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**EU SECURITY TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN
THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN EUROPE**

by Roberto Aliboni

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In the last two years, the EU has begun to strengthen its security and defence integration with a view to acquiring new capabilities in crisis management at both the European and Atlantic level. To that end, it is in the process of reinvigorating its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and developing the newly-born Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).

There is no doubt that policies towards the Mediterranean and, more in general, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will constitute an important dimension of this new EU process. At the same time, Southern Europe is certainly bound to play a role with respect to this process.

In view of these developments, the question the paper tries to answer is whether Southern European interests and roles with respect to the Mediterranean and, to a lesser extent MENA, are helping or hindering the ongoing process aimed at upgrading the EU's security role by strengthening CFSP and promoting CESDP.

To respond to this question, the paper takes four issues into consideration: (a) immigration, as a security issue affecting civil societies; (b) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation, as a military security issue; (c) the kind of security co-operation agenda that fits with the actual political conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean; (d) the implementation of peace support operations (PSOs) and crisis management.

Immigration

Immigration has been an important security factor in making the EU put forward the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative. In the words of a distinguished German official of the EU Commission, who played a prominent role in bringing about the Barcelona Declaration: "Europe wishes to see as its southern rim a group of countries that will not: be at war with each other; be destabilised by socio-political conflicts; export terrorism or drugs to Europe; threaten Europe's social stability by continued or even sharply increased flows of illegal immigration".¹

Illegal as well as legal immigration became a concern for all members of the EU with the end of the Cold War, when a wide arc of instability, from Rabat to Vladivostok, was expected to displace, for economic or political reasons, far more people than it eventually did. Nevertheless, immigration has considerably increased, though to a less catastrophic extent, and with a pattern of sending and receiving countries that is perhaps somewhat different from what was expected. In particular, the role in this pattern of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as of Southern Europe, has to be put back into the right perspective.

¹ Eberhardt Rhein, "Europe and the Mediterranean: A Newly Emerging Geographic Area?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp. 79-86.

The most important non-EU presence is in Germany (5.5 million units in 1997) followed by France (2.3), the UK (1.2), and Italy (1.1).² Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, in that order, host between 600,000 and 350,000 foreigners. As for other South European countries, in the same year, there were 325,000 non-EU immigrants in Spain, 222,000 in Greece and 129,000 in Portugal. If density is taken into consideration (i.e. non-EU residents per 100 inhabitants), Austria is at the top of the list (7.7%), followed by Germany (6.7%) and France (3.9%). In Northern Europe, Sweden and Denmark also show a high density (3.9 and 3.5%). The UK, Greece and Italy have almost the same density (2; 2.1; and 1.9% respectively). Density in Portugal (1.3) and Spain (0.8%) is lower.

All in all, absolute amounts and densities are higher in Northern Europe and France than in the extreme Southern European countries, with Italy somehow lying in between. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, while Germany and France receive substantial groups from the Mediterranean (Turkey and the Maghreb respectively) as well as from non-Mediterranean countries, in the South European countries the composition of immigrated residents (Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean) is more uneven (as in Spain and, more particularly, in Italy) or the Mediterranean presence is negligible (as in Greece and Portugal).

These figures have to be put into perspective if they are to provide some meaningful insight. In fact, two elements suggest that immigration in Southern Europe, despite its relatively lower amount and density, constitutes a relevant challenge, in particular to Italy, Spain and Greece:

- in the last ten years, immigration in Southern Europe has increased at a much more rapid pace than in Northern Europe and France, probably because it is driven by economic factors, whereas in Northern Europe a considerable long-standing stock of immigrant people is being increased by smaller inflows of family members, marriage migration and asylum seekers; in a decade, Southern Europe has developed from a peripheral area to a major centre for immigration³ coming from the Mediterranean as well as from farther afield –Asia, Africa and Europe (e.g.: Russia for Greece and the Philippines for Italy);
- the geographic configuration of the Mediterranean basin, with choke points in the Aegean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Canal of Sicily and the Strait of Gibraltar exposes Greece, Italy and Spain (and to a lesser extent Portugal) as both target and transit countries and bestows upon this part of Southern Europe the role of EU southern border. This notion of EU border has to be understood less in a metaphoric than a technical sense, because of the parallel development of the common EU space of “freedom, security and justice” behind that border.

Policies towards immigrant people are to a large extent domestic, managed by the Ministries of the Interior. Like all questions related to “soft security”, however, they have an important external interface. That is why they affect the building of the CFSP (and contribute to shaping Southern Europe’s role with respect to the latter). More in

² These figures are elaborated from G:C Blangiardo, *The Phases of European Immigration*, paper written within the research project promoted by International Affairs Institute-IAI and the Centro per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale-CeSPI on “Prevention, Control and Management of Migratory Flows in the Central Mediterranean”, Rome, May 1999 (mimeo).

³ J.J. Schoorl, B.J. de Bruijn, E.J. Kuiper, E.L. Heering, *Migration from African and eastern Mediterranean countries to western Europe*, Council of Europe CONFMED (96)4, Strasbourg, 1996.

general, it must be underscored that a good part of EU security problems, in particular towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East, require a policy response in terms of progress in integrating common internal policies rather than in CFSP proper.

In this sense, the Treaty of Amsterdam, by communitarising many questions relating to immigration constitutes such progress⁴. Still, the process of communitarising immigration-related issues in the EU is proceeding slowly, particularly in terms of common action and resources. Given these developments, the challenge facing South European countries is that, while the southern border is increasingly communitarised through the integration of the common EU space behind it, control over such border remains essentially in the hands of the individual countries concerned, i.e. Italy, Greece and Spain (and if Western Balkans were taken into consideration in this paper, Austria and Germany would also have to be included on the list).

Italy has been particularly active in raising this question in the EU. At the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference, it insisted that the communitarisation of matters relating to the creation of a common European space and its external implications be undertaken soon. As just pointed out, while such communitarisation has been started, the specific question of border control is still lagging behind. The “action plan on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice”, set out jointly by the Council and the Commission and approved at the Vienna European Council in December 1998, did not lend the question of border control the urgency it deserves in the eyes of Italy and other South European countries. For this reason, at the Tampere European Council (October 1999), especially devoted to the creation of the EU common space of freedom, security and justice, alongside the important joint paper presented by France, Germany and the UK on access to citizenship by immigrant people, their social integration and the struggle against xenophobia and racism, Italy presented a non-paper insisting on the need to share costs related to control of borders. At the April 1999 EMP Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart, the Italian government tried to introduce the idea of co-operating within the Barcelona process to develop collective agreements of readmission, but to no avail.

While lobbying in the EU for the sharing of border control costs, Italy and Greece are also making individual as well as co-operative progress in actually controlling their borders with respect to EU-directed immigration. In 1998, Italy⁵ approved more modern, thorough and effective legislation on immigration and related matters (Law 40/1998 on immigration and the status of foreigners). Thanks also to experience gained primarily in Albania, in particular when it led “Operation Alba” and the UN Protection Force after the 1996-97 Albanian crisis,⁶ Italy has developed a set of instruments and

⁴ See Bruno Nascimbene, *Immigrazione e asilo nel diritto dell'Unione Europea*, paper written for the research project organised by the International Affairs Institute-IAI on “Immigrazione e asilo nel quadro della politica italiana e nel contesto dell'Unione Europea”, Rome, April 2000 (mimeo); P. Magrini, G. Sacerdoti, “L'evoluzione delle politiche europee nel settore della giustizia e degli affari interni”, in R. Aliboni, F. Bruni, A. Colombo, E. Greco (a cura di), *L'Italia e la politica internazionale, Edizione 2000*, Istituto Affari Internazionali e Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 83-100.

⁵ On Italy see Ferruccio Pastore, “La politica migratoria”, in R. Aliboni, F. Bruni, A. Colombo, E. Greco (a cura di), *op. cit.*, pp. 319-330.

⁶ On the 1997 crisis and “Operation Alba” see A. De Guttry, F. Pagani (a cura di), *La crisi albanese del 1997. L'azione dell'Italia e delle organizzazioni internazionali: verso un nuovo modello di gestione delle crisi?*, Milano, Angeli, 1999; Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations. Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania*, United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1998;

mechanisms of control in bilateral relations, in particular by means of readmission agreements and the assignment of preferential immigration quotas as a counterpart to such readmission. At the end of 1998, 16 such agreements were in place with Eastern European and Mediterranean countries.

Further to national policies, Italy and Greece have co-operated on many occasions and recently signed a memorandum of understanding to combat organised international crime, smuggling and trafficking of human beings together in the Adriatic and Ionic Seas. These subjects were elaborated upon at a European conference on security in the Adriatic-Ionic area organised by the Italian government in Ancona in May 2000.

As the new EU centre for immigration, Southern Europe is contributing to the complex receiving effort of the whole of the EU with respect to legal immigration and to common security with respect to illegal immigration and the multifarious criminal activities coming in from the southern and south-eastern regions adjoining Europe. To the extent that this contribution remains entrusted mostly to national efforts, as is the case today, Southern Europe is actually exporting security to Northern Europe. At the same time, the efforts and experience are fostering a more articulated CFSP.

The first case examined in this paper thus suggests a positive role for Southern Europe in the ongoing EU effort to develop a common security policy towards the Mediterranean.

Proliferation, co-operative security, stability

In the security perspective opened up by the St. Malo agreement, the EU has started to establish a collective military capability. It will be confined to crisis management, in particular to the PSOs, known as Petersberg tasks, referred to in Art. 17 of the Union's Treaty (while, for EU-NATO/WEU countries, defence proper remains entrusted to the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and Art. 5 of the Brussels Treaty). Moreover, it will have a subsidiary character. In fact, the Helsinki Conclusions say that the EU is determined to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises "where NATO as a whole is not engaged", a clause that suggests a previous (and obvious) political understanding between NATO and the EU (by means of the common political institution that the Western allies have begun to seek).

This perspective is shared by Southern European countries. It must be remembered, though, that it is not the only security perspective available to them (as well as the other members of the Union). In fact, the security perspective of the CFSP/CESDP and the policy responses the EU is going to provide in this perspective

(a) do not concern national security in a broad sense and military threats to or risks for national security, such as proliferation; in the event, perspectives and responses would be bilateral or Atlantic;

(b) do not concern the Mediterranean in particular, where perspectives and related policy responses are provided by the Barcelona Declaration and specified by the *ad hoc* common strategy approved by the June 2000 EU Council in Santa Maria de Feira; to

s.a., "New Trends in Peace-keeping: The Experience of Operation Alba", *Security Dialogue*, V. 28, No. 2, 1998, pp. 201-212.

what extent the general EU security perspective fits with or is applicable to the Mediterranean remains to be seen.

What is the position of South European countries on these other perspectives? Are their positions helpful or not with respect to the aim of strengthening the CFSP and, more in general, the EU security role? To respond to these questions we consider, in the following, Southern European positions on (a) WMD proliferation; (b) the establishment of a Mediterranean scheme of co-operative security (as put forward by the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration); (c) the achievement of a “broad stability” (as distinct from security) agreement, like the one envisaged by the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability.

WMD proliferation - There is fairly broad convergence among analysts⁷ on the composite and regionally limited nature of proliferation and, for this reasons, on its reduced military weight in the North-South context.

Lesser and Tellis⁸ have concluded that “Within ten years, it is possible that every southern European capital will be within the range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa or the Levant”. At the same time they have very aptly pointed out that this development is (a) going to have less of a military than a political impact and (b) fuelled by systemic, regional and domestic motives that require less of a military than a political response. Such motives can be summarised as follows:

- the driving force behind proliferation, irrespective of its actual military effectiveness, is the political necessity to earn some strategic “weight” and status through the possession of WMD and missiles. During the Cold War, Third World and Mediterranean states could obtain strategic weight internationally by aligning or not aligning themselves in the framework of the global East-West confrontation. In a sense, WMD and missiles are a substitute for alignment in the post-Cold War world;
- on the other hand, there is no doubt that many MENA states feel insecure with respect to both regional enemies and the West and for good reasons. In this sense, WMD must be regarded as a form of military and political deterrence or as an instrument of interdiction and coercive diplomacy;
- MENA countries’ WMD and missiles are essentially targeted on their southern neighbours. As a matter of fact, it is in the South-South context that MENA states face real military threats and more often than not have proven to be willing or able to resort to military instruments to solve their disputes, (by diplomatic coercion as well as other forms of conflict). The North is not a primary target of Southern WMD and missiles, at least from a narrower military point of view.

All in all, even in the long run, the military threat posed by the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean to Southern Europe would amount to their ability to inflict damages rather than conduct a full military attack. The result could be different politically, in that a more or less significant ability to damage would very likely generate an effect of interdiction primarily on Southern European countries, and eventually the EU, and limit the Alliance’s cohesion and its political and military freedom of manoeuvring and intervening.

⁷ See recently: Anthony H. Cordesman, *Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle (Pa), May 31, 1999, cap. 6.

⁸ Ian O. Lesser, Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure. Proliferation around the Mediterranean*, RAND, Santa Monica (Ca), 1996.

Such different military and political perspectives generate different attitudes towards proliferation on the two sides of the Atlantic. In fact, eventual effects of interdiction and the regional impact of proliferation weigh more on the U.S. global perspective than on the non-global broad European perspective. While, there is increasing U.S.-EU convergence on the necessity to establish a common and stronger capability to manage crises and intervene internationally, the two sides are still not in tune about the respective weight to be given to military and diplomatic/political instruments in order to counter proliferation and its effects of interdiction on their freedom of intervening in crises. There is no doubt that the EU states, though working towards achieving a crisis management capability, believe that, in principle, the systemic, regional and domestic character of factors driving proliferation must be countered primarily by long-term diplomacy and co-operation rather than military and other coercive measures.

At the beginning of the 1990s, debate in Southern Europe on military countermeasures took place only in France. According to Pascal Boniface,⁹ it was:

a mixture of fear over nuclear weapons proliferation, combined with the perception of a threat from the South. This launched the debate in France on the possibility of changing the strategic nuclear doctrine. Some argued in favour of a switch from the “weak to the strong” doctrine to one of the “strong to the weak”, or even the “strong to the crazy”... According to this theory, France’s deterrence doctrine, suitable for the East-West context of the cold war, was no longer suitable in a more dynamic strategic environment where the threats took many different forms and were more radical.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, and the Gulf War, the option of using tactical nuclear weapons for purely traditional military purposes was abandoned in favour of the option of miniaturised weapons for surgical strikes. This involved the ability to perform accurate strikes of limited effects on a chosen target without causing environmental damage. The argument was that it was impossible to deter the countries of the South with the same type of threat - heavy strikes on urban areas - which were used against the former Soviet Union.

With the publication of the 1994 *White Paper on Defence* it became clear, though, that the French government rejected both the new conventional (pre-strategic) and nuclear (tactical) weapons because they would entail an undesired change in the purely deterring doctrine of France and because the development of such weapons would not be worth the risks coming from the South. On the contrary, it would contribute to increasing such risks.

The only South European country participating in a programme to develop an anti-missile capability is Italy. The programme is the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a U.S.-German-Italian programme to build a mobile, ground-based ballistic missile defence system intended to destroy short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. MEADS is based on the fielding of Patriot Advanced Capability-3. It would protect standing objectives (like towns or military facilities) and troops at the corps level. It must be noted that its mobility would allow its use also in the case a force is projected for interventions abroad and it arises the need to protect it against missiles.

The development of MEADS is lagging behind essentially because the U.S. wants to sell the system without transferring technology.¹⁰ However, it is very likely that the

⁹ “Arms control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective”, in A. Vasconcelos, G. Joffé, *The Barcelona Process, Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, Frank Cass, London, 2000, pp. 167-188.

European partners are not driven by a sense of urgency in implementing the programme, given their perceptions of little risk coming from the South and strategic projection. From Italy's point of view, there is no doubt that this long-term investment in an anti-missile capability in alliance with the U.S. reflects risks perceptions but also a long-standing policy of close military relations with the U.S. in order to balance intra-European political coalitions or *directoires*.

With the explained or unexplained exception of MEADS and Italy's participation in it, it can be concluded that South European countries do not believe that reacting with specific military strategies to WMD and missile proliferation in the MENA areas is necessary or urgent. Still, this does not keep the EU and its Southern members from believing that some coercion has to be used against proliferators. In fact, they do believe that it has to be used, though to a very different extent than the U.S. They do because they have supported UNSCOM (UN Special Commission on Iraq) in Iraq and now support UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission). There are differences between the U.S. and the EU on whether it makes sense to protract sanctions on Iraq, not on whether to continue arms control in the country. France, with Russia and China, voted against Resolution 1284 but did not put their veto on it and have promised to support its implementation. On the other hand, the Europeans - including the UK - have consistently proved unwilling to use coercion with respect to Iran and, with the decision taken at the Edinburgh European Council in 1992, have started a "critical dialogue" with Teheran, thus providing this alleged proliferator with a political rather than a military response.

To sum up, WMD proliferation is perceived by the Southern as well as the Northern members of the EU as less of a military than a political challenge. There are no substantive differences on this security issue between North and South in the EU. There is agreement on the necessity of long-term co-operative responses of a political, economic and social character which fit well with the EU's capabilities. On the other hand, possible military responses to proliferation remain in the realm of national security for the time being and are not included in the CFSP/CESDP perspective. Over time, however, this EU perspective, based as it is on developing a crisis management capability, may be hindered by the interdiction effects emanating from proliferation and pose problems for Atlantic cohesion.

This problem does not exist today, but is bound to emerge. Presently, Southern Europe's position on proliferation is neither hindering nor helping to strengthen the CFSP in relation to proliferation. It should take advantage of its exposure, however, to introduce a debate with Northern European partners on the fact that interdiction effects deriving from proliferation will not be neutral with respect to European security, as it is being developed within the CESDP, and that consequently some military measures to counter such effects may have to be taken. In this perspective, MEADS may be a helpful first indication.

Co-operative security and "broad stability" in the EMP - In a sense, the EMP has anticipated the present security debate in the EU, for it envisages a multidimensional policy whereby military and non-military instruments are to be used in a crisis

¹⁰ See the correspondence by Colin Clark, "Germany, U.S. Resolve MEADS Tech Dispute", in *Defense News*, Vol. 51, No. 21, May 29, 2000, p. 1.

management as well as a conflict prevention perspective. What is the outcome of the EMP's five-year debate on security, and what has Southern Europe's role in it been?

EMP's long-term security vision is based on a double agenda. First, a long-term agenda of systemic and structural conflict prevention aimed at stabilising Southern Mediterranean countries with political and economic reforms that would be made possible or facilitated by comprehensive and protracted support provided by the Union within the EMP. The essence of this agenda is that of a stability pact. Second, an agenda of co-operative security regarding military relations and armaments, similar to that of the CSCE/OSCE or the Working Group in Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East Peace Process' multilateral track. This is the agenda aiming at "establishing a common area of peace and stability", described in detail in the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration.

Is the co-operative security agenda to be achieved in the short or the long run? Is it more or as important as the first agenda or is it a secondary priority with respect to it? In the first semester of 1996, immediately after the inception of the EMP at the Barcelona conference, the EU under a Southern European Presidency (Italy) assigned a strong priority to this second agenda by putting forward an Action Plan and starting to work resolutely on its implementation. At the end of the semester, though, the Southern Mediterranean partners made it clear that they were not prepared to implement the Action Plan and its agenda of security co-operation for the simple reason that in their view the very principles of security co-operation in Euro-Mediterranean relations needed to be carefully checked and debated. For this reason, the Euro-Med partners decided to start new talks on a Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability aimed at establishing an acceptable common concept of security and related policies in order to be able to take common action eventually. These talks have been going on now for five years but to no avail. Even if the Charter, as widely expected, will be adopted at the November 2000 summit in Marseilles organised by the EU French Presidency, the extent and timing of its implementation will continue to be in question.

The point is that there are still differences between the EMP's Southern and Northern partners as well as among EU members about the concept of security on which the EMP has to be predicated. Thanks to the negotiations on the Charter, there is widespread agreement today that the EMP should aim at providing stability rather than security in a narrower, military sense. Still, many Europeans continue to seek to introduce elements of co-operative security, including co-operation in peacekeeping and crisis management; others continue to see the EMP as an opportunity that should not be missed to help the CFSP and the CESDP grow.

What is the role of Southern Europe in this debate? In the Mediterranean perspective, Spain, Greece and Italy, with the more or less convinced support of France and Portugal have regularly tried to foster military-related factors and co-operation in the EMP and tried to promote a WEU role in the EMP. However, the French position is more diversified and flexible than that of the other South European countries. Substantially, it tends towards a stability rather than a narrower security model, while not excluding the achievement, over time, of military-related security co-operation in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Since the first talks in preparation of the Barcelona Declaration, French diplomacy has stressed the need for a primarily political and diplomatic approach, based on the experience of the EU Pact of Stability with the Central-Eastern European countries. At that time, this approach was rejected by Arab Euro-Med partners, which interpreted the Pact as a more stringent political commitment than their perceived

interests suggested.¹¹ As a matter of fact, after the early attempts at implementing the Action Plan, the Partners reverted to the idea of the Charter, which is very close to that of the pact of stability in that, like the latter, it is intended to attain security by establishing conditions of political, economic and social stability in the context of a diplomatic-political process.

In the talks on the Charter, France has been able to develop its position in more detail by putting forward a set of ideas and proposals consistent with the model of the stability pact. These ideas revolve around three main concepts and a common methodology of gradual implementation:¹²

- the indivisibility of security, which would lead the EMP to deal in the international context with the security interests and objectives of both Northern and Southern countries (and would make up for the unilateral consideration of EU security concerns that permeates the Barcelona Declaration);
- the globality of security, which would lead the EMP to take into consideration EU concerns for spillovers from the South (e.g. immigration, human rights) along with Southern Mediterranean concerns for domestic stability (pace of reforms; terrorism and violent political opposition);
- non-interference, that is the need for reassurances about respecting existing jurisdictions and international legitimacy and refraining from the use of forms of coercive diplomacy (a Southern Mediterranean concern that has been reinforced by 1999 developments in Kosovo); and finally,
- the use of procedures of gradual implementation (“*mécanismes évolutifs*”) in achieving common goals, instruments and institutions.

This agenda can be criticised on two grounds. First, it may undermine fundamental European interests in realms not directly linked to security. For example, the principle of security globality may frustrate EU interest in the respect of human rights (under the cover of a relativist concept) and political reform (by confusing terrorism and legitimate political opposition). Second, it weakens the EU’s desire in strengthening its security role in the CFSP/CESDP context by developing security policies and co-operation towards the Mediterranean.¹³ In any case, though, by unveiling and accepting inherent limits to security co-operation in the Mediterranean, the agenda put forward by France has the merit of being very close to Southern Mediterranean ideas on stability and “broad security” and to what these countries are able and willing to accept. In this sense, it may facilitate the agreement that has failed to emerge in the past five years of negotiations.

With respect to our basic question about Southern Europe’s contribution to the strengthening of the EU security role, the French position lends itself to different interpretations. A first interpretation is that, as on many past occasions, France aims at mobilising all-European resources with a view to supporting Mediterranean societies

¹¹ The Barcelona Declaration talks only of “the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact”. See Fred Tanner, “The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation”, *Perceptions* (Ankara), Vol. 1, No. 4, December-February 1996/97, pp. 56-67.

¹² See *Elements de l’intervention de J.-P. Courtois sur le projet de la Charte de Paix et de Stabilité*, Séminaire de Wilton Park sur le Dialogue Euro-Méditerranéen, 19-22 Octobre 1998 (mimeo), Ambassador J.-P. Courtois is the French Senior Official in the EMP.

¹³ The case has been well done by Martín Ortega, “Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, January-March 2000, pp. 115-125.

and helping them stabilise, but would like to retain the conditions for exercising its national role in foreign and military policy. There is no doubt that many French look at the Mediterranean and the MENA as a privileged field for their country's international role and status. In this case, it can be argued that France is contributing less to reinforcing the CFSP and the prospects of the new CESDP than to its own national role. Another, more benevolent interpretation, however, is that France's position simply reflects the security agreement that objective Mediterranean conditions warrant and makes such an agreement feasible. In this case, it is up to the EU to decide whether the agreement warranted by objective conditions in the Mediterranean is in its own interest or not. If it is, France will have made a good, though ambivalent, contribution to the CFSP.

It is very likely that in Marseilles France will be joined by all the EU members in redirecting the EMP towards a definite broad stability model. Nevertheless, the EU continues to face a fundamental trade-off between achieving what is possible and trying to get more (at the risk of getting nothing). An agreement like the one warranted by objective conditions in the Mediterranean would be consistent with diffuse European aspirations for a stability model predicated on non-military factors and conflict prevention. On the other hand, an agreement more conducive to strengthening the CFSP/CESDP by making some room for security co-operation, the use of military factors for civilian and humanitarian purposes and crisis management would be consistent with no less diffuse layers of European opinion. Faced with this alternative, divisions may emerge among Southern as well as Northern EU members rather than between Northern and Southern members. In this connection, the most important issue is what to do with PSOs.

Peace support operations, in the Mediterranean and beyond

The French-led idea of limiting the EMP to stability, economic co-operation, partnership-building measures and "soft security" is similar to ideas now being floated in the U.S.¹⁴ and is consistent with the new security co-operation that is going to be established between the EU and NATO. The problem some Europeans may have with this security co-operation with the U.S. in NATO and the kind of non-military specialisation suggested by both co-operation in NATO and the objective political conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean is that, at the end of the day, the European defence identity and the EU security role may boil down to little more than nothing. In fact, one has to look at this question from the appropriate perspective, in particular it is important to separate the functional development of a EU crisis management capability from its application to different geopolitical theatres. What matters is that the EU acquires its new functional capabilities. The different ways in which this capability will be used, according to events and theatres, is a contingent and secondary question.

The South European countries have set up Eurofor and Euromarfor and made them answerable to Western alliances and international organisations. Euromarfor has the task of projecting force beyond the sea and the Southern Mediterranean countries

¹⁴ Ian O. Lesser, "The Changing Mediterranean Security Environment. A Transatlantic Perspective", in George Joffé (ed.), *Perspectives on Development. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, Frank Cass, London, 1999, ppp. 212-228.

perceive this as a threat directed at themselves. As a matter of fact, Eurofor and Euromarfor are geared to project force towards the southern side of the Mediterranean as well as towards the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf. The force of 50,000-60,000 that the EU wants to make answerable to its Council – which will comprise Euromarfor and Eurofor - will be “*tous azimuts*”. Where this forces have to be applied is a decision which pertains to the Council only and depends on contingencies and developments

If contingencies were to suggest a PSO in a Southern Mediterranean country and the UN were to ask the EU to intervene with the consensus of the country concerned, this process could take place outside the EMP. If contingencies were to suggest a peace enforcement mission in an EMP partner country, similar to the one conducted by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, and the UN were to ask the EU to intervene, the EU would do it without the consensus of the country concerned. Given the UN legitimisation (expressly mentioned by the EU documents on CESDP), the EU decision can be made even if the PSOs are not contemplated by the Euro-Med Charter or some other pact underlying the EMP.

If this is true, then it is clear that the French and American suggestions to exclude military issues from the EMP would not curtail the strengthening of CFSP/CESDP.

The Stuttgart “Guidelines” mention the “establishment of Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms for preventive diplomacy and crisis management”, both of which may entail PSOs. Further, they mention “Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping”. In addition, the “Guidelines” refer to “post-conflict rehabilitation”, a field which may overlap with PSOs. Nonetheless, as is well known, the inclusion of PSOs in the Charter is very controversial and, even if mentioned, they will hardly be mandated by the Partners. However, this will be more the EMP’s problem than the EU’s. In fact, as already pointed out, PSOs may or may not be included in regional or inter-regional security agreements without prejudice to their implementation in other frameworks, if they need to be implemented.

This is not to say that aspects of security co-operation other than PSOs cannot be included in the EMP Charter¹⁵ or pursued in other fora. The EMP has accepted to institute a limited joint action, where military factors are used for civilian purposes, namely the possibility of joint interventions in case of man-made or natural disasters. It must be admitted, however, that the scope for further progress in this direction is strongly limited. Because of its comprehensive membership, the EMP will hardly lend itself to military-related co-operation at least until the bilateral tracks of the Middle East are completed. Still, elementary forms of co-operative security in the multilateral framework, like seminars among chief-of-staff officers, cannot be ruled out and could be actively pursued.

Meanwhile, forms of military-related co-operation can be pursued by EU members, particularly by the South European states, on a bilateral basis. Southern Europe already has an excellent network of such bilateral relations and can easily take advantage of them. Furthermore, limited forms of co-operation, like seminars among members of the chiefs of staff or workshops on military doctrine, training for PSOs, etc., could perhaps be introduced in the Mediterranean Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation, where the membership combination may prove more conducive to such co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey). In

¹⁵ See Fred Tanner, “Joint Actions for Peace-building in the Mediterranean”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, October-December 1999, pp. 75-90.

time, these initiatives could help reinforce the CFSP/CESDP and allow Southern Europe to play a constructive role in this endeavour by acting in the Mediterranean.

Conclusions

In the last two years, by reinvigorating its CFSP and starting the development of the CESDP, the EU has begun a process aimed at strengthening security and defence integration with a view to acquiring new capabilities for crisis management. The strengthening of crisis management capabilities is directed at completing already existing and well developed EU capabilities for intervening in crises with non-military instruments and pursuing conflict prevention policies. Such an expanded EU capability responds better than its traditional and exclusively “civilian” capabilities to the broad concept of security which has prevailed in the post-Cold War era, in particular with reference to areas and countries like those in the Mediterranean, and the tasks this concept implies.

The EU policy towards the Mediterranean and, more generally, the areas located immediately beyond the basin, i.e. the Middle East and North Africa, is regarded by many governments as an important dimension of the process geared to enhance crisis and conflict management capabilities.

In addition, Southern Europe is expected to play a role with respect to this process. South European countries are generally and normally regarded as actors with special interests and roles towards the Mediterranean and, to some extent, the MENA countries. On the other hand, this is also their self-perception in the framework of intra-EU relations.

In view of these developments, the question the paper has tried to tackle is whether Southern European interests with respect to the Mediterranean help or hinder the ongoing processes aimed at upgrading EU’s security role by strengthening the CFSP and promoting the CESDP. To conduct the analysis, the paper has looked into a set of selected issues.

As far as immigration is concerned, the challenge facing South European countries is that, while the southern border is increasingly communitarised by the advancements in and the integration of the common EU space behind it, control over the border remains essentially in the hands of the individual countries concerned, i.e. Italy, Greece and Spain.

As the new EU centre for immigration, Southern Europe is contributing to the complex receiving effort of the whole of the EU with respect to legal immigration and to common security with respect to illegal immigration and the multifarious criminal activities coming in from the southern and south-eastern regions adjoining Europe. To the extent that this contribution remains entrusted mostly to national efforts, as is the case today, Southern Europe is actually exporting security to Northern Europe. At the same time, with its efforts and experience, it is fostering the advent of a more articulated CFSP.

The case of immigration, examined by the paper, thus suggests a positive role for Southern Europe in the ongoing EU effort to develop a common security policy towards the Mediterranean.

As for WMD and missile proliferation, both are perceived by Southern as well as Northern members of the EU as less of a military than a political challenge. There is

agreement throughout the EU on the need for long-term co-operative responses of a political, economic and social character, which fit well with the EU's capabilities. On the other hand, possible military responses to proliferation remain in the realm of national security for the time being and are not included in the CFSP/CESDP perspective. Over time, however, this perspective, based as it is on developing a crisis management capability, may be hindered by the interdiction effects emanating from proliferation and pose problems for Atlantic cohesion.

Southern Europe's positions are currently neither hindering nor helping to strengthen the CFSP in relation to proliferation. Southern Europe should take advantage of its exposure, however, to convince Northern European partners that interdiction effects deriving from proliferation will not be neutral with respect to European security, as it is being developed within the CESDP, and that some military measures to counter such effects may consequently have to be taken. In this perspective, the MEADS agenda, which Italy and Germany shares with the U.S., may be a good indication for future common action in promoting the CESDP.

As for the question of whether the EMP should envisage a model of military security co-operation or a model of civilian and socio-economic stability, there are countries (most Northern) in the EU with a strong preference for a model of broad stability in the EMP and some doubts about the extent to which a CESDP can actually be developed in the EU. Another group of EU countries, including most in Southern and a number in Northern Europe, would like to see some security co-operation implemented in the EMP, even though five years of talks on the issue have made it clear that there are strong limits to such co-operation and its implementation.

Of South European countries, France, while prepared to support security co-operation whenever feasible, is basically proposing a scheme emphasising broad stability. This scheme would indefinitely put off any significant agenda on security co-operation, but would have the merit of making possible an agreement based on broad Mediterranean stability, an agreement that would in any case be a relevant contribution to EU security, though it would reinforce only its traditional non-military component rather than promote the new military one, i.e. CESDP.

The French proposal would help to separate, in the Mediterranean area, stability and soft security, on the one hand, from hard security, on the other – a separation that is also suggested by American analysts. Following this logic, in relation to the last issue taken into consideration, that of PSOs, the paper suggests avoiding any idea of including PSOs in the EMP Charter of Peace and Stability, the document that is expected to define the scope and objectives of EMP co-operation. If it is true that prevailing political conditions in the Mediterranean do not allow for any Euro-Med security co-operation, let alone the development of PSOs as an element of co-operative security, trying to introduce them in the Charter would hinder rather than foster any Euro-Med agreement. On the other hand, from the point of view of strengthening the CESDP, PSOs do not need to be included in the agreement to be feasible. The EU can develop its capabilities and conduct PSOs, if needed, even outside a regional security co-operation scheme. To be sure, inclusion in the EMP of a consensus on the principle of PSOs, similar to the OSCE, would help to foster both security and stability in the Euro-Med circle. But this seems to lie beyond what can be pursued, given the real political conditions of the area.

Confining the EMP and its Charter to the implementation of a broad stability agenda, while in any case providing a positive contribution to reinforcing Euro-Med relations,

would not hinder the strengthening of the CESDP and the EU's acquisition of its new capabilities for conducting PSOs. All in all, coupled or not to the idea of excluding PSOs from the Charter, the French proposal looks like a step that would foster both Euro-Med and EU consensus. It would also help foster adjustments in the current re-organisation of the Atlantic-European security relationship.

This paper suggests conducting security co-operation in fora other than the multilateral and comprehensive EMP. In this sense, South European countries could bring about a positive contribution by fostering security co-operation in their remarkable network of bilateral agreements and in the Mediterranean Forum of Dialogue and Co-operation, paving the way for possible future developments in the wider multilateral circle.

In conclusion, despite some differences between its component countries, Southern Europe is pursuing policies that seem conducive to fostering EU cohesion, strengthening the CFSP and helping to promote the CESDP. While the French proposal on emphasising broad stability towards the EMP has good chances of rallying South European countries and an all-EU consensus, policies on proliferation and border control may be less successful or only receive a belated consensus.