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ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS

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CONTENTS

Preface	
Part Chapter I: The Determinant Factors.....	1
1. The Role of Geography.....	1
2. The Impact of History.....	2
3. Implications of Islam.....	7
4. The Economic Factor	11
5. The Political Considerations.....	13
6. Arab-African Communication.....	24
Footnotes.....	27
Part ChapterII: Dimensions of Arab-African Relations.....	35
1. Main Trends in the Contemporary Development of Arab-African Political Relations.....	35
2. A General Analysis of Economic Relations.....	72
3. Characteristics of Cultural Interaction.....	91
4. Afro-Arab Security.....	96
Footnotes.....	100

PREFACE

This paper presents the results of a study on Arab-African relations. It was originally prepared for the project on "Red Sea Conflicts and Cooperation" ^{organised by} ~~supervised~~ ^{supervised} by the ^{Istituto Affari Internazionali} (IAI) in Rome. It consists of two ~~parts~~ ^{parts} ~~Part~~ ^{Part} chapters. Chapter I is a study of the determinants of Arab-African relations while ~~chapter~~ ^{part} II is an analysis of their dimensions.

Two drafts of this paper were presented and discussed in the October 1979 and the July 1980 meetings of the Red Sea Project's staff and scientific committee in Cairo and Rome respectively. My appreciation must be expressed to all the distinguished participants in these meetings for their reactions and suggestions. Their contribution was really of a great help in revising those drafts. I am particularly indebted to Professor Roberto Aliboni ^{director of The Red Sea project} for his general guidance and careful critique which began with the early preparation of the outline of this paper. Finally, I must express my gratitude to Professor Paul J. Vatikiotis for his careful and precise critique of the earlier drafts of this paper. In fact, his advice was a decisive factor in shaping the final version of it. It goes without saying that the responsibility for this work is mine alone.

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Part 1
~~Chapter 1~~

THE DETERMINANT FACTORS

In the wake of the developments relating to Arab-African relations since 1973, a parallel interest was devoted to the study of such relations on the part of Arab and African scholars. The distinctive characteristic of the majority of their production was the predominance of a desire to promote these relations. Thus, most of them have dedicated their efforts to pinpoint factors of Afro-Arab cooperation rather than those of conflict. On the other hand, this may appear as a reaction to what a good many of those scholars observed that the European writings concentrated on factors with conflictive potentials. However, the sound understanding of Arab-African relations is infeasible without an objective analysis of the factors influencing such relations, regardless of their cooperative or conflictive nature.

1. The Role of Geography:

Underlining the effect of geography on Arab-African relations is not inspired merely by the geographical proximity of the Arab world and the African continent, but it arises also from geographical inter-penetration. Almost three-quarters of the Arab world area lie in Africa. This includes nine member-states of both the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU): Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Somalia and Djibouti. These

countries nearly constitute two-thirds of the Arab world population.

Geography is one of the factors accounting for both the early establishment and the high frequency of Afro-Arab contacts. Historically, Africa, was one of the main natural outlets for the Arabs (in view of their limited resources and increased numbers). Besides, it is not difficult to specify the strategic implications of the geographical inter-penetration and proximity between the Arab world and Africa. This situation raises security issues in common between the Arabs and the Africans. The security of both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea are clear examples. However, the role of geography in Arab-African relations should not be overestimated.⁽¹⁾ Geographic inter-penetration is deemed by some Africans as a source of identity crisis: Arabism or Africanism.⁽²⁾ A second point -- rather graver -- is bound to the so-called phenomenon of geographic expansion of the Arab world as indicated by the membership of Mauritania, Somalia and Djibouti to the LAS. The admission of Somalia and Djibouti into the LAS, while lacking the condition of Arabism provided for in the LAS Charter, has raised fears in Africa as to the allegation that the LAS will gradually be enlarged at the expense of the OAU.⁽³⁾

2. The Impact of History:

There is no doubt that the first Arab migrations to Africa took place many centuries before Christ, although the main

features of these migrations only became apparent during the five centuries following the birth of Christ.⁽⁴⁾ From that time to the subjugation of Africa and the Arab world by modern European colonialism, a pattern of Arab-African relations was developed. The following are believed to be the most important characteristics of this pattern:

- a. It seems that the Arabs were most of the time playing the role of the actor, while Africa was the target in this pattern. This provides the basis for a potential contradiction in Arab-African relations.⁽⁵⁾
- b. Generally speaking, with the exclusion of the Islamic conquest of North Africa, the pattern of interaction was made up of Arab migrations to Africa. The Arab migrants chiefly ran trade activities (though it was natural that these could have their cultural and social dimensions). Hence was the springing up of cities and trade centres that were mostly unbound to a central authority. This was generally associated with spreading Islam.⁽⁶⁾
- c. Possibly, it can be observed that the aforementioned pattern of interaction was geographically comprehensive.⁽⁷⁾

Whether this pattern is marked predominantly by conflictive or cooperative interaction is a rather complicated question.⁽⁸⁾

Spotting aspects of conflict, one's attention is first drawn to a comparison between the historical pattern of

Arab-African interaction and that of modern European colonialism. The two patterns are said to be alike.⁽⁹⁾ However, there are substantial differences between them.

Europeans were pouring into Africa as representatives of a mighty and highly advanced economic and social system protected as they were by the power of their respective states, by all means including armed force. Meanwhile, Arabs incoming to Africa (with the Islamic conquest in North Africa ruled out) were ones who quitted their countries for scarcity of resources or owing to religious and political strifes.⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, while economic and social development on the European side led to colonialism since the beginning of the modern age, the Arabs' extensive trade and reinforced fleets resulted in a very limited conflictive interaction with Africans.⁽¹¹⁾

On the other hand, the intermingling of Arabs and Africans brought about consequences all the more different from those between Europeans and Africans. "While the Afro-Arab was comfortable in both his Arab and African worlds, the Mulatto was stranger in both his African and European worlds in Mozambique and Angola."⁽¹²⁾

A third difference is that "the spread of Islam and Arab civilization was brought about in a manner contrasting sharply with the method adopted by Christian churches in

alliance with European colonialism. While the latter was associated with political domination and was aimed at supplanting the religion of the African, the Arab-Moslem spread his faith and culture under an order that recognized the African independence or autonomy. The result was a synthesis that implied mutual respect for each other's values."⁽¹³⁾

As the above analysis outlines three basic differences between the historical pattern of Arab-African interaction and that of modern European colonialism, a point of similarity is noteworthy, that is the role of Arabs in slave-trade. In fact, Arab writings dealing with this question contain a fervent defense of the Arabs.⁽¹⁴⁾ Generally, it is no use discussing the details of that defense since all viewpoints mentioned do not in any way deny the role of Arabs in the slave-trade and since this role was apparently underlined to destroy the image of Arabs in Africa.⁽¹⁵⁾

A senior Egyptian specialist in African affairs (depending on field remarks in East and West African countries) cited that the old image of Arabs as slave-traders was almost disappearing.⁽¹⁶⁾ However, an East African scholar stresses that the image which was carried to the contemporary generation of East Africans is one of an Arab as an exploiter of the black African, and who is only interested in what he

can get, quickly, without any regard for the welfare of the black Africans. According to him, this image is widely held and believed by many East Africans.⁽¹⁷⁾ One can easily find other much more bitter reflections, whether by other African scholars or in the African press, not only on the Arab role in slave-trade in Africa but also on an alleged mistreatment of people with African blood in Arab countries.⁽¹⁸⁾ Regardless of the accuracy of such judgements, they indicate a continuing adverse effect of the Arab connection with slave-trade on the current Arab-African relations.

No matter what the negative or positive potentials of the historical pattern of Afro-Arab interaction may be, there might not be wide difference over the fact that the subjugation almost simultaneously by European colonialism of Africa and the Arab world in the 19th and 20th centuries had brought new variables to Arab-African relations.

A number of negative repercussions of such a new historical process clearly affected these relations. Primarily, Arab-African interaction under colonial rule was impossible. Moreover, colonialism had reduced the Arab influence in Africa to a minimum. Colonial powers clashed directly first with Arabs in Africa because they represented

the distinguished sectors or strata in many parts of the continent, thus having vested interests to defend against colonialism. Besides, Islam emerged as "one of the most potent ideological forces which many African leaders used to arouse the people".⁽¹⁹⁾ On the economic level, the very raison d'être of colonialism required the integration of the colonies' economies into those of the colonial states.⁽²⁰⁾

However, it was this very colonialism which provided the firm basis for the promotion of Arab-African relations in modern times. Colonialism put the Africans and the Arabs in the same place in the political and economic international system.⁽²¹⁾ Thus it is no surprise that both should undergo the same experience of anti-colonial struggle.⁽²²⁾ Hence, despite the absence of coordination between Arabs and Africans, they apparently found themselves as natural allies in one anti-colonialism battle in the wake of World War II.⁽²³⁾ This actually was the beginning of contemporary Afro-Arab cooperation.

3. Implications of Islam:

The above analysis has indicated that Islam represents another source of sharing between Africa and the Arab world. However, to get a sound analysis of Islam's potentials for Arab-African relations a satisfactory picture of Africa's population in terms of religious affiliation is needed. Unfortunately, there is no such picture.

Some studies⁽²⁴⁾ provided the following percentages of Moslems in Africa, though figures most probably date back to the sixties.

Table 1

PERCENTAGE OF MOSLEM INHABITANTS IN NON-ARAB AFRICAN COUNTRIES

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Comoro Islands	95 %
Guinea	79 %
Niger	78 %
Senegal	76.5%
Sierra Leone	68.8%
Mali	65 %
Tanzania	62.5%
Gambia	56 %
Chad	50 %
Nigeria	44 %
Ethiopia	41.8%
Mozambique	24.5%
Upper Volta	19 %
Ivory Coast	19 %
Cameroon	17.5%
Malawi	10.6%
Kenya	10 %
Benin	7.5%
Togo	7 %
Uganda	5.4%
Malagasy Republic	4.4%
Ghana	3.5%
Central Africa	3 %
Gabon	1.3%
Congo Brazzaville	0.7%
Zambia	0.5%
Angola	Zero
Botswana	Zero
Swaziland	Zero

A more recent estimation shows the large discrepancy in this respect. According to this estimation, Moslems constitute the majority in countries such as Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Guinea, Niger and Chad. They form an extremely

influential minority (25-45 percent) in states such as Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and Ghana. They represent a minority and lack influence in Zambia, Angola, Malawi, Congo, Zaire and Gabon. Their overall numerical strength is difficult to determine in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia (more or less 50 percent) although they hold substantial social and political influence.⁽²⁵⁾

Notwithstanding the lack of accuracy in estimating the religious composition of Africa's population, the above estimations are instrumental in analyzing the potentials of Islam for Arab-African relations.

Starting with cooperative potentials, we would first come across the fact that Islam led to increased frequency of Arab-African interaction. "With the advent of Islam, the Arabs began unification of their forces under one leadership, enabling them to look beyond their borders for the dissemination of their new faith. Africa was their primary focal point". The march of the Moslem army constituted the inception of present-day Arab existence in North Africa, in 639 A.D. the first government of an Islamic state was established in Egypt, and before the end of the century, Moslem rule was stretched widely over North Africa.⁽²⁶⁾

Although the spread of Islam throughout the rest of Africa was not accompanied by its Arabization and although

Islam coexisted and in many cases sanctioned some of the traditions and practices of African culture, it was also a carrier of many of the values and institutions of Arab civilization.⁽²⁷⁾ One of the results of this process is the numerous loan words of ultimate Arabic origin, even among non-Moslem peoples.⁽²⁸⁾

Nevertheless, this factor should not be overestimated in furthering Afro-Arab communication, because it is known that Arabic is concentrated in North Africa and that the presence of a "linguistic interaction" falls short of removing communication barriers between Arab-speaking and Hausa or Swahili-speaking peoples.⁽²⁹⁾ More important is the fact that Africa's subservience to European colonialism considerably reduced the importance of the role played by the Arabic language as an instrument of Afro-Arab communication.⁽³⁰⁾

In dealing with conflictive potentials of Islam as a factor in Arab-African relations, one should not forget that Islam is not the religion of the majority in non-Arab Africa as it is in the case of the Arabs. Consequently, three kinds of countries exist in non-Arab Africa: countries of Islamic majority, others of Islamic minorities, and a third group with no Moslems.

This classification raises more than one problem. First, there is the fear of countries which fall in the second and third categories of the Islamic character of Arabism and Arab policies.⁽³¹⁾ Secondly, countries falling in the first

category would, on the contrary, welcome Arab-African cooperation, but, at the same time, exert pressure for more favorable dealings with the Arabs, particularly as regards economic aid. The third problem, perhaps the most serious, is that some countries in the first category are led by Christians. Moslems in these countries may seek Arab support enabling them to have access to the political power. Moreover, certain Islamic minorities in some African countries in the second category are ambitious to improve their status with the help of Arab countries.⁽³²⁾

4. The Economic Factor:

The economies of Arab and African countries have in common the general characteristics of underdevelopment.⁽³³⁾ It is conceded that these characteristics led them to try to establish a new international economic order.⁽³⁴⁾ It is expectable that Arab and African countries should coordinate their policies in order to strengthen their bargaining power in the negotiations aiming at the establishment of this new international economic order.⁽³⁵⁾ It is also widely believed that African and Arab economies can possibly and desirably achieve integration, or at least cooperation, in a world marked by international economic blocs set up by advanced industrial states.⁽³⁶⁾

Again, it is essential not to overestimate the role of the economic factor in the promotion of Arab-African relations. There are more than one reservation in this respect.

The first is the argument that the economic state of African and Arab countries applies as well to all backward third world countries. Thus, justifications made for creating economic integration or cooperation are by no means limited to the Arab and African countries.⁽³⁷⁾ Economic integration or cooperation on a third world basis may even seem more desirable. Therefore, Arab and African countries in particular have only the advantage of geographical proximity.

The second reservation lodges in the difference between the economic philosophies and policies pursued by Arab and African countries. This difference leads to another one in the field of international economic relations. Such relations are not necessarily compatible with the requirements of Arab-African economic cooperation.

A third reservation concerns the call for promoting Arab-African trade. Some scholars argue that most Arab and African countries are at the same level of economic development. In their view, little progress can be made to develop Arab-African trade until there is a greater variety of both imports and exports.⁽³⁸⁾

Then comes the most important reservation. The flow of Arab capital to Africa to meet its developmental needs was given priority when discussing potentials of Arab-African economic cooperation. It is known that having a big surplus of Arab capital was basically the result of raising the world prices of oil as of 1973. This raising of oil prices had adversely affected African economies. Of the 33 countries selected by the UN as the most seriously affected by the oil price rise, 21 are in Africa,⁽³⁹⁾ The African countries looked toward the Arabs in particular for help. This may be explained by the fact that those adverse effects had taken place during a period of tenacious solidarity on the part of African states toward the Arabs with regard to the Middle East conflict. It was through African dissatisfaction with the Arab response to their demands that a strong source of tension was created in Arab-African relations.

5. The Political Considerations:

This analysis of the political considerations affecting Arab-African relations will deal with two levels: the regional and the international.

On the regional level, the study covers two points: first, the main characteristics of both the Arab and the African regional systems with a view to know their impact on Arab-African relations and second, the effect of Israel and the racist regimes in Africa on these relations.

Speaking of Arab-African relations would imply the existence of two parties to these relations, whereas, in reality, this is not the case. It is true that there are only two regional organizations. However, both of them are "international" and not "supranational". This means that the principal actor in regional interaction in the Arab world and in Africa is the "nation-state". It is of vital importance, therefore, in order to understand Arab-African relations and predict their future course, to study the nature of relations maintained among those nation-states, on the Arab and African levels.

It is easy to prove that both inter-Arab and inter-African relations are not characterized by that cooperative interaction expected of states with common ideologies and political objectives. There is the division of both African and Arab states into groupings, with strained relations, in many cases, among them. There exists also the intervention by some countries in the internal affairs of others, using all possible means including military force. There are as well inter-African and inter-Arab conflicts, which sometimes take violent forms.

The main explanation for these differences can be attributed to the differentiation which occurred in Africa and in the Arab world between two groups of states: the first with political systems which can be generally

described as "progressive", amounting at times to the adoption of Marxist ideology (this took place in Africa more often than in the Arab world). The second group, to the contrary, is characterized by political systems which can be termed "conservative", sometimes adopting the right of divine rule as the main source of political legitimacy. This differentiation naturally reflected itself in foreign policy with the result that the first group of countries had mainly proceeded toward cementing relations with the Soviet-led socialist camp, while the second sought to strengthen relations with the capitalist camp headed by the USA.⁽⁴⁰⁾

No doubt, the above conditions are adversely affecting Arab-African relations. On the one hand, the nation-state's being the principal actor in Arab and African regional politics means the existence of about "sixty" actors in Arab-African relations, and not only "two" as may be presumed. On the other, inter-Arab or inter-African conflicts would be at the expense of promoting Arab-African relations, be that because the resolution of these conflicts would be given priority in both Arab and African diplomacy or because their existence eliminates the possibility of a unified Arab or African will, which is required to facilitate the promotion of Arab-African relations. Moreover, one of the outcomes of the above conditions is the conflicting Arab policies towards a number of important African issues.⁽⁴¹⁾

More serious are the differences among African attitudes with regard to the very principle of cooperation with Arabs.⁽⁴²⁾ Lastly, it can be easily concluded that the conditions discussed gave priority in Arab-African interaction to bilateral levels over regional ones.⁽⁴³⁾

The impact of the periphery actors in the Arab-African region on Arab-African relations is no less important. It is significant that there is a presumption of a similarity between Israel's existence in the Arab world and that of the racist regimes in Africa, particularly in South Africa.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Such a similarity can be expected to help promote Arab-African relations on the basis that the common enemy makes it desirable to close ranks to face it.⁽⁴⁵⁾ However, this expected solidarity had not taken place automatically, but rather the opposite was the case at some stages. This can be mainly explained in the light of the Arab-Israeli rivalry in Africa.

Israel's leaders were aware from the very start of the possible political and economic importance of both Africa and Asia in breaking up the isolation imposed upon their country by its Arab neighbors.⁽⁴⁶⁾ This awareness was enhanced when the Egyptian Government, since gaining independence in 1954, showed great interest in the African liberation struggle and rendered help to any nationalist group

fighting for independence.⁽⁴⁷⁾ On the other hand, certain economic considerations cannot be ignored. Israel receives from sympathetic overseas sources tremendous aid that amounted before the six-day war to more than two-thirds of its budget. To cope with such an unhealthy state of affairs, Israel has been eager to increase its industrial exports. Since its Arab neighbors were unwilling to engage in any transactions with it, the newly independent and relatively near African countries were the best choice left as a potential market for the Israeli exports. Thus, Israel developed an African policy based on three fundamental goals: containment of Arab influence, gaining diplomatic support among non-Arab African states and extension of economic relations with these states.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Israel depended on the persistent needs of the African states in the fields of agriculture, technical training, industrial development and the training of army and police personnel and offered African countries technical aid that was small in volume but effective. Through such aid the Israeli society was presented as an example of a modern society with socialist traits facing backward Arab states controlled by feudalism and fascism.⁽⁴⁹⁾

This was directly linked with an Israeli diplomatic offensive. There is no need to emphasize the importance of diplomatic recognition and representation to Israel and its

sensitivity to this question.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Thus, the only political condition that Israel attached to its aid was that the recipient government should extend diplomatic recognition to Israel.⁽⁵¹⁾ Besides, the Israeli top officials had carried out an extensive program of diplomatic contacts with the African states through paying several visits to these states since the late fifties.⁽⁵²⁾

On the other hand, Israel did try to adjust its policy toward the racist regimes in Africa in order to win Africa's good will. Therefore, in 1962, it voted not only against South Africa's apartheid policy in the UN General Assembly but also for sanctions against that country. Moreover, it suspended its trade with Rhodesia following the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's Government. As for its ties with South Africa, Israel explained them mainly in terms of the existence of a sizable Jewish community in that country.⁽⁵³⁾

It was natural that the Arabs should react to the above Israeli strategy. In 1960, the LAS decided to intensify its political activities in Africa. On the economic level, the Egyptian role was most prominent. Egypt indulged in massive efforts to compete with Israel for providing goods and services in the continent.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Until 1967, the outcome of the battle for Africa between Israel and the Arab states was decisively in favor of Israel. On the diplomatic level, Israel was recognized by all the independent African states south of the Sahara except for the Somali Republic and Mauritania.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Moreover, it succeeded in attaining the support of the African states in general for its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, or at least could neutralize their stances. Israel was so successful in this respect that the injection of the Arab-Israeli conflict into African politics was a frequent source of tension between Arab and Black Africa.⁽⁵⁶⁾

However, the June 1967 war brought new inputs into the Israeli-African relations. The African nations which only recently rid themselves of colonialism have been understandably sensitive to Israel's continued occupation of the Arab territories conquered in that war.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Israel for its part has slowed down its activities in Africa, limiting itself to maintaining relations with its most trustworthy partners.⁽⁵⁸⁾ More important, Israel felt that it was no more in need of pursuing an officially hostile policy towards South Africa with the negative developments in its African relations and the emergence of an African solidarity with the Arabs, especially since 1973.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Thus, Israel's relations with South Africa were considerably

promoted.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The Arabs also played an important role in this process. Extensive diplomatic efforts were exerted by some Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Arab financial aid to Africa was used within this context.

Nevertheless, the problems involved in this analysis do not come to an end at this point, owing to the latest developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The signature of this treaty in March 1979 has led to a collective Arab stand against Egypt. It is natural to see the emergence of an African discord on this issue with some African countries favoring the Egyptian policy and others supporting the Arab stand, particularly in the light of the Arab efforts to extend their attempts to isolate Egypt in the African arena. Egypt's position in this new rivalry is not as weak as it may seem at the first glance. While the Arabs rejecting the Egyptian-Israeli treaty do have the economic capabilities on their side, the Egyptian potential military role in Africa is not of marginal importance for those conservative African regimes that are concerned about eminent threats, both internal and external, to their survival. Such conditions are believed to have led to a variety of situations which are adversely affecting Arab-African relations.

The analysis of the effect of the international system on Arab-African relations is not an easy task. Writings on the attitudes of the relevant international actors towards Arab-African relations are few and the majority of them are merely passing remarks.⁽⁶¹⁾ However, it can generally be concluded that most of them tend to envisage a negative role of those actors in Arab-African relations.⁽⁶²⁾ Implied in this view is a presumption that the promotion of regional solidarity among groups of middle and small states can curb the influence of the great powers over these states. Thus, the development of Arab-African cooperation is likely to reduce the influence of the USA, the USSR and Western Europe, both in the Arab world and in Africa. However, students of international relations may find it necessary to underline the fact that the influence of a great power would only be reduced if the promotion of regional cooperation affects its interests adversely. The history of international relations acquaints us with the fact that regional cooperation in itself may not harm the interests of the great powers. Rather, it was sometimes initiated by a great power to facilitate its domination over a region and/or to curb a counter-domination. The question then turns to be: what kind of regional cooperation is the Arab-African one?

So far the Arabs and the Africans cannot be classified as a whole as pro-American, pro-Soviet or pro-Western European. It is true that the "conservative" weight in Arab-African relations seems stronger than the "revolutionary,"⁽⁶³⁾ but there is, on the other hand, the influence of some revolutionary forces on these relations. This middle position of Arab-African relations does not provide a motivation for a great power to back Arab-African cooperation with enthusiasm or oppose it fervently.

However, it is necessary here to point out some views which hold that particular international actors are benefitting from Arab-African cooperation. Western Europe is the classic example in this respect. According to these views, the Western European side views Arab financial aid to Africa as a means of relieving its shoulders of most of the financial burden towards Africa. This would enable the Europeans to be⁽⁶⁴⁾ exclusively concerned with extending technical aid to Africa. Furthermore, Arab aid to Africa is chiefly bound for certain countries known for their economic dependency on the Western European market. The study of sectors receiving Arab aid (According to a report issued in 1978) reveals that financing African imports consumes 29% of the volume of Arab aid.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Bearing in mind that the EEC has been predominantly figuring high in the trade exchange with Africa,⁽⁶⁶⁾ it could be discerned how Western Europe is indirectly availing of this

aid. Finally, the European houses of expertise are exclusive in presenting feasibility studies on Arab-financed projects and likewise European firms implement them.⁽⁶⁷⁾

Although it may be easy to agree with the above analysis, it is not as easy to conclude that Western Europe automatically has a clear-cut interest in promoting Arab-African cooperation on a "regional basis". In fact, there is no reason why Western Europe cannot take advantage of the continuation of Arab-African relations on a bilateral basis. In other words, the promotion of Arab-African relations on a regional basis is not necessarily a prerequisite for the preservation of European interests in this respect. It is sufficient that the policy of giving financial aid to African countries by rich Arab states continues on a bilateral basis. As a matter of fact, this may constitute the optimum condition for realizing European interests, as Arab-African regional solidarity could develop in the future in a direction incompatible with European interests.

On the other hand Arab-African relations have not developed so far in a course that is substantially impairing to the vital interests of any of the great powers in question.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Moreover, the economic and military backwardness of the Africans and the Arabs renders their ability to undermine those interests quite limited. No wonder then that Arab-African cooperation has not practically extended for example to the correction of the terms of selling raw

materials to industrial countries, or the discussion of the strategic interests of either of the two super powers in Africa and the Arab world, and their implications for Arab-African security. Thus, there exists no immediate threat to the vital interests of any of the international actors whose attitudes towards Arab-African cooperation are under study. Therefore, no motive is likely to induce those actors to pursue a direct and active policy to undermine Arab-African cooperation.

In accordance with the above-mentioned analysis, it can be concluded that the impact of the concerned great powers on Arab-African relations at this stage would not emanate from their policies adopted towards these relations in particular, in as much as it is the consequence of their active policies in the Arab world and Africa. The success of these policies helps deepen the division of Arab and African countries into pro-American and pro-Soviet countries. A division as such is no doubt contradictory to the very logic of Arab-African relations.

6. Arab-African Communication:

It is obvious that the factors dealt with so far, concerning Arab-African relations, have both cooperative and conflictive potentials. Nevertheless, the analysis of Arab-African communication reveals only a negative effect.

Arab and African scholars who studied this topic agree that the present state of Arab-African communication is one of the main obstacles to the development of Arab-African cooperation.

Until this moment, Arab-African communication takes place mainly through Western Europe, especially Britain and France.⁽⁶⁹⁾ For example, the literature currently available to Arabs and Africans on the history of their relations is largely the product of third parties, mainly Europeans. On the other hand, foreign news agencies dominate sources of news in Africa and the Arab world, apart from the important role played by foreign newspapers, periodicals, broadcasting stations, films, etc.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Furthermore, a quick survey of Arab and African airlines reveals that most of them play a very limited role in promoting Arab-African communication. Statistics of the number of passengers, as well as the volume of materials transferred, indicate that Arab-African communication is still marginal in this respect.⁽⁷¹⁾

To a great extent, one can explain the above state of Arab-African communication by practices dating back to the colonial era. All the various networks of communication, which were established in Africa and the Arab world by colonial powers, were channelled to Europe.⁽⁷²⁾ On the other hand, the colonizers used to force their own language in

their colonies.⁽⁷³⁾ Language should not only be viewed as symbols, as it is also a thought, an attitude and a trend. With the end of political domination, intellectual and cultural influence has continued.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Certainly, the lack of communication causes distortion in the process of Arab-African interaction. One of the important results of this distortion is the distorted African images of the Arabs, and vice-versa. It is obvious, for example, that some dimensions of the African image of the Arabs are based on a view of the latter as racists and colonialists.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Furthermore, the Arabs are perceived as owners of oil, having unlimited funds which they deposit in European and American banks and invest in the rich countries, living in extravagance and luxury. Parallel to this, the Arabs are accused of perceiving many Africans particularly the non-Moslems as primitive and atheist.⁽⁷⁶⁾ One of the other important problems resulting from the lack of communication is perhaps the impediment of conveying the understanding established among the heads of states and governments to the elites and masses. This process is essential to Arab-African relations, due to political instability in Africa and the Arab world in general. Bearing this instability in mind, the promotion of Arab-African cooperation cannot depend on the existing rulers alone.⁽⁷⁷⁾

FOOTNOTES

1. See: Helmi Shaarawi, Arab-African Relations (Arabic), unpublished study prepared for the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo. Al-Ahram Foundation, P.4.
2. See: N.M. Shamuyarira, Causes and Effects of Racial Discrimination, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium on Liberation and Development, January, 1976, P.15. Adeoye Akinsanya, "The Afro-Arab Alliance: Dream or Reality?" in African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 301, October 1976, PP.518-519. Sammy Kum Buo, "The Illusion of Afro-Arab Solidarity" in Africa Report, Vol. 20, No.5, September-October 1975, P.46.
3. Abdul Malek Auda, "The Relations between Arabism and Africanism" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya (International Politics), Vol. 13, No. 50, October 1977, P. 123.
4. Sayed Ahmed Mohammad Diab, Political Relations between Africa and the Arab World, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, P.2.
5. Especially that a considerable number of Arabic studies unconsciously confirm sayings such as: the Arab role in civilizing Africa, the Arab role in confronting colonialism in Africa, etc. Regardless of the historical correctness of these sayings, they confirm the latent contradiction discussed here because they stress the fact that Arab-African interaction is viewed as one-sided. For a clear example of such an attitude, see the introduction written by Mohie El-Din Saber, the General Manager of the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science, in: Mahmoud Khairi Issa (ed.), Arab-African Relations, An Analytical Study of Their Various Aspects (Arabic), Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science: Institute for Arab Research and Studies, 1978. Also see for an excellent expression of the asymmetrical relationship between the Arabs and the Africans: Ali A. Mazrui, "Black Africa and the Arabs" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4, July 1975, P. 725.
6. These conclusions have been drawn from a large volume of historical data in some Arabic studies. Important among them are: Gamal Zakareia Qasem, Historical Origins of Arab-African Relations, Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science: Institute for Arab Research and Studies, 1975. Mohammad Abdul Ghani Saudi, Arab-African

Communications in Ancient Ages, in: Issa, Op.Cit., pp.1-29. Mohammad Mohammad Amien, "The Development of Arab-African Relations in the Middle Ages," Ibid., pp. 31-80. Mohammad Ahmad khalaf-Alla, "The Historical Roots of the Relations between the Arabs and the Africans" in Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi (The Arab Future), No. 10, November, 1979, pp. 50-59. Shaarawi, Op.Cit., pp. 4-8.

7. Diap, Op.Cit., p.8.
8. See: Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, Afro-Arab Unity: The Historical Setting, The Afro-Arab Symposium, Sharjah, UAE, December 1976, P.1.
9. This similarity was not superficial even to some African scholars. This is clear from the following analysis of Shamuyarira: "In each area of colonial expansion, or trade, religion was used to rationalize or justify the actions of the colonizer or new trader. It provided the missionary energy and zeal that exploration of new lands required. The "Crusade" or the "jihad" paved the way for the ruling classes of the colonizing state to establish colonies." Shamuyarira, Op.Cit., p.7.
10. Or, because of the deterioration of the Islamic state or its collapse, as in the case of the collapse of the Abbasid state at the hands of the Mongols. This was followed by an increase in Arab migration to East Africa. Qasem, Op.Cit., pp. 56-57, 72.
11. Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.9.
12. Ahmad, Op.Cit., pp. 10-11.
13. Francis Mading Deng, Afro-Arab Relations, A Historical Basis for Cooperation, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.15. For an expression of the same point of view, see: Lansine Kaba, "Islam's Advance in Tropical Africa," in Africa Report, Vol.21, No.2, March-April 1976, pp. 38-39. Lemuel A. Johnson, Some Mediating Elites and the Hyphen in Afro-Arab Relations: Preliminary Notes on a Paradigm, Symposium on Afro-Arab Relations in the Eighties, Cairo, January 1980, p.5.
14. See: for details: Qasem, Op.Cit., pp. 77-78. Mohammad Abdul Ghani Saudi, "Arabism and Africanism: Confrontation or Solidarity?" in Issa, Op.Cit., pp. 262-263.

- Ahmad, Op.Cit., p.11. Shaarawi is considered to be among a few Arab scholars who developed a different point of view. He indicated that any attempt to defend the Arabs from being involved in slavetrade has an element of racial bias to the Arabs. He pointed out that it is not at all unexpectable that some Arab social strata had been involved in slave-trade, especially at a time when slavery was a common practice. See: Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.3.
15. See: Diab, Op.Cit., pp. 5-6. Ahmad, Op.Cit., P.7.
 16. Abdul Malek Auda, "Arab Policy and African Issues"(Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 11, No. 42, October 1975, p.83.
 17. Shamuyarira, Op.Cit., p.14. It is noteworthy that the two points of view were expressed nearly at the same time. Auda's visit took place in the middle of 1975, and his report was published in October of the same year, while Shamuyarira had presented his paper to the Afro-Arab Symposium held in Khartoum in January 1976.
 18. See: Buo, Op.Cit., p.46, and for quotations from the Zambia Daily Mail (June 21, 1974) and the Tanzanian Swahili-language Uhuru (May 5, 1973) see: Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities, Westview Press/Boulder, Colorado, 1979, p. 141.
 19. For more details see: Kaba, Op.Cit., pp. 39-40.
 20. For detailed studies on the subject see: Gamal Zakareia Qasem, (ed.), Arab-African Relations: A Historical Study of the Negative Effects of Colonialism (Arabic), Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science: Institute for Arab Research and Studies, 1977.
 21. See: Shamuyarira, Op.Cit., p.15.
 22. See the excellent analysis of Gamal Muhammad Ahmad of this shared experience in: Ahmad, Op.Cit., pp. 12-17. Also see: Shaarawi, op.cit., pp.12-14.
 23. Hisham Sharabi, The Unity of the Arab and African Movements of Liberation, Sharjah Afro-Arab Symposium, p. 1. Diab, Op.Cit., pp. 7-9.

24. Issa, Op.Cit., pp. 286,426.
25. Kaba, Op.Cit., p. 39.
26. Diab, Op.Cit., p. 3.
27. Abdul Aziz Mohammad Gaafar, Ideas on Afro-Arab Cooperation, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.3.
28. Mohamed Omer Beshir, Cultural Diversity and National Unity, University of Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, 1976, p.9. Mazrui, op.cit., p.726.
29. See: Pierre Alexandre, "The Politics of Language: Understood of Which People" in Africa Report, Vol. 18, No. 4, July-August 1973, pp. 16, 19.
30. See: Beshir, op.cit., p. 12.
31. Boutros Boutros Ghali, "Reflections on Arab-African Dialogue" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 12, No. 44, April 1976, p. 46.
32. Ali Abusin, Arabs and the Challenge of the Dialogue with Africa (Arabic), Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Al-Ahram Foundation, October 1978, p.18.
33. See: for details: M.O. Abu Saq, The Liberation of Africa and the Arab World, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp.2-3. Gaafar, Op.Cit., pp. 12-13. Mostafa Abdul Aziz, "Arab-African Cooperation in the Economic Field," in Issa, Op.Cit., pp.190-193.
34. Gaffar, Op.Cit., p. 5. Abdul Aziz, Op.Cit., p.198.
35. See: Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., p.109.
36. Abdul Aziz, Op.Cit., pp.199-200. And for details on the scope of that integration or cooperation see: Gaffar, Op. Cit., pp.13-14. Possibilities of Afro-Arab Cooperation in Agricultural Fields: A Preliminary Report. Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp. 1-2. M.H. Awad, Afro-Arab Cooperation for Development, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp.39-40.
37. Gosta Tompuri, Afro-Arab Cooperation: A Processual and Contextual Analysis, Cairo Symposium on Afro-Arab Relations in the Eighties, p.16.

38. Gail L. Peek, "A New Twist to Afro-Arab Relations?" in Middle East Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, Spring 1979, p.35. Also see: On Arab-African Economic Relations (Arabic), LAS's Department of Economic Affairs, Cairo Symposium on Arab-African Relations in the Eighties, p.8.
39. Ernest J. Wilson III, "The Energy Crisis and African Underdevelopment" in Africa Today, Vol. 22, No.4, October-December 1975, p.12.
40. See: Helmi Shaarawi, A New Reading of the Relations Between Arab and African National Liberation Movements (Arabic), University of Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, December 1978, pp. 59-60.
41. See Abdul Malek Auda, Principles and Framework for Planning a Strategy for Arab-African Dialogue (Arabic), Sharjah Afro-Arab Symposium, pp. 22-23.
42. For details see: Abusin, Op.Cit., pp. 22-26.
43. Auda, "The Relations between Arabism and Africanism" Op.Cit., p.126.
44. See for details: Diab, Op.Cit., p.15. Also see peter Mueshihange, A Paper on the Liberation Movements in Africa and the Arab World, Sharjah Afro-Arab Symposium, pp.3-4. Kheir El-Din Abdul Rahman, "Zionism: Another Face of Racialism" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 12, No.44, April 1976, pp.23-24. Mazrui, Op.Cit., pp. 731-2. Shamuyarira, Op.Cit., pp.5-7. It is important to note that this is not a politically biased line of analysis. In 1970, Henry Katsew (then the editor of the Zionist Record, the official organ of the South African Zionist Movement) put the issue as simple as this: "you cannot in one breath claim the right of Jews to political power and sovereignty in one corner of the earth (Israel).. and in the next breath approve attitudes which seek to take away the same hard-won right from the children of the boers." Henry Katsew, "Dialogue: South African Jews and Politics: Another View" in Africa Report, Vol. 15, No.4, May 1970, pp.22.
45. See: Ahmad Sedki El-Dagani, "Arab-African Liberation in the World of Tomorrow" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 12, No.44, April, 1976, p. 15.

46. See: Antwan Mansour, "The Economic Relations Between Israel and Africa" (Arabic) in Shu'oon Felastini'a (Palestinian Affairs), No.29, January 1974, pp.70-79. Awad, Op.Cit., p.18.
47. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Africa and the Middle Eastern Crisis" in Issue, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp.33-34.
48. Philippe Decraene, "Africa and the Mideast Crisis: Is the Romance with Israel Over?" in Africa Report, Vol. 18, No. 3, May-June 1973, p.22. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "Israel in Africa: The Strategy of Aid" in Ibid., Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1972, p. 12.
49. Diab, Op.Cit., p.6. And for a detailed analysis of the subject see: Mansour, Op.Cit., pp.80-103. Aaron Segal, "Israel in Africa" in Africa Report, Vol.8, No.4, April 1963, pp. 19-20. Valentine J. Belfiglia, "Israeli Foreign Aid Programs to Africa" in International Problems, Vol. 15, 3-4 (30), Fall 1976, pp. 132-139. Fouand Ajamy and Martin H. Sours, "Israel and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Study of Interaction" in African Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, December 1970, pp. 407-408.
50. Ibid., p.408.
51. Segal, Op.Cit., p.19.
52. Samuel Decalo, "Africa and the Mid-Eastern War", in Africa Report, Vol. 12, No.7, October 1967, p.57.
53. Ankush Balaji Sawant, "Rivalry Between Egypt and Israel in Africa South of the Sahara, 1956-1970" in International Studies, Vol. 17, No.2, April-June 1978. "Israel, the Arabs and Africa, An Interview with Ambassador Yaacov Shimoni" in Africa Report, Vol. 21, No.4, July-August 1976, p.55. Also see: Naeim Kaddah, Relationship Between Zionist Settlers and White Settlers in South Africa, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp. 8-9.
54. Khawas, Op.Cit., p.35. Also see: Ajamy and Sours, Op.Cit.,
55. Ibid., pp. 408-409. Segal, Op.Cit., p.21. Also see: Sawant, Op.Cit., p. 310. Decraene, Op.Cit., p.21.
56. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.518.

57. "Israel and Africa" in Africa Report, Vol.15, No.2, February, 1970 p. 6. Also see: Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., p.11.
58. Decraene, Op.Cit., p. 23. Khawas, Op.Cit., p.37.
59. See: Africa Report, Vol. 21, No.6, November-December 1976, p.34.
60. See: for details: Mazrui, Op.Cit., p.730. Kaddah, Op.Cit., pp. 10-12. "The Israel-Africa Connection" in Africa, No.68, April 1977, pp. 42-43. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 13, No.4, May 15, 1976. p. 4009.
61. Unless specific reference is made, the analysis in this part is based on the following sources: Henry Bienen, "US Foreign policy in a Changing Africa," in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No.3, Fall 1978, pp. 443-464. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 325-343. Special issues on Arab-European Dialogue (Arabic) Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 10, No.37, July 1974, pp.42-99, Vol. 13, No.49, July 1979, pp. 221-270.
62. See: for example: Auda, Op.Cit., p.126. Ghali, Op.Cit., p.46.
63. See: Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., p.52.
64. Nabia El-Asfahani, "The Attitude of Africa Towards the Arab-European Dialogue" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 13, No. 49, July 1977, p.249.
65. Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.30.
66. In 1975 the volume of trade between Africa and EEC rose to 35 billion dollars, while that with the USA was 10 billion dollars, with Japan more than 3.5 billion dollars, with USSR more than one billion dollars and less than that with China. See: Bienen, Op.Cit., p.425.
67. Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.30. Facing this unhealthy state of affairs was clearly the logic behind one of the most interesting papers on Arab-African relations. In this paper, the author cited that "the first two ABEDA financed projects that will utilize even a regional firm or expert in charge have been approved only very recently, in late 1978, and are both located in devastated Uganda. A textile mill will be implemented by an Egyptian

firm and an Arab agronomist will head a poultry project." See: Willard R. Johnson, Why and How to Use More Local Contractors in African-Arab Projects, Cairo Symposium on Afro-Arab Relations in the Eighties, pp. 3-4.

68. Unless we consider the development of an anti-Israeli Afro-Arab attitude inconsistent with the preservation of the American vital interests in Africa and the Arab world. There is some evidence that this may be a common perception among the American public and at least a segment of the American intellectuals. See: Bruce Oudes, "In the Wake of the Middle East War" in Africa Report, Vol. 19, No.1, January-February, 1974, pp. 11-13, 35,50.
69. Ghali, Op.Cit., p.46. Auda, Op.Cit., p.125. Auda, "Arab Plicy and African Issues," Op.Cit., p.85.
70. Mohamed Aly El-Ewany, International Communication of the Arab League in Africa, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p. 2. Gaafar, Op.Cit., p.26.
71. Auda, "The Relations between Arabism and Africanism," Op.Cit., p.125.
72. See: Awatef Abdul Rahman, Mass Media in Africa and their Role in Consolidating Afro-Arab Understanding Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.3.
73. For details see Saudi, Op.Cit., pp. 258-259. A.Sawi, Afro-Arab Cooperation in the Fields of Culture and Information, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.17.
74. Mohie El-Dine Saber, The Development of Human Resources and the Arab-African Cooperation, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.11.
75. See: Wang Metuge, "Some Observations Concerning Arab-African Cooperation" in Arab-African Cultural Relations and Development Issues in the Arab World and Africa, (the meetings of the African Association of Political Science in cooperation with the Institute for Arab Research and Studies and the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, May, 1978), The African Society, Cairo, Documents and Research Bulletin, Vol.6, No.9,p.14, September 1978.
76. Ibid.
77. Auda, Op.Cit., p.125.

Part 2
~~Chapter 2~~

DIMENSIONS OF ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS

part

The analysis in this ~~chapter~~ will address itself to four dimensions of the contemporary development of Arab-African relations. These dimensions are: the political, the economic, and the cultural, as well as that of Arab-African security. Separating these dimensions would be a difficult task, especially with regard to the economic and the political dimensions because they have been strongly linked since 1973. However, for analytical purposes, these dimensions should be dealt with separately, without, of course, attempting to break the linkage binding them.

1. Main Trends in the Contemporary Development of Arab-African Political Relations:

A deep insight into the development of contemporary Arab-African political relations reveals four trends, believed to be of crucial importance in this respect:

- a. emergence of a particular framework of Arab-African relations;
- b. increased institutionalization;
- c. political solidarity;
- d. absence of ideology.

A. Emergence of a Particular Framework for Arab-African Relations:

Before developing into their present form, Arab-African relations had passed through two stages wherein

they lacked a particular framework.

At first, Arab-African interaction was primarily conducted within an Afro-Asian framework, either in the UN⁽¹⁾ or as part of the many Afro-Asian solidarity conferences, most important of which is the Bandung Conference of 1955. It is noteworthy that the early initiatives of the LAS Council for cooperation with African peoples were launched within the same framework. Such initiatives were not directed towards African peoples or countries in particular, but to the "Afro-Asian" countries as a group.⁽²⁾ As of the sixties, this framework was enlarged so as to include the "third world," through the non-alignment movement.

One can identify the starting point of the current framework of Arab-African relations as the year 1958. In April of that year, the first conference of independent African states was convened in Accra. Of the eight African states attending, only two-Ghana and Liberia-belonged to Black Africa, while five were Afro-Arab states: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Sudan. In fact, the Accra Conference was significant because it indicated that "neither Islam nor the Sahara constituted an insuperable barrier between Black and Arab Africa.. Indeed, the view emerged at the Accra summit and thereafter that some Black African states had more politically in common with

some Arab states than with their immediate neighbors."

In 1960 two informal groupings of independent African states emerged because African leaders could not agree on the form of inter-African cooperation. This cleavage was based on policy orientations and the colonial experiences of African countries. These two groupings could be categorized broadly as "moderate" and "radical". In December 1960 the first formal grouping was formed at Brazzaville by a coalition of French speaking African states. The second formal grouping was formed in January 1960 at Casablanca by states that are generally considered more radical in their approach to decolonization and African unity.⁽³⁾

These two groupings emphasized a number of positive aspects with respect to relations between Arab and non-Arab African states. Each grouping indiscriminately included a number of states from both Arab and Black Africa. It is very important also that differences within every grouping were not based on geography (i.e., Arab-African basis) but rather on political belief.⁽⁴⁾ However, there were still Black African leaders who stood for the unity of Black Africa first, while others argued that Arab quarrels would only produce unnecessary divisions within the pan-African movement.⁽⁵⁾

At any rate, the ultimate success of all African countries in reaching a formula for the creation of the

OAU in 1963 comprising all African states, including Afro-Arab states, stood as an end to the above attitude. It also provided for the first time a framework for interaction among the Afro-Arab countries and the rest of African countries. Moreover, it implied that the Arabs, represented by their league, could interact with the Africans on a regional and not only a bilateral basis, through the OAU. In fact, this constituted the transitional stage, which eventually led to the emergence of a particular framework of Arab-African relations. It is distinct from the broader scope of the Afro-Asian group (or non-aligned countries), and also from the narrower scope of the different African conferences or groupings eventually culminating in the OAU. This framework encompasses the totality of Arab and African countries.

However, this should not be regarded as an isolationist trend in Arab-African relations. Arab-African cooperation does fall "within the framework of common action by all developing countries to increase cooperation among themselves, on the one hand, and on the other, to strengthen their action to establish a more equitable and balanced new international economic order," as stated by the Joint Meeting of the African and Arab Ministerial Committees in Cairo on July 10,

1975.⁽⁶⁾ The Arab-African summit conference held in Cairo in March 1977 reaffirmed the commitment to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and to the establishment of a just international economic order.⁽⁷⁾

B. Increased Institutionalization:

Recent developments in Arab-African relations (since 1973) began with the cooperation of the LAS and the OAU. Although these relations are still taking place within this framework, their development since 1973 has witnessed what can be called "increased institutionalization". By this we mean that in the process of Arab-African interaction through the OAU and the LAS, large number of institutions making and implementing decisions on Arab-African relations came into being.

During the emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers in November 1973, a ministerial committee was set up, consisting of seven member-states for the purpose of discussing some questions arising from Afro-Arab cooperation.⁽⁸⁾ The Sixth Arab Summit Conference held in Algeria (November 26-28, 1973) welcomed that step and reciprocated by empowering the Secretary General of the LAS to take practical measures to get in touch with the OAU Administrative Secretary General and the Committee of Seven with a view of instituting periodic consultations on all levels between African and Arab countries.⁽⁹⁾

In early 1974 the Secretary General of the LAS decided to establish a department for African affairs in the Secretariat.⁽¹⁰⁾ Later on, the OAU Council reciprocated by deciding in the 24th session, held from 13-21 February 1975, to set up a bureau within the cabinet of the Secretary General to deal with matters concerning Afro-Arab cooperation.⁽¹¹⁾

This evidently reflects the difficulty that both the LAS and the OAU were not prepared, from the institutional point of view, to receive new inputs in Arab-African relations. Both were founded at a stage in which relations had not yet developed. However, this difficulty drew attention to the need for developing new institutions for furthering Arab-African relations.

Thus, the OAU Council of Ministers decided in its 23rd ordinary session (June 6-11, 1974) to ask the OAU Administrative Secretary General to get in touch with the LAS Secretary General with a view of studying the possibility of convening an Arab-African conference on the ministerial level to discuss potential and actual fields of Arab-African cooperation.

On the other hand, Somalia presented a memorandum to the LAS General Secretariat suggesting the convention of an Arab-African summit conference. The memorandum was

put on the agenda of the LAS Council 62nd session in 1974. The Council in turn approved its addition to the agenda⁽¹²⁾ of the 7th Arab Summit held in Rabat (October 26-29, 1974). The Rabat conference agreed to hold the proposed Afro-Arab summit conference and to entrust the LAS Secretary General to make contacts with the African states to explore their views on the subject, so that necessary arrangements could be made to convene an Afro-Arab foreign ministers' conference in preparation for the summit in case of their agreement.⁽¹³⁾

On February 13, 1975, the African Committee of Seven met on the ministerial level. Its chairman submitted a report on the Rabat conference concerning the joint summit conference. He informed the committee on the preparations undertaken by the LAS in this respect. During the meeting, the committee recommended organizing Arab-African cooperation in a manner ensuring its continuation, effectiveness and protection against misunderstanding.⁽¹⁴⁾

The 24th session of the OAU Council (February 13-21, 1975) represented an appropriate occasion for the African ministers to reconsider the performance of the Committee of Seven. The council took two decisions in this respect: the first concerning its enlargement by adding five more members, thus it became the Committee of Twelve, and the second relating to its main function, which was defined as "the preparation in cooperation with the Secretary

General for the Afro-Arab summit!"⁽¹⁵⁾

The African Committee of Twelve held its first meeting on February 22, 1975 to lay down its programme of action, with the representative of the LAS General Secretariat attending. The committee decided in that meeting to entitle the OAU Administrative Secretary General to hold further contacts with all parties concerned. It also decided to form a committee of twelve at the ambassadorial level to prepare a report in the form of a declaration on Arab-African cooperation to be discussed later by the Committee of Twelve at the ministerial level. Then, another meeting was to be held between the ambassadorial committee and its Arab counterpart to prepare for the Arab and African foreign ministers' meeting.

On April 7, 1975, the OAU Council of Ministers held an extraordinary session to discuss the question of the dialogue with South Africa. At the conclusion of the session, the Committee of Twelve met and reviewed the ambassadorial committee's report which included a proposal for integrating similar Arab and African institutions and establishing new Arab-African ones. The ministerial committee expressed its hope that the LAS establishes a ministerial committee equivalent to the African Committee of Twelve, besides an ambassadorial level committee.⁽¹⁶⁾

This suggestion was approved by the LAS Council in its 63rd session (April 24-27, 1975). The council also accepted a plan for preparatory meetings that should precede the Arab-African summit. This plan was elaborated by the African Committee of Twelve. According to the plan a joint meeting was to be held in June 1975 by the two ministerial committees of twelve to prepare a joint programme of action.

The period between February and July 1975 witnessed intensive activity. The ambassadorial and ministerial committees met separately, one in Addis Ababa and the other in Cairo. The Arab ambassadorial Committee of Twelve met on May 28, 1975 to consider the programme of action prepared by the LAS Secretariat, which had also submitted unofficially to the committee the programme of action presented by the African ambassadorial committee to the African ministerial committee. After a brief comparison between the two documents, the committee decided to take up the African draft programme as a working paper. This action had no doubt contributed to the success of the joint meeting of the two ministerial committees of twelve held in Cairo (July 9-10, 1975). In this meeting a unified draft declaration and programme of action was agreed upon as representing the views of the twenty-four foreign ministers. The approval of this draft was left for the Arab-African summit.⁽¹⁷⁾

The draft included an institutional dimension. With a view to enhancing closer coordination of Arab-African cooperation and to assist in the implementation of the proposed declaration and programme of action, the Arab-African summit was to decide:

- To establish a joint standing commission on ministerial level to follow up periodically and ensure the implementation of the declaration and to explore new spheres of cooperation.
- To grant each other observer status at the meeting of their respective organizations, when matters of common interests are discussed.
- That the OAU and the LAS shall establish as soon as possible representation to the respective Secretariat of both organizations with a view to maintaining close and continuous working relationships in the implementation of Arab-African cooperation.
- To invite corresponding African and Arab institutions, in all fields, to take all necessary measures to establish close working relationships that would facilitate cooperation and coordination of their activities.⁽¹⁸⁾

The outcome of the Cairo meeting was reported to the African summit conference held in Uganda (July 28 - August 1, 1975). The conference called for a joint meeting

of African and Arab foreign ministers to reach final agreement on the draft declaration and to prepare for the Arab-African summit. This recommendation was approved by the LAS Council in its 64th ordinary session (October 18-21, 1975). Consultations between the LAS Secretary General and the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU ended up with the convention of the proposed conference in Dakar (April 19-22, 1976). After lengthy discussions, the conference issued a document, known as the "Dakar Document", or a "Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Cooperation."⁽¹⁹⁾ This document was eventually adopted by the First Arab-African Summit in Cairo. As for fixing a date for the summit conference, it was left up to LAS-OAU consultations.

Subsequently, the Lome conference was held in Togo in January 1977, comprising members of the committee of twelve from both sides to agree on the final preparations for holding the second session of the Joint Arab-African Ministerial Council, and then the first summit conference. In addition to the "Dakar Document," the Lome conference prepared the other documents which were presented later to the summit conference and fixed the final date for holding the foreign ministers conference on March 3-6, 1977 and the summit conference on March 7-9, 1977.⁽²⁰⁾

The two conferences convened in due dates, with the summit conference issuing four documents. Of these documents two are mostly related to the institutional development of Arab-African relations: the Declaration and Programme of Action for Arab-African Cooperation, and the the Organization and Procedures for the Implementation of Arab-African Cooperation. The first document included the above institutional dimension in the draft declaration and programme of action agreed upon in the Cairo meeting (July 1975). However, the second document can be considered a turning point in the process of institutionalizing Arab-African relations. This document established bodies responsible for decision making and implementation on Arab-African relations, as well as settling disputes in this respect as follows:

1. A Joint Summit Conference and Afro-Arab Foreign Ministers' Council:

The document stipulated that the Afro-Arab Summit would be held once every three years, while the Joint Foreign Ministers' Council would be held in ordinary session once every 18 months.

2. A Standing Committee:

It consists of 24 ministers or their representatives at ambassadorial level, at least 12 of whom are to be chosen by the OAU and the remaining 12 by the LAS, the Secretary General of the LAS, and the Administrative Secretary General

of the OAU. The two chairmen of the Committee of Twelve of the OAU and the LAS are the co-chairmen of the Standing Committee.

The Standing Committee holds its ordinary meetings twice a year at the headquarters of the two organizations respectively, unless an invitation is extended by a member state. Moreover, extraordinary meetings are held on the agreement of the two chairmen but their dates and duration are decided according to consultations between them and the secretary generals of the two organizations.

The Standing Committee undertakes putting into effect Arab-African cooperation, following up its development, and directing it towards its objectives, as specified in the Declaration and Programme of Action for Arab-African Cooperation. The committee is authorized to set up working groups necessary for studying different aspects of cooperation, and to delineate their jurisdiction and procedures. It is also authorized to propose an extraordinary meeting of the Joint Foreign Ministers' Council.

3. Specialized Working Groups:

These are to be formed in the different fields of cooperation specified in the Declaration and Programme of Action. However, the Standing Committee can set up other groups as well. Each group is composed, as closely

as possible, of an equal number of experts and specialists from both sides. Each side appoints a chairman for every working group, and the latter chooses a rapporteur.

The working groups present their suggestions and recommendations to the Standing Committee in order to take the necessary measures. It is up to these working groups to form specialized committees to undertake tasks falling within their jurisdiction. Each working group determines the responsibilities of the specialized committees, as well as their procedures, and, moreover, it has the right to dissolve any of them.

4. A Coordinating Committee:

It assumes under the authority of the Standing Committee the responsibility of coordinating among different working groups, and ensuring the implementation of the resolutions issued. The committee handles, within its jurisdiction, only matters of a practical and administrative nature requiring immediate decisions.

The committee consists of the two chairmen of the Committee of Twelve on both sides, the secretary generals of the OAU and the LAS, as well as the co-chairmen and rapporteurs of the working groups concerned, should this be deemed necessary by the Coordinating Committee.

5. An ad hoc Conciliation and Arbitration Court:

Its jurisdiction is to provide the legal interpretation of the provisions governing Arab-African cooperation and to settle disputes that may arise.

6. A Special Fund:

It is established to ensure the executive bodies implementation of Arab-African cooperation. Both organizations share equally in its finance, besides voluntary contributions. The fund is run by the secretary generals of the OAU and the LAS, under the supervision of the Coordinating Committee which submits reports to the Standing Committee. (21)

Four analytical remarks can be presented on the above developments which led to the phenomenon referred to in this study as "increased institutionalization":

1. Having discussed these developments, it became clear that the African side held the initiative in stepping up the process of the institutionalization of Arab-African relations. This can be explained by the keenness of the African side on the regularity of cooperation, especially at times of economic crises resulting from the rise in oil prices. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the Arab side was generally responsive to African initiatives, motivated by its interest in maintaining Arab-African political solidarity.

2. The institutions in charge of developing Arab-African relations, as outlined in the document adopted by the summit conference do not differ in many aspects from international or regional organizations in general. However, this does not imply the establishment of an organization comprising the LAS and the OAU member states. This idea was casually raised by Guinea's Foreign Minister, who at a meeting referred to an Afro-Arab organization that "we hope to establish". In a more detailed expression of the same idea, the Senegalese Foreign Minister held it possible to establish" an organization almost resembling that of the non-aligned countries, i.e., without official headquarters or a charter, but with regular sessions..." It is clear that these views did not produce a positive response. They even raised outright opposition, as was apparently the case with the response of the Foreign Minister of Benin.⁽²²⁾ It is also understood that the foreign ministers of Guinea and Senegal did not mean the establishment of an organization that would replace the two existing ones, but rather advocated an organization comparable to the UN in its relations with regional organizations.

3. It should be stressed that the institutionalization of Arab-African relations, as concluded by the summit conference, is based on equality between the African and

the Arab parties, although the number of the OAU member states is more than twice that of the LAS member states. This in fact reflects the mutual interest in maintaining relations on the basis of equality. Besides, it is an issue of secondary significance in the absence of any specified rules for voting within Afro-Arab institutions. Consensus is the acknowledged basis for decision-making within these institutions, with the right granted to every member state to express its reservations on any resolution passed. The Standing Committee was the only one to establish internal regulations of its own, which stipulated explicitly that decisions are made by consensus except for some procedural affairs wherein absolute majority is the rule. With regard to modifying the committee's internal regulations, it is viable only by a two-thirds majority.⁽²³⁾

4. Finally, these institutions were all put into force except for the ad hoc conciliation and arbitration court. For example, the Standing Committee had regularly held meetings: on May 30-June 1, 1977 in Yaounde (Cameroon), on November 28-29, 1977 in Cairo (Egypt), on June 5-7, 1978 in Niame (Niger), and on December 3-5, 1978 in Kuwait.⁽²⁴⁾ The Committee assumed its different responsibilities including setting up various working groups.⁽²⁵⁾ It also⁽²⁶⁾ held several meetings to consider the tasks charged to it.

However, it was clear that the rift in the Arab world following the Egyptian president's new policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since November 1977 has adversely affected the working of Arab-African institutions. As some African countries have supported the new policy of the Egyptian president, it is understandable that they would refuse to engage in activities that involve a condemnation of the Egyptian regime. The Arab rulers' continuous efforts to isolate Egypt in all international forums have rendered Arab-African meetings a possible arena of conflict between the Egyptian regime on the one hand and the Arabs' on the other. Consequently, the new process in the Arab-Israeli conflict has placed a constraint on Arab-African cooperation in general and the working of Afro-Arab institutions in particular.

C. Political Solidarity:

Arab-African relations in their contemporary evolution are marked by a considerable degree of solidarity. This was particularly demonstrated in the African support for the Arabs against Israel, as well as the Arab support for the Africans against the racist regimes. However, it would be misleading to separate these stances from their broader context, for political solidarity did not emerge with these issues, neither was it confined to them, but it emanated originally from the joint Afro-Arab attitude toward colonialism.

It was previously stated that the fall of both the Arab world and Africa, almost simultaneously, under the yoke of colonialism, placed them in the same position in the international political system. This, in fact, is the real basis for understanding Afro-Arab political solidarity. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to consider this solidarity as being a spontaneous consequence ensuing from the former situation, since a wide gap separated Arab from African liberation movements until the end of the first half of this century. This was a product of either the process of colonialism itself, which generally cut off Arab-African contacts, or the emergence of nationalist ideologies, which failed to place the anti-colonialist struggle in a global perspective.⁽²⁷⁾

When World War II came to an end, circumstances became more favorable for national liberation movements. Although circumstances were ripe for the meeting of Arab and African liberation movements, the Egyptian July 1952 revolution undoubtedly played a significant role in bringing about this meeting. The perception of the revolution's leader Gamal Abdul Naser of Egypt's role in world affairs had stressed its belonging to the Arab world and Africa and the necessity of assuming an active role in both.⁽²⁸⁾

This perception was put into effect through the Egyptian support of Arab and African liberation movements, both materially and morally,⁽²⁹⁾ and the central role of

Egypt in boosting both pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism. Thus, after July 1952 Egypt was a live example of bringing together Arab and African belongings without any basic contradiction. Hence, Egypt played a historical role in linking African and Arab liberation movements.

The Arab side had manifested its solidarity with the cause of African struggle, against imperialism in general or racist settler colonialism in particular, earlier than the Africans expressed solidarity with the Arabs in the most important issue of their contemporary struggle, namely the Palestinian question. Upon the inception of the wave of independence in Africa, starting with the independence of Ghana, the LAS expressed its solidarity with the African liberation movement as a whole.⁽³⁰⁾ As for the racist regime in South Africa, the LAS Council in April 1960 had discussed the question of apartheid in South Africa as part of the world concern with the problem following the Sharpeville massacre in the same year. The council condemned the policy of apartheid in compliance with successive UN resolutions since 1946 and in accordance with the resolutions issued by the Bandung conference as well as other Afro-Asian conferences. The council also appealed to the world to halt acts of violence perpetrated in South Africa, and called for cooperation with the Afro-Asian group and all countries supporting it to take a joint action in this

regard in collaboration with the UN as well as other international bodies. The council ended its resolution with a call for more efforts in the field of mass communication to explain to the Arab and world public opinion the consequences of the apartheid policy and to plead for international cooperation against it to reinforce world peace. Upon the proclamation of South African a republic in 1961 and its recognition by most countries of the world, the LAS Council adopted a resolution deferring the Arab countries' recognition so long as its government does not represent the majority of the people and maintains the policy of apartheid. In 1964, an important development in the LAS stand regarding racial discrimination had taken place. It was the first time for the council to link and compare in an official resolution between apartheid and the domination of the white minority in South Africa on the one hand and the Zionist occupation of Palestine on the other, and thus between the African struggle in South Africa and the Arab struggle in Palestine.⁽³¹⁾

Although some may justifiably deem the above stances a modest expression of Arab solidarity with African causes,⁽³²⁾ they are still more progressive than African attitudes towards the Arab struggle, particularly with regard to the Palestinian question. This judgment

can be induced by tracing the evolution of the African stance vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Arab support for African struggle against colonialism dates back to the early sixties, the African backing to the Arabs in the Palestinian question dates back to the early seventies. In fact, the evolution of the African attitudes concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict can be divided into three stages: the first was marked by the absence of political solidarity with the Arabs with the exception of the radical African states in general, the second was a transitional stage, while the third was characterized by political solidarity with the Arabs. The first stage ended in 1967, the second covered nearly the period between the two Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and the third started in 1973.

There is clear evidence of the African attitudes in the first stage. In 1958, the First African Conference of Independent States held in Accra could not approach the Arab-Israeli conflict the way the Bandung conference did in 1955, despite the participation of the Afro-Arab delegations. While the Bandung Conference declared its support of the rights of the Palestinian people and called for the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question,⁽³³⁾ the Accra conference only expressed

"its deep concern over the question of Palestine, which is a disturbing factor of world peace and security, and urges a just solution of the Palestine question." No doubt, the Israeli policy had done a great deal to that effect.⁽³⁴⁾ Besides, it might be explained partially by the absence of a concept of world colonialism and imperialism from the African perceptions at that time.⁽³⁵⁾

In 1960, the Second Conference for Independent African States was held in Addis Ababa and adopted a resolution on the Palestinian problem that did not differ much from the 1958 resolution. However, the Addis Ababa resolution might be considered partly a setback in the African attitude from an Arab perspective as compared to the Accra resolution. The 1960 resolution had specified that the Palestinian problem threatened international peace and security "in north-east Africa." This indicated that the interest of the conference in the subject was limited to the problem's bearing on Egypt as an African country, and did not extend to the problem as such.⁽³⁶⁾

From the Arab point of view, two positive developments altered the African attitude in 1961. The Third African Peoples' Conference held in Cairo in 1961 was the first one to place Israel within the context of neocolonialism. In the resolution adopted, Israel, South Africa, the USA and Western Germany were considered the main representatives of neo-colonialism. This resolution immediately found its

echo in the different African popular conferences.⁽³⁷⁾ This was important due to the fact that some officials attended these conferences in their personal capacity. Moreover, the rapid change in governmental posts in Africa offered to some of the attendants of those conferences the opportunity to assume government posts in their countries. Besides, African mass media covered these conferences, communicating them to the African public opinion. Thus, the growing support for the Arab cause in Palestine in such popular conferences constituted one of the factors which helped crystallize African solidarity with Arabs in this respect.⁽³⁸⁾

In 1961, also, the Casablanca Conference, which led to the formation of the Casablanca grouping, was held. The resolution adopted by the conference on Palestine was radically different from previous African resolutions. Not only had the resolution expressed interest in the issue, but it also pointed out the situation resulting from "denying the Arabs of Palestine their legitimate rights". Besides, the resolution had not only alluded to the UN and Bandung Conference resolutions, but it asserted that the solution compatible with these resolutions must restore to the Palestinians their rights in full. The resolution denounced Israel's pro-colonialist attitudes whenever important issues relating to Africa were discussed. Thus Israel was denounced

as "an instrument for colonialism and neo-colonialism, not only in the Middle East but also in Asia and Africa."⁽³⁹⁾ Again, in June 1962, at their second summit meeting in Cairo, the Casablanca Powers warned the African countries against Israeli infiltration into the continent "with the aim of dominating its economy under the guise of economic and technical aid."⁽⁴⁰⁾

However, these developments should not be overestimated. The pro-Arab resolutions adopted in the Third African Peoples' Conference and other popular gatherings were not reflected on the governmental level, except for members of the Casablanca grouping, which included only three Black African countries (Ghana, Guinea and Mali). Moreover, the Casablanca resolution is said to have little effect on Israel's relations with these three countries.⁽⁴¹⁾

The silence of African governments with regard to the Palestinian cause became obvious, since the establishment of the OAU in 1963. It is known that the early African summit conferences used to avoid debating issues that could cause disagreement in the African ranks. Among those issues was the question of the Middle East. So, the OAU remained silent on the question of Palestine until 1967.⁽⁴²⁾

As mentioned before, the June 1967 war is thought to be the reason behind a considerable change in African attitudes towards Israel. However, that change was neither

immediate nor spontaneous. While the development of the African attitudes could be explored both in the OAU and the UN, the following analysis would be limited to the African level on the ground that it provides enough evidence.⁽⁴³⁾

In the OAU, a majority of the members rejected a Somali request for an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers to adopt a unified stance on the June war, arguing that only the UN could deal with the situation. The Kinshasa summit held in 1967 adopted a "declaration" rather than a "resolution". This declaration carefully abstained from denouncing Israel as an "aggressor." It only expressed concern with "the grave situation that prevails in the United Arab Republic, an African country whose territory is partially occupied by a foreign power."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Not a single word was mentioned with regard to the two other Arab states involved in the war, let alone the people of Palestine.⁽⁴⁵⁾

However, the Algeria summit, convened in 1968, passed a "Resolution on the Aggression against the United Arab Republic." It reaffirmed the OAU's support for the UAR, called for effective implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, and appealed to all OAU member states to use their influence to ensure compliance with that resolution. In 1969 and 1970, the

African summit conferences reaffirmed the same stance on the question.⁽⁴⁶⁾

However, the resolution adopted by the Eighth Conference of the OAU in 1971 is considered a turning point in the OAU stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Apart from reaffirming earlier pledges of solidarity with Egypt, the summit resolution called, for the first time, for taking appropriate diplomatic measures on the part of the organization itself. According to that resolution, the Chairman of the African Heads of State Assembly of the OAU (Mauritania's President at that time) had the option to consult with other African heads of state to use their influence to secure the full implementation of the resolution. The consultations led to the formation of a committee of ten heads of state. The OAU was careful in the selection of heads of state to serve on the Middle East Peace Committee. The leaders of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zaire were chosen to carry out this mission. Most of the governments of these states were either neutral or enjoyed good rapport with both Egypt and Israel.

The Committee of Ten decided to establish a sub-committee called "the Committee of the Four Heads of State," namely Senegal (Chairman), Zaire, the Cameroon and Nigeria. Its aim was to research and to find facts, as well as to contribute to the promotion of the proposed

visit of Gunnar Jarring, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, on a mission to Egypt and Israel in February 1972. This approach had the advantage of helping African nations avoid making a choice between Israel and the Arab states since it had become increasingly difficult to maintain diplomatic relations with both sides. (47)

The members of the committee visited both Cairo and Tel Aviv, and had talks with the leaders in both countries. However, its peace plan for the Middle East, according to the Chairman of the Committee of Ten, foundered, because Israel "strongly rejected any peace settlement and was even more strongly opposed to anything that might lead to the withdrawal of its forces from occupied territories. (48)

It was not surprising, then, that the Rabat summit of 1972 passed a strongly worded resolution which congratulated Egypt "on its cooperation with the ten-member committee and on its positive stand and efforts to restore peace in the area" and denounced "Israel's negative and obstructive attitude which prevents the resumption of Jarring's mission." It called upon Israel "to declare openly its adherence to the principle of not annexing land by force" and "to withdraw immediately from all the occupied territories to the lines existing before

June 1967." It also reaffirmed "effective support for Egypt in its legitimate struggle to restore the integrity of its full territory by all means." Moreover, the resolution urged "all the OAU members to refrain from giving Israel any arms or military equipment or moral support."⁽⁴⁹⁾ The OAU Administrative Secretary General attributed the strength of the resolution to "the disappointment the group of ten felt during the contacts they had in seeking an amicable settlement."⁽⁵⁰⁾

In 1973, the Addis Ababa summit opened a new era in Afro-Arab solidarity. The African Heads of State had adopted unanimously a resolution stating that "respect for inalienable rights of the Palestine people is an essential element of any just and equitable solution of the Middle East problem." It warned Israel that her refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories constituted "an act of aggression threatening the security, territorial integrity and unity of our continent" and that it might lead OAU members to take on the African level, individually or collectively, "political and economic measures against it in conformity with the principles of the OAU and UN charters."⁽⁵¹⁾

The change in the African attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was also reflected in the behavior of individual African states. During the period between the

June war of 1967 and the October war of 1973, nine Black African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Hardly a month after the October war, another 20 Black African states followed suit. Thus, the only African states that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel were Mauritius,⁽⁵²⁾ Swaziland, Malawi and Lesotho.⁽⁵³⁾

In the wake of the October 1973 war, the resolutions adopted by the OAU summit conferences were, apart from reaffirming the previous stances, a clear expression of the mounting African solidarity with the Arabs. The 1974 resolution specified that the liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem and the exercise of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination are necessary bases of the just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It also confirmed its "total support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)" as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and called on its members to aid the PLO.⁽⁵⁴⁾ In 1975, the OAU summit passed a resolution requesting that OAU members reinforce pressure against Israel "including the possibility of eventually depriving it of UN membership."⁽⁵⁵⁾ The Assembly of Heads of State and Government reaffirmed in 1976 that just and permanent peace in Palestine and the Middle East cannot be attained without the exercise by the Palestinians of their full national rights to sovereignty, national independence and

self-determination.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The 1977 resolution was much more strongly worded. It noted with appreciation "the heroic sacrifices of the Palestinian people in the face of the Zionist aggression for the liberation of Palestine" and condemned "the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestine and the dispersal of its people." It also considered that "the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin." It decided to provide full and effective support to the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore their national rights including "their right to establish their independent national authority."⁽⁵⁷⁾ The OAU summit reaffirmed in 1978 its support for the Palestinian people "in their legitimate struggle by all possible means including military struggle to regain their usurped rights."⁽⁵⁸⁾ In all, the Africans almost completely identified themselves with the Arabs' stances toward Israel.

The above mentioned changes in the African attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict can be simply attributed either to Arab pressure and money,⁽⁵⁹⁾ or to "the possible denial of oil supplies to these African states, which refused to adopt a pro-Arab policy towards the conflict."⁽⁶⁰⁾ In the light of the analysis of Chapter I, this would be an oversimplification. With "territorial integrity" as a

cardinal principle in the OAU Charter and the Arab extensive diplomatic efforts in Africa, the African countries expectedly showed solidarity with the Arabs. The economic variable (Arab oil and money) in the development of African attitudes can be understood only within this context. We should not be oblivious of the fact that most of the change in the African attitudes had occurred prior to the October 1973 war and thus before the factor of Arab oil and money acquired the crucial influence it has now. Explaining the changes in the African attitudes only in terms of the impact of the increasing Arab economic power would not be a proper approach to understanding the African behavior in general and that of the states which predicate their stances on ideological radicalism in particular.⁽⁶¹⁾ It might be added that the change in the French policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 had no doubt influenced the policies of the French-speaking African states.⁽⁶²⁾

Anyhow, no matter what explanations provided for the change of the African attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was not only a manifestation of Afro-Arab political solidarity, but also a stimulus for consolidating that solidarity, and this was what actually took place.

The OAU Council of Ministers meeting at Addis Ababa (19-21 November 1973) called upon the Arab states to extend their oil embargo to Portugal and the racist regimes in South Africa until they conformed with the UN decolonization resolution.⁽⁶³⁾ Only a few days later, the Algeria summit of Arab Heads of State of 26-28 November 1973, responded positively. In its resolution on Africa, the Arab Heads of State decided that all diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural and other relations with South Africa, Zimbabwe and Portugal should be severed by the Arab states, which had not yet done that, and that a full embargo on the exportation of Arab oil to those three countries should be imposed.⁽⁶⁴⁾

This Arab stance was later reaffirmed in several resolutions. The Arab oil ministers in their meeting with the OAU Committee of Seven at the LAS headquarters on January 23, 1974, decided to tighten the oil embargo imposed on the racist regimes in Africa. Furthermore, the LAS Council in its 63rd ordinary session adopted a resolution on April 26, 1975, stressing the Arab and African states backing for the liberation of African territories from settler colonialism and racial discrimination. The council declared in this resolution that the cause of African liberation was equally considered as an Afro-Arab issue. It underlined that Arab states would spare no efforts in

bolstering and supporting African liberation movements in their struggle for the full liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the categorical elimination of apartheid and racial segregation in South Africa. The same line was further emphasized in the LAS Council resolutions in March 1976. (65)

Afro-Arab political solidarity was later crowned with the documents adopted by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference held in March 1977. According to these documents, the Arab and African countries condemned apartheid, Zionism and all other forms of racial and religious discrimination and segregation, particularly in Africa, Palestine and the occupied Arab territories. They also reaffirmed their support for African and Arab national causes. (66)

Finally, three remarks should be made for a realistic assessment of Afro-Arab political solidarity:

- a. This solidarity is centered on two major issues, which can rightly be considered as all-Arab and all-African issues, namely, the Palestinian question and the racist regimes in Africa. As for other issues less significant solidarity if any exists at all. In the Red Sea region for example solidarity was replaced by confrontation. There were other cases which might be much less explosive but still very significant.

Most important among those cases is the election of a new Secretary General of the OAU at the Mogadishu summit conference in June 1974. Somalia decided to nominate its Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister of Zambia stood as a rival candidate. The Arab members of the OAU made it clear that their full support would go to the Somali candidate. This produced a reaction from those African countries that had already been expressing wariness about an increasing Arab influence within the OAU. After 20 ballots were taken, neither of the two candidates received the necessary two-thirds majority for election. In the end a third candidate from Cameroon was chosen to break the deadlock after behind-the-scenes negotiations had led to withdrawal of the two front runners.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Most of the western reporting out of Mogadishu suggested that the above events are indicative of strong anti-Arab resentments among Africans. Although there is some evidence in this respect,⁽⁶⁸⁾ the implication of these events must not be overestimated. The real opposition to the Somali candidate was not prompted by any anti-Arab feelings but by the fear that the election of Somalia's Foreign Minister would transfer into the OAU central machinery one of the least tractable of all African disputes: the Somali-Ethiopian one.⁽⁶⁹⁾

- b. Although Afro-Arab solidarity is centered on the Palestinian cause and the issue of racist regimes in

Africa, it is important to indicate that even within this scope, a more thorough analysis is needed. According to some reports, African solidarity with the Arabs is limited to severing diplomatic relations without extending to economic relations.

For example, Israeli exports to African countries have almost doubled after the October war of 1973. According to Akiva Egar, Director of the Histadrut Trade Union Federation's Afro-Asian Institute, these exports during the first ten months of 1976 topped \$35 million compared with \$18 million over a similar period before the October war. Also, it was noted that 27 African states currently trade with Israel and that the 1975 Africa-Israel trade of these states came to \$ 66.5 million, an increase of 16% over 1974. Senior Israeli officials were quoted as stating that not only the above trend continued through 1976 and 1977, but that trade was worth approximately \$100 million per annum. They also said that the number of Israelis in Black Africa had grown considerably during the period in question. Almost all of them are attached to Israeli companies doing business in Africa. Another report stated that a corps of about 100 Israeli technical experts seconded to western enterprises continue to work in African countries, and African administrators and students continue to study in Israel. The Histadrut's Afro-Asian

(71)

Institute has received an estimated 900 African students since October 1973.⁽⁷⁰⁾

c. It was noted that the OAU ministerial and summit conferences in 1979 which followed the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty showed a difference of opinion over the treaty. Although the official resolutions adopted by these conferences did not reflect any shrinkage of the African support to the Arabs,⁽⁷¹⁾ it is believed that such a state of affairs may endanger Afro-Arab solidarity against Israel.

d. The Absence of Ideology:

One of the characteristics of Arab-African relations in their contemporary evolution is the absence of a particular ideology that would provide a basis for these relations. It might be claimed that anti-colonialism, non-alignment and the above stances towards Israel and the racist regimes in Africa offer elements of an Afro-Arab ideology. However, these elements simply fit for the whole Third World for instance. Thus, while the Arabs and Africans developed a particular institutional framework for their relations, no parallel developments took place on the ideological level.

This question should not be disregarded, as both the Arab world and Africa maintain separate ideologies:

Arab nationalism and pan-Africanism. No study had been made, in the course of the contemporary evolution of Arab-African relations, on the impact of these ideologies on mutual relations, though such an impact might be important in some cases. It would appear that the absence of an Afro-Arab ideology that eliminates any contradictions between the goals of Arab nationalism and those of pan-Africanism may in some cases produce a source of tension in Arab-African relations. Admitting the difficulty of developing such an ideology, one would expect that its continued absence can at times represent an obstacle, hindering the consolidation of Arab-African cooperation.

2. A General Analysis of Economic Relations:

It is not intended here to do a detailed analysis of Arab-African economic relations. Instead, the main characteristics of these relations will be explored with a view to providing a more comprehensive understanding of Arab-African relations. Three dimensions of economic relations will be dealt with in the following analysis: the political aspect, institutional characteristics and financial aid.

a. The Political Aspect:

By the political aspect of Arab-African economic relations two specific things are meant: the first is

that the real start of Arab-African economic cooperation was motivated by purely political considerations, as it is known that it dates back to the October 1973 war. This war was associated with the oil price hike on the one hand, and involving it in the Arab-Israeli conflict on the other, when Arab oil producing countries decided in October 1973 that the states supporting the Arabs practically and effectively or taking measures that would compel Israel to withdraw would not be affected by the decrease in oil production as they would be supplied with oil as they were before. The Council of Ministers of the OAU proceeded in November of the same year to contact the Arab countries through the IAS, by way of studying the impact of the oil embargo on African countries and negotiating the best means of lessening that impact on those countries. (72)

A few days later, the Sixth Arab Summit in Algeria decided with regard to Arab-African economic cooperation:

- to take special measures to supply sisterly African states with oil;
- to strengthen and consolidate economic and financial cooperation with sisterly African states;
- to establish an Arab bank for industrial and agricultural development in Africa. (73)

Following that, the process of Arab-African cooperation in the economic field proceeded as will be explained. It may thus be said that the real start to this cooperation was politically motivated. While this cooperation had also its economic motivations, such as the impact of the oil embargo and price hike on African economies, this impact applies also to the Third World at large. Therefore, the special initiatives taken by the Arab and the African countries to realize economic cooperation between them and reverse the effects of these decision is attributable to the general environment of African political solidarity with Arab countries before and during the October war.

The second meaning of the political aspect of Arab-African economic relations is clearly related to the first. A close followup of the development of these relations gives a strong impression that they take place as a result of a barter of political stances for economic benefits. We have already denied that the tilt of the African position towards the Arabs was due basically to Arab oil and finances. However, their role in this change of position was not ruled out. In fact, the Arab side seemed to be interested in the political outcome of assistance. This was not obviously the official line, but there are indicators of the existence of such inclination. One of the examples can be cited in a study by El-Shazli El-Ayary, President-Manager

of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, presented to the Sharjah symposium in December 1976, stating that "during our travels in Africa we were surprised several times by the amounts of Arab aid to Africa that were not known of, although non-Arab aid organizations, as well as Western and Eastern governments, make a great deal of propaganda for every act of cooperation in Africa.. This defect in the mass media prevents us from benefiting politically from Arab aid to Africa!"⁽⁷⁴⁾

The fact that the political aspect overwhelms Arab-African economic relations is clearly dangerous, as it may lead these relations to become a function of political relations, rather than being an enhancement of them. Thus, the possibility of diminishing African political solidarity with the Arabs against Israel, given the differences among the stances of African countries towards the current efforts at an Arab-Israeli settlement that most Arabs reject or the possible lack of the need for this solidarity, in the case of a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, may have an adverse effect on Arab-African economic relations.

b. Institutional Characteristics:

In our discussion of the basic trends of Arab-African political relations, the phenomenon of increasing

institutionalization was given due consideration. Economic relations have also been increasingly institutionalized, however in a different way.

The Sixth Arab Summit Conference of Algeria (November 1973) decided to establish an Arab bank for industrial and agricultural development in Africa. The conference also had decided that the LAS Secretary General should convoke the ministers concerned in the subscribing states to put together the charter, the articles of incorporation, and the objectives of the bank. (75)

The Secretary General of the LAS asked his economic experts to advise him on the best ways of setting up the bank within reasonable time to avoid further deterioration in African economies. Their answer was that setting up a bank is a lengthy affair. It was estimated that no less than 3 to 5 years were needed for the bank to be fully operational. The Secretary General called an urgent meeting of the Arab oil ministers in an attempt to get around that obstacle. The Arab oil ministers held their meeting in Cairo from January 22 to 23, 1974. They were eager to avoid the adoption of another time-consuming resolution, which led to the idea of the Arab Loan Fund for Africa. The Arab oil ministers had recommended the following:

- Expediting the setting-up of the Arab Development Bank for Africa in order that the bank might achieve its goals in the shortest possible time.

- Increasing the bank's capital.
- Setting up a fund with a capital of \$200 million which should become part of the bank in the future, for extending loans to African countries.
- The setting up of this fund before the end of March 1974.

The Secretary General of the LAS was requested to carry out that resolution and to coordinate with the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU. Some African states were of the view that the fund should be pooled in an existing financial institution, preferably the African Development Bank (ADB) in Abidjan. The ensuing African summit also requested the LAS to look into the possibility of having the fund transferred to ADB.⁽⁷⁶⁾ However, it was very clear that the Arab response was not positive and the fund was integrated in March 1977 into the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA).⁽⁷⁷⁾

The Seventh Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat from October 28-29, 1974 decided that the ABEDA headquarters should be in khartoum and that cooperation between ABEDA and ADB should be entrusted to the ABEDA Board of Governors.⁽⁷⁸⁾

The next step was for the Economic Council of the LAS to meet in the form of a board of governors of the ABEDA and elect its president-manager and board of directors. On January 12, 1975 Mr. Shazli Al-Ayary, former Minister of Planning in Tunisia, was elected President-Manager. Eleven

countries were elected for the Board of Directors.⁽⁷⁹⁾ The council had also requested the Board of Directors to hold its first meeting in khartoum in March 1975. The third institution of Arab-African economic cooperation is the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries (AFTA). In December 1973, the Economic Council of the LAS recommended the establishment of a fund for technical cooperation with African countries. The LAS Council allocated \$15 million for the fund in March 1974.⁽⁸⁰⁾ The Seventh Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat in October 1974 approved the charter of the fund and decided to increase its appropriations from \$15 to \$25 million.⁽⁸¹⁾ In March 1979, the LAS Council decided to allocate \$5 million per annum to finance the fund's activities.⁽⁸²⁾

Some remarks ought to be presented on the institutions of Arab-African economic cooperation. First, it is obvious that the institutionalization of Arab-African economic cooperation is lagging behind its counterpart on the political level. While the institutions concerned with political cooperation are Afro-Arab, involving the Arab and the African side on an equal footing, those of economic cooperation are purely Arab, not including one single non-Arab African state. It is the fact that they direct their actions towards Africa that brings them Afro-Arab. This is

in line with the actual situation of Arab-African economic cooperation, with the Arab side providing aid and the African side receiving it. However, this institutional backwardness is not confined to the above. In the case of political cooperation we found out that the institutions concerned with it are grouped in a hierarchic order, and there are no other institutions besides those that can cause through their activities a form of disturbance to this order or duplicate it. In the case of economic cooperation, there are institutions that belong to individual Arab states operating in this field. There are also funds operating in the field of economic cooperation pertaining to Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya.⁽⁸³⁾ It is true that the domain of the activities of these funds is not confined to Africa, but they often concentrate on it in view of the development of Arab-African relations. The problem is that at least some of these funds started successful operations in Africa before the LAS with its three institutions initiated their activities there, and given the inexistence of planning for joint action and coordination in the implementation, the field was left open for overlapping and competition.⁽⁸⁴⁾ The problem is also that at least some of these funds possess capabilities by far surpassing those of the LAS institutions, which logically makes them more capable of functioning,

while on the other hand they add a bilateral dimension to Arab-African cooperation, which is heavily affected by the foreign policies of particular Arab states.

c. Financial Aid:

A close view of the development of Arab-African economic relations shows that financial aid overwhelms them in spite of the existence of official documents on these relations issued by the Arab-African conferences, and particularly the summit conference, citing fields of cooperation much wider than the mere provision of aid.

In fact that Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Cooperation adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit Conference in March 1977 spells the desirability of "realizing the widest economic cooperation." To achieve such a goal the two parties resolved to expand, strengthen and intensify cooperation in six fields. Financial cooperation was only one of them. The others are: trade, mining and industry, agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry, energy and water resources, and transport, communications and telecommunications.⁽⁸⁵⁾ However, the Declaration of Afro-Arab Economic and Financial Cooperation adopted by the same conference did concentrate upon the financial aspect of Arab-African economic cooperation.⁽⁸⁶⁾

This concentration is in line with the actual development of this cooperation, which was characterized by a great emphasis on Arab financial aid to Africa, if not confined solely to it. Even the working groups not concerned with financial matters, formed as a result of a decision issued by the Standing Committee during its second session convened in Cairo in November 1977, and operating in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry, mining, industry, and water resources transport, communications and telecommunications,⁽⁸⁷⁾ had not realized tangible results by the end of 1978, as they met only once and passed only very vague recommendations.⁽⁸⁸⁾

In fact, financial aid acquired such importance in the context of confronting the consequences of the oil price rise borne by the African economies. African countries pressed for a multi-tiered pricing system. Such a system would have been based upon the ability to pay. In other words, industrialized countries would have paid more while underdeveloped areas like Africa paid less. Although the Arabs acknowledged that there was merit to such a system, they feared that oil sold at reduced prices would have found its way to other markets because Western oil companies own most of the tankers and refineries and control the distribution network in Africa.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Thus, loans were the only way left for the Arabs to take part in easing the crisis.

According to an ABEDA report published in November 1978,⁽⁹⁰⁾ Arab commitments to Africa were estimated by the end of 1977 at \$3130 million. This estimation was described in the report as conservative due to a number of reasons. In the first place, the data for 1977 were incomplete. Secondly, in view of the complexity regarding the allocation of funds channelled through international bodies, the statistics on financial commitments of Arab countries to Africa do not include contributions to these bodies. Africa benefits from part of these Arab contributions which, if taken into account, would greatly increase the total Arab financial commitments to Africa to approximately \$4 billion.

The major sources of these commitments are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Major Sources of Arab Financial Commitments to Africa

<u>Country or Institution</u>	<u>% of Grand Total</u>
Saudi Arabia	22.22
Kuwait	19.80
ABEDA	13.60
Libya	13.30
United Arab Emirates	4.70
OPEC Special Fund	3.70
Algeria	2.20

The number of the recipient countries was eleven in 1973. This number increased to 32 in 1974, 37 in 1975, 38 in 1976 and 40 in 1977.

The analysis of the distribution of Arab aid to Africa shows that 64% of this aid went to 24 countries classified as most seriously affected during the period under review (1973-1977). During the same period 35.3% of the total Arab aid went to the sixteen African countries considered as least developed countries.

With regard to sectoral distribution, Table 3 sums up for the five years under review the sectoral patterns of Arab aid programmes.

Table 3

Sectoral Distribution of Arab Aid to Africa(1973-1977)

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Amount in US \$m</u>	<u>%</u>
agriculture	197.577	6.316
extractive industries	266.160	8.510
Processing industries	127.264	4.070
power	207.043	6.610
constructive industries	134.999	4.315
trade and tourism	52.866	1.690
transport and communications	384.046	12.280
financial institutions	202.778	6.483
social services	302.777	9.681
balance of payment	914.268	29.240
technical cooperation	49.770	1.590
emergency aid	288.191	9.215

Arab aid to Africa, the substance of Arab-African economic cooperation, has been subjected to strong criticism, which will be summarized in the following six points:

1. The concentration of Arab-African economic cooperation on financial aid, if not its confinement to it, enhances the political aspect of this relation. Based on field observation, the question of the political payoffs of Arab aid, particularly concerning the African position towards Israel, is one that is widely raised in the continent.⁽⁹¹⁾ But Arab sources deny that there is a political motivation behind Arab financial aid to Africa. According to the previous report of the ABEDA, "Arab-African cooperation is free from any political or economic pressures."⁽⁹²⁾

However, we should not forget two important facts: the first is that this aid was clearly associated with African solidarity with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel, and it would be difficult to imagine the continuation of Arab aid to Africa, or the maintenance of its present rates, in case of a shift in the African position towards Israel, away from the Arabs. The second fact is that of the total Arab financial aid to Africa estimated by the end of 1977, a portion of approximately two-thirds was contributed by five Arab donor countries

on a bilateral basis.⁽⁹³⁾ It may be relevant here to remind also of the fact that when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar made a pledge at the Afro-Arab summit in March 1977 to increase their aid for Africa by additional commitment totalling \$1.5 billion, most of these new commitments had proved to be on a bilateral basis, as Table 4 shows.

Table 4

Contributions of Four Arab States to African Development in the Afro-Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, March 1977⁽⁹⁴⁾

(in \$ million)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>UAE</u>	<u>Qatar</u>
bilateral	850	200	100	50
feasibility studies	16	10	5	-
ABEDA	120	20	20	20
ADB	12	10	10	5
OAU Liberation Committee	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	1000	241	137	76

The problem arising from the fact that bilateral aid represents the larger portion of Arab financial aid to Africa is that this form of aid is much more apt to be affected by the foreign policies of the donor states which may contradict, albeit not necessarily, the prerequisites of Arab-African cooperation. The Saudi case provides a good example in this respect, as Saudi Arabia, the biggest Arab state in terms of contributions to Arab aid to Africa,

is keeping the larger part of these contributions for distribution by its own means on a bilateral basis. It is known that Islam is the official basis of Saudi foreign policy, let alone the conservative nature of its political system. This makes Saudi Arabia unwelcoming and unwilling to support leftist regimes in Africa. It may even openly seek their downfall.⁽⁹⁵⁾

The above analysis represents a framework within which the criticism directed against Arab aid to Africa for being religiously or politically biased can be evaluated.

As for the political bias, it is rooted in the very logic of Arab-African relations, which means that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the continuation of economic cooperation with a lessening or a total absence of African solidarity against Israel. As far as bilateral aid is concerned, it is also logical that it would be affected, as was demonstrated by the Saudi case, by the foreign policies of the donor states.

Although the religious bias may occur on the bilateral level, it is difficult to criticize aid presented by Arab institutions as being religiously biased. On the one hand, it was the OAU that laid the criteria for distributing loans by the Arab Loan Fund for Africa (ALFA) among African states. According to these criteria Algeria,

Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia were excluded as oil producers. Then, the increase in oil import bills was considered as the basic criterion. This criterion was corrected by other factors such as a country being land-locked, drought stricken, suffering a low gross domestic product or not enjoying exports of primary commodities at high prices.⁽⁹⁶⁾ On the other hand, it is relevant to recall the increasing number of the recipient countries in Africa from 1973 to 1977. According to these numbers it can be said with certainty that Arab aid had covered 100% of the recipient countries throughout the continent.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Besides, one can also recall that 64% of Arab aid to Africa (1973-1977) went to the 24 countries classified as most seriously affected and 35.3% of it went to the 16 countries considered as least developed countries.

2. The second criticism of Arab financial aid to Africa has to do with its quantity, as it is viewed as being small relative to Africa's needs regardless of its absolute volume.⁽⁹⁸⁾ As for the oil price rise, Arab aid to Africa is said to have covered less than 30% of the additional financial requirements attributable directly or indirectly to that rise.⁽⁹⁹⁾ It is interesting to note that this attitude might have been shared by African Islamic countries which are said to be favored

by the Arabs.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The question of the smallness of Arab aid to Africa is aggravated by the Africans' awareness of the large scale flow of Arab capital to the developed North.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

However, spokesmen for the Arabs have argued that the impact of the oil price rise has been greatly exaggerated, that the Arabs have been more than generous in meeting the obligation to shield the Africans from the effects of the 1973-1974 economic crises and that the Africans have failed to appreciate the Arabs' own developmental imperatives.⁽¹⁰²⁾ It might be added that the Africans are victims of a view of the Arabs as an integrated whole. They do not seem to be aware that poor Arab countries represent a majority that also suffers from the flow of Arab capital to the developed North.

3. Arab financial outflows to Africa are also criticized for taking the form of repayable loans rather than grants.⁽¹⁰³⁾ This is true and it also applies to development aid presented by international organizations, although it may be said that grants are more consistent with Arab-African solidarity than loans. Again, it must be remembered that the movement of capital within the Arab world itself takes in most cases the same form. Nevertheless, giving loans, not grants, does not deprive Arab aid to Africa of its value, so long as their conditions are very moderate: a 25 year period for repayment,

a 10 year period of grace and 1% interest for the 15 years which follow the period of grace.(104)

4. Arab financial aid to the Africans was accused of being slow in reaching them at a rate that did not suit the acuteness of the crisis of African economies as a result of the oil price hike. Although the flow of aid did take some time, it was obvious that the African side contributed to this delay, at least with regard to the ALFA loans, as the OAU, and particularly the Committee of Seven was responsible for the allocation plan of the \$20 million that the Arab ministers agreed on in their meeting in January 1974. The Secretary General of the LAS has urged the preparation of that plan more than once, but the Committee of Seven did not put the final touches on it before mid-August 1974. On September 1st, 1974, Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua assumed responsibilities of his office as Secretary General of the OAU. The proposals of the OAU Committee of Seven were officially communicated to the LAS and Mr. Eteki has cordially expressed in his letter to the Secretary General of the LAS his profound regret for the long time that these proposals took to be prepared.(105)

5. Moreover, Arab aid to Africa, at least in some cases, was not linked to well devised projects nor sound economic programmes. No wonder then that this aid is accused of having no economic or political impact on the

African countries.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ However, according to the ABEDA report published in November 1978, this accusation is true only in the beginning, when Arab aid was almost entirely used to offset balance of payment deficits and help service the external debts, without any direct positive effect on the economic development of the recipient countries. Then, Arab aid has been reoriented, slowly but steadily, towards development projects.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

6. It is obvious that Arab-African economic cooperation can be justifiably reduced to a mere process of financial transactions. Nothing has been done until now to promote Arab-African trade, let alone economic integration in general. Two negative outcomes may be expected from the confinement of Arab-African cooperation to the financial aspect. The first is that without this cooperation at least spreading to the field of trade, it will continue to lack a solid base. Second, the confinement of this aid to the financial type helps transfer the fruits of this aid to a third party, which is the capitalist countries. This is explained by the fact that during a period of five years (1973-1977) about 30% of Arab aid went to the financing of imports.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Since the capitalist countries control the trade of African countries generally, this means that the transfer of Arab finances to Africa benefits those countries more than the African ones, as conditions for trade exchange are

known to be not in favor of underdeveloped countries in general.

3. Characteristics of Cultural Interaction:

The study of recent Arab-African cultural interaction, particularly since 1973, reveals that this aspect of Arab-African relations is not less developed than other aspects. It may even be regarded as being more developed than some of them. The following analysis will be based on the available data on the most important Arab-African encounters in this field.

These are:

- the Afro-Arab Symposium on News Agencies held in Tunisia in February 1975;
- Khartoum Symposium on Afro-Arab Liberation and Development (January 1976);
- The Afro-Arab Symposium held in Sharjah in December 1976;
- Cairo Symposium on Arab-African Cultural Relations (May 1978)
- Cairo Symposium on Arab-African Relations in the Eighties (January 1980).⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

Our analysis will focus on four dimensions of Arab-African cultural interaction as it was manifested in the above meetings: parties to the interaction, institutional development of this interaction, its substance and its impact.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

fact, the frequency of Arab-African cultural interactions before the formation of the working group was apparently more than it became after its formation.

c. The Substance of Arab-African Cultural Interaction:

The substance of Arab-African cultural interaction was directly focussed on issues related to Arab-African relations, although some of these encounters involved studies on the Arab world or Africa, each on its own. This was particularly the case in the meetings of the African Political Science Association in Cairo, where papers were presented on Arab development, the role of African armies in political development, in addition to a paper on Arab-African cultural relations and some remarks on Arab-African cooperation. The agenda of the Khartoum seminar included: Afro-Arab liberation, racial discrimination and Afro-Arab relations through cooperation between the LAS and the OAU in the field of culture and information. With regard to the Sharjah Symposium, the participants discussed: African and Arab movement towards unity, the policies of the great powers towards Africa and the Arab world, cultural and civilizational issues, liberation movements in Africa and the Arab world and the role of the regional organizations in Afro-Arab relations. The Cairo symposium held in January 1980 tried to focus on the future of Arab-African relations in the eighties.

Generally speaking, most of the papers presented to the above encounters cannot be classified as purely academic

studies as they were prepared and discussed within an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the development of Arab-African cooperation. Thus, most of them concentrated on the cooperative aspects of Arab-African relations. On the other hand, progressive and leftist attitudes were prominent during these meetings to an extent that bypasses that of their existence on the "official" level. As mentioned before, paying attention to this fact is important to correct understanding of Arab-African relations.

d. The Impact of Arab-African Cultural Interaction:

Following each of the meetings referred to between the Arab and the African intellectuals, recommendations were issued on the necessity of consolidating Arab-African relations in different fields generally, and particularly in the cultural field. However, most of these recommendations were not implemented.

The Afro-Arab Symposium on News Agencies recommended for example the establishment of specialized centres for news coverage and distribution between the Arab and African agencies.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ The declaration of the Khartoum symposium recommended the establishment of an Afro-Arab publishing house.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ The declaration of the Sharjah symposium recommended the annual convening during the month of December of an Afro-Arab symposium. The declaration also recommended the establishment of a

documentation centre which will gather and disseminate relevant documents on African and Arab development and distribute them to all concerned institutions in Africa and the Arab world.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

Apart from that, there are many general and specific recommendations, almost none of which were implemented. However, this should not lead to the conclusion that the cultural encounters between Arabs and Africans were useless. In fact, these encounters gave rise to direct contacts between leading African and Arab intellectuals. There is no doubt that these contacts helped correct some of the wrong images that each party had about the other. Thus, these encounters must have had a positive impact on Arab-African relations in general, and cultural relations in particular. However, this impact must have been relative to the role played by those intellectuals in their countries.

4. Afro-Arab Security:

The question of Afro-Arab security is the most thwarting to those concerned with furthering Arab-African relations.

From a theoretical point of view, there are clear foundations for Arab-African security. Geography would suffice to explain this point, as it gives rise to issues of common interest to both Arabs and Africans in the

countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (thogh not on a regular basis) and Somalia (albeit for different reasons) were united in a fervent effort to encircle the Marxist regime of Ethiopia.

It is clear then that Ethiopia had never enjoyed the full confidence of the Arab Red Sea powers. Consequently the question of the Red Sea security was never raised by these powers as an Afro-Arab issue but rather in terms of making the Red Sea an Arab lake. Although the call for an Arab Red Sea had calmed down, this was not due to an Arab awareness of its negative implications for Arab-African relations. It was probably an outcome of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979.

As for the second source of threat, which is Israel and the racist regimes in Africa, it should be noted that Arab-African joint stances did not go beyond expressions of political solidarity. This solidarity was never transformed into any sort of military cooperation apart from mutual symbolic financial donations from the Arab side to African liberation movements and from the OAU Liberation Committee to the PLO.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Nothing changed after the OAU summit had decided in 1977 "that the OAU Liberation Committee and the PLO should jointly lay down a strategy aiming at liberating Palestine."⁽¹¹⁸⁾ It is not difficult to explain this state of affairs in the light of the lack of any all-Arab or all-African strategy against Israel or the racist regimes in Africa respectively.

Lastly, political differences between Arabs and Africans and also among them make mentioning any joint confrontation of external threats, particularly intervention by super-powers in regional conflicts, sound politically naive, because there exists no agreement on foreign threats due to these political differences. For instance, what South Yemen, Ethiopia and Angola consider essential for maintaining their security, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Somalia may regard as being a direct threat to theirs.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: Dr. Yehia Ragab, "The Political Background of Contemporary Arab-African Relations," in Issa, Op.Cit., pp. 295-296.
2. See: Nabia El-Asfahani, Arab-African Solidarity (Arabic), The Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation, March 1977, P.64.
3. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., pp. 514-516.
4. Diab, Op.Cit., p.11.
5. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.517.
6. Tompuri, Op.Cit., p.22.
7. "The Cairo Declaration." Political Declaration Endorsed by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference Held in Cairo (Egypt), March 7-9, 1977, in Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., Appendix F, p.133.
8. Diab, Op.Cit., p.20.
9. Resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference-Algeria (November 26-28, 1973), in The Resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences and the LAS Council Concerning Arab-African Cooperation, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.3. Ali Abusin, The Launching of Afro-Arab Cooperation -- An Experiment in Inter-Regional Solidarity, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp. 4-5.
10. Ibid., p.7.
11. Ibid., p.15.
12. Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978) (Arabic), Egyptian Foreign Ministry. 1978, p.17.
13. Resolutions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference -- Rabat (October 26-29, 1974) in The Resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences and the LAS Council Concerning Afro-Arab Cooperation, Op.Cit., p.4.
14. Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), op.cit., p.18.
15. Abusin, Op.Cit., pp.14-15.
16. Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit., pp.19-20.
17. Abusin, Op.Cit., pp. 15-16. Diab., Op.Cit., p.21.

18. Draft Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Cooperation Adopted by the Joint Meeting of the African and the Arab Ministerial Committees, Cairo, July 10, 1975, LAS, General Department of Information, p.6.
19. See for details: Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural series) Vol. 13, No.4, May 15, 1976, pp. 3983-3984.
20. Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit., pp.22-24.
21. See: Organization and Procedures for Implementation of Arab-African Cooperation Adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit (March 7-9, 1977), Cairo, in Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit., pp. 49-52.
22. See: Ahmed Youssef Al-Koraie, "The Afro-Arab Organizational Structure" (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 13, No. 49, July 1977, pp. 120-121.
23. The Internal Regulations for the Afro-Arab Standing Committee, in Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit., pp. 70-73.
24. See the reports issued following these meetings in: Ibid. pp. 61-63, 83-86, 121-126 and 129-134.
25. See: Ibid., pp. 63, 86, 124-125 and 132.
26. See; Ibid., pp. 77-79, 89-117.
27. See: Shaarawi, A New Reading of the Relations between Arab and African National Liberation Movements, Op.Cit., pp. 5-7.
28. For more details see: Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Cairo: The National Publication House, 1954, pp. 49-70.
29. See: Mueshihange, Op.Cit., p.2. Diab, Op.Cit., p. 13. Khawas, Op. Cit., pp. 33-34.
30. Salwa Labib, "Arab Countries and Their Position Towards African Issues," in Issa, Op.Cit., pp. 353-355.
31. Ibid., pp. 363-364.
32. See Shaarawi, Arab-African Relations, Op.Cit., p.16.
33. Khawas, Op.Cit., p.33. Sawant, Op.Cit., p.301.
34. Ibid., p. 319.

35. Helmi Shaarawi, The Role of Popular and Cultural Organizations in Consolidating Afro-Arab Cooperation, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, pp. 4-5.
36. See: Abdul Malek Auda, "African Countries and Arab Issues" (Arabic) in Issa, Op.Cit., p. 319.
37. Shaarawi, Op.Cit., pp. 5-6 and for details see pp. 7-19.
38. Auda, Op.Cit., p.316.
39. Ibid., p.319.
40. Sawant, Op.Cit., p. 321.
41. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p. 516.
42. Diab, Op.Cit., p.18. Yusuf Fadl Hassan, The Movement of Arab and African Unity, Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium, p.3.
43. For an analysis of the African behavior towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in the UN after the June 1967 war, see: Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "UN Middle East Voting Patterns of the Black African States, 1967-1974" in Middle East Review, Nos. 3 and 4, spring/summer 1975, pp. 33-37. Also see: Khawas, Op.Cit., pp. 36, 38, Sawant, Op.Cit., p.325, Ajami and Sours, Op.Cit., pp. 410-412 and Auda, Op.Cit., pp.326-327.
44. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.522. Khawas, Op.Cit., pp.36-37. Sawant, Op.Cit., pp. 326-327.
45. An Egyptian scholar stresses that the above African attitudes must be understood within the context of the overall setback of national liberation forces in Africa and the Arab world at that time (Shaarawi, Arab-African Relations, Op.Cit., p.23). However, the analysis of the evolution of the African attitude reveals that official solidarity with the Arabs was not a mere function of a revolutionary Africa.
46. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.522. Auda, Op.Cit., pp.334-335. Sawant, Op.Cit., p.327.
47. Khawas, Op.Cit., pp.37-38. Hassan, Op.Cit., p.5. Diab, Op.Cit., p. 19.
48. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.528.
49. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol.9, No.6, July 15, 1972, p. 2498. Khawas, Op.Cit., pp. 38-39.

50. Interview with Nzo Ekangaki of the OAU by Jon Woronoff, Africa Report, Vol. 19, No.8, September-October 1972, p.22.
51. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.524. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 10, No.4, June 15, 1973, pp. 2850-2851.
52. In July 1976 Mauritius severed diplomatic relations with Israel.
53. Awad, Op.Cit., pp.3-4. Auda, Principles and Framework for Planning a Strategy for the Afro-Arab Dialogue, Op.Cit., p.26.
54. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol.11, No. 6, July 15, 1974, p. 3260.
55. Ibid., Vol.12, No. 8, September 15, 1975, pp. 3720-3721.
56. Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., Appendix D, p.125.
57. Ibid., pp.127-128.
58. Ibid., p.132.
59. Akinsanya, Op.Cit., p.525.
60. Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity: Success or Failure?" in International Affairs, Vol. 51, April 1975, P.211.
61. See: Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.25. Gitelson, Op.Cit., p.35. Mazrui, Op.Cit., p.736. Decraene, Op.Cit., pp.20-21.
62. Hassan, Op.Cit., p.3. Decals, Op.Cit., p.60. Sawant, Op.Cit., pp. 328-329.
63. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series), Vol. 10, No. 11, December 31, 1973, p. 2936.
64. Resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference -- Algeria (November 26-28, 1973), Op.Cit., p.2.
65. Labib, Op.Cit., pp. 366-367. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol.13, No.3, April 15, 1976, p. 3950.

66. For more details see: Declaration and Programme of Action for Arab-African Cooperation Adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit, Cairo (March 7-9, 1977), in Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit.,pp.33-34. The Cairo Declaration, Op.Cit., pp. 133-136.
67. Colin Legum "What Really Happened at Mogadishu?" in Africa Report, Vol.19, No. 4, July-August 1974, pp. 42-43. Mazrui, Op.Cit.,p.739.
68. For example, the Zambian Foreign Minister, speaking after the election, Warned that the OAU must not become "an appendage" of any other organization because if it did so it would lose the correct sense of direction. See: Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 11, No.6, July 15, 1974, p. 3259.
70. The Israel-Africa Connection, Op.Cit.,pp.41-42.Vine and Luke, Op.Cit.,p.143.
71. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 16, No.7, August 15, 1979, pp.5326-5330.
72. Auda, Op.Cit.,p.3.
73. Resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference -Algeria (November 26-28, 1973), Op.Cit.,pp.2-3.
74. El-Shazli El-Ayary, Arab-African Relations at Present and Future (Arabic), sharjah Afro-Arab Symposium, p.5.
75. Resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference-Algeria (November 2-8, 1973), Op.Cit.,pp.2-3.
76. Abusin,Op.Cit.,pp.5-9.
77. Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit.,p.28.
78. Resolutions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference-Rabat (October 26-29, 1974), Op.Cit.,p.5.
79. They were: The United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Lybia, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and Palestine.
80. Awad, Op.Cit.,p.8.
81. Resolutions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference-Rabat (October 26-29, 1974), Op.Cit.,p.7.
82. A Report on the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab States, Cairo Symposium on Afro-Arab Relations in the Eighties, p.1.

83. See: El-Ayary, Op.Cit., pp. 7-8, Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., pp. 50-51, 138-139.
84. Auda, Op.Cit., p.23.
85. Declaration and Programme of Action for Arab-African Cooperation Adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit, Op.Cit., pp. 34-38.
86. Declaration on Afro-Arab Economic and Financial Cooperation, Op.Cit., pp. 45-46.
87. See: the report of the second session of the Afro-Arab Standing Committee, Cairo, November 28-29, 1977, in Ibid., p. 86.
88. The working group concerned with mining, industry, energy and water resources met in Addis Ababa, May 9-11, 1978, that concerned with transport, communications and telecommunications met also in Addis Ababa, May 12-14, 1978, and that concerned with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry met in Cairo, May 22-23, 1978, See the reports issued on these three meetings in Ibid., pp. 87-104.
89. Wilson III, Op.Cit., pp. 21-22. Khawas, Op.Cit., p.39. Also see: El-Ayary, Op.Cit., pp. 24-32.
90. The following analysis is based on the data contained in Features, Figures and Trends of Arab Aid to the Third World, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Khartoum, November 1978, pp. 16-24.
91. Auda, Arab Policy and African Issues, Op.Cit., p.84.
92. Features, Figures and Trends of Arab Aid to the Third World, Op.Cit., p.4.
93. Ibid., p.16.
94. Ibid., pp.10-17.
95. See: Shaarawi, Op.Cit., p.30. For more details on the alleged religious bias of Arab financial aid in general see: Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., p.21.
96. Abusin, Op.Cit., pp.10-11.
97. Features, Figures and Trends of Arab Aid to the Third World, Op.Cit., p.20.
98. Wilson III, Op.Cit., p.31. El-Asfahani, Op.Cit., p.42.

99. Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., p.26.
100. Kaba, Op.Cit., p.4.
101. This argument is based on field observations (Auda, Op.Cit., p.84). Of no less importance is the identical opinion in 1974 of William Eteki Mboumoua, the then OAU Administrative Secretary General. See the interview with him by Anthony J. Hughes in Africa Report, Vol. 19, No. 6, November-December 1974, p.9.
102. Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., pp. 31-32. Also see: Features, Figures and Trends of Arab Aid to the Third World, Op.Cit., p.5.
103. Wilson III, Op.Cit., p.31. Thus, in the opinion of Vine and Luke (p.23), the African states "pay their Arab friends twice for oil: an excessively high price on delivery, then interest on the money they borrow to pay for it."
104. Abusin, Op.Cit., pp. 9,17.
105. Ibid., pp. 6-9.
106. Hassan, Op.Cit., p.10. El-Ayary, Op.Cit., pp.5-6.
107. Features, Figures and Trends of Arab Aid to the Third World, Op.Cit., p. 29.
108. Ibid., p.24.
109. This symposium, however, was less representative of the Arab and the African intellectual communities. Many Arab and African scholars known for their interest in Arab-African relations did not attend it. Undoubtedly, this is attributable to the present state of Egyptian-Arab relations and its repercussions on Africa.
110. Except when particular references are mentioned, this analysis is based generally on The Documents of the Khartoum Afro-Arab Symposium on Liberation and Development, Khartoum, January 7-11, 1976. The Documents of the Sharjah Afro-Arab Symposium, United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 14-18, 1976. Helmi Shaarawi, Afro-Arab Symposium, Sharjah (14-18 December 1976) (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 13, No. 48, April 1977, pp. 145-54. Mohammad Abdul'la Gasem, Afro-Arab Symposium (Sharjah) (Arabic) in Derasat Al-Khaleeg wal Gazira (Gulf and Arab Peninsula Studies), No. 10, April 1977, pp. 203-212. Arab-African Cultural Relations and Development Issues in the Arab World and Africa, Op.Cit., and the papers presented to the Cairo Symposium on Arab-African Relations in the Eighties.

111. Declaration and Programme of Action for Arab African Cooperation Adopted by the Afro-Arab Summit, Op.Cit., p. 38.
112. The Report of the Afro-Arab Standing Committee, Second session, Cairo (November 28-29, 1977), in Arab-African Cooperation (1977-1978), Op.Cit., p.86.
113. The Report of the Afro-Arab Working Group on Education, Social Affairs, Culture and Information, first session, Cairo (May 25-27, 1978), in Ibid., pp.109-111.
114. Abdel Rahman, Op.Cit., pp. 16-17.
115. The Declaration of Khartoum Symposium on Afro-Arab Cooperation (Arabic) in Al-Syasa Al-Dawliya, Vol.12, No. 44, April 1976, p.71.
116. The Declaration of Sharjah, Afro-Arab Symposium, Sharjah, UAE, December 1976, pp.2-3.
117. For an illustration of the nature of Arab contributions, see: Table 4 (P.85). On the other hand, the OAU Council of Ministers agreed in February 1975 that the Liberation Committee should provide the PLO with aid, however minimal. See: Africa Research Bulletin(Political, Social and Cultural Series). Vol. 12, No.2, March 15, 1975, p. 3520.
118. Vine and Luke, Op.Cit., Appendix D, p.128.

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