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ITALY AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION

by

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Since the end of World War II Italian foreign policy has been marked by two fundamental choices: for the Atlantic Alliance, with Italy's adhesion to NATO; and for Europe with its adhesion and active participation in all Community and extra-Community initiatives (the Council of Europe, etc.). All action on the part of Italian governments and political forces has been built around these two "pillars"; even the Italian Communist Party's bid for "legitimacy", to take a well-known example, was measured on the basis of its adhesion to Atlantic and European principles.⁽¹⁾

Italy's Atlanticism and Europeanism have however been characterized by two basic limitations. The first is that no serious efforts have ever been made to revise the terms of Italy's participation in the two processes of Western cooperation, not even when changed historical and political circumstances made such a revision necessary or opportune. The Atlantic Alliance and European integration therefore appear to have been considered two fixed and unchangeable points of reference for all our country's initiatives. The usual explanation given for this Italian "passivity" is the Christian Democratic party's long and constant permanence in power (in particular in the key foreign policy posts, the Prime Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Ministry) which has become an obstacle to a more critical and innovative Italian participation in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community.⁽²⁾

The second limit is that the two choices have been used in an essentially instrumental way for internal political reasons. In particular, the two major left-wing parties have gradually been allowed a share of power on the basis of the degree to which they have modified their attitudes toward the two "pillars" (initially, both the Communists and Socialists, though in different ways and at different times, were against the two processes of Western cooperation). The Italian political establishment's attention has thus been shifted further away from the substance of the international problems to be resolved and more toward domestic political issues, reinforcing that image of superficiality and precariousness which has cost Italy so much in terms of its credibility abroad.

This premise is indispensable for a better understanding of why Italian politicians seem initially to have viewed the establishment of European political cooperation (Epc) in 1970 not as a new and innovative element in the process both of European integration and of national foreign policy, but instead, rather passively, as merely another factor in the already-functioning framework of Western cooperation.

The brief history of Epc coincides, however, with a series of international and national events which has in effect gradually transformed the Italian attitude both with regards to Italy's own foreign policy and with regards to its participation in the major Western alliances.

The most important factor determining this shift has been the progressive deterioration of Euro-American relations from 1971 on and the growing uncertainty of US policy. The weakening

of one of the pillars (the Atlantic choice) on which Italian foreign policy is based has created a number of difficulties for our leaders, frequently accused of conforming Italy's internal and domestic policies to American positions.

There are certainly some elements of truth in this accusation, especially if we consider the above-mentioned shortcomings underlying our international action. However, the problem posed by relations with the U.S. and by the consequent ties and constraints is not specifically Italian, but one which arises in the wider context of the Euro-American relationship in general, which affects in often differing ways all our European partners. It is therefore evident that any change in this relationship -- and in the past decade the transformations have been substantial -- will also have an immediate impact on Italy's behavior with respect to the American ally. (3)

A second element of great importance which has helped modify Italy's attitude toward Epc, in the direction of greater interest, is the growing instability and complexity of the situation in the Mediterranean. A number of events in the last few years, from the enlargement of the Community toward the south to the request from Malta for neutrality guarantees, from the setting in motion of the Camp David process to the worsening of the situation in the Horn of Africa, have inevitably driven Italy to view with greater concern the development of its own and Europe's foreign policy in the Mediterranean. This new perception of our role in this crucial area has been facilitated by the growing convergence of the Italian political forces' positions on questions, such as the stance to be taken with respect

to the PLO and the Arab countries, which were once explosive. Connected with this is the Communist Party's long critical revision which, after a brief experiment with the so-called historical compromise (the parliamentary alliance between Christian Democrats and Communists), helped make less distant the Italian parties' stances on certain areas of traditional interest for our country, such as the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa.

A third element is the progressive loss of momentum and interest in the process of European integration. Though on the one hand this drove Italy to assume a less acritical and passive position on the issues concerning the costs and benefits of our participation in the EC, on the other, it convinced even the most reluctant of the importance of European political cooperation.

These three elements, in the last analysis and as we shall see in the following pages, have modified Italy's perception of Epc to such an extent that it is now viewed as one of the main tools of our country's foreign policy.

European Political Cooperation and the Italian Foreign Ministry

The first to grasp the importance of Epc was, as is easy to imagine, the Foreign Ministry, and in particular its Political Affairs Directorate (DGAP).

In fact, the intergovernmental and diplomatic structure of Epc underlined the Foreign Ministry's exclusive competence in this area. This was not the case, for instance, in the field of Community activities, where the Foreign Ministry was obliged to share responsibility with other ministries interested in the

common policies, though it did hold a certain role as coordinator. Moreover, in the Italian institutional system, the Foreign Ministry plays a particularly important role in the field of foreign policy because in Italy the Prime Ministry's role as coordinator and general manager of foreign affairs is not nearly as strong and authoritative as in other Community countries.⁽⁴⁾ The Foreign Ministry has thus traditionally enjoyed a sort of special mandate for the management of bilateral and multilateral relations, and it tends to jealously guard this role. However, the evolution of the Community's institutional system, with the creation in 1974 of the European Council of heads of state and government, has directly involved the Prime Minister in the elaboration of policies to be adopted in the framework of Epc. At the same time, in Italy, a wide-ranging debate began on the opportunity of reinforcing the Prime Ministry and on the need for closer coordination of all the foreign policy initiatives (including those in the field of economic and trade policies) for which it is directly responsible. These two facts have induced the Foreign Ministry to collaborate more closely with the Prime Ministry, though from a formal point of view things have not actually changed. Only in the field of responsibility for EC affairs has there been a concrete initiative, taken by Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga in 1980, which resulted in the creation of a Ministry for the Coordination of Community Policies (responsible mainly for implementation of policies decided at other levels). Obviously, the same did not happen with Epc, given its particular political-diplomatic nature. In the last analysis, therefore, Epc remains the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.

Even within the Ministry some effects have been felt. In particular, as already mentioned, the DGAP benefited from the creation of Epc in that it is responsible for managing on behalf of the Ministry all of Italy's bilateral and multilateral relations. Within the DGAP, whose director is on the political committee for Epc, room was cut out for this additional responsibility. Moreover, it should be recalled that one of the founding fathers of Epc was Ambassador Roberto Ducci who, besides drawing up the second Luxembourg report on Epc in 1973, held for many years the post of director-general of the DGAP, giving impulse to this new responsibility.

The advent of Epc created a privileged and exclusive area of initiative for the Political Affairs Directorate and at the same time extended the spectrum of Italy's interests to areas which previously had not been touched by our bilateral policy. Ambassador Ducci, Gardini, and now Bottai, in particular, were aware of the potential, and as soon as they were nominated director-general of the DGAP they gave considerable impulse to the new commitments deriving from Italy's participation in Epc. The DGAP did not undergo noteworthy structural changes: apart from the creation of a group of Political Correspondents (who also take care of WEU business) the rest remained as it was before and each office is responsible for a particular area (Asia, Latin America, etc.), for a particular institution or international conference (UN, CSCE, disarmament, etc.), or for the organization of study groups. There were instead substantial changes in the working method. European political cooperation constitutes

a fixed point of reference for all activities, bilateral or multilateral, and at the same time any initiatives taken in the context of Epc are communicated to the competent offices which must bear in mind the positions assumed in that context when formulating their own policies. The telexes of the COREU network, to take a concrete example, are sent from the Correspondents office to the Political Director and, at the same time, to the interested area or sector offices, and vice versa. This system enables the Political Directorate to closely control all bilateral activities, continually linking them to the decisions taken at the European level.

The DGAP thus carries out its activities in complete autonomy and does not find in its way the coordination obstacles faced by the Economic Affairs Directorate, which is responsible together with other Ministries for Community business. Contacts with the Presidency of the Council are direct, through the diplomatic advisor of the President of the Council, or personal, with the Political Director. One might therefore say that the establishment of European political cooperation marked the beginning of a new moment of glory for the DGAP.

However, in the recent past, the DGAP's "central" role has been slightly overshadowed by the creation of the European Community, responsibility for which within the Ministry, given its prevalently economic nature, was entrusted to the rival Economic Affairs Directorate. This caused a bit of friction in relations between the two Directorates since each tended to assess the political or economic nature of certain issues differently. In the field of Epc this overlapping of responsibility virtually

does not exist, and will exist in the future only if Epc and the EC evolve in the direction of greater integration at the European level, something which happens today only to a limited extent.

The attitude of the Italian political forces and government toward Epc

The impact of European political cooperation on the political world is more complex. Whereas the bureaucratic structure almost immediately grasped the importance of exploiting the potentials offered by Epc, the political world arrived gradually, as the domestic and international political situations evolved.

One of the factors making acceptance of Epc difficult was the political fear of committing a sort of heresy with respect to Italy's traditional stance in favor of a process of supranational integration. It was heatedly argued that the inter-governmental method adopted for European political cooperation risked eroding the EC's authority and negatively affecting the process of supranational integration. Italy's acceptance of Epc was therefore kept at the lowest possible level in order to avoid arousing suspicion as to our stance.

But the course of events and, in particular, the progressive deadlocking of strictly Community activities gradually overshadowed such fears.

It is interesting to note how Italian interest in Epc tends to grow in parallel with an increasingly critical attitude with regards to the advantages of Italy's participation in the European Community. The change of attitude took place more or less in 1978, the year in which measures in favor of Mediterranean

agriculture were discussed at the Community level. The reluctance with which our Community partners approved these measures aroused bad feelings among the Italian political parties and social forces to such an extent that the Prime Minister at the time, Giulio Andreotti, felt obliged to ask the Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL) for an analysis of the costs and benefits of our participation in the European Community.⁽⁵⁾ This policy of claiming fairer treatment from the Community has continued to characterize our attitude. Recently, in an interview with Corriere della Sera on 12 November 1981, Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini brought up the issue again: "We will live up to our European commitments. But it is clear that, in balancing the burdens and benefits, Community policy cannot but take into special account the conditions of countries like ours, which still have serious problems of economic disequilibria."

This increasingly critical attitude has not however led our government to join forces with those Community partners who have gone to the extreme of demanding that all efforts be concentrated on European political cooperation. On the contrary, our government and the majority of the political forces have safeguarded their original position by developing the theory that sooner or later Epc and the EC will become a single body, for Europe as such cannot hope to play an important international role unless it attains a high degree of internal cohesion and this can be achieved only by further developing common economic policies.

Originally, this theory was also to be used in drawing up the Genscher-Colombo plan for relaunching political union. And, in fact, after the February 1981 Stuttgart statement, in which

the German Foreign Minister put forward his initial proposals, Colombo's response was positive, underlining the inseparability of progress in the field of Epc and progress in the EC.⁽⁶⁾ However, the subsequent elaborations of the Genscher proposal within the German government ended up playing down the Community aspect, putting our Minister in an embarrassing position. Within the Italian government there were many who began to question the opportunity of adhering to the German plan.⁽⁷⁾ In the end, however, Colombo's line, inclined to privilege the alliance with the Germans rather than insist on the request to deepen the economic integration aspect, prevailed. The compromise solution consisted in adding a note to the European Act, presented at the London European Council meeting in November 1981, in which Italy asked that progress be made in the sector of common policies.

Despite these theoretical-political "querelle", the common European positions which emerged as a result of Epc soon proved useful as a sort of "cover" for our domestic foreign policy decisions. Thus in their general policy statements, our new governments increasingly used the "preamble" supplied by Epc declarations when stating their stances on international issues. Italy's bilateral foreign policy too was brought in line with Epc declarations. It was also discovered that Epc could be used not only as an "a priori" point of reference for government activities, but also to "bolster" foreign policy initiatives which Italy had taken on its own. A typical example is the recent bombing by Israel of Iraq's nuclear reactor. After an initial Italian protest, European political cooperation was used to solicit a common

stand on the issue from the other member states, which served to reinforce Italy's protest. The links between national foreign policy and Epc tend in general terms to become more complex as the perception of Epc and of its present and future potential grows. Some concrete examples of this interaction will be illustrated further on. For the moment what we are interested in emphasizing is that this perception is constantly growing in the eyes of the Italians.

The positions formulated in the context of Epc make for greater cohesion not only at the intergovernmental level, but also domestically, among the Italian political forces. Typical is the position which has evolved on the Middle East issue and in particular on recognition of the PLO. Historically the Italian parties were sharply divided (at times even within a single party, as was the case with the Christian Democrats) into pro-Arabs and pro-Israelis. In fact, it is interesting to note how over the past twenty years the Italian attitude toward the Arab world has passed through three main lines of thinking. The first, now largely superseded, ~~xxxxxx~~ was pro-Arab and was usually closely linked with nationalistic aspirations. The second line of thinking was in favor of inserting Italo-Arab relations into the Atlantic Alliance's broader strategic context. Finally, and more recently, there is a growing awareness of the complexity of our national interest in the issues, stemming from the fact that Europe has now been invested with these problems. Traditionally, the Communists and the pro-Arab wing of the Christian Democratic party supported the first line. The second line, that in favor of involving the Atlantic Alliance

in the Middle East, was supported by the majority of Christian Democrats and Socialists, as well as by the other minor center parties. Finally, the third, that in favor of European involvement, welded the first two together.⁽⁸⁾

In effect, as a clear European position took shape, through the successive declarations in the name of Epc, the rift was gradually narrowed. The reasons for this obviously lie not only in the role played by Epc: there are also internal tactical reasons and growing uncertainties as to US policy in the Middle East. But the "cover" provided by a common European stance has undoubtedly enabled Italy to domestically go ahead more decidedly with a policy of recognition of the PLO, which was then used to reach a new and more advanced European position in June 1980, embodied in the Venice statement on the Middle East. Interaction between European political cooperation and Italy's foreign policy has in effect been two-way, thus strengthening the conviction that European policy is indeed useful.

Italian foreign policy and European political cooperation

If on the whole development of Epc was welcomed by the Italian government and political forces, this is due to the awareness that the constraints imposed by Epc on our foreign policy are much inferior to the maneuvering room and the liberty which derive from it for our international policy. This affirmation may seem paradoxical if we overlook the fact that Italian foreign policy has traditionally been conditioned by the often overbearing presence of the US ally, on the one hand, and domestic demands of a nationalistic type, on the other. These two extreme

alternatives ended up constituting more an issue of internal political controversy than an incentive to embark on clearly defined international initiatives on the part of our country. The creation and growth of Epc therefore soon demonstrated the concrete possibility of following a third road, one of mediation between the preceding two. ~~This opportunity was not perceived immediately, mainly because of the slow progress of the Ten themselves in the field of international relations. But in the last two years, especially after the dramatic turn of events in the detente process which followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, European and Italian activism grew almost contemporaneously. This interrelation is all the more evident if we consider the three main areas of Italy's international activities: relations with the US, Mediterranean policy, and policy in certain areas which have traditionally been of interest for Italy.~~ This opportunity was not perceived immediately, mainly because of the slow progress of the Ten themselves in the field of international relations. But in the last two years, especially after the dramatic turn of events in the detente process which followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, European and Italian activism grew almost contemporaneously. This interrelation is all the more evident if we consider the three main areas of Italy's international activities: relations with the US, Mediterranean policy, and policy in certain areas which have traditionally been of interest for Italy.

The problem of relations with the USA is perhaps the most difficult. Our country's position has always been one of absolute loyalty to the dictates of Atlantic policy. The fact that Italy was among the first to ratify the NATO decision on Euro-missiles is proof of this position, which is highly praised by the Americans, but which only serves to revive accusations of subservience to US positions (especially in relation to what is happening in the other European countries affected by the NATO decision).

In this context, it is interesting to note the reasons put forward by the Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, to justify our decision.⁽⁹⁾ Firstly, it contributed "in a decisive way to

increasing Italy's credibility and reliability in the eyes of our allies." Secondly, "it served to support our aspiration to participate in the major political decisions affecting Western security." Thirdly, "the Italian decision to accept deployment of the Cruise and Pershing missiles on our soil fulfilled a condition which made it possible for the other European allies to decide, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany."

From this series of motivations, and in particular from the first two, some basic preoccupations underlying our international action emerge: the scarce credibility and the marginal impact of our position (with the consequent exclusion from small and large summits). It would seem that a closer and clearer link with the American ally is a precondition for re-establishing our international image. The third motivation instead appears more substantial, that of acting as an example or incentive for the other Europeans while at the same time enjoying their backing to "cover" and justify a political decision which is strongly contested at home (especially by the Communist party). But the appeal to Europe also serves to create more ample maneuvering room and to avoid the accusation of total subservience to the USA.

There is no doubt that our foreign policy has often suffered from a certain subordination to the will of our ally on the other side of the Atlantic; but this was largely due to the fact that Italy had been unable to formulate a foreign policy of its own. It is worth mentioning, however, that a slight shift in Italy's position with respect to the US seems to be emerging, and that the tool being used to effect this shift, which is far from

being "schismatic", is Europe's political cooperation machinery. The Venice statement on the Middle East was, in effect, largely the result of Italy's diplomatic mediation between the extreme positions of France and the United States. What emerged was a position that, without denying the importance of the Camp David process, clearly indicates that this process, as our Foreign Minister Colombo pointed out, is "not capable of assuring a definitive solution" to the problems in the area and that it is therefore necessary to involve the PLO in the negotiations.⁽¹⁰⁾

The creation and consolidation of European political cooperation and the parallel emergence of greater Italian activism in foreign affairs are important elements supporting Italy's present attempt to play an international role less subordinate to the desires of its American ally, without however questioning the basic ties.

"The more Europe becomes a political subject, the stronger will its voice and its autonomy with respect to the United States be. Italy has done and will continue to do its share in this direction," declared Foreign Minister Colombo in an interview with la Repubblica on 12 August 1980. This is the line along which our diplomacy and government are moving, though it is often difficult to say whether our position is really autonomous, and, above all, whether it has been agreed on "a priori" with our European partners. Such doubts also arose over our government's decision, taken at the beginning of November 1981, to participate in the multilateral Middle East peacekeeping force, even before a common European position had been adopted. It is in fact difficult to imagine that it was once again a move designed to encourage our partners to do likewise. It is more likely that the

initiative was dictated by internal considerations and by US pressure.

As pointed out earlier, another positive effect of an increased role in Epc is the growth of Italy's bilateral policy. Acting in the European context seems to have spurred our government on to greater activity in the international arena. The Mediterranean and Middle East in particular have benefited from this renewed activism. The case of Malta is perhaps the best known. The treaty guaranteeing Italy's defense of the island's neutrality reveals the peculiarity of our country's international action, and at the same time marks an attempt to overcome its previous passivity. It is interesting to note that our government continually refers to the European "mandate" to resolve the Malta issue, decided at an Epc meeting in 1976, even if Europe (on Malta's request) is not mentioned at all in the treaty's text. Such initiatives are placed in the frame of European policy not only to ensure that the economic burden be set off by compensation from the EC, but also to lend greater credibility to efforts aimed at increasing the area's stability.

From the outset, reference to Europe's interest was therefore "de rigueur". ~~Already on 8 May 1976, Aldo Moro, Prime Minister at the time,~~ Already on 8 May 1976, Aldo Moro, Prime Minister at the time, responded to Dom Mintoff's requests saying that he "had taken the initiative to propose, in the framework of the structures of political cooperation among the nine European countries, that the urgent and important problems which Malta will be faced with after closure of the British base be considered in depth." This need for a European "cover" became even more pressing later

on when France, Algeria and Libya dissociated themselves from the negotiations for guaranteeing Malta's neutrality, leaving Italy alone. And even more when the tension between Malta and Libya grew dangerously because of the disputes over rights to the continental shelf. On 10 March 1981, before the Chamber of Deputies, Colombo declared that, "The various stages ~~off~~ the negotiations were constantly and promptly illustrated by Italy to its Community partners, who constantly gave their encouragement." To make this indirect link between Europe and Malta (mediated by Italy) even more evident, our government repeatedly underlined that Italy's guarantee served as a "bridge": "any Italian contribution to stability is in response not only to national interests, but takes on great importance for all of Europe."⁽¹¹⁾ Ultimately, even for bilateral foreign policy initiatives in which Epc does not have a direct role, the tendency which emerges in our government and political forces is that of utilizing the image of European solidarity to lend credibility and strength to Italy's own actions.

A European "cover" for our initiatives is, of course, not always deemed necessary. There are certain areas or countries in which, for historical reasons, Italy feels free to act more independently. A typical example is our policy toward Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, where a special Italian role is perceived as a sort of historical heritage deriving from our presence in and knowledge of the area. But even in such cases the so-called "coordination effect" has worked, though at times "a posteriori", in the sense that our partners have always been informed of the principal developments resulting from our policy in such countries. The same obviously applies to those areas

for which a European policy does not exist, for example, with regards to South America. In general, however, Italy's bilateral foreign policy is coordinated, with due caution, to that of Europe.

The limits of Italy's participation in Epc

Though there are many positive aspects stemming from the establishment and consolidation of European political cooperation, there are other features which are preoccupying.

The first is that the procedure and machinery adopted are intergovernmental. Though this may allow greater flexibility and room for foreign policy initiatives, ~~xxx~~ our participation becomes precarious whenever the approaches or national interests of the strongest states of the Community prevail over the common interest. Incidents of this type characterized the first half of 1980 when Italy was holding the Presidency; Italian efforts to promote a common European stand on the Middle East and with respect to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan were in fact regularly thwarted by unilateral initiatives or stands taken either by the French or the West Germans. One of the Italian Presidency's major objectives was to foster through mediation a common stand of the Nine on the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Our Prime Minister Cossiga's planned trip to Moscow was a part of this design. But the meetings held in Warsaw

between Giscard and Breznev and later between Schmidt and Breznev made direct intervention by the incumbent President of the Council impossible. It is true that our country's political instability (two different governments in the space of a few months) and the ambiguity of our position with respect to the USA cast doubts on the credibility of our position with respect to the USSR; but it is just as true that the obstacles erected by the other member states gave cause to doubt the validity of European political cooperation.

Recourse to "mini" summits, consultations between two or three leaders, and the fairly explicit trend toward the creation of a sort of "directoire" also undermine the validity of Epc. If these methods prevail, our foreign policy is likely to evolve in one of two directions: toward even greater subservience to US positions just when Europe is struggling to establish an independent stand, or toward a more nationalistic approach in areas, such as the Mediterranean, of vital importance to Italy's and Europe's security. Both alternatives would weaken solidarity within the context of European political cooperation and would undermine the credibility of the image Europe would like to project.

Security issues in particular require that no exception be made to the rule of solidarity among the Ten. But here too Italy finds its European partners reluctant or opposed to the establishment of a common security policy. Italy's increased activism in the Mediterranean has lead to higher military expenditures and potential commitments in the area (Malta is an example). Our country is strongly aware of the risks inherent in a strictly national security policy and has therefore solicited European solidarity at the military level as well. So far, however, the response has been partial and limited, and does not provide the "cover" Italy is looking for and needs.

Though it must be acknowledged that European political cooperation has generally had a positive effect on Italy's foreign policy, it is just as important to realize that, as long as Epc procedures remain precarious and reversible, these positive impulses risk being transformed into obstacles or constraints impairing Italy's foreign policy and its international position.

NOTES

- 1) The key issue of Italy's participation in Western policy was discussed in two conferences organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), at a distance of ten years from one another. Two publications resulted from these conferences:

- a) La politica estera della repubblica italiana, M. Bonanni (ed.), Edizioni Comunità, Milan, 1967
- b) La politica estera italiana: autonomia, interdipendenza, integrazione e sicurezza, N. Ronzitti (ed.), Edizioni Comunità, Milan, 1967

A good deal of our considerations are taken from these publications.

- 2) This concept is expressed by E. Di Nolfo: "Dieci anni di politica estera italiana", in "La politica estera italiana: autonomia, interdipendenza, integrazione e sicurezza", op. cit., page 103.
- 3) An in-depth analysis of Italo-American relations in the context of the European-American relationship may be found in: Italy and the Changing European-American relationship, W. Kohl and G. Pasquino (eds.), The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, 1977
- 4) The central position of our Foreign Ministry in conducting ^{Italy's} ~~its~~ foreign policy is stressed by William Wallace: "Strutture decisionali e cooperazione politica europea", in "La politica estera dell'Europa, Autonomia o dipendenza?" G. Bonvicini (ed.), Il Mulino, Bologna, 1980.
- 5) Andreotti's request to CNEL was made real when the latter published a document: Rapporto Europa, Interrelazioni tra interessi nazionali e politiche comunitarie e ricerca degli obiettivi italiani a medio e termine nell'ambito europea, Rome, 8-9 March 1975. A second European Report was published in 1981, again by CNEL. In this case, however, emphasis was given more to the defects in the functioning of our ~~bureau~~-cracy rather than to the economic costs and benefits of Italy's membership in the Community.
- 6) A more elaborate formulation of the need to advance the EPC and the EC contemporaneously is given in a speech by our Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, during II Seminario di aggiornamento sulla politica estera, organized by the Christian Democrat Party in Florence on 26-27 June 1981.

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- 7) The dispute within the Italian government concerning Genscher's proposals to relaunch the European Union involved the Foreign Minister Colombo on the one hand, and the Treasury on the other. Colombo sustained the importance of an Italo-German alliance on European problems; the Treasury was more careful not ^{to} be dragged into an initiative which held no position on the Community Budget and on common policies. Upon the initiative of its Undersecretary, Carlo Fracanzani, the Treasury also decided to write a letter to the President in office for economic problems, Sir Geoffrey Howe, asking that the problem of the community budget be tackled. In November Colombo himself, almost as if he wanted to counterbalance his support of the German plan, wrote a letter to the President of the Commission, Thorn, in which he protested against the delay with which the proposals to modify the Community Budget were being studied (mandate of 30 May).
- 8) This analysis has been developed ^{by} ~~in~~ R. Aliboni and S. Solari, "I limiti dell'indipendenza in un sistema multilaterale," in "La società italiana: crisi di un sistema", Guizzardi and Sterpi (eds.), F. Angeli Publishers, Milan, 1981
- 9) Speech by the Hon. Emilio Colombo during II Seminario di aggiornamento sulla politica estera, op. cit., page 7-8
- 10) Emilio Colombo, II Seminario di aggiornamento sulla politica estera, op. cit., page 15
- 11) Declarations made by the Foreign Minister in the House of Deputies during the ratification of the Agreement with Malta on 11 March 1981.

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