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"AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH, GOVERNING STABILITY ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE" A CONFERENCE REPORT

by Maria Cristina Paciello

Report of the Conference on "After September 11th, Governing Stability across the Mediterranean Sea: A Transatlantic Perspective".
Rome, 21-23 March 2002

IAI0214 ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

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The conference, organized by the International Affairs Institute and sponsored by the NATO office of Information and Press, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, was held to discuss the question of governing stability across the Mediterranean Sea in the post-September 11th environment. It focused on three broad themes: governing stability in the Mediterranean; challenges to stability; and governance and partnership in the Mediterranean.

1. Opening remarks

Rocco Buttiglione, Minister for Community Policies, Italy, discussed the broad lines of the policy that the Italian government is pursuing in the framework of the European Union and NATO. He first called attention to the process of constitutionalisation of the new Europe. Reporting on the debate on the EU's institutional framework, the Minister remarked that, rather than institutions deduced from theoretical principles, what is needed is a flexible constitution to accompany the development of the specific consciousness of a European people. In this perspective, he pointed out that external and internal security are fundamental problems of the Union. "We are convinced that the new European Union must have a tremendous impact on world affairs, but we do not envisage a world in which there is a polarity between the European Union and the United States", the Minister said. The European Union is a part of the broader Atlantic community.

With regard to the Mediterranean region, the Minister stated that the Italian government believes that attention should be shifted from Eastern European to Mediterranean countries, where problems are cultural and political. Referring to the famous paradigm by Samuel Huntington, he did not exclude the possibility of a "clash of civilizations" with Islam in the Mediterranean, but this will depend on what takes place in Islam and the policy we are able to adopt to favor dialogue. Indeed, civilizations are not objects, but complicated historical phenomena in which there are always inner struggles and different possibilities for their development. In particular, the Minister suggested that the West should help Mediterranean countries develop the ideals of the *petite bourgeoisie* and create within this context a home for human prosperity. Otherwise, integralism may become a real problem. He also questioned that Islam does not recognize the role of civil society and the distinction between religion and politics. He noted that, at the beginning, Christians did not recognize this distinction either, but learned it with time when they realized that they had to create institutions during the period of transition before the second coming of the Lord. Something similar took place in Islam: After the caliphate was abolished, more secular forms of Islamism developed

upon which the existing Islamic states are based. Of course, he noted, forms of fanatic fundamentalist movements persist since there is always the hope that the prophet will come back.

The Minister suggested that the best way to contrast such movements is within Islam and, in particular, by opening a dialogue of peace with Islamic countries in the Mediterranean. If we really want the second wave of the struggle against terrorism to bring peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean, we must be ready to spend more money to give force to our policies towards underdeveloped countries and, in particular, the Mediterranean countries. The European Union should strive to govern globalization not in abstract but concretely. Moreover, the solution of the Palestinian question, which implies two states in one land, seems to be the pre-condition for the development of this area and may help to avoid the clash of civilization. In his final note, the Minister stressed that the West must offer people in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean the same chances of prosperity and peace we have had in our past.

Amedeo De Franchis, Ambassador, NATO Permanent Representative of Italy, focused his opening remarks on the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, in particular highlighting the significant progress registered in recent months. The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 in Brussels and has been consistently supported since its inception by Italy and some other NATO countries. The need to develop NATO's Mediterranean initiative further was confirmed at the highest level during the Washington Summit in 1999 where the increased role of Mediterranean cooperation as an integral part of Euro-Atlantic stability and security was emphasized. When the 11th of September came, the awareness of the need for cooperation with respect to new transversal global threats was obvious to all, both to NATO partner states and the seven Mediterranean partners. The need to enhance the political and practical aspects of the initiative was recognized during an informal "brainstorming" meeting of NATO Ambassadors last October and, subsequently, in a round of political consultations with the seven partners. Following these consultations, a NAC meeting with the Dialogue countries took place in the multilateral 19+7 format. Ambassador De Franchis noted that the interest of the Alliance members and partners in upgrading and speeding up the Mediterranean cooperation process after September 11th was not expressed in a vacuum: the principles, instruments, programs and mechanisms for further development of the initiatives were indeed already in place as a result of the work done in previous years.

Ambassador De Franchis pointed out that the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum particularly well suited to dealing with subjects in which NATO possesses unique experience and competence. The principle is that the Mediterranean Dialogue can also take place bilaterally, between NATO and individual countries, and between NATO and partner countries together. This - a major difference from the Euro-Med Partnership - allows the process to go forward even at times when great difficulties in the Middle East peace process hamper the multilateral dimension. He also underlined that the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med partnership are complementary to each other.

Ambassador De Franchis concluded with some remarks on the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue. He noted that the security scenario resulting from the events of

September 11th is not the only factor influencing the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue. There are also internal NATO dynamics that favor the development of the Dialogue, namely its reform and external outreach processes launched in view of the Prague Summit next November, where important decisions are expected to be taken regarding enlargement. A decision in Prague to enlarge the Alliance further would also lead to a thorough redefinition of the geographical dimension of NATO's partnership. The specific relevance of the Mediterranean initiative would be increased since this region would be recognized as even more closely linked to Euro-Atlantic security. Against this background, as Ambassador De Franchis argued, it is legitimate to envisage that the countries that are now part of the Mediterranean Dialogue may enter the more general framework of the Partnership for Peace.

In his final notes, Ambassador De Franchis stressed his conviction that Italy will continue to contribute to the growth of this initiative because of the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean security. He also pointed out that security challenges have to be addressed collectively within the European Union and NATO, and within the partnership, and that the security of Europe cannot be addressed without a transatlantic link with the United States.

2. Governing stability in the Mediterranean

For many years, the Western countries have made efforts aimed at turning the Mediterranean and Middle East into stable areas capable of peaceful change. These efforts have led to the setting up of a considerable number of organizations and institutions based on cooperation and partnership. The impact of September 11th on international relations adds new strategic weight and importance to these efforts and suggests the need for their strengthening. The first session of the conference focused on the ways the current schemes of security cooperation, in particular the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med Partnership, can cope with challenges to Mediterranean peace and stability.

Roberto Aliboni, Vice president of the International Affairs Institute (IAI), addressed the question of how such a constellation of initiatives of co-operation, in particular the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (NMD), has to be reinforced and redirected to make it more effective and able to cope with the challenges posed by the events of September 11th. Besides effective military measures, the broad post-September 11th perspective needs to include the development of co-operation and partnership if allies are to be strengthened, and support to terrorists suppressed.

Although the effectiveness of multilateral organizations (ORGs) is constrained and reduced by the lack of a solution to the Middle East conflict, they can nevertheless implement limited measures of security cooperation both in a military and non-military sense. In this perspective, the ORGs should be reinforced as instruments of partnership in order to support co-operation in the post-September 11th situation. In particular, flexibility and variable geometry should be used: multilateralism should be turned into forms of multi-bilateralism, sub-regionalism should be given more space beside regionalism, and declaratory confidence-building and partnership-building measures

should be multiplied so as to strengthen flexibility, and increase transparency and cohesion.

As far as the EMP is concerned, it should keep on redirecting its activities towards a comprehensive security concept where emphasis is given to co-operation relating to civilian, economic, social and cultural factors. While such an agenda, which is aimed at attaining structural stability and is linked to democratization, has exposed the EMP to considerable tensions, the emphasis included in the comprehensive security perspective on non-military factors has proved broadly conductive to cooperation. Moreover, as the root causes of instability and the promotion of democracy are discussed in a bilateral context rather than in the EMP's overall multilateral context, compromise and mediation between the parties are possible. Finally, in a more general way, it is clear that the EU is getting used to a less value-laden and assertive behavior. This more pragmatic, issue-by-issue approach, identifying specific "files" central to broad regional stability and security, such as economic development and soft security issues, allows for common action and political compromise.

As for the NMD, it should move from a dialogue intended to improve information and transparency towards partnership tasks. By taking advantage of its multi-bilateral format, the NMD should be able to make progress in the field of declaratory and transparency CBMs and enter the field of operational CBMs even in a framework that is as politically narrow as the present one. Making political dialogue a regular feature of the NMD could be the first step towards enlarging the NMD and directing it towards partnership. The next aim should be the establishment of a Mediterranean Co-operation Council at ambassadorial level to meet periodically on the basis of an agenda prepared by the Mediterranean Co-operation Group.

Finally, Aliboni highlighted the importance of setting up some kind of coordination between the EMP and the NMD in a transatlantic perspective. ORGs are indeed difficult to co-ordinate because governments, in particular Western governments, are divided about objectives and policies with respect to the areas concerned. He pointed out that, even though it is possible, as things stand today, to envisage in the shorter term a kind of division of labor between the EMP and the NMD, the political impact of both ORGs is bound to remain limited unless a closer political understanding is assured between the United States and Europe on the different issues and crises of the region. Nevertheless, whatever the weaknesses of longer-term co-ordination, in the short term the ORGs and their agendas of cooperative security, with all their limits, need to be reinforced. The division of tasks illustrated above - also limited - can help with respect to two urgent challenges: (a) preventing instability in the region and preserving the possibility of long-term democratic political transition; (b) increasing the opportunities of co-operation on terrorism in both the EMP and the NMD.

Nicola de Santis, Information Officer for Mediterranean Dialogue and Partner Countries at NATO, spoke on the aim and scope of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. In his presentation he stressed how the terrorist attacks on the United States have significantly transformed the security environment in which the transatlantic Alliance operates in. NATO faces again, just a few years after the end of the Cold War, an existential threat to its peoples, represented by new and transnational threats such as

weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. Consequently, at the Prague Summit NATO will need to push even further its process of ongoing adaptation to the fast changing security environment in order to deal more effectively with these asymmetric threats, by adapting its military doctrine and developing the capabilities needed to fulfill the full spectrum of its post Cold War new missions. At the Prague Summit in November 2002 NATO will also need to reach consensus on which applicants should be invited to join the Alliance and the modalities to do so, ensuring the success of its second enlargement process. At the same time the Atlantic Alliance will need to continue to develop its new qualitative relationship with Russia and enhance its partnerships with the Ukraine and, most of all, with its Mediterranean Dialogue partners. The Mediterranean Dialogue is NATO's near abroad (as a US scholar put it). To enhance NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue the Allies at Prague will need to move from Dialogue to Partnership. The Mediterranean Dialogue is based on the same cooperative approach to security which NATO has successfully put in place projecting stability to the Euro-Atlantic Area, bringing back to Europe the countries that for too long had been unnaturally separated from the rest of Europe, doing so in security and peace through "variable geometries" arrangements. The same cooperative approach to security has allowed to promote a better understanding of NATO's post Cold War reorientation in Mediterranean Dialogue countries, building at same time mutual trust. But this process is just at the beginning. NATO is still hill-perceived in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Alliance needs to continue to reach out to Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries' elites and policy makers, to correct prejudice and realign misperceptions. At Prague NATO's top policy makers will look at practical ways to move from Dialogue to Partnership. Discussions within NATO have already started to identify how to adapt some of the PfP activities to the specific realities of Mediterranean Dialogue countries, which are different from those of PfP countries. A major public diplomacy effort will also be needed to accompany the enhancement of the Mediterranean Dialogue, moving from Dialogue to Partnership. But to promote both a better understanding of NATO's Post Cold war agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership, NATO will need adequate resources. The issue of resources is key to NATO's continuous adaptation aimed at meeting current and future challenges affecting its members' security. That is why at the Prague Summit NATO will also modernise its political-military processes and structures, while it will overhaul the defense capabilities initiative to make sure that the Alliance continues to develop those political and military capabilities enabling NATO to deal with new challenges and threats. The speakers noted that it was thanking to NATO's capabilities that: the Cold War ended; two major military crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo were managed successfully, a third one in Macedonia was prevented from escalating and turning into a blood-shed; furthermore it was thanking to NATO capabilities that Milosevic is now before the ICTY, that NATO continues to provide for a security environment in which the political, social and economic reconstruction of the Balkans can take place and the reason why_9 new countries want to join the Atlantic Alliance.

After describing the achievements of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue so far, due to the work of the 19 nations' Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) and to the activities put in place through the adoption of an annual Work Programme for practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the speaker reported that, as a reaction to the events of September 11th, there seems to be

momentum among Arab countries in cooperating in the security field with NATO, this for the first time involves also "hard security" areas of cooperation. NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue partners will need to follow up this momentum by identifying the practical initiatives that at the Prague Summit that could be useful to further enhance NATO's Mediterranean security Dialogue. Another issue the Allies will have to look at in the future, as NATO and the EU are working more closely to promote the complementary between NATO's ESDI and the EU's ESDP, will be how to make complementary NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process).
Finally, the speaker stressed that NATO also has a role to play in encouraging activities involving the "civil society" in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This is an area to which NATO has paid increasingly more attention allocating to it each year more resources, allowing to bring to the Alliance's Headquarters parliamentarians, media representatives and opinion leaders to meet with the Secretary General of NATO and other Alliance officials, or through co-sponsoring international events, such as this conference, bringing together academics, parliamentarians, opinion leaders and the media from NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to discuss common issues of security concern, exposing participants to each others' perceptions and realities.

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Lisbon (IEEI), focused on the Barcelona process, discussing the reasons for its slow progress and suggesting ways in which it could be reinvigorated. The main goal of the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) is to expand the area of peace, democracy and development in the North-South direction, through a process of inclusion. In terms of its potential, the EMP is the only framework for the participation of Southern countries in the world economy and is the sole multilateral Mediterranean framework in which a consistent, high-level dialogue involving both Israel and a significant number of Arab countries has been pursued. However, despite the process' proven potential, enormous difficulties are evident. Firstly, there is a lack of progress in the chapter on human rights and democracy. With the exception of Morocco, democratic transitions are at a standstill. Secondly, the collapse of the peace process in the Middle East makes security cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona process unfeasible. Thirdly, South-South integration, which is a necessary condition for creating an Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, is still weak, even though the initiative launched in Agadir of a free trade area between Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan is noteworthy.

The events of September 11th and the vast US-led coalition against international terrorism have brought some of those problems into the limelight and have, in some cases, aggravated them. In particular, the international coalition built to fight terrorism has in many cases entailed the opportunistic collaboration of a number of states in the MENA region, which have hoped to pursue their own internal and regional agendas. In other words, those regimes have become even more authoritarian. The events of September 11th have also contributed to further widening the perception gap between public opinion in the North and in the South. It is therefore important to try to understand what it is really happening in the MENA region after the events of September 11th. In relation to that, de Vasconscelos called attention to the importance of discussing what would be the impact on the Euro-Med Partnership and the NATO

Mediterranean Dialogue of a military operation against Iraq, as negative perceptions of the West in the Arab public opinion would likely further increase.

The issue of how the Barcelona process can face its structural difficulties was also discussed. Firstly, the speaker suggested that the EMP should put aside the holistic approach prescribed for the achievement of peace, prosperity and security, and take into account national peculiarities when assessing the measures to be implemented. Within the EMP, a debate on this issue has already started. Secondly, a South-South approach should be adopted within the EMP. This means that the EMP should begin to discuss and face the problems regarding South-South countries and those internal to specific South countries, which constitute the real security problems in the region. Thirdly, as Southern partners feel that they lack sufficient influence in the decision-making process within the EMP, ways have to be found to give them more ownership. Moreover, in the security field, the EU should commit itself to doing something that goes beyond the Barcelona process. De Vasconscelos argued, however, that NATO can hardly provide the right answer to security because problems in the region transcend the realm of security and the perceptions of NATO in Arab countries are not as positive as they are in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, even though the transatlantic Dialogue seems to be the right forum for such a dialogue to bear its potential fruits as far as Europe and the United States are concerned, no dialogue will be entirely fruitful unless it involves all the interested parties, i.e. the US, the EU and the Mediterranean countries themselves. An initiative along the lines of the Italian-Spanish CSCM project, although less ambitious in geographical scope, may be more likely to emerge as a cornerstone in the near future.

Finally, the future of the Barcelona process largely depends on the Union's ability to assert an autonomous role in foreign and defense policy *vis-à-vis* the US and the EMP itself. The Union should refuse to remain hostage to the limited consensus achievable within the EMP and develop its own initiatives on human rights and democracy issues, differentiating between countries. Moreover, in the fight against terrorism, it should integrate issues such as human rights and justice in both dialogue and cooperative initiatives. Yet, as far as security policy is concerned, the EU should initiate a dialogue with Mediterranean countries on the issue of its own defense policy.

Discussion

The discussion that followed the three presentations focused mainly on the questions of how NATO and the EU can contribute to Mediterranean security and stability and, in particular, what role NATO should play in dealing with the security problems in the area.

One participant pointed out that, in dealing with the future of the NATO-Mediterranean relationship, one should first ask the broader question of what the future of NATO will be and what kind of role it will play. The same participant recalled that NATO was set up for dealing mainly with security challenges and therefore, has a role to play in dealing with regional conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

A comment was also made on the possible role of NATO in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was argued that it would be unrealistic to send international observers

without military forces to ensure their security. Unfortunately, neither the UN neither the EU would be able to mount such a force quickly. The only possibility would be a multinational force based on a coalition that includes three components: NATO countries, the countries of the region and possibly Russia. Moreover, if there were a strong international force in the field, assistance in re-constructing the area would be possible. In addition, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, which involves important countries, could provide the framework for confidence-building measures in the region.

However, with regard to NATO's role, one participant questioned the juridical basis for NATO's fight against terrorism, pointing out that, despite connections, there is a very clear distinction in the EU between the use of military forces (the second pillar) and the fight against terrorism (the third pillar). Another participant noted that, while it is true that terrorism, like other new threats, is not part of NATO's institutional duties, it is now considered an area of interest. Consequently, the real question seems to be whether NATO is going to acquire a competence or a mission to fight terrorism. Moreover, one speaker argued that NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is not the proper framework for promoting state-society relations and political transition in MENA countries. In as much as security concerns are legitimately addressed within the right framework that is NATO, it is important to de-link state-society issues and the political agenda from security concerns. The Euro-Mediterranean framework is probably the arena in which Arab governments would be more comfortable to raise such issues, and promote political and economic reforms. It was remarked, however, that many elements of Arab civil society are against the goals of democratization.

All participants agreed that NATO and the EU should coordinate their policies with respect to the Mediterranean non-European countries and work out an explicit division of tasks to complement each other. It was pointed out that NATO can be complementary to the EU in the security field by bringing in the US. Moreover, while coordination between the EU and NATO is difficult, they have already worked together in practice, for example in Macedonia, and, four working groups within NATO are trying to find ways to establish this complementarity.

However, conflicting views were expressed on the issue of transatlantic relationships with regard to the Mediterranean. Some doubts were raised about whether NATO can live and prosper under the Bush' doctrine. One participant made the point that, while the Mediterranean dialogue between the US and the EU is important, in the current period there is need for a different and strongly autonomous EU policy in the Mediterranean *vis-à-vis* the US. According to the same speaker, there is too much Mediterranean dialogue between the US and the UE which has contributed to inhibiting the EU's autonomy in the region. Nevertheless, one participant questioned how an autonomous position of the EU *vis-à-vis* the US could promote stability, peace, democracy, security and human rights in ways that co-ordination with the US or following in the US' path could not. Another remarked that, even though NATO plays a fundamental complementary role to the EU, the latter needs its defense autonomy in order to be accountable to European citizens and to be in a position to intervene if the US is not interested in doing so. Yet, only if the EU acts collectively and in an autonomous way, will it be able to influence the US - the fundamental actor in the

international system - with its vision. It was also noted that the development of EU security and defense policy works in the interests of NATO anyway.

3. Challenges to stability

The second theme was discussed in four sessions: Islamism's roots and prospects; trans-national risks and soft security cooperation; globalization trends; and new and traditional terrorism.

3.a Islamism: roots and prospects

Béchir Chourou, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Tunis I, examined the issue of Islamism, highlighting in particular the reasons behind its emergence and popular support, and the prospects of radical Islamic movements after September 11th. According to Chourou, although some of the Islamic fundamentalist movements maintain informal contacts with each other, there is no structured international Islamic movement. Islamic fundamentalist movements are local organizations that were created to deal with local issues, have very little interest in international issues and are not very actively involved outside the borders of their respective countries. In particular, Islamic groups were often sponsored by ruling regimes in the beginning to counteract leftist opposition movements but, subsequently, when they entered the political arena and became leading opposition forces in their respective countries, were subjected to even harsher treatment than that given other opposition movements. By contrast, as he noted, after the events of the September 11th, the West has interpreted the Islamic movement as a "diffuse and trans-national" movement and, consequently, has reacted to it by building up another international movement – the international coalition behind the US leadership.

However, he cautioned that fundamentalist movements are likely to attract more and more local sympathizers and activists should the West fail to convince Israel to accept the creation of a Palestinian state and convince current Arab regimes to adopt meaningful political reforms. In particular, he called attention to the fact that Western countries are not credible to the populations of the MENA region because they are perceived as the root causes of their problems: even though their regimes are unaccountable, illegitimate and unresponsive to public needs, they continue to prosper because of Western support. As far as the actions undertaken after September 11th are concerned, popular attitudes towards the West in Arab countries seem not to have changed. In its efforts to mobilize support for its war on terrorism, the US asked for and received full cooperation from most Arab countries. Moreover, even though the US launched a campaign to convince public opinion in the world that the war is against terrorism and not Islam, it is unlikely that such discourse can receive much credibility in Muslim countries. The average man on the street in Muslim countries considers such a campaign as highly hypocritical. In fact, before September 11th, no attention was paid to Muslims and their culture, the Palestinian conflict had been ignored for years and authoritarian regimes in the MENA tolerated by the West. The speaker furthermore observed that there is no evidence that the West, and in particular the US, is interested in putting pressures on Arab regimes to adopt political reforms. Yet, he pointed out that,

with respect to human rights, there seems to be a discrepancy between what the West says and how it behaves, as the case of the al-Qaida prisoners shows. This is likely to reinforce the image of the West that Osama bin Laden wants to convey.

Chourou concluded by expressing concern that the way in which the US is trying to play on people's emotions with respect to the dramatic events of September 11th may have costly consequence if there is a return to continuous dis-respect for fundamental human rights and inconsistency between what the West says and does. Both the US and the EU should realize that the fundamentalist movements are – for now at least – by and large local opposition movements whose appeal and popularity are based more on the concern they show for the common man than on the real desire to harm the West. So, the most effective way of challenging the fundamentalists is to adopt proactive policies designed to improve standards of living, to put an end to corruption and repression and, more generally, to reduce the number and the impact of the factors that appear to be leading the world towards a "clash of civilizations".

Discussion

Attention was drawn first to soft security issues and the importance that they be handled within the right framework. According to one participant, many soft security issues relating to civil society, democracy issues and economic prosperity, have been mishandled for so long that they have reached the point of hard security. The same speaker also pointed out that there is no reason for anyone from outside to interfere in soft security issues since they are domestic issues and, therefore, should be handled at the domestic level. In particular, in the coming years, two issues should be addressed at the domestic level: integrating Islamic political parties and finding a way to adjust the modernizing agenda in Muslim societies. However, one of the negative consequences of the events of September 11th is that governments in the MENA region have pushed aside the agenda of the so-called donor community that aims at promoting civil society, democracy and human rights, in favor of the other international agenda, the security agenda, which requires military and intelligence cooperation.

The nature of the Islamic movement and its roots were further discussed. Some comments underscored the fact that Islamic movements have a national and specific agenda. Two factors have contributed to the distortion of political development and the rise of radical elements in the MENA region: the nature of governance and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As one participant noted, the latter cannot be excluded from any discussion on the Islamic movement. With regard to the most radical Islamic movements, it was pointed out that, in most cases, for instance in Egypt, they are on the decline because of lack of popular support and are acknowledging the failure of using violence as a political strategy.

As far as trans-national Islamic organizations are concerned, one participant argued that the criminal network has developed and prospered in a specific context, in which a number of factors came together to allow it to organize in a particular space. In particular, as a result of their defeat on a local basis, a few of the most radical elements of the Islamic movements of Egypt went to Afghanistan where they found the economic support of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the same speaker highlighted that, despite popular sympathy for al-Qaida, the trans-national movement does not relate in any

substantial way to what goes on domestically. Popular sympathy with al-Qaida in MENA countries has to do with the people's discontent and resentment. According to another participant, a more global crisis of identity also has to be considered as a factor in explaining the emergence of the trans-national strain of fanatical Islamic groups. In particular, the participant drew a link between the old generation of Islamic groups related to Afghanistan and the new generation of immigrants. Islamic groups have indeed found new ground within the fresh generation of immigrants in the US and the EU. However, another comment was that, in order to avoid confusion, it is very important to distinguish clearly between the two phenomena that have emerged after September 11th and that now dominate the international agenda: one is the wider ideological issue that generated the events of September 11th and involves issues in the Islamic world, and the other, which is developing in parallel with it, but is quite separate, is the radicalization of immigration in Europe.

A participant also called attention to another important feature of Muslim society today. While Islamic movements are failing, Islamic institutions, which are the legitimate representatives of Islam, have gained a lot of influence in the last years. As a result of the erosion of their legitimacy, governments have had to negotiate each and every issue with them. However, even if it is too early to say, as a result of the events of September 11th and the consequent pressures from outside, governments have started challenging the religious establishment on some issues.

Finally, a debate took place on how the spread of radical Islamic movements can be avoided and if unconditional support of current regimes – in the name of security – is the only or most acceptable alternative. Participants agreed that there is a need to integrate Islamic groups into the political sphere and that it is no longer possible not to allow these societies to express their views democratically because authoritarian regimes are considered a lesser evil than the spread of radical Islam. At the same time, how this dilemma should be addressed is still not clear. Doubts were raised as to how the West can ensure that it is not supporting a peaceful way to a totalitarian power. On the attitudes of the US and the EU on political Islam, a participant highlighted that, after the September 11th, while the US is globalizing the phenomenon, the EU is trying to differentiate and analyze it, although it is still very cautious about political change. However, while sharing the concern that all Islamic movements, whether moderate or violent, aim at establishing an Islamic state, another comment was that communist parties were successfully integrated into the democratic system in Western societies. It was also stressed that if the West wants to do something to avoid the spread of radical movements, it has to stop legitimating Arab regimes or, at least, dissociate from them.

3.b Trans-national risks and soft security cooperation

George Joffé, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, UK, explored the issue of trans-national risks. He first shared with participants some reflections on problems of definition, noting that trans-national risks seem to involve non-state actors and are fundamentally non-conventional political criminal activities. He also highlighted the importance of distinguishing between international and trans-national risks.

Four different categories of trans-national activities were identified: terrorism; smuggling and trafficking; international crimes, particularly organized international crime; and financial activities, either money laundering or the use of financial havens. Trans-national risks are typically seen to operate as a South-North phenomenon and, in particular, as an East-West European phenomenon. However, the speaker noted that there are also North-South trans-national risks that are more general, such as the process of globalization. Moreover, trans-national risks should not be considered only as the consequences of push factors, such as employment, remittances and demography, but also as the consequences of pull factors such as demand for drugs in developed countries.

As far as trans-national terrorism is concerned, the speaker argued that, even allowing for the implications of September 11th, in European terms it is still a minor concern. Statistics indicate that the actual incidence of terrorism either in Europe or in the Middle East is small. So, regarding the question of how to respond to terrorism, he stressed that terrorism is a phenomenon that deserves intelligence and police control rather than military control. Concern was also expressed about the great danger of the West adopting the agenda of governments in the South that have specific reasons for wishing to see terrorism trans-nationalized. Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria are cases in point.

With regard to drugs, Joffé pointed out that, contrary to what is generally presumed, the Mediterranean is a transit area, not a producer. Only cannabis originates mainly in Morocco where it represents one tenth of the country's total gross domestic product and fifty-six percent of its visible exports. Given the important role that cannabis plays in the local economy, it is difficult for the Moroccan government simply to dismantle production. A much more serious risk, according to the speaker, is that the drug transiting into Europe through the South Mediterranean is a powerful engine for the growth of integrated organized crime networks in Europe. Moreover, as for the trafficking and smuggling of people, he noted that, in some respect, it can be considered the most serious and dangerous trans-national risk we face. Figures and recent facts in Britain, France and Italy show that there is a massive population movement to Europe. In particular, the problem of illegal workers is one that European states have "to consider very carefully". Indeed, the ageing of the European population, the changing patterns of labor and the problem of European pension structure mean that labor is required. Finally, associated with it, is the question of international organized crime. Organized international crime groups can be found in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where they are very sophisticated and collaborate with each other. Since they generate a large amount of cash, money laundering is also becoming an important associated activity. While regulation has been inadequate, the OECD and the US recently respectively introduced a convention.

Lastly, the speaker addressed the question of control of trans-national risks. With regard to the smuggling of people, he pointed out that, at the national level, even in the most developed states, controls in legal terms are very weak. For example, there are countries of destination, like UK, where there are no specific laws on trafficking and smuggling. At the international level, on the other hand, control has been constructed. For example, last year, the US put through an act attempting to control the trafficking of persons, while the UN brought in a convention on trans-national organized crime with two

associated protocols, one on trafficking and one on smuggling. However, with regard to Europe, he noted that it is still unequipped to deal with the smuggling of people, organized crime and terrorism. At the level of national and EU integration, there is still a lot to be done.

In conclusion, he underscored the needs for the EU to put into place the instruments with which to control international or trans-national risks and, at the same time, for European states to take great care that what they do does not actually worsen the situation of their domestic population and those involved in trans-national risks.

Discussion

Attention returned to the question of the definition of trans-national risks. On the issue of actors, one participant argued that the emphasis on non-state actors can lead to confusion about what the appropriate response is and whether the threat should be seen as a problem of criminality or security. With respect to terrorism, for example, such a distinction seems to skirt a major problem that has to do with state support, encouragement or toleration of terrorist actions, and, at the very least, with the state's inability to exercise sovereignty within its borders. In relation to non-state actors, one comment was also that, after 1989, there have been two main changes: first, increasing deregulation and privatization of terrorism, which was previously state-controlled, while it is now much more state-aided; and second, a freeing of criminal resources from the Russian area.

Another participant pointed out that definitions of trans-national risks tend to include everything, with the result that they become non-sensical and inefficient. What creates a real category of trans-national risks is the fusion of both traditional and non-traditional categories. To categorize trans-national risks, the same participant proposed a new acronym - the MPPTM - which is a synthesis of the actors involved in them: Mafia, Politicians, Priests, Terrorists and Managers. In other words, the perpetrators of trans-national threats can be defined as "people managing political activities as business, justified by political and, sometimes, religious means, and using terrorism as war against the state". Due to globalization and the failure of the state, the new actors responsible for trans-national threats are capable of dealing with the state as a non-governmental actor but at the state level.

Conflicting views were expressed on what, among trans-national risks, should be considered of priority security concern. Consequently, different points were also raised about the strategies to deal with trans-national risks. One participant emphasized that the smuggling of technology, smuggling of substances and organized crime are security risks that, if not managed, can become security threats. As a result, they also have to be addressed within the NATO framework. However, one participant argued that NATO is not the appropriate vehicle to deal with such risks. For instance, as far as the smuggling of substances is concerned, the problem has to do more with intelligence than with the materials themselves. Yet, with regard to international crime, the same speaker noted that, while it is true that organized crime can take on a dimension that threatens the existence of the state, people involved in international crime actually do not want to change the state but to exploit it.

With regard to migration, one participant remarked that it does not have to be brought into a discussion on security cooperation since it is not a security threat; migration issues can be better addressed within the EU framework. The point was also made that, even though NATO is a hard military organization, one should not overlook that soft security issues are being covered in NATO and that partners are looking for cooperation on these issues. Finally, a participant pointed out that the real trans-national risk to the world community today is the future of Afghanistan. The country's persistent instability is likely to have international consequences in terms of drug trade, terrorism and migration. NATO and MENA countries could play an important role in helping to restore stability in Afghanistan.

Concrete suggestions on how to respond to trans-national risks were also made. According to one participant, based on the premise that criminal groups are fundamentally conservative, and, paradoxically, created by the state, to respond to trans-national risks, one could try to restrict those actors' activities through legalization (in the case of drugs, for example), policing the international off-shore financial system, effecting cross-border arrests rather than waiting for the slow process of extradition, and promoting co-operation among national judicial systems. In addition, a participant warned against the seduction of using quick and effective means at the beginning. On terrorism, in particular, it was noted that, once the network has been dismantled, nothing will stop people from rebuilding it if social and political conditions do not change in their countries.

3.c Globalization trends

Michael Intriligator, Director of the Burkle Center for International Relations of the University of California, dealt with the process of globalization of the world economy, evaluating both the potential costs and benefits stemming from globalization as well as suggesting policy responses to offset such dangers. Globalization is understood to mean major increases in worldwide trade and exchanges in an increasingly open, integrated, and borderless international economy. There have been several sources of globalization over the last past decades: technological advances that have significantly lowered the cost of transportation, communications, data processing and information storage; economic liberalization that has led to a more liberal world trading system; changes in institutions; a convergence of beliefs in the value of the market economy and a free trade system; and, finally, cultural developments with a move to a globalized and homogenized media, and the widespread use of the English language.

As the speaker argued, globalization has both positive and negative effects. As far as the benefits are concerned, they stem from the effects of competition that globalization entails. In particular, they include widening of markets, increase in production and efficiency, specialization and division of labor, and mutual gains by all parties from trade. With regard to the costs, globalization has led to an increase in polarization between countries. The reality is that only a small group of nations, "the tiger economies" of East Asia, have grown at rapid rates. A second problem related to globalization is the fragility of the international economic system that leads to mutual vulnerability. This means that local economic fluctuations or crises in one nation can have regional or even global impact. Intriligator noted that this is not just a theoretical

possibility, but was seen in the financial crisis in Asia, which started in Thailand in 1998 and then spread to other Southeast Asian economies. A third type of problem is that control of national entities is seen by some as possibly shifting from sovereign governments to other entities, including the most powerful nation states, multinational or global firms, and other international organizations. The result is that some perceive national sovereignty as being undermined by the forces of globalization.

Intriligator concluded by suggesting some ways of responding to the challenges of globalization. He argued that, overall, the dangers stemming from globalization could be offset through wider international cooperation, and the establishment of new international institutions or the expansion of existing ones. For example, a supranational institution based on global cooperation could address the first of the problems stemming from globalization. It would, in effect, tax the nations gaining from globalization and use the proceeds to provide financial and technical assistance to those losing out from it. Moreover, with regard to the second problem, international cooperation could lead to the implementation of the Tobin tax, a small tax on foreign exchange transactions that could play a valuable role in limiting destabilizing currency speculation. Thus, while globalization can cause international conflicts, it can also contribute to their containment through the beneficial effects of competition and the potential of global cooperation to treat economic and other threats facing the planet.

Discussion

The discussion began with comments on the definition of globalization and its effects. A participant noted that the definition of globalization provided by the presentation basically focused on economic aspects, but technological development also fosters exchange in people's information and ideas with widespread political, cultural, social and economic effects. The same speaker furthermore outlined some of the non-economic effects stemming from globalization. As far as the benefits are concerned, it was pointed out that, thanks to internet and satellite dishes, it is now much more difficult than before for governments to prevent the free flow of ideas and information. Human rights values have also been universalized, and international institutions and international law are now playing a greater role. With regard to the negative effects, it was stressed that in addition to inequality between nations, there has been massive growth in inequality within nations. Moreover, inequality should not be attributed to governmental fiscal policies, as Intriligator seems to suggest. In fact, governments have to pursue these policies if they are to retain access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Elite migration can be considered a further damaging effect of globalization for exporting countries. Another participant commented on the definition of globalization. While agreeing on the definition that highlights openness, the same participant pointed out that it does not underline what makes this globalization different from that of a century ago, that is increasing growth in international investment in manufacturing and services related to manufacturing. It was also noted that this process of restructuring has had an asymmetric impact. In particular, MENA countries, with the exception of Tunisia, have not been able to take advantage of the opportunities stemming from globalization.

Some participants tried to explain why MENA countries lag behind in the process of globalization. One participant stressed that equity problems have to do more with the

inability or unwillingness of certain states to bring their countries into the process of globalization, than the dynamics of globalization *per se*. So, referring to MENA countries, the problem with inward capital flows in the region has to do with bad governance. However, another speaker noted that certain elements in the globalization process provide the opportunity for those faults on the part of individual governments. The point was also made that a number of political and cultural factors such as the existence of a conflict in the region and the cultural intensity in this area should be taken into account.

Finally, a debate took place regarding the key issue, as one participant said, on how to cope with globalization and, most importantly, how to create processes and structures to ensure that the globalized world is not marked by instability on the one hand, and inequality and injustice, on the other hand. In particular, comments focused on the proposal of global cooperation as a way to counteract the negative dimensions of globalization. One participant noted that international institutions are dominated by the US and, perhaps, one or two other Western countries. As far as the Middle East and Southern Mediterranean countries are concerned, this is a very important dimension that very deeply affects the way in which the international system is seen and the kind of role international institutions are expected to play. The same participant also expressed concern that a proper response to the challenges of globalization is not possible without the political scenario required to achieve international cooperation. So, there is a need to see how public opinion and forces both in the South and on the underside of the North may be mobilized to press for this kind of change. Another participant pointed out that international cooperation does not mean only international institutions. Decentralized decision-making could be even more effective than central international institutions to deal with certain issues. Thus, future international cooperation could involve very different levels of intervention - multilateral, but also regional and in some cases bilateral - that should be made compatible and, if possible, complementary to each other. The key problem to be addressed is therefore how to make these different levels consistent. Lastly, someone commented that, in order to change the situation of inequality and thereby the implicit security threat, macroeconomic policies have to be accompanied by actions that allow populations to exploit the globalized world. Populations indeed require services that have to be provided by the states and not by the globalized economy.

3.d New and traditional terrorism

Ian Lesser, Senior Analyst, International Policy Department, RAND, explored the issue of terrorism, examining how it has changed and is changing, and how it can be counteracted. After the transforming and shocking events of September 11th, generalizing about terrorism is difficult. Alongside new aspects, a lot of other traditional aspects of terrorism persist. The speaker, in particular, noted that the lethality of what happened on September 11th is in fact a trend that has been going on for a long time. In the last decade, since the 1990s, although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide actually went down, the lethality of terrorism has increased steadily. The general explanation accounting for such extensive use of violence can be linked to new motivations. The political agenda of the old terrorist organizations had specific goals that led to a rather specifically - tailored politically - motivated violence that was highly

calibrated. Whereas, as is the case with the new terrorist organizations, if the aims are broad, systemic, global and not very coherent, all sorts of violence, in particular with religious connotations, can become more intense. Terrorism has also become more diverse in its forms and less isolated as a phenomenon: in addition to terrorism motivated by political goals and, at the end of the spectrum, systemic objectives, there are also a lot of other forms of terrorism that are associated, for example, with drug trafficking and international crimes.

Moreover, looking at the Afghan experience and the operations against al-Qaida after September 11th, Lesser argued that they can be considered a special and rather exceptional case. From the point of view of the international coalition, al-Qaida was the best possible adversary: it was easily targetable and visible, and was associated with a specific regime. Bin Laden's systemic aims threaten an extraordinary range of regimes and interests. Building up an international coalition against al-Qaida was therefore easy. However, he continued, al-Qaida is now different since it is a much more dispersed phenomenon. Finally, he remarked that the old terrorism has not gone away.

As far as the issue of counter-terrorism strategies is concerned, he argued that, in the post-September 11th environment, a national counter-terrorism strategy is inappropriate and ineffective. After September 11th, for example, arrests of terrorists were carried out in sixty countries around the world. Moreover, future counter-terrorism activities in general will not consist of large-scale military responses, but rather in police co-operation and intelligence-sharing among states. On this point, he noted that, after September 11th, cooperation of police and intelligence-sharing between the EU and the US has been very good. However, it is not clear for how long cooperation between the EU and the US is going to persist and be effective if there is no agreement on a common foreign strategy. Finally, he pointed out that the risk of terrorism should not be seen as the organizing principle for foreign strategy. While it is an important strategic problem to be dealt with, it should not be discussed and addressed in isolation from other strategic problems.

Discussion

Participants first commented on the nature of trans-national terrorism. According to one intervention, four elements have made terrorism new after September 11th: globalization that, through the global spreading of finance and communication, has facilitated the networking of terrorist groups around the world; high levels of knowledge and education due to the growth of the educational system around the world; sophistication of education; and a feeling of frustration resulting from lack of democracy and economic development. Moreover, the same participant argued that, after the events of September 11th, the escalation from locally focused terrorism to globally focused terrorism has to be related to the specificity of radical Islam. In particular, three elements explain the globalization of the fight of radical Islam: first, historical and political factors such as colonization, the Iranian revolution, authoritarian regimes, and some economic problems; second, the specificity of the *shaid* (martyr) and, third, immigration which made it possible for some radical groups to settle in Western societies and develop their own strategies inside the Muslim community.

However, one participant contended that, while it is true that Islamic terrorist groups are motivated by global issues, grassroots causes at the domestic and national levels are more relevant in explaining their move towards more systemic goals. One should not forget that such groups have a history and come from a society with history. In fact, they were initially influenced by domestic problems and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they then moved toward more systemically motivated goals as a result of their local defeat in the 1980s and 1990s. The same speaker furthermore underscored the importance of distinguishing between al-Qaida and other organizations like Hamas that have more specific and clear goals. Another participant further emphasized the importance of looking at the history of Islamic movements and argued that al-Qaida has specific targets and specific reasons. In particular, it was noted that there was a progression in al-Qaida's construction: from the specific complaints about the American presence in Saudi Arabia in 1992 through the Committee of Legitimate Rights, of which Osama bin Laden was a member; the first *fatwa* against the US issued upon Osama bin Laden's initiative in 1996; to the *fatwa* against Jews and Christians issued in 1998. Finally, another participant questioned the view that groups like al-Qaida have moved from a national agenda to a global one arguing that the September attack was not a world attack against the global order but was directed against the US.

The issue of how to counteract Islamic terrorism was discussed at length. It was argued that there is no one strategy to counteract terrorism as a tactic, but there have to be many different strategies. One comment was that the globalization of the fight makes it very difficult to defeat Islamic terrorist organizations quickly. Moreover, since al-Qaida has the strategic goal of imposing an Islamic order worldwide, one of the main characteristics of the new terrorism is that there is no possibility of negotiation and dialogue. To defeat those organizations, some strategies were suggested: using traditional means like prosecution; cutting finance; cooperating at the level of intelligence; early warning and prevention; and, at the military level, using special forces capable of dismantling these groups without risks for themselves and for the society in which they operate. Another intervention stressed that a long-term fight is essential to defeat these groups, rather than the war that was started. Islamic terrorism, as participants agreed, has indeed used the strengths of the West (open borders, access to technology and democracy) to transform them into weaknesses. The case of al-Qaida prisoners in Cuba was put forward as an example of wrong counter-terrorism response. The fact that justice was not applied in the way it should be in Western societies gave Islamic terrorist groups further arguments for their fight. Lastly, according to another speaker, in the long run, the only way to reduce the magnitude of Islamic terrorism is by addressing the problems of good governance and economic development in the MENA region, as well as finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israel conflict. In particular, there is a need for a comprehensive policy package and gradual reforms that introduce some elements of good governance since those countries are still not ready for full fledged democracy. The same participant argued that the approach developed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is still the right one. So, the experience of EMP should be studied to see how this approach can be made more productive in order to address instability and terrorism. In particular, governments in the MENA region need more insurance from outside that they will be assisted in facing any kind of problem.

Finally, a few comments were made in relation to the specific cases of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. On Saudi Arabia, one participant commented that it is the most destabilized country in the region after September 11th. While it was suggested that the question of the US bases should be faced because it is a cause for dissent and anger among Saudi people, someone else noted that there are also other sources of discontent in the country that need to be taken into account. With regard to Iran and Iraq, the point was made that targeting the two countries would contribute to increasing the tension in the Gulf region. So, the US should swallow its pride in dealing with these countries and try to accommodate them. According to another participant, the US needs to solve the Palestinian conflict before taking any action against Iraq. If Iraq is destroyed, there is the risk of new forms of destabilization in the region. The same speaker also pointed out that designating Iran as a bad and pariah state only works in favor of the conservative forces in the country. As for Afghanistan, one participant suggested that federalism may be a solution for maintaining the integrity and unity of the country. Others agreed, however, that the real problem is Pakistan more than Afghanistan.

4. Round Table

The round table session, which was held by **Alvaro de Vasconscelos**, **Béchir Chourou**, **Ian Lesser** and **Tom Farer,** discussed the theme of Governance and Partnership in the Mediterranean.

Alvaro de Vasconscelos began the round table by giving a brief overview of the main problems of the Middle East and North Africa. He first called attention to the region's lack of structures and institutions: the Middle East process has failed, the Euro-Med partnership is still a weak process, and the NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, while interesting, is not a multilateral process and involves a limited number of countries of the region. Moreover, the region suffers from deep economic and social problems, and is marginalized from the process of globalization. In addition, there has been no progress in the process of democratic transition and, after September 11th, the regimes that entered the international coalition have become even more authoritarian. However, as he noted, Europe and US are now aware that there is an urgent need to support real reforms in the region. He also remarked on some of the points that had been raised during the discussion: the importance of differentiating between trans-national terrorism and Islam, between Islamic groups and al-Qaida, and trans-national groups and national groups; and the fact that participants recognized that Islamic groups should be integrated in the process of democratic transition. He underlined, however, that transition has to be prepared and a better understanding of how to deal with the issue of political Islam is required. In this perspective, fundamental issues like the question of the Algerian crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must receive a response. According to de Vasconscelos, the solution of the Palestinian problem could facilitate democratic transition in the region. He concluded by noting that there is great scope for cooperation between the EU and the US on the Palestinian conflict, but it is fundamental that the EU plays its own role and maintains its point of view *vis-à-vis* the US.

In his intervention, **Béchir Chourou** focused on three points. First, the importance of identifying and addressing the so-called root causes of terrorism. Second, attention was drawn to the more general environment in which the events of September 11th took place. In particular, Chourou pointed out that there is a growing disenchantment with the political process and politicians both in the North and in the South. As an alternative to this disenchantment, people are either withdrawing from the public space, especially if they do not face personal problems, or are looking for unconventional ways of expression. Chourou argued that acts of terrorism can be considered as part of this general trend of resorting to unconventional means of expression. As a third point, he discussed the main problems faced by the Euro-Mediterranean process that have to be solved. A first problem is that the EU suffers from a lack of credibility in Southern Mediterranean countries, which in turn suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the EU. Second, negotiations between South and North are not fair. So, to avoid future radicalization of those who oppose the Partnership, Chourou underscored the need to address the lack of balance between the partners. Moreover, MENA is one of the areas in which military tension remains high and the accumulation of weapons is among the highest in the world. Why do these countries keep on buying arms and weapons? How are these weapons going to be used? Are suppliers of arms willing to decrease tension and increase security by not selling arms? According to Chourou, such questions need to be addressed if we want to avoid future problems. Finally, the problem of South-South cooperation was mentioned. The Euro-Med partnership will not succeed unless South-South cooperation is encouraged. If the South wants to avoid greater marginalization and poverty, the only solution is to create a regional block.

Ian Lesser brought two questions to the attention of participants: with regard to security cooperation and the management of internal security, how can the problem, especially in the South Mediterranean area, of strong states that do not want to compromise their sovereignty be dealt with?; and how much risk are we willing to tolerate in pursuit of social change in the South? For example, in some instances, states may seek assistance in managing their own internal security challenges under the guise of counter-terrorism. In other cases, states may seek a political price for cooperating against terrorist movements that threaten Western interests more than their own. Lesser also warned of the tendency after September 11th to believe that it is possible to respond to terrorism only if there is political and cultural change in the South. This may be valid for the long but not for the short term, he said. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, he pointed out that, after September 11th, it is likely that the US, which has always been jealous of the peace process, will be more open to the EU's approach to the problem. Finally, he highlighted that security problems have not changed since September 11th. Thus, regarding the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med Partnership, their agenda is still the same.

Tom Farer discussed the implications of the events of September 11th for the framework of international relations. He highlighted some of the concrete measures that would seem to fall within the Bush doctrine: the US might parachute troops into countries to seize suspected terrorists or might eliminate them by means of air strikes, rather than working through the often slow and unpredictable process of extradition. Within Iraq, it might launch an attack and provide protected zones in which to arm and train indigenous forces. In the case of Iran, it might employ cruise missiles against

nuclear reactors or other facilities relevant to the production of nuclear chemical or biological weapons; and it might blockade the country to force agreement on international weapons inspections or to prevent importation of dual-use technologies. Although it has to be seen whether or not Bush will do this, Farer argued that all these measures would break the UN Charter norms which have served as the framework of international relations for the past half century. However, a conceivable alternative framework, as he suggested, could be the establishment of a Condominiun that would involve an unparalleled degree of cooperation between states and would require the inclusion of certain additional states such as India, Brazil and South Africa.

5. Concluding remarks

Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, concluded the conference with a brief overview of NATO's current political agenda and specific considerations on the Mediterranean region. With regard to NATO's current activities, he reported that the Alliance is busy preparing for a Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Prague in November, where important decisions are expected to be taken regarding enlargement. Even before Prague, NATO hopes to have in place a new framework that will allow NATO and Russia to go beyond consultation.

Commenting on the events of September 11th and their aftermath, he noted that they have underlined the need for improving NATO's capabilities. While it is clear that the fight against terrorism requires a broad approach in which military means are just one element, the case of Afghanistan has shown that military means are important. This means that the Alliance, as the world's most effective military organization, has a role to play in the fight against terrorism.

As far as NATO's response to terrorism is concerned, he pointed out that NATO is working hard to maximize the Alliance's terrorist fighting potential by increasing intelligence-sharing among the Allies. The Allies' defense capabilities are also being reviewed to tailor them more specifically to the requirements of combating terrorism. In addition, NATO is also focusing more systematically on the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, on the protection of their forces and populations against these lethal weapons, and on ballistic missile defense. Finally, NATO is attaching a lot of importance to the engagement of all its partners - not just the 27 that form part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, but also the seven that take part in the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.

More specific remarks were made on the Mediterranean region and its importance to the Alliance. After having highlighted that the Mediterranean has always played a significant role in the European security equation, he pointed out that the Gulf War, the break-up of Yugoslavia and – most recently – the threat of terrorism, have all shown that security and stability in and around Europe is still very much a work in progress, and have reinforced the notion that security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean region. These developments have therefore led the Alliance to focus more specifically on the region as one with unique characteristics and dynamics, and presenting specific security challenges. In particular, the Deputy Secretary General

outlined five problem areas presented by the Mediterranean region. A first is the rift between Europe and the Mediterranean region in terms of their democratic and economic development. A second is the persistence of several regional tensions. He argued that, more than any other conflict, the Middle East crisis has implications that go far beyond its point of origin. This means that, without a serious Middle East peace process, a major obstacle to sound relations between the Western and Arab worlds will remain. The other three problems were related to limited resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. On the last one, the Deputy Secretary General noted that terrorism is not a specifically Mediterranean phenomenon, nor one linked with any particular religious beliefs. At the same time, he continued, it is clear that the lack of democratic and economic reforms combined with a lack of fundamental freedoms and human rights, all provide a fertile breeding ground for terrorism in many parts of the Mediterranean.

Finally, in order for the Mediterranean to become a more stable and prosperous region, NATO has its part to play. While the EU offers what the region undoubtedly needs most, that is economic cooperation, the EU alone cannot deal with the scope and diversity of the region. Moreover, the EU does not include several key players in Mediterranean security, notably Turkey and the US. In particular, through the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO currently offers opportunities for both political consultation and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas to a total of seven non-NATO Mediterranean countries. Yet, the Dialogue, as the Deputy Secretary General underlined, is a two-way channel of communication that after September 11th has only become more important. He concluded by pointing out that, as terrorism is a security challenge that threatens Allies and non-Allies alike, there is a need for a cooperative approach. This is why, he said, NATO attaches so much importance to engaging all its partners – our 27 European partners as well as the 7 partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue.