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EEC ENLARGEMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Political change in Southern Europe in recent years has in various ways dynamicized the European international political scene. The fall of the old dictatorial regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece, led to the setting up of new parliamentary democracies. Driven by the need to consolidate their internal position, to resolve the economic crises inherited from their predecessors and to adapt to change in the domestic political and international decision-making environment, these have had to reformulate their foreign policies.

The fall of fascism in Southern Europe coincided with the opening of the "Eurocommunist" question, that is of the problem of whether the Portuguese, Spanish, French and Italian Communist parties should be allowed to participate in government coalitions. Simple changes in domestic political leadership and strong nationalist pressures have led to Europe being presented with a series of ultimata and "faits accomplis", e.g. the call for the withdrawal of NATO bases on Malta; the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

The growing concern over the future of Yugoslavia and Albania adds to the instability and uncertainty over events in Southern Europe in general. Today, the area is "in waiting" and is receiving much attention from elsewhere in Europe. On the one hand, Spain, Portugal and Greece's international political ties with the rest of the Western world have been strengthened by the prospect of improved collaboration, now these countries have come to be ruled by democratically representative governments. On the other hand, however, the prospect of Communist participation in national governments and the radicalization of the new political forces represented in the

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Maltese and Turkish governments has led to European mistrust and concern, such as to induce these countries to seek purely national solutions to their problems.

The countries concerned have thus been faced with two different kinds of international pressure. On the one hand, there has been a call for them to collaborate more closely within a European political, economic and strategic framework. On the other, they are mistrusted, and this mistrust tends to exclude them.

Every time that European observers face the problem of the enlargement of the EEC to include Portugal, Spain and Greece or the NATO crisis in Southern Europe, there emerge the same attitudes and concerns. The research work summarized in the appendix on the problems faced by the Atlantic Alliance in this area shows up the lack of an international political framework, capable, in a zone where the various countries' international ties tend to divide a country from its neighbours rather than to unite these, of guaranteeing both continuity and change. The primarily military American presence has not as yet succeeded in guaranteeing a sufficient degree of political homogeneity in the area. In the Mediterranean, the East-West division has not created the same degree of Western solidarity as in the rest of Europe. For Southern Europe perhaps the only unifying element is the prospect of future membership of the European Economic Community, even if this move is opposed by significant political forces in both Greece and Turkey. It is interesting to see how far, at a given time, this enlargement process could influence Atlantic relations and the general stability of the area, and conversely, how far strictly politico-military problems could influence the prospects for Community

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membership for these countries and thus the Community itself.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in Europe at the beginning of the 1950's when it was thought that the most likely theatre for the outbreak of a third world conflict was in Central Europe, initially on the Franco-German border and later on the frontier between the two Germanies. As a result, the greater part of the allied conventional and nuclear military capability was concentrated in Central Europe. This sector has been priviledged both from a political and a military point of view, as was shown in the MFR negotiations on mutual force reductions and other collateral measures.

Right from the beginning, the Southern sector was regarded as being of peripheral importance. Portugal, France and Italy were the only countries to join the alliance as founder members in 1949. Portugal was entrusted with an exclusively Atlantic role. Cooperation in the control of the Mediterranean sea routes was restricted to France and Italy. Only three years later did Greece and Turkey join the Western alliance, the aim being to build a network of alliances around the Soviet Union. The logic of this operation was the same as that underlying Truman's containment policy. Even in this early period the granting of alliance membership to the Mediterranean countries (France excluded) gave rise to serious doubts. In 1967, these prevented Malta from joining the alliance. Even thirty years of partnership in the Atlantic Alliance has not led to increased trust in these countries. In practice, the other allies have built up a special network of relations with the Southern European countries, the result being their effective integration within the Alliance but in a pattern of relations exclusive to themselves.

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
The diagram above summarizes the multiple relations existing between the various Southern European countries, NATO (SHAPE), NATO's Atlantic sector (the USA), the central sector (Germany) and the Northern sector (Great Britain).

Quite apart from the loss of territorial continuity deriving from the French withdrawal from the alliance's military organization, the result of these special ties is that the contribution by NATO's Southern flank to overall Western defense depends more on a close collaboration with the United States than on a high level of integration with the rest of Europe. The Southern European countries have only weak ties with each other. Portugal has signed agreements with Spain for the defense of the Iberian peninsula and with France for the use of the Azores. Italy and Turkey are the only two Southern European countries to maintain forces permanently assigned to Allied Command Southern Europe, in Naples. The only Southern European countries to have forces assigned to NATO are Portugal, Italy and Turkey. These countries also have special bilateral agreements with the United

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States. Only Portugal has any close ties with Great Britain with
whom she collaborates in Allied Atlantic Command. In the Mediter-
ranean, the only role now assumed by British forces is occasional
participation in joint air-sea exercises. Spain, which is not a
NATO member, maintains close bilateral relations with two alliance
members, namely the United States and Portugal. France and Greece
have withdrawn from the alliance's military organization, but have
maintained a whole series of contacts, described in more detail
elsewhere in this paper. At a formal level, Greece has recently
reached agreement with the United States over the use by the Ameri-
cans of a number of Greek bases. Apart from the previously cited
agreement over the use of the Azores, France maintains a certain
number of troops in Germany although this is steadily falling.

The Southern European countries have a twin role in the
Western defense system as a tie between the United States and the
Mediterranean and as a European theatre in the more general East-
West conflict. It is quite enough to go back to the historic ori-
gins of the roles of the different countries to discover their mu-
tual incoherency. Originally, in the period before the last world
war, the presence of British bases in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and
Malta was motivated by British colonial interests in the Middle
East. Even today, given that a solution has yet to be found to the
Middle Eastern question, one of the factors motivating NATO control
over the Eastern Mediterranean and the maintenance of American bases
in Turkey is to give the West "un droit de regard" over Soviet in-
fluence in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. France and Italy,
whose territory was more closely tied to European defense, were the

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only two Southern European countries to join the Atlantic Alliance
as founder members; furthermore, today they are the only two countries in the area to belong to the European Economic Community.
Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, play an important role in
controlling respectively the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic
air and sea routes. Membership of the European Community will give
Portugal, Spain and Greece a further incentive to pursue their integration into the Western system at all levels, including the military level. The identification by the Southern European countries
of their interests with those of Europe is not, however, enough to
ensure the automatic coherency of their positions with the Atlantic
Alliance. Rather, EEC membership could give a role to national problems and motivations which not only differ among themselves, but
which also differ from those of the Central Northern countries and
thus diminish rather than increase the already low level of existing
coherency.

What is more, there are two separate trends in the alliance's
presence in Southern Europe. On the one hand, there is a trend towards a growing presence in the Middle East; on the other though, a
reduction in the presence in Europe. Having risked losing important
bases in Southern Europe and having committed herself to withdrawing
all nuclear forces from Spain by 1979, it is difficult for the United
States to contemplate any short term increase in her presence in Southern Europe. The USA's greatest success has been the rapprochement
with Egypt. Soviet interest in the Mediterranean is today concentrated on Libya and Algeria rather than on Albania and Yugoslavia, at least
in so far as regards the presence of military bases. On several occa-

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sions, it has seemed to external observers that the Southern European countries were willing to partially sacrifice their relations with their super-power allies in return for a higher degree of national independence. It was as if the Eastern threat were assigned secondary importance with respect to a domestic threat or a threat from a neighbour. Even the British and French presences no longer seem to be motivated by concerns over European security. Having withdrawn from their ex-colonies, the two major European powers have turned back to the Atlantic. Even the recent return of the French fleet to the Mediterranean does not seem to have been motivated by concern over European defense.

Our research on the NATO presence in Southern Europe shows how the problems faced by the Atlantic Alliance in this region are far from being strictly military but rather how they are more closely tied to the internal cohesion of the Western World. Prospects for EEC enlargement to include Portugal, Spain and Greece could have positive consequences on interallied relations. In particular, it would allow the United States to collaborate with a more compact European partner in Southern Europe. At present, the Americans have to chose between close bilateral relations or a steady withdrawal from the Southern European countries. Membership of the EEC would offer a third solution, that is, the guaranteeing of area security through an alliance strengthened by a policy of European integration. Granted that the integration process moves ahead rather than collapsing under the weight of a 12 member Community, there should be an increase in the domestic political stability of the member countries. At the same time, there could be a homogeneization of the latter's economic and industrial po-

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licies. This is extremely important if there is to be a rational European policy on military equipment. All this, however, is in the long term. In the short term, the European Community will be faced with a series of political and economic problems deriving from the presence of the three new members and this quite apart from strictly military problems. In other words, whatever effect Community enlargement may have on the Atlantic Alliance, even the prospect of enlargement poses new questions which must be answered:

1) Is it possible to subordinate European integration to the imperatives of security?

2) Is it possible to subordinate security to the imperatives and the time required for integration?

3) Is it possible to operate a division of labour between the EEC and the USA in the field of European security?

During the alliance's thirty years' existence, there has been much support for the idea that security should be given priority over the construction of the European Community. The problem with this view is that for the Southern zones it risks transforming the two poles of the question: Europe and security into an antinomy. For the present nine members of the European Community, the twin concepts of security and European integration have been closely tied to each other in a relationship almost of cause and effect. For Portugal, Spain and Greece, on the other hand, any priority given to one of these two concepts could signify the loss of the other. In the past, the priority given to security has implied accepting anti-democratic regimes rathen than risking the loss of an ally. These regimes, were naturally excluded

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from Community membership. The Spanish case is perhaps an exception to this rule, being closer to the German example in the 1950's. The German Federal Republic was able to join the Atlantic Alliance only after having been included by the Europeans first in the plans for the EDC and then in the WEU. If Spain followed the inverse procedure today, that is if she joined NATO immediately, thus giving priority to security, this would create a number of difficulties, both on the domestic front (due to the neutralist policy of the Socialist left) and internationally (opposition from the Soviet Union). Greek and, in the future perhaps even Turkish membership of the European Community would not automatically lead to an improvement in Greek-NATO relations, nor is there any guarantee that Greece would find in Europe any satisfactory response to her security problems.

The day when the three Southern European applicant countries join the EEC, the risks attached to certain Southern European crises could worsen. Immediately, these would involve the other nine countries of the Community and thus endanger the security of the whole region. Conflicts which might otherwise have been contained at a more limited level, would be internationalized. Even before European Union or the setting up of a European Government, the homogeneization provided for in the Treaties of Rome and the practice of political cooperation already in operation, implies a common European position (if not joint action) on the main questions of foreign policy. Enlargement would necessarily imply the involvement of the European allies in foreign policy making by the existing nine member states. Giving priority to security questions not only implies giving priority to the military side of foreign policy. The consequences of enlargement in European security could worsen Europe's present limitable position. Enlargement could, at the same time, increase the EEC's pre-

sent economic vulnerability. It could worsen Europe's dependence on non-European natural gas and oil suppliers. (The new members' lack of supplies would increase overall European imported energy consumption and thus overall demand). At the same time, it could affect existing political equilibria within European institutions. If Communist parties were to participate in government in the Southern European countries or if there were an increase in the Socialist presence, this could lead to a general European shift to the left and thus to a weakening of the block represented by the conservative parties. Political change does not necessarily imply a reduction in security. Nonetheless, a shift to the left combined with economic weakness, could lead to increased super-power interference in European affairs and thus provide a greater threat to European stability than that of tens of divisions on Europe's frontiers. It is possible, however, to examine the consequences of the three Southern European countries' applications for membership from a completely different viewpoint. What would be the consequences if priority were given to the demands of integration over those of security? There is no historical precedent for this. The degree of European integration which has now been achieved in Central Europe is a result of the presence of two consolidated military blocs capable of guaranteeing a stable international framework within which to pursue the integration process. Today, the stagnation in the European integration process has reached a point where it appears impossible for the Community to play a vanguard role in finding solutions to unresolved security problems. At the same time, it is unlikely that the Americans would take a positive view of an increase in the Southern European countries' commitment towards the Community if this were paralleled by a steady withdrawal from

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their Atlantic commitment. In the Mediterranean, the increase in the
Soviet presence, the Middle Eastern question, and the problem of the
outlet to the Indian Ocean mean that the Americans find it impossible
to delegate any great part of their security responsabilities to the
Europeans. At the same time, Europe's political organs not only have
no military capability, but are not even capable of elementary crisis
management. Our analysis of the main crises in Southern Europe in
recent years shows that where serious differences emerge, concrete and
tiemly political proposals are needed. These, today's European in-
stitutions and "political cooperation" seem incapable of providing;
the necessary instruments are lacking. Even if one day these do come
into being, this is a long term prospect. The approach of giving
priority to Europe has to face the problem of the vacuum which sepa-
rates EEC political institutions from NATO military organs. It is
difficult to subordinate to the integration process for the simple
reason that Europe lacks the concrete tools to deal with security
problems.

Given that in this region it is impossible to separate the
two sides of this problem, the only question which remains is how to
reconcile the security guarantees offered by NATO (and thus by the
United States) and the European requirements of the Southern European
countries. The practical question is whether, in the security field,
a division of labour between Europe and the United States is possible.
Such a division of labour could lead to irremediable political con-
flicts between the two poles of the Atlantic Alliance. Even if these
were avoided, greater direct EEC responsability would require profound
changes in the Atlantic Alliance including the reorganization of the
various European countries' armed forces and strategy. The only link

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between the EEC and the Atlantic Alliance is the Independent European
Programming Group (IEPG). This body's terms of reference seem, how-
ever, to be limited and its work has been very slow. In the eyes of
many European observers, the IEPG's role is not so much the formula-
tion of an independent European policy as to build new ties between
France and NATO. In this case, the priority would be given to Atlan-
ticism rather than to Europe. At the same time, EEC membership for
Southern European countries could signify a role for defense problems
in political cooperation. The reservations of present Community mem-
bers are at least in part due to their awareness of the difficulties
involved. The European institutions do not as yet seem ready to take
on this responsability. To date, the Europeans have never attempted
to define a joint approach to the problem of relations between the
European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. Portugal, Greece and
Spain's requests for membership could force them to chose between
making this step and abandoning all hope of European integration.