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**SECURITY, GLOBALISATION AND STATE
TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

by Karin Aggestam & Helena Lindholm Schulz

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SECURITY, GLOBALISATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION IN THE
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1. Introduction

Globalisation challenges central assumptions of the state as well as international relations, such as the conventional divide between national and international spheres. Globalisation has resulted in a diversification of threats, which on the one hand have created multilateral pressures to cooperate, but on the other hand new modes of fighting and sources of conflict. We may also observe a drastic decline in major interstate wars as well as a general decline in military expenditures while a rise of transnational actors. *Military globalisation* refers to “the process (and patterns) of military connectedness that transcend the world’s major regions as reflected in the spatio-temporal and organization features of military relations, networks and interactions.”¹ Thus, military globalisation involves the ways in which military networks and alliances expand and the ways in which security affairs of different regions interact and influence one another. This has meant according to some scholars that national security and traditional state-centred approaches have weakened under the impact of powerful global social forces. We are therefore faced with a new and broadened security agenda (including “soft security” issues), which alters the relevance of national military power and increases the importance of multilateralism. Consequently, security is increasingly being sought through regional institutions. The transformation in the security sector includes a shift from traditional Clausewitzian interstate wars to postindustrial warfare and changes the way states organise their security apparatus, that is, from warfighting to crime fighting components and policing apparatus.²

Still, others argue that we need to differentiate the effects and changes in the developed world with the third world where the security predicament is still strongly linked to the ongoing processes of state formation and where the phenomenon of weak states persist.³ A distinction is made between judicial (in theory) and empirical (in practice) sovereignty. In large parts of the third world, the security/insecurity dynamics of vulnerabilities relate both to internal as well as external threats, which may weaken state structures significantly. It means that the security apparatus is defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity from outside threats, but also protecting the regime

¹ Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, 1999, *Global Transformations*, Polity Press: 88

² Ripsman, Norrin, M. and Paul, T.V, 2005, “Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 200-3; Cha, Victor 2000, “Globalization and the Study of International Security”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 391-94.

³ Ayoob, Mohammed, 1995, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner; Rotberg, Robert I. (ed), 2004, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press.

from internal threats. Thus, it is impossible to separate domestic order from domestic and international security.⁴

The global order is characterised by a blurred picture of local/internal wars, regional security structures and American military hegemony. The American response against global terrorism implies a return to a realist paradigm and a strong emphasis on military power, which is of particular relevance for the Middle East. Although 9/11 made it clear that security threats were of a new and amorphous kind, stemming both from “inside” and “outside” state borders, the American reaction has primarily been based on conventional security concerns and unilateral strategies, such as invasions and military attacks against states.

The multitude of internal as well as interstate conflicts and wars in the Middle East means that states and other actors have had to navigate in a political landscape characterised by regional conflict, hostility and internal instability. As a consequence, the dominance of security in the region provides a foundation for a strong security apparatus.⁵ As Hinnebusch underlines “[w]ar has profoundly shaped the Middle East regional system”.⁶ Globalisation constitutes one of the most poignant factors of change when it comes to the security sector of the Arab world, but globalisation processes come uneven, implying both an extensive role for foreign (state and non-state) actors and the redefinition of non-state actors and internal opposition. Globalisation of security concerns means increasing Western pressures to behave in accordance with normatively defined principles (e.g. democracy, adherence to human rights) as well as heavy foreign presence (such as in Iraq) and dependency in the form of arms trade, security cooperation, training etc. Yet it also means increasing assertiveness against internal opposition, which is often linked to transnational networks opposing globalisation. Thus, what is a global threat to Western states is an internal threat to many Arab regimes. As a consequence, globalisation defined as a “threat” to Arab regimes both intensifies internal opposition and Western pressures.

The main research problems in this paper are threefold: (1) How are security policies and the security apparatus shaped by the overarching processes of political transformation? (2) In what ways does the security sector play an active role in these processes? Political change in the Arab world does not imply “democratisation” and yet political transformation is formed by a complicated interplay between “stubborn authoritarianism”⁷ and gradual political liberalisation⁸. Change in the direction towards

⁴ Maoz, Zeev, 2004, “Domestic politics of Regional Security: Theoretical Perspectives and Middle Eastern Patterns”, in Maoz, Zeev, Landau, Emily B., Malz, Tamar, *Building Regional Security in the Middle East. International, Regional and Domestic Influences*, London: Frank Cass, p. 28.

⁵ Eg. Picard, Elizabeth, 1988, ‘Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State’ in Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State*, London: Croom Helm, 1988; Barry Rubin & Thomas Keaney (eds.), 2002, *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, London, New York: Frank Cass; Hinnebusch, Raymond, 2003, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester University Press; Owen, Roger, 2005, *State, Power and Politics in the making of the Modern Middle East*, London, New York: Routledge.

⁶ Hinnebusch, *op. cit.*, p. 154

⁷ Pripstein Posusney, Marsha, 2005, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective” in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

⁸ Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), 1998, *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, Vol. 1 and 2, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Salamé, Ghassam (ed.), 1996, *Democracy without Democrats: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London, New York I.B Tauris.

limited political liberalisation is pushed by globalisation as much as it is part of internal and regional political dynamics. States in the Arab world show an impressive capacity to resist change, while at the same time adapt modes of governance to increasing pressures. (3) In what ways are relations between regime and the security sector changing? The changing role and function of the security sector is a neglected area of research even though the high degree of politicisation of the military will undoubtedly affect the outcome of political transformation. In sum, the overall research problem relates to how political change, stemming from global and domestic sources, affects security policies of states as well as the roles and functions of the security apparatus.

2. Interplay between globalisation and regional (in)security

During the latter half of the 20th century, the security dynamics in the Arab world were greatly affected by the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict and by the superpower rivalry, which conducted war by proxy in the region. The Cold War functioned as an “overlay” of regional conflict patterns and alliances but since its end, security relations have increasingly become regionalised.⁹ At the same time, this has not led to a regionalisation of security mechanisms and conflict resolution instruments in the Arab world or the Middle East at large. On the contrary, in terms of institutionalisation the Middle East remains a region without much cooperation. The effects of globalisation on security heightened following the Gulf war in 1991 with new security precedence, such as the UN alliance against Iraq and humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq to protect minorities against their own regime. The war in Iraq, which has been transformed from a US-led war of intervention to a prolonged war of attrition between foreign (American/British) troops and rebellious groups, loosely organised around jihadist and/or Sunni Arab dissent, will have profound consequences for regional security in the Middle East, and potentially for the role and function of security apparatus.

Bilgin argues that regional security to a large extent derives from actors’ different worldviews, which consequently outline threat perceptions and security policies. Hence, there exists a multitude of contending perspectives on regional security, which is determined by the ideas of reference. *Western security conceptions* have for a long time been imposed in the region. The primacy of threats originates in the unrestricted flow of oil at reasonable prices, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and preventing the emergence of any regional hegemony while holding Islamism in check by maintaining friendly regimes sensitive to western security concerns.¹⁰ The new security concerns of the West, such as the global war on terrorism and American involvement in Iraq, has spurred a growing sense in the Arab world that there is an American neo-imperialist project being implemented in the region. The augmented calls by the US and Europe for democratisation and reforms as well as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) are similarly viewed as external imposition in the region. In sum, these threats are largely defined by external powers and by the American urge to control, stabilise and

⁹ Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver, 2003, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Bilgin, Pinar, 2004 “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security” *International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 25

“peacify” the Arab world. Security is achieved by states entering alliances with the West and thus, American and Middle East security is intertwined.

As discussed above, security conceptions also contain non-military dimensions, such as ideational factors. *Pan-Arab security concerns* dominated the region from the 1950s onwards by its emphasis on the Arab Middle East, and the expectation of strengthening the Arab political community. “Arab states were not only sovereign states but also, at a basic level, *Arab* states, deriving their legitimacy from and representatives of the Arab nation; these different social identities contained very different behavioural expectations”.¹¹ For several decades before receding in the 1970s, Pan-Arab security concerns were primarily centred on the threats posed by non-Arab states, such as Iran, Turkey and Israel, and the Palestine conflict, which was rhetorically on top of the Arab security agenda and dominated thinking about regional order.¹²

Another more current and contrasting ideational force is *Islamic security concerns*, which refers to the Muslim Middle East. The ideas of reference are religious identity, the transtate community of the “Ummah”, and a redefinition of jihad. Security is framed as achieving greater unity for the Muslim peoples and by lessening the “un-Islamic influences”. Threats are often associated with an anti-status quo discourse and directed against the core of the neo-liberal globalisation and western global dominance. Also the military in several Arab states are on collision course with Islamic radicalism since the armed forces historically have been the bastion of secularism. Yet, the Islamic discourse unites various groups more on the basis of what they are against than what they are for.¹³ At the same time, jihadists organise in the form of globalised networks and alliances, which turn internal opposition global and thus no longer confined to territorial states. Hence, Islamist terror groups act globally as transnational communities, in the form of organisation, networks and the distribution of messages and information. Individual threats stem both from outside and inside state boundaries since globally organised networks maintain a local presence. Thus, territory and geography means less in terms of serving as the prime object of security, with direct consequences for sovereignty.

Since the end of the Cold War and as part of the changing and broadening security agenda, *Mediterranean security concerns* have more frequently been articulated in the context of regional security. Triggered by the Middle East peace process and the multilateral negotiations that took place in the 1990s, several Arab states began redefining security on issues of common concerns, such as economic development, refugees, regional security and hydro-political cooperation. Also the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO in 1993 and the following peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 presented the emergence of a new security landscape.

The main ideas of reference is the European Union (EU), which is directed towards creating cooperative schemes with Mediterranean-rim countries to promote domestic and regional stability, cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, economic development and democratisation. This has resulted in an overall Mediterranean Policy of the EU, which includes a Euro-Arab dialogue and a Mediterranean Partnership process containing a

¹¹ Barnett, Michael “Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System”, *International Organization*, Vol.49, No.3, p. 508

¹² Bilgin, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32

¹³ Bilgin, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33

number of agreements with sub-regional organisations, such as the GCC and the Arab Maghreb Union. These cooperative schemes are, for example, the only ones that have managed to bring Syria, Israel and a whole range of non-state actors together by its emphasis on people-to-people diplomacy.¹⁴

3. Interplay between state and regime (in)security

In almost every Middle Eastern state, great importance was attached to the creation of national consensus. However, given the general absence of democratic institutions of such a consensus was more likely to be simply imposed rather than emerging out of general public discussions and debate.¹⁵

One of the most salient features of Middle East politics is according to Kamrava the intimate nexus between the state and the armed forces.¹⁶ National liberation was often orchestrated by highly ideological officers and as a consequence, national armies were politicised. Regimes also relied heavily on the armies, which enjoyed popular legitimacy in mobilising populations in a new era when colonial institutions were taken over and transformed into state-governing structures.¹⁷ This was frequently related to the absence of a single unifying vision around which to rally and held back the emergence of a corporate unified sense of identity among the officers.¹⁸ Yet, the army remains the utmost symbol as the institution holding the legitimate use of violence, which can secure the state against external threats and guard borders and territories. Armed forces were also instrumental in expanding the very reach of states. The military is therefore a symbol of nation-building in the sense that it might homogenise heterogeneous populations into the same army (an integrative approach) or, on the contrary, it may be used as a repressive force subjugating national minorities to regime rule. Populist nationalism, the overarching nature of the “national task” has rhetorically been emphasised in order to control societies through the use of military machineries¹⁹. Armies also served the role of a modernising institution in post-colonial states, given its reliance on modern technology and its strict mode of organisation. As armies have had the role of nation building and state construction, “rather than state protection”²⁰, they view themselves as the core function of the state. Hence, the relationship between regimes and armed forces in the Arab world has been of the praetorian kind. As Kamrava points out, “[a]lmost all of the ideological military-states of the 1950s and the 1960s had by the 1990s been reduced to autocratic Mukhaberat (Intelligence) state”.²¹

¹⁴ Bilgin. *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35

¹⁵ Owen, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Kamrava, Mehran, 2000, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No.1.

¹⁷ The classical work on the role of military institutions in nation-building in the Third world remains Janowitz, Morris, 1964, expanded edition in 1977, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, The University of Chicago Press.

¹⁸ Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 77

¹⁹ Waterbury, John 1996, Waterbury, John, 1996, ‘Democracy without Democrats: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East’, in Ghassam Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London, New York I.B Tauris, p. 26.

²⁰ Kroonings, Kees & Kruijt, Dirk, 2002 *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London & New York: Zed Books

²¹ Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 81

“Political armies” of this kind often use turbulence and instability as a reason for political actions. The interlinkage between regimes and armies is also to be explained by the ways that conflict, threat perceptions and enemy images have been exploited in order to promote state interests. The role of political armies may be seen as one of the factors behind the remarkable

strength of the Arab state in the era of globalisation. In fact, it appears as though we are today witnessing an “in-between” situation where armies remain large, keeping a special position among state institutions and the missionary legacy in mind, but where political change also imply a more limited role for the army. At the same time, the emergence of new global and domestic threats may well serve to re-strengthen the security sector vis-à-vis other spheres of society. To many Arab regimes, the presence of Islamist opposition groups with links to transnational organisations of informal violence, means a direct security threat. These threats are countered by strengthening the security apparatus and increasing coercive measures against such groups.

3.1 *The robustness of authoritarian regimes*

The Arab state system is to a large extent characterised by enduring authoritarianism, which according to Pripstein Posusney has to do with the patrimonial norm of the militaries and the capacity of the security apparatus to repress dissent, particularly in times of crisis, such as in Syria 1982, Tunisia 1987, Libya 1993 and, more recently, Algeria 1992, Egypt 1995-97.²² Typical of political armies are the frequent violent interference in domestic politics.²³ Also Bellin adheres to this view and underlines the exceptional strength and will of the security apparatus, and the limited degree of popular mobilisation for democratic reforms in the Arab world. Low level of popular mobilisation for democratic reforms means low costs of repression, which subsequently increases the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to force to impede reform initiatives.²⁴

Another decisive factor is the continued diplomatic support for existing regimes, which include significant foreign military aid and strategic rent. Saudi Arabia, for example, imposes strict limits on civil society, discriminates against women and curb dissent. Yet, “Western governments have contended themselves with purchasing Saudi oil and soliciting Saudi contracts while maintaining a shameful silence toward Saudi abuses.” Similarly, “Egypt has secured from the US government massive aid and tacit acceptance of its human rights violation.”²⁵ The dependency on some Arab regimes on technology and assistance from the West has no doubt increased since the first Gulf War. At the same time, Islamist movements are perceived as embracing an anti-western stance and many Arab leaders enjoy relative freedom from external pressure for change and for maintaining authoritarianism and repression as a remedy against Islamist-flavoured

²² Pripstein, *op. cit.*, p. 11

²³ Koonings & Kruijt, *op. cit.*,

²⁴ Bellin, Eva, 2005 “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders” in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 21, 35.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch, quoted in Brownlee, Jason, 2005, “Political Crisis and Restabilization: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Tunisia” in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 59.

opposition. At the same time their legitimate rule is undermined by their extreme subordination and dependence of powerful economic military and political forces.²⁶

State and regime (in)security correlates to a great extent to weak/strong dynamics of a state. As Krause underlines, the absence of empirical sovereignty and legitimacy means that the process of state consolidation is lacking. In a weak state, the idea of the state, institutions and territories are not widely accepted by the population, for example in Lebanon. To create domestic order requires a shift in the logic of internal security from military to police, which also means that the police relies less on violence to impose its will.²⁷ As mentioned before, the patrimonial linkage between regime and the security apparatus means that democratisation can only be carried out successfully when the state's security

apparatus refrain from acting against such a process. However, if the military remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular dissatisfaction and survive significant illegitimacy.²⁸

3.2 *Strength and willingness of the security apparatus*

The security sector in the Arab world may generally be characterised by its enduring strength. Despite economic crises in several countries, military budgets have not been severely affected. For example, Egypt was forced under pressure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make substantial reduction with fourteen percent of subsidiaries for basic goods,. Yet that same year the regime increased the military budget with twenty-two percent. Despite a general temporary reduction in military budgets in the 1990s, the region still has one of the highest defence expenditures in the world. The Middle East is also the biggest spenders in terms of arms purchase and a high percentage of the population is engaged in various branches of security. Yet, it is difficult to get exact figures since most information is controlled and military budgets are surrounded with secrecy.²⁹

There are various types of armed forces in the Middle East. Egypt and Syria hold *large armies*, which often exercise a decisive influence in politics and economics. Military courts often try civilians and it is difficult to make a distinction between the police and armed forces since their work is complementary. In Egypt, the military has also expanded its role into non-military areas, such as water management, agriculture and electricity generation.³⁰ Hence, several countries are characterised by a “merchant/military complex” with the security apparatus having extensive networks of clientelism, patronage and corruption.³¹

Morocco and Jordan have *modern professional armies* that draw on a colonial legacy whereas the Gulf States have *small professional armies coexisting with tribal based* military organisations due to their small populations. This is why they have sought to strengthen the GCC. The increasing threats from Iran and until the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, have also led the Gulf states to become heavily dependent on western

²⁶ Krause, Keith, 2004, “State-Making and Region-Building: The Interplay of Domestic and Regional Security in the Middle East”, in Maoz, Zeev, Landau, Emily B., Malz, Tamar, Building Regional Security in the Middle East. International, Regional and Domestic Influences, London: Frank Cass,

²⁷ Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 112

²⁸ Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 22

²⁹ Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 32

³⁰ Owen *op. cit.*

³¹ Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 114

military technology and expertise.³² The threats from Iraq are today of a different kind, with risks of spreading resistance and terror groups with regional fragmentation as a consequence.

Ethnicity or other identity markers are employed by several Arab states in order to control the security sector. In Syria, the Alawi minority, which comprises no more than fifteen percent of the population, controls half of all army divisions and all the security intelligence services. Syria has sometimes been defined a “warfare state”, a country “so preoccupied with military preparation that it permits almost all levels of the economy, society and culture”.³³ Consequently, peace with Israel would modify all the political and socio-economic structures. In Jordan, tribal background also plays a significant role since the persistent regime vulnerability makes it extremely dependent upon the armed forces. The ruling family handpicks the officer corps primarily from traditional East Bank families, which means that officers with Palestinian origin only counts for ten percent even though they constitute forty percent of the soldiers. Even though the country has a weak economy, it receives substantial rents from Saudi Arabia, the US and other Arab states, which makes it possible for the regime to strengthen its position without having to make new domestic coalition building with groups that might challenge its legitimacy or its security policies. Entering the military also entails a well paid career and after leaving the military to enter business or government.³⁴

3.3 Institutionalisation vs patrimonialism of the armed forces

The will to repress reform initiatives is related to the degree of military institutionalisation. The more the military is institutionalised the more it is willing to disengage from power. According to Bellin, institutionalisation should not be mixed up with professionalisation and does not refer to the de-politisation of the security establishment and its subordination to civilian control. The emphasis is rather placed on the rule governed and merit-based hierarchy of organising the military, which means a clear delineation between public and private. The security elites have a sense of corporate identity that is separated from the state, a distinct mission and career path, which serves the public good and thus enjoy a high level of popular mobilisation.³⁵

However, in the Middle East several armies are organised along patrimonial lines, which is characterised by cronyism, corruption and a lack of a clear distinction between public and private. Discipline is often maintained by balancing tension between different ethnic groups. The Egyptian armed forces have become highly institutionalised whereas in Saudi Arabia and Syria entire branches of the military and security forces are “family affairs”. Yet, patrimonialism is not the same thing as professional incompetence. Yet it does indicate a strong linkage between the security sector and the regime it serves.³⁶ For instance, several armies have gone through a partial professionalisation, triggered by the crushing defeat in the war with Israel in 1967. To counter the loss of legitimacy, there was a drive to professionalise the armed forces by modern military equipment, establish procedures for recruitment, promote and advance training, which increased the military corporate identity and its sense of efficacy. Yet,

³² Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 186

³³ Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 179

³⁴ Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 117

³⁵ Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 29

³⁶ Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 28, 33

this has not translated to full civilisation of the armies in the sense of military depolitication and increased subordination to civilian control.³⁷ Various strategies are used to contain the military and withhold it from exaggerated involvement in politics and governance. Control may be exercised and loyalty ensured by rotating commanders and generals, forming rivalling branches of the security sector and having well-paid career opportunities.³⁸

In sum, the military establishment in many Arab states is firmly ingrained into the system with political and economic interests grounded in the status quo. It means a personal identification of the military and security establishment with the regimes longevity and thus induces resistance to political reform.”³⁹

4. Central research questions

What major alterations of internal and external security policies have taken place in the last decade? What are the main reasons for these changes and their implications on the role and function of the security apparatus? One key area is the definition of “threats” by various regimes. What type of threats are the security apparatus trying to counter? What is the interplay between external and internal threat perceptions? What are the relations between “hard” and “soft” security concerns?

How may civilian-military relations be characterised? What role does the institutions of organised violence play in sustaining the regime? How are different branches used in relation to internal opposition and domestic threats? To what extent is the armed forces institutionalised and civilised? Civil-military relations and the civilisation of Arab armies may be studied through an overview of how the armies have exercised influence on politics. Do government representatives frequently have military background? Are military officers recruited from groups with close alliance to a regime? To what extent is the security apparatus involved in non-military sectors?

To what extent is the regime benefiting from regional and international support in the security sector (military alliance, aid, technology, training etc)?

Is the security apparatus in fiscal health?

5. Research design

The research project emphasises political change and state transformation in the Arab world, which will be analysed and explained by considering three interrelated areas, namely security, economics and politics. Hence, the research design and selection of cases have been based on these considerations as well as on overarching methodological principles of representation and most different comparison.

First, three countries are selected on the basis of being representatives of their sub-regions: *Morocco* (Maghreb), *Egypt* (Mashrek) and *Saudi Arabia* (the Gulf). These three countries are all part of the wider Middle East regional security complex while at the same time oriented toward different sub-complexes.

³⁷ Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 68

³⁸ Baram 1998

³⁹ Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 34

Second, the research design includes a comparative approach in which the three cases will be evaluated on the basis of their different characteristics, such as type of army and regime. Egypt is one of the three countries with a large army and security sector. Egypt is also an illustrative case where a military coup meant the introduction of a new political order. Due to its sheer size, Egypt is a critical actor in any regional security structure. Moreover, since the peace treaty with Israel Egypt has sought for the last decades a role in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as in inter-Arab affairs. Yet, the Egyptian security apparatus is to a great extent directed towards internal threats emanating from a large Islamist opposition in Egypt. In contrast, Morocco's domestic security concerns are directed towards the West Saharan conflict implying that the state is positioned against an opposition with demands of national self-determination and liberation. In terms of regime type, the tribally based monarchy has a modern professional army. Finally, the case of Saudi Arabia highlights the intimate linkage between state and regime security. Saudi Arabia also plays a longstanding ally to the US, being a critical part in the overarching American security strategy in the Middle East. The military combines a tribal force with a small and expensive professional army, which relies to a large extent on foreign assistance and training.

A fourth case, *Lebanon*, is also added as part of the most different comparative design. Lebanon is in many ways a deviant and yet a critical case to include in the analysis of political change in the Arab world. The long civil war and the tradition of paramilitary units have made Lebanon a unique case in the Arab world. The dominance and security concerns of Syria have further underlined Lebanon's peculiarities. At the same time, Lebanon's linkages with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as the dominant role of Syria indicate that Lebanon is a critical actor in any regional security structure.

* Karin Aggestam is researcher at the University of Lund, Sweden; Helena Lindholm Schulz is Professor at the University of Göteborg, Sweden.