Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective?

Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi

Abstract

Demand for operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has grown steadily since 2003, while the trends towards globalising its operational range and broadening its tasks have continued. However, ESDP performance is at best mixed. This partly hinges on policy inconsistencies, but the lack of experience should not be underestimated either. Even if the ESDP seems for many observers a well-established field of activity of the European Union, it must not be overlooked that it is still a young and on many aspects quite unpractised endeavour of the EU.

Keywords: European Union / European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) / ESDP Missions
Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective?

by Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi

1. ESDP 2009 – State of Play

Even if the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) seems for many observers a well-established field of activity of the European Union, it must not be overlooked that it is still a young and on many aspects quite unpractised endeavour of the EU. Only in 2003 – after a four-year period of institution building, strategic considerations and civil/military capability development – ESDP became officially operational, and started in Bosnia and Herzegovina its first field mission.

Today, only six years later, the EU has already completed 11 ESDP missions:
- five in Africa (Artemis, EUFOR and EUPOL Kinshasa in DRC, EUFOR in Tchad/RCA, EU Support to AMIS/AMISOM)
- four in the Western Balkans (Concordia, EUPOL Proxima, EUPAT in FYROM and EUPAT Kosovo)
- one in Caucasus (EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia) and
- one in Asia (AMM in Aceh/Indonesia).

The ongoing missions in the framework of ESDP are diversified to the following regions:
- three in the Western Balkans (EUPM and ALTHEA in BiH, EULEX Kosovo)
- one border mission in Moldova/Ukraine
- three in the Middle East (EUPOL COPPS in Palestine, EUJUST LEX in Iraq, EUBAM Rafah)
- one in Central Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan)
- one in Caucasus (EUMM Georgia)
- four in Africa (EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo in DRC, EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau, ATALANTA/EU NAVFOR off the Somali coast).

The first period after the establishment of ESDP through the European Council in Cologne (June 1999) was characterised by basic institution building, the creation of fundamental structures as well as the definition and implementation of civilian and military capability headline goals. Already at the European Council Summit in Laeken in December 2001 did the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States declare that the EU was “capable of conducting some crisis-management operations”.¹ This assessment was adjusted and expanded in May 2003 in relation to the planning and the carrying out of the first ESDP missions and operations: the General Affairs and

---

**External Relations Council (GAERC)** thus stated that “the current military assessment of EU military capabilities is that the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls”.\(^2\) This was coupled by the results of the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference organised in November 2004, where Member States’ indicative commitments in the areas of police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection far exceeded the concrete targets set by the Feira European Council in 2000.\(^3\)

Simultaneously, however, since the launch of its operative phase in 2003, a number of different ESDP deployments have been initiated, among which many have already been successfully completed. As of June 2009, the EU has deployed all in all 24 missions, of which 13 are still active.\(^4\)

Despite the EU’s relatively young history in the field of defence and security policy, one can already today spur a particular demand directed explicitly towards the EU for more of its civilian and military security commitment. This has led the Union to become mature within a very short time, and it can today be considered as an established crisis management actor. The most obvious reasons for the attractiveness of the operational ESDP are the comparatively high political credibility and neutrality of European institutions and representatives as well as the financial and economic power which is associated with the EU. At the same time, another important factor in this regard might be identified in the European Union’s identity as a comprehensive civilian-military actor, which gives it a considerably strong structural capability to cope with the crisis management tasks of the 21\(^{st}\) century – which are drifting further and further away from the tasks and missions related to conflicts in the classical understanding. However, a pressing need for improvement unquestionably exists with respect to both qualitative and quantitative capabilities as well as civilian and military interaction.

This discussion paper attempts, based on the trends that can be deduced from the first six years of practical experience, to closer study the operative aspects of ESDP civilian and military missions, which will be addressed in three chapters: in the first part on the evolution of ESDP missions and operations, the running as well as completed EU field activities will be described through the lens of the first patterns of European crisis management. Then follows a detailed analysis of apparent operational trends in ESDP, which will highlight both the structural strengths as well as the deficits of European engagement. The third part considers goals and realities of ESDP as it is today in the face of further developments that are already beginning to make themselves known.

### 2. Civilian and Military ESDP Missions – An Overview

With its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU entered a new operative phase of its international crisis management after four years of development of ESDP. The start of this phase was given by the until now active EU

\(^2\) See General Affairs and External Relations Committee (GAERC): Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, Brussels, 19/20 May 2003, p. 1.


Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), which since January 2003 has contributed to support the training of local police forces and since its January 2006’s restructuring has also been given a stronger mandate on police reform, police accountability and support in the fight against organized crime. Despite critics to its effectiveness, EUPM’s mandate has been prolonged until December 31\textsuperscript{st} 2009, while its future will very much depend on the political decisions on the EU’s presence in BiH. Only three months after the official launch of the operative phase of ESDP, the EU’s first military operation – Operation CONCORDIA – was deployed in March 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: the mission took over of the NATO-led operation Essential Harvest and was aimed at helping and supporting the already initiated stabilization process. In the same year, the EU implemented an immediate peace-enforcing military intervention in the Eastern Congolese crisis-ridden province of Ituri, demonstratively sending out the message that – as a new security actor still in the making – it was capable in principle of accommodating the goals it had set for itself and anchored in the Treaty on the European Union (the so-called Petersberg Tasks) and of taking action in the highest military level. Moreover, it also proved its willingness to intervene outside of its most direct geographical as well as geopolitical sphere of influence in the future.

Nevertheless, due to its geographical proximity and latently omnipresent crisis potential, the Western Balkans area still remained, particularly in the operative ESDP latency period, at the centre of the European focus of action. Indeed, the events of war which had taken place there had made the development of an operative European defence component politically possible in the first place, the EU Member States unquestionably carrying a part of the responsibility for the events which unfolded in the region in the face of their much too obvious incapacity to act militarily.\textsuperscript{5} Next to its civilian police mission PROXIMA, whose goals, like those of the previous European military engagement in FYROM, were to support local police forces in the development of European standards, the EU also launched the operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which it took over the SFOR mission’s stabilisation tasks which until then had been carried out by NATO. In this operation, with its up to 7,000 soldiers and recourse to NATO-capabilities (Berlin Plus-Operation), the EU has provided since December 2004 an active contribution to the further stabilisation of the Western Balkans and it represents (for the moment) the peak of its military engagement. The EU Council is currently considering the possible evolution of Operation ALTHEA towards non-executive capacity building and training mandate.\textsuperscript{6} However, this decision would require a careful consideration of the challenging political environment in BiH and is linked to the ongoing process of revision of the EU Special Representative’s powers.

Apart from the Western Balkans, it was only in the DRC that the EU came to act militarily through its first ever peace-enforcing mission, Operation ARTEMIS, carried out on demand from the United Nations. In the framework of this mission, approximately 2,200 primarily French troops laid down a “cordon sanitaire” around the province capital Bunia between June and September 2003 in order to protect the


civilian population from attacks by rebel groups.\textsuperscript{7} On a further occasion, within the framework of the operation \textbf{EUFOR RD Congo}, the EU renewed sent more than 2,000 soldiers to the DRC. Their tasks were to assure that the Congolese parliamentary and presidential elections would take place in a secure and orderly way, as well as to scare away at the hand of an offensively outdrawn presence concept (“show of force”) potential rebels in the region around Kinshasa.\textsuperscript{8} This mission also represented a test case for EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, as the EU mission acted as a stand-by force deployed to temporarily reinforce a UN mission (MONUC). Parallel to the military missions, the EU in early 2005 sent a unit of 30 police officers to the Congolese capital Kinshasa in the framework of the \textbf{EUPOL Kinshasa} mission, where they were to help local authorities establishing an \textit{Integrated Police Unit}.\textsuperscript{9} Moreover, an ESDP Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission by the name of \textbf{EUSEC RD Congo} has been running since June 8\textsuperscript{th} 2005: its goals are to provide counselling and support to high-rank Congolese leaders on SSR-matters and to contribute to the build-up of a functional and efficient demobilization authority for local soldiers. In another occasion, the EU has decided to intervene in support of the African Union Mission to Sudan/Darfur (\textbf{EU Support to AMIS}) not through its own ESDP mission or operation in Sudan, but rather providing a “civilian-military support action”, the latter consisting in the deployment of civilian police and military staff officers whose task was to help training the forces of the African Union (AU), provide logistic help as well as assure the coordination of the aerial transport support supplied by EU Member States.

Much smaller, yet also characterised by important security risks and political sensitivities is the EU’s new engagement in the Middle East. Next to its EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (\textbf{EUPOL COPPS}) in place since January 1\textsuperscript{st} 2006, the EU launched already in November 2005 an EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (\textbf{EUBAM Rafah}), the latter assuring the small border transfer onto the Egyptian Sinai half-island.\textsuperscript{10} However, with Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian election in January 2006 and the deterioration of the security situation in Gaza, the Rafah crossing point has only irregularly been opened – last time on June 2007.\textsuperscript{11} Since then, the mission has maintained its operational capability: it remains in stand-by and its mandate has been extended until November 24\textsuperscript{th} 2009. Moreover, in 2005 an EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (\textbf{EUJUST LEX}) was initiated, in the framework of which until today roundabout 2446 Iraqi senior criminal justice officials are trained, the courses taking place on EU territory. EUJUST LEX is the only integrated (police, prosecution and justice) Good Governance mission for Iraq. The Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU decided on March 26\textsuperscript{th} 2009 that the EUJUST LEX mission would be extended until June 30\textsuperscript{th} 2010, including a pilot phase for activities in Iraq.


\textsuperscript{10} See also Nicoletta Pirozzi, \textit{The new EU engagement for the maintenance of security in the Middle East: Border Assistance and Police Reform in the Palestinian territories}, in European Security Review, n. 28, February 2006, \url{http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_29.pdf}.

Already in September 2005 the EU deployed its first Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR) mission to the Indonesian troubled province of Aceh, where after the Tsunami-disaster (December 26th 2004) a political resolution of the 30-year conflict between the independence-seeking Rebel Movement GAM and the government in Jakarta had taken place. The task of the approximately 250 forces of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), who, though unarmed, primarily came from the military sector, was to supervise the disarmament of the GAM and to ensure the arms destruction process took place in an orderly way. Thereby the AMM not only provides a good example of the diffusion of borders between the civilian and the military domains which can be observed in all pressing security-political problem fields, but also testifies of the EU’s high credibility. Indeed, the operative engagement of other security actors (primarily the United Nations) was impossible due the strong reservations of the former conflict parties, and only the EU was accepted as a neutral companion of the resolution process.12

The Mission EUPOL Afghanistan clearly contrasts with the recently described developments in Aceh. Launched on June 17th 2007, it takes place in an overtly hostile environment. Thus, the launch of the civilian police mission, in the framework of which former local Afghan security forces are to be supervised, observed, counselled and trained by an EU police troop consisting of some 230 police, law enforcement and justice experts,13 was overshadowed by the most serious terror attack since the fall of the Taliban in 2001/02. 35 Afghan police recruits died in the assault which must be seen as the clearest signal against operative engagement in the history of ESDP. The EUPOL Afghanistan mission, which is under German command, has first been scheduled to run over a period of three years and represents the Europeanisation of tasks which were formerly carried out nationally through the work of the German Police Project Office. The mission will be soon extended to other two provinces in Eastern Afghanistan, with an additional personnel to be arrived by next June.

The operational spectrum of the EU also includes the Rule of Law mission EUJUST THEMIS. Initiated during summer 2004, its goal was to support the Georgian justice institutions to achieve standards of international and European law, particular importance being accorded to the reform of the prosecuting justice through the counselling provided by judges, lawyers and law experts who spent a year in Georgia within the framework of the mission. In 2008, the eruption of Georgian-Russian conflict over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia challenged the EU’s ability to use both its foreign policy instruments and ESDP operational capabilities. While the French President Sarkozy, acting on behalf of the EU, managed to broker a ceasefire between the conflicting parties, an ESDP civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) has been tasked with a one-year mandate starting from September 15th 2008 to supervise the implementation of the agreement, which also includes the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions prior to the outbreak of the hostilities. However, since the beginning of the mission, Russia has impeded EU personnel to access the areas affected by the conflict, thus obstructing the implementation of EUMM’s mandate and dramatically limiting its impact on the stabilisation of the situation in the field.

13 The experts are not only deployed at central level (Kabul), but also at the regional (the 5 regional police commands) and provincial levels (through Provincial Reconstruction Teams – PRTs).
In 2008, the EU has also expanded its presence to the East, through the EULEX mission in Kosovo, and to the South, with a series of interventions in the African continent.

On February 16th 2008, one day before the Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia, the EU decided to launch its largest civilian crisis management mission (EULEX Kosovo) with the aim of assisting Kosovo authorities in consolidating the rule of law area, and in contributing to a safe and secure environment for all inhabitants, regardless of their ethnic origins. However, the deployment of the mission, which was designed to take over the UN mission (UNMIK) and was prepared by a two-year EU planning team mission (EUPT Kosovo), had to face several obstacles concerning firstly the definition of its mandate and lately its actual deployment. Serbian opposition to deal with the EU mission and to permit EULEX to operate in the Serb enclaves in Kosovo has only recently been overcome and the mission has reached its full operational capability on April 6th 2009. Nevertheless, the takeover of capacities from UNMIK cannot be completed, as the UN mission maintains its presence in the field and exercises its authority on the autonomous police force established in Serb-majority areas. Moreover, the EU has committed with Serbian authorities to maintain its mission neutral on the question of Kosovo’s independent status, thus contributing to forming a negative image of EULEX among the entire population. In order to allow the implementation of its mandate, the EU mission is now called to engage in a series of outreach actions to gain the trust of both the civil society and the Kosovar government.

In an attempt to contain the effects of the neighbouring crisis in Darfur, in January 2008 the EU launched the military operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the eastern Tchad and the north-east of the Central African Republic, with the aim of protecting civilians and particularly refugees and displaced persons fleeing from Sudan, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting UN staff. EUFOR’s effectiveness was undermined since its inception by the perception of the main French component as a non-neutral actor in Tchad and, more recently, by the deteriorating relationship between Tchad and Sudan, which prevented the deployment of EU personnel on the border between the two countries. On March 15th 2009, the UN mission MINURCAT took over the operation, with 2,000 troops from European countries that served under EUFOR acting now under UN command. EUFOR has acted as a bridging force mandated to allow the UN to assemble a follow-on operations and the hand over has proved quite effective in terms of cooperation between the two organisations. However, the outbreak of violence at the beginning of May in Tchad is a symptom of the still fragile situation in the field and an important element for EU’s lessons learned.

In Guinea Bissau, the EU deployed 19 civilian and military experts in Security Sector Reform mission (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), whose ambitious mandate is “to provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy”. The task of implementing Guinea Bissau’s NSS is particularly challenging, as it foresees the modernisation of the entire spectrum of the security sector – from the armed forces to the police units and the judiciary – in an extremely volatile security context, characterised by failing infrastructures, weak civil society, drug-trafficking and illegal immigration and further destabilised by the recent turnover in the leadership of the

---

country. The small EU presence in the field, recently extended for six months until the end of November 2009, can only have a limited impact on it, even if it is designed to fit in with the activities of the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability and the European Development Fund.

The operational spectrum of the EU has been completed in December 2008 by the launch of the first ESDP military maritime mission, Operation ATALANTA/EU NAVFOR off the Somali coast. Among its tasks, ATALANTA is protecting WFP vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia and other vessels sailing the Gulf of Aden, including ships aiming at sustaining the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), from acts of piracy and armed robbery. The EU has proved to be able to mobilise quickly its maritime capabilities in order to address the resurgence of the piracy phenomenon and has acquired high visibility at the international level. It has also established smooth cooperation mechanisms with other operations in the area, including the US Combined Task Force 151 and the NATO Operation Allied Protector, and with third States – one example is the agreement with Kenya for the transfer of piracy suspects detained by Operation ATALANTA. However, the real impact of the EU’s action still remains to be tested ashore, where more effective interventions are needed to build institutional capacities and restore stability in the Somali territory.

ESDP-Operations 2003-2009
3. Operational Developments in ESDP – The First Six Years

Based on the analysis of ESDP missions between 2003 and 2009, one can deduce a number of operative developments that will be presented as follows. These developments, partially guided and partially enforced, already today tell us much about the EU's new actoriness in the area of international crisis management. Moreover, they allow for the first extrapolations of the future of ESDP's operability.

3.1 Globalization of the operational area – but still no clear strategy

In the light of its increasing experience and self-confidence in the area of operative action, the EU has expanded its action field in security policy by including global deployment: its initial geographical focus on the European continent has been extended to comprise also global missions. If the Balkans still represent the most important region for ESDP both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Middle East and particularly Africa are becoming increasingly important key regions for future ESDP operations. The operative readiness of the EU to intervene in traditional and new scenarios has allowed it to achieve worldwide recognition as a security actor. Nevertheless, the identification of a clear EU strategy for ESDP interventions has been hampered by the divergences in terms of interests and priorities of its Member States and has suffered for the lack of a long-term vision on EU foreign policy directions. Too often competing national agendas have obstructed a coherent EU action, with the most manifest case being the EU policy towards African crises.

3.2 Expansion of the operational spectrum

The EU has also broadened the security-related range of its tasks, the latter becoming more and more diverse, particularly in the civilian sector. On one side, the scope of traditional EU tasks, such as policing, has considerably evolved, ranging from monitoring, consulting, education and training to advising authorities on methods and structures for police reform. On the other side, ESDP missions have taken up an increasing number of new tasks in the areas of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) – which encompasses military, police and judicial aspects – and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The recent EU employment of military maritime forces to tackle the re-emerged piracy phenomenon has opened a new scenario in the ESDP operational development. Emerging threats in the ESDP theatres of action also require the EU to equip itself with additional operational means, which are not yet at its disposal: these include intelligence and expertise to tackle organised crime and civilian administration resources to help in the reconstruction of failed states.

3.3 Focus on the lower Petersberg Tasks

The operations which have taken place until now represent only a limited part of the goals that the EU has defined for ESDP. This is mirrored not only in the civilian/military missions’ ratio, but also in the low-escalation spectrum of the hitherto carried out military operations. Furthermore, all operations up to date have had a manageable quantitative size, whereby the largest one (EUFOR ALTHEA) was carried out with simultaneous recourse to NATO capabilities. For the time being, doubts remain concerning the EU’s ability to act autonomously in high-intensity conflicts. Its hitherto only autonomous peace-enforcement operation (Operation ARTEMIS) has been

---

carried out to a large extent under the direction of the French Defence Ministry and cannot be considered as a fully-fledged ESDP deployment. The lack of will on the part of EU Member States to test their battlegroups forces to conduct high-intensity missions in hostile environments has further reinforced this tendency to ground EU’s operative engagement in the lower Petersberg spectrum.

3.4 Increasing civilian-military border dissolution – but no real integration

The assignment of assumed tasks to respectively military or civilian actors within the ESDP framework has been in no way unambiguous so far. Indeed, another considerable trend in ESDP is that the operational activities seem to coincide less and less with the classical understanding of civilian and military missions. Illustrations are the civilian DDR mission in Aceh, carried out primarily by the military, or the activities in Sudan and Somalia, which were explicitly categorised as civilian-military support actions. Lately, the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau can be considered, at least in the declared objectives, as the first example of a civilian-military ESDP operation in the field. If this trend were to endure, the pressure to better coordinate actions within the EU would increase. The proposed merging of DG E VIII and DG E IX in the Council General Secretariat (dealing with military and civilian missions respectively) could help in achieving greater coherence in the planning and management of operations, but its actual implementation remains unclear. Moreover, the different funding mechanisms for civilian and military actions still impedes the conduct of genuinely integrated ESDP missions.

3.5 Growing intertwining of the first and second pillars

Parallel to the ongoing diffusion between the civilian and the military sectors, a certain degree of intra-institutional interlocking between the European Commission and the Council has been established. Examples of this are the establishment of the Civil-Military cell within the EU Military Staff, to which experts of the European Commission are also associated, and the recent appointment of Koen Vervaeke as both EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the AU and Head of the EC Delegation (HoD) in Addis Ababa, thereby combining the representation of both the Council and the Commission. This tendency has also led to a partial inter-institutional operational meshing. Thus, since June 16th 2006, a team of Commission staff specialised in police-related issues has been successfully integrated in FYROM in the Staff of the EU Special Representative, after the conclusion of the ESDP military (CONCORDIA) and police (PROXIMA) missions. The EUPOL RD Congo mandate being expanded beyond the police sector, the Commission, through its efforts to reform the Congolese judicial system, will from now on contribute directly to the accomplishment of this ESDP operation. More recently, the Joint Action that authorises the deployment of EU SRR Guinea Bissau explicitly outlines that the mission is complementary to the EDF and other Community activity managed by the European Commission.

3.6 Increasing importance of the EU Special Representatives

Also within the second pillar a growing intertwining of tasks and actors is an observable trend. For instance, due to the financial means at their disposal as well as their competence, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), who are deployed worldwide as part of the CFSP, play an increasingly active role in operations. Decisive in this regard is not only their unique coordinating function, but also the establishment of units assigned with security-related tasks within the EUSR’s office. The border control mission in Moldavia (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine), scheduled to last until December
2009, is an illustration of the increasing complexity of the institutional affiliation of operational measures. Indeed, the mission is certainly being carried out within the framework of a Commission Project (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States – TACIS). Nevertheless, it has also being significantly accompanied by a consolidated EUSR team. The personnel of the Border Team of the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova, which is preponderantly constituted of seconded experts from EU Member States, thus establish a direct connection to the CFSP and can only by extension be considered as part of ESDP. In recognition of their important function in helping the EU instruments acting in theatre to attain the desired political objectives, a number of actors has advanced the proposal to establish a new EUSR for Somalia. Ongoing discussion on the future presence of the EU in BiH are centred on the revised role to be assigned to the EUSR, which currently also heads the Office of High Representative (OHR), thus enabling him with the Bonn powers.

3.7 Multinational character and high degree of participation by non EU states

ESDP operations are mainly characterised by the fact that a relatively small contingent is supplied by a relatively large number of participating States. The multinational personnel structure of the military headquarters helps increase the political legitimacy of the operation and offers (particularly in the strategic military field) all Member States, also those who have not supplied troops, a very attractive possibility to participate in the planning and execution of operations. Nevertheless, the considerably fewer troop providers gain not only a much more direct co-determination power, but also a more attractive forum for self-portrayal (“Show the Flag Policy”). This tendency does not necessarily conflict with the operational efficiency of the civilian or military missions, as far as the process of providing and appointing personnel does not become too political. Such an evolution would not be in the interest of any of the Member States. On the same page as this last evolution is the high degree of participation of non EU Member States in ESDP operations, both civilian and military. Among the states that contribute regularly, not only NATO partners such as Turkey, Norway and Canada are particularly prepared to engage in operations. Depending on the concerned geographical region, a number of regional and neighbouring states also participate in operations. This should help increase the acceptance of the operation with the local population. This tendency is generally welcomed by EU Member States, since it has the further advantage of contributing to the political legitimacy of the operation as well as to an increased share of the burden of providing personnel and capabilities.

3.8 Unsatisfactory exit-strategies

The length of operations tends to depend on the type of mission being carried out. For instance, due to the natural diversity of tasks involved, civilian missions in exposed crisis areas present the highest “Mission Creep”- risks. Faced with such challenges, noticeable improvements can be expected only within a mid- or long-term timeframe. Since the personnel recruitment and rotation systems have been designed for mostly short-term engagements, the efficient accomplishment of missions, notably in the case of investigation-intense police missions, quickly reaches its limits. When planning and carrying out military missions, the majority of EU Member States, as opposed to what is the case with civilian missions, tend to insist in the compliance with a clear operational timeframe. Hence, as the debate preceding EUFOR RD Congo shows, a precise pullout date may even be fixed politically. This bears the risk of becoming problematic with regard to military planning requirements as the operations in question come to an end. This tendency to identify an end time instead of an end status for missions exit strategies has significantly hampered the EU’s impact in crisis theatres.
3.9 Increase of the financial requirements for ESDP operations

Parallel to the qualitative and quantitative broadening of ESDP’s operational action possibilities, one has inevitably seen a soaring increase of the necessary financial needs to cover the operational costs. This tendency has in no regard reached its climax. Particularly the civilian missions, which are growing in number, size and mandate, are an increasing challenge in this regard. At the latest with the start of the European planning to take over the UN Mission in Kosovo, which by far constitutes the largest and most complex civilian ESDP mission, it became clear that the existing financial framework would in no way be sufficient to support the new requirements and tasks. For the time being, civilian missions are directly financed through the collective CFSP budget, while military missions abide to the principle ‘costs lie where they fall’, with only a small proportion (common expenditures) funded through the Athena mechanism. In the light of the different sources of funds, a reform of the existing cost distribution mechanism for operations is a pressing issue, particularly for the deployment of larger civilian and military contingents.

3.10 Pick-and-choose support to UN action

The last few years have also seen an increasing cooperation between the EU and other security organisations in the field of crisis management. Africa has been an important test case. The EU has been able to implement the two models envisaged in the 2003 EU-UN Joint Declaration: the “Bridging Model”, which reflects an operation akin to Operation Artemis, whereby the EU rapidly intervenes for a short period – with a clearly defined endpoint - in order to allow the UN time to mount a new operation or reorganise an existing one and the “Stand-by Model”, where the EU force acts as a temporary reinforcement for a UN mission in place, such as in the EUFOR RD Congo case. However, it is worth recalling that, in October 2008, the EU refused to respond a request coming from the UN and civil society organisations, which urged the deployment of an EU force to help the UN in facing a humanitarian crisis in the Congolese province of Kivu. EU Member States, particularly UK, Germany and France, denied the recourse to the EU battlegroups to intervene in DRC, determining a strong reaction by the UN Secretary-General and raising doubts on the EU’s willingness to engaging more effectively in Africa.

4. ESDP’s Honeymoon is over – A worried Outlook

The analysis exposed above leads to growing scepticism as to whether the EU really has the political unity and the willingness to provide the necessary capabilities to foster ESDP’s development with the same speed, enthusiasm and efficiency as in the aftermath of its establishment in 1999.

On the one hand, many important trends still show how the EU, within only a few years, through the integration of civilian, military as well as civilian-military elements, has managed to expand its field of action in foreign and security policy, thereby allowing it to gain more credibility and political weight as a security actor with global reach. As measured by the pure diversity and geographical spread, an undoubtedly positive overall assessment can be made of the operative ESDP actions having taken place until now. No other security actor has the potential to provide security as comprehensive as the EU can due to the wide range of civil and military instruments at its disposal.
On the other hand, however, the trends and developments which have been outlined in this paper clearly point out that there are important problems which must be dealt with if the EU and its Member States still want to reach their strategic objectives and not get a bad name by pursuing a “show the flag”-policy. The EU will not reach decisive influencing power neither in the Western Balkans nor in the Middle East and Africa as long as the limitedness of the operations which have been described in this paper will not be overcome. The Union will only be publicly perceived as successful in crisis regions if its presence and actions are in line with the expectations of the actually influential powers. Too many activities are in danger of appearing superficial and some EU Member States are still more interested in the “image” of a mission instead of the concrete outcome in terms of security. The SSR-Mission in Guinea-Bissau is only one example of this. Until today it remains largely unclear what 19 EU experts can change in a country in which all relevant government institutions have been taken over by corrupt and criminal elite. With some faults, there are similar reasonable doubts when it comes to a perspective outlook of the impact of EULEX Kosovo, where organized crime also has a predominant political and social role. Especially Kosovo could become an acid test, because the EU mission, which aims especially to fight organized crime, is not only the largest but also the most ambitious civilian ESDP mission so far. It is fair to say that the risk of mission failure in the long run can be assumed substantial, yet the consequences of such a failure would be immeasurable.

Qualitative aspects of the civilian and military capabilities developed in the framework of ESDP also need further improvement in order to enhance the ability of the EU to deploy at short notice well-trained personnel and adequate assets responding to appropriate interoperability and sustainability standards. Only by meeting these improved qualitative requirements will the EU be able to cover the full spectrum of tasks it is called to perform in crisis responses – i.e. in connection with increasingly complex interventions such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), institution building; to be able to implement actions that cover the entire crisis management cycle – not only rapid reaction but also follow-on phases, including long-term engagement and exit strategies; to effectively interact with other international, regional and local actors in the field – not only “traditional” partners such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE, but also other emerging security actors such as the AU and civil society organisations. The fact that the EU is able to act only in “tailored” crises for which the limited instruments and capabilities at its disposal are adequate and sufficient, shows that the ambitions and realities of the EU as a globally active security provider still do not go hand in hand.

In general it can be considered that the EU and its Member States have focussed too much on the aspects of rapid response over the last years, thereby neglecting those aspects that are linked with the sustainability of its engagement. Despite this focus on rapid response, even the flagship of ESDP’s rapid response capability – the EU battlegroups (EUBG) – has become an object of internal criticism and its future is (comparable with that of the NATO Response Force - NRF) increasingly uncertain. The fact that the EUBG, installed in 2005, have been never used, has led to increasing scepticism concerning this asset. One could argue that the upcoming “use it or lose it”-discussion does not take into account the once intended “fire brigade character” of the battlegroups. However, especially in the view of the British government, there is no convincing reason to have such a well equipped force always on standby when other operations are suffering a significant lack of equipment and personnel.
With regard to the institutional structure of ESDP it seems clear that the EU still must markedly strengthen its internal coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making – even without the Lisbon Treaty. On the political level this includes the structural implementation of comprehensive developed ‘strategic options’ which integrate civilian as well as military perspectives and approaches on all missions, where the complexity of the situation require the expertise of both sides of crisis management. On the level of the planning and leadership ability of the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty holds out promise for the restructuring of the institutional architecture behind ESDP and enhanced cooperation across all the EU assets. Nevertheless the EU Council Secretariat is already rationalizing DG VIII (military) and DG IX (civilian) into one new directorate called the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and thereby providing “the first indications of moves within the EU Council towards integrating its military and civilian functions and capabilities.”16 The potential role of the Civ-Mil Cell remains still unclear. Even with the achievement of the full operational capacity of the Operation Centre within the Civ-Mil Cell in Brussels, the build-up of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the creation of the CMPD, the EU has still no comprehensive civilian-military structure for planning and conduct of operations17. Until today, the support for the further development of existing institutions into a permanent EU headquarter capable of leading military operations as well as civilian missions from Brussels is particularly lacking on the British side, because such a headquarter would (not only from the British point of view) lead to a direct duplication of NATO capabilities.

Another important development is the growing lack of political leadership in ESDP and the dramatically loss of visions for the future of ESDP. After the very limited progress in the field of security during the (initially quite ambitious) German EU Presidency and the growing scepticism about the final adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it may seem that many European governments have lost faith in the EU and especially in ESDP. Additionally, with President Sarkozy’s announcement of France’s full reintegration into NATO’s military structures in 2007 as well as the assumption of office by Barack Obama in the USA, it is fair to ask if the focus of security policy and crisis management should not be redirected to NATO and the realisation of a new common transatlantic security agenda. This would include a reanimation of the debate whether NATO should be stronger engaged in civilian security tasks as once intended with the ‘Berlin-plus in reverse’-attempt. One first signal in this direction could be the establishment of a NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at the Alliance’s 60th Anniversary Summit meeting in Strasbourg-Kehl. This new NATO mission will further support the development of capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces and include also an expanded role in developing professional Afghan National Police. It remains to be seen if the NATO mission will really support and complement EU’s police engagement on the ground or if it will rather outstrip EUPOL Afghanistan.

17 The first option is the use of the five national OHQs which are answerable to the EU. These OHQs are the French Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) in Paris, the British Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, das Italian Commando Operativo di Vertice Interforze (COI) in Rome; the German Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (EinsFüKdo) in Potsdam as well as the Greek Operations Headquarters in Larissa. The second option is the use of the NATO-Headquarters SHAPE via “Berlin Plus”.

© Istituto Affari Internazionali
Indeed, together with the quantitative and qualitative limitedness of the operations, the contradiction will remain between the increasingly self-assured articulated ambitions of a rising world power on the one hand, and the scarce allocated resources on the other. An overall look on the existing operative actions raises questions as to the sustainability of the operations and their strategic impact in terms of long term stability in a given crisis region. Furthermore, the threat assessment laid out amongst others in the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) of 2003 – and reiterated in its implementation report of 2008 - makes it apparent that the nature of the risks at hand does not allow for any clear-cut geographical priorities to be set. These risks are “borderless”, in terms of their impact beyond their immediate area of origin as well as in terms of the multitude and diversity of potential crisis areas. Since the EU disposes neither of the necessary means nor of the sufficient political will, there is a strong need for political leadership.

In summary it can be said, therefore, that without a strong pressure group of like-minded EU-member states who really want to advance the idea of a powerful and autonomous European Security and Defence Policy with efficient EU-institutions and a wide range of effective instruments at its disposal, the EU runs the risk of losing its spirit as an important and distinguished security actor in this field.

*Updated 30 November 2009*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Operational area</th>
<th>Joint Action</th>
<th>Personnel (Max.)</th>
<th>Aim and type of Operation</th>
<th>OpCdr; Force Cdr; HoM; CivOpCdr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPM in BiH</strong></td>
<td>01. 01. 2003 - 31. 12. 2009</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>JA 2002/210/CFSP of 11.03.2002</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Civilian mission designed to support the police reform process and will continue to develop and consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime.</td>
<td>HoM: Kevin Carthy (Ireland) (01.03.04-31.12.05); Vincenzo Coppola (Italy) (from 01.01.06-31.10.08); HoM: Stefan Feller (Germany) (from: 01.11.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concordia</strong></td>
<td>31. 03. 2003 - 15. 12. 2003</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>JA 2003/92/CFSP OF 27.01.2003</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>Military operation designed to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.</td>
<td>OpCdr: Rainer Feist (Germany) Force Cdr: Pierre Maral (France) (31.03.03-30.09.03); Luis Nelson Ferreira dos Santos (Portugal) (01.10.03-)15.12.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artemis</strong>&lt;br&gt;12.06.2003 - 01.09.2003&lt;br&gt;RD Congo&lt;br&gt;JA 2003/423/CFSP of 05.06.03&lt;br&gt;CD 2003/423/CFSP of 12.06.03&lt;br&gt;1,800&lt;br&gt;Military mission designed to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.&lt;br&gt;OpCdr: Bruno Neveux (France)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUJUST Themis</strong>&lt;br&gt;16.07.2004 - 14.07.2005&lt;br&gt;Georgia&lt;br&gt;JA 2004/523/CFSP of 28.06.04&lt;br&gt;Ja 2004/638/CFSP of 13.09.04&lt;br&gt;10&lt;br&gt;Civilian mission designed to support the Georgian authorities in addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system, assisting the Georgian government in developing a co-ordinated overall approach to the reform process.&lt;br&gt;HoM: Sylvie Pantz (France)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Operation ALTHEA**<br>2.12.2004 -<br>Bosnia and Herzegovina<br>JA 2004/570/CFSP of 12.07.04<br>CD 2004/803/CFSP of 25.11.04<br>2,200<br>Military mission designed to help BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process.<br>OpCdr: John McColl (UK) (from 11.08)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>HoM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL Kinshasa</strong></td>
<td>30. 04. 2005 - 30. 06. 2007</td>
<td>RD Congo</td>
<td>Civilian mission designed to monitor, mentor and advise on the setting-up and the initial running of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and according to international best practices in this field.</td>
<td>Adilio Ruivo Custodio (Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUSEC RD Congo</strong></td>
<td>02. 05. 2005 - 30. 06. 2009</td>
<td>RD Congo</td>
<td>Civilian mission designed to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army, while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.</td>
<td>Pierre Joana (France) (from 05.06-02.08) Michel Sido (France) (from: 03.08 -06.08) Jean Paul Michel (France) (from: 07.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EJUST LEX</strong></td>
<td>01. 07. 2005 - 30. 06. 2009</td>
<td>Iraq (Training in EU)</td>
<td>Civilian mission designed to provide training for high and mid level officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary, in order to contribute to the restructuring of the criminal justice system according to European standards, in particular human rights standards.</td>
<td>Stephen White (UK) (from 07.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Start Date/End Date</td>
<td>Action Code</td>
<td>Of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS / AMISOM EU Supporting Action</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>18.07.2005 – 01.01.08</td>
<td>JA 2005/557/ESDP of 18.07.2005 JA 2007/245/CFSP of 23.04.07 JA 2007/887/CFSP of 20.12.07</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>15.12.2005 - 14.06.2007</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>JA 2005/826/CFSP of 24.11.2005</td>
<td>JA 2005/64/CFSP of 24.11.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>01.01.2006 - 31.12.2010</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>JA 2005/797/CFSP of 14.11.2005</td>
<td>JA 2005/797/CFSP of 14.11.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPT</td>
<td>10.04.2006-31.03.2008</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>JA 2005/304/CFSP of 10.04.2006</td>
<td>JA 2005/304/CFSP of 10.04.06 (10.04.06-31.12.06) JA 2006/918/CFSP of 11.12.06 (01.01.07-31.05.07) JA 2007/334/CFSP of 14.05.07 (01.06.07-01.09.07) JA 2007/520/CFSP of 20.07.07 (01.01.07-30.11.07) JA 2007/778/CFSP of 29.11.07 (01.12.07-31.03.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>15.06.2007 - 20.06.2010</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>JA 2007/369/CFSP of 30.05.2007</td>
<td>JA 2007/369/CFSP of 30.05.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo</td>
<td>01.07.2007-30.06.2010</td>
<td>RD Congo</td>
<td>JA 2007/405 CFSP of 12.06.2007</td>
<td>JA 2007/405 CFSP of 12.06.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
<td>28.01.2008-15.03.2009</td>
<td>Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>JA 2007/677/CFSP of 15.10.2007</td>
<td>JA 2007/677/CFSP of 15.10.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EULEX Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>JA Number</th>
<th>CFSP of</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>HoM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.02.2008-14.06.2010</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>JA 2008/124/CFSP of 04.02.08</td>
<td>JA 2009/445/CFSP of 09.06.09</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>Civilian mission assisting the Kosovo authorities in consolidating the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas, and in contributing to a safe and secure environment for all inhabitants, regardless of their ethnic origins.</td>
<td>Yves de Kermabon (France) (from: 02.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EUMM Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>JA Number</th>
<th>CFSP of</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>HoM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.10.2008-15.09.2009</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>JA 2008/736/CFSP of 15.09.2008</td>
<td>JA 2008/736/CFSP of 15.09.2008</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Civilian monitoring mission established to contribute to stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region, to oversee the deployment of the police and armed forces, to observe compliance of all parties with human rights and humanitarian law and to help build confidence between the parties of the August conflict.</td>
<td>Hansjörg HABER (Germany) (from: 09.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>JA Number</th>
<th>CFSP of</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>ForceCdr:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia;  
- the protection of vulnerable vessels sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. | Antonios Papaioannou (Greece) (from: 11.08-04.09)  
Juan Garat Caramé (Spain) (from 04.09)  
OpCdr: Phillip Jones |

The Institute

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economics and international security. A non-profit organisation, the IAI aims to further and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks.

More specifically, the main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations. The IAI puts out an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), a series of research papers (IAI Quaderni) and an Italian foreign policy yearbook (La politica estera dell'Italia).