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**UKRAINIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
SINCE THE ORANGE REVOLUTION**

by Taras Kuzio

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UKRAINIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY SINCE THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

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Ukraine's security policy will not change its strategic goals under President Viktor Yushchenko. Ukraine under Kuchma had already outlined a desire for EU and NATO membership in 1998 and 2002 respectively, but these goals had never been backed by domestic policies and both NATO and the EU had refused to consider Ukraine as a candidate for membership. What will fundamentally change under Yushchenko will be a shift towards an *ideological* commitment to Ukraine's domestic policies to meet NATO's requirement that countries complete an individually tailored Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Copenhagen Criteria required for EU membership. Since Yushchenko's election, NATO has evolved towards accepting Ukraine's candidacy for membership while the EU has continued to remain passive; in other words, little has changed from the Kuchma era when NATO had an open door policy and the EU a closed door policy. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine will no longer use a vacuous and constantly shifting 'multi-vector' foreign policy that serves the interests of the president and a narrow group of ruling elites, as was the case during Leonid Kuchma's decade in power, rather a foreign policy based on the country's national interests.¹

The paper is divided into three sections. The first surveys Yushchenko's foreign policy priorities in such areas as seeking membership in the WTO, NATO and the EU. The second section investigates the degree of domestic political support for Yushchenko's foreign policy priorities. The third section discusses the influence of international factors for the success of Ukraine's post-Orange Revolution foreign and security policy.

Yushchenko's Foreign Policy Priorities

Yushchenko's immediate foreign policy priorities upon being elected were four fold. First, to improve US-Ukrainian relations and return them to the 'golden era' of the 1990s under President Bill Clinton when Ukraine was the third largest recipient of US assistance.² US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst predicted that, 'We expect not only the revival of friendly ties that existed between our states seven-nine years ago, but the establishment of a qualitatively new level of relations'.³ This step was accomplished after Yushchenko's visit

¹See Tor Bukkvoll, 'Private Interests, Public Policy. Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.51, no.5 (September-October 2004), pp.11-22.

² On the Kuchma era see Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine's Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment', *European Security*, vol.12, no.2 (Summer 2003), pp.21-44.

³ *Kievskiy Telegraf*, 25-31 March 2005.

to Washington in April 2005. During the visit the Bush administration backed Ukraine's entry into NATO's Intensified Dialogue on Membership, the precursor step before an invitation to a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). After his visit to the US, Yushchenko reinstated the goals of NATO and EU membership in Ukraine's military doctrine, goals that had been removed by Kuchma in July 2004.

Second, to graduate from the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanick amendment that restricts the ability of the US to trade with Ukraine. The Soviet era legislation tied US trade to the USSR's willingness to permit the emigration of Jews. Ukraine graduated from the amendment on the eve of the March 2006 elections.

Third, to obtain political recognition of Ukraine's market economic status, a status Russia received in 2002. The EU and US granted Ukraine market economic status in December 2005 and February 2006 respectively.

Fourth, to obtain membership in the WTO. Ukraine began adopting legislation required by the WTO in June 2005, showing for the first time its real intention to combat intellectual piracy. Ukraine should join the WTO by the end of 2006, ahead of Russia. The Party of Regions, Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine, who together control 396 out of 450 deputies in the 2006 parliament, will support WTO entry.

Towards NATO Membership

The Yushchenko administration understands membership in NATO as a stepping stone to future membership in the EU. This view is therefore different to that raised by national democrats in the 1990s where NATO membership was supported as a means to counter a Russian threat that manifested itself in an unwillingness to accept Ukrainian sovereignty or its borders. NATO membership is potentially achievable after 2010 while membership in the EU could only become a possibility if the EU evolves towards accepting Ukraine as a potential candidate. The gap between NATO and EU membership for Turkey is instructive of how Ukraine's relations with both institutions could evolve.

Ukraine has a decade long active relationship with NATO through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and bilaterally with the USA and Britain in the 'Spirit of PfP'. Ukrainian military servicemen are studying in 14 countries, none of which are Russia. The largest number are in the USA (65), Germany (18), France (6) and the UK (5). Language training is being undertaken in Canada (26), Hungary (18), USA (14), Slovenia (10), Austria (6) and elsewhere.⁴ Ukraine should be invited to upgrade from Action Plans, yearly plans introduced in 2003 when NATO's relations with Ukraine were too poor to permit an invitation into the MAP process, to a MAP by the November 2006 NATO summit in Riga. Annual Action Plans in place since 2003 have pursued similar goals of all-round domestic reforms to a MAP and therefore Ukraine could quickly transfer from an Action Plan to a MAP. Ukraine has fulfilled many of the conditions to be invited into a MAP: long-term cooperation within PfP, contribution to the US-led coalition in Iraq, the holding of 'free and fair' elections in 2006, and the creation of a pro-reform Orange parliamentary coalition and government.

⁴ *Defence-Express*, 27 October 2004.

After the 2006 elections, Vice President Dick Cheney and Dr. J. D. Crouch II, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, both advised President Yushchenko of the condition of a 'democratic' (Orange) parliamentary coalition in place for the Bush administration to support Ukraine joining the WTO and obtaining a NATO MAP. A senior NATO diplomat echoed these sentiments, 'Assuming that the new government came in committed to working towards NATO, you could say by Riga that they had done enough to get into the membership action plan'. The US and other NATO members wish to support Ukraine's fledging democracy, reward it for holding free elections and, without explicitly stating this, protect it from predatory, authoritarian Russia.⁵ NATO's pro-active approach is therefore fundamentally different to that of the EU's passivity.⁶

The third - and final - round of NATO enlargement will be more complicated and time consuming than that of the first and second in 1997-1999 and 2002-2004 respectively. Croatia, Albania and Macedonia are taking longer to complete their MAP's than countries admitted into NATO in the first and second waves when the average time-frame for MAPs was only four years. The 2008 NATO summit will be devoted to enlargement and four or five countries in the MAP process (Ukraine, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania and possibly Georgia) could be invited that year to join NATO in 2010. The Bush administration wishes to leave office with Ukraine's emerging democracy inside NATO: 'the United States has finally determined its position on Ukraine's prospective NATO membership. The US will support it in every possible way and call upon the other allies to help to assist Ukraine to integrate into the alliance'.⁷ With authoritarianism on the rise in Belarus and Russia the contrast between these two countries and a democratic Ukraine is encouraging high level support in the US for Ukraine's early entry into NATO, but not into the EU.

The Orange revolution has improved Ukraine's image in the West and particularly in Washington at a time when Russia's international image is on the decline. This changed image could be seen during Yushchenko's visit to the USA in April 2005 when he was given the honor of speaking to both houses of Congress. Ukraine's democratic transition was re-started after the Orange Revolution, and it also has no unresolved border or ethnic disputes that could block Ukraine's NATO membership (unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan). NATO does not view Russia's stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2017 as a factor hindering Ukraine's accession to NATO.

Ukraine's drive to NATO will succeed or fail depending on two domestic issues of concern - political support and public opinion - rather than on international factors as the international climate is precipitous for Ukraine's entry into NATO. There is strong support at the Ukrainian executive level for NATO membership beyond the empty rhetoric of the Kuchma era. The Ukrainian parliament is in favour of cooperation with NATO, as was the case under Kuchma, but is divided over seeking membership. Support within the 2006 parliament for cooperation with NATO will have support among the three largest factions,

⁵ Daniel Dombey and Tom Warner, 'Nato Lines Up Ukraine as New Member', *Financial Times*, 26 April 2006.

⁶ See Kataryna Wolczuk, *Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union*, *EIU Working Papers*, RSCAS no.2004/15 (Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2004) and T.Kuzio, *EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?*, *ISS-EU Occasional Paper* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies-EU, December 2003).

⁷ Tatiana Silina, 'Have Vision and Act', *Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia*, 29 October-4 November 2005.

the Party of Regions, Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine. The Party of Regions states it is in favor of cooperation with NATO and points to Russia also cooperating with NATO through the Russia-NATO Council. Yanukovich reaffirmed the Party of Regions intention to fulfill Ukraine's international obligations.⁸ At the same time, the Party of Regions stance on NATO, and foreign policy in general, is still in a state of flux.

During the Kuchma era, centrists backed cooperation with NATO. Following their defeat in the 2004 elections, the Party of Regions and other centrists joined the left in voting against cooperation with NATO. The Communists and centrists (including the Party of Regions) voted against November 2005 and February 2006 parliamentary votes on NATO using Ukrainian long-range air transport and permitting foreign troops to exercise in Ukraine. Under Kuchma, NATO had long used Ukrainian heavy lift aircraft and NATO troops had been permitted to train during Ukraine's decade long cooperation with NATO's PfP under Kuchma. The votes against these two areas of cooperation with NATO by former pro-Kuchma centrists were defied logic NATO pays for the lease of long range aircraft and training grounds.

Beyond cooperation, support for Ukraine's NATO membership is limited to only two of parliament's factions, the Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine, who together do not control a majority of seats (210 out of 450). The Party of Regions, the largest faction in parliament, is currently opposed to NATO membership, a position that they continue to insist will not change. As an ideologically amorphous and eclectic group, the pro-business wing of the Party of Regions, which controls 50-80 of its 186 deputies, could evolve towards a neutral or positive position on NATO membership. This would be strategically imperative to provide a greater than fifty percent support inside parliament for NATO membership beyond the Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko bloc factions. The *potential* for the Party of Regions to evolve in its foreign policy stance exists. Presidential adviser Vera Ulianchenko believes that agreement can be reached between the three political forces in the Orange camp on NATO and the CIS SES.⁹ Yanukovich has also hinted that the Party of Regions could compromise over NATO membership if it were invited to join a parliamentary coalition and government.¹⁰ Former Kuchma First Adviser Serhiy Levochkin was even more optimistic that the Party of Regions would change their views on NATO membership over the course of the five year parliament :

'I believe and know that the position of the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine and BYuT on NATO and the formation of the SES (CIS Single Economic Space), the idea of the movement of the country to the EU, and the role and place of Ukraine in the international system concur in many areas'.¹¹

Ukraine is the first post-communist state where there is no support for NATO membership anywhere on the political left. The two left-wing factions in parliament, the pro-Orange Socialists (SPU) and anti-Orange Communists, both agree on opposing Ukraine's membership of NATO. Although it has only 54 deputies, the SPU is an important

⁸ Viktor Yanukovich, 'Peremozhstv sudiat?', *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 8-14 April 2006.

⁹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 28 April 2006.

¹⁰ V. Yanukovich, 'Peremozhstv sudiat?', *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 8-14 April 2006.

¹¹ Interview with Serhiy Levochkin in *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 28 April 2006.

constituency of the Orange camp. The SPU, which won seven per cent in the 2006 elections, has common policy objectives with other members of the Orange coalition on democratization and battling corruption, but would be in opposition on issues of land privatization and some market economic reforms. The SPU claims it is in favor of EU membership, as do the majority of Ukraine's political parties.¹² At the same time, many of the reforms that the EU would demand as part of the Copenhagen Criteria for membership would be opposed by the SPU. The SPU also continues to back Ukraine's non-bloc status, thereby remaining opposed to NATO membership.¹³

A second problematic factor is public opinion, although we should state at the outset that public opinion plays little role in the formulation of Ukraine's security policy.¹⁴ Yushchenko has promised to hold a referendum on NATO membership, although closer to the date of accession. Referendums on NATO membership are held during the year of entry which, in Ukraine's case could be potentially in 2010. Former National Security and Defense Council Secretary Poroshenko upheld the need for a referendum in the future as only 35 per cent of Ukrainians backed NATO membership. 'Public opinion polls indicate that if a referendum were held tomorrow, the majority of the population in Ukraine would not support it', he admitted.¹⁵

Table 1. Support and Opposition to NATO Membership (%)

	West	Centre	South	East
Support	31.3	20.6	6.3	7.2
Opposition	32.1	53.2	79.7	77.6

Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies Opinion Poll (Ukrayinska Pravda, 24 February 2006).

In Yushchenko's first year in office, 39 per cent of Ukrainians believed that NATO membership ran counter to Ukraine's national interests and 21 per cent believed membership upheld the country's interests. The view that membership ran counter was highest in the east (72 per cent) and south (45 per cent).¹⁶ The 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo, the 2003 Iraqi invasion and anti-American campaign launched by the authorities during the 2004 elections has damaged Ukrainian support for NATO membership. Throughout the 1990s, when Russia continued to remain a threat to Ukraine's borders and sovereignty, support for NATO membership in Ukraine had been stable at a third of the population, with another third of Ukrainians opposed and a third undecided. By the end of the Kuchma era this one third of support had dropped to 21 per cent, ranging from a high of 38 per cent in western Ukraine to only 4.9-4.2 per cent in the east and south, two Russophone regions dominated by the Party of Regions.

¹² See Anna Makhorkina, 'Ukrainian political parties and foreign policy in election campaigns: Parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol.38, no.2 (June 2005), pp. 251-267.

¹³ See SPU statement on NATO membership available on www.spu.org.ua, 28 February 2005.

¹⁴ See Victor Chudowsky and T. Kuzio, 'Does Public Opinion Matter in Ukraine? The Case of Foreign Policy', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol.36, no.3 (September 2003), pp.273-290.

¹⁵ *Interfax*, 29 June 2005.

¹⁶ *Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia*, 14-20 May 2005.

Ukraine will have three years (2007-2010) during the MAP process to undertake an information campaign funded and directed by the state. Although there has been a NATO Information and Documentation office in Kyiv since 1997, it received little financial or other forms of assistance under Kuchma. After Yushchenko was elected little has changed; an initiative by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies to re-launch the US-Ukrainian Advisory Group active in the 1990s failed because of Ukraine's unwillingness to allocate funds, a condition of a US foundation which had agreed to finance the project. Ukraine needs to prioritise the issue of public opinion as a strategic priority in its quest for NATO membership by 2010. The state programme to inform the public on Euro-Atlantic integration has suffered from a traditional problem of weak institutional capacity. Although the State Committee for Radio and Television was allocated funding to conduct a public information campaign this has been weak with few real activities in 2006, aside from a conference and the preparation of reports. One commentary believed that, 'the neglect by the State Committee for Radio and Television of Euro-Atlantic integration verges on sabotage'. It is the, 'the most outrageous example of a central body of executive government ignoring the national interests of the state'.¹⁷ The Ukrainian state is 'the least effective administrator' in preparing the country to join NATO.

If Ukraine is successful in reviving support for NATO membership to the same levels it had in the 1990s this would resemble a similar starting point for a NATO information campaign to that found in some other central European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia) who were also initially lukewarm on joining NATO. The potential to increase support for NATO membership exists within the one third of Ukrainians who were undecided in the 1990s and the 28 per cent who currently believe that membership is *partially* in Ukraine's national interests (compared to 21 per cent who see membership as upholding them).¹⁸ Support for NATO membership did not improve after Ukraine's troops were pulled out of Iraq ahead of the 2006 elections.

The EU's Continued Closed Door

During the Orange Revolution and after Yushchenko was elected, there was widespread optimism in Ukraine and the West that this would lead to a breakthrough in Ukraine's membership prospects in the EU¹⁹. One of the driving forces in the Orange Revolution had, after all, been the desire to move *away* from Russia and *towards* 'Europe'. Ukraine's newly elected leaders were self confident that, unlike under Kuchma, the speed of reforms and the reality of a new, Orange Ukraine, would give the EU little choice but to move towards a NATO-style open door policy. Then Deputy Prime Minister for European integration, Oleh Rybachuk, threatened to, 'undertake an orange revolution in Brussels' if the EU continued to ignore Ukraine. Rybachuk was eager to launch a two-year drive to fulfill the

¹⁷ Tatiana Silina, 'Ukraine's Long Way to NATO', *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 29 April-12 May 2006.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Typical headlines were by Gareth Harding, 'Time for the European Union to Back Ukraine', *United Press International*, 23 November, Anatoliy Lieven, 'Europe Has Moral and Strategic Reasons to Reach Out to Ukraine', *The Times*, 28 December 2004, Stefan Wagstyl, 'Ukraine to Press Ahead in Drive to Join EU', *Financial Times*, 10 June and Daniel Dombey and Chrystia Freeland, 'Turkish EU talks Give Hope to Kiev', *Financial Times*, 9 October 2005.

Copenhagen Criteria required for EU membership. 'I can understand Ukraine's entry into Europe as my life's aim', Rybachuk confessed.²⁰

Speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Yushchenko claimed that Ukraine's future lies inside Europe because, 'We, along with the people of Europe, belong to one civilization'. Yushchenko told PACE, 'The realization of the strategy of our foreign policy aim is membership in the European Union.' Domestic reforms in Ukraine to assist integration will 'become a real, and not a declarative, reality,' a clear jab at the vacuous multi-vector foreign policy rhetoric of the Kuchma era. To applause and laughter Yushchenko told PACE that, after his reforms, Ukraine will have changed so much that the EU itself will ask, 'Why are you, such a fantastic place, not yet in the European Union?'

Yushchenko had initially looked optimistically at the 2005-2007 period as a three year transition to an accession treaty. During these three years Ukraine would prove its commitment to the EU's 'core values' by fulfilling the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan, signed in February 2005. The EU has not made clear how long Ukraine should 'prove' its commitment to democratic values before the EU opens the door to membership. It is also unclear if Ukraine will be able to continue to sustain its commitment without the 'carrot' of EU membership as an inducement. The ten year EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994 but not going into force until 1998, will also end in 2007. It is still unclear what the EU would offer Ukraine in 2008 to replace the PCA and the three year ENP Action Plan. Ukraine would seek to include in any new agreement some commitment from the EU to an open door policy that gave Ukraine a long-term membership option.²¹

Working in Ukraine's favor are a different European perception of Ukraine following the Orange Revolution, steady progress in democratic reforms and the likelihood of joining NATO, which is usually seen as the stepping stone to EU membership. The European Parliament has also strongly lobbied the EU to open its door to Ukrainian membership and new post-communist states are strong advocates of Ukraine's membership in both NATO and the EU. There is also greater support in Europe for Ukraine to join the EU than for Turkey. 55 per cent of Europeans support Ukraine's membership of the EU, 10 per cent more than they do of Turkish membership. The highest support is to be found in Poland at 77 per cent with Britain and France also surprisingly high at 49 per cent and 58 per cent respectively. Only Germany had a greater number opposed than in favor of Ukrainian membership. The survey organizers concluded that, 'People who are against Turkish membership but who accept Ukraine feel it belongs to the European area. They see Turkey as outside their geographic area'.²² In the eyes of many western Europeans, Ukraine's Christian culture trumps Turkey's Islamic identity.²³ The situation is very different among west European EU members who continue to seek an end to any further EU enlargement beyond Bulgaria, Romania and possibly Croatia in 2007-2008. Enlargement fatigue is an

²⁰ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 18 January 2005.

²¹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 7 March 2005.

²² *The Guardian*, 24 March 2005.

²³ See the survey at <http://www.yes-ukraine.org/en/survey/november.html>

issue that influences attitudes towards the EU within both the left and right political spectrum in Germany and France.

Although public opinion within the EU, support from new EU members and progress on democratic reform work towards improving Ukraine's EU prospects, a breakthrough in EU-Ukraine relations since Yushchenko's election has failed to materialize. Two factors account for this. First, internal crises in the EU. Second, continued complacency towards Ukraine's EU membership objectives.

First, Ukraine's Orange Revolution and democratic breakthrough came at a difficult time for the EU and some western European member states who are in the midst of difficult crises. The EU enlarged by ten new countries in 2004, eight of whom were post-communist with a further two or three post-communist states joining in 2007-2008. The enlargement process has not been welcomed in western Europe as France has found it difficult to come to terms with a widened EU. Since the 1960s, when Charles de Gaulle instituted a unilateralist foreign policy and withdrew France from NATO's military arm, Paris's vision of the EU was that of an extension of Paris. As long as France was at the center of the EU then the EU was not seen as a threat to French national identity. A Gaullist vision of the EU as a deepened European and world power competing internationally with the USA came unstuck with enlargement. France also failed to introduce the domestic shock therapy that Margaret Thatcher introduced against the 'sick man of Europe', as Britain was called until the 1970s. With a widened EU and a US hyper power willing to conduct foreign policy outside the UN, France is in the midst of a deep sense of angst about its national identity. That an enlarged EU is different to a Gaullist EU came to the fore in 2003 during the crisis in Trans-Atlantic relations prior to the US-led intervention in Iraq. Central European and Baltic states set to join the EU a year later followed Britain's and Spain's lead and backed the US in the Iraqi crisis. France had come to realize that an enlarged EU would now include 8, and later 10 or 11, pro-US and pro-Atlanticist countries.

The most notable outcome of this crisis and angst over national identity was the rejection in France and the Netherlands of the draft EU constitution. The EU has always been an elite-driven project which has rarely consulted with the public, causing what has been described as a democracy deficit (turnout to European parliamentary elections have always been low). The Euro has only been introduced in EU member states where referendums have never been held; where a referendum has been permitted the Euro has been routinely rejected.

Added to these difficulties has been Turkish membership because of its size, large population, relatively low socio-economic development, and religion. Opposition to Turkish membership is particularly strong in western Europe as the addition of Turkey, creating an EU stretching from Eire to Iran, would spell the end of a deepened Gaullist EU. At the same time, it would be understood as a victory for the British vision of the EU as primarily a free trade zone with limited delegation of national sovereignty to Brussels.

Second, the EU continues to remain complacent towards Ukraine's membership objectives. The EU seeks to not offend the reformist leadership in Ukraine by continuing to keep the door closed while pretending it has slightly opened. This has been confusingly formulated by EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner as 'The door is neither closed nor open'. EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso repeated a refrain commonly heard under Kuchma that the onus was on Ukraine:

‘Our door remains open, the future of Ukraine is in Europe. The best way to get there is not to talk about EU membership all the time but achieve concrete results, show commitments to European values and standards’.²⁴

The EU has continued to treat Ukraine as part of its Neighborhood Policy, instituted in 2003 with all of the EU’s new neighbors after its enlargement. The only change to the Action Plan was the addition of an additional ten-point addendum. The inadequacy of these steps were already evident when the policy was unveiled in 2003 when it placed Ukraine on the same level as northern Africa and Israel, which are not part of Europe and therefore have no right to join the EU, and Russia, which has never declared its intention to seek EU membership. The EU has remained unmoved in not being willing to adapt to the reality of change on the ground in Ukraine. Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who took up the EU's rotating presidency in January 2005, said, ‘I can only warn against offering Ukraine the prospect of full membership’.²⁵

Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy

Five political forces entered the 2006 parliament and there is little consensus among them over the course of Ukraine’s foreign policy. As Yulia Mostova wrote, ‘Half the country wants to be like Belarus and the other half like Europe’.²⁶ With constitutional reforms introduced in early 2006 the power of parliament has increased and therefore it is important to survey the attitudes of parliament’s political groups towards NATO and EU membership. Ukrainians are not divided over membership of the EU which regularly obtains between 50-60 per cent support inside the country. Only the Communists in parliament, the smallest of the five factions with 21 deputies, oppose Ukraine’s membership of the EU. Obstacles to EU membership lie outside Ukraine in the EU which does not see Ukraine as a member. The opposite is the case for Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO which is unpopular domestically but has international support in key Western countries and NATO member states.

The Left

During the 1990s when the left controlled parliament they were unable to influence the course of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The left (Communists and SPU), with even fewer seats in the newly elected parliament (54), will continue to have little influence over Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation and decision making process. During the 1990s the Communists had the largest parliamentary faction but were unable to block Ukraine’s extensive cooperation with NATO or push Ukraine towards deeper integration in the CIS.

The SPU was included in the two Orange governments (Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Yekhanurov) and has provided strong support in combating corruption and promoting democratisation. At the same time, the SPU voted throughout 2005 with the Communists *against* legislation required for WTO membership. The SPU also agrees with the

²⁴ *Associated Press*, 6 October 2005.

²⁵ *The Times*, 10 December 2004.

²⁶ Yulia Mostova, ‘Choosing or Losing?’, *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 25-31 March 2006.

Communists in opposing Ukraine's NATO membership. Indeed, Ukraine is the first potential NATO aspirant member where the entire left, both pro and anti-Orange, is *against* Ukraine joining NATO. In other post-communist states the post-communist left, such as former Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski, supported NATO membership.

National Democrats

Since Yushchenko's 2004 election the executive has been dominated for the first time by the centre-right which has traditionally been more pro-Western and critical of Kuchma's vacuous multi-vector foreign policy. Yushchenko will continue Kuchma's policy of attempting to balance maintaining good relations with Russia when orienting Ukraine towards Euro-Atlantic integration and, like Kuchma, Yushchenko wants to anchor Ukraine in the West 'without overtly antagonizing Russia'.²⁷ During the course of Kuchma's two terms in office, Russia increasingly did not regard Kuchma as anti-Russian, especially during his second term. Russia did not see Kuchma's support for NATO and EU membership as a real threat because Moscow never considered these strategic goals outlined by Ukraine to be feasible while Kuchma was in power.

In contrast, Russia has always seen Ukraine's national democrats as 'anti-Russian'. Russia lobbied for Borys Tarasiuk to be replaced as Foreign Minister under the Yushchenko government and he was removed in October 2000 (Tarasiuk returned as Foreign Minister under President Yushchenko). Russia's attitudes towards Yushchenko were clearly seen during the 2004 elections when Russia intervened to block Yushchenko's election, including a suspicion that Moscow was involved in his poisoning. Russia did not intervene in three other 'coloured' revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Although Yushchenko is perceived as 'anti-Russian' by Moscow, this image is largely absent within NATO and the US. Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration will only be supported by the West if Ukraine's membership of NATO and the EU will be undertaken by Ukraine if it minimizes the damage this does to the West's relations with Russia.

Although national democrats have been consistent in their support for Euro-Atlantic integration they are represented in the 2006 parliament by a different political force to that under Kuchma. Many long-standing national democrats failed to enter parliament when the Yuriy Kostenko-Ivan Pliushch and Pora-Reforms and Order blocs lost the 2006 elections. National democrats are represented in the 2006 parliament by two of the five factions – Our Ukraine (81 deputies) and the Tymoshenko bloc (129 deputies). The Our Ukraine bloc continues to have a national democratic wing, as evidenced in Tarasiuk's Rukh being one of five parties in the bloc. Our Ukraine also has a large constituency of prominent businessmen, such as the Solidarity Party led by Petro Poroshenko, and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, led by Anatoliy Kinakh. Our Ukraine's main weakness is that it failed to become a united pro-presidential party, as Yushchenko called for when it re-named itself in 2005 to the People's Union-Our Ukraine. The five parties that make up Our Ukraine are marginal and without Yushchenko as Honorary Chairman it is doubtful Our Ukraine would be supported by large numbers of voters. The predominance of business groups over national democrats in Our Ukraine has made it more pragmatic, less anti-

²⁷ Matthew Kaminski, 'Viktor Yushchenko. An Accidental Hero', *Financial Times*, 17 December 2005.

Russian and inclined to balance Euro-Atlantic integration with other domestic and foreign policy concerns.

The Tymoshenko bloc is a more ideologically amorphous group, both national democratic and centre-left in its socio-economic outlook. On foreign policy issues the Tymoshenko bloc is nebulous. The Tymoshenko bloc's 2006 election programme was typical of this lack of a clear position which was so common during the Kuchma era. Ukraine's foreign policy, it wrote, should work, 'In the name of one's nation, on the basis of peaceful, equitable, mutually profitable, economic relations with all states...' The country's national priorities should be clear and always defended.²⁸ The Tymoshenko bloc can occasionally adopt foreign policy stances that are 'nationalist', seeking a third way that is *neither* pro-US or pro-Russian. Similar to Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc is disinterested in deeper integration in the CIS and supports WTO and EU membership, although it is more cautious on NATO membership. The Tymoshenko bloc has stated its unwillingness to give its backing to NATO membership unless public support improves.

Centrists

The only centrist political force in the new parliament are the Party of Regions who have the largest faction with 186 deputies. As the most ideologically amorphous party in parliament, the Party of Regions has the most contradictory and confusing positions on foreign and security policy. To describe it as 'pro-Russian' is a misnomer as centrist parties in the Kuchma era traditionally were *neither* pro-Russian nor pro-Western, but pro-their private and regional interests. As roofs (*kryshy*) for business, regional and corrupt interests the pro-Kuchma centrists were solely interested in the Ukrainian state pursuing domestic and foreign policies that were of benefit to their business interests. Ukraine's two centrist presidents from 1991-2004 therefore pursued a constantly vacillating multi-vector foreign policy which changed depending on the fortunes, whims and personal calculations of the president and his political supporters. In the Krawchuk (1991-1994) and first Kuchma terms (1994-1999) the centrists were allied to national democrats, leading to a pro-western foreign policy. In Kuchma's second term the centrists were isolated and national democrats were in opposition, leading to a foreign policy oriented towards the CIS.²⁹ At the same time, during Kuchma's second term this pro-CIS orientation did not reduce cooperation with NATO or halt the dispatch of troops to support the US-led invasion of Iraq, the invasion of which Russia adamantly opposed. Ukraine declared its intention to seek NATO membership during Kuchma's second term.

The Party of Regions entered the post-Kuchma era with contradictory foreign policy baggage. Ukraine declared its official intention to seek NATO membership four months prior to Yanukovich becoming Prime Minister in November 2002 and as Prime Minister he never opposed the official position on seeking NATO membership. This was also the case with Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the Social Democratic united Party (SDPUo) and presidential administration during the last two years of Kuchma's rule. After Yushchenko's

²⁸ www.byut.org.ua

²⁹ See T.Kuzio, 'Neither East nor West: Ukraine's Security Policy', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52, no.5 (September-October 2005), pp.59-68.

election both the Party of Regions and the SDPUo sought to use anti-NATO sentiment to obtain votes in the 2006 elections. During the 2006 elections the Ne Tak! (Not This Way!) election bloc, dominated by the SDPUo, conducted an anti-NATO campaign and collected signatures to hold a referendum. Yanukovych only raised the holding of a referendum on NATO membership after Yushchenko came to power (and not when Yanukovych was Prime Minister). Yanukovych argued that a referendum was required because 80 per cent of Ukrainians were opposed to NATO membership; yet, such a figure had not changed since the Kuchma era and therefore it was unclear why there was an urgent need for a referendum only after Yushchenko came to power.³⁰ Calls for referendum's on NATO membership had never been made by the SDPUo and the Party of Regions during the Kuchma era and their raising of this demand in 2005 was a calculated move to win public support in Russophone eastern and southern Ukraine.

Although Ukraine had the third largest contingent of troops in Iraq (and the largest non-NATO contingent) and officially sought NATO membership, the Kuchma authorities launched an unprecedented anti-American campaign in the 2004 elections in an attempt at undermining Yushchenko's candidacy, reminiscent of the pre-détente Leonid Brezhnev era of the USSR. The anti-American campaign was part of an overall return to Soviet ideological tools, such as spy mania and forcing school pupils to write letters against 'American imperialism', used in desperation by the authorities in a vain attempt at blocking Yushchenko's election. The neo-Soviet, anti-American campaign in the 2004 elections was orchestrated with the assistance of Russian political technologists working for the Yanukovych team. Their support from Russian President Vladimir Putin led to a *Russianisation* of Yanukovych's foreign and security policy in six areas:

1. Soviet-style distrust of the USA;
2. Opposition to NATO membership and an unclear position on continued cooperation with NATO;
3. Integration into the WTO and EU only together with Russia;
4. Disillusionment with integration into the EU and the lack of Ukraine's acceptance in 'Europe';
5. Strong support for deeper integration into the CIS Single Economic Space;
6. Coordination of Ukrainian foreign security policy with Russia in the CIS and in international affairs.

Yanukovych believed that EU and NATO membership would ruin Ukraine's economy and military-industrial complex.³¹ His views also exhibited an eastern Slavic inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West: 'I am against converting Ukrainian citizens into a cheap European workforce that obtains Ukrainian wages at European prices while paying European taxes'.³² A Yanukovych election leaflet portrayed EU membership as leading to the 'liquidation of our economy'. NATO membership, on the other hand, would pull Ukraine into 'military adventures', a reference to NATO's bombing of Kosovo and the US-

³⁰ Nick Holdsworth, 'Ousted Prime Minister Yanukovych Eyes Revenge as Orange Revolution Sours', *Sunday Telegraph*, 12 March 2006.

³¹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 12 February 2005.

³² *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 29 October 2004.

led intervention into Iraq.³³ The election of Yanukovych to succeed Kuchma as Ukraine's President would have meant the continuation of a vacuous multi-vector foreign and security policy. The greater *Russianisation* of Ukraine's security policy would have led to Ukraine reducing its reservations about greater integration into the CIS while continuing to be skeptical about the possibilities of integration into 'Europe'. Greater coordination of Ukraine's and Russia's security policies, long a Russian long-term objective, would have been tantamount to Ukraine returning to a status of Russia's 'younger brother' in international affairs as Russia would have gained a second vote alongside Belarus in international organisations. Under Kuchma, Ukraine backed Russia's demands that the OSCE reduce down its election monitoring and human rights activities and focus instead primarily on security issues.

The Party of Regions is in favour of economic reform because it is dominated by oligarchs and businessmen, and it will therefore vote in favour of economic reform regardless of whether it is in government or in opposition. In 2005-2006 the Party of Regions voted against WTO legislation as a protest vote against Yushchenko, a stance that will now change into a pro-WTO position. More problematical are the Party of Regions attitudes towards NATO and the CIS. During the 2004 presidential and 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions campaigned in favour of greater integration into the CIS SES. In 2003-2004, when Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc were in opposition, they described Ukraine's involvement in the CIS SES as 'treasonous'. President Yushchenko has changed this adamant hostility to the stance pursued by Kuchma in only agreeing to stage one of the CIS SES – a free trade zone and Ukraine's official position has continued to be opposed to stages two and three – monetary and customs unions. The Party of Regions campaigned in favour of going beyond Kuchma's stance and joining stages two and three, without describing these additional stages. These two stages would rule out integration into the EU as no country can be in two customs unions at the same time.

A second problem with the Party of Regions is its negative attitudes towards NATO membership, a stance that will be more difficult to change than its contradictory attitudes towards the CIS SES and EU. Senior Party of Regions official Mykola Azarov said, 'Yushchenko is pulling (Ukraine) into NATO which we are against. We are for the CIS SES, Yushchenko is against'.³⁴ Ukraine's choice of which parliamentary coalition is established will influence the manner in which NATO and the EU will look upon Ukraine. An Our Ukraine-Party of Regions coalition would send the wrong signal to the NATO and the EU that the Orange Revolution was in retreat. The EU is already passive in its attitudes towards Ukraine and an Our Ukraine-Party of Regions coalition would give sustenance to EU members who do not want Ukraine to join the membership queue. An Our Ukraine-Party of Regions coalition would also confirm to Ukraine-skeptics inside the EU that Ukraine's Orange Revolution was *not* a democratic breakthrough. Yushchenko's alliance with a political force hostile to NATO membership would also lead to a postponement of NATO offering Ukraine a MAP, meaning Ukraine would not be invited to join NATO at its 2008 enlargement summit.

³³ *Financial Times*, 26 October 2004.

³⁴ Interviewed in the *Kyiv Post*, 10 March 2006.

Influence of International Factors on Foreign Policy

Ukraine's membership of NATO is unlikely to create great difficulties for NATO. The US is a strong advocate of Ukraine's membership of NATO and the US position is backed by NATO's post-communist European members. Both the Bush administration and the Democratic Party support Ukraine's NATO membership. Some western European NATO members may wish to placate Ukraine's desire for Euro-Atlantic integration by offering it NATO membership in order to give the EU a greater opportunity to postpone opening its door to Ukraine. Since France withdrew from NATO's military arm in the 1960s it has less influence in NATO than it possesses in the EU.

Russia has been a consistent opponent of NATO enlargement, which Ukraine welcomed. Former Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov drew a 'red line', the border of the former USSR, at which NATO enlargement should not cross. NATO's enlargement to the three Baltic states in 2002-2004 crossed Primakov's 'red line'. NATO enlargement to Ukraine would again cross Primakov's 'red line', but for the first time into what Russia considers its exclusive sphere of influence, the CIS.

Although critical of enlargement, Russia has continuously cooperated with NATO through the Permanent Joint Council (1997-2002) and the NATO-Russian Council (2002). NATO-Russian relations only briefly deteriorated between March 1999, when NATO bombed Serbia, and September 2001, when Islamic terrorists attacked the USA. Following the terrorist attacks, Vladimir Putin sought to align Russia with the US in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).³⁵

Although strongly opposed to NATO enlargement into the CIS, Russia has only a limited number of instruments that it could attempt to use to thwart Ukraine's NATO membership. If Ukraine were to be on track to join NATO in 2010, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be effectively inside NATO for seven years until the twenty lease expired in 2017. NATO does not see the Black Sea Fleet as an obstacle to Ukrainian membership and considers it a bilateral issue between Russia and Ukraine. Russia has also threatened to end military industrial cooperation with Ukraine in the event of NATO membership but the economic and social effect of such a step would be difficult to gauge until it actually occurred.

Russia's limited capability of thwarting Ukraine's NATO membership were discussed by Bukkvoll who showed how Russian policies towards Ukraine in three key areas have failed.³⁶ First, Russia has failed to develop a coherent policy towards Ukraine because it has not been able to psychologically accept Ukraine's independence or the separate existence of a Ukrainian people. This national identity issue came to the fore in the 2004 Ukrainian elections when Russia intervened on a great scale in support of Kuchma's successor, Yanukovich, and to thwart Yushchenko's election. Russia did not look upon its actions as

³⁵ See John O'Loughlin, Gearoid O Tuathail, and Vladimir Kolossov, 'Russian geopolitical storylines and public opinion in the wake of 9-11: a critical geopolitical analysis and national survey', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol.37, no.3 (September 2004), pp.281-318 and Thomas Ambrosio, *Challenging America's Global Preeminence. Russia's Quest for Multipolarity* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), Ch. 7, 'Russian-American Relations after September 11th', pp.129-148.

³⁶ See Tor Bukkvoll, 'Off the Cuff Politics – Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.53, no.8 (December 2001), pp.1141-1157.

'intervention' as Ukraine, in Russian eyes, is not a 'foreign' country. Russia condemned Western 'intervention' while justifying its own actions as 'brotherly' support.³⁷

Second, attempts to incite Russian-speakers to mobilize against central government policies have not been successful. Eastern Ukrainians have traditionally been passive in Ukraine, as seen during the Orange Revolution. Separatism in the Crimea has been marginalized since 1995 and is no longer a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Third, and possibly the most serious potential Russian leverage, is the use energy pressure Ukraine. Such policies were first used in the first half of the 1990s over the Black Sea Fleet and more recently in 2006 to influence the 2006 elections and 'punish' Yushchenko. The use of energy for political and geopolitical purposes is difficult for Russia to pursue for three reasons.

First, Ukraine under Yushchenko is also in favour of raising energy prices to 'market levels'. If these price increases are undertaken gradually over the next five years, Russia would lose its ability to use cheaper priced energy as a form of geopolitical pressure. Ukraine's current price of \$95 per 1,000 cubic metres of gas is slightly lower than the price paid by central Europe and the Baltic states (\$110).

Second, although Ukraine is a 'gas junkie' dependent on Russia for its energy supplies, Russia is also dependent on Ukrainian pipelines to transport its energy to Europe.³⁸ 80 percent of Russian gas is transported through Ukraine, a figure which will only decrease to 60 percent after the northern pipeline is built from Russia to Germany. Therefore, as the January 2006 gas crisis showed, it is difficult for Russia to close supplies to Ukraine without also closing them to Europe.

Third, Russia also seeks to be seen in the West as a reliable supplier of energy and raised energy security as a key issue during the July 2006 G8 summit in St.Petersburg. The EU and US believe that the use of energy for political pressure is impermissible and during the January 2006 gas crisis supported Ukraine, not Russia. Vice President Cheney told the Community of Democratic Choice meeting in Vilnius:

'No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation. And no one can justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbour, or interfere with democratic movements'.³⁹

³⁷ See T.Kuzio, 'Moscow Continues to Undermine Democracy in Independent Ukraine', *Jamestown Foundation, Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vol.2, no.89 (6 May 2005) available at http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3323&article_id=2369714 and T.Kuzio, 'Russia and State-Sponsored Terrorism in Ukraine', Parts 1 and 2, *Jamestown Foundation, Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vo.1, no.90 and 91 (22 and 23 September 2004)available at http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3078&article_id=2368544 and http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3079&article_id=2368569

³⁸ See Roman Kupchinsky, 'Ukraine: An Unrepentant Gas Junkie', *RFERL News Feature*, 17 January 2006 available at <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/1/713D3DF6-BB10-4C3B-8630-2096AAB3F5B0.html>

³⁹ Vice President's Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference, Office of the Vice President, 4 May 2006 available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html. See also Hohn D.McKinnon and Gregory L.White, 'VP Cheney Turns up Rhetorical Heat on Putin', *The Wall Street Journal*, 5 May 2006.

Russia has refrained from threatening Ukraine over EU membership because the issue is purely theoretical and the EU, unlike NATO, does not have a negative image in Russia. Russia has allies in western Europe with whom it has good relations that are often at the expense of Ukraine. France, in particular, has a reputation in central Europe and Ukraine of Russophilia and a willingness to talk to Russia over their heads. French and German leaders have built personal relationships with Vladimir Putin in an attempt at forging a closer alliance with Russia against the Bush administration's 'unilateralism'.

The Russia factor plays a role in western Europe blocking consideration of Ukraine as a future member. EU deepeners are blocking the EU from fashioning a new open door policy to Ukraine while EU wideners would like the EU to move towards NATO's open door position to provide external support for Yushchenko's administration. The Russia factor also plays a powerful role in perpetuating the view in western Europe that Ukraine is a non-European state. Under Kuchma this was easy to accomplish as, despite loud claims to Ukraine's links to European geography, culture and history, its domestic policies were decidedly non-European. The EU never provided membership as an option for the twelve former Soviet states who joined the CIS, unlike the three Baltic states who never wanted any truck with the CIS. 'Europe', which is often subsumed as the EU, was understood as only extending as far as the western border of the CIS which was understood as 'Eurasia'.

Attitudes towards the EU are not unanimous in the CIS; only Western-leaning Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia seek EU membership with Russia and Belarus never having expressed any interest in EU (or NATO) membership. The EU has though, been unable – or unwilling – to fashion a policy to Ukraine that takes into account this major difference between itself and the other two eastern Slavic states. Brussels and Paris have preferred to deal with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as one CIS Eurasian group. The EU's policy has differed from that of NATO and the US which treated Ukraine as a 'central European' state, as in the 1997 Charter, and eligible for membership. The EU has in effect placed CIS outside Europe' and in inside Eurasia, thereby making it ineligible for membership, while NATO and the US have de facto ignored the CIS's boundaries. EU Commissioner Guenter Verheugen foresaw that in two decades all of Europe would be members of the EU, except Ukraine and other CIS members.

These Russophile views in western Europe are not found in post-communist Europe's new EU and NATO members. Ukraine's membership of the EU is supported by post-communist and Scandinavian EU members. Poland supports Ukrainian integration into NATO and the EU to provide it with security on its eastern flank: 'Without the prospect of EU membership, Ukraine will drift towards closer relations with Russia'.⁴⁰ Former Solidarity leader and Polish President Lech Walesa was an early visitor to the Orange Revolution, Poland and Lithuania hosted round-table negotiations, and former Czech President Vaclav Havel sent two statements of support to Yushchenko. Ukraine's allies in the EU include all eight of the new post-communist members, led by Poland. Austria, Finland, and Sweden also support Ukraine's EU membership. Poland, which had backed Turkish membership, has broken ranks with Britain by lobbying for Ukraine to be invited to join the EU at the same time as Turkey. Poland has become a major lobbyist for Ukraine in NATO and the EU, and Ukrainian troops in Iraq between 2003-2005 served under Polish control. At a

⁴⁰ Polish MEP Janusz Onyszkiewicz cited by *United Press International*, 23 November 2004.

February 2006 summit to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) the group stated its readiness to back Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.

In the post-communist era, Germany was supportive of Polish membership of NATO and the EU to secure its eastern flank. Poland sees a Ukraine inside the EU and NATO as the best way to secure stability on its eastern flank and provide a buffer between itself and Russia. This has been a long standing Polish geopolitical goal first elaborated in the inter-war period as *Miedzymorze*, the need for the region lying between Germany and Russia to cooperate in the face of these two large threats. Since World War II, the German threat is no longer an issue but post-communist Europe remains fearful of Russia, especially under Russian President Putin. Poland had been fearful of a 'Belarus-Lite' emerging on its eastern flank, which, Warsaw believed, Yanukovich's election would have secured.

New EU members are acutely aware that the success of their reforms in the 1990s was due to the EU holding a 'carrot' of future membership. Central Europe and the Baltic states signed Association Agreements with the EU that provided for potential future membership. New EU members do not believe that reforms in Yushchenko's Ukraine are sustainable in the medium term without such a 'carrot'. The EU has though, not provided any 'carrot' to Ukraine or other CIS states who were always treated differently with PCA that never held an option of membership. The CIS was also treated differently through the TACIS program that received far less financial and technical support than the PHARE program for central Europe.

The EU cannot indefinitely insist on Ukraine under Yushchenko continuing to pursue reforms to 'prove' its commitment to 'European values', as it did to Kuchma, with the pretense that Ukraine can succeed in its reforms without the offer of future membership. The offer of EU membership was a crucial external stimulant in persuading post-communist states with the prospect of membership to stay the course as reforms are inevitably unpopular and damaging to at the ballot box. As a post-soviet state, the reforms required in Ukraine will be far more unpopular than in post-communist Europe, making the need for an external stimulant even greater for Ukraine. The EU's decision to dangle membership in front of the western Balkans -- and possibly Turkey -- while denying it to Ukraine under Yushchenko is untenable in the medium to long terms. None of the four western Balkan states -- Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina -- have a clear timeline for membership. Nevertheless, the prospect of membership has been offered to ensure there is no return to the inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. There is no rationale for offering four western Balkan states membership while continuing to deny it to Ukraine as such a policy merely rewards ethnic violence in the Balkans and penalizes the lack of it in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Conclusions

Ukraine's declared strategic goals of EU and NATO membership have been in place since 1998 and 2002 respectively and Yushchenko has continued these membership goals set out by his predecessor, Kuchma. At the same time, this continuation in the strategic goals of Ukrainian foreign and security policy masks a break between the Krawchuk-Kuchma and Yushchenko era's that will influence the domestic content and degree of energy driving

Ukrainian foreign and security policy. The Krawchuk and Kuchma era's adopted a vacuous multi-vector foreign policy that was confusing, contradictory and ideologically empty. Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy was not driven by 'domestic influences' or public opinion but by foreign and security policy changing to accommodate itself to the objectives and personal interests of Kuchma and his oligarch allies. Ukraine's multi-vector security policy was vague because of the ideological amorphousness of the centrist camp. Both Presidents Krawchuk and Kuchma were disinterested in *either* Euro-Atlantic or Russian-CIS integration, regardless of their rhetoric in favor of either trajectories.⁴¹

The election of Yushchenko moves Ukraine to a more ideologically driven foreign and security policy that is focused on adopting the domestic reforms that would move Ukraine beyond the empty rhetoric of Euro-Atlantic integration that existed under his two predecessors. Under President Yushchenko, Ukraine has set its sights on the country's full integration into the full panoply of Western institutions: WTO, NATO and the EU. Yushchenko has gone further than his predecessors in describing NATO as an institution, membership of which would provide Ukraine with security guarantees. Speaking at the October 2005 Ukraine-NATO commission, Yushchenko was equivocal, 'Arising from the fact that NATO is an active guarantor of stability in Europe, Ukraine is preparing for full membership in this organization'.⁴² NATO has reiterated its open door policy, a policy that has always distinguished it from that of the EU. NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer outlined Ukraine's membership in NATO as a stepping stone to EU membership, as it traditionally has been with earlier aspirants. 'NATO is ready to assist in providing all manner of assistance and support to this state (Ukraine) in this area', Scheffer said.⁴³

NATO and the EU have advised Ukraine that they want the pro-Euro-Atlantic integration rhetoric of the Kuchma era to be backed up by 'action'. 'Actions speak louder than words', Scheffer said.⁴⁴ But, only NATO has backed this call for 'action' with the 'carrot' of membership. Four areas were signaled out by NATO that Ukraine should target. Ukraine should prove itself by holding free and fair elections in 2006, uphold the rule of law, there should be more resolute action against corruption, and improve public support for NATO membership. Ukraine held free and fair elections and the rule of law, and democratization in general, are moving ahead. The think tank Freedom House upgraded Ukraine from 'semi-free' to 'free' in 2006, the first CIS country to receive this designation. The battle against corruption is less successful, especially in the energy sector.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities have devoted insufficient attention to increasing public support for NATO membership.

The EU has continued to remain complacent and passive towards Ukraine's membership objective and Ukraine under Yushchenko has seen little progress in its attempt to be taken by the EU as a potential candidate for membership. The EU's closed door policy under Kuchma has only slightly opened, if at all. EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told visiting Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov that, 'Our door remains open' and 'The

⁴¹ See T.Kuzio, 'Neither East nor West: Ukraine's Security Policy', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52, no.5 (September-October 2005), pp.59-68.

⁴² *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 19 October 19, 2005.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Reuters*, 7 October 2005.

⁴⁵ See T.Kuzio, 'Gas, Corruption and non-transparency', *Kyiv Post*, 10 May 2006.

future of Ukraine is in Europe'.⁴⁶ In the same manner as NATO, Barroso reiterated the importance of 'action' by Ukraine to back up membership goals. Ukraine should, 'show its commitments to European values and standards', Barroso advised.⁴⁷ But, the EU has not made it clear how long Ukraine should prove this commitment to democratisation ('action') before obtaining a clear signal of membership prospects. If reforms continue to be implemented by an Orange parliamentary coalition and government following the 2006 free and fair elections, Ukraine will seek to include some obligation, however opaque, of future membership in any new agreement to replace the PCA and ENP Action Plan.

The holding of free and fair 2006 elections shows the gradual consolidation of Ukraine's democratic progress after the Orange Revolution. At the same time, there is little evidence of a consolidated cross-elite position on Ukraine's foreign and security policy within parliament. The two left factions oppose WTO and NATO membership. The greatest contradictions are inside parliament's largest faction, the Party of Regions, between businessmen and Slavophile, former Communist voters. The Party of Regions will now move to support WTO membership and may back away from full membership of the CIS SES, in effect, returning to Kuchma's position of only agreeing to step one, a free trade zone. Russia will though, not agree to a free trade zone with Ukraine if it refuses to integrate into the CIS SES Monetary and Customs Unions. The Party of Regions is again pursuing contradictory foreign policies as its call to fully participate in the formation of the CIS SES would not be supported by the majority of parliament. It is therefore more likely that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will proceed with integration in the CIS SES without Ukraine. During the 2006 elections the Party of Regions also claimed that greater participation in the CIS SES would lead to an improved gas deal. Again, it is not clear that Russia would agree to subsidise gas prices in Ukraine when it is raising prices throughout the CIS, including in pro-Russian Belarus and Armenia.

In order for Ukraine's progress towards NATO membership to be successful the Party of Regions needs to adopt a more neutral or supportive position. Party of Regions business and economic elites could move in this direction if they are convinced that NATO membership is a stepping stone to EU membership (as it has traditionally been). Moving the Party of Regions away from a negative towards a more neutral position on NATO membership is the strategic impediment of Ukraine's foreign and security policy during Yushchenko's first term in office and the life of the 2006-2011 parliament as the Party of Regions dominates Russophone eastern and southern Ukraine where opposition to NATO membership is greatest. Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc could become the bedrock of Ukraine's pro-NATO orientation but, they alone cannot push Ukraine into NATO and their only possible partner in this goal is the Party of Regions. Through the 2006 elections the Party of Regions has stuck to its current stance of opposition to NATO membership. Senior Party leader Ivan Rybak said, 'We do not want to be rushed into the question of Ukraine's entry into NATO',⁴⁸ indicating that the Party of Regions could gradually change its stance over the course of the 2006-2011 parliament.

⁴⁶ *Financial Times*, 9 October 2005.

⁴⁷ *Associated Press*, October 6, 2005.

⁴⁸ Interview in *Stolichni Novyny*, 26 April 2006.

Ukraine's membership of WTO is likely to take place in 2006, ahead of Russia. Ukraine could receive a MAP from NATO leading to an invitation to membership in 2008 and entry into NATO in 2010.⁴⁹ Both foreign policy objectives – WTO and NATO – will require cooperation between the two Orange and Party of Regions parliamentary factions in the face of opposition from two left factions. Successful entry into the WTO and progress towards NATO may grudgingly force the EU to change its passivity towards Ukraine, assuming democratisation continues to proceed inside Ukraine.

The election of Yushchenko has led to Ukraine being considered only for WTO and NATO, but not EU, membership. NATO membership could become a stepping stone for future EU membership, as in the case of Spain and Poland. But, it could also be indefinitely postponed, as in the case of Turkey which applied for EU membership in 1987. Some Western European EU members are in favour of the EU's 'borders' being defined after the next round of enlargement to south eastern Europe, effectively excluding Ukraine and the CIS from the EU (and Europe). Democratic consolidation in Ukraine is unlikely to take place if the country is only a member of NATO, but kept outside the EU. Democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine without the 'carrot' of EU membership are unsustainable in the medium to long terms.

⁴⁹ Defense Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko foresaw a MAP invitation in September 2006 and membership in 2009 (*Interfax-Ukraine*, 5 July 2005).