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## **THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE WEST: FROM REACTIVE TO EFFECTIVE POLICIES**

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# **The Iranian Nuclear Program and the West: from Reactive to Effective Policies (DRAFT VERSION)**

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# Summary

- ✦ To really solve the Iranian nuclear puzzle, the West should not focus only on the ‘technicalities’ of the Iranian nuclear program;
- © ✦ Simply ‘negative’ answers, such as regime change, pre-emptive strikes, unconditioned halting of the enrichment program do not represent a durable solution;
- ✦ Instead, it should address Iranian points of concerns, national interests and aspiration;
- ✦ That will be an impossible task without a new regional security order which positively consider all the elements of concerns and fears of the actors involved.

# The Iranian Nuclear Program

- # *The Formal Legal Frame*: Iran is an NPT member state, signed the Additional Protocol, no 'definitive smoking gun' found by IAEA inspectors, legal rights of NPT members.
- # *The Real Perceived Frame*: Iran during the last 20 years has developed and tested all the elements necessary for an effective nuclear program. In other words, it has left the 'door open' for crossing the nuclear threshold (nuclear status as political status and defensive needs)

# The Debate on the Iranian Nuclear Program

- # In 2002, revelations about a 'covert program' with omitted information to IAEA for the last 18 years;
- # Since then, IAEA 'special file' with inspections. More evidences after Iran signed the 'Additional Protocol' in late 2003;
- # However, no 'smoking gun' for the UN SC;
- # Great emphasis to enrichment independence (dual use technology);
- # Russia has slowed down her activities in Bushehr, which is to be fitted with uranium bar in Dec 2005;
- # Enrichment-related activities has been suspended. Iran wants to distinguish between 'real enrichment' and 'research activities' at Natanz.



# Iran: at the center of the unstable Middle Eastern macro-region

# Iranian Points of Concerns and Security Challenges

- # US 'true' goals towards Iran, and Tehran's fears about 'regime change' policies;
- # Iran weak Armed Forces;
- # The pariah state syndrome which exasperate Iran positions;
- # Pre-emptive strikes by Israel and/or US against its nuclear facilities;
- # Willingness to deal by the great part of the political factions, but fears to be domestically de-legitimated.

# The Wide Arc of Instability surrounding Iran

- # Afghanistan: again a failing state?;
- # Pakistan and its underground “talibanization”;
- # The Iraqi quagmire;
- # The Road Map and the Iranian ideological stance against Israel?;
- # US hegemony in the Gulf;
- # US military presence all around Iran;
- # The dispute over the Caspian Sea legal status;
- # Perception of isolation and unfair treatment.

# A Matrix of Constants in Iran's Foreign Policy

- # *There are four constants in Iran's foreign policy:*
- Iranian geopolitics;
  - Iran's large energy resources;
  - Deep attachment to political independence and national sovereignty;
  - Iranians' cultural attention for Western science, technology, and culture.

# How to deal with the Iranian Nuclear Program

- # Simply 'negative' answers do not represent a long term effective answers;
- # Granting some form of 'existential' security to the regime;
- # Recognizing Iranian regional role without rhetoric and prejudice, i.e.: favour an informal arrangement for regional security;
- # Coordinate policies with EU/Arab/regional states for building security measures and increasing bilateral/multilateral economic, political, etc. integration policies.

# The negotiation Format

- # 3-UE/UE formula:  
launched on Fall 2003  
failed in 2004;
- # New negotiations in 2004-5, stronger frame and better results;
- # 'May crisis': a controlled crisis for gain time (NPT conference, Iranian elections, and so on);
- # Weak points:
  - too narrowly focused on the enrichment dispute;
  - Problems in assembly credible 'rewards' package for the deal;
  - They recognized in principle the Iranian right to enrich. Now they want 'irreversibility'.
  - US is watching from outside. Problems of involving formally Russia (Iranian nuclear supplier).

# The proposed G-8 Format

- # G-8 formula includes also Italy, Russia and Japan, countries with strong economic, energetic and political links with Tehran;
- # In particular, though unofficial participation of Russia in the EU3 negotiations already exists, it is important its formal and explicit participation;
- # US in a G-8 formula will be 'inside' the negotiations, though not directly;
- # Arrangement of a complete External Nuclear Fuel Cycle for Bushehr (now only at Russia – Iran bilateral level);
- # It is not antagonistic to the UE deal, but a follow up for reaching a real regional stabilization.

# Multinationalization of Nuclear Fuel Cycles without Irreversibility

- # A project for meeting both the security and independence needs of the Iranian energy program as well as giving guarantees for the front and back ends of a nuclear fuel cycles;
- # The extension of external enrichment services to Iran with additional provisions in energy security guarantees;

# Multinationalization of Nuclear Fuel Cycles - II

- # “*Bringing EUODIF to Natanz*”. Iran already has a roughly 10% share in EUODIF. A possible proposal might, therefore, be *to partner* the Natanz asset with the EUODIF complex facilities, by establishing an EU-Iran joint venture for Natanz itself, as well as by endorsing common security and safety practices therein under the IAEA Safeguards;
- # Clearly EUODIF should have all the legal rights and sufficient stakeholders to balance the Iranian share in this new EU-Iran uranium enrichment Consortium at Natanz.