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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION TO THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA: INTERACTION WITH THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

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Communication presented to the International Conference “The New European Architecture in the 21st Century. Promoting Regional Co-operation in the Wider Black Sea Area: the BSEC Case”, organised by the International Centre for Black Sea Studies-ICBSS and the Hellenic Parliament
Athens-Milos, 3-7 September 2003

IAI0304

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION TO THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA: INTERACTION WITH THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

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This communication deals, first of all, with the relationship between globalisation trends and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation-BSEC region. Its key argument is that BSEC role and dynamics with respect to globalisation are strictly related to and largely dependent on the relationship between BSEC and the European Union (EU). In other words, the paper assumes that BSEC performance in the framework of globalisation is related to and mostly affected by its relations with the EU.

These relations are about to be regulated by the doctrine of Neighbourhood the EU Commission has put forward recently, with a view to tackle the consequences of the Eastern and Southern enlargements starting in 2004. The EU Neighbourhood doctrine will affect the BSEC directly and indirectly, that is by means of EU policies towards BSEC itself and its neighbouring regions and countries. In particular, it will affect two regions that are very significant to the BSEC: Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The communication comments on such indirect effects and concludes by recommending the establishment of contractual relations between the EU and the BSEC in a form similar to that of the Northern Dimension, so as to avoid excluding the BSEC from the Neighbourhood process.

Globalisation and regional integration: the case of BSEC

The BSEC has two principal inter-related tasks. The first such task relates to its very matrix, namely its aim of acting as a confidence-building measure in the framework of the OSCE process. In fact, this is what is stressed by the BSEC founding documents². Within the framework of the European architecture, as ultimately enshrined in the Paris Charter, the building up of a solid and structured regional economic co-operation and/or integration is intended to be a definite contribution to peace and stability.

In this sense, BSEC economic activities are in principle instrumental to the attainment of its political aims of peace and stability. Still, they are equally important and must be considered as an end in themselves. The BSEC is a typical process of regional economic co-operation, an example of regionalism in the framework of globalisation, very similar to many other ongoing regional undertakings in Europe and the world. This is the second task of BSEC.

Like BSEC, regional processes of economic co-operation and integration use to include both political and economic factors as sides of the same coin. The two sides cannot be easily separated and, for this reason, they are considered in a “political economy”

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² See the “Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation” and the “Bosphorus Statement”, Istanbul 25 June 1992. Information on the BSEC is provided in the organisation’s web site: www.bsec.gov.tr.

perspective, a perspective that tries to combine the analysis of both political and economic factors. In this perspective, the economic performance is linked to the issue of governance. In fact, the question internationally debated, particularly in the last years, is whether regions contribute or not to global governance. While globalisation is an objective trend, it must be governed if it is to be beneficial and its adverse effects are to be smoothed over. What is today the role of a proliferating economic regionalism with respect to global governance? Is it consistent or opposed to the latter? Is regionalism systemic with respect to international free trade and economic globalisation or is it anti-systemic?

According to different schools of thought³, regionalism can be co-operative- or conflict-oriented. It can be so either accidentally, that is because of circumstances, or intimately, that is by its very nature and deliberation. There are authors who see regionalism as an offensive response to the present conditions of the international economic system, a response similar to the creation of discriminatory and exclusive trade blocs and the large application of protectionism that prevailed in the 1930s, when the first wave of regionalism took place. Others look at it as a response that is co-operative in its character (or so will it prove at the end of the day). This co-operative regionalism seems to characterise the second (1950s-1970s) and the present, third wave.

There is an important difference between the second and the present wave of regionalism with respect to international governance. The second wave took place in a situation in which the United States provided the necessary “public goods” to assure the equilibrium of the international system. In this system, regionalism could be regarded as a stage of transitional protectionism directed at assuring national development or overcoming local imbalances without putting into question the system’s hegemonic governance, however, and with the final result of reinforcing the overall system. Governance was essentially global. With the end of the United States hegemony, the international economic system has shifted in an enduring post-hegemonic situation in which the supply of public goods is short and cannot meet the demand. According to authors, regionalism must be regarded, first of all, as a response to such shortage, that is a mechanism trying to provide locally the public goods that cannot be provided by the system.

If this is accepted, regionalism is highly consistent with globalisation as an economic trend. On the political side of the coin, the economic consistency between globalisation and regionalism means that regionalism plays an essential role in global governance by providing an intermediate level of decision-making and management and generating public goods between the global and the national level.

This author shares the view that current regionalism is consistent with globalisation and contributes to international governance by complementing global and national governance. BSEC, in particular, is definitely in tune with such systemic regionalism, as regularly illustrated by its statements and its policies. In the BSEC we can find all the motivations for creating a regional supplementary engine to development and modernisation “ in terms of location (trade and investment, saving in transport and economy of scale)”, of chances to expand and train firms thanks to a larger market size,

³ See, most recently, Mario Telò (ed.), *European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era*, Ashgate, 2001; and Paolo Guerrieri, Hans-Eckart Scharrer (eds.), *Global Governance, Regionalism and the International Economy*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, with numerous references to current literature on the subject.

and of capabilities to learn to coping with international competition⁴. At the same time, the BSEC members look very clearly at these regional steps in a wider perspective, be it the European or the global space. BSEC is a factor in what is called “open regionalism”. The features of BSEC correspond to those of the third wave: “the heterogeneity of participating countries, the outward-looking approach of members, the domestic liberalisation not only of goods but also of services, which involves new rules for investments and the provision of competition policy and technical standards”⁵. BSEC is a globally-oriented region, using regionalism to carry out successfully its transition towards globalisation.

The BSEC and the EU: regions and sub regions in Europe

BSEC relationship with globalisation is not (or is not always) a direct one. It cannot take place in isolation. BSEC transition to globalisation takes place in a given context, that comprises other regions and networks of economic and political relations. In other words, it takes place in a given geopolitical regional environment. This regional environment includes two main references: on one hand, Central Asia and the Middle East (in particular, the Upper Gulf area); on the other, the expanding area of the EU.

The BSEC is a natural bridge between the two areas and is bound to work as a platform connecting and developing the space between the EU and the Greater Middle East. The success of the BSEC is linked to a virtuous circle between its capacity to attract foreign investment with a view to develop its role of bridge; then, to reap profits from such role; and, finally, to invest profits in members’ broad economic development.

In its role of bridge, BSEC has a clear global attitude as an investment-receiving area (from the EU as well as other global actor, as the United States). At the same time, its attitude has a more regional character when it comes to developing and trading the outcome of investment. This outcome is naturally directed at domestic markets and, most of all to the greater EU area. The EU and BSEC areas have a clear major complementary character. The latter is strengthened by non-economic factors as well. In fact, it must be pointed out that the BSEC is a bridge also for a relevant number of soft security issues, as international crime and trafficking. This fact increases its complementary character with the EU area and stresses the political economy perspective in which the BSEC has to be taken into consideration in a globalisation perspective.

Against this background, one has to say that BSEC role of bridge is not neutral or equidistant between its two shores. As a matter of fact, the BSEC is subjected to a fatal attraction of integration and co-operation towards the greater EU area because of economic as well as political reasons. This EU bias of the BSEC is confirmed by a number of facts. The BSEC was born on the assumption that its members would not be prevented from pursuing their policies aimed at establishing specific relations with the EU. The status of its members’ relations with the EU (see table) illustrates very well this attraction. At the end of the day, the expectation of a special relationship with the EU is

⁴ These motivations are listed by Mario Telò, “Introduction: Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European Union”, in Mario Telò, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-17; see p. 5.

⁵ Paolo Guerrieri, Isabella Falautano, *Introduction*, in Paolo Guerrieri, Hans-Eckart Scharrer, *op. cit.*; see p. 16-17.

definitely not a mystery: the BSEC need and desire to develop and strengthen its relations with the EU appear regularly in its official documents, ultimately in the Istanbul 2002 Decennial Declaration of the BSEC Heads of States and Governments and in the resolution of the Foreign Ministers issued in Yerevan on 18 April 2003.

In conclusion, the role and status of the BSEC in the context of globalisation seems twofold. On one hand, it has its own agenda that is bound to take advantage of its geopolitical location of bridge between the EU and Central Asia/Middle East with a view to enhance its resources and development. On the other hand, the BSEC is attracted by the EU area of integration, including because the crossing of the bridge is more towards the EU than the other way round.

In other words, because of its geopolitical configuration, BSEC is confronted by two levels of globalisation: globalisation proper and a kind of regional globalisation concerning its relations with the EU, its big neighbour. The EU generates public goods within the circle of Euro-Asian relations, the BSEC can take advantage of. The Euro can be regarded as one such public goods. Another public good is the network of agreements and institutions that the EU is creating in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Russia and the financial resources they provide. On the other hand, the role of BSEC in developing infrastructures and co-operating in sensitive sectors, as environment protection and soft security, provides advantages to the EU and contributes an appropriate regional articulation to European as well as global governance.

EU response: the “Wider Europe” agenda

What we have said so far suggests that the impact of globalisation to the BSEC and its wider area regards mostly its relations with the EU. For sure, other factors have an impact on BSEC globalisation, as the United States and the major relations of this country with the Middle East. There is no doubt, however, that EU is the most significant pole of BSEC attraction and, as a consequence, the most significant BSEC link to globalisation.

While the BSEC is attracted by the EU, the reverse is definitely less true. In the past, there were times when the EU showed an interest in the BSEC, for example when in 1997 the Commission aired a well articulated agenda for its action in the BSEC area⁶. The EU also funded a number of projects in the region. Still, it remains true what Valinakis said some years ago: “EU involvement in the BSEC framework has ... been minimal”⁷. In general, the EU is very supportive of sub-regional agreements of co-operation and integration. The political economy of regional integration broadly fits with EU very identity and is regarded by the EU - as well as the OSCE - as an important instruments of economic development and conflict prevention. Still, Valinakis very aptly notes that so far the EU has been more successful in promoting and supporting sub-regionalism in the Northern and, to some extent, Central eastern Europe than in South eastern Europe and the Black Sea area.

⁶ *Regional Co-operation in the Black Sea area: State of play, perspectives for EU action in encouraging its further development*, COM (97) 597 final, 14 November 1997.

⁷ Yannis Valinakis, *The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe*, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers No 36, July 1999, p. 54.

As of today, the Commission's project for re-ordering EU relations with neighbours in order to cope with the consequences of next May 2004 enlargement⁸ seems to disregard the BSEC in casting out what they call "A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" - briefly dubbed "Wider Europe". The latter is, first of all, a statement about EU identity and, conversely, about the status of neighbouring countries with respect to EU. According to this statement, after the EU will be enlarged to ten countries in May 2004, three more countries have a chance to be included: Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Turkey at an indefinite date. It must be remembered, however, that in December 2002, the European Council in Copenhagen reaffirmed the "European perspective" of the countries of Western Balkans in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process. This being the maximum possible extension of the EU in the long-term, the "Wider Europe" agenda lists a number of countries that the EU will consider as its non-EU neighbours and states a special, preferential policy of co-operation and support towards all of them. These countries are (a) the Russian Federation, (b) the so called Western Newly Independent Countries (WNIS), namely Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and (c) the Southern Mediterranean countries which are parties to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian National Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Libya (presently, with the status of observer).

The Southern Caucasus countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, would not be included in the notion of Wider Europe. In its Conclusions on Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood, the 18 June 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki stated that at a later stage it "will examine whether the Southern Caucasus countries could also be covered within" Wider Europe policies. One cannot exclude that a long-term, indefinite perspective will be open. For the time being this is not very likely.

What is the relevance of this new EU Neighbourhood policy for the BSEC? One can respond to this question from a general point of view as well as from the BSEC particular point of view. From a general point of view, one has to point out that, first of all, the substance of the policies put forward in the "Wider Europe" perspective is nothing more and nothing less than the long standing instruments and aims of the associative relations the EU has evolved towards its neighbouring regions almost since its inception, with a view to promote regional (it would be better to say: inter-regional) co-operation. All is new in the "Wider Europe" agenda is the area of application and the attempt at using the old format to create a systemic, wider architecture for the entire EU "near abroad".

In principle, EU regionalism purposes to foster regional relations among its partners beside bilateral relations with each of them. (At the end of the day, it is this purpose that makes inter-regionalism - especially between countries at different level of development - compatible with globalism and global governance.) In general, however, bilateral relations have increased by far more than horizontal relations among partners. More in detail, results are mixed and very much dependent on the degree of development of partners. When partners are less developed, there is an effect of polarisation. Each associated country gets more interested in developing its economic and commercial

⁸ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Brussels 11.3.2003, COM(2003) 104 final.

relations with the EU rather than its neighbours. The latter have usually little to offer with respect to the EU or there are conflict or disputes. The EU economic power acts as a dividing factor with respect to its less developed partners.

Thus, the pattern of EU relations with its less developed neighbours tends to be inevitably a hub and spokes one. Horizontal integration and co-operation among EU associates gets neglected rather than upgraded. This has been the experience made with the Maghreb, with the associated Arab countries and, more in general, with other inter-regional relations the EU has tried to foster in Central eastern Europe and the Balkans. (It must be stressed that the ruling classes of the less developed countries involved have never even attempted at countering this negative trend of fragmentation by fostering co-operation and integration in their own regions).

This effect of polarisation is much less important when the partners are sufficiently developed economically or, more broadly speaking, when the partner regional organisation is something that already works rather than something that has to be set up more or less from scratch. This is more of the experience of EU relations with Northern or European countries, for instance the Northern Dimension.

From the BSEC particular point of view, the implementation of the EU emerging Neighbourhood policy can weaken BSEC in two respects. First, the extreme differentiation of BSEC members' status vis-à-vis the EU may weaken BSEC cohesion. Second, while the new EU policy takes into consideration existing sub-regional frameworks of relations with its neighbours, such as the EMP and the Northern Dimension, it does not take the BSEC into consideration. Technically, because the BSEC Caucasian members are not comprised in the notion of Neighbourhood. This may contribute to weaken and divide the BSEC all the same. In any case, from both point of view, while individual members of the BSEC would take advantage of the benefits that the EU Neighbourhood policy is promising, other members of the BSEC and the BSEC as such would not be able to do the same. There will a discriminatory effect that may put at risk BSEC cohesion an rationale.

What is the best option for BSEC? Should it try to be included in the Neighbourhood policy or not? In case it remains out, the discrimination stemming from an uneven application of the Neighbourhood policy to individual BSEC members can compromise the very foundations of the organisation. On the other hand, the inclusion in the Neighbourhood framework may bring about an analogous risk of polarisation and fragmentation, according to the hub and spokes pattern of relations inclusion would seemingly generate. In both cases, there is a risk of fragmentation and even dissolution or disruption. However, BSEC members have an average level of development higher than Southern Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, it is a well-structured and functioning regional organisation and the members look strongly willing to pursue their regional co-operation. Consequently, the best (or least damaging) option is the inclusion in the Neighbourhood scheme, whose polarisation effects the BSEC should be able to counter successfully while enjoying Neighbourhood advantages. This is the best option also from a global governance vantage point, as it preserve, with the BSEC cohesion, a viable regional articulation in the area. Thus, this should be the option BSEC institutions should support in its evolving relations with the EU.

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in the “Wider Europe” perspective

What is the interplay between the developments discussed in previous sections and the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas? What is or would be the role of BSEC with respect to these areas in the EU Neighbourhood policy perspective?

Eastern Mediterranean - The Eastern Mediterranean concept remains partly heir to Cold-War geopolitics, when it focused on Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, other countries on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean being referred to as Levant, Near East or Middle East. Post-Cold War developments have tended to enlarge that concept to neighbouring areas and have brought about the very BSEC. The latter can be seen as a kind of Greater Eastern Mediterranean.

The idea that the early Eastern Mediterranean area has expanded in a new wider area organised to attain stability and peace can be regarded as an important and positive factor in the framework of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and its attendant conflict on Cyprus. For sure, the BSEC has developed for the time being more as an economic than a political and security co-operation venture. While this option is consistent with the development of a long-term capabilities of conflict prevention and management in the region, it has left behind such capabilities in the short term. In this sense, the BSEC has been unable to contribute to the management and solution of the Turkish-Greek dispute or the Cyprus conflict. Still, there is no doubt that the presence of both Greece and Turkey in the BSEC has contributed to the ongoing “detente” between the two countries⁹. More in general, although the BSEC cannot be regarded as a specific factor for solving the dispute, the inclusion of both countries in a regional co-operative structure as the BSEC has to be considered in itself as a factor anyway contributing to a process of conflict prevention and resolution in the longer term.

With respect to the solution of the dispute, the inclusion of Turkey in the EU, beside Greece and - as a consequence of the 2004 enlargement - Cyprus, could be regarded as a more effective alternative than the BSEC. As matter of fact, however, the inclusion of all the three countries in the EU does not detract from the significance of BSEC tasks for furthering co-operation between Turkey and Greece (and maybe Cyprus tomorrow). By the same token, co-operation with Russia remains an issue for the Baltic countries even after their inclusion in the EU and, to that purpose, the so called Northern Dimension will not cease to help co-operation in the area. Greece and Turkey (and maybe Cyprus) need a sub-regional dimension to develop their relations with the other BSEC countries anyway.

In fact, while the solution of the disputes relating to the narrower Eastern Mediterranean area are of importance for EU security, this solution cannot come only thanks to the inclusion of all the stakeholders in the EU. Co-operation in the Greater Eastern Mediterranean area, that is the BSEC, would strongly contribute to such solution by allowing for co-operation in a sub-region where Greece and Turkey - and Cyprus - have strong interests.

The Greater Eastern Mediterranean area can perform another co-operative task. The BSEC area is very important for Russia and related to a set of significant political and economic Russian interests. From the point of view of Russia, a degree of independence

⁹ Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics*, Rand, 2001.

on the EU in dealing with its interests around the Black Sea basin is certainly welcome. From the point of view of the EU, this flexibility in its relations with Russia would be helpful, so much so that the BSEC is bound to develop in any case as a filo-EU area.

A last point may regard what the Commission's communication on EU Neighbourhood calls "the management of the new external borders and transboundary flows", mostly the problem of legal and illegal migration and soft security issues (such as international crime, drug trafficking, other kind of trafficking and the suppression of terrorism). While EMP as a non regionally-structured entity didn't help in tackling these issues, the BSEC is bound to be more cohesive than the EMP in case it were encouraged to tackle soft security issue in its regional context. This would help the EU much more than any bilateral or hub and spokes pattern of co-operation in the fields involved.

In conclusion, the existence of a working regional space in the Black Sea area would combine positively with the EU in dealing with conflict in Eastern Mediterranean and other regional security issues, such as soft security ones. By the same token, it would ease and reinforce co-operation with individual countries, as in particular in the case of Russia. A network of bilateral EU relations with the individual countries of the region only would be definitely a very second best. If the impact of the EU Neighbourhood policy were to trivialise the BSEC regional framework of co-operation, the emerging EU policy could become such second best and result detrimental not only to the BSEC but to the EU also.

The Middle East - The EU has never considered the Middle East as a single area in the way the United States and now Russia after the Soviet Union use to. The EU policy towards this area is very fragmented.

While the EU has developed significant common political approaches to the Mediterranean and the Near East (the Arab-Israeli conflict), it has always maintained an extremely low profile with respect to the Gulf area. The EU never had any contractual relations with Iraq, and very limited and low level political relations. All is there with Iran is a political dialogue in the shape of the so called "critical dialogue". Between the GCC countries and the EU there is a comprehensive agreement that contemplates a political dialogue as well as trade and economic relations, that is considered by analysts undeveloped and unsatisfactory, however.

Some European countries only, namely the UK, France, Germany and Italy have developed some bilateral relations with Iran and or individual GCC countries. Still, while the UK and France have always included the region in their strategic perspective, the other European countries have just missed such perspective. The lack of strategic perception has prevented EU policies from emerging (as in the case of Iraq and Iran) or from assuming a more adequate profile (as with the GCC). The task has been largely left to the United State and to the European members of the Security Council, i.e. France and the UK.

The emerging EU Neighbourhood policy risks to strengthen the fragmentation of the EU policies towards the Middle East and the ensuing lack of strategic perspective by consolidating its present distinction between the Southern Mediterranean and the other areas of the Middle East.

The European official discourse keeps on attributing a special importance to the Southern Mediterranean for its security. As a matter of fact, the pattern of migration includes many Asiatic and African sending areas beside those of the Middle East and North Africa; transnational trends as terrorism and Islamic extremism go well beyond

the Levant and North Africa. When it comes to hard security issues, as WMD proliferation or the Arab-Israeli conflict, the distinction between the Mediterranean and the Middle East is absolutely senseless.

The lack of strategic perspective and the fragmentation of the EU Middle Eastern policies is essentially the outcome of its enduring deficit in the CFSP. Unless the CFSP is developed in a full communitarian rather than intergovernmental policy, the EU will continue to be unable to have with the Middle East the kind of relations it would fit to have. In this sense, when the large belt of crises that surrounds the EU since the end of the Cold War - a belt that stretches from Central Asia to the Atlantic Ocean - is taken into consideration, it is evident that the area covered by the BSEC plays a role in this belt of crises. The BSEC, as an organised area oriented to stability, development and peace, fills a vacuum the EU is unable to fill until it will be able to get out of its political minority status by enforcing a real EU common security and foreign policy. The BSEC, in alliance with the EU, can perform a series of political and security functions with respect to an area the EU cannot manage by itself. In this sense, a downgrading of the BSEC within the context the EU Neighbourhood policy would not be a plus for the EU itself.

While there is no doubt that the stabilisation and democratisation of the Southern Mediterranean is an important, though strategically limited, asset for EU security and prosperity, the Europeans should not overlook the fact that with respect to many European interests, as the future of the Balkans and the relationship with Russia, as well as national interests of individual EU members, the BSEC area's stability, democratisation and development is not less important than that of Southern Mediterranean. In both cases, a working regional organisation helps the interests of the EU towards the areas involved and those beyond them. In this respect, it must be noted that while the BSEC is a functioning regional organisation, the Southern Mediterranean is not and, sadly, it will hardly be so in next future.

Conclusions

The BSEC has a consistent and positive role in the context of globalisation and, in this sense, it contributes to global governance. The role of BSEC as a region in the globalisation context is mostly affected by the EU. The emerging EU Neighbourhood policy may fragment and weaken the BSEC by including some of its members in the new policy and excluding others.

The paper argues that this is not convenient to the EU itself because the BSEC and the EU are complementary in a number of significant respects. Furthermore, for the sake of global governance, viable regions like the BSEC have to be strengthened rather than enfeebled. In this perspective, the paper points out a number of argument relating to the positive political and economic role of the BSEC with respect to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean area.

At the end of the analysis carried out by the paper, one can wonder what should be done. There is no doubt that, because of the extreme differentiation in the BSEC members with respect to the EU, setting out a contractual relations between the EU and the BSEC may put some challenges. In any case, the EU should recognise the role of the BSEC and give it an appropriate format as a condition to include it in the network of its

emerging Neighbourhood policy. The Northern Dimension format seems the more appropriate one to shape a EU-BSEC viable contractual relations. Under this format, other EU members, further to Greece, might be interested in joining the BSEC, as for instance Italy - whose interest towards the Black Sea area are definitely more important than those towards the Mediterranean - Germany and maybe Cyprus. The Northern Dimension format has been very aptly pointed out by the Yerevan BSEC resolution that, however, didn't find a response in the Thessaloniki European Council.

BSEC members' status with respect to the EU

BSEC countries	Excluded from Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Indefinite "European Perspective"	Candidates waiting for negotiations	Candidates at 2007	EU members
Armenia		X				
Azerbaijan		X				
Georgia		X				
Moldova	X					
Russia	X					
Ukraine	X					
Albania			X			
Bulgaria					X	
Romania					X	
Turkey				X		
Greece						X
Kind of relation with EU	Partnership and Co-operation Agreements		Stabilisation & Association Process (SAP)	Candidates		Members
Perspective with respect to EU	OUT	CO-PROSPERITY BELT	IN			