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National Conference :

ITALY - EUROPE - THE MEDITERRANEAN

Naples, 8-9 November 1975

The Prospects for Southern Europe

by

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The conference has been organized with the collaboration of the
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

THE PROSPECTS FOR SOUTHERN EUROPE

I. Southern Europe?

A. "Southern Europe" is becoming a geo-political and, to some extent, a socio-economic concept perceived by some as distinct from the post-war categories of Eastern and Western Europe. However, before examining some salient aspects of recent developments in this "sub-region" of Europe, we must ask ourselves a preliminary but fundamental question: Does such a "sub-region" really exist and, if not, is it legitimate to use this term for analytic purposes? In more esoteric terms, we should ask whether Southern Europe represents a sub-system, distinct from those of Western and Eastern Europe.

The Cold War and the subsequent institutionalization of relations among capitalist countries on the one hand, and among socialist states on the other, have undoubtedly given rise not only to two clearly distinguishable sub-systems but have also raised considerably the levels of interactions within the two European sub-regions. The process of détente has tended recently to break down some of the barriers dividing Europe, but it would be totally unrealistic to lose sight of the continuing existence and development of the two sub-systems. On the contrary, the existence of the two groups of states, strengthened by their respective socio-economic integration process will tend to become more and more a lasting characteristic of the European system. Given this basic assumption, what sort of sub-region do we have in mind when we speak of "Southern Europe"?

B. From a strictly geographic point of view, Southern Europe includes those territories situated south of a line running West to East from Bordeaux to Ljubljana and Constanza and whose populations are ethnically European. The countries included are Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, the European part of Turkey, and the south of France. This is, however, a largely arbitrary geographic division and it does not even have the relative precision of the "Mediterranean Europe" described by André Siegfried. If we introduce as indicators the climate and Siegfried's "olive tree", Bulgaria and a good part of Yugoslavia should be excluded, and if we add ethnic criteria, Turkey would probably have to be left out. If, however, we take into account economic indicators, we find that there is some limited homogeneity among South European countries. It is not our intention to present in the context of this brief report detailed statistics for Southern Europe, but some orders of magnitude may help us answer the question we posed. (1)

First - and in spite of its well-known limitations as a

(1) Our figures are based on OECD statistics as well as on the annual Economic Surveys of Europe, published by the United Nations Commission for Europe. The latter include a chapter on Southern Europe. In addition, we have not included in this brief presentation Albania and Bulgaria because of unavailability of some of the data but, above all, because of the centrally planned characters of their economies - in whose context data such as per capita GNP are not very meaningful. Finally, given our limited objective, we have not tried to go beyond 1971-1972 as our reference years and, as a rule, we have rounded off the figures given.

valid indicator - if we consider Western and Southern Europe together we find that nine countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia) have per capita GNP of under \$ 2,000.- while another twelve have a per capita income of \$ 3,000.- or above (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom for the first group of countries, the annual rate of GNP growth in the late Sixties and early Seventies, varied from 4% to 8.5%, while the second group witnessed growth rates of 2% to 5.8%. The agricultural sector accounted for GNP percentages of 11.5% to 38.5%, for the first group, and 2% to 7.5% for the second; the industrial sector for 22% to 40.5% for the first and 38.5% to 54% for the second; and services, respectively 39.6% to 52% and 39% to 53.5%. In relation to these figures, we should note, however, that Southern European countries have had and have a much higher percentage ratio of annual increases in the industrial sector in their GNP than those of Western Europe. It varies from 7.5% to 12%, while in highly industrialized market economy countries it is slightly or considerably lower than the overall GNP growth rate. Balance of trade indicators, at present, are not very revealing, essentially because of the distortions brought about by the present international economic crisis; but, on the whole, and until the early seventies, Southern European countries have tended to run up sizeable deficits in their relations with industrialized Western Europe. In all cases, this deficit is covered by services and invisible payments - in which transfers from several million South European workers in Western Europe and tourism occupy by far the largest parts. Finally, we should note, when looking at these figures, that all but one

country belonging to each group (Ireland for the first and France for the second) are either part of geographic Southern Europe or of the group of industrialized European market economy countries.

C. If we take therefore into account geographic and economic indicators, we come to the conclusion that there is a group of European countries which have in common certain characteristics. For geographic reasons, we would, however, exclude Ireland from the group of nine less developed countries falling within this group; while its level of economic development would place France outside the group. From the point of view of their socio-economic structures, Yugoslavia stands alone; while the remaining countries are market economies. Their political structures vary from democratic pluralism (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal) to right-wing dictatorships or authoritarian régimes (Spain and Turkey) or left-wing authoritarianism (Yugoslavia). The three latter countries are, however, going through periods of transition and, at least in the case of Spain and probably Turkey, it would not be unrealistic to foresee a prolonged process leading to the establishment of pluralist régimes.

D. A last point to be raised, before answering our preliminary question, concerns the relations of this group of countries with Western European institutions. First, Italy is a member of the Communities; Portugal is a member of EFTA; Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are members of OECD; while Greece and Turkey have signed association agreements with the EEC and Cyprus, Malta, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia are bound to the EEC through trade agreements. In June 1975, Greece applied for full membership in the Communities. These institutional affiliations

indicate that, to varying degrees, all Southern European countries are either participating in the process of Western European unification or have established privileged relations with the Communities. Moreover, beyond these formal arrangements the peoples of Southern Europe (1) are aspiring - again to varying degrees - to closer relations with Western Europe. On the side of the Communities it is generally recognized that Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey will eventually accede to full membership while Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia will progressively establish ever closer relations with EEC.

E. At this point of our analysis we could formulate the following propositions: "Southern Europe is a group of countries which have in common certain geographic and socio-economic characteristics and which share certain aspirations concerning their relations with Western Europe". It is, however, a relatively heterogeneous group because of the socio-economic gap separating Turkey and Italy (approximately \$ 500 GNP per capita - \$ 2000 GNP per capita) and even Turkey and Spain (\$ 500 - \$ 1300); because of the differences in their political systems; and because of differences in their contractual relations with the Communities which will make of some of them full members in the foreseeable future, while there is no such perspective for some others. Finally, we should add that from a strategic point of

(1) Excluding naturally Albania and Bulgaria whose ideological orientations, socio-economic and political systems differentiate them from the other Southern European countries for the purposes of the present analysis.

view, three are non-aligned, four are members of NATO and one is strategically tied to the United States; but, as we shall see below, all of them share certain views concerning the Mediterranean which are not necessarily those of the great majority of Western European countries. We should, however, stress that Southern Europe is not a sub-system, in the sense this term applies to Western and Eastern Europe. At best, it can be considered as the "immediate periphery" of Western Europe; if for no other reason because of the fact that relations in all fields are much closer - between each country taken individually and Western Europe than among countries of Southern Europe taken as a whole.

II. Development and Political Change.

A. As we have already seen, Southern European countries are characterized by rapid rates of economic growth. We are also witnessing spectacular upheavals in their political systems - some more drastic than others - but, in all cases, political change is taking place at a pace which is disconcerting to decision-makers who had become accustomed to the "stability" resulting from the Cold War stalemates. Before discussing the directions these political transformations are taking and are likely to take in the future, we must try to answer the following question: To what extent have these changes been a function of internal developments, as compared to the externally induced - and sometimes imposed - changes which took place in Europe following the end of the Second World War?

In our view, political change in Southern Europe has been and is almost entirely determined by societal changes within

the various countries. This interpretation should, however, be qualified by adding that such profound transformations would have never taken place had the bipolar situation in Europe, and at the global level, not been stabilized, limiting the areas of direct confrontation between the two super-powers. In countries like Greece, Italy and Turkey, the perceptions of external threats to their security among decision-makers and opinion leaders have undergone such profound modifications that the credibility of the Cold War arguments concerning Communist subversion has been steadily withering away. This is true, independently of rear-guard action by ultra-conservative or right-wing totalitarian forces within these countries. The situation differs from one country to the other, but after experiencing political "stability" since the end of the war because of real or imagined threats by the Soviet Union and its allies they are now witnessing a progressive integration of left wing political forces into their political systems. Even in Turkey, where the rate of change has been the slowest, the largest political party is adopting a social democratic posture and is attracting to its ranks individuals and groups which had been politically "marginalized" since the end of the period of Kemalist reforms.

The second external factor which has had a bearing on internal political developments has been the emergence of the European Communities as a pole of attraction for Southern European countries. Political forces in Spain and Greece - and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Turkey - take increasingly into account reactions and potential reactions of the Nine in the determination of their strategies and tactics. As for Italy, a member of the Communities, its conservative élites feel reassured to some extent because of the acceptance of the market economy

rules of conduct even by those sectors of the left which until recently had been denouncing European unification as a "capitalist ploy". The Community setting which Italian political élites have accepted is conducive to political change to the extent that it is perceived as remaining within the bounds of what was denounced not so long ago by Communist Parties as "reformism".

On the whole, however, neither these nor any other factors external to developments within Southern European countries could have induced such far reaching changes, had it not been for the societal transformations which we have been witnessing over the past twenty years. Yugoslavia, Spain, Italy and Greece have followed the direction of rapid economic modernization - both through accelerated industrialization and in the agricultural sectors - and, with variable delays, its social consequences began to be felt in the late sixties and early seventies. Turkey and Portugal have not experienced similar rates of socio-economic change, but the exposure of increasing numbers of workers from these countries to Western European socio-economic conditions - until 1973-1974 when labour migration started slowing down - has had comparable social effects within their frontiers. Large scale labour intensive industries and higher labour incomes became a reality in all Southern European countries, either as a result of their national development or through the exposure of their workers to Western European industrial societies. As for agriculture, the evolution has been one of a definite decline of its part in the GNP but, at the same time, in most countries it has been undergoing structural changes tending towards the rapid decrease of the labour force.

The social consequences of these changes have not been the same in all countries. They all do have, however, some common

characteristics: A modern industrial proletariat has tended to replace the traditional Southern European worker who maintained a foothold in the peasant sector; the role of trade unions became increasingly important (even in countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey trade unionism became a reality in the Sixties and Seventies); the general educational levels rose rapidly and illiteracy ceased to be a major problem (with the exceptions of Portugal and Turkey); in spite of gross shortcomings which still subsist, social welfare became a reality in most Southern European countries; the influence of the Church - to the extent that it had been a pillar of socio-political conservatism - has been receding; the status of women underwent profound changes; etc., etc. These characteristics - cited almost at random - do not cover all sectors where social change has taken and is taking place. They all point nonetheless in the same direction: that of the emergence of pluralist societies in which traditional social structures tend to break down.

B. With the exception of Yugoslavia - where the League of Communists, under the firm leadership of Marshal Tito, has been in full control of the political situation since the war - all other Southern European countries have undergone increasingly rapid political change. Not so long ago "well informed observers" were forecasting a lasting split between democratic Western Europe and its Southern fringes - Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey - which were expected to remain under authoritarian or totalitarian rule forever after. In 1968, a distinguished Swiss scholar-politician, speaking as a member of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, stated that the peoples of the Mediterranean were too strongly attached to freedom to

live under democratic régimes ("trop épris de liberté pour vivre en démocratie"). By making such a statement - which, to say the least is not flattering for the peoples of Southern Europe - he was simply expressing a view widely held at the time in Western Europe, and which is still shared by wide circles of Western decision-makers and opinion leaders. Such views of Southern Europe include Italy, whose politics remain to a large extent a "mystery" north of the Alps and whose political future is regularly forecast as being totalitarian, on the right or on the left. At the end of 1975, however, it would be belabouring the obvious to state that such "well-informed observers" proved not only to be wrong, but to border the ridiculous in their simplistic forecasts. This is true for all of the countries we are discussing; although we shall devote our more detailed comments to the Eastern sector of the sub-region, including Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The limitations inherent in such a short report and the presence of distinguished experts on the Iberian peninsula, on Italian and on Yugoslav politics justifies this choice.

C. Greece turned a page of its history when the dictatorship collapsed in July 1974, in the aftermath of the military régime's attempt to assassinate President Makarios. The mounting socio-economic crises, the more overt expressions of the Greek people's refusal to accept the dictatorship which became apparent since early 1973 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; all contributed to its downfall and the re-establishment of democratic government. During the first two and a half months, following July 24, a coalition government under Constantin Caramanlis - including conservatives, centrists and moderate leftists - succeeded in assuring a remarkably smooth transition from totalitarian

dictatorship to a political situation in which two elections and a referendum were held between November 1974 and March 1975. In early October, the coalition government resigned and Prime Minister Caramanlis formed a new Cabinet which organized parliamentary elections in mid-November. The landslide victory which carried the Prime Minister's Party was not surprising given the prestige of the man who led post-dictatorial Greece's first government. A month later, the referendum abolished the Monarchy and on March 30, municipal elections were held which reflected a decline of the ruling party's popularity (though not necessarily of the Premier's personal appeal). All observers agreed that the conduct of the elections and referendum, as well as parliamentary life which was resumed in January 1975 showed the exceptional maturity of the Greek people and of its political leadership, from Right to Left. A new Constitution was adopted in June and we could state that, to a large extent, the period of transition has ended.

The present political constellation in Greece, as reflected in the parliamentary elections, is as follows: Communist Parties (in the plural because there are two of them), under 10%; the left of Center PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou, which includes Socialists, Centrists, Trotskyites, "tiers-mondistes" and disillusioned Communists, under 14%; the Centre Union-New Forces led by George Mavros, which includes Centrists and Socialists, under 22%; the New Democracy Party, led by Prime Minister Caramanalis, which includes traditional Conservatives, royalists and anti-royalists, as well as traditional right of Centre elements, under 54%; the extreme right wing with definite totalitarian tendencies, 1%-2%. We should note, however, that the Prime Minister refuses to consider his party as conservative

and, as a matter of fact, it does include a number of Centrists and some isolated individuals with left of Centre leanings. The Centre Union-New Forces, on the other hand, is considered by some of its leaders as the centrist party, while others are pressing for a much clearer stance on the side of democratic socialism. The latter represent undoubtedly the "mounting forces" within the party and a growing number of its members are now stating explicitly that their party is the democratic socialist party in Greece. On the instructions of George Mavros, its members sitting in the Council of Europe Constulative Assembly joined the Socialist group. It is also interesting to note that the New Democracy members of the Assembly have joined the Gaullist group. As for PASOK, during the course of last summer, it entered a period of crisis, with a series of purges which have led to the departure of a good part of its leaders, particularly of those who participated in the resistance against the dictatorship inside Greece. Finally, the two Communist Parties continue to be at loggerheads and there is no indication whatsoever that the split may in any way be overcome. In addition, the left wing party EDA - which had been controlled by the Communist Party in the past - has been revived and is trying to find a political basis to the right of the Communists and to the left of the Centre Union. In fact, this is the part of the political spectrum claimed by some of those who joined Papandreu in establishing PASOK. As for relations among Opposition parties, the leading role of the Centre Union-New Forces is tacitly accepted by the others, with the possible exception of the "orthodox" Communist Party. On the whole, the general tone of relations between the government and the opposition is courteous and responsible - all the more so as none of the parties, strong

or weak, have really determined in any final form their exact position on the political spectrum. During the coming months, we should expect a reshuffling of cards in Greek politics and the impression one has is that, with few exceptions, no political leader wants to cut off any bridges, be it to his right or to his left.

This reshuffling process may either be accelerated or stopped, as a consequence of efforts which will have to be accomplished by all concerned to solve four major sets of problems. First, and foremost in the eyes of a majority of the people we have the "catharsis" of the remnants of the military dictatorship to be found still in all walks of life. Considerable progress has been accomplished but, in the eyes of most Greeks, a great deal remains to be done, particularly in the armed forces and in certain sectors of the administration. Second, the tragic economic mess left behind by the dictators is posing almost insoluble problems to Greek decision-makers. For obvious reasons, the Government has not been willing or able to take strong deflatory measures which could possibly lead to unemployment and social unrest. Foreign borrowing has to continue and, on the whole, those who expected generosity on the part of Greece's Western European friends have been bitterly disappointed. Third, Greece's application for full membership in the Communities opened some stimulating perspectives both in the socio-economic and political sectors; but it also represents an unprecedented challenge to Greek political élites and Greek diplomacy which will have to overcome some very real obstacles on the road to unemployment and social unrest. Last, but not least, Greece is faced with the continuing crises in Cyprus and in its relations with Turkey. In neither of these two areas has

there been many significant progress and the prolonged stalemates may lead at any time to a resurgence of violence, on the island or even in the Aegean Sea.

In the face of these very real difficulties facing the Greek people and its political leadership, we should expect rising internal political tensions; while at the same time nothing will be done on the side of the government or on that of the opposition to render impossible the formation of a new coalition if and when Greece is faced with a real danger to its integrity and independence. This moderate tone in Greek politics may be surprising to many but, above all, it demonstrates most convincingly the ineptness and dishonesty of those who had been forecasting for seven and a half years that Greece was faced with the alternative: military dictatorship or chaos. The Greek people have proven their maturity and their political leaders have shown that, in spite of their differences, they assume their responsibilities in a way which is uncommon even in the most advanced pluralist societies.

D. Since its return to formal civilian rule in 1961, Turkey has been going through a period of difficult transition, in which the pendulum has been moving back and forth between civilian and military rule, in a way disconcerting to foreign observers who have always predicted either a new dictatorship or a return to true civilian rule. During the first five years of civilian government, following the withdrawal of the military, the leading political force was the People's Republican Party, under Ismet Inonu; while the following eight years saw the domination of parliamentary politics by the Justice Party under Suleiman Demirel. While the People's Republican Party was in opposition,

its prestigious leader died and its new leader, Bulent Ecevit, succeeded in regaining some of the popularity lost in the Fifties and Sixties. In the 1973 elections, the PRP obtained more than 30% of the popular vote and became the first party in Parliament. Its strength, however, was not sufficient to govern the country alone and Ecevit became Prime Minister only after entering into a coalition with Professor Erbakhan's obscurantist National Salvation Party. The coalition broke down in the fall 1974 and, after a prolonged period of parliamentary crisis, Suleiman Demirel formed the new government. New elections may take place before the end of 1975, or early in 1976 and many observers expect a substantial increase in the PRP's strength.

The past fifteen years in Turkey have been characterized by four fundamental trends: A resurgence of right wing extremism, accompanied, if not motivated to a large extent by a revival of conservative and reactionary religious forces; a steady drop, until 1973, of the Kemalist PRP's electoral strength; an active involvement of the armed forces in the country's politics, independently of the party in power; and, much more recently, a determined attempt on the part of the PRP's new leadership to reform its structure and introduce some notable social-democratic elements into its platform. On the whole, however, the Turkish electorate is still largely conservative and more than 60% of the popular vote in 1973 went to right wing or reactionary parties. At the same time, the swing of the PRP to the left is introducing polarizing elements which, given the animosity among leaders of the right, render the political balance particularly fragile and unstable.

The problems lying ahead for Turkey are those of modernization, which have become almost intractable given the reinforced

position of the most conservative forces in Turkish society. Economic growth is continuing at a high rate, but so is inflation and its social effects. The continued occupation of Cyprus and the state of preparedness of its armed forces add to the normal economic difficulties of a modernizing society a particularly heavy burden. At the same time, the continuing tension in Greek-Turkish relations seems to be one of the last ties keeping together the political fabric. On all other questions, the distance separating the PRP and the Justice Party is so great that if the external tension recedes, the country is likely to become even more ungovernable than it is today. In the meantime, the armed forces assume a legitimized role in maintaining a modicum of political consensus and those political groups on the left of the PRP are kept out of Turkish politics through repression, if for no other reason because they are the only ones to adopt an overtly critical view of Turkish action on Cyprus.

E. In Cyprus, since independence, politics have been particularly "stable". Given the present situation, such a statement may sound absurd, but in referring to stability we have in mind the politics within each of the two communities. The Turkish-Cypriot community at the time of independence was led politically by a group of conservative politicians - much closer ideologically to the Justice Party and, more recently, the National Salvation Party than to the PRP - who are still in power today. Raouf Denktash was already, before 1963-1964, the real leader of the Community and today this role has been officially recognized. On several occasions, dissident groups tried to challenge the authoritarian leadership exerted by R. Denktash, but to no avail. In the case of trade unionists, several have been imprisoned or

assassinated and others have had to flee abroad. (Trade unionists deserve a special mention because it is in the unions that Greeks and Turks continued to work together, long after inter-communal strife started.) Turkish-Cypriot newspapers are also subjected to very rigorous censorship and, on several occasions, journalists have been arrested and ill-treated. On the whole, the least one can say about the politics within the Turkish-Cypriot community is that they are not pluralistic.

The Greek-Cypriot community has also had a remarkably "stable" political life since 1961. In spite of repeated attempts - overt and covert, violent and non-violent, from outside or from within Cyprus - to do away with the undoubtedly charismatic leadership of President Makarios, he continues to be the one, unquestioned leader of the Greek Cypriots. Most of those who opposed him in the past and many of those who participated in the coup of July 15, 1974, have declared recently that they regret their past actions, encouraging their rare followers to stand behind the President. In this respect, it is amusing to observe how often foreign decision-makers, diplomats and covert agents have predicted in a self-fulfilling manner his downfall and his replacement by a more "reasonable" politician. In fact, Makarios has not only survived several attempts at his life, but has remained the unquestioned leader of the Greek Cypriots. The only significant change since independence has been the relative increase in the strength of the AKEL (Communist) Party, which obtained at the last legislative elections more than 30% of the votes.

F. Having touched briefly on the political situation in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, we should now discuss the present state of

affairs in the relations among the three countries involved in what is rapidly becoming a long-drawn out international conflict. Fifteen months after the coup perpetrated by the Greek dictatorship against President Makarios, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the collapse of the military régime in Athens, the tension between the various parties in this multifaceted conflict has in no way receded. On the contrary, the stalemate in the military conflict on Cyprus and the arms race which is being accelerated have brought the crisis closer to open warfare than ever since late August 1974. Various efforts have been made to "interpose" third parties and direct Greco-Turkish negotiations at the highest level as at more technical echelons have all failed to contribute in any way whatsoever to the search of a viable solution. Neither the "Kissinger touch", nor the pleas and polite advice of Mr. Rumor and the "Nine", nor Constantin Caramanlis and Suleiman Demirel in their "tête-à-tête" in Brussels nor Secretary General Waldheim and his Vienna talks nor all other attempts in the same direction have been able to affect the Turkish determination not to abandon any of the benefits of last summer's invasions, or the Greek-Cypriot determination not to accept the new de facto situation brought about by the sole use of force. As for the Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean Sea and air space, the situation is hardly more encouraging. Ten months after Greece proposed to bring the sea and sea-bed issue to the International Court of Justice, the agreement between Greece and Turkey defining the legal terms of the dispute not only has not been signed but it is not even being negotiated. As for the air space, although Greece made some very substantial concessions by accepting to enter into negotiations over a situation in which all rules of international law are on the Greek

side, no significant progress has been made either.

This state of affairs is causing "concern" in various capitals, but little is being done to bring about a change in Turkish policy and a beginning of withdrawal of the occupation forces from Cyprus. On the Greek-Cypriot side, both decision-makers and public opinion have to believe that there is not much to be lost by just waiting until Turkey reaches the stage when some concessions on its part would begin to reciprocate the important concessions made by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot sides. In the meantime, the progressive "Palestinization" of Cyprus is not sufficiently noticed by foreign observers and the determination of the Cypriot people and of its leadership not to accept the island's partition is grossly underestimated.

As for Greek-Turkish relations, the failure to reach any concrete results in the negotiations initiated last June contributes to their serious deterioration. To the extent that the initial moves in the talks gave the impression that Greece was likely to make some very substantial concessions - which the Greek Government is neither willing nor able to make - the Turkish reaction has been one of defiance and protest over what is qualified in Ankara as a refusal on the part of Athens to abide by "promises" perceived to have been made in May and June. Such a diplomatic-political atmosphere is particularly propitious to an escalation of the conflict, even to the point of armed clashes.

III. Southern Europe and its Environment.

A. The tense situation in the Eastern part of Southern Europe

should be viewed in the light of several other crises, or potential crises, in its immediate environment. It should also be considered in the context of changing perceptions of security, international cooperation and, more generally, of the foreign policy components of the national interests of South European states. From Portugal to Turkey, Southern European countries are searching for new roles in their external relations. The directions followed by the governments and political forces in these countries are diverse, but they all share one common characteristic: the reaffirmation of their national identity, vis-à-vis the superpowers and, at the same time, their determination to establish ever closer relations with Western Europe. We should stress, however, that this attraction for Western Europe does not carry with it any cold war overtones, nor is it perceived as hostile to Eastern Europe; on the contrary, it is viewed by decision-makers and public opinion as a way out of the cold war pattern of their relations with the United States. For political, economic, social and cultural reasons, Southern European peoples and governments seem convinced that their futures lie in a strengthening of their relations with the Communities. Italy is a member, Greece and post-Franco Spain are viewed as the next credible candidates for accession to the Communities; while Portugal and Turkey would follow suit soon afterwards. Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia, for the time being at least, seem to prefer a looser relationship, but also the strengthening of their association ties, through a clear recognition not only of economic motivations, but, above all, of their cultural affinities with Europe.

B. At the end of 1975, it is still difficult to state with some

certainty what Portugal's foreign policy is likely to be in the foreseeable future. The Armed Forces Movement, as well as the government and Parliament, seem to be divided into three groups: those whom we could qualify as "tiers-mondistes", those who share the Communist Party's views and 'those who would like to see Portugal establish as rapidly as possible close relations with the Communities. The composition of the government sworn in on September 19, 1975 - and what we know of AFM deliberations indicate that the last group seems to be the strongest; all three tendencies share, however, the determination to reaffirm the country's independence and dignity vis-à-vis the United States. As for the political forces likely to take over the reins of government in Spain in the immediate post-Franco period, they stand overwhelmingly on the side of Western Europe. Spain has not had a colonial history comparable to that of Portugal and the "tiers-mondistes" groups should not be expected to play a significant role. As for the Communist Party, it shares the Italian Communists' acceptance of the Communities, although it expresses reservations concerning their general orientation in the social field, which are also those of large sectors of the Socialist and Christian left. The clearly Western European positions adopted by a large majority of Spanish democratic forces, are viewed by those who are likely to govern the country in the near future as leading to a progressive disengagement from US influence and strategic presence, which have dominated Spain's international posture since the end of the war. Moreover, beyond these probable ideological and political differences between Portugal and post-Franco Spain, the socio-economic conditions in the two countries are important factors in their respective relations with the Communities. As for their policies

towards the Middle East, both Iberian countries stand on the side of the Arabs.

C. Malta and Yugoslavia are following a consistent policy of independence and non-alignment, which does not exclude - in either case - the expression of strong views on a great variety of international issues. Both countries are pressing for closer ties with the Communities, although in the case of Malta it is essentially asking for a higher level of financial assistance. Yugoslavia, on the contrary, is mostly interested in the elimination of obstacles to the conduct of its trade relations with the EEC countries. From a political point of view, Yugoslavia was the first Socialist country to "recognize" the Communities diplomatically and, on numerous issues, the foreign policy followed by Belgrade is very close to that of some Western European governments. The political rapprochement between Yugoslavia and some members of the Communities should, however, not be interpreted as an indication of a desire to go, one day, beyond the intensification of their economic relations and move in the direction of a Yugoslav participation in Western European political unification. As long as the present political structure of Yugoslavia remains unchanged, non-alignment and the refusal to participate in any sub-regional groupings will continue to be the credo of its foreign policy decision-makers. As for the Middle East conflict, both Malta and Yugoslavia are and have been consistently pro-Arab; although in the case of Yugoslavia, this posture has not led to an unconditional support of the most "extremist" Arab positions. Malta, on the other hand, has chosen to support the Libyan positions and to establish particularly close economic and political relations with Tripoli.

D. The foreign policies of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are largely a function of their conflictual situation. Since independence, the government of President Makarios has followed a non-aligned policy, with some clear pro-Western overtones. Given the relations between Cyprus and Greece, this was natural. In this respect, it is ironic that the coup and the assassination attempt against Makarios in 1974 - which to say the least, did not create any displeasure in Washington - took place at a time when the Cypriot government had accepted an extension of Western intelligence and strategic facilities on the island. As a result of the invasions and prolonged occupation of Cypriot territory, however, even the most conservative sectors of Greek-Cypriot public opinion have moved away from their past pro-United States orientation. Even those who believed, until recently, that Washington could "change its mind" and show greater understanding for the Cypriot situation, have lost their illusions. Western Europe, on the contrary, appears increasingly in the eyes of Greek-Cypriots as a pole of attraction - both economically and politically. The extent of this attraction will naturally depend on the evolution of the conflict and on the Western European responses to a crisis which is of direct concern to the "Nine".

Post-dictatorial Greece has undoubtedly entered a period of profound re-examination of the country's foreign policy options since the end of the second world war. The withdrawal from the NATO military structure, the renegotiation of bilateral defence agreements with the United States, the Greek initiatives in the direction of the Balkans - but not necessarily Eastern Europe - and, above all, the application for full membership in the Communities are creating a qualitatively new situation. More generally, the dictatorship left behind it deep feelings of

bitterness towards the United States and some other Western allies because of the support and "understanding" which was offered to the military régime. These feelings are widely shared in all sectors of public opinion and, in some respects, they are more apparent in the Centre and Right, where anti-communism and unqualified pro-Americanism always found their warmest supporters. As for the Communist left and its allies, their disillusionment was, on the whole, as great with the USSR. One of the two Communist Parties proclaims its ideological ties with the Communist Party of the USSR, but many of its supporters do not hesitate to adopt a more critical view of Soviet policy towards the military dictatorship. These reactions on the part of the Greek people must be taken very seriously into account when discussing Greek foreign policy. In the eyes of sophisticated observers, they may appear emotional and unfounded in Greece's geo-political and socio-economic conditions; but this is irrelevant. The present or any other Greek government, has to take these reactions into account. Its initiatives since last July reflect an understanding both of the mood of the Greek people and the transformation in Greece's external environment over the past ten years. The long-term Greek foreign policy design is based on membership in the Community institutions. At the same time a strengthening of relations with the Balkan countries is viewed as an objective in itself and as a means to bring Greece and Turkey together in a political, economic and institutional context which would offer some hope for better relations in the future.

Turkey's foreign policy orientation since 1947 was not very different from that of Greece; although following the elimination of the immediate post-war tension, relations with the USSR were

warmer than those of Greece. Not having gone through an experience comparable to that of the Greek civil war, Turkey always adopted a more "relaxed" posture vis-à-vis its Northern neighbour. As for its recent evolution, it may seem a paradox that Turkish foreign policy is following the same direction as that of Greece. The refusal of the US Congress to authorise arms deliveries to Turkey has had as a consequence the extension of Anti-Americanism into large-sectors of right-wing political forces as well of the military establishment. The pro-Western European positions of the PRP and of the Justice Party is another point in common with Greece. At present, the Turkish authorities view with considerable suspicion the Greek initiatives in the direction of Western Europe; notwithstanding the fact that it has been often stated, on the Greek side, that Turkey's full membership in the Communities is not and will not be opposed by Athens, to the extent that the Turkish economy is likely to be in a position to carry the burden of membership. Another recent development in Turkish foreign policy has been a rapprochement with some Arab countries and a support of Arab positions in the U.N. and in other international meetings. Finally, Turkish public opinion is also moving in the direction of greater independence towards the United States but its commitment to Western Europe is still limited to the leading circles of the PRP and, to a lesser extent, of the Justice Party and to the "modernized" strata of Turkish society.

E. We have tried to analyse - often superficially - the present situation in Southern Europe. We did not discuss at any length the situation in Italy, nor the new trends noticeable in Italian foreign policy. Others are much better qualified to do so.

Taking the sub-region as a whole, however, we note that the general trends in its politics are introducing some fundamental changes in the relations of Southern European countries with their environment. During the next decade, most of these countries should be expected to become members of the Communities, while the others will occupy positions of privileged partnership. The United States influence is diminishing and will continue to diminish considerably; but, for the time being, none of these countries seems to turn to the USSR in view of establishing new defence relationships. This means a weakening of NATO and the spreading of some limited and varied forms of non-alignment. The role of Yugoslavia will therefore grow and we should expect a redefinition of neutralism and non-alignment, not excluding close ties and even full membership in the Communities. Naturally, these are trends as we see them today, but any serious upheavals in the sub-region, or in US-USSR relations, may cut their development short and we may return to a cold war situation.

