MAGHREBI CONFLITCS AND MEDITERRANEAN IMPLICATIONS

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Neither divine will nor geographic determinism nor any other permanent destiny has imposed fixed and immutable causes of conflict (or cooperation) in this world. Objective factors are subject to actors' perception, and subjective factors are highly variable. This is not to say that events are haphazard and without cause, but simply that even the most longstanding quarrels and friendships are the outcome of different ingredients, interests, desires and decisions from regime to regime, country to country, era to era. To identify ongoing sources of conflict in North Africa, then, is an exercise in interpretation rather than a study which identifies permanent, overriding factors within which rulers try to maneuver.

Furthermore, in North Africa, many of the strongest sources of conflict operating in other areas are absent. The four Maghrebi societies discussed here--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya--are brothers. All are Arabo-Berber societies, practicing Sunni Islam of the Maliki school with a few Ibadi exceptions, speaking a mutually intelligible if slightly variant dialects of Arabic and reading a common newspaper standard (again with a few yet-unArabized Berber pockets), and following generally the same lifestyle. All underwent the same conquest and Arabization process and evidenced the same successful assimilation practices that might be the envy of later-day colonialists. When the Muslim community fell under Turkish rule, the Sherifian Empire of Morocco (and the Saharan nomads who owed it spiritual allegiance) escaped its suzereinty, without becoming a

historic enemy to the beyliks of Algiers, Tunis or Tripoli. When the European conquest came, over the century after 1830, three countries (plus Mauritania) fell under the same French ruler, again with the exception of zones and enclaves along the Moroccan coast which went to Spain. They then became independent through the efforts of similar and related nationalist movements, between 1956 and 1962. Italy's brief conquest of Libya ran 1911-42.

The societies which continued their collective existence through these events show greater difference within than among themselves. On a map without boundaries, there is nothing to indicate where any of the component states starts and stops. Instead, one sees roughly east-west bands of features cutting across the region, wider or higher in the west, pressed into the sea by a north-pushing desert in the east. The predominant feature is a mountain chain that starts in the Canary Islands and cuts diagonally across Morocco, joined by other spurs from the Atlantic coast and the Mediterranean shore, flattening out into the High Plateaus of Alteria and the Tell of Tunisia before dipping into the sea and emerging as Sicily and the Appenines. This is the Atlas chain, which separates the coastal plain along the Atlantic and Mediterranean shores from the arid lands of the pre-Sahara and the Sahara. South of the Atlas, the land is valuable for its mineral resources alone, ~~although Algeria is experimenting with sand farming~~. On the highlands and plains, the land is good for farming, and a number of rivers rise from the mountains to provide current irrigation, with a potential for expansion. The vocation is not new: North Africa fed Rome in an earlier time. The population has molded itself to these geographic bands. It is densest along the plains and thins out into the interior, although this distribution was not always so. It was European colonization which turned economic activities toward foreign

trade and established or expanded the large port cities; the earlier Arab conquest flowed westward in the interior of the country and located its cities on land trade routes. The flood of Arabization left significant pockets of Berbers above its high water mark--most in Morocco (35%) where the mountains are highest and most inhospitable, a smaller group (18%) in the Algerian Kabylia, least (5%) in less mountainous Tunisia. Bands of social similarity run across the region, so that there is more in common among the lifestyles of the mountain herdsmen of the Atlas, the Kabylia, Jebel Akhdar, the Khroumeria, of the plainsmen of the Gharb, the Mitidja, the Mejerda, or of the traditional artisans of the medinas of Fes, Constantine, Tripoli, and Tunis, than there is among the several levels within each country. The same effect is even more characteristic of relations between the modern sector of businessmen, military, bureaucrats, technicians, and intellectuals and the more traditional parts of each country.

Many more characteristics could be cited to show similarities and diversities in North Africa, and other elements will be brought out as specific causes of conflict are identified. But the major point from which to begin is a recognition that great cultural clashes, like the Hindu-Muslim conflict on the Indian subcontinent, or longstanding national drives, like the Russians' search for warm-water ports, or historic conflicts reinforced by national character interpretations, like the politics of the French and the Germans or of the French and the British, or large-scale geopolitical imperatives, such as the various interpretations of heartland and rimland, or geo-historical patterns, such as the ebbs and flows between Nile and Fertile Crescent across the landbridge of Palestine, have no equivalent in the sources of conflict in the Maghreb.

I

1. The most obvious potential source of conflict between any states is found in their boundaries. Since North African states contain nations abuilding and since the concept of a territorial bounded state is relatively new to the region, boundary problems are to be expected. To this should be added the fact that the terrain is often hard to mark and was long considered not worth marking. Under such conditions, it is not hard to understand why there simply is no established boundary in some areas.

The Muslim socio-political unit is the community of believers (umma), ruled by a representative (khalifa) of God chosen by the community and in contractual (bei'a) relationship with it. This "state" existed wherever its members moved, resulting in a demographic rather than a territorial unit. Obviously, no state can be exclusively one or the other but it is the basis of the concept that is referred to here. Since the jurisdiction of the state was determined by the allegiance of the people, not by the limits of the land on which they lived, there were no fewer "territorial" problems but there were no boundary problems per se. Where nomads settled, city-states and their regions gave their allegiance to one capital or another but the limits where one region abutted on another were usually not under any authority strong enough to require a line of demarcation. Even in the era of pre-modern national consolidation, at the end of the eighteenth century (Bey Hamuda II in Tunis, Dey Mohammed ben 'Uthman in Algiers, Mawlay Mohammed III in Fes, Yusuf Karamanli in Tripoli), it was the central authority which was being consolidated but not the geographically finite extent of its writ.

Under French conquest, some boundaries were established to separate colonized (Algerian) from not-yet-colonized (Moroccan and Tunisian/Libyan territories; when colonization was completed, any disputes were at least an internal, French affair. A large part of the territory was treated in the same way as the North African rulers themselves had done earlier, as a region to be shifted from one jurisdiction (Algiers) to another (Rabat) but unworthy of an established boundary since it was "without water" and "uninhabitable" and so a boundary would be "superfluous." In the absence of any such boundary determination, the way was open after independence for nationalist movements to revert to a traditionalist justification for irredentism. Particularly where the colonial rule took the form of a protectorate of an ongoing monarchy and khalifate, as in Morocco, where in addition only the main part of the realm received its independence at first and bits and pieces were restored thereafter, it was logical to push for a maximum restoration of the Empire. On the other hand, where the restoration of the monarchy was not the basis of nationalism but where an undemarcated frontier ran into a desert that was considered to be a common patrimony, it was logical to call for a redrawing of the boundaries, and then equally logical to be satisfied with a solution that provided for negotiated sharing of the benefits of the desert.

The traditional basis of border disputes could be expected to pass away along with other aspects of traditional legitimization, were it not supported by two other, more modern concerns. One is the discovery of mineral deposits. The Algero-Libyan dispute was introduced by some old maps and unratified treaties but is exacerbated by oil under the ground and is still not settled in the minds of the current Libyan rulers. Twenty years earlier, the Algero-Tunisian dispute was ignited by a

Tunisian agreement to run a French pipeline from the Edjele oil deposits to the nearest port, the Tunisian city of Skirra, during the Algerian war when the question of sovereignty over the Sahara had not yet been settled; the exacerbant of the conflict was the discovery of an oilfield at el-Borma initially tapped from the Algerian side but with most of its underground deposits on the Tunisian side of the border. The Algero-Moroccan dispute was compounded by the presence of an iron mountain at Gara Jebilet, south of Tindouf, which the Moroccans claimed and which the Algerians could exploit most economically for export through a Moroccan port. It was then further complicated by the discovery of rich phosphate deposits at Bou Kra' in the northern part of the then-Spanish Sahara (in this part of the Moroccan irredentist conflict, the question is not over boundaries--except for the new boundary separating the Moroccan north from the Mauritanian south of the formerly Spanish territory--but over ownership).

The other "modern" element is the role of success in legitimizing the claim and claimant. In each dispute, the national leader of each country staked a lot on his claim, and only Bourguiba has been secure enough in other aspects of his program and legitimization to be able to withdraw and compromise gracefully. The bitter dispute over the Sahara has continued beyond all reason, with an Algeria which has no direct claim on the territory challenging a relatively well-established fait accompli by Morocco; yet the endurance of the conflict is somewhat more understandable when the personal engagement of the two leaders, both in the process of a major election and a shift in political institutionalization, is considered. By the same token, the fact that both have come through their domestic political challenge in good shape may permit some disengagement on the border issue.

The resolution of the contemporary boundary disputes in North Africa has displayed some very specific characteristics. There have been no disputes over established, demarcated boundaries other than the Libyan special cases, and most of the disputes have concerned the disposition of colonial territory. In addition, those disputes which went to war followed the usual African pattern of brief hostilities until the exhaustion of current stocks, followed by a cease-fire and then a long period marked by bits of progress and regress in the resolution of the conflicting claims themselves. The Fabian proxy war in the Moroccan (and Mauritanian) Sahara is a new military approach to contemporary conflict, but it resembles traditional means and even traditional behavior in general among the nomads (particularly the Reguibat) of the region. Even when boundaries are established and demarcated, frontier mineral deposits, transit facilities, and nomadic wanderings will continue to provide the basis for conflict, although at a much more manageable level.

2. If boundary disputes refer to the shell of the state, national consolidation as a source of conflict refers to the internal composition within that shell. The political history of North Africa over the past two centuries (or more) can be interpreted as a struggle for national consolidation, an attempt to create a centralized governmental structure capable of commanding the loyalties and mobilizing the resources necessary to meet the demands of modern life. The need to build a center implies also the need to define, attract, and hold its periphery, and this is often a competitive process with one's neighbors, both because of potential conflict

over the same peripheral territories and because patriotic solidarity against a consolidating neighbor is often the best means of consolidation at home. Some aspects of this process have already been noted in connection with boundary disputes, for there is an inevitable overlap.

Of the major consolidators at the end of the eighteenth century, only the Moroccan sultan and the Tunisian bey were successful to any extent, and the bey--favored by geography and history--was the only one who could boast a centralized state with the beginnings of a bureaucracy and a sense of national identity, organized about a single capital, and enough in control of its functions to be able to experiment not only with military and tax organizations but also with industry and education. Morocco was in a sense a Tunisia spread out over a larger territory, in which the sultan occupied the major cities as his capitals and attempted to consolidate his temporal control over the rest of the territory; the effort required left little energy or structure for the activities of modernization that Tunis was able to begin, even if unsuccessfully. In Algeria and Libya, the writ of the city-state authorities did not run far beyond their walls and the centralizing power was absent. As a result, when the French came to conquer a coastal enclave--as they and the Iberians had been doing for the past three centuries--they found themselves drawn both by vacuum and by dissidence into the interior, and eventually into contest with the Sherifian Empire over whole border regions. But more important is the fact that even before the French arrived, the sultan sought to include the region of the Tlemcen city-state in his consolidating realm, and in the process of fighting the French, he sought to extend the same suzereinty over Abdelqader. In Libya, the Italians did nothing at all to consolidate a state.

The territorial division of the Sahara can be seen as part of the same conflict of national consolidation and contests over the periphery, a process of sorting out national territories, identities, and activities in which the center tries to consolidate its ability to control its land and people and at the same time tries to establish convincing reasons why a particular territory and population should be part of its state rather than of another. Inevitably, there is a conflict potential inherent in both types of activities as states attempt to protect themselves against and distinguish themselves from their neighbors. The constant parallel between Morocco and Algeria in such military measures as arms imports and military budgets and the sudden overarming of Libya and then of Tunisia are indicator of the first. A less frequently-cited example of the second is the way in which one state uses the other as a target of nationalism: Ben Bella used the Algero-Moroccan war of 1963 to rally the Kabyle dissidents to support his regime, Bourguiba used the Gafsa raid of 1980 to reintegrate the opposition, and Hassan II used the entire irredentist issue, but particularly the Green March into Spanish Sahara in 1976, to swing over the entire opposition to his camp. In the case of unconvertable opponents--whether they be Morocco's ben Barka, Algeria's Zbiri and Qaid, and a series of Tunisian plotters and politicians--one of the components of their treason is their support from the neighboring country, even though no state of war exists between the two. There is of course an ideological dimension that goes beyond simple national consolidation and that is associated with this cause of conflict, but it will be the subject of separate examination in the following section.

Before turning to ideology, however, there is an additional aspect to national consolidation that warrants discussion. The attempts of the North African states to solidify national structures and develop national

identities is conflictual because the societies--and indeed the economies--are so similar. If the countries were visibly different, national consolidation would not require such effort; if the economies were complementary, cooperation would be easier. Too much can be made of this point: Maghrebi states are not perpetually at loggerheads because they grow Mediterranean products, but, although growing Mediterranean products does give them certain common interests, it also provides the necessity for working out shares and competing for markets in dealing with the outside world since precolonial times.

The reverse is more significant: Since Maghrebi states are going through a process of national consolidation, protectionist autarky often takes the lead over interdependent complementarity. Complementarity is seen as dependency, subject to the whims of capricious leaders of rival states. It is hard to find pre-colonial, pre-industrial examples of Libya's, Morocco's, Algeria's and Tunisia's reluctance to locate an all-Maghrebi steel mill in one of their countries; heightened self-sufficiency seems to come with modernization. The conflict appears with a neo-Leninist extension of this activity: Given the size of the North African states' internal markets, the drive for self-sufficiency paradoxically requires the conquest of a regional market to be successful. Thus, Algerian industrialization is predicated on Algerian dominance of the Maghrebi market, a policy that cannot work if each state adopts it.

National social, political and economic consolidation is an imperative felt by each of the North African states, pressing them into distinctions, competition, and imposition. Conflict here is more subtle than in the case of boundaries, and it is hard to distinguish particular patterns to it. Nor is the obvious solution offered by comparative advantage--in economics or in other areas--always an acceptable means of conflict resolution.

3. A third source of conflict is ideology, which adds a further dimension to the previous factors. Polities are not merely interchangeable entities, behaving identically under the same imperatives of external and internal consolidation as modified only by free will and accidents of geography. States also compose the myths and values by which they live, and these ingredients of ideology are indissociable from the structure of society and its political reflection. The North African states have identified and reinforced their objective differences with ideological perceptions, coloring a black-and-white picture so as to bring out some aspects and hide others. Such ideological perceptions tend to be self-proving hypotheses, providing a subjective basis for conflict that often outlasts the original objective factors. The perceptions thus appear to have a longer future than a past; although they can be consciously altered, they seem to be a feature of developing, industrializing society, with no precolonial antecedents (unless one considers the different types of religious beliefs behind the desert/city rivalry which Ibn Khaldun analyses to be an example of traditional ideology).

Algeria is basically a revolutionary proletarian society. It was twice revolutionized, by the French when they came and by the French when they left, independent of anything the Algerians themselves might do: The first move superimposed an ascriptive upper class on society, the second decapitated the social structure, and the Algerian response of national solidarity and social promotion was a logical reaction. In a country where few of the new ruling elite owned land, where any remaining aristocrats were collaborators, where the national liberation struggle was a people's (and even a peasants') war, and where cultural identity had been kept alive in the home, the political myths of the new state were inescapable.

In Libya, the first independence was a traditional restoration, with a small bourgeoisie making money under the protection of the palace (itself inhabited by an old sufi symbol), but the second independence (to borrow an African opposition term) was a traditional jacobin revolution, with ideas for change imposed from the top but drawing their inspiration from a number of sources within the society (all parallels break down somewhere, and unlike the Jacobins the Qadhdhafist ideology drew heavily on religion for its ideas). Earlier social and political institutions--bourgeoisie and palace--were new and weak in legitimacy, inviting an ideology in their mirror image.

In Morocco, by contrast, nearly every factor was different and a bourgeois monarchy was the result. Both the commercial aristocracy and the tribal monarchy were protected by the Europeans, even before the formal French Protectorate which strengthened both and then gave way to their nationalist alliance. Both were landowners, both collaborators, both nationalists, and both maintained the cultural identity during the two-generation-long French occupation. Even when the king has tried to pursue a radical foreign policy, as in the Casablanca Group of 1961-62, the words never sounded the same as when used by the Algerians. In Tunisia, the polity has been a bourgeois republic, with the baldi families of Tunis playing a leading role in the governance of society even under the bey and the bourgeoisie of the lesser cities of the Sahel joining them through the nationalist movement. Conveniently, it was the bey who was the collaborator, but property ownership, cultural identity, and political participation belonged to the rest of the population. Political party activity, a government exercise in Algeria and a (loyal) opposition exercise in Morocco, was typically an integrated exercise of rulers and ruled in Tunisia. These elements may be impressionistically selected but they are facts nonetheless, and they form the basis of very different ideologies. They are subject to both evolutionary and revolutionary change, to be sure, but such changes can also be identified nationally.

The result is a number of empirical referents for self-perception and identification that influence political discourse. Societies not only see themselves in chosen terms but they see others in relation to these terms, either applying their referents to other societies or using or contesting the terms other societies have chosen. Colonial farmers generally agreed that Moroccan farm laborers were better than Algerians because they were harder working and accepted authority. Moroccan students in the 1960s longed for the socialist intellectuals' paradise which they perceived Algeria to be. Algerians felt assured that Morocco's feudal monarchy would collapse in its own corruption. In the 1970s, readers of Moroccan newspapers and students in the University had to be satisfied with biased and incomplete information on the Algerian system. On the basis of their own and others' ideological perceptions, similar and neighboring societies have begun to make real distinctions between each other, building on false expectations and poor information, and with a mixture of envy and disdain seeing the enemy of the domestic system in control of the system next door.

The thesis presented here is that such artificial distinctions which make themselves real are indeed the reflection of the historical evolution of societies but are also the product of a felt need to make oneself identifiable and distinct from one's neighbors where otherwise such distinctions do not exist. If there were no real ideological differences, they would have to be invented. The continued ideological rivalries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, or of Russia and China, are applicable to the Maghreb, not inapplicable because of North African internal similarities. A revolution in Morocco will not bring long lasting amity with Algeria, for reasons of both reality and perception. In fact, only when identities

are sorted out and given a real distinction internally and acceptance by others externally will ideology receed as a source of conflict.

4. A fourth source of regional conflict, again related to the previous factors, is the Kautilyan pattern of relations characteristic of North Africa. Although there is no Maghrebi equivalent of the Mauryan Indian commentator (ibn Khaldun wrote about a single opposition of desert and town), the states of the region have continually acted as if "my neighbor is my enemy and my neighbor's neighbor is my friend." Three countries, standing side by side along the Mediterranean coast, with their backs to the sand and their faces to the sea, held together by a common notion of regionality, by membership in the same overlapping regional international organizations (OAU and LAS), by an east-west transportation network, and by the need to interact, have had to develop a pattern to these interactions. In addition, this Kautilyan pattern was encouraged by the French during the nationalist period and thereafter to the present. Even the institutionalized attempts at regional unity have been dominated and broken by this same pattern.

The very act of granting independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 was an attempt by France to secure its Algerian flanks, cut its losses, and enlist new allies in its North African policy. While these aims failed, the attempt of the three nationalist movements to establish the basis of regional unity the following year ran ashore on the effect created by the French, namely that two of the nationalist movements were government parties while the third was a rebel guerrilla force. Later that

year, Tunisia persuaded the Algerian FLN to move its headquarters from Egypt to Tunis, and alienated the Sherifian Empire by abolishing its own monarchy. Tunisia then alienated the FLN by allowing the Ejele-Skhirra pipeline to cross its territory, and in 1961 Morocco had enlisted it in its first alliance, the Casablanca Group, from which Tunisia was excluded because of its support for Mauritania against Morocco. Within two years, Algeria was independent and the two former allies were at war with each other.

Beginning in 1965 with the Hassan-ben Bella meeting at Saida (which in part resulted in the latter's overthrow four months later), the pattern began to change slightly. Algeria's Maghrebi policy has been to develop a pattern of friendly bilateral relations with its neighbors as an alternative preferable to predetermined hostilities and more realistic than regional unification. Boumedienne worked out agreements with Morocco over trade, mineral exploitation, foreign policy, and finally the border in 1968-72, settled the el-Borma dispute with Tunisia in 1970, and joined in positive-sum tripartite cooperation with Morocco and Mauritania over Spanish Sahara against Spain. None of it lasted. Relations with Tunisia have become testy on occasion, and relations with Morocco have moved back to the edge of war since 1975.

Algeria's policy is well-fitted to its position: It is the keystone state, and any move toward regional unity is impossible without or against it. But Algeria is not interested in regional unity either, since such an arrangement would saddle it with more problems than advantages. As a result, a position of policy dominance is all it seeks to achieve, but the tendency to return to a Kautilyan pattern of relations has proven irresistable.

Into this checkerboard pattern then came Libya, essentially after its Mashreqi rebuff in the October war of 1973. After its abortive unification with Tunisia in 1974, it set up the basic pattern of relations for the coming decade by signing the mutual defense treaty of Hassi Messaoud in 1975. The two allies sometimes act as enemies (over the border), sometimes as rivals (over Saharan, Chadian or Tunisian policy), sometimes even as allies (in the Steadfastness Front)--as as a Kautilyan set of neighbors/non-neighbors should.

Except for a short time in the eleventh century, North Africa has never been a political or economic unit. All colonial rulers divided the extensive territory into administrative units with different regimes. There is no concept of a "Maghrebi nation" as there is of an "Arab nation," despite the interest in Maghreb unity. In fact, there is not even a single Arabic word for North Africa, since "Maghreb" refers properly to Morocco. Nor is there a common enemy on the horizon, against which the states could unite.

Whether the Kautilyan pattern is played out at the level of hostilities or merely as shifts from disillusion to indifference, it appears to be a resiliant tendency, perhaps more a reflection of relations than their cause, but nonetheless a pattern that seems to reassert itself despite some efforts to the contrary.

5. All of the previous sources of conflict have been essentially internal to the states or to the region. A fifth source concerns the states' relation to the two larger regions to which they belong--Africa and the Middle East. For long the states of Africa have had a fair degree of equality in terms of effective power resources. As a result, despite some early attempts, no continental leaders have arisen; no states have had the resources to support a bid for African leadership and even the best-endowed states have not been able to mobilize and transform these resources into power. The same characteristic is obviously not true of the Middle East, where leadership struggles have been endemic, but it is applicable to North African participation in these struggles.

However, this situation is changing, particularly in regard to the African states. Some states in Africa--and among them the three states of North Africa--are developing at a respectable rate, pulling far ahead of others, and this development can be translated into applicable power and into the desire to exercise power. As a result, the coming decade is likely to see serious leadership struggles, particularly in regard to Africa, with the Maghrebi states, particularly Morocco and Algeria, drawn in in pursuit of their potential.

Morocco and Algeria are twins, as already noted in part, a condition which accentuates their rivalry. With about 20 million people each, they are the sixth and seventh largest states in Africa (including Egypt). With about$16 million and$32 million GNP, respectively, they are the third and sixth richest states in Africa; Libya with $25 million is fourth. With percapita GNP of $900 & $1800 they are still the fourth and sixth richest states (Libya with $9000 & Tunisia with $760 are first & fifth by this measure); their per capita growth rates over the 1970s decade of 3.9 and 2.6% show a steady growth performance, but Tunisia's percapita growth rate of 5.8% in the 1970s is outstanding. Libya, over the mercurial decade, fared badly at -2.6%. Tunisia and Libya have universal primary education and Algeria may attain it by the 1980s; Algeria and Morocco can be expected to have 20% of the eligible-age children in secondary school in the 1980s, with Tunisia 30% and Libya 50%, and figures of 3% to 5% for higher education, giving them a sizeable pool of skilled manpower.

A few other factors work against Moroccan and Algerian pretentions at African leadership, particularly their distance and separation from the rest of the continent and their racial difference from Black Africa. On the other hand, their rivals are few: The obvious one is Nigeria, if it rouses itself, but the more proximate rival is Libya even though its pretentions

are primarily limited to Arab Africa and may not outlast the current regime.

As North African states develop ahead of others in their region, they will be increasingly tempted to use their sources of power to line up other states behind them and save the rest from the misleading influences of their rivals. Leadership is therefore not likely to be satisfied with its followers of the moment; it is also likely to seize on the developmental problems of its rivals' followers to attack and subvert their regimes if it cannot influence their decisions.

It would be presumptious to seek historic roots for such policies in the eleventh-century Saharan Empire of the Almoravids or the sixteenth-century trans-Saharan expeditions of the Saadis, or in the wide-ranging colonial alliances and conquests of the Italians and French. The most immediate antecedents come from the incipient balance of power politics that arose out of the two groups of new African states, named after their founding capitals, Casablanca and Brazzaville, in 1959-1963, prior to the creation of the OAU. Subversion was a means of carrying out inter-African relations during this period, in the absence of a conflict-resolving forum and norms provided subsequently by the African Organization. The establishment of the OAU generalized African states' contacts with each other and their concern over African problems, while at the same time creating a concert pattern of international relations that kept blocs and alliances from forming.

The rise of more developed states and the breakdown of the conflict resolution machinery of the OAU concert system has brought back the predominance of camps and blocs, and the sides have hardened. The trigger has been the Saharan affair, which deadlocked the OAU into two equal groups behind Morocco and Algeria; it could also be said that the Angolan affair provided the initial split, but the intervention of South

Africa undermined the "moderate" side and prevented the split from continuing. The same cannot be said of the Saharan affair, and in any case, the sides in the two conflicts of early 1976 largely coincided. The second incident was the alleged raid on the presidential palace at Cotonou, Benin, in which Morocco, Senegal and Gabon were supposedly implicated. The third incident the invasion of Shaba province of Zaire, originating in Angola, where Moroccan troops have been sent to support the regime of Gen. Sese Seko Mobutu. The fourth was the establishment of the Rejection and then the Steadfastness Fronts in the Arab world, a split much more significant than the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League. All of these events date from the latter half of the 1970s, but it took two more years before the summer of 1982 when they finally took organizational form with the OAU split.

There are two other influences on the leadership struggle in beside the conscious--even if episodic--policies of the principle states. One is the role of the followers: As any active state knows, one's allies have a way of inserting their own interests and moving outside the assigned role of obedient supporters. If the leadership drive of a few states is a source of conflict in North Africa, the interests of their respective followers is a source of equal importance. The other is the role of external allies: As crises escalate, developing states find their own resources overtaxed, even when other developing states are enrolled in the conflict, and the natural tendency is to seek outside support from developed states. The highly principled campaigns to seek only "African solutions to African problems," expressed in other terms for other regions, derived its practical importance as a tactic to delegitimize the search for outside allies. Again, there is practical wisdom in the approach, since for developing countries, developed allies may provide power resources but they also bring "conflict by association" that is not always helpful to developing states' interests.

6. The final source of conflict in North Africa builds on the previous factors and projects into the world beyond. The goal of the entire modern (post-medieval) history of North African societies (as elsewhere) in its broadest sense has been to achieve a better life for some or more of its inhabitants in contemporary terms. It was this drive which led rulers to look for new possessions and functions in the nineteenth century, in contact with the West (or to North Africa, the North). It was the broadening of this goal which the French called their civilizing mission, and it is the same goal, with somewhat different specific components and a different cultural or ideological hue, which is associated with such ideas as development, modernization, Islamic socialism, and others. Yet the concern is not merely one of domestic goals and policies, although it is primarily so. It also has foreign policy ramifications. On the field of foreign relations, it can also be said that a primary goal of developing states is to achieve acceptance in the world of the developed.

The philosophy and general concept of international relations have changed much since the years when they were a reflection of a Concert of Europe and a colonial system emanating from it. The major change can be summarized as the entry of new non-European states into that Concert (USA, Japan, possibly China), the self-destruction of the European center and its replacement by a bipolar security system, and the liberation of the formerly-colonial world from a subordinate to a legally equal status from which they may aspire to entry into the central Concert. This entry is above all a matter of generating and mobilizing the elements of national power, and hence of development; in the past, the acquisition of these elements in

sufficient quantity was demonstrated by successful participation in a major war, although there is no guarantee that that is the only way turning points in history may be marked in the future. But associated with this development, basically economic, is a choice of political strategies. Like readiness or worthiness for independence, readiness or worthiness for entry into the central Concert may not be immediately apparent to the naked eye and may have to be asserted, supported, and eventually imposed by political action.

There are three strategies for this action: New aspirants can simply compete and become accepted on their own, they can be coopted under an alliance or sponsorship of a member, or they can force their way in (on somewhat different terms) as the representative or leader of lesser outsiders. These strategies are as applicable to new firms entering into competition with established businesses, new graduates making their way into competition with lawyers or other professions, or new blood making its way into a closed circle of established families, as they are to newcomers on the world arena, but are no less applicable to the latter context because of their universality. Historically, the states of North Africa, among others, tried the first strategy and failed, were pressed into the second in a particularly rigid form, and now are faced with the three-fold choice again in different terms.

Tunisia is particularly apt as an example of a state which tried to hoist itself to the level of the developing European states in the middle of the nineteenth century, wavered in its strategy, and then fell into bankruptcy and receivership as a result. However, the same policy, with different dates and details, yielded the same result in Algeria fifty years earlier and in Morocco thirty years later. The borrowed

status acquired under colonialism is less interesting since it does not concern national policy by North African polities; the policy of moving from proxy membership in the European concert to an independently-negotiated relation, however, is particularly well exemplified in the shifting attitudes and negotiations with the European Economic Community Morocco and Tunisia have concluded association agreements out of a provision for special consideration in the original Rome Treaty, whereas Algeria moved from de facto membership to its participation in the association agreement.

If at the present time, all three states appear to join in agreement on the strategy toward the EEC, it is not as certain that the general strategy or all aspects of it toward entry into the developed center will not be a source of conflict in the future. Again, the two major opponents are Morocco and Algeria, with Tunisia being closer to the Moroccan position and Libya to the left of Algeria. Morocco's approach--in a word--appears to be one of "joining 'em" while Algeria's is one of "licking 'em." Morocco is more amenable to cooperating with developed--notably Western--powers, to benefitting from association with them, eventually to borrowing power from them to make up for its shortfall. Cooperation with France in Zaire, acceptance of US personnel on former American bases, a more flexible attitude in CIEC negotiations are present examples. Morocco's strategy is a mixture of the first and second. Algeria appears to be not only expanding its own capabilities both by borrowing and reinvesting, but also has led the attack on the Old International Economic Order while seeking to rally smaller states behind it in the assault. Algeria's role in calling the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly and in leading the Group of 77 are

important examples. Algeria's is a mixture of the first and third strategies. Played to the fullest, these two divergent choices of strategies are highly conflictual. That they have not been so in the past is most likely evidence of the fact that the battle has not yet been fully joined. The stage of their own development does not yet qualify either state for membership in the Concert of Developed Powers. As development procedes, however, the conflict--exacerbated by the other causes described above--is likely to sharpen.

Libya's is a fourth strategy, more idiosyncratic and less transferable but worthy of note if only because it is so badly misunderstood. Qadhdhafi does not merely seek to enter the Core Concert; he acts now as if he were already in and uses his elements of national power to play as a fullfledged actor. This refusal to "know his place" and the frequent gap between role aspirations (or assumptions) and means at hand make for an erratic performance that unsympathetic observers have mistaken for "craziness." Qadhdhafi's global policy is profoundly activist and revisionist. He seeks to mobilize and revolutionize the Arab world for the overthrow of imperialism, as he mobilized and revolutionized the Libyan armed forces for the overthrow of the monarchy in the name of the people. Giving meaning to these tactics is the ideology of the Third way, "the universalism of Islam conceived as revolution." All means are mobilized behind this task, but for Libya the most available and thus the most evident means are financial and subversive, both operating outside the "normal" rules of established diplomacy. Libya is therefore revisionist in means as well as ends. Few follow its path, among the Third World or even the Arab states, but many admire its gall.

II

Discussion can now turn to the Sea. The Mediterranean has no new sources of conflict of its own, but is merely the extended arena--from the Maghrebi point of view--for land-origin conflicts to be pursued. It can, of course, be an active or a passive arena, that is, it can bring its own elements to existing bases of conflict or simply be the place where conflicts take place. For example, there are boundary conflicts on the sea (or at least the territorial waters) as on the land, and there are different attitudes that govern Magrebi states' view of their role in Mediterranean security arrangements vis-a-vis the central (European) Concert. On the passive side, ideological differences may prevent Maghrebi states from cooperating on common interests on the Law of the Sea, for reasons having nothing to do with the sea itself. The following discussion will focus on the Mediterranean as an active arena, the passive aspect in a sense already being covered in the previous discussion. However, since many of the elements of an active arena are covered in other papers specifically addressed to them (e g energy, non-energy resources, boundaries, military activity), the discussion here will be indicative rather than specific.

It should be recognized that Maghrebi states stand in different relation to the Mediterranean. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are Mediterranean states: All their ports are on the Sea, and all their commerce in the broadest sense must be Mediterranean before it becomes anything else (except for that which transits the far less hospitable Saharan routes to the south). Morocco is different: Its Mediterranean commerce is insignificant in comparison with its Atlantic activity, its Mediterranean relations are Atlantic before they are anything else (except for its Saharan commerce and its land access through Algeria, the latter frequently reduced or closed because of interstate conflict). Geographical imagery should not be overdone, but as long as perception is the screen for reality, it is of some relevance.

There are five areas of conflict related to the Sea as it concerns North Africa, some direct extensions of the previous six conceptual dimensions and others existing on more specific levels of their own.

1. The Sea knows its boundary conflicts like the land. There have only been two thus far, both involving the revisionist state par excellence of the region, Libya, but a few others are conceivable. One type of conflict involves the seaward extension of land boundaries between states, exacerbated on sea as on land by under-surface mineral deposits. The case at hand is the long maritime border conflict between Libya and Tunisia, bearing the characteristics of complexity: a land border not perpendicular to the shoreline, offshore islands, a concave coast, and offshore oil deposits. Two positive aspects of the conflict are noteworthy: First, it was resolved, after years of maneuvering wich could have escalated into a larger conflict involving outside powers, by appeal to the International Court of Justice and arbitration by international institutions. Second, the four conditions which made the dispute so intractable technically are present nowhere else along the Southern shore.

A second type of sea boundary dispute involves boundaries to national jurisdiction and territorial sea parallel to the coast. Here the case is again Libya, which has asserted its claim over the the Gulf of Sirte as an inland sea, against the precepts of international law. This type of dispute is more properly a part of the discussion on the extension and delimitation of national water boundaries, the suject of a different session, but again it should be noted that, except for the even more complicated Gulf of Gabes, there is no other concave coast that could lend itself to the type of claim that Libya makes on Sirte. On the other hand, territorial waters can be the subject of rroublesome claims, not only into the open Mediterranean, but more disruptively at the Mediterranean chokepoints bordered by Morocco and Tunisia. It would take a different mood on the part of both countries to raise a conflict with Spain and Italy, respectively, over the intervening channels.

A third form of sea boundary conflict involves the maritime implications of territorial claims, relating specifically only to one case, the anticolonial campaign against the Spanish islands and enclaves along the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. The Moroccan claims are simply on hold for the moment, until the Saharan question is resolved, but once Morocco's hands are freer, it no longer needs Spain's support or at least neutrality, and a national cause is required, the campaign against Ceuta, Melilla, and the islands will erupt. It is related in turn with the reasoning and outcome in the Gibraltar case, since the Spanish enclaves are the mirror image of the British Rock. Use, possession, and extent of the territorial sea are matters that are involved in the recovery of the enclaves. A Falklands-like episode is not inconceivable at some distant time, despite the many obvious differences in geography and force levels, among others.

2. Conflict may come over the bridges across the Sea. Such bridges are not numerous, and they have provoked no notable conflict as yet. A gasline has been completed from Hassi Rmel in Algeria through Tunisia to Minerbio in Italy; other pipelines are under consideration to Spain and other points. One might also consider the tanker routes with their expensive terminal facilities as commitments of similar magnitude as a permanent pipeline, although there is an important difference in degree. But the project of a bridge across the Straits of Gibralter which Morocco has revived in 1982 is a more literal case of linkage that can also provide conflict.

The cooperative ingredient in such linkages is evident, and they are tangible cases of the functionalist notion that ties create interdependences that reduce conflict. At the same time, it should be noted that interaction and independence also create the ingredients of conflict. They raise expectations, bring otherwise conflicting parties into contact, restrain freedom of independent action, and provide the means of pressure and dispute which did not exist without them. The history of the gas negotiations between Algeria and France and Italy

includes illustrations of all these effects, leaving bilateral relations in both cases closer but testier than before. However, as the cases also show, such conflicts are technical and diplomatic matters--elements in but not causes of a conflict.

3. The Sea can also be a battlefield among Maghrebi states. The chances of a full-scale naval battle are slim in this day and age, to be sure, but curiously the Sea does have a role to play in the more typical warfare of our times--the guerrilla. In this, it has a history: The Mediterranean was a major (and at times the major) channel of support for the Algerian Army of National Liberation (ALN) during the Revolutionary War (1954-62), notably for supplies and men from Morocco and from Egypt via Tunisia, and even a sophisticated French navy had difficulty controlling the flow. The war is over and the flow has stopped, but when conflict arises the same trails are used again. It was from the Sea that the airplane of unknown source dropped arms at Cape Sigli in 1978 for opponents of the Algerian regime. More important, arms from Libya to the Polisario have started to come by sea in 1981-82, transiting the Medterranean and then the Atlantic to Nouadhibou and thence to the interior, as friction between Algeria and Libya reduces the flow across the "Polisario Trail" through the Sahara.

The Sea is useful for this kind of activity and not much can be done about it, even if it attained greater magnitudes. Hot pursuit on the high seas requires more pf a navy than Morocco or Algeria has, although in the absnce of effectiveness such naval action could produce an important political incident (as did the Cape Sigli airdrop). Beyond the incident, what is important is such a conflict is the dispute itself, and in this the Sea is only ancidental. The day that Algeria decides to join loyally in the search for a political solution to the Western Saharan problem, Libyan diplomatic and military support and the sea channels for it will be a secondary consideration.

4. The two remaining aspects relate to Maghrebi views and policies on external roles in the Mediterranean. Maghrebi states have little capability for projecting power into the Sea (as already noted), but they are able to offer other states an entry and an anchor for seapower on the shore. Through portcalls and base rights, littoral states grant access to outsiders and thereby establish an association which by its nature is conflictual with neighbors (unless they too have established the same association). Thus Tunisia's portcalls are more or less balanced between the US and the USSR, more frequent but for smaller ships for the Russians and slightly less frequent but for larger ships for the Americans; whereas Libya's and Algeria's portcalls are Russian. For these purposes, Morocco is not a Mediterranean country, since its major ports and portcalls are Atlantic.

Base arrangements are a less clear matter, because of the secret nature of the agreements; fortunately, consideration of the matter does not require up-to-date intelligence reports. The French, British and Americans left a number of naval bases are port facilities for military use along the Maghrebi coast after World War II and then the decolonization: Port Lyautey (Kenitra), Mers el-Kebir, Bizerte, and Tripoli. Today, there is American and Soviet access to the Moroccan and Libyan base, respectively, but no foreign presence or installations in the Algerian and Tunisian bases. At the present time, these arrangements have aroused comment and criticism from neighbors but little else. They have not been used--nor are there plans to use them--against neighbors or in connection with the conflicts that trouble North Africa. Nor does the neutral-looking buffer of Algeria and Tunisia between Morocco and Libya explain the lack of further naval-based conflict, since the pattern is Kautilyan rather than"Scandinavian", Algeria and Tunisia being more Soviet- and American-leaning than their simple naval base arrangements would indicate.

In a deeper sense, however, foreign bases and facilities are a sign of North African weakness, a foreign imposition on Maghrebi territory and an external power's penetration of the Southern shore. To make a fine but appropriate distinction, foreign bases give Maghrebi states protection but not capability, and they are of greater use to the foreign power than to the host state. To be sure, the host state expects to get equal value from the arrangement, but the equal value is not in base-related military capability; it is rather in some form of "rent," such as the economic aid which the US gave to Libya and gives to Morocco or in favorable consideration of military supplies and training which the US provides Morocco and the USSR provides Libya. The base itself, however, is a platform for the extension of foreign power, not an enhancement of host state power. In fact, even the element of protection may be thin; foreign powers take up bases in foreign countries because the site looks secure (and because it looks militarily useful, of course), not because the foreign state wants to take on its host's conflicts and cover them.

As a result, foreign bases may enhance conflict among North African states but they are unlikely to serve as a means of conflict. Indeed, foreign powers try to minimize the concern that their bases cause for the host's neighbors, as the US reassures Algeria that its Moroccan military facilities agreement of 1982 has nothing to do with Algeria or the Saharan question, and the USSR assures Tunisia that whatever arrangements it has with Libya are not directed against Tunis. But base relations make other problems harder to solve, as Algeria charges that Morocco is polarizing the Saharan dispute, and they inhibit outside powers from being useful in conflict resolution since they give the host a means for restricting the outside power's latitude in mediation.

5. Finally, in the broadest sense, the Sea is a source of conflict for Maghrebi states as they dispute--with words--its geostrategic place in the world. Whose lake is it? The views differ among the four states, and they merge into each state's own self-image and its concept of how to get on in the world. All share in viewing the Sea as properly belonging to its shoreholders, but the variations on the common theme are such that little basic unity remains.

The leitmotif of Moroccan global policy is equitable participation in regional affairs, with tolerance for diversity and protection against hegemony. Morocco therefore seeks entry into a concert of Mediterranean states, just as it participates in concerts of Arab and African states. In this regard, it maintains its special commercial agreement with the European Community and would like to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as an interested Mediterranean state. Morocco's Mediterraneanness makes it part of the Concert of Europe.

Tunisia sees itself as a perpetual crossroads, centrally located in the Mediterranean. Its Mediterranean should be open, not a subject for access to the North but a terrain of commerce and intercourse. Such an open Sea need not exclude foreign fleets but it presumably would exclude foreign bases, at least on the Southern shore.

Algeria is the spearhead of Third World revisionism, more actively so under Boumediemne than under Benjedid but still holding the same philosophy. Its Mediterranean should be cleared of foreign (non-Mediterannean) fleets, although at one point it admitted that the Soviet fleet should be present as long as the American fleet was there (which it should not be). At the same time, eliminating superpower naval forces would also be a way of leaving the Sea with states more nearly equal in charge and thus giving a larger place to Algeria in regional politics.

For Libya the Mediterranean is part of the battlefield for the revolutionary forces of the Third World against imperialism, in which for the moment cooper-

ation between the anti-imperialism second and Third World leaders is required. Thus, in the name of the struggle against foreign forces, alliance with foreign forces is justified.

These four different attitudes factor into different stands on different aspects of the debate over the geopolitical place of the Mediterranean Sea, according to the way in which questions are posed. The result is different diplomatic positions and different types of demarches. But the outcome of this concern, as well as of the other four, is greater conflict with outside powers than among North African states. With the exception of the Libyan-Tunisian border dispute, for the moment apprently settled, none of the other specific instances or general categories of conflict has a serious Mediterranean aspect or extension, and none of the serious conflicts that separate Maghrebi states on the land--Sahara, Chad, Peace Process, NIEO, even the important general category of regional power rivalry--has an important ramification or theatre of operations on the Sea.

The reason is not hard to find: Not only is there little to fight over, but there is less to fight with. North African states are weak on sea, and weaker still in comparison with the naval power from the northern shore or from outside. Moreover (or therefore), North African states turn instead to the power vacuum which is unoccupied, the desert area which lies to the south and in which the power rivalries of North Africa are played out. To the extent that there is an association of outside powers and Maghrebi states across the Mediterranean, it is not so much to coordinate policy and increase power in the Sea arena as it is to provide mutual support in the sahel/sahara zone--The US with Morocco in Western Sahara, France with Algeria in the region from Mali to Chad, the USSR with Libya in Chad and further southeast. This is all very tentative and perceptional, but it indicates a reverse direction of operations from conflict and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

III

The picture of conflict spillover into the Mediterranean from the Southern shore appears inconclusive. As a result, it may be more insightful to turn the subject proposition around and ask, What are the implications of external activity for conflict escalation and deescalation in North Africa? The two pairs of variables to be manipulated are external power cooperation and conflict and Maghrebi states' cooperation and conflict.

1. As a general rule , North African states have always hedged against polarization of their own relations with the superpowers. Morocco is armed by France and the US and has close political relations with the US, but has little trade with the US to compare with its 1978 $2 billion phosphate agreement and $300 million fishing agreement with the USSR. Algeria is armed by the USSR, with which it also shares political views, but has little trade with the USSR, its first trading partner being the US and its second France. Tunisia, to be sure, is more exclusively Western-oriented, and Libya is completely Soviet-oriented on the political and military level but still Western-oriented in trade. Furthermore, the situation is fluid: Morocco has always had an eye toward maintaining Soviet relations, and Algeria in 1982 is moving to diversify its military supplies with American and British sources and reduce its dependency on the USSR. In Maghrebi relations, foreign ties act not so much as a limit as a counterweight to other foreign associations--a "cantelevered policy", as it were. This is a delicate situation, and can be destabilizing if one side withdraws support, as the US did in Libya. It limits outside powers' maneuverability and leverage for conflict resolution, and encourages escalation, although not necessarily on the Sea.

2. There is a total breakdown of organizational structure and unity in the international relations of the region, but existing organizations played such a limited conflict resolution function that the impact on regional conflicts is slight. The collapse of the OAU in July-August 1982 into two camps mirrors

the division of the Arab League in 1977 (both around the twentieth anniversary of the respective body) have weakened organizations whose capacity for conflict management was very low already; they will be missed for other reasons, until reconstituted, but scarcely for the impact they have had on Mediterranean politics.

3. A predominant greatpower presence in the Mediterranean facilitates conflict resolution. It reduces the chances of littoral states' playing off one outside states against another and it reduces **distracting competition** from another another Cold War state. The US could better mediate the Camp David agreements after Russia was removed from the immediate area; conversely, the chances of reducing conflict in the Horn of Africa in the late 1970s was eliminated by the primary need of the great powers to keep their own balance while shifting sides during the Ogaden war. It would have been more difficult for the US to rein in Libya in various theatres during 1981 if the Soviets had had a greater naval presence in the Gulf of Sirte. Competition among various Western powers is less important, and can even provide alternative leverage if the states will concert on specific policies from time to time.

4. Predominant Soviet penetration of a North African state (Friendship Treaty, Karmal coup, for example) would be highly disruptive to Western predominance in the Mediterranean and would make external efforts at conflict management difficult, but would also isolate the penetrated state. No such possibility appears on the horizon; neither a toppled monarchy in Morocco nor a stumbling succession in Tunisia nor a military radicalization in Algeria--the likely "worst futures" for those three states--suggest a dominant Soviet penetration, just as in Libya the forces threatening the Qadhdhafi regime come from the dissident bourgeoisie rather than from the radical left. A Soviet-Steadfastness Front alliance would be the most likely entry for penetration, but the Soviet Union has not appeared very steadfast as a supporter of Palestinian revolution, where there is some mileage to be gotten. It is even less likely to expose itself by espousing some less promising cause in an intra-Maghrebi conflict.