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BUILDING**

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Since the conclusion of the Korean War, over fifty years ago, Western armies have prevailed in nearly every conventional battle in which they have engaged, generally very rapidly, and usually with minimum casualties. As a result, fewer and fewer potential adversaries have dared engage Western armies in a stand up fight. No one other than Saddam Hussein has been foolish enough to do so twice.

By contrast, Western armies have been notably less successful in dealing with the rest of the spectrum of military operations, from peacekeeping through counterinsurgency. During the Cold War, the United States compensated for this deficiency by supporting indigenous allies and engaging in proxy wars with its Soviet adversary. Vietnam was America's only large scale exposure to counterinsurgency and the experience did not encourage a repetition. During those same decades, European powers lost what was left of their colonial empires, although the British won a few counterinsurgency campaigns along the way, notably in Malaya and Kenya.

Since the end of the Cold War, the frequency with which Western forces have found themselves engaged in operational missions beyond their borders has grown rapidly. From 1945 to 1989 the United States intervened militarily in half a dozen countries, to include Korea, Lebanon (twice), the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Panama and Grenada. Two of these were extended, hot wars, the rest were of relatively brief incursions. By contrast, between 1991 and 2004 American troops intervened, in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti (twice), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq for a total of eight invasions in thirteen years. So the frequency of American led interventions rose from once every six or seven years to more than once every other year.

For the international community as a whole, the frequency of military intervention has risen higher still. NATO mounted no interventions during the Cold War and has initiated three since its conclusion. The European Community had no military capacity whatsoever. Its successor, the European Union, has launched five military missions in the past six years, in Macedonia, Bosnia, twice in the Congo, and most recently in Chad. But it is the UN where the greatest increase has been registered. During the Cold War the United Nations launched a new peacekeeping mission on an average of once every four years. Since 1989 the average frequency of new UN military interventions has risen to once every six months.

The Rise of Nation Building

The duration and scope of these interventions have also been rising. During the Cold War most American interventions were very brief, and most UN missions were very limited in function, generally confined to observing ceasefires and patrolling lines of demarcation. The intent of Cold War peacekeeping was usually not to solve underlying disputes, but to

prevent them from escalating into open conflict. Because neither superpower was inclined to permit local disputes to be settled to its disadvantage, many such conflicts dragged on indefinitely, while others were permanently frozen. Thus Berlin remained divided, as did Germany, Europe, Cyprus, Palestine, Korea and China, and either American or UN troops were used to preserve all these divisions, in other words to prevent the underlying disputes from being settled.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union changed this dynamic. After 1989 it became possible to secure broad international backing and attract widespread participation in efforts to end long simmering civil wars. As a result, international interventions began to pursue more far reaching objectives, seeking not just to separate contending factions but to disarm combatants, reintegrate the fighters into civilian society, organize political parties, promote civil society, restore the economy, hold elections, and remain in place long enough to ensure that the resultant governments could take hold. Nation building thus replaced inter-positional peacekeeping as the dominant form of international intervention.¹

In the early 90s these operations usually lasted only two or three years, their objective being to hold one election and get out. Experience demonstrated that more time was often needed to build an enduring peace. By the end of the decade the average duration had expanded to around five to seven years. Currently many such missions are lasting eight to ten. As the average mission's duration has extended, the cumulative nature of these commitments has become more evident. The United States, which was launching a new intervention every couple of years through the 90s, eventually found by 2003 having to man five at once, with troops deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti. The UN, in dispatching a new peacekeeping operation every six months, eventually found itself having to run nearly two dozen, a total it approached in the early 90's and is nearing again today.²

The Results

In popular Western imagination, the Cold War was tense, but relatively peaceful, while the post-Cold War world is much more violent and disorderly. The opposite is in fact the case. During the Cold War the superpowers fed proxy wars in places like Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola that killed hundreds of thousands of people every year. Since the end of the Cold War the number of conflicts and the number of casualties

¹ Nation building can be defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government. The United Nations terms this activity peace building. Many scholars prefer the phrase "state building" as more descriptive of the process. The current American Administration calls these "stabilization and reconstruction" missions, or stability operations. Any of these other phrases may serve equally well; those who prefer can substitute one or the other without injury to this papers argument.

²For statistics on the number and duration of US and UN led military operations see *The UN's Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Dobbins et al, RAND, 2005.

resulting from those conflicts have been reduced dramatically. The number of refugees and displaced persons is similarly way down, as are the number of genocides.³

While the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur dominate the popular view of nation building, the cumulative effect of all these multinational interventions has been, on balance, positive. Tens of millions of people are living at peace today, and for the most part under freely elected governments in places like Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, East Timor, and Liberia because UN, NATO, U.S. or European troops helped bring a halt to the fighting, disarm the combatants, institute political and economic reforms, and then remained until these changes were consolidated.

Peace operations of this sort impose a considerable burden on the international community. Those costs pale, however, when compared with the costs of ongoing conflict. Societies in the midst of civil war almost invariably experience negative economic growth, impacting not only their own welfare, but that of all their neighbors and the international system as a whole. Once security is established, positive economic growth almost always resumes, even if there is little external aid. If aid is also provided, it will promote more growth, dollar for dollar, than the same amount in a more settled society.⁴

The Nation Builders

There are presently three main international providers of nation-building capacity, the UN, NATO and the EU.⁵ The UN has the widest experience; NATO has the most powerful forces; and the EU has the most developed array of civil competencies.

The United Nations has the most widely accepted legitimacy and the greatest formal authority. Its actions, by definition, enjoy international sanction. Alone among organizations, it can require financial contributions even from those governments opposed to the intervention in question. The United Nations has the most straightforward decision making apparatus, and the most unified command-and-control arrangements. The UN Security Council is smaller than its NATO or EU equivalents, and takes all its decisions by

³For a discussion of trends in conflict and resultant casualties see *Human Security Report 2005, and 2006*, Human Security Center, The University of British Columbia.

⁴ For cost benefit analysis of peacekeeping, see *The Bottom Billion*, Collier, Oxford University Press, 2007 and "The Challenges of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, Collier and Hoeffler, Center for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University Challenge Paper, 2004.

⁵ The African Union and several regional African groupings have also mounted peacekeeping missions, so far with only limited success. African countries lack the capacity to fund and sustain such missions and therefore must rely heavily upon Western donors for support. As a result, from the standpoint of Western governments, African Union peacekeeping can be more expensive than a comparably sized UN force, while also less experienced and well run. It is true that African peacekeepers may sometimes be more acceptable to local governments, but usually for the wrong reasons, that is they will be less insistent on fulfilling and enforcing their mandate.

qualified majority; only five of its members having the capacity to block decisions unilaterally.

Once the Security Council determines the purpose of a mission and decides to launch it, further operational decisions are left largely to the Secretary-General and his staff, at least until the next Security Council review, generally six months hence. In UN operations, the civilian and military chains of command are unified and integrated, with unequivocal civilian primacy and a clear line of authority from the UN Secretary-General through the local civilian representative to the local force commander.

The UN is also a comparatively efficient force provider. In its specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities needed for nation-building. All UN-led operations are planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN headquarters in New York. Most UN troops come from developing countries whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of those of any Western army. In 2007, the United Nation deployed over 80,000 soldiers and police officers in some 20 countries, considerably more than NATO and the EU combined.

NATO, by contrast, is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers and of using them to force entry where necessary. But NATO has no capacity to implement civilian operations; it depends on the United Nations, the European Union and other institutions and nations to perform all the nonmilitary functions essential to the success of any nation-building operation. NATO decisions are by consensus; consequently, all members have a veto. Whereas the UN Security Council normally makes one decision with respect to any particular operation every six months and leaves the Secretary-General relatively unconstrained to carry out that mandate during the intervals, the NATO Council's oversight is more continuous, its decision making more incremental. Member governments consequently have a greater voice in operational matters, and the NATO civilian and military staffs have correspondingly less.

The European Option

European attitudes toward nation building were heavily influenced by the UN's failure, in the first half of the 1990s, to halt civil war in Bosnia. European governments had invested heavily in this mission and European militaries had provided most of the manpower. With its failure, European governments withdrew almost entirely from UN peacekeeping throughout the rest of the decade, instead lending their weight to American-led operations under NATO command. The Atlantic Alliance possessed several advantages over the UN from a European standpoint, the most important of which was the guarantee of heavy American participation. Yet this dependence upon the United States was, from a European standpoint, also NATO's principal drawback, for the Alliance offered a potential instrument for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction only if and when the United States chose to participate, and was given the lead.

Europe's failure to stabilize the Balkans using the UN as its instrument therefore led to two parallel lines of action. One was the use of NATO to achieve the same purpose, first in Bosnia and then four years later in Kosovo. The other was the development of a purely

European capacity for intervention, via the European Union, one which would provide Europe an alternative to both NATO and the United Nations. Drawing heavily upon NATO as model, European government's developed institutional arrangements that would allow the EU to include military force among its instruments for external influence. These arrangements were labeled, somewhat misleadingly, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), since this name describes not a common policy, but rather an aspiration to achieve such commonality, a mechanism to do so, and the institutional means to give such policies collective effect.

Like NATO, and unlike the UN, EU decision making in the security and defense sector is by consensus. The European Union has a much leaner military and political staff than NATO, in part because it can call on NATO, if it chooses, for planning and other staff functions. The EU, like the UN but unlike NATO, can draw upon a wide array of civilian assets essential to any nation-building operation. Like NATO soldiers, EU soldiers are much more expensive than their UN counterparts. EU decision making mechanisms, like those of NATO, offer troop-contributing governments more scope for micromanaging military operations on a day-to-day basis than do the UN's.

Operating on its own periphery, within societies that regard themselves as European and aspire to membership in its Union, the EU clearly has advantages that alternative institutional frameworks for nation building cannot entirely match. More distant EU-led operations, on the other hand, have been rather tentative, and most European governments have proved highly risk adverse, a criticism that was often leveled, with some justice, at the United States in the 1990s. The nature of EU decision making is likely to sustain this risk adverse behavior. In NATO, military commitments are driven by the institution's dominant member, the United States. In the United Nations, such decisions are taken by governments that, for the most part, do not intend to hazard their own soldiers in the resultant operations. As a result, NATO is prepared to accept risks at which the EU would balk, while the UN regularly takes chances which neither the EU nor NATO would countenance. As one example, at present lightly equipped UN troops are trying to halt genocide in Darfur, while a much more heavily equipped and mobile European Union force is securing refugee camps in Chad, the safer and less demanding mission.

Most European nations have extreme difficulty deploying more than a tiny fraction of their military manpower on operational missions abroad. From 1991 to 2005 the total never exceeded three percent of Europe's active duty personnel. In some cases, this reflects domestic resistance to the use of armed force for anything other than self defense. More generally, it results from the need to fund operations from fixed defense budgets, meaning that the active employment of the armed forces cuts funding for their maintenance and modernization. The U.S. circumvents this trade off by securing supplemental funding for major, unforeseen contingencies. As long as European governments continue to fund new military commitments out of fixed defense budgets, they will prove unable, or at least unwilling to do their fair share in manning internationally sanctioned peace operations, whether under the UN, NATO or EU flag.

Another EU weakness, oddly enough, is in the integration of the military and civil components of nation building. In theory, the EU should be uniquely equipped to mobilize the full panoply of civil-military assets needed for successful post conflict reconstruction.

Yet American-led nation building missions are almost always more generously resourced than those directed by the EU (or the UN), because the United States tends to back up any troop commitment with substantial economic assistance. This is not a criticism of European generosity, since much of the funding the U.S. secures for its priorities is in fact European. Rather it reflects the greater success the U.S. has had in reorienting national and international priorities toward those areas where its troops are committed.

The division between the European Council, which decides upon defense and security matters, and the European Commission, which sets and implements development policy often leads to a disjointed EU response. Reforms currently in the process of ratification should improve EU performance in this regard. European governments and institutions also tend to draw a sharper line between development and security assistance than does the United States (or the UN) creating barriers for the use of European development funds to pay for things like police training or militia demobilization. Greater European involvement in the management of nation building operations may erode these barriers.

Despite these continuing difficulties, European institutions for the management of civil-military operations have developed to the stage where more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked upon with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy which must underlie it. The difficulty the EU encountered reaching a common view on the final status of Kosovo is an example of this limitation.⁶

Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Counterinsurgency

UN led peacekeeping is the most cost effective way to prevent the renewal of conflict in most societies emerging from civil war. Peacekeeping will not stop ongoing genocide, aggression, or WMD proliferation, however. The United Nations does not do invasions. In circumstances where one or more parties are not ready to lay down their arms and permit the insertion of foreign troops, a forced entry, or threat thereof may be needed. Where such is necessary, either a nationally led coalition, or a standing alliance will need to execute this mission. This is what US did in Haiti, in 1994 and again in 2004, in both cases quickly turning the resultant peacekeeping operation over to the UN. This is what NATO did in Bosnia and Kosovo, employing air power and in the latter case the threat of invasion to bring the parties to the table. Similarly, in 1999 and again in 2005 Australia led UN mandated interventions into East Timor, then immediately turning responsibility over to UN peacekeepers.

⁶ The forgoing discussion of U.S., UN and European approaches to nation building draws on three RAND studies on the subject. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to the Congo*, Dobbins et al, RAND, 2003, looked at the U.S. record. *The UN's Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Dobbins et al, RAND, 2005, compared the U.S. to the UN way of nation building. *Europe's Role in Nation Building: From the Balkans to the Congo*, to be published by RAND later in 2008, looks at the European record.

As these cases demonstrate, peace enforcement missions can transition to peacekeeping provided the intervening power acts quickly to suppress, deter, or co-opt all sources of violent resistance. Spoiler elements exist in opposition to any nation building effort, determined to frustrate reforms being promoted by the intervening power. Successful peacekeeping requires that these elements be either deterred from taking up arms, or co-opted into the newly emerging political and economic arrangements. When this does not occur, the peace enforcement action morphs not into peacekeeping, but rather into counterinsurgency

This is what happened in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the American led coalitions failed to establish a secure environment in which economic and political reform could go forward. The reasons for this failure are several. First of all, the Bush Administration initially resisted the degree of international oversight and participation that earlier post-Cold War nation building missions had enjoyed and thus forfeited the greater legitimacy that would have resulted. Secondly, American leaders grossly underestimated the military manpower and economic assistance levels required to establish a secure environment and launch a process of reconstruction. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the United States, having toppled the existing regimes, was loath to accept responsibility for maintaining public security. This failure gave spoiler elements time and space to organize, arm and begin intimidating the local populace.

Counterinsurgency and peacekeeping missions are alike in requiring a high degree of integration between the civil and military components of an intervention directed toward promoting political and economic changes in the affected society. But counterinsurgency requires a quite different mix of external and indigenous capability. Peacekeeping is by definition a task accomplished by foreign forces in a society that has lost the capacity to secure itself. Foreign troops have often succeeded in securing an acquiescent and in many cases grateful population even in the complete absence of a functioning local government. Outside forces have a much harder time suppressing a well entrenched local insurgency, however, and can seldom succeed unless they are acting in support of an increasingly capable and legitimate indigenous ally. Building local capacity is thus the ultimate objective for a peacekeeping mission, but an absolute prerequisite for success in counterinsurgency.

Gradually Improving Competence

Given the volume of nation-building activity over the past twenty years, the international community has, not surprisingly, become more adept at mounting such operations. This improvement has been uneven, however, with significant instances of regression.

The UN's earliest forays into post-Cold War nation building proved surprisingly successful. In the early 90s the UN helped broker an end to long running conflicts in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia, and then sent comparatively small contingents of blue helmeted troops to oversee the resultant settlements. These early successes encouraged an exaggerated optimism about what such sparsely resourced, short lived interventions could expect to achieve. Soon the Security Council was sending UN

troops into situations where there was no peace to keep. Blue helmeted soldiers proved unable to halt famine in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, or civil war in Bosnia. By mid decade UN peacekeeping was in retreat. The number of missions went way down. The organization was chastened and the public opinion highly critical. Yet the demand for such interventions continued, and, with rare exceptions, no other organization proved ready or willing to take up the task. By decades end, therefore, UN peacekeeping had been reinvented in a more robust form, with mandates and capabilities that went beyond mere self defense. UN Administrators governed Kosovo and East Timor. UN troops were soon establishing peace in Sierra Leon and Liberia and beginning to tamp down the conflict in Congo.

The European Union, for its part, expanded its capacity for military intervention over the past half decade. Since a small EU led military contingent entered Macedonia in 2003, the Union has conducted four other military interventions, two in the Congo, in 2003 and 2006, one in the Bosnia, where it took over peacekeeping duties from NATO in 2004, and most recently in Chad. The military components of these operations have all been fairly small, and those outside Europe have also been very short in duration. All have been conducted quite competently, however, and all have achieved their sometimes rather limited aims. These small missions may be regarded as a successful test of the ESDP concept.

American performance also improved through the 90s, beginning from the low point of Somalia through increasingly better organized efforts in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the collapse of that first post-Cold War venture in Somalia, the Clinton Administration embraced the doctrine of overwhelming force, often called the Powell Doctrine after former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell. In Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo large, powerful and determined peace enforcement operations quickly established security and deterred overt resistance. These operations suffered no casualties and transitioned to peacekeeping missions with heavy international oversight and participation.

The American learning curve was not sustained into the current decade. George W. Bush entered office openly disdainful of nation building, an activity he had promised during the Presidential campaign to avoid. "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building," candidate Bush said in his Oct. 11, 2000 debate with Vice President Gore. "The American military is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. It is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society," wrote Condoleezza Rice in the January, 2000 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

When faced with the necessity of reconstructing first Afghanistan and then Iraq, the Bush administration was determined to conduct these operations differently, and in particular, more economically. Donald Rumsfeld set out in speeches and newspaper articles the rationale for what became known as the "small footprint" approach to nation building, asserting that high levels of economic assistance and military manpower had made Bosnia and Kosovo permanent wards of the international community, something that the United States was determined to avoid doing with Afghanistan and Iraq. His Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, has explained that, "Rumsfeld often remarked, with disdain, that America had saved people from aggression and repression – only to create

debilitating dependencies on external aid. Such dependency was what we wanted to avoid.”⁷

The core of this new approach was a determination to avoid having American troops drawn heavily into providing public security. That task was to be left to locals, first in Afghanistan, where Washington rejected pleas from both the UN and Hamid Karzai to deploy international peacekeepers outside Kabul, and then in Iraq, where U.S. troops stood by while looters stripped every public facility to the bare walls, and often beyond. Afghanistan had no army or police force, which meant security was left to warlords and tribal militias, whose leaders funded their efforts through drug trafficking or various forms of extortion. The Iraqi Army and intelligence services were disbanded, and the police force was found to be utterly incompetent.

In both cases, the U.S. also initially sought to limit international participation. In Afghanistan it confined multinational peacekeepers to Kabul and even declined to put that small force under NATO or UN (or even U.S.) command. In Iraq the U.S. initially sought to restrict the UN to humanitarian affairs, according it no role in security, political or economic reform.

All of these early decisions were reversed. U.S. and international troop levels were eventually increased in both Iraq and Afghanistan, protecting the local population was eventually designated as the preeminent military mission, and both UN and NATO roles were expanded. These changes came too late to forestall the reemergence of civil war, however.

Stabilizing Afghanistan

Responsibility for Bosnia has shifted from the U.S. and NATO to the European Union. Kosovo is gradually making a similar transition. Most European governments have shunned involvement in Iraq. Neither the United States nor Europe are participating substantially in any of the twenty UN led peacekeeping missions currently underway (other than in Lebanon in the case of Europe). Afghanistan is thus the only place where American and European forces are currently engaged together in a large scale operation.

Washington originally conceived of this mission as an “economy of force” operation, meaning that it intended to make the absolute minimum commitment possible. Throughout most of 2002 the United States had no more than ten thousand soldiers deployed there, a troop to population ratio fifty times smaller than had been the case in either Bosnia or Kosovo. Economic assistance was similarly stunted. Individual donor nations were encouraged to take responsibility for various aspects of reconstruction, such as military and police training, counter narcotics and judicial reform. No institution was set up or brought in to blend these efforts. Peacekeeping was to be confined to Kabul.

The situation is now very different. NATO and U.S. force levels are some five times higher than they were in 2002. A high volume of international assistance is finally being provided.

⁷ *War and Decision*, Douglas Feith, p 102, Harpers, 2008.

But there is still no one charged with setting priorities for its employment. International structures in Afghanistan remain a hold over from the earlier “small footprint” era when individual countries were supposed to take the lead in various key sectors and the UN’s role was largely limited to promoting political reform and constitutional development. This division of labor is no longer tenable, given the larger resources now available.

Military command chains are also badly tangled. The United States and NATO are effectively waging two separate wars, NATO in the south, the U.S. in the east. But there are also American troops in the NATO area and Europeans in the American. And American and European Special Forces are operating in both areas while coming under the control of neither commander.

American troops, for instance, operate under three distinct chains. Those committed to NATO answer to the U.S. European Command, located in Stuttgart, Germany. The larger number operating independently of NATO is directed by the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida. American and allied special force elements conducting counterterrorism missions work under yet a third American combatant commander, that for Special Operations, also located in Tampa. NATO troops operate under yet a fourth chain of command, headquartered in Mons, Belgium. Thus three American four star generals, working through four separate headquarters direct Western operations in Afghanistan.

These confused and overlapping command arrangements are a source of continuous friction and a standing invitation to fratricide and failure to render timely aid to units in trouble. All international military operations should be put under NATO. This does not mean that all NATO contingents must conduct counterterrorism missions, or even engage in counterinsurgency. Those governments which prefer to have their soldiers do only peacekeeping may continue to confine their activities to areas where little local resistance exists. There needs however, to be a single command chain for all Western forces, and, consequently, for all American forces.

However well organized, NATO cannot wage a successful campaign on its own. Counterinsurgency requires the integration of military and civilian capacity. NATO has none of the latter. The Alliance therefore needs a civil partner, as it has had in Bosnia with the Office of the High Representative and in Kosovo with the UN Mission. In theory, this might be a role for the European Union. In practice, the mission is probably beyond the current institutional capacity of either the European Commission or Council. The United Nations is thus the best alternative source of civilian leadership. Most of the resources are going to come from elsewhere, however, to include the U.S. Europe, Japan and the World Bank. UN leadership will only work, therefore, if all these donors, to include the United States, prove ready to accept the resultant discipline.

This war could well be lost inside Afghanistan, but it cannot be won there. It can only be won inside Pakistan, from whence much of the threat emanates. The Karzai regime faces multiple opponents, all of whom are headquartered across this border, where they recruit, train, secure funding and supplies and direct their operations. Yet the war also cannot be won militarily inside Pakistan, at least not by American and NATO troops. Thus the Western strategy for Afghanistan must encompass a much larger and largely non-military effort to help Pakistan secure control of its border regions.

Conclusion

Nation building has become the dominant paradigm for post-Cold War military interventions. Over the past two decades such missions have become larger, longer and more frequent.

Having initially spurned nation building, the Bush Administration has embraced the mission, in all but name, with the fervor of a new convert. In 2004 the Department of State established an office for reconstruction and stabilization, the mission of which is to create a doctrine for the civilian aspects of these missions and build a cadre of experts to staff them. In 2005 the Pentagon issued a directive making stability operations a core mission of the U.S. military, on a par with major combat. That same year President Bush issued a directive establishing an interagency structure for managing future such operations⁸.

Other governments have been taking similar steps. Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom have created units to help manage post conflict reconstruction along the lines of the new State Department office. In New York the United Nations has established the Peace Building Commission to help manage the transition from peacekeeping to sustainable development in post conflict societies. The European Union has concentrated heavily on building the capacity to deploy military and civilian personnel in post conflict environments. While most of its ventures to date have been small scale and rather tentative, they have been competently managed and generally successful within their limited spheres. The UN's success rate, as measured in enhanced security, economic growth, return of refugees and installation of representative governments meets or exceeds that of U.S. and European led missions in almost every category. It is time, therefore, that Western governments, militaries and populations got over their disappointment at the UN's early failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, acknowledged this subsequent improvement in UN performance, and began once again to do a fair share in manning, as they are already doing in paying for, these efforts. The UN currently deploys more troops in active operations abroad than the EU, NATO and every European government combined. Almost none of these soldiers are American, and very few are European. The most efficient way for both European and American governments to contribute to the most international peacekeeping is to assign national contingents directly to these UN peacekeeping missions. However, peacekeeping alone will not stop genocide, aggression or other active threats to international security. Nationally led, or standing alliance coalitions will be needed for occasional peace enforcement missions. This is a role for which heavily equipped and highly mobile Western militaries are well suited. Forced entry is not the most demanding challenge facing Allied governments, however. The most critical phase is transitioning

⁸ The Bush Administration term for nation building is stabilization and reconstruction. The State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in July of 2004. The Defense Department Directive issued the directive entitled "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" in November of 2005. President Bush released Nation Security Directive 44, entitled "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," a successor to the Clinton Era Presidential Directive 56, which had been allowed to lapse in January of 2001, in December of 2005.

from peace enforcement to peacekeeping by quickly establishing a secure environment, deterring the emergence of violent resistance, and beginning the process of economic and political reconstruction. These are the tasks for which Western military and civilian authorities must do better organizing, training and when necessary, conducting.