

STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF TURKEY-EC RELATIONS

by

Maurizio Cremasco

Rome, 13 March 1984  
Doc. IAI/09/84

DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

### Introduction

An analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community presents special methodological and substantive difficulties.

The European Community as an institution has no duty or responsibility to confront and deal with defense and security problems.

The organization through which the European countries handle defense-related issues - strategy and tactics, doctrine and operational use of force, technical and logistical integration and standardization of armaments - is the Atlantic Alliance, of which Turkey has been a member since 1952.

Not all the European countries which are members of the Atlantic Alliance are members of the European Community. Nor is the United States, which nevertheless plays a decisive role in Turkey's security.

Notwithstanding the initiatives, proposals and indications that certain member countries are more aware of and willing to tackle the problem - the Colombo-Genscher document is a prime example - as things stand today the prospect of extending the Community's sphere of competences to include foreign policy and defense issues appears rather unrealistic and hardly realizable in the near or medium term. It is therefore difficult - and one might say incorrect - to link Europe's security problems to the political and economic issues connected with an enlargement of the Community.

But the case of Turkey is emblematic of how it is just as difficult to draw a sharp line between the two series of problems because of the complexity of the interrelations and interactions which exist between political, economic and security factors.

The Turkish case is also emblematic for a number of other reasons too: the country's geographical position; its importance for the defense of NATO's southeastern flank and the Mediterranean theater in general; its political, social and economic situation; and the important place held by Europe in the context of Turkey's foreign policy.

Over the past twenty years the often dramatic evolution of Turkey's socio-political situation, the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises, the international events in the Middle East and southeast Asia have gradually prompted Turkey to review and redefine the basic parameters of its foreign policy. The revival of Islamism, which has deep roots in the country, and Turkey's heavy dependence on external sources of energy have lent new significance and new impulse to relations with the Arab world. A measure of

disillusionment in its relations with the United States has given rise to a more articulate and diversified policy toward the Eastern bloc, though one still conditioned by the awareness, sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that the Soviet Union remains the highest potential risk factor in the Turkish security picture. The new international and internal picture has raised questions as to whether it is opportune to continue to pursue the traditional path of Westernization and as to the feasibility of a more "nationalistic" policy with a mainly regional projection and objectives.

In many respects the issue of the Community's enlargement, especially after the accession of Greece, has become for Turkey a crucial test of the validity of its ties with the West, a touchstone of the effective willingness of the European countries to consider and accept Turkey, without reservations, as a truly "European" country.

It is in this context that the security and defense issues enter into play: in the context of Turkey's perceptions of the importance of its political and economic ties with Europe in relation to its national security, and the Europeans' reciprocal perceptions. Hence, as a factor that will ultimately influence, directly or indirectly, choices whose context is basically political and economic.

This analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community is therefore addressed to answering two closely interrelated questions. If, how and to what extent Turkey's succession to the EEC might affect relations between Ankara and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance? If, how, and to what extent the EEC membership issue, when not resolved in terms acceptable to the Turkish government and public opinion, might prompt Turkey to redefine, loosen or break its NATO ties, thus opening a dangerous gap in the fabric of European security and consequently in its defense capabilities?

Obviously, the problem is not exclusively military. It is not only a matter of assessing the strategic and tactical advantages of having Turkey as a member of NATO in the event of an East-West conflict as opposed to the disadvantages of a neutral or pro-Soviet Turkey (if the latter is a sustainable hypothesis). Nor is it simply a question of evaluating the military role Turkey might play in extra-NATO crises in which vital European interests are threatened.

The political dimension of security is just as important in international situations in which, although a military confrontation between the two superpowers may seem improbable, the preservation of the stability of the

regional balance has become essential for the maintenance of peace.

It is therefore clear that an estrangement of Turkey from the European context, even if Ankara maintained those ties with the United States or NATO that it considered indispensable, would inevitably, even if only in the long run, have negative repercussions on European security.

It is from this dual perspective, military and political, that I will attempt to respond to the questions posed above.

This paper is divided into three chapters. In the first, Turkey's relevance with respect to European security is examined, in particular from the geostrategic viewpoint. Its importance is considered not only in relation to the traditional scenarios of NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, but also as an element of European security in the event of extra-NATO crises. I also analyze how the European countries perceive and to what extent they appreciate Turkey's strategic importance; whether or not they think strategic considerations should bear on relations between Turkey and the European Community; in what way and to what extent the Europeans' evaluation of Turkey's importance to their security is made evident politically or militarily.

In the second chapter I analyze how Turkey perceives and assesses its security problems and the military threats it may have to face; how Turkey perceives the European contribution to the resolution of these problems; if Turkey feels that its membership in NATO is an adequate and sufficient response to its security requirements, its perception of a specifically European contribution in the form of a security guarantee or assistance in strengthening its military capabilities; and, finally, if and how Turkey tends to link its relations with the Community in this role.

In the third chapter, on the basis of the analyses conducted in the preceding two chapters, I attempt to identify the eventual points of convergence of Turkish and European perceptions and requirements and assess to what extent these eventual points of convergence might affect the European attitude in negotiations and their final decision on Ankara's entry into the European Community.

Furthermore, on the basis of the points of convergence identified, I suggest some measures that could be taken either individually or in a coordinated effort by the European countries and Turkey- especially if the Community's decision does not fully satisfy Turkey's expectations - to strengthen Ankara's ties with Europe and enhance Turkey security and, consequently, the security not only of Europe's southern flank but also of the regions

whose crises would inevitably affect stability in the Mediterranean area.

## Chapter I

### European Perceptions

Geographically, Turkey is only partly a European country. Its political and military position as a "European" country is, however, decisive for West European security.

Europe and Asia are sutured on its territory, making Turkey a concrete link between the two continents. The country is also at the center of the intersection between the East-West and the North-South arteries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas. Finally, Turkey serves as a barrier which hinders Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a characteristic which is enhanced by the fact that Turkey controls the Straits which are the only outlet to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Union's Black Sea naval forces.

Over the past fifteen years a number of political and military developments have increased the importance of Turkey's function as a "barrier" and a "bridge".

a) The increased activism of Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East. This became evident in the late '60s and early '70s with the Soviet Union's direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its defense of Egyptian territory, which included the deployment of its own military forces in the area. (1)

Successively, after President Sadat's dramatic political turnabout, the expulsion of all Soviet military personnel in August 1972 and the abrogation of both the 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty and the agreement by which Soviet vessels operating in the Mediterranean were allowed to use the infrastructure of Egyptian ports, the Soviets directed their efforts to the consolidation of relations with Syria. Military aid was intensified immediately after the Yom Kippur War and political ties were strengthened with the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty in October 1980. The prime objective of the treaty, apart from implicitly guaranteeing Syrian security, seemed to be to reiterate the Soviet Union's unflagging interest in the Middle East situation and its determination to become once again a central figure in the region's difficult and complex political and diplomatic game. Military cooperation between the two countries was deepened, culminating in July 1981 with joint naval

manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean and Soviet-Syrian amphibious landing operations on the Syrian coasts. (2)

b) The quantitative build-up and the qualitative strengthening of the Soviet fleet operating in the Mediterranean. (3) The fleet grew from 1800 ship-days in 1981 with an average presence of 46 units. In terms of quality, Moskva-class helicopter carriers have been added to the Mediterranean fleet and, since 1976, the typical composition of the Soviet fleet has occasionally been reinforced by the presence of a Kiev-class aircraft carrier.

In addition, Backfire bombers assigned to the Naval Air Force and armed with air-to-surface missiles have been deployed at the Soviet air bases in the Crimean and southeastern Russia.

c) The "special" relationship the Soviet Union has established with Libya, to which it has supplied and continues to supply a mass of armaments that is superior in quantity and sophistication to the country's real defense needs and to the Libyan armed forces' effective capacity to use them or maintain them technically and logistically without external assistance.

A peculiar feature of the Soviet-Libyan relationship is that, despite Libya's close military ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and notwithstanding Qadhafi's outspoken and violent anti-Americanism, Libya cannot be considered an unequivocally pro-Soviet country. Just as Qadhafi's anti-Americanism has not prevented him from continuing to utilize US oil technicians, his pro-Soviet attitude has not yet induced him to let Moscow establish military bases on Libyan territory.

Nonetheless, the enormous quantity of Soviet weapons systems in the Libyan arsenal and the political constraints this could generate (though mitigated somewhat by the policy of diversification of the sources of military supplies which Tripoli began to implement some years ago), coupled with the substantially anti-Western and "revolutionary" (and hence potentially highly destabilizing) policy that Qadhafi seems determined to pursue in the Mediterranean area and Africa, has induced many observers to consider the Libyan-Soviet links a potential threat to European security.

d) The Soviet Union's increasingly evident tendency to intervene in the regional crises of the African continent, supplying considerable military aid, sending advisers and instructors, and deploying the "Cuban legion" (Angola 1975, Horn of Africa 1977).

e) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The operation was significant not only as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's military capabilities but also because it raised

disturbing questions as to the expansionist tendencies of Moscow's foreign policy and because, by polarising in an East-West sense the volatile situation in southwest Asia, it inserted new elements of instability into the Mediterranean strategic equation - which is now more than ever closely linked to that of the Persian Gulf.

The "barrier" function of Turkey's geographical position with respect to the eventual lines of Soviet political and military expansion toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East can be better appreciated if considered in the light of two particular circumstances: as a direct air route from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and African countries, and as the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

In the past, the Soviet Union has flown transport aircraft through Turkish airspace. This occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict when the Soviet Union organized an airlift of arms and spare parts to Egypt and Syria, and again in 1975 during the Angolan crisis with the airlifting of military equipment to the MPMLA forces.

What could be significant, however, are the possible consequences of Turkey's refusal to grant overflight rights to the Soviet Union.

In the two cases cited, it would have been politically impossible for Turkey to deny overflight permission to the Soviet Union, since among other things, the airlift was effected using Aeroflot rather than military cargo planes. But the Soviet Union has no automatic rights nor particular privileges. And there might be cases in which Turkey, for evident reasons of security - the only motives that could justify such an initiative - could decide to deny or delay the authorizations or could impose certain restrictions (regarding the number of flights, the type of aircraft, the norms for applying for permission or the flight procedures) in such a way as to reduce the operational flexibility of Soviet transport operations. Moscow would then be confronted with the alternative of accepting the situation, with the attendant political and military constraints, or running the risks involved in attempting to force Turkey to bow to its wishes.

True, it is difficult to imagine a Turkish-Soviet confrontation over the USSR's right to transit through Turkish airspace if not in defense of interests which Ankara considers vital. And it is just as true that such a threat is imaginable only if the Soviet Union were to attempt to supply arms and military equipment to a country in conflict with Turkey.

Nonetheless, Turkish airspace is not unrestrictedly open to Soviet cargo planes. This fact alone, without

considering further restrictions - however hypothetical - which could be imposed, reduces the Soviet Union's strategic transport freedom in the event of an international crisis and consequently enhances, even if indirectly, the European countries' security. This advantage is available, however, only if Turkey remains strongly tied to the West. The filtering function of Turkish airspace would be extremely important to operations in the Mediterranean theater in the event of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In fact, the most dangerous threat, above all to naval operations in the Mediterranean and especially in its eastern basin, comes from the Backfire bombers of the Soviet Naval Air Force. The Backfire, a medium bomber with advanced operational characteristics, (4) can cover the entire Mediterranean sea and the territory of the countries of NATO's southern flank.

Turkey's air defense system could perform two important missions. The first is an early warning mission: that is radar detection and control, with "cross-tell" tracking of approaching aircraft in coordination with the radar centers of the allied countries' NADGE systems and naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. In particular, the cross-tell could be effected in tandem with the NATO AWACS planes and with the E-2C Hawkeye surveillance planes of the US Sixth Fleet. The importance of early warning in supplying the essential data of an imminent attack - magnitude and nature of the threat, flight course and speed of the planes - is obvious.

The second is an interception mission, aimed at harassing or neutralizing Soviet aircraft flying over Turkey toward the Mediterranean. However, for these missions to be carried out effectively, Turkish air defenses would have to be improved significantly.

A similar, but strategically more important filtering function is played by the Turkish Straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, with respect to maritime traffic. The Turkish Straits are the only passageway available to Soviet naval forces and merchant ships travelling from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Transit through the Straits is under Turkish control and is regulated by the Montreux Convention of 1936. In the 1940s the Soviets explicitly applied pressure to have the Straits regime modified. In June 1945 Moscow proposed that Turkey allow it to establish military bases along the Straits. At the Potsdam and Yalta conference, Stalin tried to convince the allies that a revision of the Montreux Convention was necessary. Throughout 1946 the Soviet Union insistently proposed that Turkey conclude an agreement for joint control and defense of the Straits.



The Montreux Convention provides for the transit of warships through the Straits in peacetime, but sets precise conditions regarding the prior notification of passage, the number of transits allowed over a given period of time, the type of ships and the transit procedure. Turkey thus evidently has the capacity to keep a check on navigation through the Straits and, just as evidently, has the legal right to impose respect of the provisions of the Montreux Convention, including Articles 20 and 21, which stipulate that in the event of imminent danger of war the transit of military naval units is left to the complete discretion of the Turkish government. (5)

There therefore exist precise constraints at the "technical" level which to a certain extent penalize the transit of Soviet warships through the Straits. The Soviet Union is fully aware of this, just as it is conscious of what it would mean in strategic terms if the Straits were totally closed or even if the more restrictive limitations were imposed in such a way as to adversely affect the operability of its Mediterranean naval forces.

These constraints are particularly binding because all the units of the Fifth Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean (except for the submarines from the North Sea Fleet) come from the Black Sea Fleet and depend mainly on the Black Sea bases for technical and logistic support.

In addition, Turkey, and hence NATO, can check the flow of warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in peacetime, and thus remain continuously informed (by adding this information to that supplied by the Gibraltar NATO Command on the entry and exit of Soviet vessels) on the number and type of ships of the Soviet Fleet operating in the Mediterranean. In wartime, the closure of the Straits would isolate the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean from its Black Sea bases, depriving it of all support - unless the Soviets were allowed to use the ports of North African littoral countries - thus reducing it to what is sometimes defined as a "one-spot Navy".

The Soviet Union has nonetheless demonstrated that, in the event of extra-NATO-Warsaw Pact crises, it is capable of rapidly increasing its fleet in the Mediterranean without violating the norms and procedures set down in the Montreux Convention. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean increased from about 47 ships at the beginning of October (6) to 80 units, including 26 warships and 16 submarines, by October 24, and to 96 units including 34 warships and 23 submarines, by October 31. (7)

Moreover, there exist clear political constraints which condition Turkey's response to the Soviet Union's requests. In 1976 the Turkish government accepted the

Soviet definition of the Kiev aircraft carrier built in the Black Sea shipyards as an antisubmarine cruiser and allowed it to pass through the Straits even though aircraft carriers are not included among the "capital ships" listed in Annex II of the Montreux Convention. D.B. Sezer correctly pointed out that this is an evident example of the "interplay of the Soviet Union's global strategy with Turkish rights and security". He also underlined how it clearly illustrated "the Soviet Union's dependence on the Straits and the limits of Turkey's ability to influence the strategic environment and events despite the Montreux Convention". (8)

Turkey's control over the Straits represents an even more fundamental factor than its control over a space for European security in peacetime and in wartime. Even if this control must be exercised taking into account the importance the Soviet Union attributes to free access to the Mediterranean and hence the limits to a rigid application of its rights in those crises that do not directly involve Turkey's vital interests.

Another element that contributes to the global security of Europe is the possibility, again deriving from Turkey's geographical position, of gathering information on Soviet military activities.

A US Congressional Research Service report, prepared in 1977 by the Europe and Middle East subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations, mentioned five intelligence collection sites operating in Turkey with American military personnel. (9)

Most of the intelligence material gathered is of course of particular interest to Turkey and the United States. However, part of it is eventually recycled into the Alliance's intelligence system, becoming the common property of all NATO members and contributing to a more informed and accurate evaluation of the Soviet military "threat" to NATO's southern theater, particularly with regard to the naval aspects.

Finally, at the military level, the fact that Turkey is contiguous to Russia and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance obliges the Soviet Union to keep more forces in its southwestern military districts than would be necessary if Turkey were to adopt a neutral policy or establish closer ties with the Soviet bloc.

According to the most recent estimates, 29 divisions are deployed in the three military districts which would presumably be engaged in NATO's southern theater in the event of conflict. (10)

If Turkey were not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, these divisions, or at least some of them, would

be redeployed to the central and southern flank making the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in those areas even more evident.

But it is not simply the positive contributions to European security provided by a "European" Turkey which is firmly anchored to the Western military alliance which need to be considered.

The strategic importance of Turkey for the security of Europe can be appreciated still better if we evaluate it in negative terms: that is, if we consider the strategic advantages the Soviet Union would enjoy if Turkey were a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Among the most evident advantages cited by Sir Bernard Burrows (11) are: "free and uncontrolled passage of Soviet ships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; open air and land passage to the Arab world over Turkey's frontiers with Syria and Iraq; an important additional threat to Greece over the Greek-Turkish frontier; denial of Western monitoring facilities in Turkey". To these could be added the installation of Soviet radar stations and intelligence collection sites in Turkey to control NATO air and naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

But even if Turkey's detachment from the Alliance did not culminate in a switch to the "other side", a hypothetical and highly improbable occurrence, but simply in the decision to assume a neutral or nonaligned position, this would have repercussions on European security just the same.

It is difficult to predict the impact of such decisions, to estimate to what extent eventual Turkish neutrality might alter the strategic balance between East and West in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, or anticipate how it might influence Soviet policy toward these regions, encouraging and sharpening old and dormant, but never dead, expansionist drives.

In any case, in elaborating its foreign policy, Turkey cannot afford to ignore the fact that it shares borders with the "big neighbor to the North", not even if its relations with NATO were less problematic than they are now. There are a number of objective constraints which condition Soviet-Turkish relations and make political caution a must. Many of the political constraints which might be necessary in case of Turkey's neutrality would probably not be much different from those present today in Turkey's foreign policy toward Moscow.

Nevertheless, in considering the realm of the "possible" Turkish political options and attitudes, if Turkey knew that it could count on concrete Western support, it would probably make choices that might contribute to European security: choices that might not be

adopted if the ties with the Alliance were severed or drastically redimensioned.

These considerations are all the more valid if we contemplate the security role Turkey could play outside NATO's area of responsibility.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the related hypotheses of Soviet attempts to penetrate the Gulf region politically or militarily, have already been suggested as factors increasing Turkey's strategic importance.

The United States has clearly indicated that it considers the Gulf area vital to its strategic interests so that direct US-USSR confrontation has to be considered as a possible scenario. Europe too continues to be dependent on Gulf oil and the consequent need to prevent any single power, especially a potentially hostile power, from gaining absolute control over this essential source of energy remains paramount.

Another factor that needs to be taken into account, even if based on sometimes contradictory projections, is the Soviet Union's future dependence on external sources of energy. If the projections according to which the USSR will pass from an oil-exporting to an oil-importing country by the end of the '80s prove right, this will give political stability in southwestern Asia an evident strategic dimension.

From the geostrategic point of view, Turkey is in a particularly favourable position. Its geographical position makes the country's territory an ideal platform from which to project military power into the Gulf region. But this does not mean that the political conditions to exploit its position automatically exist. Turkey has clearly and repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to offer its bases as a point of transit or departure for military forces earmarked for use in the context of a Gulf crisis. Even in the recently renegotiated bilateral treaty regarding the use of Turkish facilities by the US armed forces, explicit limits were set: facilities on Turkish soil can be used only in the context of NATO requirements and only to face contingencies that are a part of the Alliance's defense planning in the event of a crisis between the two blocs.

There therefore exist precise constraints at the "technical" level which to a certain extent penalize the transit of Soviet warships through the Straits. The Soviet Union is fully aware of this, just as it is conscious of what it would mean in strategic terms if the Straits were totally closed or even if the more restrictive limitations were imposed in such a way as to adversely affect the operability of its Mediterranean naval forces.

These constraints are particularly binding because all the units of the Fifth Soviet Naval Squadron in the

Mediterranean (except for the submarines from the North Sea Fleet) come from the Black Sea Fleet and depend mainly on the Black Sea bases for technical and logistic support.

In addition, Turkey, and hence NATO, can check the flow of warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in peacetime, and thus remain continuously informed (by adding this information to that supplied by the Gibraltar NATO Command on the entry and exit of Soviet vessels) on the number and type of ships of the Soviet Fleet operating in the Mediterranean. In wartime, the closure of the Straits would isolate the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean from its Black Sea bases, depriving it of all support - unless the Soviets were allowed to use the ports of North African littoral countries - thus reducing it to what is sometimes defined as a "one-shot Navy".

The Soviet Union has nonetheless demonstrated that, in the event of extra-NATO-Warsaw Pact crises, it is capable of rapidly increasing its fleet in the Mediterranean without violating the norms and procedures set down in the Montreux Convention. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean increased from about 47 ships at the beginning of October (6) to 80 units, including 26 warships and 16 submarines, by October 24, and to 96 units including 34 warships and 23 submarines, by October 31.(7)

Moreover, there exist clear political constraints which condition Turkey's response to the Soviet Union's requests. In 1976 the Turkish government accepted the Soviet definition of the Kiev aircraft carrier built in the Black Sea shipyards as an antisubmarine cruiser and allowed it to pass through the Straits even though aircraft carriers are not included among the "capital ships" listed in Annex II of the Montreux Convention. D.B. Sezer correctly pointed out that this is an evident example of the "interplay of the Soviet Union's global strategy with Turkish rights and security". He also underlined how it clearly illustrated "the Soviet Union's dependence on the Straits and the limits of Turkey's ability to influence the strategic environment and events despite the Montreux Convention". (8)

Turkey's control over the Straits represents an even more fundamental factor than its control over airspace for European security in peacetime and in wartime. Even if this control must be exercised taking into account the importance the Soviet Union attributes to free access to the Mediterranean and hence the limits to a rigid application of its rights in those crises that do not directly involve Turkey's vital interests.

Another element that contributes to the global security of Europe is the possibility, again deriving from

Turkey's geographical position, of gathering information on Soviet military activities.

A US Congressional Research Service report, prepared in 1977 by the Europe and Middle East subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations, mentioned five intelligence collection sites operating in Turkey with American military personnel. (9)

Most of the intelligence material gathered is of course of particular interest to Turkey and the United States. However, part of it is eventually recycled into the Alliance's intelligence system, becoming the common property of all NATO members and contributing to a more informed and accurate evaluation of the Soviet military "threat" to NATO's southern theater, particularly with regard to the naval aspects.

Finally, at the military level, the fact that Turkey is contiguous to Russia and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance obliges the Soviet Union to keep more forces in its southwestern military districts than would be necessary if Turkey were to adopt a neutral policy or establish closer ties with the Soviet bloc.

According to the most recent estimates, 29 divisions are deployed in the three military districts which would presumably be engaged in NATO's southern theater in the event of conflict. (10)

If Turkey were not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, these divisions, or at least some of them, would be redeployed to the central and southern flank making the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in those areas even more evident.

But it is not simply the positive contributions to European security provided by a "European" Turkey which is firmly anchored to the Western military alliance which need to be considered.

The strategic importance of Turkey for the security of Europe can be appreciated still better if we evaluate it in negative terms: that is, if we consider the strategic advantages the Soviet Union would enjoy if Turkey were a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Among the most evident advantages cited by Sir Bernard Burrows (11) are: "free and uncontrolled passage of Soviet ships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; open air and land passage to the Arab world over Turkey's frontiers with Syria and Iraq; an important additional threat to Greece over the Greek-Turkish frontier; denial of Western monitoring facilities in Turkey". To these could be added the installation of Soviet radar stations and intelligence collection sites in Turkey to control NATO air and naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

But even if Turkey's detachment from the Alliance did not culminate in a switch to the "other side", a hypothetical and highly improbable occurrence, but simply in the decision to assume a neutral or nonaligned position, this would have repercussions on European security just the same.

It is difficult to predict the impact of such decisions, to estimate to what extent eventual Turkish neutrality might alter the strategic balance between East and West in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, or anticipate how it might influence Soviet policy toward these regions, encouraging and sharpening old and dormant, but never dead, expansionist drives.

In any case, in elaborating its foreign policy, Turkey cannot afford to ignore the fact that it shares borders with the "big neighbor to the North", not even if its relations with NATO were less problematic than they are now. There are a number of objective constraints which condition Soviet-Turkish relations and make political caution a must. And many of the political constraints which might be necessary in case of Turkey's neutrality would probably not be much different from those present today in Turkey's foreign policy toward Moscow.

Nevertheless, in considering the realm of the "possible" Turkish political options and attitudes, if Turkey knew that it could count on concrete Western support, it would probably make choices that might contribute to European security: choices that might not be adopted if the ties with the Alliance were severed or drastically redimensioned.

These considerations are all the more valid if we contemplate the security role Turkey could play outside NATO's area of responsibility.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the related hypotheses of Soviet attempts to penetrate the Gulf region politically or militarily, have already been suggested as factors increasing Turkey's strategic importance.

The United States has clearly indicated that it considers the Gulf area vital to its strategic interests so that direct US-USSR confrontation has to be considered as a possible scenario. Europe too continues to be dependent on Gulf oil and the consequent need to prevent any single power, especially a potentially hostile power, from gaining absolute control over this essential source of energy remains paramount.

Another factor that needs to be taken into account, even if based on sometimes contradictory projections, is the Soviet Union's future dependence on external sources of energy. If the projections according to which the USSR will pass from an oil-exporting to an oil-importing country by

the end of the '80s prove right, this will give political stability in southwestern Asia an evident strategic dimension.

From the geostrategic point of view, Turkey is in a particularly favourable position. Its geographical position makes the country's territory an ideal platform from which to project military power into the Gulf region. But this does not mean that the political conditions to exploit its position automatically exist. Turkey has clearly and repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to offer its bases as a point of transit or departure for military forces earmarked for use in the context of a Gulf crisis. Even in the recently renegotiated bilateral treaty regarding the use of Turkish facilities by the US armed forces, explicit limits were set: facilities on Turkish soil can be used only in the context of NATO requirements and only to face contingencies that are a part of the Alliance's defense planning in the event of a crisis between the two blocs.

This logical political condition does not, however, detract from the European countries' perception of the strategic importance of Turkey even outside the traditional NATO-Warsaw Pact security picture: that is, even beyond the limits of the area of responsibility drawn by the North Atlantic Treaty.

If the Europeans are aware of (and consent to recognize as legitimate) the precise limits to Turkey's willingness to support or participate in extra-NATO operations at the military level (among the Europeans themselves there is no political consensus, perhaps not on the need, but certainly on the modalities and the means of collective or at least coordinated intervention in the event of a Gulf crisis), they are equally aware that at the political level Turkey as a "European" country or the bearer of common European interests could play an important role as a mediator or to help stabilize the situation in the event of a crisis in the Gulf region that seriously threatens European interests.

Naturally, Turkey can effectively play such a role only if it continues to feel that it is a European country, though one retaining its Islamic dimension, a characteristic which lends credibility and authority to its role in the eyes of the other countries of the region. It is a complex political problem which necessitates the careful balancing and integration of economic growth trends and social development tendencies; of foreign policy choices that may at times be divergent and contrasting but nevertheless necessary depending on the perspective, eastern or western, from which they are evaluated; of Turkey's traditional anchorage to the Atlantic security system and the trend towards a greater diversification of



the country's national defense requirements.

An analysis of the European countries' perceptions of the strategic importance of Turkey, and of the links between this importance and the need to establish and maintain firm and stable relations with Ankara, reveals a number of contradictory aspects. In the capitals of the major members of the European Community the approach to the problem of the linkage between Turkey's association to the Community and its strategic importance for European security is influenced by political and social biases and prejudices which die hard, by remote and recent historical events, by the international ties with other Mediterranean countries which traditionally have been privileged with respect to Turkey, by economic and financial interests, and so on. Naturally, the foreign and defense ministers of the European countries evaluate and tackle the problem from different perspectives. The political parties tend to attribute greater importance to the issue of democratic compatibility and to economic and social factors, while public opinion (apart from the special case of the Federal Republic of Germany) appears more or less insensitive to the strategic implications of the Turkish issue.

Generally speaking, governments, state administrations and the leaders of the major political parties have been reluctant to link what Turkey could represent for European security in peacetime and even more in the event of an East-West crisis with Turkey's place in the Community order and the political and economic questions of a further enlargement. In the Council of Europe and European Parliament debates on Turkey a number of members made the security link explicitly as part of the argument against breaking off relations even if they did not go so far as to link it with future membership.

The strategic importance of Turkey is usually recognized, though without attributing to it an absolute value and subjecting it to a series of distinctions.

For those governments which see the Soviet European global threat as greater or as at least as great as in previous years, the security of Turkey is seen as integral to the security of Europe. For them, the strengthening of Turkish defense is considered a factor which reinforces overall European defense and is hence a necessity to which the Europeans must contribute politically and financially.

Au contraire, those governments which regard the emphasis now placed on a renewed Soviet threat as mistaken, view Turkey's role in very much vaguer terms.

In any case, all European governments continue to consider NATO as the institutional body responsible for European defense planning and the handling of the Alliance's military problems. It is in fact significant for

example that the solution to the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1974 and Greece's re-entry into NATO, which involved not only special military issues but also political aspects of primary importance, was managed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, General Bernard W. Rogers.

There is an equally evident tendency to attribute little credibility to the hypotheses of a direct political link between the Community's decisions on Turkey's entry and a more or less explicit and far-reaching shift in the country's foreign policy. That is, to the hypotheses that a European failure to meet Turkey's requests and requirements would accentuate Turkey's sense of estrangement from Europe and its lack of faith in the validity of the Kemalist policy which Ankara has traditionally pursued, engendering a progressive detachment from the European context which is bound to have negative repercussions on European security.

It is difficult to say how these tendencies and the attendant European political attitudes might change if the international situation were transformed by a further deterioration in East-West relations or by a crisis involving the Gulf or the Mediterranean region or Turkish-Soviet relations. However, even if such changes were to occur there is little reason to believe that they would have any great impact on Community politics. If Turkish security were directly threatened, the West would respond through the political-military mechanisms of NATO. It is extremely doubtful whether the Community would be willing to attribute very much greater weight to the security factor when taking decisions, although it has made certain gestures in the past, as in, for example, concluding a new cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia soon after Tito's death.

On the other hand, if Turkey were threatened, the stance taken by the United States, the weight of US military power and the state of relations between Washington and Ankara would play the more important part in Turkish security considerations, just as they do now. There is no doubt, in fact, that in such circumstances, Turkey would necessarily, though not unconditionally, prefer a privileged relationship with the superpower on the other side of the Atlantic with respect to the European allies.

In other words, it is unlikely that the strategic importance of relations between Turkey and Western Europe will be the element which prevails over other considerations (mainly economic and political) in arriving at a decision on whether to enlarge the Community to include Turkey.

It is probable that in the Community debate on Turkey's entry strategic considerations will be present, just as it is probable that the arguments of a more

strictly military nature advanced in the NATO context will be echoed. But this will not be enough to modify the parameters of a process to which security issues appear extraneous, being outside the Community's statutory area of competence. The block of economic, political and ideological factors will almost certainly outweigh strategic considerations in determining the outcome of the Community's decision on Turkey's membership.

Nonetheless, security considerations have played a role in the West's policies of helping Turkey both economically and militarily outside the Community framework.

In April 1980 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) offered Turkey economic aid for a total of 1.16 billion dollars. (10) The following year the OECD allocated a slightly lower figure (940 million dollars), partly because of the economic difficulties many European countries were experiencing, partly because of certain governments' dissatisfaction with the internal situation in Turkey. (13)

It was clear that the aid was aimed at preventing further severe deterioration in the country's economic situation which, coupled with the explosiveness of the social situation, could have led to the complete disintegration of the State. Given the absolute breakdown in authority, the generals' takeover in Turkey in September 1980 was considered by many governments in the West as the only means of saving the country from civil war and bankruptcy. However, the continuation of military rule led to a political and economic debate over whether aid should be given unconditionally or whether it should be used to bring about change. It took place at two separate levels and the former argument had little impact on the latter. In the OECD context the decisions on whether to continue economic aid were based largely on straightforward economic considerations including indications that the Turkish economy was on the road to recovery and growth (inflation dropped from over 100% to 35% in 1980 and there was a sharp increase in exports).

In other words, it would seem that if anything influenced the economic debate it was strategic rather than political considerations. On the whole, strategic considerations - the importance of an economic recovery and political stability in Turkey for Western security - had more weight than legalistic considerations and guarantees of democratic rights.

A significant example of this is what happened in West Germany, which is particularly sensitive to the internal situation in Turkey and deeply committed in the effort to aid the Turkish economy. In June 1981 the

Bundestag unanimously passed a resolution approving aid to Ankara for a total of 460 million Marks on condition that democracy be rapidly restored. It seemed in this case, too, that only consideration of the role played by Turkey in NATO prevented the German parliament from later voting immediately to suspend aid.

Basically the same considerations and concerns seemed to prevail at yet another level: that is in the decision of European governments - especially Germany again - to help Turkey in its efforts to modernize its armed forces and fill the gap in armaments and in technical and logistical support left by the long US arms embargo (5 February 1975 - 4 August 1978). (14)

Although European governments, contributing in terms of military aid have been limited, they have not been negligible. As already mentioned, the Federal Republic of Germany has played a special role (15) because of the size of its effort: credits for the purchase of 77 Leopard 1-A3 tanks and 4 Bergepanzer auxiliary tanks; the financing of part of the order for 2,500 Franco-German, made Milan antitank missiles; the modernization of 200 M-48 tanks, fitting them with new diesel motors, 105 mm cannons and new firing-control systems. (16)

It is interesting to note that the Germans insisted the agreement be considered a German contribution to the security of NATO's southern theater. This insistence is of significance because the agreement was initially conceived as part of a wider-ranging plan which also foresaw military aid to Greece worth 60 million Marks.

If NATO as an organization has clearly shown that it is fully aware of the importance of tackling the problem of modernizing the Turkish armed forces, going so far as to set up an ad hoc group for military assistance to Turkey, the response of the European members of the Alliance (apart from Germany) has been below Turkish expectations. Any European initiatives that have been undertaken have been at a strictly bilateral level, without effective coordination within the Alliance and without a global vision of the strategic problems of NATO's southern theater. France has not seemed particularly willing to help Turkey militarily, preferring to cultivate its preferential relationship with Greece, to which it feels historically and ideologically linked, (17) a tendency that seems to have been reinforced by the twin socialist victory of Mitterrand and Papandreou. It almost seems that the two major West European countries - France and the Federal Republic of Germany - have tacitly, and perhaps unintentionally, established a sort of "division of labor" in the field of military assistance to the two key countries of NATO's southern flank.

The other allied countries do not seem willing to go

beyond what they are already contributing in the sphere of economic assistance.

Italy in the autumn of 1974 and in February 1975 sold to Turkey a total of 36 F-104S fighters and later undertook to pass on the air force's F-104s as they were substituted by the new Tornado fighters. Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark also sold their F-104Gs to Turkey at economically advantageous conditions as they were replaced by the new F-16s.

## Chapter II

### 1. Turkish Security Perceptions

Generally speaking, Turkey's security situation and the problems that derive from it are linked to four main parameters. First, the geographic position and the orographic characteristics of Turkish territory. Second, the external "threats" as they are perceived, evaluated and ranked by the Turkish government (with a scale of priorities that may differ from that of NATO or the United States). Third, the internal problems, both those of an exclusively military nature in terms of the efficiency of the armed forces and their effective capacity to defend the country and those of a political nature which derive from the political, economic and social situation in the country. Fourth, the eventual repercussions, foreseen or unforeseen, of extra-regional events on the Turkish strategic equation.

#### a) The geostrategic factors

Turkey's geographic position, which is at the root of its strategic importance for European security, is also at the root of the complexity and difficulties of Turkey's national security problems.

Turkey borders directly on the Soviet Union for 610 km along its Eastern frontier and indirectly for 1,500 km along the Black Sea coast. In addition, Turkey shares a 269 km border with Bulgaria, one of Moscow's most loyal Warsaw Pact allies. Finally, to the East and South it shares borders with three Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Iraq (339 km) and Syria (877 km). The latter two have signed bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which provide for consultations and reciprocal support in the event of military threats.

A geostrategic analysis reveals a number of negative elements in terms of security. In the event of East-West

conflict the Turkish armed forces could find themselves engaged on three separate fronts: the Turkish Thrace, the Straits and the Black Sea coast, and the eastern Turkish-Soviet border. These fronts are distant from one another and particularly extensive, characteristics which complicate the problems of defense, deployment and movement of troops, especially since Turkey has an inadequate road and rail communications system and insufficient tactical airlift capacity. Moreover, it cannot be excluded - though the hypothesis seems improbable - that Turkey may also be engaged in combat on the southern front if Damascus were to decide to take advantage of the situation to revive its claims on the Turkish province of Hatay (Alexandretta).

There are, however, few beaches on the Turkish Black Sea coast that are suitable for massive amphibious operations, and advances toward the interior are made difficult by the Black Sea mountain range. Much of the terrain adjacent to Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union is inaccessible, with few practicable passes, the least difficult of which leads to Erzurum. The terrain bordering on Syria is also rough and mountainous, especially near Iskenderun.

The weakest and most vulnerable area is Thrace, where there are easy lines of attack that lead directly to the Aegean Sea and the Straits, only a few dozen kilometers away. The terrain is particularly suited to the use of armoured and mechanized divisions, while the limited depth prevents the adoption of tactical defense maneuvers and makes forward defense a necessity.

The Straits can easily be closed to maritime traffic, while the Aegean Sea, from the Dardanelles to the island of Crete is dotted with more than 3,000 islands which make it easy to block traffic. No ship, alone or escorted, could pass without having to engage in battle.

The geographic "barrier" function referred to in the preceding chapter, control of the Straits, proximity to the Soviet Union and to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea have obliged Turkey to direct special attention to the possible external "threats", both as elements of the traditional East-West conflict and as elements in scenarios of exclusively national conflict.

#### b) The Warsaw Pact

Historical reasons, and especially those expansionist tendencies toward the Mediterranean, which have been a constant factor of Russian policy from the Czarist period to the present era, physical proximity, as well as Russia's enormous superiority in military capabilities have obliged Turkey for centuries to

concentrate primarily on the USSR's foreign policy intentions when evaluating its security requirements.

The decision to join NATO was dictated by an acute sense of vulnerability in respect to the possible political and military initiatives of the "big neighbour to the North" and by the need to find a balancing factor, by formally tying itself to the US superpower through its adhesion to the Atlantic Alliance.

At the military level, the disparity in power and the potential Soviet threat appear particularly significant. The Soviet Union has 29 divisions (including 23 motor-rifle divisions) stationed in the three military districts of Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. Most of these divisions are category 3, (18) that is, at a low level of combat readiness, and would therefore have to be reinforced before being brought into action. There are however two category 1 divisions which are, significantly, airborne divisions which could play a decisive role in military operations aimed at occupying the Straits, in cooperation with the Naval Infantry of the Black Sea Fleet.

Moreover, the Soviet army is being equipped with an ever growing number of Mi-24 Hind combat and transport helicopters which increases the possibilities of encircling operations, thus partly eliminating the advantages which Turkey's inaccessible terrain offered for defending the territory.

The air threat consists of more than 650 combat aircraft. In addition, the Black Sea Fleet has 26 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 43 frigates, 25 amphibious vessels, 240 minor surface units, 541 auxiliary and support ships and 380 planes.

These ground and air forces represent of course only that part of the Soviet defense system deployed in the three military districts which it is assumed would be assigned to combat against the forces of NATO's southern flank. They could be strengthened, if need be, by other units from the military districts of Kiev, Moscow, the Volga or from the southern Turkestan Military District. (19) The Bulgarian armed forces represent another element of the threat. (20)

Beginning in 1974, these forces have been built up noticeably. New equipment has been assigned to the Army, including armored vehicles, T-72 tanks and Mi-24 Hind-D attack helicopters. The ASW Mi-24 Haze helicopter was introduced into the Navy's helicopter component. And in the Air Force there was a partial substitution of the MiG-17 with the Flogger H MiG-23 and of the MiG-21 with the Flogger B MiG-23. The MiG-23 was assigned to Bulgaria before the central European countries of the Warsaw Pact received it. This was especially significant since it

breached practice of placing the southern countries of the Pact at the bottom of the list of priorities in modernization programs, often even behind certain Third World countries. This would seem to indicate greater Soviet attention to the potential Greek-Turkish Thrace front, a trend made more evident by reports, not yet confirmed, that the Soviets have been setting up stores of military material in Bulgaria. In fact, the acquisition of Mi-14 Haze ASW helicopters makes operational sense only if they are to be deployed in the Aegean Sea; that is, only if they are to be used for an eventual Warsaw Pact attempt to conquer the Thrace and the Straits.

In addition, in November 1976, the Soviets opened a ferry service with large ships equipped to transport railroad cars from the Bulgarian port of Varna to the Soviet port of Ilichevsk near Odessa. These ferries, among the largest in the world, eliminate the serious delays (up to four weeks) that are inevitable if the trains have to pass through Romania to get to Bulgaria, and can easily be adapted for the transport of military equipment and supplies. In fact, each ferry can carry up to 108 railroad wagons or platform cars which means a maximum load capacity of approximately 150 T-62 tanks. (21) The strategic importance of this ferry link is thus evident. It makes it possible to bypass Romania, avoiding not only technical delays (Romanian railways have a different gauge from that of the Soviet ones) but also the eventual political delays that would ensue if, in the event of a crisis, Romania decided to restrict the transit of Soviet military convoys through its territory.

Finally, Bulgaria, like the other Warsaw Pact countries, has modernized its radar network by installing new and more advanced systems with greater coverage of low altitudes. It has strengthened its air defense with the acquisition of SA-6 and SA-9 missile systems. And it has enhanced its passive defenses by hardening its infrastructure and building more hangarages at its airbases.

Turkey is conscious of the fact that in the event of East-West conflict it would not be in a position to face the threat alone given the present state of its armed forces' capabilities and efficiency.

The Army (470,000 men) is made up of 16 divisions (2 mechanized, 14 infantry), 23 brigades (6 armoured, 4 mechanized, 11 infantry, 1 paratrooper, 1 commando) and 4 missile battalions with "Honest John" surface-to-surface missiles. (22)

The Navy has 16 submarines, 15 destroyers, 2 frigates and 13 fast attack craft armed with Harpoon and Penguin antiship missiles, plus a number of torpedo boats,



large and coastal patrol boats, landing craft, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and auxiliary units (depot and supply ships).

The Air Force has 407 combat aircraft deployed in 18 fighter-bomber squadrons, 3 interceptor squadrons, 1 reconnaissance squadron and 6 transport squadrons. The type of aircraft: F-4E and RF-4E, F5A/B, F104G and F-104S, F-100C/D/F, RF-84F, C-130E and C-160 Transall, plus a number of different types of helicopters.

If only the numbers are considered, the Turkish defense system might seem stronger than it actually is. A closer look reveals that 430 thousand of the 470 thousand men in the Army are conscripts. Most of the divisions and brigades are infantry (while most of the Soviet and Bulgarian units are armored or motor rifle). Almost all the tanks are old American M-47s and M-48s, which are technically and operationally obsolete. Most of the armored vehicles for the transport of troops are outdated M-113s. The missiles are still of the old "Honest John" class that has been replaced by the "Lance" missile in other NATO countries. Only recently have 2500 Milan missiles been ordered for the antitank systems.

The air force still flies the old F-100. Effective all-weather interception capability is lacking and the air defense system suffers from inadequate coverage, especially at low altitudes, because of the technical backwardness of the radar system and the unreliability of the C3 system. In the Navy, all the destroyers, mostly of the Gearing and Fletcher class, are hand-downs from the US Navy, passed on to Turkey under the MDAP bill. The only really modern units are the four 209-type submarines and the Dogan and Kartal-class missile FAC.

The current procurement programs and those planned for the future (Leopard tanks, Milan antitank missiles, 209-type submarines, Meko-200-class frigates, missile FACs, Harpoon antiship missiles, Super Side-winder air-to-air missiles, F-16 and F-18 combat planes) will only partly meet Turkey's military requirements.

In 1980 the Turkish government made public a detailed estimate of what would be needed to meet its NATO commitments for the 1981-86 period. The cost of the most urgent and priority needs was 4,442.3 million dollars. (23) The Air Force estimated 1,145.7 million dollars in order to procure F-4 and F-104 planes, spare parts and ammunition, equipment and matériel for air defense, etc. The Army needed 2,191.9 million dollars for tanks, antitank missiles, armored vehicles, communication equipment, helicopters, etc. The Navy required 1,104.7 million dollars for submarines, fast attack craft, ASW helicopters, aircraft for maritime patrol, electronic warfare systems,

antiship missiles. However, it was estimated that only 2,190 million dollars would be available for the 1981-86 period (from the Turkish defense budget, US credits and West German aid). The shortfall of more than 2,200 million dollars could not be remedied by increasing the Turkish military budget, nor could the Alliance partners be expected to help fill the gap. The situation does not seem to have changed substantially since then, despite the increase in US aid (24) and in the Turkish defense budget.

Turkey therefore depends on external reinforcements for its defense, especially in the Thrace area where the Turkish forces do not appear capable of driving back or halting a massive attack of armored units which would be facilitated by the flat terrain of the area.

The United States appears to be the only ally that could supply external reinforcements. It is highly unlikely that Italian forces could be used in Turkey (except for the NATO ACE Mobile Force contingent), and it is unlikely that the Greek forces would be able to offer much support on the Thracian front, except by trying to contain attacks on Turkey from the west. However, it is uncertain how many air and ground units based in the United States would actually be available for deployment to NATO's southern front, in view of the commitments in central and northern Europe. There is also the problem of how long it would take the available units to intervene. The air forces might be able to make it on the scene in a matter of one to seven days, but the ground forces - except for the Marines TF-69 normally stationed in the Mediterranean - would take very much longer, up to thirty days. Moreover, the heavy equipment and supplies shipped by sea would have to cross the eastern Mediterranean where the Soviet forces, especially the air forces, enjoy greater freedom of manoeuvre thanks to the proximity of that area to the Crimean and southern Russia bases.

#### c) The Middle East and the Persian Gulf

Iraq and Syria are a part of the Turkish security situation not so much because they represent a direct threat but because they are crucial elements in the Middle East strategic equation making for regional instability.

There are no open controversies or unresolved territorial disputes between Turkey and Iraq. Turkish-Syrian relations currently present no elements of particular tension and Damascus has not voiced any claims to the Turkish province of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) since the early '60s. Moreover, Iraq, heavily engaged in a tough and bloody conflict with Iran which has closed the Shatt-al-Arab terminals from which Iraq formerly exported much of its oil (and which has also generated a further

deterioration in its relations with Syria), now depends heavily on the oil pipeline from the Mosul to the Gulf of Iskenderun in the eastern Mediterranean. (25)

The Iraqi and Syrian armed forces are well equipped with modern armaments. (26)

Nonetheless, neither Syria nor Iraq represent a real military threat to Turkey.

However, there remain some security concerns which derive from the role the two countries could play in the event of an East-West crisis. They could seriously complicate Turkey's defense planning; they are both tied to the Soviet Union by friendship and cooperation treaties; there is close military cooperation between Moscow and Damascus. The Middle East continues to be unstable and so encourages the intervention of the superpowers in support of countries in the region with which they have established ties. Turkey would find itself in a particularly difficult position if, in the event of a crisis, the United States were to ask it to give a concrete show of support for its policy, of the type furnished for example in the 1958 landing operation in Lebanon. Indirect superpower involvement poses at least some of the same problems.

The Islamic revolution in Iran has also affected Turkish security in a number of ways. It gave new life and vigor to those political and religious movements which favour an end to Kemalist secular western state and a return to Islamic values and a theocratic government. If, because of the unstable situation in Iran, the Iranian Kurds were able to establish some form of autonomy, this could provide a focus for increased Kurdish nationalist agitation in Turkey.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Turkey's awareness of the implications of bordering on its northern neighbour. For the first time since the end of World War II, Moscow has shown itself ready to intervene with its own military forces outside the Warsaw Pact area and in a situation in which its vital security interests did not appear to be directly threatened.

The invasion also threw new light on Soviet military capabilities, especially in terms of the number of men and the quantity of means deployed, and raised disturbing questions as to the future of the Gulf region.

Soviet military intervention capabilities and the stability of the Persian Gulf area are two elements which are necessarily a part of the Turkish security picture, especially since any crisis in the region would inevitably lead to an East-West polarization and the risk of a direct conflict between the two superpowers, which would almost certainly involve their respective allies and friends.

d) Greece

Because of the longstanding and still unresolved Cyprus dilemma and the disputes over the Aegean (division and control of airspace, limits of territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf and of the right to exploit the seabed, militarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coast), Turkey has considered Greece a potential external threat. (27) Obviously, Turkey's perception of the threat does not include the hypothesis of unilateral aggression on the part of Greece. It is rather the possibility of conflict which is inherent in the difficulties of resolving the problems diplomatically. These difficulties are rendered all the more intractable by recollections of ancient struggles and rivalries and by the more recent divergences at the political and ideological level.

The fact that both countries are members of NATO does not seem to have helped make finding a solution to the controversies any easier. Their disputes have not been subordinated to a common view of regional security which includes their political and military cooperation. In fact, Turkey's increased flexibility, which in 1980 led to the removal of its veto on Athens' reentry into the military arm of the Atlantic Alliance, had little impact. Greek-Turkish relations were improved only temporarily. Indeed, the victory of the Socialist party in Greece (which increased the ideological distance between the military regime in Turkey and the government in Greece) and Papandreou's more explicitly nationalistic foreign policy have radicalized the positions, reignited old polemics and revived old mechanisms of confrontation.

It is difficult to forecast how flexible and what margins of maneuver there will be in future Greek foreign policy toward NATO - since his electoral victory, Papandreou has toned down his opposition and no longer appears as determined to withdraw Greece from NATO - and toward Turkey. However, the Greek request at the December 1981 meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee for a formal Alliance guarantee in the event of Turkish aggression (28) dampened hopes that Greek-Turkish relations might improve and naturally tended to accentuate the Turkish perception that security factors play a more than marginal role in its relations with Greece.

At the military level, Turkey seems to be in a superior position, at least in terms of numbers and particularly with regard to ground troops. Because there remains the possibility that the political controversies might lead to a military confrontation, Ankara feels obliged to keep an "Aegean fleet" - which Greece considers a possible external threat - and approximately 20 thousand

men on Cyprus, with a dispersion of its forces and a disfunctional distribution of its resources that subtracts from NATO defense requirements.

Relations with Athens, even beyond the military aspects, have therefore caused deep concern in Turkey, complicating its relations with the other allies, too. Ankara had explicitly and repeatedly affirmed that an extension of the limits of Greek territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles would be considered a "casus belli".

The Turkish government was conscious that, in the event of a new crisis with Greece, European mediation would have little effectiveness and little chance of success and that, given the 1974 precedent, the US stance might be far from impartial.

Even though the controversy is of direct interest to the Alliance in that it weakens NATO's southeastern flank, Turkey perceives it as a strictly bilateral problem. In an interview published in Le Monde in February 1980, then premier Demirel affirmed: "Cyprus and the Aegean have nothing to do with NATO. It is a Greek-Turkish affair. NATO mediation would only complicate matters". (29) If a Greek-Turkish conflict were to eventually erupt, the military costs for Turkey - and for Greece - would certainly be very high, and would inevitably have adverse affects in its capacity to meet other defense requirements for an unforeseeable period of time.

## 2. Turkish foreign policy

The threats mentioned above are credible to differing degrees, have more or less effective military weight and greater or lesser chances of materializing, but they are omnidirectional, a characteristic which tends to complicate Turkish defense planning. Turkey's vulnerability, accentuated by the country's strategic position, weighs not only on Ankara's military policy choices but on its foreign policy choices as well.

In a May 1979 interview published in a NATO affairs periodical, Gunduz Okçun, then foreign minister of Turkey, affirmed: "We consider ourselves a European country. But we are also a Middle East, an eastern Mediterranean and a Balkan country". Drawing from this the consequences at the level of his country's international policies and economic policies he added that one of the main tasks of Turkey was to "cooperate to strengthen détente both at the regional level and in Europe" and that Turkey "has four markets with which to make its own economy progress: the Middle East, Africa, the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, and the European Community". (30) In November of the same year, prime minister Demirel, presenting his new minority government's foreign policy guidelines, declared that

foreign policy would be conducted "in accordance with the reality of our geographic position and to protect our defense and our economic needs". (31) These two statements, expressing respectively the evaluations of the country's two major political parties on Turkey's international role, seem to indicate quite clearly that their appreciation of the opportunities offered and the constraints imposed by geography and by the complexity of the internal social and economic conditions coincide substantially.

a) The United States. The Soviet Union's foreign policy in the late 1940s and the gradual division of Europe into two blocs made it necessary for Turkey to choose sides. Neutrality was not regarded as a practicable option. Security considerations made it necessary to find a way to balance the pressures exercised by its "big neighbor to the North". Formulation of the Truman doctrine offered Ankara the possibility of establishing ties with the United States that could compensate for its weaknesses and attenuate its fears. Turkey became a front-line country of the belt formed to contain the Soviet Union, accepting the inherent risks. At the same time, by joining NATO, it formally links its national security to that of western Europe, giving it a dimension which was deemed necessary in view of the delicate international situation of the early '50s.

But relations with the superpower on the other side of the Atlantic were not without their moments of tension and contrast, at times deep.

Tensions first surfaced in 1964 over the problem of Cyprus. President Johnson's letter in June dissuaded Turkey from intervening militarily on the island, but at the same time it raised serious doubts and disturbing questions about the United States' effective willingness to fulfill its commitments to defend its allies.

In fact, after pointing out that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus might lead to Soviet involvement, Johnson went on to say: "I hope that you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies". (32)

The security guarantee provided by the Alliance, which as it was did not foresee any sort of automatic military response, seemed to have become dangerously weak. If Ankara's and Washington's interpretation of the Soviet threat had to coincide before the US would take any action, could Turkey consider its security effectively guaranteed? Was Turkey to allow the United States to evaluate and define what its real security requirements were? Ankara obviously thought not and so was obliged to redefine some

of the basic assumptions of its security situation, revising the support eventually deriving from its NATO ties and assessing the importance of its relations with the United States against the background of the altered strategic balance between the two superpowers.

This revision (33) reached its apex in 1975 when the US position on the new Cyprus crisis and the embargo on arms supplies to Turkey brought Turkish-US relations to the verge of collapse.

The American embargo, with its deep repercussions on the efficiency and operational readiness of the Turkish armed forces, clearly showed Ankara how dangerous it was to depend on a single arms supplier, how unacceptable it was to be in a situation in which national defense requirements could be exploited by arms-supplying countries to apply political pressure, and the need for at least a measure of autonomy that could be gained only by developing a national arms industry. In short, it showed up the imbalances in and the disadvantages of relations between a superpower and a medium power.

The international developments at the end of the '70s - the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran war - refocussed the United States' attention on the strategic importance of Turkey and increased Turkey's sense of isolation and vulnerability, creating new elements in favor of a revived convergence and rapprochement. It appeared, however, that something in the long-standing privileged relationship between Ankara and Washington had changed deeply: Turkey's security perceptions had undergone a transformation; diversification of its foreign policy goals had been accentuated; new movements, expectations and aspirations were emerging with greater force within the country.

On 30 March 1980 a new economic and defense cooperation treaty was signed that formalized US military activities in Turkey, after the closure of the bases in 1975 and their temporary reopening in 1978 (significantly, the US Congress lifted the arms embargo in August and shipments of arms began in September). But the number of US military installations dropped from 26 to 12 and their utilization was explicitly restricted to NATO defense requirements. (34)

The military takeover in Turkey and Reagan's electoral victory, which some thought would make a return to the former relationship possible because of the ideological and political affinities of the two governments, did not seem to have an impact on the new course of Turkish foreign policy in the sense of bringing Turkey again very close to its superpower ally. In June 1981 the Turkish defense minister Haluk Bayulken, referring

to the hypothesis of making Turkish bases available to the American RDF (Rapid Deployment Force), said explicitly that the bases on Turkish territory could be used by US forces only to defend vital NATO interests. (35) The same concept was reiterated the following year by the Turkish premier Bulent Ulusu, who states in an interview to the Kuwait daily "al Qabas" that Turkey could not associate itself with actions that might jeopardize the security and interests of the Arab countries. (36)

Nonetheless, Turkey's relations with the United States are still too important to be underestimated. It is unlikely that Turkey would renounce American support for its security.

The United States continues to be Turkey's major source of economic aid and military assistance. From 1979 to 1983 Washington allocated the following funds:

- FY 1979. 225 million dollars, including 175 million from the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and 50 million in economic aid. (37)

- FY 1980. 300 million dollars, including 200 million from the FMS program, 98 million in economic aid and 2 million from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In addition to the sums, in April 1979 the Carter Administration requested an additional 100 million dollars in immediate and urgent economic aid and a grant of over 50 million dollars for military equipment and arms to plug the most serious gaps in the efficiency of the Turkish armed forces. (38)

- FY 1981. The total aid program amounted to 703.5 million dollars, including 403.5 million in military aid and 300 million in economic aid. (40)

- FY 1983. A further increase of about 115 million dollars was requested for a total of 815 million of which 465 million for FMS and 350 million in economic aid. (41)

These figures are significant. The large amount of aid has its political significance and determines, especially in the military sphere, a certain degree of dependence.

Another US arms embargo or a new rift in relations between Ankara and Washington that resulted in a cutback in the United States' military aid programs - it should not be forgotten that Congress has more than once proved sensitive to the pressures of the Greek lobby - would bring to a standstill the slow and laborious process of modernization of Turkey's armed forces.

In recent years there has been a trend toward diversification of the sources of military supplies. But it seems that this trend is more than anything the result of the need to utilize the military aid supplied by the European allies, especially by the Federal Republic of



Germany (the purchase of 209-type submarines, Leopard tanks, Milan antitank missiles, etc.).

At the same time, the Turkish military establishment seems fully aware that total diversification - which in any case seems hardly practicable given the country's present state of affairs - with a move away from US arms, even if gradual, toward European or "national" or Soviet arms (but this latter hypothesis seems out of the question) would generate serious technical and logistic problems.

b) The Soviet Union Turkey necessarily views its ties with the United States against the background of its relationship with the Soviet Union; that is, as an indispensable part of its security, both as a deterrent against unacceptable Soviet pressures of threats and as a concrete support in the event of a crisis. Even if this support has not always been credible (President Johnson's warning set off an alarm bell), and it cannot be taken for granted especially now that the Soviet Union has attained rough nuclear parity with the United States, the United States - and the Soviet Union - would move cautiously if the crisis risks leading to a direct confrontation with the rival superpower. But if vital Turkish interests had been threatened, for example if the Soviets had attempted to gain control over the Straits by force, it is unlikely that the United States would consider this a security problem which concerned only Ankara.

However, this awareness, which has been both a strong and a weak point of Turkey's foreign policy toward the United States (and to a certain extent also of its attitude toward its European allies), did not prevent Turkey from establishing relations with those countries that the military establishment considers the most likely potential adversaries, not from adopting a posture in which the advantages and risks of the US-Turkish tie were evaluated more carefully and realistically.

The course of relations with the Soviet Union could perhaps be considered a necessity which more or less reflected the state of Turkey's relations with the United States, in the sense that greater openness toward Moscow corresponded to a chilling of relations with Washington.

This mirror-image course of Turkish relations with the two superpowers is, however, only an immediately visible and transient aspect of a much more complex reality. Ankara's new foreign policy attitude toward Moscow began in the mid-1980s and gained momentum in the early '70s in line with the détente policy that was being pursued, though with contradictory results, by the Western countries and by the United States itself. Only after the 1974 Cyprus crisis did it seem that the growth of relations with the Soviet Union was being used by Turkey to

"compensate", or perhaps in defiance of, US policy choices with respect to Turkey.

Closer ties were apparent, however, more at the economic than at the political level. Even Ecevit's visit to Moscow in June 1978, which seemed to anticipate, in the context of the Turkish premier's "new concept of defense", the birth of a policy toward the East very different from that of the past, did not lead to noteworthy changes. (42) Important industrial cooperation agreements were concluded, but the political document signed by Ecevit could hardly be defined a friendship and cooperation treaty, which is what the Soviets would have liked, nor was there any mention of eventual military cooperation. Indeed, the document did not even go so far as the one signed by the Soviet Union and the FRG in 1971; it was instead similar in content to the Soviet-French and Soviet-Norwegian "common declarations".

However, even the creation of closer economic and commercial ties cannot be considered without its political effects. Beginning in the mid-60s, the Soviet Union helped Turkey finance a series of important industrial projects: a steel complex at Iskenderun, a sulphuric acid plant at Bandirma, a synthetic fibre plant at Artvin, a line of communications between Seyit-Oemer, and the construction of a dam at Arpacayi. (43)

In 1979 a new protocol agreement was signed for the realization of some twenty new industrial projects for a total of about eight billion dollars. Among the most important: expansion of the Iskenderun steel complex's output from 2.2 to 6 million tons, the construction of a plant for the production of hydrogen peroxide and a thermoelectric station, a concession for the Soviet Union to search for oil in the southeastern regions of Turkey on the basis of data collected by Soviet geological satellites, (44) the construction of two 440 MV nuclear energy stations in Turkey with the necessary fuel (45) and, finally, an increase in Soviet oil supplies of up to 2 million tons and in electric energy to the eastern and Black Sea provinces up to a maximum of 2.4 billion KWh.

These important projects, which involved mainly the public sector, helped fill the gaps in Turkish industrial development left by Western reluctance to invest in high-risk sectors, and hence concretely aided Turkish industrialization, creating a network of interests which was bound to influence future economic choices in favor of a continuation of the relations.

Credits from 1967 to 1975 amounted to about 700 million dollars. In the following years they increased, peaking in 1978 to a volume which placed Turkey at the top of the list of developing countries to which the Soviet Union supplied economic aid.

For example, half the cost (8 billion dollars) of the 20-odd projects included in the June 1979 agreement was financed by the Soviet Union.

In the trade sector, too, a considerable increase was recorded, in part due to the fact that Soviet credits were to a certain extent repaid with the export of consumer and manufacturing goods. In 1980 the volume of trade reached more than 600 million dollars, an increase of some 40% over the preceding year. However, since 1980 there was a decline and in 1982 the trade balance showed a significant surplus for Turkey.

Turkey also intensified its "Ostpolitik" with respect to Bulgaria, with whom relations had deteriorated previously over the question of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and with Romania, whose eccentricity within the Warsaw Pact context served both as a "behavioral" point of reference for Turkish policy within NATO vis-à-vis the United States and an element with which to alter the global threat situation on the Thrace front.

In effect, Ankara's policy toward the Soviet Union in the '70s was characterized by a series of choices which involved more than just economic ties and which could have given the impression that a new course had been undertaken. For example: Soviet transport planes directed to the Middle East during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war were granted permission to fly over Turkish territory; in 1976 the Turks loosely interpreted the Montreux Convention, accepting the Soviet definition of the Kiev-class aircraft carrier as an antisubmarine cruiser and allowing it to transit through the Straits; Moscow's explicit consent was required before Turkey would comply with the US request, after the loss of American intelligence bases in Iran, to let its U-2 reconnaissance planes use Turkish airspace to verify Soviet respect of the SALT-2 accords; (46) although Turkey condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the government refused to apply sanctions against Moscow.

Moreover, it seemed that this new policy had become an irreversible component of Turkish foreign policy, and an element common to Ecevit's center-left government, Demirel's conservative government and the military government which took power in 1980. (47)

But reality was more complex than it appeared. It could be said that the new course was not a "revirement" or a break with former policy, but the outcome of a pragmatic evaluation of the altered international situation and a logical adjustment, in terms of greater openness at the political level, of its bilateral relations with a bordering country which, like it or not, had become the second strongest military power in the world. Turkey could not afford not to take this reality into account and could

not but arrive at the conclusion that, despite their respective positions in two opposite ideological and military camps, there were no special reasons that might prevent or advise against the creation of correct political and economic relations with Moscow. Nor could it ignore the "necessity" of avoiding a policy of confrontation with Moscow both in order to avoid tempting Moscow to reopen the question of the territorial disputes and the Straits (dormant since the early '50s) and in consideration of the not always positive and reassuring evolution of Turkish-American and Turkish-European relations.

There were, however, fairly clear limits to how far Turkey was willing to go in its policy toward the USSR. Ankara was not about to make concessions that might concretely undermine its sovereignty over the Straits. It was not willing to tolerate external pressures or destabilization attempts. It was not thinking of embarking on a process of detachment from the Western context that would ultimately lead to a more or less explicit policy of neutrality, and even less disposed to formally or informally switch alliances. Nor was it willing to see its relations with Moscow transformed into outright dependence. Turkey was aware of the political and military weight of its "big neighbor to the North". And by drawing a clear line, Turkey seemed to be just as aware that there was no rationally practicable alternative to its ties with the United States and Western Europe and that neutrality would inevitably lead to a sort of self-imposed Finlandization.

The Soviet Union, though not abandoning attempts to break Turkey away from the West, seemed to accept the limits set by Turkey. And, significantly, it tended to adjust and conform its policy to the state of relations between Turkey and the United States, logically stepping up its efforts when these relations deteriorated. This reinforced (perhaps to an unrealistic extent) the impression that there was a direct relationship between the two phenomena: Turkish-US detachment, Turkish-USSR rapprochement; that is, the mirror-image effect mentioned above. Naturally, the mechanism worked the other way, too; that is, when Turkish-US relations improved. In those cases, as in 1980 after the new cooperation and defense agreement had been signed, Moscow predictably began again to accuse Turkey of being nothing more than an American outpost in Asia Minor.

c) The European countries. In its relations with the European countries - in the NATO and the European Community framework - Turkey seems to feel that it is constantly in a different if not inferior position; in terms of military preparedness, because the process of modernization of its armed forces has been slower and more laborious; in

political terms, because it feels that it has been treated differently by the Community with respect to Greece, Spain and Portugal (it matters not if this perception reflects reality if it influences Turkey's posture and its reactions); in economic terms, because of the divergent development processes and the severe crisis of the late '70s; in psychological terms, because it is the only Muslim country among the European countries.

These perceptions, added to the awareness of its strategic importance, have sometimes led to contradictory attitudes, wavering between a desire to quicken the pace of its accession to the Community - in February 1980, with a surprise move, the Turkish government announced that it would apply for membership by the end of the year (48) - and fear of the European response which they perceived would be negative; and between a conviction that in any case and all circumstances the Western countries would have helped Turkey out of the quicksands of the most serious financial crisis and its history and the doubts as to whether the West would have been as ready and willing to help if the Turkish crisis had not coincided with the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Turkey appreciated the Western countries' efforts to shore up its ailing economy, but at the same time it did not hide its disappointment and irritation with regard to Greece's entry into the European Community, which gave Athens a voice in the decision on Turkey's adoption of certain economic reforms; the insistence of many European countries that Turkey restore democracy more rapidly, suggesting that otherwise aid would be suspended and the country would be excluded from the European organization.

In July 1980 Turkey concluded a new association agreement with the European Community, to replace the 1964 accord, which among other things provided about one billion dollars to financial aid and a further opening of the Common Market to Turkish agricultural products. (49) But in 1981 relations with the European countries, including Germany which had previously been Turkey's major sponsor, began to deteriorate again.

In the last analysis, Turkey's attitude toward Europe often seems a victim of its own complexity. It tends to suffer, at times excessively, from the impact of that close linkage and interdependence of political, military and economic factors that make the relationships with NATO and the EC advantageous and remunerative but also inadequate, uncertain and sometimes frustrating.

d) The Arab countries. Turkey's diversification of its foreign policy naturally included a redefinition of its relations with the Islamic world.

In the mid-60s Turkey's posture began to shift from

one of substantial alignment with Western, and in particular, US policies to a more autonomous line which included the progressive expansion of political and economic relations with the Arab countries.

At the root of this development and of what some today call Turkey's "new Arab dream", there are a number of motives which are connected partly with the regional security balance, partly with economic considerations, partly with political opportunity and partly with internal politics.

The elements which made this new course in external relations apparent can be identified as follows:

- the pro-Arab position assumed by Ankara during the 1967 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts;

- the diplomatic recognition of the PLO and permission to open an office of the organization in the Turkish capital;

- the economic and military cooperation agreement between Ankara and Tripoli signed in January 1979 during premier Bulent Ecevit's visit to Libya; (50)

- the extreme caution with which Turkey reacted to the Islamic revolution in Iran and to the Mujaheddins' raid on the American Embassy in Teheran with the arrest and detention of all personnel. Though the episode was condemned as a violation of the rules of international law, Ankara did not follow Washington's example of applying sanctions against the Iranian government;

- its rigid line of non-interference during the Kurd rebellion in Azerbaijan, which confirmed Turkey's policy in support of the maintenance of Iran's territorial integrity; (51)

- its complete neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict, keeping normal diplomatic relations with both and even increasing its commercial and economic ties with the two countries;

- the special relationship established with Saudi Arabia, the only Arab country to participate in the OECD effort to rescue the Turkish economy by providing long-term, low interest credits and by making investments in infrastructure and the energy sector. (52)

The new economic and commercial relations established with the Arab countries are of particular interest because of the far from negligible role they could play in shaping Ankara's foreign policy line of action (especially if their development continues as indicated by the trends of the early '80s). (53)

Of equal interest are the agreements concluded in the sphere of military cooperation and arms sales, in particular those involving Libya, which seems to have become the Turkish defense industry's major client. (54)

### Chapter III

#### The Convergences and the Role of the European Countries

##### 1. The Convergences

The preceding analysis reveals that there are a number of convergent interests between the European countries and Turkey. These could serve both as the basis for elaborating a more articulate pattern of international relations and as the framework within which to formulate a programme of concrete European initiatives aimed at assisting Ankara in its efforts to adequately meet its security requirements.

Underlying the relationship is the belief that Turkey's security is fundamental to European security. It is a point often obscured by political and economic considerations despite both sides' keen awareness of its importance. From this root coincidence of interests derives a number of other common interests linked to those problems which most deeply affect the complex web of Turkish security perceptions.

First of all, the Community and Turkey have a reciprocal interest in finding a political solution to the intractable Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Not only must the Community seek out appropriate instruments for mediation but it must also be careful not to let the dispute become a pretext which in one way or another influences the procedures relating to Turkey's accession to the EC. Both parties have an interest in ensuring that Greece's membership in the Community is not interpreted in a way which gives it not only "special" economic status but also a special political status which biases the European countries' individual or collective assessment of and attitude toward the dispute. In other words, it is in the common interest that Greek-Turkish relations be perceived as a problem directly affecting the security of Europe as a whole. The dispute must therefore be treated as an element which directly bears on European security, without ignoring the fact that Community initiatives and instruments, however they are or are intended to be impartial, may not be sufficient on their own to resolve the dispute or may not be accepted by one or both of the antagonists.

In particular, European efforts should be directed at preventing the controversy from spreading beyond the regional sphere with the intervention of external powers (not necessarily, but most probably, the USSR) intent on acquiring political advantages (greater influence in return

for support offered, attempts to weaken or destabilize the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, utilization of an eventual crisis for political gains at home, etc.).

There is also a confluence of interests in providing unambiguous European support for Ankara's foreign policy whenever necessary in the context of Turkish-Soviet relations.

There is a reciprocal interest in causing Moscow to perceive that Turkey's ties with Europe (and not only with the United States, even if the security guarantee provided by the latter is somewhat more credible) are firmly rooted and that despite the ups and downs of Euro-Turkish relations, which stem partly from Turkey's internal situation, Western European countries would invariably consider a direct threat to Turkey a threat to their own security. Obviously, Moscow's perception of the solidity of those ties depends not only on the European countries' attitude toward Turkey but also on Turkey's attitude toward Europe. The political limits of a convergence based mainly on security considerations should be neither overestimated nor underestimated.

It could be argued that this convergence of interests has already been manifested in Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and that the Soviets, in formulating their foreign policy toward Ankara, base their evaluations on their perceptions of the significance and solidity of Turkey's NATO ties. It could also be argued that, in terms of security, a specifically European role would add very little to the ties which already exist within the Alliance framework. This is true. Yet a Community attitude which constantly and explicitly referred to Turkey as a European country and as a future member of the Community would give to the NATO ties a political and economic dimension of an importance not to be ignored.

Finally, there is some convergence of interests, though not an identity of outlooks nor a coincidence of postures, in finding a way to stabilize the situations in the Middle East and a political solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. Dependence on external sources of energy, the negative repercussions on the entire Mediterranean area of another Arab-Israeli conflict (especially one involving the two superpowers), and the risk of an extension of the Iran-Iraq war are elements which engender deep and common concerns in which security plays an important part.

There is instead a less distinct convergence with regard to the political and military role Turkey could play in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Gulf regions either as an element which would contribute decisively to the formulation of the Community's external policies or as a



continental platform endowed with extremely valuable infrastructure which would give the Allies a decisive geopolitical advantage in the event of an East-West crisis.

The Europeans are well aware of the geostrategic importance of Turkey. But they are also aware of the constraints that limit the range of military choices open to Ankara; constraints and limits that cannot be ignored or avoided even if Turkey becomes a full member of the Community.

## 2. The European Role

Such common interests could serve as a frame of reference for shaping a more specific European role aimed at assisting Turkey in its efforts to adequately respond to its security needs and at breaking the impasse created by the reluctance or inability of Western Europe to express in more concrete terms their recognition of the importance of Turkey's contribution to their collective security at least in the political form considered most desirable from Ankara's point of view: Turkey's full membership in the European Community. Any extension of the Community's competence beyond the present limits of an economic community is a long-term prospect. It is understandable that the member countries should tend to concentrate on more immediate economic difficulties. On the other hand, the present economic recession will, it is to be hoped, come to an end sometime and member states may once again turn their attention toward the construction of Europe.

In either case, Turkey's strategic importance will tend to play a very marginal role in the Community context while retaining its relevance as an essential factor with respect to operations in NATO's southern theater.

Whatever the timetable and procedures of Turkey's entry into the Community, a way should be found to permit it in the meantime to participate in, or become more closely associated with, what is today the major nucleus of "political" aggregation of the Community members: European Political Cooperation (EPC). In other words, consideration should be given to the possibility of Turkey's political participation preceding economic integration. This would anticipate in a sense Turkey's assumption of responsibility for community policies. It could be argued that such an involvement has been rendered all the more necessary by the increasing probability of extra-NATO crises in the Mediterranean area which would require a European response which could not be given through the structures and decision-making mechanism of the Alliance.

This would be a very important step, representing a high significant political choice for Europe and for Turkey

itself and serving to remove Ankara's doubts as to the importance of its European ties in the context of its foreign policy.

A second element of fundamental importance, which would increase the country's deterrent capacity and hence its feeling of security, is the European contribution to the modernization of Turkey's armed forces. It was pointed out earlier that Turkey would encounter enormous financial difficulties if it had to shoulder alone the extremely high cost of procuring the weapons and equipment considered necessary to meet its security requirements. Certain European countries have of course already helped Turkey in its rearmament drive (especially during the US arms embargo) by granting credits, selling arms at convenient terms, passing on operationally valid, though not ultra-modern weapons and equipment, etc. The assistance was provided mainly in the form of bilateral accords endorsed and encouraged by NATO but undertaken outside the framework of its structures. What was lacking was any coordination within a European programme of military aid aimed clearly at reducing, if not reversing, the decline of the Turkish armed forces' operational capabilities provoked by the US arms embargo. Obvious and understandable political considerations prevented a greater commitment on the part of the European allies; and the situation was further complicated by the military takeover. A coordinated European effort was thereafter an even more remote prospect.

On the other hand, there had always been a privileged relationship between Turkey and the United States in this sphere - since the 1950s the United States had been practically Turkey's only arms supplier - and also by reason of the agreements under which the Americans were allowed to use certain Turkish bases and infrastructure. The Federal Republic of Germany began to play an important role only in the '70s, granting credits for a considerable sum, supplying technologically sophisticated weapons systems, and allowing the Turkish arms industry to produce German arms and equipment under licence.

It might again be argued that Western European countries (and still more the Community as such) can play only a very marginal role, if one at all, and that they necessarily have to limit themselves to calling for (and fostering), a deeper commitment on the part of NATO and greater coordination among the allies with respect to the problems of the efficiency and operational readiness of Turkey's defense system.

The thesis adopted throughout this paper is, however, that there does exist a specific sphere in which

the European countries can legitimately operate. Few would beg to differ with the argument that the various military aid programmes should be coordinated by the organization set up to deal with Western defense problems, the Atlantic Alliance, and with the participation of the United States. And it is easy to say that the Community is still too far away from achieving that degree of political integration which would justify such initiatives. It might even be argued that all this has nothing to do with the issues involved in an enlargement of the Community. But it can also be argued that the Community cannot afford to remain indifferent to developments in the field of industrial growth, economic cooperation and rationalization of production (even if limited to the arms industry), especially if the country concerned is envisaged as a future member of the Community and, if by strengthening its security, European security is also reinforced, however indirectly.

What is needed is a coordinated European effort to enhance the Turkish arms industry's technological capabilities and to raise its output so as to favor, in a long-term perspective, the undertaking of joint ventures aimed at increasing the level of interoperability and standardization of the Turkish and the European military structures. Such an effort constitutes the third element of a European role in Turkish security.

The 1979 accords between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey already included a series of measures providing German assistance to the Turkish arms industry. (55)

In this field a certain role could be played by the Independent European Programme Group, which is not a NATO institution and of which Turkey is a member. As far as possible, Turkey should be included in those joint ventures, which would generate valuable technological fallout and offer Turkey the opportunity to modernize its defense system at the same time.

If Europe were to follow this course of action, the ties between Western European countries and Turkey would be strengthened and proof would be given that Turkey, despite the problems and motives that may obstruct its rapid entry into the Community, is considered a European country and as such an essential element of the European security picture.

Obviously, there are many difficulties involved. Community countries have differing evaluations and attitudes; there will be the need to consider the repercussions on relations with Greece; and the precarious state of the European economy is a further constraint which limits progress in this direction. Turkey too would have to

DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

overcome a number of problems: it would have to integrate European initiatives in its foreign and domestic policies and not dramatize any European reluctance to respond favourably to Turkey's application for membership in the Community.

Finally, since the major goal is enhanced security, the European role, even if motivated by diverse considerations and future prospects, should be coordinated with that of the United States (which has so far used a bilateral approach too). Moreover, though American support will continue to be indispensable, it appears to be in Ankara's own interest to avoid having the United States as its only security option.

DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

### Conclusions

Turkey constitutes an important link in European security. Turkey knows that its membership in the Atlantic Alliance is strategically decisive for European security. It knows it can count, as has in fact been verified, on Western financial assistance to avoid bankruptcy and on allied military support in the event of conflict with the USSR. And on allied military support in the event of conflict with the USSR. And it knows that the European countries are conscious of this strategic relevance and of the political if not military role it could play in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. It is therefore logical that it should tend to expect concrete European recognition of its role in the form of increased military and economic aid, greater understanding of its internal political developments, greater openness and willingness to meet its requests for membership in the Community.

In the past, Turkey has felt that this recognition was inadequate.

It is difficult to predict Ankara's future attitude toward the EC and what decision the Turkish government might take on the issue of Turkey's membership.

The attitude of the EC countries and the terms and the timetable of the membership procedure risk becoming for Turkey a crucial test whose outcome will determine the country's future relations with Europe. In other words, there is the risk that Turkey may not share the European countries' opinion that Turkey's strategic importance and security issues should not be considered in the context of negotiations between Ankara and the European Community.

In other words, Turkey might maintain that military aid is only one part of what the allies should be willing to do for Turkey in order to keep it firmly anchored to the Western bloc and ensure that its foreign policy is consistent with European interests. And it might therefore expect the Europeans to consider the Turkish-European security link which exists through NATO a motive for establishing closer political and economic ties by accepting Turkey as a member of the European Community.

This is obviously a hypothesis that still has to be verified - and only future events will prove whether and to what extent it is valid. But it is a credible hypothesis.

The spectrum of political positions on the issue of relations between Turkey and the European Community is

fairly broad and articulated. Today in Turkey there are those who see membership in the Community as a necessary step to further "Europeanization" of the country in terms of economic growth, deeper and more widespread industrialization and social progress. There are those who doubt the wiseness of a hurried "European" choice, fearing the economic backlashes and the domestic repercussion. And there are still others who totally reject the European option, considering it contrary to Turkey's interests, and who propose a different political and social development model with a preeminently regional projection.

Notwithstanding the gradual emergence of underlying Islamic drives; notwithstanding the clear tendency to seek a regional projection, more aggressively at the economic level (trade, industrial cooperation, agreements for the realization of infrastructure projects), more cautiously at the political level; and notwithstanding the perceived inadequacy of its relations with the US and Europe with respect to the totality of the new and more diversified interests and security requirements of the country, the strength of the Kemalist tradition, the political platforms of the major Turkish parties, the weight of the geostrategic factors, the great importance of economic and military relations with the West are all elements that make it unlikely that the adjustment will be such as to eliminate the western dimensions from Ankara's foreign policy.

There may be further adjustments, a temporary or permanent emphasis on new relations, efforts to realize a better balance between possibilities and needs, and greater attention to the Islamic roots of the Turkish nation. But it is hard to imagine, unless very special and unexpected events occur, that Turkey would completely sever its ties with Europe.

In March 1981, before a delegation of parliamentarians of the UEO, the leader of the military government, General Kenan Evren, affirmed: "Turkey is an inseparable and indivisible part of free and democratic Europe, and it wishes to remain so". (56)

Apart from the rhetoric, these words, meant to reassure the Europeans at a time when Turkish-European relations were particularly strained, still seem to fairly accurately reflect the thoughts and feelings of a majority of politicians, intellectuals, military men and public opinion in the country.

However, if the Europeans should fail to meet Turkey's desire for closer ties - and membership in the EC is certainly an emblematic element of closer ties - might Turkey decide to adjust its foreign policy accordingly and to the detriment of European security?

This is an open question. The hypothesis is not certain, but it must be considered as a possibility.

The issue of Turkey's entry into the Community cannot be faced only in terms of economic considerations and its effects on the European market. It must also be evaluated in strategic terms, taking into account Europe's security requirements as they present themselves today or in the intermediate or more distant future. European security requirements cannot, in fact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's participation and contribution. These elements are in many respects essential.

This is valid today, when it is NATO that performs the duties of planner and guarantor of European defense, and it will remain valid in the future - assuming that ideological antagonism and political and military competition will continue to be the outstanding (if not the only) features of East-West relations for many years to come.

The importance of strategic considerations in relations between Ankara and the European Community should therefore be viewed from a perspective which contemplates possible future developments as well, including perhaps the assumption of a greater security and defense identity in the Community. After all, the process of Turkey's entry into the Community can be expected to extend over a long period.

It is inevitable that Ankara should tend to consider the Community's response to its applications for membership a crucial test of Western Europe's acceptance of Turkey as fundamentally a "European" country and not simply as Europe's southeastern flank. Certainly, Turkish government could not justify, internally, political and military choices in line with European interests solely on the ground of membership of NATO.

Turkey's strategic importance cannot be divorced from considerations of future relations with the European Community, however indirect the link. The Community needs to take into account Turkish perceptions and requirements, especially in order to prevent those perceptions from coagulating into a feeling of alienation and estrangement from the rest of Europe.

In this context, perceptions - including of course the Community members' perceptions of Turkey's internal and foreign policies - play an important role whose impact should not be underestimated.

It is true that relations with the United States are more important for Turkey's security than relations with Europe. However, the former bear the characteristics

typical of a relationship between a medium power and a superpower. A more solid link with Europe could to a certain extent mitigate the negative effects, but only if it possesses a good dose of credibility.

I have tried to indicate how this could be accomplished. Apart from what can be done (with greater commitment and better coordination of the various national programs) to help Turkey at the diplomatic level (such as mediation with Greece) and at the military level (including participation in the effort to modernize the Turkish defense system), it seems essential to have Turkey participate politically in the Community in advance of its complete economic integration.

In other words, Turkey should be allowed to take part in European Political Cooperation while the long process of accession to the Community proceeds. The formal difficulties should not be ignored or underestimated.

It might be objected that the analysis on which these conclusions are based is overly optimistic or, worse, lacking in objectivity. It might be accused of not taking into due account the limits to the impact Turkey's strategic importance can have on relations with the Community; of underestimating the Community's substantial indifference to security problems whose management has been delegated to NATO; of seeking to superimpose distant and uncertain future prospects on the present situation.

In effect, it is undeniably difficult to imagine a politically and militarily integrated Europe at a time when the Community offers such an alarming picture of disintegration, protectionist tendencies, and diffused crisis.

Yet, the international developments of the late '70s and early '80s and the projections as to the likely course of events throughout the present decade suggest that the major problem that will have to be faced and resolved by the European countries, apart from the economic crisis, will be security. An adequate solution can be found to the security problems only if there is a collective effort and commitment. And it is essential that Turkey, because of its strategic importance, participate in this effort. It will be willing and able to do so so, however, only if it feels that it is a European country and that it shares and participates in shaping Europe's destiny without having to deny or renounce those Islamic characteristics which make it a natural bridge between eastern and western civilization.

DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION



NOTES

1. In 1970 Soviet military personnel in Egypt numbered about 20,000: the 4,000 military advisers already present on Egyptian soil were in fact joined by over 200 MiG-21 pilots, ground personnel for the maintenance of the aircraft, and 12,000-15,000 technicians and specialists assigned to the radar centers and the SA-3 surface-to-air missile bases that were installed in increasing numbers to the west of the Suez Canal.
2. In that period the Soviet Mediterranean fleet consisted of 53 units, the highest number since 1977.
3. Cfr. Maurizio Cremasco and Stefano Silvestri, Il Fianco Sud della Nato, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1980, p. 81.
4. The Backfire characteristics are: radius of action from 2,000 to 6,000 km depending on the flight profile: capable of reaching supersonic speeds at low altitudes; equipped with sophisticated navigation and firing systems and with electronic countermeasure systems; armed with AS-4 and AS-6 air-to-surface missiles; capable of attacking in any kind of weather.
5. The text of the Montreux Convention is reproduced in Appendix B of the book by Jesse W. Lewis, The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, 1976.
6. The exact size of the Soviet Navy when the hostilities broke out has not been officially made public. For an estimate cfr. R.G. Weinland, Superpower naval diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-israeli war: a case study, Washington Paper No. 61, Washington, 1979, p. 76.
7. Cfr. Amm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., On watch: a memoir, New York, 1976, p. 447.
8. Cfr. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, Turkey's Security Policies, Adelphi Papers No. 164, IISS, London, 1981, p. 15.
9. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of the Congress, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, 95th Congress, 27 March 1977, Washington, USGPO, 1977.
10. Cfr. The Military Balance 1982-1983, IISS, London,

- 1982, p. 15.
11. Cfr. Sir Bernard Burrows, "The security dimension for Western Europe", paper presented at the TEPSA/IEP Conference on Turkey and the Community, Bonn, 28-29 November 1980, p.1.
  12. The major European contributions were from the Federal Republic of Germany (295 million dollars), Italy (115 million dollars) and France (100 million dollars). The United States contributed 295 million dollars and Japan 100 million. Cfr. Financial Times, 7 May 1981.
  13. The West German contribution dropped from 295 million to about 200 million dollars whereas the United States contribution rose from 295 to 300 million. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 8 May 1981.
  14. Actually, in October of the same year, the US Congress mitigated to a certain extent the February measure by approving 125 million dollars' worth of military credits for the purchase of arms in 1976 and 175 million for 1977 and 1978. Cfr. D.B. Sezer, op.cit., p. 25.
  15. In January 1975, at the Guadeloupe conference, West Germany was asked to lead coordination of assistance to Turkey.
  16. Cdr. Défense et Diplomatie, n. 44, 1 October 1980, p. 5 and Military Technology, n. 21, February 1981, p. 86.
  17. In May 1981 the two countries signed a "memorandum of understanding" for cooperation in the arms industry.
  18. The category 3 divisions are at a quarter of their full war strength in terms of personnel, possibly complete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescent). Cfr. The Military Balance 1982-83, IISS, London, 1982, p. 15.
  19. The deployment of forces in these military districts is as follows: Kiev, 11 divisions (6 tank, 1 motor rifle, 1 artillery); Moscow, 7 divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 airborne); Volga, 3 motor rifle divisions; Turckestand, 6 divisions (5 motor rifle, 1 artillery).
  20. Cfr. The Military Balance 1982-1983, op. cit., p. 20.
  21. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 29 November 1978.
  22. All data on the Turkish armed forces is from the The Military Balance 1982-1983, cit., p. 44.
  23. For the financial data and a complete list of the planned purchases cfr. Senate Delegation Report,

- Perspective on NATO's Southern Flank, a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3-13 April 1980, USGPO, Washington, 1980, p. 16.
24. For the fiscal year 1981 the US Congress had approved 250 million dollars for the Foreign Military Sales program and 200 million for the economic aid program and about 2 million for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. For the fiscal year 1982 the United States increased its aid to 700 million dollars (300 million in economic aid and 400 in military aid). Of the 400 million in military aid, 250 were provided at low interest rates. In addition, the aid for the IMET program was to be increased from 1.6 to 3.5 million dollars. Cfr. International Communications Agency Daily Wireless File, ICA 53, 18 March 1981.
  25. In the course of 1982 the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was frequently sabotaged. On Iraqi oil output, cfr. Financial Times, 4 January 1982, p. 1, 8 January 1982, p. 14. I June 1983, p. 3 and 3 December 1982, p. 3.
  26. Syria, for example, has more than 3,500 tanks (including 1,800 T-62s and T-72s), over 1,600 armoured vehicles, Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles, SA-6 and SA-8 surface-to-air missiles, Su-20, MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighters. Iraq - before the war with Iran started - had over 200 tanks, including 150 T-72s and some one hundred French-made AMX-30s, about 3,000 armored vehicles, Frog and Scud surface missiles, SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, Tu-22 Blinder medium bombers, MiG-23, Su-20 and Mirage F-1 fighters.
  27. On the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean cfr. Andrew Mison, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Papers, No. 155, IISS, London, 1980.
  28. Greece's insistence and the impossibility of finding a compromise formula prevented the formulation and issue of a final communiqué for the first time in the Alliance's history.
  29. Cfr. Le Monde, 13 February 1980, p. 7.
  30. Cfr. Nouvelles Atlantiques, No. 1130, 8 June 1979, p. 4.
  31. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1979.
  32. Cfr. Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and Nato, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 309-313.
  33. Among the measures taken we can cite: the suspension of US reconnaissance missions over Turkish territory; the signing in 1969 of a defense

- cooperation treaty that rationalised the many bilateral accords concluded in previous years on the operations of US military infrastructure in Turkey, setting precise limits and procedures; the refusal to allow the US to use bases on Turkish territory during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts.
34. These were five main installations (Pincirlik, Incirlik, Sinop, Kargaburun, Balbasi) and seven communications centers (Yamanlav, Karatas, Sahintepe, Alemdag, Elmadag, Mahmurdag, Kurecik). Cfr. Nouvelles Atlantiques, No. 1209, 15 April 1980, p. 3.
35. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 13-14 June 1981.
36. Cfr. Nouvelles Atlantiques, No. 1428, 10 June 1982, p. 2..
37. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 11 January 1979.
38. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 28 March 1979, 12 April 1979, 24 May 1979.
39. Cfr. International Communications Agency, Daily Wireless File, n. 52, 14 February 1980, p. 9 and n. 87, 20 March 1980, p. 17.
40. Of the 403.5 million in military aid, 400 were for FMS and 3.5 for IMET. Cfr. International Communications Agency, DWF, 53, 18 March 1981, p. 4 and DWF, 57, 25 March 1981, p. 5.
41. Cfr. Nouvelles Atlantiques, 1394, 19 February 1982; p. 4.
42. Of interest was the agreement signed on the limits of their sovereignty over the Black Sea continental shelf. Cfr. Financial Times, 19 January 1979 and Nouvelles Atlantiques, n. 1104, 7 March 1979, p. 3.
43. Cfr. D.B. Sezer, op. cit., p. 31.
44. Cfr. Financial Times, 31 May 1979.
45. The project was to be jointly managed by the state-owned Turkish electricity company and the Soviet Atomenergo Export group. Cfr. Financial Times, 6 June 1979 and Défense et Diplomatie, n. 26, 28 June 1979, p. 4.
46. On the U-2 issue cfr. International Herald Tribune, 16 May 1979, 17 May 1979, 30 June - 1 July 1979.
47. A substantial coincidence of positions could be noted in the foreign policy declarations of the last three Turkish governments from the '70s to 1980 with regard to the stance toward the USSR.
48. Cfr. Financial Times, 7 February 1980, p. 22.
49. The financial aid package included 852 million dollars in credits starting on 31 October 1981 and an immediate sunk capital credit of 106.5 million dollars for technical assistance. With regard to the Community tariffs on Turkish agricultural products, they were to be reduced by 80% by 1985 and

- completely abolished by 1987. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 2 July 1980.
50. Libya undertook to supply a considerable amount of financial aid and to increase oil exports to Ankara. Cfr. Défense et Diplomatie, n. 6, 8 February 1979, p. 3.
51. Cfr. Financial Times, 19 Decemember 1979, p. 3.
52. Turkey received 250 million dollars in 1979, another 250 million in 1980, plus 80 million in credits from the Islamic Development Bank in 1979. Cfr. Financial Times, 4 April 1979, p. 2, 7 August 1979, p. 2, 2 May 1980, p. 20 and International Herald Tribune, 14 March 1980.
53. The bulk of the increase in Turkish exports in 1982 is attributable to a jump in exports to the Middle East and North Africa, which were beginning to replace OECD countries as Turkey's major customers. According to figures for the first eight months of 1982, five of Turkey's top seven markets were in the Middle East, and Iraq was replacing West Germany as the biggest recipient of Turkish goods. Cfr. Financial Times, 4 November 1982, p. 4.
54. One of the latest contracts was stipulated with the Taskizak shipyards of Istanbul for ten to twelve SAR-33-class missile fast attack craft (designed by the Germans and produced in Turkey on license) to be supplied to the Libyan Navy. Libya has also purchased nine C-107-type LCT (landing craft, tank) from Turkey.
55. Cfr. Der Spiegel, 4 February 1980, pp. 33-34.
56. Cfr. International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1981.

[illegible]

100-443887-100

[illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 35 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 17 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 85 years of age or older is projected to increase from 2 million to 4 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 90 years of age or older is projected to increase from 500,000 to 1 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 95 years of age or older is projected to increase from 100,000 to 200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 100 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10,000 to 20,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

*Journal of Management Studies*, 19(6), 709-728.

...the fact that the ...

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI  
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 6721

BIBLIOTECA