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**INTERVENTION ON:
USA, NATO AND ESDP MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES**

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Transformation

The process of transforming the armed forces of the U.S. started as early as 1996 with a focus on modernisation and jointness. Just a few weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Office of Force Transformation was established within the Pentagon. Yet, the goal of the U.S. has not been limited to the transformation of its own forces. Rather, transformation is an interdepartmental approach. And America would like to be joined in this effort by its partners in Europe and around the globe – not only with regard to conceptual and technological aspects, but also with regard to a shared responsibility for global security.

Modernisation, structural change, innovative concepts and technological developments as well as close co-operation with coalition partners are the preconditions of interoperable 21st century forces. Transformation institutionalises such change. In light of current and future security challenges, governmental instruments – armed forces in particular – need to be able to react to unforeseen developments and events in a timely and effective manner. Like the political, economic, social and technological conditions in our societies that are subject to constant change, the armed forces have to adapt constantly.

Transformation is the permanent search for new answers to new questions, it is not just one single reform programme. It is about finding suitable, promising concepts and training methods through the use of networked information and communication technology. Transformation is about the synergy between concepts and training, technology and materiel, and governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) both on the national and international level. It is about a new way of thinking and its translation into constant innovation.

European nations are responding to the U.S. transformation process, both individually and through institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU), by changing perceptions of threats and addressing previously identified capability gaps. Efforts at modernisation of armed forces have paid off with increasing deployments of European troops for operations. However, there are still widely acknowledged weaknesses: institutional attempts to boost capabilities, through NATO and the EU, have so far broadly failed. New efforts are now under way with the inauguration of NATO's Allied Command Transformation and the NATO response force (NRF), as well as the forming of the EU battlegroups, the establishment of the EU Defence Agency and the EU's formulation of new 2010 Headline Goals. Moreover, individual countries have structural reforms under way in a drive to use resources more effectively. Even as these initiatives are being put into effect, there remains considerable debate about the precise capabilities needed, how to fund, structure and equip them, and how best to achieve interoperability between them.

Information superiority plays a vital role. Concepts and operational planning focus on C4IISTAR.¹ What is needed is a capability to conduct rapid decisive operations in a joint and multinational way. In order to be able to involve coalition partners at all, interoperability is the key to effectiveness and cooperability. Future armed forces are to target the vital political, military and social structures of the adversary through effects-based operations taking advantage of modern information and weapons technology.

One important aspect of future operations is to minimise casualties both among combatants and the civilian population, and collateral damage. Battles fought from a distance become ever more important, duel situations should be avoided. Future operations are subject to political oversight. The presence of the media makes it necessary to take into consideration the effects that operations have on the adversary and the national and international public.


Effects-based Operations

Effects-based operations (EBOs) as presently developed with regard to the employment of US forces and the NRF – this doctrine may well become key to the employment of the EU battlegroups – aim at weakening the political and military structures, breaking the fighting spirit and paralysing the power instruments of the adversary. EBOs include both military and interagency measures, taking into account all factors relevant to the implementation of political and military objectives, even international humanitarian organisations.

With regard to military operations EBOs make use of the synergies created through the integration of sensors, command and control systems, and precision-guided weaponry. From a broad range of joint capabilities, political and military leaders select those options that implement political objectives most effectively and efficiently. A precondition is information superiority, which means the use of the whole spectrum of nationally and internationally available knowledge. Weapons systems need to be able to attack targets accurately and effectively without being detected. This requires new command and control processes. Modelling and simulation reduce complexity and support decision-making procedures.

The adversary is analysed from a systematic perspective that identifies key links and weaknesses, which are then to be influenced through the appropriate instruments including diplomacy and armed forces, information operations and intelligence services, economic and financial measures. Flexibility and adaptability are crucial elements for efficiently and effectively harmonising interagency operations. Early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Autonomy needs to be respected as civilian agencies have presence in crises regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions and are rather focused on long-term solutions. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particular valuable resources when it comes to design action and effects, methods for assessments and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates participation of NGOs but honours their autonomy and neutrality.

¹ Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Information, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance



First of all there needs to be strategic political guidance to develop a coherent plan with military and non-military elements of governments and NGOs. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for EBOs conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness in cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology. Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonised for interagency actions. While a military commander should lead during combat operations, a qualified civilian should lead during stability operations. A civilian authority should be designated and involved from the outset of contingency planning to achieve a seamless transition from combat operations to post-combat stability operations. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is especially in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy and rapid action are crucial factors. Democratic nation-building requires an extraordinary amount of human skills, financial resources and time. EBOs are going to significantly change the multinational operations of the future. However, only in combination with political crisis management and civilian assets can EBOs realise their full potential.

NATO and the EU

While NATO is developing the NRF and has placed emphasis on transformation, the EU has emerged as a separate deployer of member nations' forces, with a military staff, development of a pool of forces available, and some capacity for operations planning. Given this background, what capabilities does Europe actually need? Naturally, this is reflected in the level of ambition being shaped presently, and in the roles that individual nations want to play, either as part of coalitions or as members of NATO, the EAPC, the EU or the United Nations. In any case they need to build on the benefits of an effects-based approach and network-centric concepts.

To this end NATO is the single most important bridge across the Atlantic. Europe is transforming its military capabilities under the alliance's umbrella. The finality of this

approach is a Europe that is a robust and valuable partner of the U.S. in rapid decisive operations as it is a particular strong partner in crises management and civil-military stability operations.

From an American point of view, the perspective of Europe as a global strategic actors holds several promises:

- Europe's technological assets contribute to the security of the U.S.
- A U.S.-supported interoperability strategy that provides for the integration of European assets increases the relevance of transatlantic relations.
- More flexibility in the transatlantic armaments sector is beneficial to the capabilities of all partners.

The Bundeswehr

The Bundeswehr is an instrument of a security policy based on the transatlantic partnership and global responsibility. Germany's contributions to improve the EU's ability to act with regard to the battle group concept, to give but one example, and its contribution of roughly a quarter of the total forces of the NRF send a clear message. The NRF is the nucleus of an emerging European network-centric capability, a state-of-the-art force and the key component of a common European security policy. As a consequence from the establishment of the NRF, Germany's network-centric capabilities will be reinforced.

Furthermore, Germany has initiated the battlegroup concept together with the U.K. and France. In order to strengthen the EU's crisis management capacity, rapidly deployable combat units of some 1,500 troops each are to be set up. This provides the EU with a military instrument similar to NATO's response force. The relevance and the weight of the crisis management capabilities of both NATO and the EU will improve considerably. The German approach to transformation supports the transformation processes of these two institutions. The further development of NATO and the EU are closely connected with the German transformation process.