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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: DOES SOFT POWER WORK?

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European interests in the fight against nuclear proliferation

Nuclear proliferation is not an *immediate* threat to the European Union (EU). When it comes to capabilities, no regional actor having a nuclear programme (except Israel) is yet capable, at least as far as known capabilities are concerned, of posing a potential threat to European Union member states.[1] When it comes to intentions, no nuclear-armed country is known to be hostile to Europe as such.

Nevertheless, current and foreseeable moves on the nuclear proliferation front are in many respects a source of concern for Europe. Proliferation can affect different types of interests according to the region concerned. In North Africa, a renewal of nuclear proliferation would naturally affect Europe's efforts, particularly through the Barcelona process, to develop good relations. Many Europeans would consider nuclear-armed regimes such as Algeria or Egypt as potentially hostile – especially if nuclear programs were coupled with the affirmation of an Islamic identity. In the Middle East, other interests could be affected: economic security (proliferation being likely to concern zones that are sources of supply of oil and gas), defence agreements between certain members of the Union and Gulf states, and the European involvement in the Israel/Palestinian conflict. In Asia, the risks for Europe are more indirect. They are essentially to do with what can be termed global stability, with non-proliferation regimes and norms being called into question. But a major conflict in Asia over nuclear issues or involving the risk of nuclear use would have serious indirect political, economic and financial consequences for Europe.

This correlation between interests at stake and the location of threats is approximate. The EU sees itself as a responsible world power and cares about international law and multilateral regimes – wherever the proliferation threat may be. It also intends to become a fully-fledged global actor, and is developing political and economic links to all major regions in the world. It is not impossible that in the next ten to fifteen years the Union will have to conduct major military operations at a considerable distance from its territory: what then if its forces find themselves exposed to a nuclear threat in an area not covered by the Washington Treaty? Also, the increase in the range of missiles developed or obtained by several proliferating countries will bring the territory of the Union within range of a larger number of them.

This takes place against the background of an interest in the ex-Soviet nuclear heritage – not a proliferation threat per se, but nevertheless a nuclear risk and a potential source of materials and expertise. A consequence of enlargement has been to bring the ex-Soviet nuclear problem nearer to Europe: its enlargement to the north and east gives the Union a shared border with the country that has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Also, in a situation where Iran had nuclear weapons, the integration of Turkey would establish a new "nuclear frontier" for Europe.

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[1] Nevertheless, Sicily was within range of Libya's *Scud* missiles, and the improved version of Iran's *Shahab*-3 makes it able to reach Greek territory.

The EU's response to nuclear proliferation

The gradual construction of a EU approach

Initially Europe was mostly concerned with proliferation *within itself*. The EURATOM treaty signed in 1957 was not designed with a non-proliferation goal in mind – rather the opposite: at that time, there were still French-German-Italian discussions on a possible trilateral nuclear force. Later, after France became a nuclear power a major question in transatlantic circle was whether or not other European Community (EC) members could and would become nuclear powers.[2] One of the main goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was to prevent further nuclear proliferation on the continent. Today, implementation of the most stringent non-proliferation controls (the Additional Protocol) is still a prerequisite for joining the Union.[3]

Still, until the early 1980s nuclear proliferation outside Europe was not an important concern, to the point that in the 1970s, several European countries were still exporting sensitive nuclear technologies with little regard for their potential military applications. In this domain, Europe came of age later than the United States.

This explains why, for a long time, proliferation was near the bottom on the European Community's list of concerns. The real efforts began in the aftermath of the Cold war, with the conjunction of France's signature of the NPT, the first Gulf war, and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

A EU non-proliferation policy began to take shape in the mid-1990s with the use of the CFSP toolbox (Presidential Declarations, Common Positions, Common Strategies, and Action Plans) for non-proliferation purposes: the adoption of the 1995 Joint Actions on the Union's participation in Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and on the NPT Review Conference, the 1997 Joint Action on transparency on export controls in the nuclear field. Common positions were then adopted on nuclear and ballistic non-proliferation in South Asia (1998), on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1999), and on the next NPT Review Conference (2000).

A new phase was opened in 2003 in the aftermath of the Iraq war and amidst revelation of the extent of Iran's nuclear programme. Simultaneously new EU actions were taken on assistance to the ex-Soviet Union and on the entry into force of the CTBT. Most importantly, the EU adopted a comprensive strategy to fight against proliferation. Today the EU non-nuclear proliferation policy is a combination of comprehensive overall efforts and targeted regional efforts.

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[2] For a history of the early non-proliferation debate in the EC see Tom Sauer, *How "common" is European nuclear non-proliferation policy?*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Edimburgh, 28 March – 2 April 2003.

[3] As of May 28, 2005, the Additional Protocol was not yet into force in Estonia and Slovakia.

Overall efforts

The EU strategy against proliferation is largely an offspring of September 11 and of its aftermath. In April 2002, the Council envisioned the principle of an overall strategy against proliferation in the context of the fight against terrorism. The adoption by the United States of a new National Security Strategy (September 2002) and of a Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) gave a boost to European efforts. Finally, the many in the EU sought to reconcile with the United States after the Iraq war and wanted Europe to be considered as a responsible non-proliferation actor. In February 2003, at the initiative of Sweden, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) formally agreed to review the EU non-proliferation policy. In June, the Thessalonica European Council paved the way for a new era in the EU non-proliferation strategy.[4] This was followed by the formal adoption of the “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” in December 2003.[5] While including no major political or conceptual breakthroughs, taken together these texts constituted a first systematic and comprehensive EU approach of the problem of proliferation. Also, among their noteworthy provisions were mentions of the possibility to use force (especially since no mention was made of the need for an *explicit authorization* of the United Nations Security Council to that effect).[6] Finally, the Strategy has had the effect of putting the EU action into high gear, with a flurry of new activities since 2003.

EU efforts in the field of multilateral instruments have essentially focused on implementing existing agreements rather than on devising new ones. Its main stated goals are: *“strenghtening the international system of non-proliferation, pursuing universalisation of multilateral agreements, and reinforcing strict implementation and compliance with these agreements”*.[7] It has adopted in 2004 a Common position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of WMD.

The NPT has been the crux of EU multilateral efforts in the nuclear area. In the 2000 Final document, the emphasis on “irreversibility” and “transparency” owed a lot to the EU.[8] In 2005, the Union was able to agree upon a common position despite initial difficulties due disagreements over the references to the disarmament commitments contained in the 2000 Final Document. The text was longer than in 2000 and included the *acquis* of the EU Strategy.[9] During the Conference, the EU made substantial contributions to the Review Process, in particular through the submission of "common approach" working papers on cooperative threat reduction and on withdrawal from the Treaty.

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[4] Three texts were adopted at the Thessaloniki Summit: a “Declaration on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, the “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” and an “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”.

[5] *EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Council, 12 and 13/12/2003),* <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf>.

[6] Clara Portela, *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond,* PRIF Reports n° 65 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, undated), p. 27.

[7] Council of the European Union website <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=392&lang=EN>, accessed May 28, 2005.

[8] Portela, *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, op. cit., p. 7.

The EU has also attempted to contribute to the entry into force of the CTBT. It adopted a Common position in 1999 on the early entry into force of the CTBT, renewed in 2003 and accompanied by an Action plan. So far, these efforts have not been very successful. As of 28 May 2005, out of 175 States that have signed the Treaty, only 121 of them have ratified it, including 33 Annex Two countries. There have been only five ratifications since the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 54 countries have not ratified, including 11 "Annex Two countries" out of 44 (whose signatures are needed for entry into force). Those who have not ratified include three countries that could be called the "easy cases" (Colombia, Indonesia, Viet-Nam), and eight other which constitute a category of "hard cases" (China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, United States).

Finally, the EU has adopted a Joint action for support to the IAEA, including a financial contribution of 10 million € for three years (3,3 million € for 2004) to its Nuclear Security Program (2004).[10]

Regional efforts

The reduction of nuclear risks on the territory of the ex-Soviet Union – be they civilian or military – have thus been a major area of efforts by the Union, for which an essential vehicle has been the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Aid to countries of the former Soviet Union was also the subject of several EU Joint Actions. EU efforts have focused on safety and security, plutonium disposition, and the employment of nuclear scientists and engineers.

Under the umbrella of the Global Partnership, the EU has pledged a total of one billion € for the years 2002-2012. However, about half of this sum will be devoted to nuclear safety in general. According to data provided by the non-governmental *Strenghtening the Global Partnership* (SGP) project, nuclear non-proliferation related programs under the current EU budget cycle (through 2006) include 125 million € for the International Science & Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), 78 million € for exports controls assistance, 50 million € for nuclear submarines dismantlement, 23 million € for fissile materials safeguards, 6 million € for plutonium disposition, and 5 million € for a 2004 Joint action on the physical protection of nuclear installations. [11] This amounts to a total of 287 million €.

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[9] *Council Common Position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (2000/297/CFSP), in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 19 April 2000, L 97/1; and *Council Common Position 2005/329/PESC of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 27 April 2005, L 106/32.

[10] Council of the European Union, *Implementation of the WMD Strategy – Annex B: List of priorities for a coherent implementation*, 3 December 2004, p. 39.

[11] *Strengthening the Global Partnership: EU Donor Factsheet*, <http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/EU.html>, accessed May 28, 2005.

As per annual spending, numbers are contradictory. Experts from the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI) suggest a total of 40 million € a year.[12] European Commission representatives have provided the same number.[13] But SIPRI experts have also provided figures suggesting a total of 57.9 million € for 2004 (50 million € for TACIS programs and 7.9 million € for nuclear security in Russia).[14]

There are other inconsistencies. For instance, concerning the Joint action for nuclear security in Russia, the SGP project mentions 5 million € for 2004, while SIPRI experts have mentioned 7.9 million € for 2004; however, the EU December 2004 progress report plans for 7.73 million € in three years.[15] Also, the Joint action on IAEA support (for which 3.3 million € were allocated for 2004) does not seem to be taken into account, even though it will be largely devoted to nuclear security in the ex-Soviet Republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

One reason why these evaluations are imperfect and contradictory is that the level of EU financial effort directly related with nuclear non-proliferation is particularly difficult to assess: it is scattered among different budget lines, it is not easily broken down into nuclear and non-nuclear activities, and it often involves both civilian and military dimension.

Nevertheless, based on these evaluations one can say that the EU spends more or less 50 million € per year on nuclear non-proliferation related activities in Russia and the ex-Soviet Union, most of it being financed by the European Commission.[16] The bottom line is that the EU contribution is still fairly modest.

North Korea has been another focus of EU efforts. Europe is concerned by the North Korean nuclear crisis for many reasons: the importance of the North Korean case for the non-proliferation regime; the danger of the transfer of nuclear expertise and technology to countries geographically close to Europe that have in the past shown an interest in nuclear matters; the involvement of some member states in maintaining security in the peninsula, through the Military Armistice Commission, the Committee supervising the Commission, and the 1953 declaration that guarantees South Korea's security; the risk, in the event of a serious crisis in the peninsula, that North Korea could be tempted to blackmail the United States's European allies;[17] finally, the dramatic effects that another Korean war would have on the world's economy, and therefore that of Europe.

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[12] Ian Anthony, *The Role of the European Union in International Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Assistance*, paper presented at a workshop on "The Future of Disarmament and Expanded Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs", Centro Volta – Landau Network, Geneva, 28 September 2004, p. 11.

[13] *Examination of Witnesses*, in House of Lords, European Union Committee, 13th Report of Session 2004-2005, *Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution,* Report with Evidence (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 5 April 2005), p. 47.

[14] *Supplementary memorandum by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,* in House of Lords, op. cit., p. 82.

[15] Council of the European Union, *Implementation of the WMD Strategy – Annex B: List of priorities for a coherent implementation*, 3 December 2004, p. 39.

[16] According to EU officials, non-proliferation activities in 2004 in the context of CFSP amounted to 15 million € out of a total CFSP budget of 62,6 million €. *Examination of Witnesses,* in House of Lords, op. cit., p. 41.

[17] It is noteworthy that if North Korea continues to increase the range of its missiles, European territory will in theory be vulnerable to such a threat before that of America.

For these reasons, on of the EU's first concrete nuclear non-proliferation actions was its involvement in KEDO, for which 115 million € were spent until the suspension of operations. (The vehicle for EU participation was EURATOM.) Later on, the Union struck up a dialogue with Pyongyang, at Sweden's initiative, in May 2001, at a time when the Bush administration had closed its channels of communication with North Korea.

European interests in the Iranian nuclear crisis are also numerous. Although the Union's territory is not yet – with the possible exception of Greece – within the range of existing Iranian missiles, Turkey, a key NATO ally and a candidate for EU membership, already is. This is also true of several countries of the region vis-à-vis which some EU members (France and the United Kingdom) have security commitments, such as the United Arab Emirates. The credibility of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) and of the "effective multilateralism" that the EU claims to promote is also at stake. What the Europeans are trying to demonstrate is "the power of soft power": this is about resolving a proliferation crisis by using the political and economic might of the Union. The prospect of additional nuclear powers in the Middle East, a volatile region that is also Europe's immediate neighborhood, is scary enough. But the Europeans also attach great importance to the survival of the NPT, which could very well be at stake here. Finally, European countries and companies have some significant industrial interests involved. As one of the Middle East's main producers of oil and gas, Iran cannot be neglected.

Before 2003, nuclear issues had been discussed only superficially between the EU and Iran. The negotiation of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was largely separated from these discussions. Things changed in mid-2003 due to two reasons: a negative report issued by the IAEA about Iran, and the desire of the France and Germany to play a stronger role on the non-proliferation scene; these two countries wanted to reconcile with the United States, and show that proliferation could be dealt with through diplomatic means. The United Kingdom, for its part, was keen to demonstrate its ability to play along its key European partners on a significant security problem. The European Union as such was included later as a full partner. While no specific proposals seem to have come from Brussels, the advantage of having the EU "in" was to give additional political weight to the European delegation and to ensure that the Iranians would understand that they would not be able to "de-link" their bilateral relationship with the Union from the *ad hoc* negotiating process.

After the failed start of the October 2003 Tehran agreement, negotiations began in earnest after the November 2004 Paris agreement. It was clearly meant by both sides as the opening of a new phase, with a formal negotiating process including three "baskets" (political, economic, nuclear). At the time of this writing (late May 2005), the negotiations have failed to produce any tangible result, and Iran has made it clear at several occasions that it intended to resume their nuclear activities, and that it would not renounce its alleged right to the whole fuel cycle. Still, Europe – including the EU – has achieved two significant results: it has demonstrated its ability to be a credible actor in a complex nuclear crisis, and has been able to delay the continuation of Iran's enrichment program.[18] But a successful outcome would require either a shift in Tehran's position, or a change in Europe's desired outcome, or a change in the mix of carrots and sticks that the Europeans have been willing to offer.

The situation in South Asia has been the focus of EU efforts at rare occasions. One was the aftermath of the 1998 tests, when the Union temporarily deferred the conclusion of trade agreements. The second was the 2001-2002 military face-off between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, at the occasion of which High Representative Solana travelled to the region to express Europe's concern. The EU plans to do more. A program for nuclear material accountancy and export control assistance is envisioned for up to 10 million €, equally shared between a EU-India program and a EU-Pakistan program, for a duration of three to five years.[19]

Net assessment and policy recommendations

Net assessment

Having thoroughly examined the EU's record, Clara Portela's harsh judgement is that *"the EU is still ineffective as a non-proliferation actor"*.[20] This is perhaps a bit severe. The EU nuclear non-proliferation efforts face five inter-related hurdles. A first obstacle is the complexity of EU policies, in a field that had to involve both the Commission and the Council. A second one is the cumbersome budgetary practice of the Union, which precludes it from being appropriately responsive to new international developments, all the more since many members are reluctant to increase the EU budget. A third obstacle is the "competition" that the EU faces from national efforts: individual member States also contribute, diplomatically and financially, to non-proliferation. (The EU's two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom, also contribute through their deterrence and disarmament policies.) A fourth but by no means less important hurdle is the diversity of "nuclear cultures" within the Union, ranging from countries which are members of the "New Agenda Coalition" (Sweden, Ireland), to the two European nuclear powers (France, the United Kingdom), with a mix of neutral countries, non-aligned ones, NATO members, and NATO nuclear host countries in-between; and from countries which plan to give up nuclear power to countries such as France and Lithuania which rely heavily on it. The fifth hurdle is the fact that the EU as an institution has had to overcome national preferences in a domain very closely associated with sovereignty and independence, in both the military and civilian dimensions.

Given these difficulties, the EU has not fared too badly and its nuclear non-proliferation can be called a "moderately successful story". Progress in the past decade has been very significant. Awareness of nuclear proliferation issues has increased dramatically in EU circles. Coordination and visibility of EU actions have been improved. Non-proliferation activities represent a large part (some 25%) of the total CFSP budget.[21]

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[18] This assumes, of course, that there are no hidden enrichment facilities in Iran.

[19] Council of the European Union, *Implementation of the WMD Strategy – Annex B: List of priorities for a coherent implementation*, 3 December 2004, pp. 42-43.

[20] Portela, *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, op. cit., p. 21.

[21] See above, note 16.

The nomination in October 2003 of a Personal representative on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has helped a lot. Most importantly perhaps, there is no major nuclear proliferation issue today where the EU is not involved one way or the other.

The EU has three major assets in the fight against nuclear proliferation: its financial resources, its attractivity as a trade and investment partner, and its preference for "engagement". However, it also lacks three significant non-proliferation instruments. One is the ability to extend a security guarantee to a country that feels threatened, in order to persuade it not to embark in a nuclear program. Another is the ability to dissuade, through missile defense, a country from investing in a ballistic program – the inevitable companion of a nuclear program. A third one is the ability to credibly threaten the neutralisation or destruction of a large nuclear programme by conventional means (more by lack of know-how, adequate plannning and training than by lack of military assets). In fact, it could be argued that the only *comparative* advantage that the EU has is that it is not the United States. The positive reputation of Europe is a political asset that helped concluding the Iran-Europe agreements of 2003 and 2004.

It remains to be seen that the EU as a collective entity can make a real difference in the management of a nuclear proliferation problem. The EU's soft power works; whether the EU's soft power is enough is a different matter. The Union as such has been considered a junior partner in the management of nuclear affairs, be it with Russia, or in negotiations with Iran and North Korea. With the exception of the NPT Review Conferences, the EU is largely reactive and not often proactive. Its policies are hardly imaginative and are not *that* different from those pursued by Washington. [22] (There are two exceptions: an absence of opposition in the EU for reprocessing and fast-breeding technologies; and a linkage between disarmament and environment issues in assistance to the ex-Soviet Union). Clearly – and this has been the case since 1957 – most Europeans look to Washington first when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation, either to follow the US lead or to distantiate themselves from US policies. This all the more true since non-proliferation policies are often instrumentalized to the benefit of the broader transatlantic relationship.[23]

At the same time, however, the presence of the United States in the background of any EU non-proliferation effort will probably remain for a necessary component of any effective and comprehensive European nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Europeans often rightly complain of being asked to finance US-devised policies without a real say in the making of such policies; but it is far from certain, for instance, that calling the EU to *"stretch its foreign policy wings over Korea"* and build a separate approach from the one pursued in the context of the Six-Party talks, as proposed by the European Parliament, would be productive.[24]

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[22] Some have gone as far as saying that the EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation has been "Americanized" (Tom Sauer, "The 'Americanization' of EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy", *Defense & Security Analysis* Vol. 20, n° 2, June 2004, pp. 113-131).

[23] In this regard, Clara Portela argues that *"there is a risk (..) that the WMD issue is approached primarily as a transatlantic issue rather than for its own sake"* (Clara Portela, "The EU and the NPT: Testing the New European Nonproliferation Strategy", *Disarmament Diplomacy,* Issue n° 78, July/August 2004 <http://acronym.org.uk/dd/dd78/78cp.htm>, accessed 6 December 2004).

Policy recommendations[25]

Europe must be realistic. Lecturing India and Pakistan on the urgent need to join the NPT is probably not the best way to play a useful role in dealing with nuclear risks in Asia, and could even be counter-productive as per the credibility of Europe as a security partner in the region; it is conceivable that the EU, as a matter of principle, would make such a request, but that should be merely a reminder. Likewise, the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East has no chance of succeeding in the short and medium term: the problem of defining such a zone seems impossible at present; and it is difficult to admit the argument that Israel's nuclear capability presents an obstacle to lasting peace in the region when it is put forward by countries that have not even acknowledged Israel's right to exist. In fact, such a zone will be a realistic prospect only *after* a just and durable peace is established in the region.

The use of the principle of conditionality vis-à-vis non-proliferation has become a routine practice. But the EU does it in a rather "soft" way. Full compliance has never been a prerequisite for access to European markets and investments (except perhaps in the case of Ukraine: the implementation of the cooperation agreement with this country, which only happened after Kyiv had become a signatory of the NPT). The "non-proliferation clause" included in bilateral agreements is fairly weak: it does not *require compliance* with non-proliferation treaties. In the future, it should be strengthened and include specific commitments such as CTBT ratification where applicable and, most importantly, ratification of the IAEA's Additional protocol.[26] "Hard" conditionality should ideally become a *sine qua non* of access to European aid and markets.

Full support for the current moratorium and the importance of signatories to finance the CTBT Organization and its monitoring system should continue to be clearly stated by the EU. The Union should use conditionality in its dealings with the three "easy cases" mentioned above, as well as on "hard cases" such as Egypt and Iran. It should also, of course, continue to promote the CTBT in its contacts with the US Senate.

If EU members believe that an FMCT *could* be verified (which the United States does not believe), then they would need to demonstrate it. To this end, the EU could commission a study that would make use of its considerable nuclear expertise, at the national level and at the level of EURATOM, to make a convincing case on verification.

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[24] See Soyong Kwon and Glyn Ford, "The EU Stretches its Foreign Policy Wings Over Korea", *The Nautilus Institute*, undated document <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0531AKwon_Ford.html>, accessed 21 April 2005.

[25] For a lengthier discussion of recommendations for the EU see Bruno Tertrais, "Europe and nuclear proliferation" in Gustav Lindstrom & Burkard Schmitt (ed.), *Fighting proliferation – European perspectives*, Chaillot Papers n° 66 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), pp. 37-58; and ibid., "Nuclear disarmament: how to make progress" in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), *Effective Non-proliferation. The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference*, Chaillot Paper n° 77 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2005), pp 27-42.

[26] As of May 28, 2005, the Strenghtened Safeguards System had entered into force in only 67 States (out of 102 who have signed up to it). Among the countries where the Additional Protocol is not yet into force are Iran and Libya.

European contributions to the dismantlement of ex-Soviet nuclear arsenals are still disparate. It would therefore be useful to coordinate all national initiatives better, under the aegis of the Union, and as from 2006 have a significant increase in joint aid. Further, the Union could take advantage of the fact that so-called “theatre weapons” (which are of particular concern to the new member States) are not covered by binding bilateral disarmament agreements. Russia claims the destruction of these weapons has been delayed because of the priority given to strategic weapons (which has been financed partially through American programmes). Europe could take Russia at its word and finance an increase in Russia’s dismantlement facilities. Actions taken must not be limited to Russia: Europe can play its part in securing the materials contained in tens of research reactors in the world. It could also, where appropriate, contribute its own unique experience of intraregional control gained through EURATOM.