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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON "TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION"

rapporteur: Riccardo Alcaro

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Introduction

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful outcome of the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT RevConf), the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome held an international conference to debate nuclear proliferation trends and options for transatlantic cooperation to address them. The meeting was organised in cooperation with the EU Institute for Security Studies of Paris, with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Compagnia di San Paolo of Turin, the Rome Office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Embassy of the United States in Rome. It took place in Rome, on June 10th-11th, 2005.

The conference brought together experts, practitioners, and academicians from the United States and Europe to discuss a range of issues related to nuclear proliferation: current shortfalls and foreseeable trends in arms control regimes, especially the NPT; the Iranian and North Korean nuclear intentions as major test cases of the effectiveness and consistency of non-proliferation policies; US and EU approaches to and the prospects of a common transatlantic strategy.

Papers

The following papers were presented and discussed during the conference:

Non-proliferation initiatives and NPT review, by Serge Sur, Professor at Panthéon-Assas University in Paris 2, Director of the Thucydide Centre and Director of the *Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales*, Paris.

The NPT Review Conference: 188 states in search of consensus, by William Potter, Director of the Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey (California).

The European Union and nuclear non-proliferation: does soft power work?, by Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris.

A new non-proliferation strategy, by Joseph Cirincione, Senior Associate and Director for Non-proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC.

The Iranian nuclear programme and the West: From reactive to effective policies, by Riccardo Redaelli, Director of the Middle East Program, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como and the Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milan.

North Korea: A non-proliferation test case, by Daryl Howlett, Senior Lecturer, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Division of Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton (UK).

Prospects for a common transatlantic strategy to deal with the new trends in nuclear proliferation, by Gerrard Quille, Acting Executive Director, International Security Information Service Europe, Brussels.

First session – *Non-proliferation Initiatives and NPT Review*

The NPT is faltering because of lack of confidence. All participants acknowledged that the failure of the May 2005 NPT Review Conference in New York mirrors a deeper crisis of international nuclear arms control regimes based on multilateral agreements. The RevConf highlighted the increasing difficulties that the NPT member states have in finding common positions. The NPT is facing what has been described as a "crisis of confidence", because several member states tend increasingly to see the treaty's provisions as hindering their interests. Many parties focus on that aspect of the non-proliferation regime which best serves their interests, paying little attention to the interrelationship between the various principles of the treaty. In addition, key parties to the treaty seem less committed than in the past to these principles. As a result, not only the treaty's effectiveness , but also its credibility are now put into question.

The NPT no longer protects from proliferation. These considerations led some participants to ask whether the crisis affecting the NPT hinges more on structural factors than on political will. It was suggested that the NPT structure, designed during the Cold War and affected by the logic of the two-blocs system, is unable to counter effectively the most recent trends in proliferation – such as the nuclear ambitions of emerging powers, the considerably easier access to nuclear technologies and materials, and the risks posed by the combination of nuclear devices and "rogue states" or terrorist networks.

Many participants underlined that the NPT is no longer able to protect its parties from proliferation threats. The treaty's Article IV makes it possible to develop civilian nuclear activities, including enrichment of uranium, which can be quickly converted to military use. Furthermore, the treaty does not provide for adequate instruments with which to verify compliance with its provisions or credible means with which to sanction non-compliance or withdrawal. The persistent imbalance between nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states also fuels mutual mistrust and flaws the treaty's solidity. The 'official' nuclear weapons states have so far shown a weak commitment to Article VI obligations to disarmament, which is widely seen as linked to non-proliferation.

Has the 'proliferation taboo' been broken? Some participants expressed concern that in today's international context the NPT's main objective – non-proliferation – may no longer be seen as useful, because it does not help stabilise relations between rival powers, as was the case when the treaty was conceived. On the contrary, the treaty is increasingly seen as a political instrument for mutual constraint. As a result, it was argued that the 'proliferation taboo' – the assumption that proliferation is bad in itself – has been broken. Some countries, NPT members included, now tend to look at nuclear weapons as a means to strengthen their political status and give them a say in international affairs. From this point of view, nuclear weapons increase a country's prestige, as the cases of India and Pakistan apparently suggest. In addition, it was remarked that many NPT members considers the attempts to block nuclear civilian programmes as illegitimate. They argue that nuclear weapons states constrain the legal aspirations of non nuclear weapons states in order to keep their privileged status. Thus, the deal struck between nuclear and non –nuclear weapons states – that is, the trade-off between a commitment to non-proliferation and the

promise to disarm – is under deep strain. A discussant warned that if the NPT falls apart, a very dangerous devaluation of international norms could follow.

Bad preparation and weak commitment. Participants who took part in the NPT RevConf in New York reported that the meeting was ill-prepared, and that member states did not show enough commitment. Parties were unable to agree on rapid procedures and several delegations were inexperienced, composed mostly of persons attending an NPT Review Conference for the first time. The presidency showed a lack of flexibility –making bad use for instance of the consultative process – which played a role in preventing the parties from assuming more compromising stances. No final document or statement was released by the presidency at the end of conference.

Divisions among and within groups. Experts who attended the RevConf said that even though the negative outcome was predictable, the extent of divisions among and within groups was striking. Stark divisions had also characterised previous conferences. For instance, the 2000 NPT RevConf took place in a critical moment, and many thought it was doomed. However, the main collective actors in the NPT negotiations – the five recognised nuclear weapons countries (P-5), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) – showed a considerable degree of unity and were eventually able to find a consensus. In 2005, internal divisions affected groups' ability to find common ground for credible proposals. In contrast to what had happened in 2000, the P-5 did not issue any joint statement. The NAM has always experienced considerable internal frictions, which is no wonder considering its large size (it comprises more than a hundred NPT members). This time, however, there was no hint of a shared vision, with some countries – above all Egypt – rigidly maintaining their positions. Bitter differences between NAM members and non-NAM members also emerged within the NAC, leading the group to a substantial paralysis. Thus, the NAC could not play the strategic role of 'bridge' between the nuclear and the non nuclear weapons states that it had successfully played during the 2000 RevConf. Its internal divisions were described by one participant as a "growing gulf". In the eyes of many, the failure of the 2005 RevConf put an end to this group, at least in its present configuration.

Winners and losers. Participants expressed common opinions over the list of winners and losers of the RevConf.

Participants maintained that for the United States the results of the RevConf are mixed. Experts who attended the conference in New York described the American delegation as of low level, uncommitted, often not audible. It focused on risks posed by 'proliferators' like Iran and potential connections between "rogue states" and terrorism, but failed to make any significant concessions that could have facilitated an agreement. At the same time, the US, along with France, did not pick up from the difficult compromise achieved in the 2000 RevConf final document, which urged the nuclear weapons states to adhere to their commitment to further disarmament. This uncompromising approach led some commentators to express doubts over the US' willingness to continue to play a leading role in multilateral non-proliferation negotiations.

Some analysts concluded that the US missed a crucial opportunity to promote its own interests in order to retain total flexibility., Yet others noted that the current US

administration is not wholly uncomfortable with the outcome of the RevConf as it has repeatedly expressed its scepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral regimes and shown a clear preference for more informal initiatives. It emerged that the US tendency to de-link non-proliferation policies from disarmament while emphasising the need to confront proliferators is not accepted by the majority of NPT members. Its half-hearted support for the strengthening of the NPT was criticised by several conference participants because it makes it easier for countries to question NPT efficiency and credibility. On the contrary, experts praised the European Union for assuming coherent and pro-active positions on key issues like agenda, programme, and final report. The EU, represented by the Luxembourg presidency, emphasised the urgency to revise the allegedly lax procedures regulating withdrawal from the NPT. One participant who took part in the negotiations in New York reported that the EU was instrumental in preventing the RevConf from collapsing in the second week. However, the failure of single EU members to reiterate common European positions in their individual national interventions diminished EU leverage. French defiance over the 2000 RevConf results could be explained in this way, but one expert contended that the negative outcome of the negotiations do not coincide with French interests.

The Democratic People Republic of Korea was singled out as the great winner by almost all participants. It was regretted that the RevConf did not discuss the case of North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty in 2003. Indeed, Article X, which regulates withdrawal procedures, is widely recognised as one of the main flaws of the NPT. Equally disheartening was that NPT parties did not address treaty loopholes that can be exploited by non-state actors. As a consequence, non-state actors – such as terrorist networks – were also placed in the winners' list. Iran also came out a winner: it managed to divert attention from its controversial nuclear programme to nuclear weapons states' failure to fulfil their disarmament obligations. Some participants remarked that the political leverage that the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) can now exert on Tehran was weakened: the RevConf showed the difficulty Europeans would have in building consensus within the Executive Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for a resolution referring the Iran case to the UN Security Council. Some participants added Egypt to the winners. The hard-blocking role it played in negotiations contributed to the negative outcome of the RevConf. It was suggested that this uncompromising stance stems from a sense of frustration: Egypt feels it has conceded a lot in the past, but has not seen any positive returns. It was also remarked that Egypt's concern for losing its traditional leadership in the Middle East could lead it to look at Iran as an example. China was mentioned as a long-term winner of the non-proliferation crisis. Beijing largely benefits from US-Iranian estrangement because it considers Tehran a strategic partner in the Gulf region. Egypt can also be seen as one of its potential partners. Some participants warned that when Beijing is eventually able to offer it substantial incentives, Egypt could abandon the US camp.

The losers' list comprises all groups that have traditionally characterised the 'geography' of the NPT negotiations – that is the P-5, the NAM and the NAC. It became evident that the P-5, as a whole, do not share common priorities. They are split and unable to form a homogenous bloc on non-proliferation issues. Divisions among NAM members added confusion and melted the group's solidity. Apparently, non-alignment alone no longer provides common ground. The NAC, as already said, is considered close to its end. Several participants added that the Russian Federation has to be viewed as another big loser. It was unwisely marginalized at the RevConf.

Not all went wrong. Participants noticed that, despite bitter divisions on priorities and end-goals, NPT parties were able to launch at least one significant initiative, the Highly Enriched Uranium reduction and elimination initiative, which is aimed at reducing the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear sector. This measure was proposed by Kyrgyzstan and Norway and gained support from many other key actors, such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States. Participants suggested that the initiative, which is of great value in the fight against nuclear terrorism and the smuggling of nuclear technologies, could contribute positively to counter-proliferation trends.

Review is not revision. One participant stressed that the dismal outcome of the RevConf should not be seen as the end of the NPT. The inability to produce a final report or statement should not be exaggerated. Previous review conferences ended without a final document or declaration and were nonetheless able to obtain significant successes (the most blatant example being the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that indefinitely extended the treaty's life). Disillusion over the RevConf may also be attributed to over-expectations. A 'review' conference is not a 'revision' conference – that means the RevConf in New York was not entitled to change the treaty. A treaty revision is difficult to achieve because it requires unanimity. It was argued, therefore, that the loopholes in Article IV (civilian use of nuclear power), Article VI (disarmament commitment) and Article X (withdrawal from the treaty) can realistically be addressed only through agreements that fall outside the NPT framework. Given the unrealistic prospect of an NPT revision, some discussants asserted that counter-proliferation should rely on such measures as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (adopted in April 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the relevant conventions on terrorism or other, more informal initiatives. A participant suggested that the UN Summit and the following General Assembly session scheduled for next September could provide a valuable opportunity to relaunch at least part of the non-proliferation policies. Learning from the failure of the RevConf, the UN members could give a boost to non-proliferation policies, for instance by reasserting the central role of nuclear weapons states' commitments to disarmament or by urging the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to intensify its efforts to give new momentum to negotiations over the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Recalling the difficulty linked with NPT revision, one scholar advanced the provocative thesis that the indefinite extension of the treaty's life, achieved at the 1995 Review and Revision Conference and almost universally hailed as a great achievement, has actually been counterproductive: since the NPT can only be changed by unanimity, its indefinitely prolonged existence has made any NPT reform *de facto* impossible.

Extra-treaty initiatives. Participants generally acknowledged the utility of such informal measures as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), through which a multilateral regime to intercept suspect transfers of nuclear technology or materials has been established on a voluntary basis; the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines for monitoring sensitive national exports; and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, which aims at securing nuclear arms and materials in the former Soviet Union. However, there were differing views on the compatibility of such measures with the NPT. Some analyst argued that such initiatives as the PSI or the CTR are fully

complementary with the NPT because they address problems that the treaty does not cover or is unable to tackle. Other experts warned that there can be a trade-off between the treaty and these measures, which risks further undermining the NPT's significance. A participant deplored that NSG members have so far been unable to connect their actions with their NPT obligations and expressed concern that they could follow the same wrong path within the PSI framework. It was therefore argued that more pro-active consultation among countries is needed to ensure that these measures are compatible with the NPT and can contribute to upholding it.

NGOs and the media played a positive role. Participants who took part to the RevConf reported that a positive signal came from the large community of NGOs operating in non-proliferation and arms control issues, as well as from the media. NGOs attending the RevConf as observers were often better prepared and informed than national delegations and gave some significant, though unheeded, recommendations. Media coverage was reasonably high, reflecting the public opinion's growing concerns over proliferation trends.

Second session – *EU and US non-proliferation strategies*

The US has apparently shifted its attention from proliferation to proliferators. American experts underlined that the Bush administration has introduced significant changes in the US non-proliferation strategy. Both the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) and the National Strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (December 2002) have emphasised, as the main priority, the need to counter threats emanating from outlaw or hostile regimes that pursue nuclear programmes and their potential connections with terrorist networks. It was remarked that both documents, though correctly focusing on the necessity to enforce controls of nuclear arms and materials production and transfers better, signal the administration's shift from the possession of nuclear weapons, i.e. proliferation in itself, to 'proliferators', that is the would-be possessors of nuclear weapons. It was stressed that this approach is risky, because it relies on unilateral perceptions of threats.

The US strategy is not working. An expert referred to the Iraq war as the first implementation of this strategy. Indeed, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition was justified with the supposed attempt of Saddam Hussein's regime to develop unconventional weapons and its readiness to use them, and secondly with its connection with Al Qaeda. Recalling that intelligence data on Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological programmes, as well as on Saddam's links with Islamic terrorism, was all proven wrong, a participant stated that the current US strategy is not working and even proving counterproductive. US military intervention in Iraq, he explained, has exacerbated Iranian security concerns and probably fuelled the conviction of hardliners in Tehran that they need the atom bomb.

Libya, not Iraq, is the right model. It was underlined that the Bush administration's focus on enforcement – even through informal measures like the PSI – suffers from considerable drawbacks. A participant argued that what is needed is an holistic approach comprising all forms of non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament measures. The United States and its allies have already experienced the potential of a concerted, cooperative, multifaceted approach, in dealing with Libya.

Libya gave up its non-conventional weapons programme after international pressure on it mounted following the interception, in the context of the PSI, of an illegal shipment of gas centrifuges (used to enrich uranium) headed for a Libyan port. Nevertheless, participants agreed that that would not have been sufficient had the United States and Britain not engaged Col. Gaddafi in a pragmatic deal.

A participant remarked that today the nuclear proliferation regime is at a turning point: It presents challenges that a country alone, however rich and powerful, is not able to counter effectively. The United States, it was added, should promote a comprehensive approach based on cooperation. Washington should keep urging other countries to adopt and implement such pragmatic measures as the PSI, but at the same time promote international rules in the nuclear sector in a more consistent and pro-active way. An American expert noticed that the European Union has developed high-level non-proliferation standards that the US should assume as a model to follow and enhance.

The EU has become more pro-active. Experts agreed that with the December 2003 adoption of the *EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* (WMD), the European Union opened a new phase in its security policy. Since then, the EU has developed a more structured approach to nuclear proliferation and devoted growing financial resources to anti-proliferation initiatives. Nevertheless, the level of funding remains fairly modest. It was remarked that the European Union places great emphasis on the implementation of existing non-proliferation agreements, to which it does not apparently see any valuable alternative. The Europeans have mostly concentrated on Iran, which represents a testing ground for the EU's aspirations to play an effective anti-proliferation role. Participants agreed that the EU has been able to take on a profile distinct from that of the United States, even though its capacity to achieve substantial results without the American support was disputed.

Pros and cons of the European approach. Analysts warned that a realistic assessment of EU non-proliferation policies needs to take into account a range of hurdles that structurally affect all or most EU initiatives, given that they are usually based on an intergovernmental consensus and are carried out in a complex multilateral context. Several handicaps were cited: cumbersome budgetary practices, competition among member states, diversity of nuclear cultures, and different degrees of sensitiveness to the issue. Small and big countries often do not have a shared vision of their security role in international affairs, the latter pushing for deeper European involvement in international disputes and crises. Furthermore, divisions also exist among big countries. In particular, Britain and France, given their nuclear status, tend to retain a high degree of autonomy on nuclear issues. But it was argued that the EU can benefit from valuable assets, the most important being the availability of significant financial resources and, above all, its appeal as a trade and investment partner. Nevertheless, both European and American experts acknowledged that some deficiencies deeply undermine the consistency of the EU approach. First of all, neither the European Union nor its member states are able to provide countries like Iran with credible security assurances, which are widely deemed to be what Tehran seeks the most. Secondly, the EU lacks the intelligence and military capabilities to neutralise nuclear facilities through a military strike. Therefore, the EU can neither offer the biggest 'carrot' – a security guarantee – nor threaten with the most robust 'stick' – a

military strike. As a result, its ability to dissuade potential proliferators to give up their nuclear ambitions is limited.

More realism is needed. A participant expressed the opinion that the European Union should become more realistic over what it can effectively achieve. While the EU does not have the political and military means to replace American leadership in international anti-proliferation policies, it has not yet fully exploited its potential. Some participants observed that, in the final analysis, the EU's real comparative advantage with respect to the US is that it is not the US. Accordingly, it should become more pro-active, for instance by implementing the "thirteen steps" it endorsed at the NPT 2000 RevConf, or by imposing stricter conditionality on proliferation issues in its relations with countries 'at risk' since the "non-proliferation clause" that the EU currently includes in its trade and cooperation agreements does not make access to the European single market conditional on ratification of the relevant international conventions. . Others suggested that it should be more resolute on issues where it has a different position from the United States, for instance on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): if the EU is really convinced that it is possible to verify the elimination of fissile materials on a global scale, it should demonstrate it. While someone argued that the Europeans should not abstain from raising other scathing questions, like the continued presence of US nuclear arms on European soil, someone else doubted the opportuneness of putting the presence of US nuclear warheads on European soil into question. It was remarked that Washington, as well as others, still regards NATO's nuclear weapons – believed to be some 400-450, all carried by cruise missiles –a key component of European security. A discussant warned that if German political parties raise the question during the election campaign next Fall, this could trigger an 'avalanche' effect that would undermine NATO unity.

Is the EU really so soft on nuclear proliferation? One participant contended that the EU is not really that soft on non-proliferation, contesting that the "non-proliferation clause" is weak. On the contrary, it is as tough as it can reasonably be: it obliges partners to abide by international agreements they have already ratified, prompts them to move to other relevant multilateral agreements, and foresees the suspension of the agreement in case of non-compliance. The proposal to link the "non-proliferation clause" to ratification by third countries of other international agreements was rejected as unrealistic. The clause is included in most arrangements the EU has with third countries. For example, all action plans adopted in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which covers countries like Israel or Egypt, include it. In addition, the European Union pushes for very strict controls of exports of sensitive technology and materials. It was also recalled that the EU is very active on other fronts, for instance by cooperating with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or by urging all signatory countries – the United States included – to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible.

Is there room for US-EU convergence? There was a general consensus that it would be opportune, if not essential for the Europeans and the Americans to forge common positions on non-proliferation issues or, at least, develop their approaches and capabilities in a more complementary fashion. The combination of soft and hard elements that only the EU and the US together can offer was widely believed to be the

best option to face the Iranian case. One participant warned, though, that the United States and the European Union encounter many difficulties in working out functional complementarities; even agreeing on the common language for a joint statement on WMD to be issued at the end of the June 2005 EU-US summit was proving hard. Some participants remarked that the EU feels a bit uncomfortable with the US' tendency to stress the compliance obligations of only certain countries. The Europeans fear that this could lead to a further weakening of the collective structure of nuclear security.

Nevertheless, several participants maintained that the United States and European countries have concrete chances for cooperation. The Proliferation Security Initiative was singled out as a good example of coordinated counter-proliferation efforts. A participant suggested that it should be expanded to international waters and founded on international law. Yet another expert replied that there is no need for this, because the PSI is an informal initiative already in conformity with international law, even though some countries – including China – contest its implementation procedures.

Other measures were also suggested: the integration of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme with other arms control regimes; making the nuclear cleanout – that is, the elimination of unsecured fissile material – a global priority; establishing a technical assistance unit at the UN; building consensus to sanction withdrawals from the NPT; linking disarmament to a credible verification system; fostering intelligence sharing at transatlantic level. Several experts underscored this last point, because the role of intelligence is critical to threat assessment. The Iraq war, it was reiterated, is a sad testimony of poor intelligence: The transatlantic partners cannot afford similar failures in the future. In particular, a much more detailed assessment on the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear programme is badly needed.

Some participants doubted that nuclear disarmament can be carried out in a truly verifiable manner, because any verification system presents several flaws and gives rise to often endless controversies. The possibility of subjecting withdrawal from NPT to sanctions was also contested. The NPT is *de facto* impossible to modify, since this requires unanimity. Furthermore, many countries that accepted to enter the NPT as non –nuclear weapons states could not agree with extra-treaty measures which further restrain their potential use of nuclear technology.

Addressing the "three states problem". All participants expressed concern over the possibility that India and Pakistan's unchallenged development of military nuclear programmes might induce other countries to follow suit. A participant recalled that Japan was beginning to query its long-established commitment to non-proliferation. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were also pointed out as potential proliferators. Both countries may be encouraged by the inability of the international community to counter Iran's ambitions and to resolve the persistent question of Israel's officially non-existing nuclear arsenal. A participant underlined that India, Israel and Pakistan, as nuclear weapons states that have remained outside any international anti-proliferation agreement, represent a constant menace to the effectiveness of international anti-proliferation regimes and disarmament arrangements. This "three states problem" has to be addressed.

One participant criticised the EU for not assuming a more confrontational approach toward India and Pakistan and allowing them to freely pursue their military nuclear programmes. Europe, as well as the United States and others, should have

sanctioned the two countries. It was stressed, however, that the EU wants them to give the IAEA assurances on their non-proliferation commitments.

Discussants agreed that India and Pakistan will never give up their nuclear arsenals and join the NPT as non –nuclear weapons states. This option is completely implausible and the UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which contains such demands, should be considered obsolete. A participant suggested that all three states – thus including Israel – should be convinced by the US and the EU to abide by international non-proliferation commitments that currently burden the 'official' nuclear weapons states.

Third session – *Test cases: Iran and North Korea*

Iran

EU and US aim at irreversibility of uranium enrichment freeze. It was underlined that both the Europeans and the Americans share the assumption that Iran has to be prevented from further developing its uranium enrichment programme. So, though they have very different approaches – the Europeans rely on engagement, the Americans on confrontation –, they are equally seeking a complete and permanent end to Iran's uranium enrichment activities, following the suspension to which Iran committed itself on the basis of the November 2004 Paris agreement with the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany, in cooperation with CFSP High Representative Solana).

No legal case for sanctions. Doubts were raised on the plausibility of sanctioning Iran. It was remarked that the United Nations Security Council (even assuming that its members hold the same opinion on the subject, while the opposite is actually true) would probably fail to find enough evidence to justify sanctions. Iran is widely suspected of having developed a clandestine nuclear military programme for the last twenty years, but the only violation of its international obligations that has emerged thus far is that it informed the IAEA of having resumed nuclear activities much later than requested by the safeguard rules. Some participants added that there is no evidence of the supposedly military destination of the Iranian nuclear programme. The few traces of highly enriched uranium found by IAEA inspectors in Iranian nuclear facilities are not sufficient. Another participant, who had recently visited Iran, said that Iranian nuclear facilities are workshop-type and that, in his opinion, Iran still has a long way to go before it will be able to build the bomb.

According to other participants, however, there are enough elements – such as the presence of P-2 centrifuges in Iranian plants – to reasonably suppose that the nuclear programme has been partly hidden, and that this hidden part has a military application.

One analyst said that international law is not the only point of view from which to assess the Iranian case. The strategic and political implications of Iran's nuclear plans also have to be taken into account.

The effectiveness of a military strike is dubious. There was much scepticism about the positive outcome of a surgical, targeted bombing of Iranian nuclear sites. The 1981 Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear facility of Osirak, which blocked the development of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, was successful thanks to a series of circumstances that are absent in the case of Iran. Apart from the political implications of a new military strike against an Islamic country – which all participants acknowledged

would further enflame the Middle East and the Islamic world –, there is great uncertainty about what such an attack would achieve. If the programme is hidden, it will resist better than the Osirak facility. The only result of the strike would be a slight delay. Furthermore, intelligence information on Iran's unauthorised nuclear activities is reported to be poor. A participant stressed that the United States cannot afford another huge intelligence failure after no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq.

Yet another expert observed that, if the objective is to put an end to the nuclear programme of Iran before it has developed to the point that it cannot be stopped, the right time to attack Iran would be now. So he warned that the military option, though not probable, is and will for the foreseeable future be on the table of the US president.

Is Iran really a rogue-state? Many participants expressed the conviction that the Iranian proliferation crisis goes beyond the sector of international nuclear arms control and has its roots in the twenty-five –year long diplomatic confrontation between the regime in Tehran and the United States. In the 2002 National Security Strategy, the United States emphasised the risk of the connection between unconventional weapons and "rogue states" – that is, hostile governments – or terrorist networks as the most dangerous threat to its security. Iran is allegedly sponsoring terrorism in Palestine and Lebanon and in his 2002 state of the Union address, President Bush included it in the "axis of evil".

One scholar contented that such a perception of Iran as a standing threat to global security is largely misleading. He emphasised that Iran is at the centre of an unstable and potentially threatening regional environment, has no reliable partners and suffers from diplomatic isolation mainly because of its antagonism with the US. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of American troops operate in neighbouring countries (Iraq and Afghanistan) and in the Persian Gulf. Iran has, therefore, understandable security concerns. Other participants remarked that Tehran does not act as a rogue state: its foreign policy behaviour – including its constant efforts to avoid exacerbating ethnic and religious tensions in Afghanistan and Iraq – proves its willingness to play a constructive role in the region and to be recognised as a credible actor in and beyond the Gulf area. The nuclear issue has become a matter of national pride, which the increasing unpopular clerical regime has been able to exploit so far to keep control over the country. In this context, an attack against Iran because of its nuclear programme would be perceived by the majority of the population as an attack against the whole nation. In addition, it should be taken into account that the nuclear issue is not in the hands of the government, but in those of the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the heads of the security forces. Finally Iran, which lacks the financial resources to develop conventional military programmes, considers the nuclear programme the best rational choice to prevent a forceful regime change led by foreign powers.

Some participants suggested, therefore, that the US should adopt a more articulated approach towards the Iranian regime, assessing the potential of a cooperative Iran in an unstable and strategically crucial area. Even Israel does not tend to take on a confrontational stance against Tehran.

Though badly needed, a Gulf region security arrangement is improbable. Most participants agreed then that what Iran is currently looking for is an understanding with the US on security issues. Tehran seeks guarantees that the US will not use the

'regime change' card against it. Secondly, Iran wants to play a decisive role in whatever regional order will emerge after the tectonic change in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some discussants argued that this would require an effort on the part of the US to bring the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) into security talks with the Iranians. But one participant said the chances of such a possibility were low. Apart from US rigidity towards Iran, the other countries in the Gulf region do not trust each other. A scholar reminded those present that the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council itself could be seen as an attempt by the Gulf countries to prevent Iranian interference in internal politics. Another participant underlined that, as far as cooperation is concerned, the GCC states and Iran still think in terms of a zero-sum game. This mindset needs to be reversed, and a participant noted that the Europeans could have a role in doing this.

G-8 rather than EU-3? An expert proposed that the EU-3 negotiating group, which has so far obtained only limited results, should evolve into a larger one including all G-8 members. This new framework would be the right follow-up of the EU-3 formula, because it would offer several advantages while retaining the good results the Europeans have so far reached. The G-8 negotiating formula would directly involve Japan, Italy and Russia – all countries that have strong economic and energy relations with Iran – in the talks. The G-8 could also be a face-saving formula to allow the United States to participate in the negotiations. Such a framework would probably meet Iranian aspirations to become a significant regional actor and a respected member of the international community.

Uranium enrichment: politically acceptable? One participant remarked that Tehran would never agree to the European (and American) condition of making the suspension of uranium enrichment activities irreversible. He therefore concluded that this request – which is central to the European negotiators' agenda – should be abandoned. Uranium enrichment should be recognised as a legitimate activity, but should at the same time be made less attractive through offers of the security assurances and economic incentives Iran longs for. Tehran claims that it needs to have enrichment capabilities, at least for research. If the West were to consent to Iran's wish to distinguish between 'research enrichment' – which it would continue to develop – and 'real enrichment' – that is, production of highly enriched uranium in a larger scale, which it would drop – there would be room for negotiation. According to this policy recommendation, Europe and America should provide Iran with fuel cycle services, for instance by bringing the nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and Iran on the Bushehr nuclear power plant into the multilateral context, or by initiating an EU-Iran joint venture to run the Natanz enrichment plant using EURODIF facilities.

Some participants objected that bringing EURODIF into the Iranian nuclear programme is unlikely, if not impossible. In addition, experts maintained that talks should be conducted on a bilateral basis, which is much more flexible and makes it possible to address questions that are particularly problematic directly. Supporters of the multilateral framework objected that there is deep mistrust between the United States and Iran, which makes bilateral talks an implausible option.

A participant suggested that Iran should be allowed to develop a virtual capacity to build a nuclear arsenal and be satisfied with that, as is the case with Japan. This would respond to its security worries because a virtual capacity is a sort of deterrence.

Some participants, however, raised serious doubts that the "Japanese model" could actually be repeated elsewhere.

What about human rights? Almost all participants agreed that Europeans should bring the respect and defence of human rights in Iran onto the negotiating table. Yet a participant objected that adding a human rights dimension to the talks would reduce and not increase the chance of a possible understanding.

North Korea

Regional complexity worsens North Korean crisis. According to an expert on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), a very complex regional environment hampers efforts to solve the proliferation crisis stemming from North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in early 2003 and its alleged development of a nuclear military programme. Northeast Asia does not have structured multilateral arrangements, even though regional actors – the United States included – are developing an ever-closer economic interdependence. Regional rivalry could trigger a 'proliferation chain' involving states like Japan and/or South Korea, both of which have the technological and financial resources to develop a military nuclear programme. Japan, in particular, has deliberately stopped short of passing the nuclear threshold and is believed to be able to build a nuclear arsenal in a short time. Furthermore, some participants expressed the fear that the 'proliferation chain' could involve non-state actors, especially if they were to find a way to exploit North Korea's structural weaknesses. This assumption was deemed pure speculation by other participants because North Korea is unlikely to transfer abroad the nuclear materials and technologies on which it is spending a disproportionate share of its scarce financial resources. Nevertheless, no participant contested that future proliferation trends imply risks of the increasing participation of non-state actors in illicit nuclear traffic.

North Korea's strategic culture is based on radical assumptions. A participant emphasised the need to gain a better understanding of the peculiar strategic paradigm of North Korea, in order to clarify what is at stake for Pyongyang and what can be done to dissuade it from its nuclear ambitions. As both Russia and China have considerably improved their relationship with the United States since the end of the Cold War, North Korea's international isolation has sharpened. Kim Jong Il's regime tends to see itself as under a standing threat of being ousted by an external power, notably the United States. Security threats, therefore, are perceived as threats against the nation's very existence or, at least, against the survival of the regime. As is the case in Iran, gaining nuclear weapons capabilities is largely seen as the best rational choice in terms of both military power and cost. Like Iran, the DPRK needs to rein in its expenditure for conventional military programmes. A participant noted that Pyongyang leadership has misrepresented expectations of foreign powers' intentions and plans. More generally, the fact that the DPRK is fighting for its very survival, makes its behaviour unpredictable.

The six-party talks should be more coordinated. All participants were of the opinion that North Korea, again like Iran, longs for security assurances from the United States. A discussant suggested that Pyongyang aims at a peace treaty with Washington, given that the 1950-53 war ended without any formal arrangement. North Korean

defiance toward the six-party talks, the negotiating framework addressing DPRK's nuclear programme issue, stems from its perception that the US is using the negotiations to avert considering the offer of a peace or non-aggression deal. Actually no participant believed that the US is ready for such a step, but there was a relatively unanimous consent about Washington's willingness to use diplomacy to solve the crisis. A military strike against North Korean nuclear sites was largely considered improbable, though the US could leave the door open even for that option.

A participant who took part in the NPT RevConf in New York noticed that the six-party talks are in line with the much suggested diplomatic optionfor solving such issues. Regional initiatives can be a powerful instrument to attain a positive outcome from problematic situations. It was also reported, however, that this opinion, though widespread, was by no means unanimous.

Another participant underlined that the six-party talks had until then not fully exploited their potential and suggested that they be more coordinated. The United States, Japan and South Korea have agreed that a confrontational stance has to be integrated with humanitarian aid offers, but have failed to agree on whether the issue should be taken before the UN Security Council if North Korea keeps resisting nuclear dismantlement requests. South Korea opposes such a move, while the US and Japan are in favour. As for other parties, it was stressed that China has a critical role, given its long-established friendship with the DPRK, while Russia's part in the game is of a lower profile.

Drawing attention to what ultimate objective of North Korea's interlocutors might actually be, a participant suggested that rather than focusing only on the DPRK's nuclear disarmament, they should concentrate their efforts on establishing a nuclear weapons free zone on the Korean Peninsula as a necessary step toward the eventual reunification of the two Koreas.

DPRK-like cases of NPT non-compliance must be addressed. It was emphasised that withdrawing from NPT is a right that countries wish to retain, otherwise they would be much less ready to join international agreements. It was observed, in fact, that North Korea has followed the prescribed procedure for withdrawing, apart from failing to provide other NPT parties and the UN Security Council with a detailed explanation of the reasons for the move.

All participants agreed that North Korea's cynical exploitation of the loopholes of NPT Articles IV and X (regulating assistance in the civilian nuclear sector to parties lacking the needed capabilities and withdrawal procedures, respectively) made urgent the need to find adequate responses.

Amending NPT Art. X is necessary… On this basis, a participant concluded that the NPT should be at least partially amended. He referred to the paper on this issue presented by the European Union at the New York RevConf, which proposes that, under certain circumstances, safeguards should continue to be applied even after withdrawal. The paper contains a range of proposals, among them changing the wording of Art. X, so that it envisages direct consequences for withdrawal; reiterating the binding nature of Art. X, including the provision demanding detailed notification of the reasons for withdrawal; taking into account the state of compliance with NPT obligations of the notifying country; sanctioning possible effects of withdrawal on the basis of the principle that the responsibility for the international violations of the withdrawing state is inextinguishable; affirming that withdrawal from NPT is a threat to global security;

and forcing the notifying party to give back technologies and materials obtained under NPT guarantees.

…but extremely difficult. Again, many participants noted that, however useful it could be, amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a very difficult task. No state, it was argued, would be willing to join an international treaty without being recognised the right to withdraw from it. A possible re-interpretation of Art. IV, aimed at banning uranium enrichment activities (not mentioned as an explicit legitimate activity), was also deemed implausible. Many European NATO members would never have become part to the treaty, if it had not allowed non–nuclear-weapons states to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.. Clearly, the scepticism about the possibilities of amending the NPT stems not only from the unanimity requirement, but also from the states' reluctance to accept amendments that would further constrain their sovereignty.

North Korean crisis must be kept distinct from the debate on NPT deficiencies. A participant underscored that the debate about the urgency and necessity to address NPT deficiencies, through amendments or in other ways, must be kept separate from the debate on how to deal with the DPRK nuclear crisis. The first problem regards the international legal means to prevent nuclear proliferation before it takes place. The second problem concerns a present nuclear proliferation menace that has to be addressed properly.

Similarities and differences of the Iran and North Korea cases. Some participants argued that a comparison of the similarities and differences in the Iranian and North Korean proliferation cases would help to find the right strategies to face them. As for similarities, discussants mentioned the international isolation of both regimes, their concerns over US regime change policy, their search for defence self-reliance as a security imperative, the diplomatic brinkmanship they have resorted to, and the prestige they both accord to the status of nuclear weapons state.

As for the differences, a participant stressed that Iran is still part of the NPT family and has thus far not given clear signs of wanting to leave it. He also reminded that any allegation of the military destination of the nuclear programme has to be proved and that Iran still maintains that it has no intention of building a nuclear arsenal. He interpreted this attitude as reflecting Iran's readiness to reach a deal on the nuclear issue. On the contrary, North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent announcement of having pursued a military nuclear programme (and related delivery system) based on plutonium separation have dealt a serious blow to international nuclear arms control regimes. While all participants agreed that North Korea's behaviour deserves general condemnation, they did not feel the same way about Iran. As already mentioned, some participants contested the perception of Iran as a rogue state, contending that this definition hinges more on its attitudes toward the United States and the Westthan on objective criteria. Pakistan and Israel were cited as examples of states that are treated as friendly governments by Europeans and Americans even although their behaviour, in some respects, resembles that of a rogue state.

Is Pakistan the real rogue state? A discussant reminded everyone that neither the US nor the EU has ever sanctioned Israel for having developed a secret military nuclear programme in a highly unstable region. Other participants pointed to Pakistan as

the rogue state *par excellence*, as it appears to fit all the criteria: it is run by a dictator, hosts innumerable extremist Islamic schools, its military and security services have close links with terrorist networks, it has been a nuclear proliferator and, worse, has been a nuclear smuggler too. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist known as the father of Pakistan's atom bomb, had based in Pakistan his criminal network for illegally selling nuclear materials, technologies and expertise to such authoritarian regimes as Libya, Iran and, probably, North Korea. Experts agreed that the twenty-year activity of Khan's criminal network has caused huge damages to non-proliferation regimes.

Several participants objected to this perception of Pakistan, pointing out that Musharraf's government has supported Western actions against Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan and has taken severe measures to curb the spread of violent Islamic extremism.

Fourth session – *Prospects for a common transatlantic strategy to deal with the new trends in nuclear proliferation*

International non-proliferation regimes need strong leadership. A participant tried to resume the basic assumptions that had emerged from the discussions in the first three sessions. He registered unanimous consensus on the crisis affecting multilateral institutions dealing with nuclear proliferation, the NPT's wavering being the most relevant evidence of it.

The United States, especially under the current administration and increasingly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, has shown a marked preference for measures focused on US security priorities and carried out in cooperation with informal groupings of like-minded countries. The US can play an undisputed leading role in those groupings thanks to its superiority in military and intelligence resources. The most innovative of these initiatives, the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as long-established programmes such as those undertaken under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or the proposed strengthening of the NSG guidelines, have encountered almost general approval, especially because they aim to ensure the enforcement of the rules concerning arms and exports controls.

Nevertheless, several participants criticized the US for having neglected the established multilateral anti-proliferation arrangements. By doing so, it was argued, Washington has contributed to weakening the multilateral institutions and eroding the legitimacy of international norms. It is now a fact that the actual or aspirant proliferators are taking advantage of that. US involvement in initiatives aimed at strengthening multilateral frameworks was considered a necessary step to increase global security.

It was observed that the anti-proliferation policies of the European Union have made big strides forward. Some participants noticed that, paradoxically, the Bush administration's unilateralism and manifest scepticism about the role of multilateral institutions has prompted the Europeans to define more clearly the peculiar role that the EU can play in promoting unconventional arms control regimes. The EU member states have managed to work out a European Security Strategy that emphasises the risks associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction. However, it was observed that the EU strategies present significant flaws, especially regarding enforcement. So no one was convinced that the EU can achieve a lot alone. In this regard, some participants raised the question whether a failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty could impact on the EU-3's negotiations with the Iranians. Different opinions were expressed on the

matter, but a point of agreement was that the European integration *impasse* could be a major obstacle to further development of CFSP, in particular of such relatively new policies as anti-proliferation.

In this context, the question of leadership – which implies credibility and legitimacy beyond capabilities – remains crucial. Nobody contested that this leadership should be exerted by the United States, although the EU's contribution was judged fundamental as well.

Building blocks of a transatlantic non-proliferation agenda. A participant expressed the opinion that Americans and Europeans can forge a combined approach by merging their approaches in a common agenda.

One participant suggested that transatlantic cooperation can be depicted as a multi-level structure that resembles a pyramid. According to this metaphor, the top of the pyramid coincides with the strategic assessment of security priorities in nuclear issues. At this level the United States and the European Union do not differ: both the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (December 2003) single out the connection between the availability of WMD and unstable governments or terrorist networks as the biggest threat to global security.

The first differences are to be found further down the pyramid, when it come to policies. The EU has shown that it has difficulty in developing pro-active policies to address the security threats, given its limited defence resources and the lack of a solid strategic culture. The European countries' geographic proximity to problematic regions like North Africa or very unstable areas such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf also induce them to embrace a compromising attitude. Indeed, the EU has developed a softer approach, principally based on diplomacy and engagement. The United States, which spends much more in defence than all EU members combined, tends to rely on military means more than Europeans and to take a tougher diplomatic stance when a proliferation case emerges.

At the bottom of the pyramid, that is the operational level, Europeans and Americans have made significant progresses on specific issues, such as the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the PSI and the G-8 measures in support of CTR programmes.

However, the recent transatlantic convergence on anti-proliferation policies must be seen only as a starting point. The newly emerging challenges, including the possible acquisition of nuclear capabilities by some proliferator, will require more structured common responses.

Is there common ground for a transatlantic strategy? Several participants contested that there is enough common ground to build a transatlantic strategy, arguing that Europeans and Americans do not share a strategic vision, though they have common interests on many issues. A crucial point of divergence concerns the role of multilateralism. While the EU has consistently emphasised its central importance, the US has repeatedly denounced the ineffectiveness of multilateral organisations and arrangements. There is also a strong feeling in Washington that they are used by hostile or rival countries as political instruments to constrain American power. This explains the US delegation's weak commitment to NPT reinforcement at the May 2005 NPT Review Conference, the US refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though Washington signed it in 1996, and its reluctance to bolster

negotiations for the long-invoked FMCT. The European Union, on the contrary, has made the strengthening of the NPT, ratification of the CTBT, and the conclusion of negotiations on the FMCT the top priorities of its anti-proliferation agenda. A participant suggested that the European Union should further consolidate its international position by taking the lead in the verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation and the follow-up process for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

The European Union and the United States have common interests in such areas as the fight against nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism. Therefore, the prospect of consolidating pragmatic cooperation seems plausible whereas it appears much more difficult to transform it into a systematic common strategy.It is fairly clear however that US-EU collaboration today suffers from too much improvisation. What is needed is a credible operational framework for cooperation. Any strategic notions that could curb efforts to achieve better coordination should be put aside.

Convergence is the key. Several participants held the view that pragmatic convergence of the European and American approaches is the most rational option: in the first instance, the EU and the US need to converge operationally rather than strategically.

Yet opinions on how convergence should be pursued differed largely. The 'bad cop/good cop' formula was indicated as a possible model by several participants. But while the United States appears to be ready to play the 'bad cop' and the EU the 'good cop' – as in the Iran case –, it was stressed that the formula should be flexible and the partners allowed to change roles. Someone suggested that this formula could evolve into a more sophisticated division of labour between the Europeans and the Americans. But others firmly contested the usefulness of such a division of labour, stating that the 'bad cop/good cop' formula has not prevented Iran from driving a wedge between the US and the EU. From this point of view, what is needed is coordinated development of complementarities, so that the Americans and Europeans are able to forge a compact, flawless common front. One participant pointed out that the prospects for solving the dispute over the Iranian nuclear programme had improved slightly since the US administration chose to back European efforts to reach a deal, although much greater convergence is necessary. One participant complained that this insufficient convergence will probably cost the world a nuclear Iran.

A participant recalled that the Atlantic allies have already started to cooperate on non-proliferation issues within NATO. He cited the initiative against the spread of nuclear weapons launched by NATO in 1994. The NATO approach contemplates both diplomatic dissuasion and military response. He insisted that NATO should be given a larger role, considering its long experience as Europe's prime security agent .

How to improve convergence? Experts singled out a range of issues on which the EU and the US most need to converge. The first mentioned was the fight against nuclear terrorism and related smuggling activities. The adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1540, which obliges all UN members to sanction proliferation to non-state actors and to establish appropriate export control systems, was judged an important achievement, made possible by a rare show of unanimity by the Security Council's permanent members. It was stressed, however, that the Security Council risks trivialising the threat posed by 'unconventional terrorism' by bringing nuclear,

radiological, biological and chemical elements together under the formula "weapons of mass destruction". Various types of weapons of mass destruction present threats that cannot be addressed with a single instrument or set of instruments. It is necessary, therefore, to develop more targeted threat assessments, counter-measures, and response capabilities.

The Proliferation Security Initiative was mentioned as a very useful instrument for curbing illicit exports. It was under a PSI operation involving American, British, German and Italian cooperation that the ship *BBC China*, secretly bringing gas centrifuges (needed to enrich uranium) to Libya, was blocked. Many asked whether the initiative can be improved, for instance by providing it with a coherent structure, a regular budget and a sort of institutional framework. Intelligence sharing was also singled out as a crucial element of counter-proliferation efforts.

However, it was also underlined that overcoming the traditionally extreme reluctance that security services show for sharing information will be a challenging task. A participant remarked that intelligence sharing should be 'market-driven', that is, security services should be able to provide each other with equally worthy information, if they want to develop a fruitful collaboration.

Other suggestions regarded the preservation and reinforcement of the NSG guidelines ensuring that the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group exchange information on denials of sensitive materials export licenses. Reciprocation of information should be extended to approvals and the IAEA should also be notified of any sensitive transaction.

The need to address the matter of fissile material production was also emphasised. It was suggested that the EU and the US should favour the conversion of highly enriched uranium plants to low enriched uranium plants and promote a five-year moratorium on the construction of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Efforts to promote such a production-freeze should be accompanied by strengthened initiatives to either eliminate or secure the existing materials, most of which is scattered over the territories of the former Soviet Union, including countries neighbouring on the EU like Ukraine and Belarus.

One participant stressed that the West has to engage Russia in order to reach a nuclear security deal with such countries. Russia should be convinced that it faces the same threats as Europe and the US and that it is therefore in its interest to contribute to a combined effort to counter terrorism and proliferation. A participant objected that the commonality of interests between Russia and the West is purely instrumental, and that a Western-Russian security partnership would be short-term.

Nuclear proliferation is rooted in nationalistic instincts. At the end of the conference, a discussant recalled that nuclear proliferation is rooted in international competition, which is in turn fuelled by nationalistic zeal. To what extent nationalism can hamper genuine non-proliferation efforts can be seen in Europe, where the single member states, especially the two nuclear ones, France and Britain, sometimes pursue policies that contrast with the position that the EU, as a supra-national actor, has agreed upon. He remarked, therefore, that fostering a climate of reciprocal trust is a basic condition for consolidating the whole non-proliferation system. Another discussant contended that a preventive approach should imply not only coercion, but also a range of offers able to divert countries' priorities from nuclear armament to security and economic cooperation. In the opinion of another participant, the only non-proliferation

strategy that can be successful in the long term is the universal compliance of all countries with the set of obligations, commitments, principles that they have recognised as the conditions needed to avert international confrontations and foster better relations.



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Rome, 10-11 June 2005

Venue: Palazzo Rondinini, Via del Corso 518, Rome

Friday, 10 June 2005

14:00-14:10 **Welcome Address**
Giovanni Gasparini, Co-Director, Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

14:10-16:00 **First Session**
Non Proliferation Initiatives and NPT Review

Chair: Ettore Greco, Deputy-Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.

Introduction: Serge Sur, Professor at Panthéon-Assas University in Paris 2, Director of the Thucydide Centre and Director of the *Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales*, Paris
William Potter, Director, Center for Non proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey (California)

Discussants: Natalino Ronzitti, Scientific Counsellor, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Professor of International Law, LUISS University, Rome
Harald Müller, Executive Director, Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt, Frankfurt

16:15-18:15 **Second Session**
EU and US Non Proliferation Strategies

Chair: Marcin Zaborowski Research-Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Introduction: **EU:** Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
USA: Joseph Cirincione, Senior Associate and Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC

Discussant: Sverre Lodgaard, Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
Annalisa Giannella, High Representative Solana's Personal Representative for WMD, Council of the European Union, Brussels
Ralph Thiele, Colonel Commander, Bundeswehr Centre for Analysis and Studies, Waldbröl, Germany

Saturday, 11 June 2005

9:00-11:00 **Third Session**
Test cases: Iran and North Korea

Chair: Vincenzo Camporini, President, Center for Advanced Studies on Defense, Rome

Introduction: **Iran:** Riccardo Redaelli, Director of the Middle East Program, Landau Network – Centro Volta of Como and Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milan
North Korea: Darryl Howlett, Senior Lecturer, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Division of Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

Discussants: David S. Yost, Senior Research-Fellow, NATOato Defense College, Rome
Sharam Chubin, Professor, Geneva Center for Securıty Policy, Geneva
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Sciences and World Affairs, Rome, and Professor at the University of Milan

11:15-13:15 **Fourth Session**
Prospects for a common Transatlantic Strategy to deal with the new trends in Nuclear Proliferation

Chair: Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Introduction: Gerrard Quille, Acting Executive Director, International Security Information Service Europe, Brussels

Discussants: Gustav Lindstrom, Senior Research -Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
David Mosher, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND, Arlington, USA
Roberto Zadra, Deputy Head of the WMD Center, Political Affairs Division, NATO, Brussels

13:15-13:30 Concluding remarks

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Riccardo Alcaro	Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Michael Braun	Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Rome Office
Gaia Brenna	Department for European Community Policies, Italian Prime Minister's Office, Rome
Lee R. Brown	Political-Military Counselor, US Embassy, Rome
Vincenzo Camporini	President, Center for Advanced Studies on Defense, Rome
Iride Ceccacci	Intern, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Sharam Chubin	Director of Research, Geneva Center for Security Policy
Joseph Cirincione	Senior Associate and Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino	Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Sciences and World Affairs, Rome, and Professor at the University of Milan
Federica Di Camillo	Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Filippo Formica	Plenipotentiary Minister, Head Office for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Giovanni Gasparini	Research -Fellow and Co-Director of the IAI Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Rome
Annalisa Giannella	High Representative Solana's Personal Representative for WMD, Council of the European Union, Brussels
Ettore Greco	Deputy-Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Daryl Howlett	Senior Lecturer, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Division of Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
Ian Lesser	President, Mediterranean Advisors LLC, Washington DC
Gustav Lindstrom	Senior Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Sverre Lodgaard	Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
Raffaello Matarazzo	Research -Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali
David E. Mosher	Senior Policy Analyst, RAND, Arlington, USA
Harald Müller	Executive Director, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
William Potter	Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
Gerrard Quille	Acting Executive Director, International Security Information Service Europe, Brussels
Riccardo Redaelli	Director of the Middle East Program, Landau Network-Centro Volta of Como and Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milan
Natalino Ronzitti	Professor of International Law, LUISS University, Rome
Stefano Silvestri	President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Serge Sur	Professor at Panthéon-Assas University in Paris 2, Director of the Thucydide Centre and Director of the *Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales*, Paris
Bruno Tertrais	Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
Ralph Thiele	Colonel Commander, Bundeswehr Centre for Analysis and Studies, Waldbröl, Germany
Gabriele Tonne	Assistant Editor of *The International Spectator*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Ernesto Vellano	Secretary-Treasurer, Italian Group of the Trilateral Commission, Turin
David S. Yost	Senior Research Fellow, NATOato Defense College, Rome
Marcin Zaborowski	Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Roberto Zadra	Deputy Head of the WMD Center, Political Affairs Division, NATO, Brussels

Cristiano Zagari Department for European Community Policies, Italian Prime Minister's Office, Rome