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THE ENLARGEMENT AND THE MEDITERRANEAN : THE BALKANS CASE

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The enlargement of the EEC to include three new Mediterranean members will profoundly change relations between Europe and the Mediterranean. A whole series of problems which today are considered as being of only marginal importance will become far more significant than in the past, forcing the Community to make considerable changes in its political, economic and perhaps even in its institutional priorities.

This is particularly true of European policy towards the Balkans. Greek membership will oblige the EEC to involve itself directly in one of the most complex problems existing in Europe today.

Of course, even membership by West Germany and Berlin in the old six member Community involved the EEC in important questions of East-West relations. Here, though, everything took place within the framework of a strong and compact Atlantic Alliance and in the presence of well-defined frontiers between the two military and economic blocs. Conditions in the Balkans are very different. The Atlantic Alliance's Southern flank is geographically discontinuous. From a political point of view, the situation is confused and contradictory. Economically, the Southern European countries are facing considerable problems, especially since the increase in oil prices in 1973. Inflation rates are high, there are threats of a recession; certain currencies are no longer fully convertible. The boundaries between the two blocs are unclear. In both there are countries whose position is critical. Once Greece has joined the EEC, the key countries

in the new Balkans balance of power, will probably be Turkey and Yugoslavia (even though it is impossible to exclude crises and changes of regime in Albania and Roumania, which could prove extremely important from an international point of view). Both Turkey and Yugoslavia have serious economic development problems. Their relations with the EEC are far from being easy. The future international position is uncertain. Given these considerations, how is the situation in the area most likely to change in the future?

Nationalism in the Balkans

In the immediate post-war period, the "Balkans question" seemed to have been resolved through the establishment of a stable equilibrium between the two blocs. Thus Greece and Turkey took up their positions in the Western camp, whereas the other countries in the area joined with the East. As early as 1948, however, Yugoslavia managed to escape close association with either bloc. In the following years (right until half way through the 1950's), she received substantial American military and economic aid, without, however, joining the Western bloc. Then the Albanian schism in the 1961 gave China a foothold on the European political scene. In 1967, the Roumanian national heresy finally matured. Thus, Roumania progressed from her earlier opportunism on specific issues to the conscious propagation of an ideological and political national position, aimed at re-defining Roumania's place within the Socialist Community and in world politics. Earlier in 1964, Turkey had gone through her first, psychologically extremely important, wave of anti-Americanism, following the Cyprus crisis and President Johnson's opposition to any form of military intervention. Johnson had

sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu, stating "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step (on Cyprus) which results in Soviet intervention...." The Turkish response was both clear and inevitable: "....Your message....gives me the impression that there exists between us a wide divergence of view as to the nature of the basic principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.... If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of a fellow member victim of Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they had an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such discussion, the very foundation of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning" (1). And, indeed, the foundations of the Alliance were in fact considered to be meaningless (on similar grounds) by France, two years later. Relations with Turkey following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the Turkish intervention and the arms embargo voted by the US Congress in February 1975, led to a fresh deterioration in relations.

The origins of the crisis between Greece and the Alliance, on the other hand, date back to 1967, when the USA gave priority to "realpolitik" and decided to support the military coup, cooperating actively with the Greek Colonels in their attack on democratic forces within the Country. The 1974 Cyprus crisis rendered all future cooperation between Greece and Turkey in NATO impossible (thereby opening new flaws in the Southern flank, which was already suffering from its lack of geographical conti-

unity) and brought back to power the old Greek political élite, which had matured considerable mistrust and resentment against the Americans. Greek agreements with NATO and the United States were questioned. The new agreement with the United States, signed in 1976, radically changed the situation. In these agreements (as in the agreements under negotiation with Turkey), the local governments have made it clear that only those American bases which serve their national interest will be allowed to operate on their soil, and will remain in any case directly under their national control. Albania too is changing her international position. In 1973, several purges resulted in the removal of almost one-third of the Politburo members and nearly the entire state administration. More notably, the most important changes have occurred in the Ministry of Defence and in the top echelons of the Army. According to certain observers, Hoxha used these purges to effect the bloody elimination of a significant pro-Soviet faction (headed by Beqir Balluku, who was Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister as well as being a member of the Politbureau). There has also been considerable speculation over the health of the two main Albanian leaders, Hoxha and Shehu and over the possibility that the change in leadership might prove to be difficult and might lead to a change in the Country's line on international affairs. Reacting to this kind of speculation very much in the same way as the Yugoslav leadership, the Albanians seem to be emphasizing the "originality" of ~~this~~^{the} line. The death of Mao Tse Tung coincided with a break in Albanian-Chinese relations. Hoxha is accusing the new Peking government of deviationism, thereby increasing his Country's isolation. Albania was the only Eu-

repean country to refuse to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The only "stable" country in the area seems to be Bulgaria, but here too the standard Balkan nationalist problems are ever-present. This is easily seen in continual references to "greater Bulgaria" which imply the re-opening of the Macedonian dispute with Yugoslavia and in Yugoslav charges that the Bulgarian regime is giving active help to the "cominformist" (pro-Soviet) faction within the Country. Nor should it be forgotten that the faithful Zhivkov is nearly 70 years old and that the BCP Politbureau is suffering from the same age problems and has the same need for a change in personnel as the Politbureau of the CPSU. Should the two "succession problems" occur in the same period, there is a strong possibility that they would be likely to set off important factional strife, similar to that of the early post-war years. Finally, there is the interreaction between the Balkan problem and Italian domestic politics which complicates the international scenario and causes complex reactions from the interested parties.

One or two general comments should be added to this brief summary of the situation. Firstly, it should be noted that there is a close connection between the growth in rivalry between the superpowers in the zone and the re-emergence of nationalist pressures, domestic conflicts and boundary questions. The independence won by the Balkan states and the development of their own "independent political lines" was directly tied to the end of Stalinism and the beginnings of détente. Nonetheless, this growth in independence is as ambiguous and fragile as the pheno-

mena which allowed it to occur. It was ambiguous just as the end of Stalinism was ambiguous (Stalinist methods and concepts still survive today). It was as fragile as détente and reflected every up and down in the process. In this way, international uncertainties combine their effects and interreact with domestic problems.

Secondly, one should recall the abnormal characteristics of the region which prevent the creation of a self-sustained Balkan balance. It is no coincidence that the balance in the area is centred around the non-aligned position of Yugoslavia whose integration in either bloc would have a serious unbalancing effect for the system. Purely Balkan solutions should also be excluded. Although from time to time it is announced that a solution of this kind has been reached, (as occurred for example with the Conference on Balkan cooperation called by Greece in 1975, the Roumanian proposal to "denuclearize" the Balkans, etc.), solutions then reveal themselves as being incompatible with the international positions of the countries involved and with the fear which each bloc has of seeing the overall balance move against it. One should also remember that the region suffers not only from East-West but also from North-South tensions. A gradual rapprochement between Turkey and the Arab-Islamic area could introduce a new element of uncertainty into the situation.

To conclude, we are faced with a European region in which the solutions which have been proposed and tried out in the rest of Europe, cannot be applied. Although there has been a process of political and economic integration within the EEC

(and the Atlantic Alliance), in the West, and in COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in the East, it is impossible to include the Balkans completely in either process; ^{no?} it is possible to divide the area between East and West (without raising the Yugoslav and the Albanian problems). The only alternative which remains seems to be that of maintaining the present balance, despite growing tensions, domestic succession problems and changes in the international positions of individual countries (Greece, Turkey, Roumania and Albania are all in the process of modifying their foreign policies).

Greek membership of the EEC and the enlargement of the Community to include two new Mediterranean members could accelerate certain of these crises. Here, important international political initiatives may be required. Nonetheless, if the Europeans adopt a far-seeing strategy and the two superpowers cooperate, showing a degree of moderation, it might be possible to reduce the instability of the region and to limit the impact of nationalist trends.

Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav question is often identified with the problem of how to assure a stable succession to Marshall Tito (who will shortly be 86). Yugoslavia is composed of six different "nations"; there are, furthermore, as many as 18 different national minorities. She is not, in other words, an easy Country to govern. In particular, it seems difficult to strike the right balance between liberalism and centralism.

Thus, in the 1963 constitution and the series of economic

reforms around 1965, the individual republics were given the right to decide their own economic policies. This encouraged a kind of "economic nationalism" whereby the "richer" republics found themselves in opposition to the "poorer republics", as well as to the central authorities and their taxation system (which favours a redistribution of income and investment in favour of the less developed regions).

The 1969 Congress of the Communist League continued the "liberalization" process and gave increased powers to individual party organizations within each republic (the result being, in practice, that six different national parties were created: one for each republic).

In 1970-71, however, this system crumbled when a combination of various factors led to the Croatian crisis, to nationalist protests from students and intellectuals and perhaps to the worst crisis Yugoslavia has gone through over the last 30 years.

The result was a rapid return to democratic centralism, to a single Yugoslav Communist Party and to illiberal measures against intellectuals (purges, sackings, closures of review, etc.). A series of prominent political leaders in the various republics were politically eliminated (these went from the Serb, Nikezic and the Slovenian, Kavcic to the Foreign Minister Tepavac). Both in the republics and in the party, there was a considerable increase in influence of military men (within the military, there was an attempt to reduce the Serbian predominance). The new constitution, passed in 1974, approved these measures. At the same time, however, there was a regrowth of concern about ex-

cessive "centralism" and a renewed struggle against the (centralist, pro-Soviet) "cominformist" faction within the Country. Although the "liberal" period now seems to be over, there is still considerable concern not to become over-rigid, thereby losing consensus at a local level. This explains perhaps why, very recently, during the preparations for the Congress of the Communist League, fresh voices have been raised (including that of the authorative Stane Dolanc) calling for an increased "liberalization" of the principle of "democratic centralism" within the party, thereby making it easier for political minorities to make their voice felt and giving these minorities increased protection.

This continual Yugoslav oscillation between liberalization and centralism is directly tied to the international position and security of the Country. The fact that economic development problems also play a role in determining these fluctuations is an added complication which gives rise to considerable concern amongst Yugoslav leaders.

Over the last 30 years, Marshall Tito has conducted a foreign policy which is fully coherent with Yugoslavia's peculiar characteristics and which has reinforced, not only the security, but also the internal homogeneity of the Country. The policy of non-alignment is determined by a double "refusal": the initial refusal to become a satellite of the Soviet Union (which in 1948 led to Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist Information Bureau, the Cominform) and the subsequent refusal to join with the West. Yugoslavia has accepted economic and military aid from the West (until 1955, the USA was the Coun-

try's main source of military supplies). Nonetheless, it was enough for Khrushchev to visit Belgrade in 1955 and to show his readiness to accept "different roads to socialism" for relations between Moscow and Belgrade to improve (improvement was especially visible in the 1960's when the Hungarian question had receded into the past and the adventures in Berlin and Cuba had been forgotten). In order to strengthen her position of neutrality, Yugoslavia has made a particular commitment to the creation of a group of "non-aligned countries", thereby winning herself a number of allies in the Third World. In this way, she has strengthened her national identity without making any choice between a Western or an Eastern "model". Nonetheless, this interesting experiment is in crisis. The first problem was the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, although this was followed by a Soviet diplomatic offensive and a long series of meetings between Tito and Brezhnev. Later came the general crisis in "non-alignment", the growing Soviet military presence in the Third World and the increasing political, military (and nuclear) ambitions of many of Yugoslavia's old allies. The result has been that today the Third World countries are seeking their own direct ties with the two superpowers and Yugoslavia's role is becoming ever more marginal. No longer has Yugoslavia a clear "international identity".

Similar problems have been caused by "détente". Here it should be sufficient to recall the concern caused in Yugoslavia by the so-called "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" and indeed by any plans for direct contacts between superpowers, capable of limiting the smaller countries' freedom of action.

Belgrade's policy thus concentrates on four fronts (relations with foreign communist parties, the ECSC, agreements

with the EEC and improving relations with the USA). Those initiatives which have been taken in these fields, which we will now proceed to examine, give the impression that Belgrade is gradually realizing that she is no longer able to base her foreign policy on the Third World and that she is, therefore, seeking support for her non-aligned position, either in Europe or, in the same way as in the early 1950s, in closer relations with the United States (which could last at least for a period).

As far as relations with foreign communist parties is concerned, Yugoslav policy has been centred around the Pan-European Congress of Communist Parties - held in Berlin in 1976. This Congress, prepared at great length, was originally aimed at closing the "Czech problem" and at dealing definitively with the problems caused by dissident Communist parties (Eurocommunism, relations with China, the "guiding role" of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, etc.). Yugoslavia and, to a certain extent, Roumania and Hungary, however, saw the Congress as an opportunity to obtain official recognition that the role of the "guiding" state and the "guiding party" was over and that the various "national roads to socialism" were fully legitimate. The Western "Eurocommunist" parties were natural allies in this kind of plan even if there were nuances in their individual positions. From a conceptual point of view, the final result of the Conference was probably ambiguous. At the same time, however, the USSR failed to achieve any of its practical objectives. The Soviet Union had to accept a kind of language more usually heard from her opponents and was obliged to listen to a whole series of speeches in which she was made the object of extremely strong criticism. Since then, Moscow has tried to make out that

the Berlin Conference was a victory for "internationalism". Nonetheless, there has been no attempt to call a second such meeting. Rather there has been growth in contacts between those parties whose positions border on heresy (the Yugoslav - and to a lesser extent the Hungarian -, the Spanish, French and Italian Communist parties).

It is possible to consider the results of the ECSC, the signature of the Helsinki declaration and the calling of a first review Conference two years later in Belgrade (which has just come to a conclusion) as a second Yugoslav success. Here what had already occurred in relations between Communist parties, was repeated in relations between states. The USSR came to the Conference with the aim of obtaining recognition for the legitimacy of her hegemony in Eastern Europe. She left it with a burdensome commitment to "human rights" and to measures aimed at safeguarding the national independence of the smaller countries (limited controls over military manoeuvres, a commitment to renounce the use and the threat of the use of force, etc.).

At this point, however, the series of Yugoslav successes came to a halt. First, when Belgrade was hoping to exploit her successes more fully than in the past, through the drawing up of new tighter criteria for the application of the Helsinki agreements and just as she was hoping for an increased role in government for the Western Communist parties, so as to reduce Yugoslavia's isolation without increasing her dependence on one or the other bloc, the situation deteriorated. Both the Eurocommunist and the human rights questions became an integral part of the conflict between the USSR and the United States and were

thus excluded from the "grey zone" of questions where the influence of the non-aligned countries could be brought to bear. The gradually worsening crisis in détente reduced the value of the Pan-Communist and the European Security Conferences, neither of which today seems sufficient to guarantee Yugoslavia's security and to satisfy her international political ambitions. In particular, the disappointing results of the Belgrade review Conference put an end to Yugoslav hopes of conducting a "European" non-aligned policy with the consensus of the superpowers.

While the ECSC was still dying in Belgrade, Tito visited President Carter. In recent years, the USA has declared its willingness to offer limited arms supplies to Yugoslavia (as shown by the contract for the purchase of TOW anti-tank missiles). It is still too early to evaluate the importance of these moves. Certainly it does not seem that we are moving towards a repetition of the rupture with Moscow in the 1950s and growing Yugoslav dependency on the West. Rather the non-alignment's credibility crisis could force Yugoslavia to play the more difficult game of improving relations with both superpowers. This is bound to have negative effects on Yugoslavia's domestic situation for, whereas non-alignment and ties with the Third World provided opportunities for reaching united positions in domestic politics thereby strengthening national cohesion, sharper fluctuations between Washington and Moscow, even if these were dictated by purely tactical considerations, would inevitably fire the hopes and the disputes of the various factions. At the same time, there would always be the risk that Yugoslavia would find herself unable to oppose a direct agreement between the two superpowers providing for a forced "re-alignment" of the Country.

political and economic stability), even in 1977, despite an increase in EEC trade with Yugoslavia of about one billion dollars (total trade amounted to 6.3 billion dollars), Yugoslavia's imports remained 32% higher than her exports. The deficit with the EEC amounted to about 60% of the Country's total trade deficit. The EEC has granted Yugoslavia access to credits from the European Investment Bank, and has signed a joint statement (December 1976) designed to increase cooperation in trade, industry and agriculture. At the same time, however, the recession in Europe has forced about 200,000 Yugoslav emigrants to return home. The result has been a double loss for Yugoslavia: she has lost her foreign currency earnings from emigrants' remittances and, at the same time, has had to provide some kind of solution to returning emigrants' problems (i.e. to increased domestic unemployment)..

It is not clear whether concrete solutions can be found to these problems in the negotiations for the renewal of the 1973 five year agreement (which is about to expire). It is obvious, for example, that the granting of EEC membership to three new Mediterranean countries will complicate Yugoslavia's problems in agriculture (and may cause problems for Yugoslav emigrants). There is clearly in Brussels, among member governments, a general willingness to make a positive gesture towards Yugoslavia. However, insistence by Yugoslavia that relations must be based on the principle of non-preference leaves the Community perplexed as to which of its limited range of instruments might be suitable. What is to be the final result is still unclear. The idea seems to be to conclude a new kind of agreement, at once "cooperative" (on the Indian, Mexican and Canadian

Yugoslavia and Europe

In one sense, Yugoslavia's relations with Europe are very balanced. On the one hand, there has been an intensification of relations with COMECON (the percentage of Yugoslav exports going to the East has increased from 32.3% in 1973 to 46.8% in 1975 and is continuing to grow). On the other hand, there are agreements with the EEC first signed in 1968.

In practice, however, the EEC continues to be Yugoslavia's main trading partner, particularly as far as regards purchases of advanced technology.

The 1970 and 1973 agreements laid down the characteristics of EEC-Yugoslav cooperation, including a most favoured nation clause and providing for the maximum possible liberalization of imports and exports. The 1973 agreement also contained a special evolutionary clause, permitting further negotiations within the terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, relations with the EEC were beset with difficulties from a very early stage: the EEC ban on all beef products in 1974 and other protectionist measures contributed to the creation of a considerable Yugoslav deficit with the EEC and forced the government to introduce severe import restrictions on a wide range of consumer goods and production materials. The overall effect of the beef ban was to increase economic difficulties at a time when the Yugoslav economy faced a high rate of inflation and increasing unemployment, and this forced the government to increase its trade with Eastern Europe and the Third World. Although the situation is gradually changing (the EEC has, since 1976, shown greater awareness of the implications that a deterioration of relations might have on Yugoslavia's

model) and thus suitably neutral, yet with particular provisions for finance, investment and joint ventures, and thus likely to increase the integration of Yugoslav economy into the Western European framework.

It is, thus, possible both that Yugoslavia will have to face new problems and that the EEC will take on new responsibilities. This is especially so if one considers that Greek membership of the Community could open the way for the kind of "Balkan cooperation" which the Greek and Yugoslav governments have often attempted to encourage. The sort of policies to which this could lead has not as yet been defined (particularly in so far as regards infrastructures). It is, however, interesting to recall that it was the idea of a "Balkan Federation" proposed by the Communist Dimitrov which caused the first ever sever Soviet reaction in the Balkans. In this area, with its highly delicate balance, any sign of change can lead to sever tensions for which we should be prepared. This problem, however, we will return to later.

Turkey

Clearly, the Country most closely involved in and concerned by the enlargement of the EEC is Turkey. This is for two main reasons: politically, Turkey fears the political effects of Greek membership; economically, she fears the consequences of a higher degree of protection granted to Mediterranean agricultural produce.

The Turkish internal political situation is not an easy one, even though it is in no way comparable to the intricacies of the Yugoslav one. Turkey is still the main pivot of the At-

lantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as providing the only possible route for Soviet forces bound for this area. On the one hand, this situation gives Turkey every incentive to accentuate her ties with the West. At the same time, however, her position encourages her to make occasional concessions to her inconvenient and extremely powerful neighbour. Thus, for some time now, Turkey has no longer been insisting on the strict application of the Convention of Montreux which regulates the passage of warships through the Straights. On several occasions, she has granted the Soviets the right to overfly her territory. At the same time, she had accepted significant quantities of economic aid from the USSR: over one billion dollars worth under the most favourable terms and payable by Turkish exports. The framework of the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union is contained in a Declaration of Principles of Good Neighbourhood, issued in April 1972. It is not, however, in this field that the main problems lie.

As we suggested earlier, the crisis in Turkey's relations with the West is mainly due to Cyprus and to the new economic strength of the Arab countries. The 1964 crisis, the more recent crisis in 1974 and the subsequent American embargo in 1975, served to compound and to exacerbate existing difficulties. What is more, Turkey's domestic political balance is extremely unstable. The government is headed by the leader of the Republican People's Party, Bulent Ecevit, who wone the last elections. His parliamentary majority, however, depends on complicated political and personal equilibria. The opposition Justice Party (which until only a few months ago was in government) has, at least in theory, sufficient strength to overthrow him. This position increases the importance of minor groupings such as the religiously oriented National Salvation Party. This party's importance is

further increased if one considers how its religious line (and that of the Turkish right in general) has been encouraged by nationalist frustrations and by a growing Arab economic presence. The Turkey which emerged after Kemal Ataturk's revolution was a secular state, and yet in May 1976, Istanbul acted as host to the VII Conference of Islamic foreign ministers. Certainly Turkey is no "Islamic State"; she is, however, attempting to build closer ties with the various Middle-Eastern countries. These contacts, and especially those with the richer conservative states (such as Saudi Arabia), are extremely useful to Turkey. Another sign of the country's "Asian" leanings is the renewed interest which is being shown towards the Organization for Regional Cooperation and Development (the economic branch of the Central Treaty Organization), especially in so far as the Organization allows Turkey to build closer ties with Iran. As early as 1976, Turkey supported anti-Israeli motions at the UN; the Palestine Liberation Organization has been allowed to open an office in Ankara. It is worthy of note that there is an increasing flow of articles and studies by Turkish economists (and especially by those close to Ecevit's Party), in favour of an economic policy which reduces the emphasis hitherto placed on increasing integration with the European market.

If we consider all these factors together, it is not difficult to conclude that Turkey is somewhat disenchanted with the West and that this could in the future lead to an even more serious crisis in her relations with the Atlantic Alliance than those which have occurred in the past.

Turkey and Europe

As relations between Turkey and the USA have worsened, relations with Western Europe have gradually become more important. Unfortunately, however, these relations too have been anything other than easy. Thus, as a moderate observer like Nuri Eren wrote when discussing European reactions to the Cyprus affair in 1974-5 (2): "They (the Turks) were compounded as the European Economic Community turned a deaf ear to Turkish complaints. The Community's refusal to honour these complaints, while originally having shown itself sympathetic to accelerating Turkey's application for full membership on the Common Market; generated suspicions that Europeans were reverting to nineteenth century Euro-Christian discriminatory practices against the Muslim Turks".

At an economic level, things were not much better. In a recent study, Gul Gullova noted (3): "Together with her Association with the EEC, Turkey also entered the period of planned economic development based on extensive industrialization through import substitution. The Association Agreement, comprising only concessions for Turkish agricultural exports and financial aid for the first five-year preparatory period, did not promote Turkish industrial exports and no significant gains arising from the EEC concessions for agricultural exports were recorded. The signature of the Additional Protocol in 1970 put into effect the transition to a customs union between the Community and Turkey. Coupled with the recessionary effects of the Oil Crisis, the Additional Protocol aggravated Turkey's economic problems rather than reducing them. Her balance of trade with the EEC deteriorated.

rated considerably after 1973. Turkey was also unhappy about the EEC reluctance to grant the concessions she had been asking for two years, concerning exports, free movement of labour, and aid".

As far as purely economic considerations are concerned, Turkey fears that the enlargement of the EEC will worsen her present situation. She can cite precedents. Thus, in 1970, for example, EEC and Turkey negotiated tariff reductions, but in the meantime, the Community granted new preferences to former colonies and to several Mediterranean countries, including Spain and Israel (the so-called "politique globale méditerranéenne"). These latter agreements provided reductions above those granted to Turkey. According to Turkish calculations, those preferences for third parties affected Turkish exports to the extent of 200 million US dollars annually. Despite this, and despite the provisions in the Additional Protocol, the Community refused, both in 1974 and 1976, to revise the agricultural list. Finally, whereas Morocco and Tunisia enjoyed aid around 230 million dollars per annum, Turkey had access to only about 40 millions, even though the Association Agreement called for financial help in bridging the economic gap. The Community's position improved significantly in 1976 when Turkey was offered much better terms. Unfortunately, however, the psychological atmosphere had, in the meantime, deteriorated and as Nuri Eren put it "the strain in the relations between the Community and Turkey had developed to such a hysterical pitch that the Turkish side failed to appreciate the internicine difficulties of their protagonists as sadly as the Community had misunderstood

the realities of Turkish atmosphere". Later the situation improved still further. Nevertheless, past experience should be borne in mind if it is sought to avoid similar mistakes in the future in an ever worsening international climate. This is even more important if political as well as economic considerations are taken into account. Thus continued European concern to strengthen and protect Greek democracy is seen by the Turks as a justification for further discrimination against them. The Turks probably tend to exaggerate the degree to which Greece could ever influence her European partners' foreign policy options. Nonetheless, this mistaken Turkish conviction reflects growing Turkish mistrust of the West in general. This was especially clear during the Cyprus crisis. Whereas initially the Nine's political cooperation seemed as if it might give results, repeated Greek declarations in favour of Greece joining the Community and the positive European reactions to these were significant in convincing Ankara that the Nine were no longer impartial.

New Responsibilities after Enlargement

The enlargement of the Community is a political necessity which can no longer be delayed. However great the problems which must be faced, these today constitute the main test of the EEC's vitality. To refuse enlargement would mean for Western Europe a retreat from her political responsibilities in an area as vital for her as the Mediterranean. Although this is clear, it is still necessary to define a genuine European policy in this field. Our examination so far, with the

emphasis given to the Balkans, to Yugoslavia and to Turkey poses two main problems which the EEC must resolve, namely:

- a) the formulation of a "Mediterranean policy"; and
- b) the Community attitude to security and stability in the region.

- Mediterranean policy

The "global approach" to the Mediterranean was conceived late in the day to give a new economic, and thus political, coherence to the mosaic of relationships that had grown up in the Mediterranean. In practice, however, this "global approach" has never been based on clear political guidelines, nor have the economic policy tools available been adequate to guarantee the Community the key role which it should be able to play in the Mediterranean. Rather the contrary, as Nick Van Praag noted in a recent study (4), European policy has been essentially "reactive": "European policy has only been saved from total political impotence by the political stamp that third states have managed to put on their relations with the Community, thus offering only a very imperfect tool of influence to the Community". Nowhere has this reactive nature of the European political presence been clearer than in the field of foreign policy coordination, where indeed it has become a rule.

This situation could be manageable in a framework of assured international stability which could be guaranteed through some other mechanism. In the Mediterranean, this framework has usually been guaranteed by the balance between the blocs and by the American military presence. In this way, the

Community has been only marginally involved in the politics of the area. Its role has never been to make proposals, but rather simply to respond to external stimuli. This situation is, however, changing often. In the Balkans (the Middle East lies outside our field of enquiry), we have noted the re-emergence of nationalism, together with a rapid deterioration in the traditional framework of stability. At the same time, the "demand" generated by local actors seems to be ever more contradictory. Thus a positive response to Greece could lead to a crisis with Turkey. Vice-versa, any increased interest shown towards Turkey and any excessive delay in accepting Greek membership of the Community could lead to dangers for democracy and a deterioration in the situation throughout the region. The Yugoslav case is similarly contradictory.

- Stability and security.

This brings us to our second point. To date the Community has managed to avoid facing up to the problems of the military balance and security. The only modest exception to this role was the EEC's participation in the discussions over the economic basket ^{of} ~~to be added to~~ the ECSC, and certain proposals for European cooperation in defense contained in a number of documents published by the Commission and in speeches to the European parliament (as well as in the Tindemans Report). Enlargement to include new Mediterranean members, in practice, leaves the Community no other choice than to play an important role in security as in other fields. This has already occurred once (a portent for the future) during the Portuguese crisis when the Community's initiative made it possible to save Por-

tugal's relations with the West and to maintain her within the integrated Western defense system. If, however, we apply the same criteria as were used in this case to the Balkan situation, we discover that the correct response is far less obvious. Above all, the policy tools available to the Community may be inadequate for effective policy-making. In the Portuguese case, it was simply necessary to provide credits. In the case of the Balkans, it is necessary to formulate a whole range of new policies (social, industrial and financial policies, policy on technical cooperation) as well as a genuine foreign policy and crisis management strategy. Is the Community able to face this task? Where are the policy tools it is going to need?

Enlargement in the Mediterranean inevitably raises the problem of relations between the European Community and the USA. In the rest of Europe the aim is to construct an integration process under the American security umbrella; in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, the goal is to take over a role which the United States is no longer able to carry out effectively. This requires a fresh effort, not only to identify the necessary economic policy tools, but also to discover a "European identity" within the international system. Is it possible to conceive an enlarged Community lacking a coherent policy towards the East and with interest in security? How will the Community respond to the requests in these fields which it will receive from the new countries with which it is coming into ever closer contact?

These questions suggest that the Community needs to

carry out a kind of "exercize" (similar to the Atlantic Alliance's exercise Harmel), constituting a fresh effort to define the extent of the European presence and the European capability and to outline the characteristics and the aims of the European commitment. Without this kind of initiative there is a risk that Europe's strength and ambitions will be overestimated and that the exposure of this over-estimation could, in the future, damage vital European interests.

NOTES

- 1) Quoted in Nuri Eren's "Turkey, NATO and Europe: a deteriorating relationship" - the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris 1977. For the Balkans in general, see F. Stephen Larrabee: "Balkan Security", Adelphi Papers n. 135, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Summer 1977.
- 2) Nuri Eren - "Turkey, NATO and Europe".
- 3) Gul Gullova, "Implications of Greek Membership in the Community for Turkey", Mimeograph, The Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna 1977.
- 4) Nick Van Praag, "European Foreign Policy". Research done for the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma 1977. To be published.

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