

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

RESOCONTO SOMMARIO	$\frac{gEE}{2}$
ottobre 1967	

CONFERENCE ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM
IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

(Rome, 16-17 July, 1967)

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HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

(First session)

GORIELY (introductory remarks) - The German problem can be dealt with through a comparison with the Arab world with its plurality of states which are at various levels of development, often rivals or adversaries, and without possibilities of political union, but whose peoples, nevertheless, feel that they belong to an "arab nation".

The origin of the German national awareness is analogous to the Arab problem. In fact, the phenomenon appears not when a nation finds itself in a state of absolute dependence, but rather when it finds itself on the threshold of access to power. The beginning of German national awareness came with the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars as a reaction to French politic-cultural predominance. From this stemmed the development of the new romantic-nationalist conception of the "Deutschtum"; a conception that much more essential in a country which even today has conserved a much deeper sense of particularism than many others.

The theme of German unity has been proclaimed both by the extreme right and by the extreme left. And this spirit is today systematically cultivated in East Germany itself. Even in the thirties, the claims expressed by the Communist Party against the "slavery" imposed by the Treaty of Versailles reveal quasi-nationalist accents. This type of language can still be found today within the GDR: the program of the "Nationalfront" imitates the programs of the old "Burschenschaften", recalling the idea of German greatness and unity and, as in the 1930's, urging the struggle against the capitalist world in its name.

NOBECOURT - I agree that the nationalist mentality of the GDR has been systematically developed since 1950. As for the establishment of two German states, this took place on both sides and was almost contemporaneous; as the West inaugurated certain measures, these were imitated in the East.

MEHNERT - In reference to the nationalism of the German left which has been revived today in East Germany, it must be remembered that this does not represent the will and the sentiments of the population, but rather the necessity felt by the Communist leaders to find some cohesive force for a population which regards a man like Ulbricht as a direct stooge from Moscow.

LOEWENTHAL - Throughout German history two tendencies have always been present: one towards the West, the other towards the East. But after the defeat in the First World War, the problem of German national unity took on the aspect of a defeated and dominated nation. The Soviets cleverly exploited this state of mind by linking it to the above-mentioned anti-Western sentiment; thus the nationalist attitude of the German Communist Party in the first postwar period was more imposed by Moscow than spontaneous.

With the division of Germany in the second postwar period, the two tendencies have become polarized; in the East the philo-

oriental tradition is conserved; while the Federal Republic manifests a total philo-occidentalism. However, in the last two years considerable changes have occurred on both sides so that one group regards itself as eastern Europeans and the other regards itself as western Europeans.

SNEJDAREK - The comparison with the Arab world is not valid; at the most there are certain analogies which can be discovered.

A distinguished factor is that the Germans were widely dispersed throughout central and even eastern Europe. Numerous and powerful German minorities were to be found within the territory of other nations, and in their minds the German idea retained a profoundly nationalistic significance with a tendency towards the annexation of vast territories which were inhabited by Germans only to a small extent. This fact profoundly influenced the formation of German nationalism; since that time there has been a constant conflict between German nationalism and the new nationalism of the Slav states, as well as with Hungarian and Rumanian nationalism. The suspicion with which the Eastern countries regard the Germans has its roots here.

In regard to Goriely's comments on the nationalism of the German communists, I do not believe that such citations prove very much. In reality the anti-Versailles nationalism which existed after 1919 was general, and that which varied was merely its level of intensity.

RADOVANOVIC - The German problem, after the foundation of the united German empire, appeared to the European peoples, especially to the closest neighbours, such as France, Yugoslavia, and the east European countries, as a problem of security. Nevertheless, after the First World War, Hitler was able to destroy the security system created at Versailles without provoking other than verbal reactions on the part of the allies.

The Locarno system was unsuccessful because, among other things, it was limited to only a few countries and did not include all of Germany's immediate neighbours. The same observation is valid for today's coalitions; facts have taught that regional alliances cannot be effective since a balance of power and a coordination of interests can only be assured by a general system of collective security.

The problem of the postwar period was a product of interallied disagreement despite an earlier agreement on the principles of a German policy at Yalta and Potsdam. The first German government, born precisely in a period of such conflict, gave its full support to the western position, convinced that by so doing it was acting in the German interest. As far as material and economic reconstruction was concerned, perhaps this policy was a correct one; but in terms of national unity it was mistaken.

SPINELLI - It is necessary to note that the movement towards the formation of a German national consciousness is strictly tied to the European context and to the European system with, therefore, the possibility of conflicts between the needs of one and of the other.

The First World War gave rise to the problem of the relationship between Germany and Europe. It was resolved by the creation of a weak Germany without the establishment of a European order; it was like summoning nationalism from an abyss. The major defect of the Versailles Treaty was precisely that of not having any idea whatsoever of how to organize Europe. In the second postwar period, on the other hand, there arose two systems of European organization, one western and one eastern.

Today the two European systems in which the two Germanies are included, are both in a period of crisis, whose final outcome cannot be known. If, in the end, they disintegrate, the problem of the reconstruction of a new German state will arise.

SCHULZ - The German question came into existence with the birth of the new national European states in central Europe. For as long as the European nations continue to exist as individual states it will not be possible, in the long run, to keep Germany divided in two. If, on the other hand, a European solution, a new European order, can be found, then this will be possible.

SEGRE - Why is it that German national sentiment has had such a complicated history with such different and yet converging expression by the extreme right and the extreme left? The desire for German unity must be studied in itself, with reference to the two systems of the two Germanies. Thus, in East Germany, and in West Germany there exists an analogous exploitation of the necessities of national unity, and of nationalistic feeling, with very precise characteristics.

GRIFFITH - Germany is not two countries, but three. Austria, too, exists; and the fact that some kind of national consciousness is being formed in Austria makes one think that the same thing could happen in the GDR.

The German problem cannot be discussed in European terms; the division of Germany was in fact determined by the will of the two great extra-European powers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

MOSCA - Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia there has been a historical tendency in Europe to keep Germany divided which has been determined by security considerations. Europe, until 1870, had always thought that the most satisfactory solution for all concerned lay in the conservation of a multi-state Germany.

The repercussion of the German victory over France after Sedan were enormous, and there was a general conviction that Europe no longer contained the bases for lasting peaceful coexistence. The First World War was the reaction against the consequences of German unity.

I do not agree with Spinelli when he states that the objective of the peace of Versailles was to diminish the power of Germany without, at the same time, establishing a European organization. Rather, the Treaty of Versailles demonstrates that the victorious powers had a very clear idea of a European order within

which a diminished Germany would fit.

As for Griffith's affirmation that the division of Germany is due to extra-European powers, this is not valid for the past. Today, it is true, the problem cannot be solved without the intervention of extra-European powers; but up until Versailles, Europe bears the responsibility for what took place.

BROWN - The new sense of Western European identity which exists in the Federal Republic today assumes, particularly in certain groups (students, for example) unhealthy forms; connected to this is a sense of frustration and resentment towards the United States.

LOEWENTHAL - It cannot be claimed that European history after the Thirty Years War reveals the tendency of Europe to keep Germany divided. In those eras, in fact, no one thought in terms of Germany and of Europe. On the other hand, I am quite in agreement with Mosca's views regarding the post-1871 period.

The essential weakness of Versailles was not that of constructing a system without a European structure, but of constructing a system conceived and put into effect against Germany, against Russia and without the United States. The consequence of all this is that it is not possible to return to a Europe composed of sovereign states with a greater Germany. There is, however, an alternative to the present division of Europe, and it is that of a security system within which Germany would have other prospects than those she would have as a sovereign state with a totally independent policy.

One thing is in any event certain; it makes no sense to ask at the same time for German reunification and for the revision of the eastern frontiers.

ABENDROTH - The solution of the German problem in the second post-war period was directed at the reorganization of the German nation in such a way as to eradicate its imperialistic tendencies. In reality, however, the United States and Russia were not able to reach agreement on the means of implementing such a solution.

With the rise of two German states, a new tradition of national identification came into existence on both sides. For that matter, a crisis of national identification still exists not only in East Germany but in West Germany as well.

SNEJDAREK - Since the 18th century Russia has played an active part in the European system. After 1945 a new element was the American presence in Europe and the further development of the Russian-American dialogue. Germany was divided into two parts, but not as a result of German desire. In Austria a national awareness has been in the process of formation since as early as the 1922-1925 period. Thus it is not impossible to imagine that a similar phenomenon might take place in the two German states as well.

MEHNERT - Regarding the attitude of the Germans towards the Eastern peoples, it is necessary to note that if the refugees are excluded this attitude is conciliatory, understanding, and not at all nationalistic.

MOSCA - With regard to Austria it is to be remembered that the growth of national consciousness in this country is at least in part due to the fact that two Germanies exist.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM FROM THE EASTERN POINT OF VIEW

(Second session)

CALZINI (Introductory remarks) - Once the prospect of German reunification was abandoned in 1955, the Soviet Union under Krushchev committed itself to a complex politico-diplomatic action designed to consolidate and formalize the position of the GDR vis-à-vis the West. In its initial phase this policy, undertaken under generally advantageous conditions, was characterized by considerable dynamism; an attempt was made to force the West to concede recognition of the GDR by means of intimidatory policies, such as applying pressure on West Berlin etc. During this phase the dependence of the GDR on the Soviet Union was almost total; the eastern European countries completely supported the USSR on the German problem, and this was one of the fundamental factors of cohesion in the eastern bloc; a cohesion aided by the rigid position of the Federal Republic.

After 1962 the situation began to change thus introducing the second phase of the Krushchev period (1962-1964) which was characterized by the attenuation of this policy by Moscow. Regarding the German problem there was, on the one hand, the reduction of pressures on the West designed to obtain concessions and guarantees, and on the other the economic and social consolidation of the GDR which was favored by the "defensive measures" adopted in Berlin in 1961. With the fall of Krushchev in 1964 and the installation of the new Soviet administration, new factors within the eastern camp began to ripen. These factors, the further strengthening of national centrifugal tendencies, caution and difficulties in policies towards the Soviet Union, growing relations with the West, are all factors which have a bearing on the German problem.

When in 1966-1967 Bonn developed a more openminded attitude towards the eastern bloc with its proposal for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, the solidarity of the communist countries revealed weakness. The German problem was becoming transformed from an element of cohesion among communist regimes into a cause for division. On the one hand the southern countries were in favor of Bonn's initiatives; on the other, the northern countries - with the GDR, self assured of its economic and social prestige - were opposed. In the middle was the Soviet Union, forced to operate as a mediator. The conference of Karlo Vivary succeeded in temporarily re-establishing a common front, but the outlook for the future is uncertain. The incapacity of Moscow and its allies to formulate effective proposals for a solution to the problem can be seen in the vagueness of the plans advanced for a European system of collective security. The Soviets, in effect, seem to have decided upon the defense of the status quo and on a two-Germanies thesis at least until a readjustment on the basis of a pluralism of the eastern alliance emerges and allows them to attempt more daring policies vis-à-vis the West.

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LOEWENTHAL - The German problem should be examined in both a European and a world context. It is in this framework that the policy undertaken after 1957 for the recognition of East Germany and for the rupturing of relations between West Germany and the West, and in particular the United States, should be considered. However, had this policy been successful, the result would not have been the stabilization of the status quo but rather Soviet preponderance in Europe.

In 1965 the Soviets, unsuccessful in their attempts, repropounded the project of a system of European collective security. The Soviet idea is that the new treaty should take the place of the present alliances by guaranteeing the entire status quo, including the German division and the East German regime. The Soviets then went on to guarantee themselves with a series of bilateral pacts designed to permit them to intervene in order to maintain a Soviet type communist regime in East Germany even the present alliances were to be replaced. Thus, the goal at which the Soviet Union is aiming is the same one sought by Krushchev; the reaffirmation of Soviet preponderance in Europe through the disintegration of the western alliance.

SCHULZ - There are new elements present in German policy:

- 1) Some recognition of the existence of the GDR;
- 2) the acceptance of the existing frontiers;
- 3) the rejection of any form of nuclear armament.

However, as of yet there has been no positive reaction by Moscow to these three new points. The Russian leaders prefer to await a moment in which the Bonn government will be in a weaker position, but this is a mistaken attitude toward Bonn's policy since its result will be to strengthen conservative domestic forces.

SNEJDAREK - In 1945 the policy established at Potsdam, which tended towards the maintenance of the status quo, came to an end and gave way to a new policy which was directed at the reconstruction of an eastern German state, which, in fact, began to stabilize itself effectively after 1961.

At present the socialist states are seeking to establish firm ties with West Germany, and 1966 seemed the most propitious moment for such a policy. However, all further developments have been influenced by:

- 1) The fact that Moscow maintains the necessity of a joint German policy among the socialist states;
- 2) the growing influence of the GDR.

Karlo Vivary marked the culminating point of the consultations on this question within the social camp. The importance of the German question has diminished and a further development of autonomous positions on the question of the normalization of relations with West Germany can be observed. It is in the interest of the eastern countries to seek a system of cooperation which could then serve as a basis for a system of European security.

GORIELY - There are two meanings to the concept of status quo which must be distinguished: the territorial status quo and the status quo in domestic relations. If it is granted that in reality neither the East nor the West have ever had a real interest in the reunification of Germany, the problem of the status quo must be considered, in the negotiations which will take place on the problem of Germany, on the basis of distinction referred to above: the division of Germany is a question of fact, and no one can question the status quo from the territorial angle. What must, instead, be sought, and what should be the object of the negotiations, is a change in the nature of the East German regime.

As for Poland, it should be remembered that since 1956 the only means of influencing latent anti-Russian sentiment and of justifying the adherence to the Warsaw Pact has been that of stirring up the German danger. Despite the differences of regime, agreement with the GDR has been found on this basis.

GRIFFITH - I would like to strongly emphasize the economic importance of Germany's relations with East Europe. This is an issue which has been insufficiently studied and to which I feel should be devoted greater attention.

RADOVANOVIC - There are two documents which would seem to be essential to the study of the eastern position with regard to the German question: the Soviet peace project of 1959, and the declaration of Bucharest of last June. Whereas the western thesis is based on the restoration of Germany to her pre-Hitlerian position, the eastern program is based on the changes which took place at the end of the Second World War. It is not a question of returning to the principles established and the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam. At this point provisional solutions must be replaced by a definitive solution which will do away with the resistance of all those who persist in ignoring the real changes which have taken place.

ABENDROTH - Between 1952 and 1954 the Soviet Union tended to favor the reconstruction of a reunified Germany, but subsequently modified its point of view. Today the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at obtaining the recognition of both states, after which a solution to the German problem can be found within the realm of a European security system. The legal acceptance of the situation which developed after Potsdam is posed as the essential condition for the further modification of this situation through cooperation, on an equal footing, of the two German states.

It is only, however, if the West German government fully accepts the existence of another German state that it will be possible to move towards a new arrangement based on European security. Once the GDR were fully recognized, it too would begin to develop its own autonomous tendencies and eliminate the remains of Stalinism.

DAL BOSCO - The economic changes which took place in East Germany in the period from 1961 to 1965 were very important. Whereas originally the reparations constituted a real exploitation of East Germany, later a period of great economic development took place largely as a result of the planning system which is one of the best organized in East Europe.

MEHNERT - The prospect of a "Europe des Patries" with two Germanies is not acceptable to the Germans because it is clear that they aspire to a unified, national state. The real path towards a solution of the problem is a European solution in which the national states will be done away with and the question of national unity will, therefore, no longer exist. Such a system will have to maintain the best of relations both with the USSR and with the United States; nor is it irrelevant to the problem of future relations with China.

BROWN - In the future, the trend in southeast Europe will be towards a conflict between German and Soviet influence with many implicit dangers. Given such a situation of a potentially explosive confrontation, the American presence might have a certain utility.

SOGLIAN - The system of bilateral agreements between East Germany and its allies should not be seen as a guarantee of intervention in East Germany, should that necessity arise. The first of these agreements, that between the GDR and the USSR in 1964 was the greatest Soviet concession towards a separate peace. The other pacts have instead come about only a few months ago as a consequence of the new policy followed by West Germany.

LOEWENTHAL - The bilateral agreements: it is true that the original motivation for these, in 1964, was different. But now they have acquired a new significance, and give testimony to the Soviet tendency to replace alliances with the present bilateral system.

The division of Germany: regarding the thesis that the Soviets did not want the division of Germany and made proposals to this effect, I am of the opinion that the Soviets sought to prevent the adhesion of Germany to NATO but that they did not make serious proposals of reunification.

The problem of the status quo: it is obvious that the Soviet Union cannot accept the liquidation of the German Democratic Republic if threats regarding the modification of the territorial status quo exist. What should be emphasized is that irregardless of the economic development and the increased stability of East Germany, this state cannot live without a Soviet intervention from outside. It is thus the modification of the nature of this regime which must be aimed at.

SIGNORINI - It is to be questioned to what extent Bonn's policy toward the East is really different and to what extent the Hallstein Doctrine has been abandoned. The presupposition for negotiations on the German problem is the full recognition of the existence of two German states.

The Conference of Karlo Vivary asked West Germany to clarify whether Bonn considers the right of the exclusive representation of all Germans and the revision of the postwar frontiers as fundamental points.

The solution of the German problem is possible within a European context by means of the proposed treaty of collective security.

SPINELLI - Question directed to Snejdarek: Do prospects for the development of integration restricted to the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland exist?

SNEJDAREK - Czechoslovakia is interested in ties among these three countries but not at the level of the integration which has been experimented within the West.

The Europe which we want, need not be either anti-American or anti-Russian; it need not imply the exclusion of the Soviet Union nor can it be established without the approval of the United States.

The GDR ought to cooperate in the construction of the new Europe. No one in my country favours an anti-German Europe; but it is necessary that the two Germanies take stock of present realities and that the Hallstein Doctrine be done away with.

ABENDROTH - In the long run it will be impossible to deny the German nation the possibility of reunification in a Europe from which the danger of German domination has disappeared. It is precisely a question of finding a system of cooperation and security which will eliminate that risk. Today the problem is that of establishing an identity between the German interest and the European interest in such a security system. The necessary premise to such a development is the recognition of the fact that the two German states belong to two different systems.

THE WEST AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

(Third session)

SPINELLI (Introductory remarks) - The German problem is not the only problem facing Europe, but it is certainly one of the most important and the most central. It would, however, be uncalled for to evaluate Western policy merely on the basis of what it has not accomplished vis-à-vis the German problem.

The problem is a complex one, and in order to evaluate the part it plays in the western political outlook it is necessary to keep three aspects in mind: 1) how a German democratic community can be created; 2) what kind of coexistence and cooperation can be practiced with a divided and nationally incomplete Germany; 3) how should the problem of this division be affronted?

Regarding the second point, the worries which relate to the difficulty of dealing with a sovereign national German state have led to the formulation of two forms of pluri-national community, the Atlantic and the European, both of which would limit German independence and sovereignty. This method of dealing with the German problem should be regarded as largely positive; it is a method which tends to downgrade the importance of the national problem and of reunification.

The other alternative which is often proposed is that of reunification of a neutralized Germany. However, the plans for the neutralization of Germany are based on two alternative presuppositions: either that the United States and the USSR exercise an absolute influence over Germany, and that they are agreed upon keeping Germany unarmed, which is completely unrealistic; or there will be a "Europe des Patries", that is, a completely unorganized Europe, in which Germany will be neutralized from the start, only that this neutrality will not last as the two Great Powers will not hesitate to woo this new big power and seek to attract it within their respective orbits.

In reality, in both the East and the West the reunification policy has merely been a policy to which lip-service has been paid, while the real policy has been that of the establishment of two German states. The policy followed by the two blocs was jeopardized by the détente which introduced an element of crisis into the Atlantic and European systems by creating a situation which permitted centrifugal forces to come to the surface in France and the United States.

If the outlook is one of a progressive downgrading of the Atlantic and European system, if we are headed towards a "Europe of the States", then the idea of "one people, one state" will re-emerge once again in Germany as well. To speak of a European security system based on a "Europe of the States" in which the largest and the most dangerous of these states is nationally frustrated seems unrealistic.

The answer then, is to create a new system of integration for Western Europe and the United States founded on greater European participation and nuclear co-responsibility. This new inte-

grated system should make it a point to systematically develop collaboration and détente with the eastern world. And in this respect two alternatives present themselves. Either the eastern countries succeed in their turn to create a greater cohesion and integration within their own system, in which case the outlook for the German problem will be not reunification but rather a greater liberalization of East German policy and her progressive integration in the eastern system. Or, on the other hand, East Europe will be unable to develop such a system and instead, the present tendencies towards polycentrism will continue. In this case it is inevitable that the German problem will crop up again and that East Germany will be without a future.

LOEWENTHAL - The Soviet policy towards Europe, which is directed at the goal of becoming a Mediterranean power, continues to be a central aspect of Soviet foreign policy. Even the Vietnam conflict, from the Soviet point of view, serves to draw American forces out of Europe. And it is for this reason that the Soviet Union takes such a strong interest in the German problem as a means of consolidating her position in Europe and tomorrow towards China.

The United States favours a continuing détente between the blocs but is (contrary to the USSR) opposed to their dissolution because of their value as a security guarantee. This policy, however, given the attitude of France and the distrust of American policy in the Federal Republic, is not realistic. And in this framework the American tendency to remove troops from Europe only renders more difficult, from the German point of view, any negotiations on reunification.

The Soviet Union tends to favour the continuation of a competitive détente and the rejection of the more important demands of her adversaries without arriving at negotiations so as to obtain a predominant position in Europe without having had to pass through the negotiation stage.

It is necessary to react to this policy and to arrive at the conference table with a common policy for the United States and the other western countries which reflects careful study of what price is to be paid for these negotiations and what can realistically be offered in exchange for a modification of the status quo. The first step towards this policy should come from Germany itself which, after all, has the greatest interest in such negotiations. German policy, of course, should be coordinated with the general western policy on negotiations.

GRIFFITH - In recent years the gap between the United States and Europe in the fields of military technological development and the development of technology for peaceful uses has increased. And the new Russian-American arms race which is directed towards even more greatly sophisticated nuclear arms on an even higher technological level will have the effect that within ten years the French and English deterrents will no longer have any significance.

Since a joint European effort in the technological field is a difficult undertaking, the gap between Europe and the United States, and with its American influence in Europe, will increase even further. This will create serious political problems for the Americans and will strengthen the deep sense of frustration among Europeans.

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As for the American commitment in Europe, if the United States is able to maintain the credibility of the possibility of their nuclear intervention in Europe, the reduction of American troops in Europe signifies, in substance, a return to the strategy of massive retaliation.

MEHNERT - In regard to the relations between Germany and the United States, it should be remembered that the American image in Europe has been deteriorating as a result of the war in Vietnam etc. Especially since De Gaulle's arrival on the scene American leadership has been increasingly questioned.

It has been said that the German problem is a function of American-Soviet relations and that the USSR now wants a settlement with the USA. It should not however be forgotten that the essential objective of the Soviets remains the furthering of the communist cause in the world. In their turn the United States of course want a settlement with the Soviet Union but cannot abandon its European allies.

SCHULZ - The changes which Bonn has in recent years put into effect in her Eastern policy are important. In addition it should not be forgotten that the Bonn government is at present in a rather strong position, and thus it is unrealistic to think of changing it.

SNEJDAREK - There are three possible courses of action:

- 1) the first is that the only solution to the international problems which concern us consists in the arms race and international tension;
- 2) the second possibility is that of competitive détente, for which however a set of rules and regulations must be found;
- 3) and finally there is the idea, of which I am in favour, of a real détente based on the dissolution of the blocs and on a new organization of Europe.

In order to put this alternative into effect it is necessary to establish a security system which can ensure 1) cooperation among the states of Europe; 2) the recognition and guarantee of present frontiers; and 3) cooperation between the USSR and the USA.

The primary advantage of such a system will be the increased economic, technological, and cultural cooperation among the European countries (which are ripe for such cooperation), keeping in mind that economic necessities are fundamental realities and have very distinct political effects.

LOEWENTHAL - The debate on a European security system is, in reality, related to the expiry of the Atlantic Pact; the East's proposal is to replace the Pact with a European security system rather than renewing it.

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An objection to this is that the Federal Republic would have to renounce the Hallstein Doctrine prior to the negotiations on European security; but in that case the Federal Republic would have to give in preliminarily on the very subject of the negotiations themselves, that is, a change in the status of the GDR. This would weaken her position and make it even more difficult to obtain the proposed goal of changing the East German regime.

GORIELY - Russia is no longer capable, as has been suggested, of threatening to acquire a position of hegemony in Europe. The progress of the United States in the post-Suez period through an extraordinary explosion of power and technology has considerably altered the balance of power. What this means is that the problem of America is much more troubling for Europe than that of the Soviet Union. The real problem is that a monstrously unbalanced division of power has been created in the world. A redistribution of this power is needed, but this cannot in any case be obtained either through the formula presented by Snejdarek nor that proposed by Loewenthal.

A security pact must without doubt be drawn up, but it must be signed by truly comparable entities one of which should be a politically united western Europe. In this way Europe will possess both body and soul and will thus be capable of having a better partnership with America. The same thing must take place in the East; all those countries must strengthen their ties with one another.

ABENDROTH - A solution of the German problem is impossible without a solution of the European problem. The European problem is a problem of coexistence between socialist and capitalist states; in the same way, the German problem is a problem of the coexistence of a capitalist state and a reactionary socialist state which is characterized by the remains of Stalinist political and cultural forms (even if also characterized by modern economic forms).

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