two decision-making bodies that were competitive in the beginning. Later we shall come back to the problem of the effectiveness of measures mutually agreed upon by the two European structures. Here, it suffices to point out some fundamental tendencies in terms of improvement and consultation procedures between the EPC and the EC. The first, obviously deals with an improvement in relations with the Commission which have, from the very start, and mainly due to political and symbolic reasons, constituted the point of greatest friction between the two systems. In this case, the role played by routine procedure was of decisive importance. The Commission's ability to contribute, by means of its services and its independent information network to the achievement of common positions in the EPC field has been an extremely important element from the very beginning. Proof of this collaboration within the CSCE and, more generally, the advantage of being able to evaluate the economic results of a foreign policy decision have, throughout the years, helped to eliminate ideological and political differences between the EPC and the Commission. In fact, in the London Report, the small margin of discretionary power that still existed, giving the president-in-office the right to decide whether or not the Commission may participate in certain EPC activities, was done away with. The Commission's participation in the European Council and at the tables of the Seven Summits, without the former rigid distinction between political and economic discussion, that characterized the first times, also contributed to solving this problem.

The second point concerns relations between the EPC and the European Parliament. Here, too, contacts between the bodies of the EPC and the Assembly in Strasbourg have travelled along the same lines, expanding and developing. It is now practice that the European Council's president-in-office reports on the results of the meetings of the Heads of Government (therefore including possible decisions in the EPC field) to the EP, that the EPC reports to that of the European Parliament, that foreign ministers present annual reports on the EPC and respond to questions in parliament. Nevertheless, the powers of the European Parliament are limited to consultation and it is difficult to imagine that they can go beyond that.

What is, perhaps, more interesting to note, is that the EP plays an ever greater role in foreign affairs using all instruments at its disposal and often preparing the ground for future EPC actions. Relations with the parliaments of Third Countries or groups of Third Countries (such as those with Latin America which, after the Falkland crisis, reopened communication channels between Europe and Latin America), invitations to foreign leaders to speak at Strasbourg (the memory of Sadat is still very much alive) and the tendency to approve resolutions regarding all major international political events (such as the support given to deployment of Euromissiles) are all factors which put pressure on the EPC to orient its choices and actions. More than any weak institutional links, this is probably the greatest novelty concerning EP and EPC relations.

Another line of development of the EPC regards crisis management. Given the slowness of European reactions to international crises (just think of the time it took for the Nine to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and in order to be able to respond more promptly to Third Countries' requests for more immediate expression of a European opinion on important political events (such as, for example, the political crisis in South Africa), a regulation has been introduced in EPC procedure making it possible to have EPC bodies and foreign ministers to meet within 48 hours.

At the insistence of the British, this procedure was set down in the London Report in 1981. Strangely enough, only a few months later, the new rule was used to England's advantage at the beginning of the Falkland conflict. This has also played a part in enhancing Europeans' image abroad and spurring EPC decisional mechanisms to function beyond the normal routine.

Besides these positive effects, however, crisis management mechanisms have two important drawbacks in common with the rest of EPC procedure. The first is that the only result of a crisis management consultation can be a common declaration in as little time as possible. The second, related to the first, is that "management" lacks traditional instruments of persuasion, both military and for direct intervention. The term "management" is, therefore, excessive and does not reflect Europe's almost total impotence in the face of crisis events.

2. Relations between different decision-making systems: the Falkland case

The question of traditional crisis management instruments leads us to another matter of vital importance for determination of the nature and the

effectiveness of the EPC: its ability and potential to become integrated and work together with other institutional systems. The most obvious example is that of relations between the EPC and the EC in management of international affairs, but in the future other examples could be, for example, the relations between the EPC and the WEU if and when security problems become so important for Europeans that they demand some form of cooperation with the WEU or other European defence organizations (Eurogroup or IEPG). Since the latter are only possible future projects at the moment, here analysis will be limited to the potential for interpenetration between the EPC and the EC.

We have already mentioned the difficulties and mistrust involved in having officials from the two structures work together. Nevertheless, once this theological-political standstill was overcome, the problem of closer cooperation between the two systems was dealt with quite concretely. There are now numerous cases of cooperation in which EC procedures have functioned as a support to EPC procedures, from aid to Poland to sanctions against the Soviet Union, Iran and against Argentina during the Falkland crisis.

The latter is the most illuminating with regard to both economic instruments to use in support of political actions and the validity of cooperation among different methods of integration.

In the first place, during the sudden and unexpected Falkland incident on April 1, 1982, the crisis management procedure worked perfectly. On the day after the Argentinian invasion, the Political Committee was already gathered to work out a common condemnation of the act and to prepare for the foreign ministers' meeting a few hours later. Political support of a member state hit by crisis was unanimous and complete (at least in the first days). Initiatives succeeded each other rapidly and necessary information was quickly communicated. The Belgian president at the time, moved very effectively and carried out the job of consensus-building very well.

In fact, the first measure adopted, the arms embargo on Argentina, was the upshot of a proposal by the president and was taken on a national multilateral basis, the only context in which such an action could be taken. All member states agreed to this proposal.

Another remarkable element was European cohesion at the United Nations and towards Third Countries (especially Latin America and the United States) directly interested in one way or another in the conflict. European embassies reacted in a rather compact way and asserted the European position as opposed to that of Argentinian policy. At the United Nations, European countries voted together in the Security Council.

The most important fact, however, was the EC Council's decision to adopt economic sanctions on the basis of Art. 113 of the Treaty (although there was, at Denmark's urging, indirect reference to Art. 224). The Commission played a decisive role, in that it convinced European countries to adopt a common procedure on the basis of Art. 113, to make the sanctions more rapid and politically significant, rather than resort to Art. 224 which made adoption of identical measures a national responsibility. Use of a common economic instrument for exertion of concrete pressure following a political declaration enhanced the EPC's image and effectiveness.

The role of the European Parliament was interesting. Since the measures adopted were of a common character (recourse to Art. 113) having to do with common commercial policy, the EP was entitled to express its opinion. But besides that, it also gave strong political backing to the decision of the Council of Ministers with a large vote in favour of sanctions, thus partially facilitating, at least at first, explanation of the measures adopted to national parliaments and public opinion. Even after Italy and Ireland withdrew from the common action, the EP continued to back the majority position in order to continue with the sanctions (even if then on the basis of Art. 224).

Finally, it can be argued that the EPC dealt with and publicly supported measures having to do with collective security policy, in an area which, moreover, was really beyond the competence of military alliances. Even if this does not mean that security policy falls into the EPC's province, there is no doubt that at least on this occasion it was discussed.

In conclusion, this case-study confirms the importance of coordinating EPC and EC activity. This can allow the EPC to cross the threshold of common declarations and provide the means of intervention which the EC is lacking. Thus, it is possible to use articles from the Rome Treaty in support of EPC policies. This has led to a more effective relation between Community institutions and the EPC and has opened the way to a more extensive use of the articles of the Rome Treaty by the EPC. It has led to the prospect of using not only commercial clauses, but also association agreements and financial policy in the Third World for common foreign policy. Even if the link is, as yet, shaky, the potential is doubtlessly there (12).

3. The effects on and interactions with national decision-making apparatus

As we have seen, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between the confines of the EPC and national foreign policy structures. The two blend into and integrate one another. Nevertheless, the birth of the EPC has partially changed the manner of politics in individual national ministries and has given a different balance to internal organizational structures (13). To prove this, should there be the need, it is enough to look at the internal changes to their Foreign Affairs Ministries' structures being carried out in Spain and Portugal so as to be able to participate more effectively in EPC activity.

To a greater or lesser degree, national ministries have had to adapt to the EPC. For example, it is obvious that the creation of the EPC has been positive, in terms of political equilibrium, for the Directorate General for Political Affairs, partially shifting the focus by the Economic Directorates responsible for Community affairs.

But the most important change has been created by the presence of Correspondants. They and the information system via telex have become an important reference point for other offices working in the same field and territories. For example, to know whether there already is a European stance regarding a certain event or whether certain institutional or ad hoc channels of the EPC exist in a Third Country can greatly facilitate the work of the Foreign Ministry's national offices. Not only that, but information acquired at a political or official level concerning a subject of interest to the EPC is

normally transmitted to European colleagues, thus developing and spreading both inside individual foreign ministries and among them, the function of coordination - reflex which is the most solid basis for EPC's activity. At the same time, the fixing of common positions is often used by national politicians and bureaucrats to back their own foreign policy, often with more benefits and less risks of being isolated in case of crisis. This is the so-called coverage function which comes to the fore each time Europeans take on a common commitment within the EPC.

On the basis of these considerations, the EPC today constitutes a large portion of national foreign policy and in turn, the results of national actions inevitably end up having an impact on the meaning and validity of certain common declarations. This is not without risks because of the fact that the *acquis politique* does not have that clear predominance over national policies typical of Community legislation. At the best of times, this relationship in the EPC is balanced, with the predominance of common over national positions and viceversa, depending on political circumstances.

4. Tendencies of the EPC in the light of results obtained and weaknesses emerged

Analysis of the decision-making procedures and mechanisms of the EPC leads to some conclusive remarks about the nature of this method of cooperation among Europeans.

It is evident that the decision-making system is rather sophisticated even if only slightly bureaucratized. This gives it the ability to adapt relatively easily to the needs of the moment and to live alongside other decisional structures, such as those of the Community which, if well used, can strengthen its role. This flexibility and adaptability depends however, to a large extent, on the consensus of member states. Therefore, the main function permitting the working of the EPC is construction of consensus whenever necessary. This leads to some obvious considerations:

- a) consensus can be withdrawn at any time;
- b) consensus can be obtained more easily on the basis of declarations than of actions, due to the lack of common instruments;
- c) consensus does not have a binding effect on national policies.

This leads us to believe that in the absence of clearer and more binding procedures for construction of consensus, organizational improvements of the EPC are possible but cannot change the essence of the problem which is that of making the decision-making process binding and giving it pre-eminence over the national process.

In this light, entry into the Community of Spain and Portugal is not going to have a very significant effect on the modality of EPC decision-making processes, in one way or another. That is, while EPC substantial policies could be considerably affected by the entry of the two countries, procedures will not be greatly impacted. At the most, there will be a growing tendency to look for agreement among smaller number and more homogeneous groups of countries, leaving to the EPC the task of solving secondary problems or adapt itself, later, to policies decided upon multilaterally by groups of nations.

From this perspective, equally, the proposal which yet another time emerged on the eve of the meeting of the European Council in Milan in June 1985 to create a light secretariat will not substantially change the EPC's present operating capabilities. It may slightly improve organization of work, but not its overall effect on national foreign policies or on Community policies. A secretariat, seen as a driving and coordinating center, can only have meaning as part of a whole institutional plan giving the EPC those characteristics mentioned above that can transform it into a decision-making system capable of producing European foreign policy.

A qualitative jump of this kind is unlikely in the near future. Experience to date, however, allows us to contemplate an intermediate solution, and that is, the differentiation of the roles of governments in EPC activity. Without setting up a multi-speed system, the participation of the member states could be modulated at the stage of action (the most qualifying factor of any foreign policy): that is the use of common instruments. Thus, two levels are called for: a political level for adoption of common policies within the EPC with the participation of all member states and an operational level, using economic and financial instruments (those of the EC included) and even military means which for now would be national, in view of a revitalization of the WEU or other defence agencies. These tools would be used only by the member states able to shoulder responsibilities for actions taken (while the others would be exonerated). Thus, the EPC would function as a political cover for the actions of some member states in particularly delicate areas of European foreign policy (Middle East, South Africa, etc.), with the EPC maintaining continuous political control of all such actions. A dream? An answer, albeit not explicit, has already been provided a number of times by reality. This occurred, for example, in the Sinai and in Lebanon when a number of European countries intervened under the partial cover of the EPC. Procedures should be generalized and political control extended, but the road is paved.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) David Allen and William Wallace, "Political Cooperation: procedure as a substitute for policy", in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), Policy-making in the European Community, Wiley, West Sussex, England, 1983, second edition.
- 2) Basic references are: Philippe de Schoutheete, La Coopération Politique Européenne, Labor, Bruxelles, 1980 and D. Allen, R. Rummel, W. Wessels (eds.), European Political Cooperation, Butterworth, London, 1982.
- 3) These points are also analysed in an essay of Philippe de Schoutheete, "External Relations of European Political Cooperation", in E.U.I. Working Paper, No. 85/172, Florence, May 1985.
- 4) For this concept see the classical book of L. M. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, Patterns of Change in the European Community, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, page 4.
- 5) See Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, Croom Helm, London, 1983.

- 6) A short essential bibliography on EPC is included in the preparatory introduction to the Bonn Conference 15/16 November 1985, for which this paper has been produced.
- 7) Hellen Wallace, "The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Council: Tasks and Evolution" in Colm O Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers, Crook and Helm, London, 1984.
- 8) On the role of European Council and EPC, see G. Borvicini and E. Regelsberger, "The Organisational and Political Implications of the Establishment of the European Council on both EC and EPC Decision-Making", Paper presented at the EIPA Annual Conference, Erestein Castle, 1984.
- 9) H. Wallace, "The Presidency...", op. cit.
- 10) See Ilfriede Regelsberger, "European Political Cooperation Contacts with Third Countries: Past and Present", in E.U.I. Working Paper, No. 85/172, Florence, May 1985.
- 11) As far as the institutional relations between EC and EPC system are concerned, see G. Borvicini, "The Dual Structure of EPC and Community Activities: Problems of Coordination", in Allen, Rummel, Wessels, European Political Cooperation, op. cit.
- 12) See Simon Nuttall, "The Future of External Relations of EPC", in E.U.I. Working Paper, No. 85/172, Florence, May 1985.
- 13) See Christopher Hill, National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, Allen and Unwin, London, 1983.

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