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CHANGES OF REGIME ON THE
IBERIAN PENINSULA

by

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In both countries of the Iberian Peninsula the same basic constellation has come about in recent years : the regime of an old and well entrenched strong man who had dominated his country completely for more than a generation came to an end by the death of that dominating political leader. Both societies saw themselves confronted with the need to begin a new regime. In both the questions were posed : how much of the old order, its institutions, its personalities, its profiteers and privileged groups could be preserved ; how much of them had to change, to disappear ; how was the change to be accomplished, gradually, by violent means ; who would supervise it?

Inevitably the answers given to those questions have turned out to be different in the two countries. But there are sufficient points of similarity to warrant the attempt to view them together comparing and contrasting events and their reasons in both countries. In Portugal things began happening first, when Salazar at 79 was incapacitated by a stroke in September 1968. But in the years after his replacement by Caetano, who ruled as prime minister from 1968 to 1974, there was little change. In fact too little, as later was to become obvious. The reasons for this can be grouped under several headings : personal, institutional and economic, military, intellectual.

Personally Caetano was a conservative lawyer, a man of some age, grown up inside the regime of Salazar, a rather timid character and at the same time an obstinate man. He found himself surrounded by the establishment of Salazar, again old men, rather obstinate and many of them decided to defend to the very last all their previous privileges and advantages which through forty years they had come to consider as their due.

In particular the head of state, Admiral Américo Tomás, who had helped nominate Caetano as successor to Salazar, himself a very old man

became the center of all forces who resisted even such minimal changes as Caetano attempted to introduce.

Under Salazar a tight little social and economic system had grown up. It was based on very powerful family holdings which dominated the banks and industry (1). The few dominating groups had divided production amongst themselves so that there was little competition ; the colonies were an essential part of their operating area ; towards the outside world they were protected by customs barriers. For long years they had little incentive to modernise their methods of production and management, as they were rich and grew richer anyhow. The same can be said of the big landowners in the Alentejo.

But some movement had come into the previously immobile economic system in the last years of Salazar and in the period of Caetano. This was due partly to emigration of the rural and urban working classes to the EEC, partly to the ever increasing costs of the colonial wars. Rural and urban labour leaving the country in very high proportions forced the landowners to give somewhat higher salaries and consequently to make better use of their land in order to afford those wages. The same was true of some industries, mainly textiles. On the other hand the state needed more and more money for the wars (those had begun in 1961 in Angola with the raising of the future FNLA) and it saw itself forced to increase the efficiency of Portuguese industry by admitting foreign capital and know-how in association with the established Portuguese industrial holdings. Under Caetano a certain struggle had developed between a modernised sector of industry which looked forward to larger markets and association with Europe and a traditional sector which had been unable

to renew itself and was only interested in preserving things as they always had been. This second sector spoke of traditional values, the Portuguese overseas empire (i.e. the colonies), our brave soldiers etc. It managed to retain the political hegemony under Caetano, partly by allying itself with Admiral Tomàs and other high dignitaries, civilian and military, grown old in the service of Salazar.

Trade unions had been arranged by Salazar in such a way that they were practically incapable of action. The political police (PIDE) looked after that, as indeed after all political opposition. For a short period Caetano had granted the trade unions somewhat greater freedom of action. But he grew frightened as he saw the Communists taking advantage of this immediately and put the controls back on.

The colonial wars entering into the second decade under Caetano and offering no realistic hope of ever ending in victory served for a long time to help immobilising the regime. No changes could be made as Portugal was in a war situation ; no risks could be taken ; the main financial and administrative efforts of the regime went into the colonies. The wars served also as a pretext to keep all intellectual life stagnating. Censorship lasted all through the Caetano period and it strangled all public discussion of political and social issues. The censorship was one of the main reasons for the ever growing disaffection of all intellectual groups and professions. The war was invoked as its justification, but in reality it was used to strangle all intellectual life in the country.

Revolution in Portugal

As it is well known, it was the colonial wars which led finally to the decisive disaffection of the young officers towards the regime,

their grouping into an officers movement (MFA) and their coup d'état of April 25, 1974.(2). The MFA program was basically moderate and seemed to be aiming at a "bourgeois" democratic regime. Two principal factors however, contributed to a more and more radical "reading" of the program by the officers themselves : the struggle for power among two officer groups known as Spínolists and MFA-Officers; and the action of the Communist party and allied elements among the disaffected intellectuals and workers. MFA-Officers and Communists collaborated at first in order to overcome Spínola and his followers. In the course of those operations (they consisted of three main "crises" due partly to unsuccessful initiatives by Spínola, partly to provocations of Spínola by the Communists and their allies : July 1974, September 28 of the same year and March 11, 1975), the MFA officers collaborating with the PCP and allied elements managed to impose Vasco Gonçalves as prime minister (3). Later he turned out to be a strong pro-communist if not a secret member of the party (4). They forced the retirement of Spínola and his replacement by Costa Gomes as chief of state and finally allowed them to nationalise all strategic positions in the economy, to nominate an "assembly of the MFA" obedient to the pro-Communist line and to occupy important positions in the army (propaganda, information, secret services, some key units in Lisbon, the command of one of four military regions, navy positions, military police in Lisbon, arms deposits in Lisbon) with officers either sympathetic to them or secretly belonging to the party (5). Pro-Communists and Communists also took hold of the information media, state owned like radio and TV, or privately held like most newspapers ; they managed to monopolise the trade union movement and to occupy decisive positions in the offices of the prime minister, chief of state, and services to the Revolutionary Council. This Revolutionary Council became the real center of power ; but it was split between pro-Communist MFA-officers

and an officer group which grew more and more suspicious of the brazen attempts of the Communists and their allies to monopolise power.

The second group, at the time known as the moderates, also the group of "nine", took action under the leadership of Vasco Lourenço, one of the earliest organisers of the MFA. This action evolved on two fronts : publicly, by resisting openly the pro-Communist trend in the army assemblies, the information media, public life generally, and secretly by the formation of a special intervention group inside the army, commanded by Col. Ramalho Eanes, which prepared itself for the moment of a future armed show down (6).

Public discussions and debates inside the army, marine and air-force assemblies took place all through the summer of 1975. Major Melo Antunes, one of the "nine", wrote a document critical of the attempt to impose a new dictatorship of the left which was circulated among the officers and found the approval of 80% of them (7). The political parties critical of the Communists, PS, PPD, CDS, had proved in the constitutional elections of April 1975 (8) that they represented the vast majority of the people and they themselves began opposing energetically to a Communist take over in the streets. In September officer assemblies of the three branches of the armed forces obliged Vasco Goncalves to quit his post as prime minister. A new government was formed under Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo in which the parties were represented according to their electoral strength, the Communists being accordingly in a minority.

But the PCP and allied elements continued their struggle for power by revolutionary means. They began organising the soldiers of certain army units, principally around Lisbon and in the South, into revolutionary groupings which were told to accept only revolutionary orders. Which orders were revolutionary and which not, was made clear to them

by the news media, particularly certain radio stations and TV, which were in the hands of the leftists and pro-Communists. Since the main order forces of Lisbon were among the units thus revolutionised, government grew gradually impossible. Episodes like the siege of the constitutional assembly and the office of the prime minister by striking building workers of November 12 occurred without any police or army intervention (9). Finally, in secret agreement with the officer group of the "nine"(10), the government suspended its activities but refused to resign. Shortly after an attempted rebellion of parachute troops occupying the air force command and postulating a new composition of the Revolutionary Council, in order to exclude a decisive number of moderate officers(11), led to the intervention of the forces prepared and commanded by Col.Eanes on November 25, 1975 and to a quick and nearly bloodless defeat of the revolutionary units. The counter insurgency action of November 25 proved decisive. It broke the attempt of the PCP and the extreme left groups to reach power by non democratic means and consequently stabilised the democratic system : the army was reduced and reorganised on non-political lines ; parliamentary elections took place in April 1976 (12) and Eanes was democratically elected president in June (13). The majority party of Mario Soares formed a government in July. There have been some minor clashes among officers since. The "moderate" group of the MFA has now become the left wing of the officers and on some occasion they were opposed by so called professional officers who disliked their continued political role. The Revolutionary Council remains with greatly reduced powers as a kind of constitutional watch dog committee. But so far Eanes has been able to moderate these new military tensions. Vasco Lourenço has taken over from the "populist" officer Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as military commander of Lisbon.

The Economic Challenge

At the present time the economic difficulties are a danger to the new Portuguese democracy. They have accumulated from the period of Caetano : already at that time there was a serious trade imbalance and considerable inflation, both principally due to the colonial wars. Since this time troubles have grown : in 1974 the trade deficit grew from 28,5 Milliard Esc to 55,8 Milliards, and the balance of payments grew negative as well from +6,5 Milliards, to -16 Milliards. According to the finance minister in June 1976 the payments deficit had reached 100 Million Escudos daily. Salazar had accumulated big reserves in dollars and in gold, and those were gradually spent during the two years of revolutionary activities. Much of them went for basic food stuffs, needed to feed the nation. The efficiency of Portuguese industry has never been very high, partly because in the past it had been able to operate in a closed and captive market. It has declined further as a consequence of social disorder which in part was stimulated by the leftist groups and partially was due to the longstanding and justified resentments of the working population which had been kept under permanent police pressure by the previous regime. The colonies which in the past had helped the economy of the European part of Portugal have gone. But over half a million refugees came from them to the homeland and swelled the ranks of the unemployed and resentful. Inflation increased to 24% in 1974 and was about as high if not higher in 1975. Production decreased except in the sector of foodstuffs : textiles, shoes, clothes by 17,3%, metallurgy by 18%, building by 12%. The increased food consumption was a consequence of the government policy of increasing considerably the wages of the lowest paid groups. This in itself speaks of the very low standard of living of these lower paid classes ; they spent their increase in more and better food - not even in clothes. The agricultural reform in the Southern latifundia

which was accompanied by considerable local agitation and irregular occupations of land, has done nothing to increase agricultural yield, rather the opposite so far. Similarly, the nationalisation of industries and banking caused at first disruption ; the politicians were too much occupied with the political struggles to give the necessary attention to the reorganisation of the nationalised assets. The Soares ministry has introduced saving measures, increased taxes and a more severe working discipline. But in the long run it will have to increase productivity and exports if the economy is to become balanced again. If this should not come about, in the long run new social difficulties and consequent political troubles are likely.

So far, evolution in Spain

In Spain - contrary to events in Portugal - a certain evolution in the sense of liberalisation had taken place already in the life time of Franco. This had begun with a new economic policy - following the break down of the previous one of autarchy - in 1959 and the following years. It had consisted in opening up the Spanish economy to the western - world market by arranging for the convertibility of the Peseta and inviting foreign capital and know-how into the country. It had led to rapid economic growth, on the average 10% each year during more than 10 years (15). Emigration and tourism, both linked with the new economic policies, had increased contacts with Europe. In 1966 a press law was introduced which permitted to lift censorship, even though it left large discretionary powers to the authorities permitting them to strangle disobedient news media (16). The new press freedom, limited as it was, admitted a certain amount of discussion about the time after Francos death.

On the personal level the man Franco had trained and prepared to

take his succession and to safeguard the regime, Admiral Carrero Blanco, a hard line conservative and profound admirer of Franco was murdered in Madrid at the end of 1973 by Basque terrorists(17), after he had served as a prime minister for a mere 100 days. No true replacement for him has ever been found, and consequently one stone in the carefully built arch Franco had foreseen for bearing the regime after his death was missing. In the last years of Franco it was even possible to discuss considerable changes in the structure of the regime. These discussions turned around the possibility of admitting different political associations in the framework of the regime and a first timid law in this sense was passed at the end of 1974.(18)

Spain had no real colonial problems. The one remaining colonial question was the future of the Spanish Sahara, and with an eye to events in Portugal the Spanish officers and civilian authorities decided that the Sahara was not going to cause a war. After a tense confrontation with Marocco the territory was ceded bloodlessly to the Maroccans and Mauritians, much to the disgust of Algeria and to a considerable part of the inhabitants of the Sahara itself.

There were some signs of unrest in the army after the revolution in Portugal had broken out. This was due to the generation gap which goes through the whole of Spanish society, dividing those who have participated actively in the Civil War from those who do not remember it. Some of the younger officers, apparently captains and some majors, founded an illegal military association called Union Militar Democratica (19). Nine of them were captured and eventually condemned to long prison terms. The tensions inside the army opposed the younger officers to their superiors, the generals who had fought with the nationalists in the Civil War. The old generation wanted to maintain the regime ; the younger officers desired a non-partisan army in a pluralist state.

The king, belonging himself to the younger generation and having

waited patiently for many years in the shadow of Franco, declared immediately after the death of the Caudillo (November 20th 1975) that he was willing to bring a new democratic regime to Spain. The Church itself had gone through a modernisation in the years following the Vatican Council; for several years and with increasing decision it had spoken for greater justice, more participation, more equal distribution of wealth, and it now came out for the plans of the king.

But the king was tied to the institutions and institutional laws laid down by Franco. Behind those institutions stood considerable powers : all the previous dignitaries and interest groups tied to the state from the members of the Spanish Cortes down to the police men, and behind these interests the army was supposed to guard and protect the institutions of the state. The institutional framework was laid down in the Leyes Fundamentales, a series of laws of constitutional rank promulgated by Franco in the course of his regime. The oath of the officers and of the civilian servants of the state, ministers and undersecretaries, including the king himself, consisted and still consists of the promise to safeguard and uphold those constitutional laws. The laws admit the possibility of revision, they even foresee the necessary procedure. Two thirds of the Cortes have to agree to any such revision. The introduction of real elections and an elected parliament necessitates a revision. An other vital prescription of the Fundamental Laws obliges the king to select his prime minister from a list of three men nominated by the crown council (Consejo del Reino) This council itself is composed of 17 of the most important dignitaries of the Franco regime, many of them picked by Franco himself, and it possesses the faculty of renewing itself by internal election when one of its permanent members retires or dies. Franco himself had declared that everything "was tied and well tied up" for the time after his death. In fact, the Fundamental Laws were of enormous importance since the consensus of the higher army officers seemed to be, that the new regime of the king could do whatever was admitted by those Funda-

mental Laws, including changing them according to the ordained procedure, but that he could not overstep their limits without risking intervention by the officers who had been educated in the idea that they were the ultimate guardians of the "Constitution".

It became clear quickly that the crown council was not willing to nominate a liberal politician in his list of three, and the king consequently gave up the idea of appointing a new prime minister. He preferred keeping the last prime minister of Franco, Arias Navarro, but to make him change his ministry, appointing several politicians to it, who were well known for their liberal views. Making use of his constitutional powers the king did appoint a new president of the Cortes and of the crown council : Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, who had been a teacher of the king at the University and offered the advantage of being a minister of the previous regime and at the same time a backer of King Juan Carlos.

The new ministry of Arias Navarro formulated a reform project which would have led to an elected lower and a more or less government controlled upper house. But before it could become reality friction between King Juan Carlos and prime minister Arias Navarro (20) increased. The king complained that his prime minister did not follow his directives and he seems to have become more and more afraid that the slow pace of the reforms could divide the country into two hostile halves. He took advantage of the first opportunity to change his prime minister. This seems to have offered itself, when Fernandez-Miranda, president of the crown council, could assure the king, that the council would now be willing to put at least one candidate acceptable to the king on the short list of three. A crisis was suddenly precipitated as this point was reached, and the relatively young and unknown Adolfo Suarez became prime minister.

Adolfo Suarez and his team decided to outdo the reformers of the

previous government, principally Fraga, the minister of the interior and Areilza, minister of foreign affairs, by offering more liberal and more authentically democratic reforms. Their project was characterised by elected upper and lower houses, increased power for the king by granting him the possibility to convoke plebiscites, a new conformation of the crown council and above all quasi-constitutional powers for the future lower house that was to be elected democratically. Elections were promised before July 1977, a plebiscite about the new order, prescribed by the Fundamental Laws was planned for December 1976. But before this could take place the reform laws had to pass the Cortes with a two thirds majority. At the time of writing there were hopes that the Cortes could be pressured to agree to the law, even though they would in doing this, as the left opposition was found of remarking, "dig their own grave". The government counted on their power over many of the Cortes deputies, who in their majority owe their positions to the government, in order to make them pass the reform bill. There was some danger that the contents of the bill might be watered down in order to reach an agreement with a sufficient number of deputies.

Suarez' difficult path

The Suarez government in its attempt to obtain a change of regime by peaceful and constitutional means has to proceed between two oppositions. On the right a powerful alliance was formed under Fragas' leadership comprising a number of previous ministers of Franco giving themselves the name of Alianza Popular and intending to win the future elections. In order to do this they wanted the future election law tailored to their needs, above all they desired a majority system. As they had many friends in the Cortes they seemed in a position to impose their will on the government, particularly as long as they remained moderate in their demands.

On the other side there was a long series of center and left democratic groups, stretching from several shades of Christian Democrats and Liberals to several kinds of Social Democrats, multiple Socialists, the Communists and small radical groups left of Communism. All this array including the Communists, desired a peaceful passage to "bourgeois" Democracy ; only the revolutionaries left of the PCE dream of a direct way to socialism and revolution. But the center and left opposition did not really believe that the government would be capable of achieving a passage to true democracy by way of using the political institutions of Franco. They spoke of the need for a break and a freely elected constitutional assembly to make a clean start. However, the more the plans of Suarez for elections progressed, the more the parties of the center and left opposition recognised the need to deal with the government and to obtain assurances that the elections would be accomplished in such a way as to give equal chances to all. They want a proportional election law. They want their share in TV time, radio time, propaganda possibilities, and there is at the time of writing a strong tendency to negotiate about all these questions with the government. Things are complicated however, by the fact that the government has made clear that the Communist party will not be permitted to compete in the elections. The prohibition of the Communists is another of the conditions laid down by the leading generals of the army. The civil war was against Communists and Separatists, or so the officers have been told all their lives. At least the older generation of them sees it as their military duty to avoid any possibility of the Communists or the Separatists ever being legalised again. So far both governments of King Juan Carlos seem to have respected this desire of the military hierarchy. On the other hand, the non-Communist left parties have been tied to the Communists by bonds of solidarity. They have formed a common platform with them against the old regime in the so-called Coordinacion Democratica. If they want to negotiate with the

government, leaving out in the cold the PCE, they would have to dissolve that common platform.

The PCE itself says it is ready to accept a bourgeois democratic system and it would be willing to leave power if it should be voted out of power ; but the government and the army officers do not trust such assurances. Sometimes the speculation is voiced that the PCE might participate in coming elections, but not as PCE, only with independent candidates.

Another difficult problem for the reform is the question of "separatism" as it appears to the falangists and the high officers of falangist convictions ; i.e. the problem of the spanish "nationalities", as the Catalans and the Basques as well as many Gallegos like to call it. Contrary to Portugal there are strong autonomous tendencies in those three regions which speak their own languages as well as on the islands, Canaries and Baleares, and in the country and city of Valencia. Other regions have begun to call for their own autonomous administrations as well, declaring that they have been neglected scandalously by Madrid during centuries. In Barcelona, the Basque provinces and Galicia, the local parties have formed alliances aiming at autonomy, and there is no doubt a strong will to reach at least a return to a special statute (estatuto) such as had existed in Cataluna and in the Basque countries before Franco. The government would like to leave the definitive decision in these difficult problems to the future elected parliament, but the local party groupings are pressing for at least some previous assurances, before they agree to go to elections.

The government and the king have begun to change cautiously the structure and the mentality of the army. In September the previous vice prime minister in charge of army affairs, General de Santiago, was retired suddenly and replaced by a much more liberal general, close to the king, Gutierrez Mellado. Since then, Gutierrez has made

it clear(21) that the future army will not have the task of upholding one political mentality, if not party, as it had been the case ever since the Civil War under Franco. But that instead it will have to serve the state in its new pluralistic shape. There are signs that a careful reorganisation of the army is under way, the same is true of the police. But in both cases this is not yet concluded.

In the case of the police it is evident, that the rank and file of the older policemen resent the new democratic tendencies. There is little doubt that policemen in civilian clothes form the backbone of the so-called "uncontrolled groups" which take it on themselves to beat up left wing and "separatist" elements, to menace them and to destroy their houses and shops. Such groups are too small to cause decisive damage by themselves. But they are dangerous because they might be capable of provoking serious unrest, and serious unrest could lead to an army intervention. This could possibly lead to attempts by the right wing extremist officers to exercise pressure or even to seize power.

The left wing, including the Communists, but not the small revolutionary groups left of them, seem to have understood this danger. They try hard not to start any uncontrollable agitation which might play into the hands of the ultra right elements (22). But another element in the dangerous balance of the present approach towards a democratic system are the - illegal but tolerated - trade unions. The government has promised trade union freedom soon, but it intends to leave to the future parliament the definitive regulation of the trade union question. So far the discredited state "sindicatos" are still the only legal groupings. But the illegal ones, Comisiones obreras, UGT and USO are more or less tolerated. Inflation and a low standard of living force the workers to militancy. The competition between the future trade unions and inside "comisiones obreras" (where the pro-communist line has fairly violent fights with the so-called minority line of ORT and

PT, both groups standing left of the PCE) also makes for increased militancy. The danger of street troubles caused by the "illegal" trade unions and violent suppression of them by the police (possibly in the interest of fomenting their own political aims, namely wrecking the attempts of reform) is ever present ; it will further increase as economic difficulties grow (23).

This is bound to happen because already now the Spanish economy suffers from the general world slump (which has reached Spain late) and in addition to it from lack of confidence in the future. This is typically more pronounced among Spanish capitalists, for they are mostly people of the old regime, than among foreign investors. The Spaniards do what they can to take their money out of the country, while foreign investment is still flowing in . A new economic upturn seems unlikely before the new political system has been established and the new regime has settled down. But it would be over optimistic to believe that a new period of calm can begin already after the promised elections have taken place - if they take place at all. After that, many decisive and possibly divisive questions will remain to be settled by the parliament and even in the best case they will take a considerable time to find solutions acceptable to all sides.

Contrary to Portugal where rapid politicisation of nearly the whole population set in at once (in part expressly promoted by the left elements of the MFA in the so-called dynamisation campaigns) in Spain only certain social groups, workers in the big cities, Basques, Catalans, students, have been politised so far. Large parts of the provinces are still quiescent. But increased interest and political activity is bound to come with the approach of elections.

In the two countries opposite approaches to the problem of readjusting a new political system to the societies seem to have come about. In Portugal, politics started - after long enforced quiescence -

by an army coup, and the essence of politics for several years remained army and officer politics ; the political parties served mainly to simulate different groups of officers to different actions. Eventually the army found a new equilibrium and only after that the political system could settle down.

In Spain politics started as a civilian affair, the officers served at first only as a retarding element, menacing possible intervention if the rules of the old system were not observed. But by now political change in Madrid has reached a stage in which it will either become possible to hold the promised general elections in the foreseeable future or else it could happen that the army might see itself forced into politics and tempted to seek a political role for itself. If this should happen things might well become much more violent and dangerous in Spain than they have ever been in Portugal. This is partly so because of the civil war past, which has still not been overcome ; partly because of national idiosyncrasies and in part because of the question of the "nationalities" which introduces one more sharp dividing line into the Spanish situation. But it is also true that there is awareness of the dangers any conflict might bring, if it should break out, particularly so inside the army. And this awareness, so far, has worked in favour of caution.

NOTES

- 1) Compare : Maria Belmira Martins : Sociedades e grupos em Portugal editorial estampa, Lisboa, 1973.
- 2) Most revealing are three short booklets of Te. Coronal Luis Ataide Banazol : a origem do movimento das forcas armadas, Prelo documentos, Lisboa 1974 ; the same : Os capitães, analise critica da sua formacao, Prelo, Lisboa 1974 ; and : A tarde dos Generais, Prelo, Lisboa 1975. compare also : Avelino Rodrigues, Cesario Borga and Mario Cardoso : O movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril Moraes, Lisboa 1974 and the documents printed there.
- 3) Details see in : L.Pereira Gil : Novembro 25, anatomia de um golpe. Editus, Lisboa 1976 and Avelino Rodrigues, Cesario Borga, Mario Cardoso : Portugal depois de Abril, Lisboa 1976 ; shorter in German by the Author : Die portugiesische Demokratie in der Bewährung, Europa Archiv, Folge 15, 1976 p.487-496.
- 4) cf. Rodrigues, Borga, Cardoso as in Note 2, p.170 for indications of communist antecedents of Vasco Gonçalves.
- 5) For details see the important book of José Gomes Mota, A resistencia, Edicoes Jornal Expresso, Lisboa, 1976 p.32 ff giving names and positions of pro-Communist officers. This book is the first inside report of an officer who collaborated with the "nine".
- 6) see Gomes Mota as above note 5, p.99 giving other officer's names.
- 7) Document printed in Gomes Mota, as above note 5, p.121 also details of its history.
- 8) PCP 12,53% of voices ; other left groups : MPD 4,12% ; 7 small groups of the extreme left : 4,53% - against this : PS 37,87% ; PPD 26,38% ; CDS 7,65% ; total : 71,6%.
- 9) The escalation of violent events in Oct. and Nov. cf. Gomes Mota as note 5 : p.166 ff.
- 10) cf Gomes Mota as above p.176 ff
- 11) cf Gomes Mota as above p.190, and L.Pereira Gil as note 3, p.205 ff and documents.
- 12) results : PS 34,97% ; PPD 24,02% ; CDS 15,9% ; PCP 14,56% - this time the MDP did not participate ; extreme left : 10 groups together 5,74%
- 13) Other candidates were : Carvalho 16,52% ; Pato (PCP) 7,58% ; Pinheiro de Azevedo 14,36% ; Eanes obtained 61,54%
- 14) Numbers according to : Eugenio Rosa, A economia portuguesa em numeros, Lisboa 1975 and blasco Hugo Fernandes, Portugal atraves de alguns numeros, Lisboa 1976 4. ed. completed by : A.Rebello de Sousa, Analise da conjuntura economica in "Tempo" (Lisboa) 24/6/1976 and Salgado Zenha in "Jornal novo" (Lisboa) 25/6/1976. "A Luta" (Lisboa) 12/9/75 p.6
- 15) cf the Author : Spain in Transition, Washington Papers no.18 and 19 : N° 18 p.21 ff.
- 16) Details in the brilliant book of Manuel Fernandez Areal : la libertad de prensa en Espana 1938-71, Cuadernos para el dialogo, Madrid 1971.

- 17) cf. Julen Agirre : Operacion Ogro, como y por qué ejecutamos a Carrero Blanco, Handaye and Paris 1974.
- 18) The author was Arias Navarro, but the law had been reduced to little significance by the Cortes cf. the author : Spanien vor dem Ende des Franco Regimes , Europa Archiv 19/1975 p.600 ff
- 19) A collection of documents of the UMD was published anonymously "by a group of citizens" in Feb.1976 under the title : Union Democratica Militar, los militares y la lucha por la democracia.
- 20) For details see : Cambio 16 (Madrid) 3-9/5/1976 p.8 ff "Arias para todo".
- 21) see his long declaration to the press agency efe as printed in all Spanish papers of 24/10/1976.
- 22) cf. "Opinion" (Madrid) 6-12/11/1976 p.8 f, speaks even of a pact between government and opposition intended to avoid excessive tensions.
- 23) These dangers became evident at the occasion of a recent strike of bus workers in Madrid lasting from Oct.28 to Nov.3, 1976. cf. "Opinion" as above p.17.

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