Green Deal Watch

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Uncertain Waters Ahead

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About the Green Deal Watch

The "Green Deal Watch" was launched in 2020 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. The aim of the project is to follow the evolution of the ambitious and cross-cutting "European Green Deal" (EGD) strategy towards climate neutrality launched by the Von der Leyen Commission in December 2019. The "Green Deal Watch" follows the "Energy Union Watch" which IAI published from 2015 to 2019 to monitor the evolution of energy and climate policies under the previous legislature. IAI covers the debate among national and European stakeholders and reports the key dynamics in order to help the reader better navigate the challenges and opportunities of implementation of the EGD. The Watch is produced on a quarterly basis, collecting official documents, public information and open source data, which are processed and analysed by the IAI team.

About IAI

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation, focusing on topics such as European integration, security and defence, energy and climate policies, as well as key regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas. The IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), two book series (Trends and Perspectives in International Politics and IAI Research Studies) and other paper series related to IAI research projects.

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About this report

This is the 19th issue of the Green Deal Watch, a quarterly report produced by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. This publication aims at monitoring and analysing the initiatives launched by the European Commission and discussed by EU institutions and member states under the umbrella of the Green Deal.

A timeline of initiatives envisaged under the European Green Deal concludes this report.

1. Navigating amid the crisis

Here we are again: another EU energy crisis. The March US-Israeli attack on Iran, the following closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the spike in oil and gas prices triggered the second energy crisis for the EU in less than five years. The disruption to transit through the Strait and direct attacks on Gulf LNG infrastructure – including at facilities connected to the South Pars/North Dome field, the world's largest natural gas reserve containing approximately 51 trillion cubic metres of gas (around 19 per cent of global proven reserves) and shared between Iran and Qatar - have significantly constrained export capacity. While roughly 90 per cent of these volumes were, on average, directed toward Asian markets - primarily China, India, and South Korea - Europe remains highly exposed to the resulting increase in global energy prices. Indeed, President von der Leyen reported that just in the first 44 days of the crisis the EU's total bill for fossil fuel imports increased by over 22 billion euros. Member states like Italy remain particularly exposed to the resulting effects. Indeed, following the phase-out of Russian supplies, Qatar has become a key partner in Italy's diversification efforts, accounting for approximately 10 per cent of its natural gas imports. Even if, at the time of writing, the US and Iran have signed an agreement that led to the reopening of the Strait and to a drop in oil prices, the situation remains complicated: the US administration's unpredictable course of action, the broad dissatisfaction of the Israeli government, and the boost in confidence the Iranian regime gained from the war all contribute to casting shadows over the agreement's possible success. Furthermore, despite the immediate soothing effect of the agreement on oil prices, the end of the war does not necessarily translate into the end of the energy crisis, or at least of some of its most acute effects: mines will need to be removed from the Strait, infrastructures will need to be rebuilt, and so will be the trust of a variety of players – energy actors, insurers, shipping companies in particular. Even if the agreement holds, it may take months before the crisis is actually over, and many could feel its impact for even a longer time. The EU is likely to be among them.

The Commission's response to the crisis attempts to leverage a critical situation to boost its transition agenda. The Commission's actions partially echo those of the 2022 energy crisis, but they take into account the lessons learnt, in particular concerning price instruments. Unlike the 2022 crisis response, which relied on untargeted support and several binding regulatory measures — such as gas storage obligations, the Market Correction Mechanism and mandatory demand-aggregation — the Commission has this time focused instead on targeted temporary measures and enhanced coordination and market functioning to avoid exacerbating price pressures. Indeed, one of the first moves of the Commission has been to update its guidance on the implementation of the RepowerEU - attempting to adapt the tools developed during the 2022 crisis to the current conjecture. Specifically, the measure introduces faster authorisations and simpler submissions for non-Russian LNG, with the aim of reducing frictions that the regulation had generated in gas sourcing, particularly for spot transactions and portfolio-optimisation operations. On April 22, the Commission published the AccelerateEU Plan. It is presented as the path to follow during the current crisis, proposing immediate responses and long-term solutions to increase the EU's energy resilience. It introduces a set of measures to boost coordination and connectivity, insulate markets and consumers from price volatility, and increase domestic production of clean energy. The main path forward of the Plan focuses on increasing electrification as a way to address fossil fuel price shocks. To deal with the immediate market instability and price spikes, the Plan includes flexibility for filling gas storage of up to 10 per cent under the updated EU Gas Storage Regulation, a flexibility intended to ease the upward price pressure that the storage-filling obligations themselves tend to generate, and authorizes the release of some oil stock reserves to attempt to curb the price spike. Additionally, while the plan strongly suggests increasing energy savings as the right course of action to shield companies and households from high prices, measures to do so remain in member states' hands. The Plan promises measures for reducing electricity costs, which were later presented as The Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF). It is quite telling of the precarious state of the EU energy landscape that the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF) - presented to be the new normal to substitute an emergency tool, was made obsolete in less than a year by a new crisis requiring an emergency update. The METSAF will be, however, temporary and should stay in place just until 31 December 2026. It allows for member states to provide aid for companies in the form of electricity price relief of up to 70 per cent for the electricity cost of the eligible consumption. Unlike the broad support deployed in 2022, this aid is sectoral, temporary and targeted, directed at the sectors most exposed to higher energy, fertiliser and fuel prices — among them fishing, transport and energy-intensive industries. Moreover, the Commission is, at the time of writing, reportedly weighing a temporary suspension of the penalty framework under the Methane Regulation, reflecting a broader recognition of the need to make the EU's regulatory architecture more resilient and flexible in the face of the crisis.

Member states have also sought national responses to the energy crisis. Member states have been quick in responding to the sudden increase in energy prices, and by the beginning of May they spent almost 12 billion euros to reduce the impact on consumers. In comparison between 2022 and 2023 to respond to the energy shock caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine the whole EU spent circa 540 billion euros. This difference in mobilized resources is likely due to the lessons learned from the 2022 response — when most measures were untargeted and the EU spent roughly 2.2 per cent of its GDP over 2022-2024 — and to the different nature of the shock: Russia then supplied around 40 per cent of EU gas, mostly by pipeline, whereas today the disruption is concentrated on global LNG markets, against the backdrop of an energy system and infrastructure that have themselves changed, but it is also an indicator of much less fiscal space currently available. However, the response has focused on shielding consumers from high prices, with little to no attention to cut down consumption on fossil fuels – a strikingly different approach than most of Asia, where despite fuel prices being kept subsidized they also introduced restrictions on purchases (as in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia) and sometimes even drastic measures were taken (as in the case of the national emergency declared by the Philippines). The continent, Southeast Asia in particular, has been much more affected than the EU, as most countries are more exposed to supply disruptions from the Middle East. Nevertheless, the measures taken by member states such as Germany or Italy (VATs or general energy excise duty for example) are also an indicator of the perceived unpopularity of policies tackling energy efficiency or structural changes in energy systems (which have been largely missing in national debates).

Such a stark difference between the Commission's recommendations and the measures taken by member states highlights a growing distance between the European and national visions on the energy transition, which is perhaps best shown by the debate over the future of the Emission Trading System, the ETS. After two decades of functioning, the system has received increased pressure to maintain the high level of free permits that several heavy industries still benefit from, despite a push from Brussels officials to tighten the ETS under the current revision (the so-called "ETS benchmark"). The landscape is however quite fragmented: Italy and Germany are among the countries strongly supporting a more limited application of the system, particularly with regard to electricity generation, while Spain backs the tightening of the ETS. The core of the discussion however revolves around the chemical and the paper industries, which received a substantial share of the circa 260 billion the ETS generated, but have invested little in upgrading production. One of the main arguments by the Commission indeed is that the distortion is not in the ETS structure, but in how funds are invested, and that proposed changes may have a beneficial impact on some industries, but a negative one on others: according to DG CLIMA, the demands for the chemical industry member states such as Poland and Italy are pushing could cost the cement industry 2 billion euros.

The crisis also further pushed a crucial debate for the EU: that on nuclear. More generally, the rise in energy prices, coupled with the global increase in energy demand driven by AI and other factors, has boosted interest in nuclear energy worldwide in recent months, as in the case for instance of India and Japan (although this may involve Africa as well). The EU has, however been the centre of this renewed discussion, following years of intense debate on the topic in Brussels, particularly following the 2022 energy crisis. The Nuclear Energy Summit held in Paris on the 10th of March was likely the clearest demonstration of a strong surge in interest towards the resource across the EU following the current energy crisis: during her speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that it was a "strategic mistake for Europe to turn its back on a reliable, affordable source of low-emissions power." Ironically, she was a minister in the German government that approved the nuclear phase-out in the country in 2011. This renewed political backing seeks to boost investment in a sector regarded as increasingly strategic in such an unpredictable energy market – one that could also contribute significantly to reducing the EU's emissions, yet struggles to attract investments. The Summit indeed focused on technological innovation as one of the keys to address the main issues still hampering nuclear developments, i.e. the high costs and the dominance of Chinese, US, and Russian players.

Not by chance, the mantra in Brussels has been on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), which could be particularly useful to meet new demand, such as that coming from data centres, hydrogen production, or heavy industries decarbonising heat processes. Following the Paris Summit, the Commission published an SMR strategy, which proposes SMR deployment explicitly as complementary to decarbonization efforts and as a tool to reduce traditional fossil fuel supply

vulnerability. The Commission hopes to pave the way for development, licensing and deployment of SMR technologies and to reach operational reactors by 2035, coordinating also industry stakeholders and research organisations. The strategy also states that capacity for the small reactors could reach between 17 and 53 GW by 2050, and proposes 9 core actions to achieve the objective. While this increase is substantial for a new technology but relatively small for nuclear as a whole, there is also a lot of action ongoing among member states in this sense: Italy has approved a framework law for nuclear energy on the 4th of June, while the political debate in Belgium, Greece and Sweden on nuclear energy has significantly expanded (particularly in the latter, where construction for the first reactor in forty years may soon begin). Indeed, at the political level, nuclear energy remains strongly supported by a coalition of member states organised within the so-called "Nuclear Alliance", a group led by France and including Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Belgium and - despite not having active reactors - Italy. Already in 2023, the Alliance had set an objective to reach 150 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, with a group of eleven of them recently pledging closer coordination "to structure cooperation on the whole nuclear value chain" and provide Europe "with all the tools to reach carbon neutrality by 2050". Notably, countries that have historically opposed nuclear development appear to have shifted their position to some extent, with Germany - which has traditionally led them - becoming more inclined to consider SMR development while remaining reluctant toward conventional nuclear expansion.
The EU also provided additional support on nuclear energy, with a 330 million euros investment for fusion research and improving nuclear skills across the Union. Nuclear power was also strongly featured in the AccelerateEU Communication, where it has been proposed as a key diversification option alongside renewables; this was a remarkable change compared to previous packages, particularly RepowerEU, which included it but in a much less evident role.

The energy crisis has however, not been the only key element affecting the external dimension of the Green Deal. The defeat of Orban in Hungary, a staunch Putin supporter, in favour of Péter Magyar in May indeed lifted many of the obstacles for advancing support to Ukraine. As a two-year block of arms reimbursement was lifted shortly after the elections, the 20th package of sanctions was also approved. The package significantly pushes towards the total phase-out of Russian pipeline and LNG gas imports, which are respectively by September and January 2027, also putting additional pressure on the shadow fleet through a series of measures – a port infrastructure ban, a future maritime services ban, a ban on LNG terminal services, among others. The package also contains a significant set of measures concerning general trade and finance, and much is equally happening outside Europe; while the UK has seized a Russian shadow fleet tanker on the 16th of June, the latest G7 in Évian-les-Bains saw unprecedented support by Trump for Ukraine – perhaps also inspired by the recent advancements of Kyiv against Russia. The G7 Final Communique indeed called for further sanctions, also hitting the Russian energy sector. As the EU was losing faith that the US would instead not support its stance against Russia, particularly concerning new measures against the shadow fleet, this positive outcome could further strengthen the Ukrainian momentum in the war.

2. Steering the legislative ship

As the energy crisis unfolds, the EU attempts to keep the helm of its legislative proposals. In March 2026, the Commission published the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), attempting to kick-start the European industrial sector. The IAA was the long-awaited central piece to deliver on the promises of its Clean Industrial Deal, but consensus on its details seems hard to materialize. The proposal arrives after multiple delays due to disagreements on its scope among member states and DGs. This was already exemplified by the change in its name - as the original name Industrial Decarbonization Accelerator Act - was later changed, likely as an attempt to depict it as a broader tool of industrial policy for all sectors. Indeed, the IAA proposes to increase European manufacturing capacity to reach 20 per cent of EU GDP by 2035. Currently, this value sits at 14.3 per cent, with large gaps between different member states. The text does not provide an adequate explanation of why this exact quota was chosen or how it was derived as an "optimal" target based on a quantitative model of the current potential of the European industrial base. The main tool introduced by the IAA to reach its goal is the revision of local content requirements regarding public procurement spending. The Commission has estimated that the EU public procurement market has a value of approximately 2 trillion euros. This issue, however, also became the main source of disagreements among the involved parties.

To leverage the public procurement market to support European companies, the IAA proposed the introduction of "Made in EU" requirements. These criteria would cover especially sectors such as EVs, wind turbines, solar technologies, hydrogen technologies and cement. Expectedly, member states are divided on their exact scope and definition. During initial discussions, Nordic and Baltic states warned that rigid "Made in Europe" criteria would deter investment and distort the Internal Market - proposing instead "Made with Europe" approaches. The current text defines both 'content of Union origin' and 'content equivalent to Union origin'. This means that for public procurement, commodities that come from countries with free trade agreements (FTAs) or in a customs union with the EU are considered equivalent to EU content. This broad net relieves the initial worries of more trade-open countries, but it substantially spurs the IAA's capacity to stimulate exclusively European companies - especially after the recent wave of new FTAs signed by the Commission, which will include in the list economic giants such as India. One noteworthy economy left out will be China - whose huge production and export strategy is the main cause of global overcapacity in several sectors, including steel and EVs. Indeed, Beijing has harshly criticized the IAA. At the same time, it is increasing its presence - through subsidiaries and joint ventures - in countries not excluded by this set of criteria, such as Morocco, which benefits from its Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement. Other criticisms come from inside the EU. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) has pointed out the excessive bureaucratic approach of the Act, which runs against the recent tide of simplification pledges by Brussels - a course of action strongly welcomed by Berlin.

The IAA also sets up new rules to evaluate foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic manufacturing sectors, including economic security considerations. The text proposes that designated Investment Authorities will have to consider if specific FDIs would increase the bloc's economic vulnerability, giving them the possibility to block the investment. These considerations would apply to FDI exceeding 100 million euros, in strategic sectors, and carried out by an entity linked with a third country that holds more than 40 per cent of global manufacturing capacity in that sector. Currently, commodities covered are battery technologies, EVs, solar PVs and technologies related to CRMs. The Commission would maintain the power to expand this list. Similarly to local content requirements, introducing FDI screening also needs to be carefully weighed. On the one hand, Chinese dominance in the clean tech sector and their investment in Europe have increasingly put the EU at risk of over-dependency. However, FDI influx remains instrumental in fostering the batteries and EVs sectors in the EU, as shown by the role that South Korean companies have had in Hungary and Poland. Another element proposed by the IAA is the establishment of Industrial Manufacturing Acceleration Areas (IMAAs). IMAAs would be economic areas benefiting from simplified and accelerated permitting procedures for manufacturing projects. This idea is not completely innovative, as it builds on the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which proposed the creation of Net-Zero Acceleration Valleys. IMAAs would broaden the scope of the NZIA by supporting clusters not just for clean technologies, but for heavy industry such as steel, cement, chemicals, aluminium, glass, pulp and paper, and ceramics.

Another major piece of legislation under discussion is the Grid Package. The proposal is under review by the Parliament's Committee, and it is expected to reach a parliamentary vote in autumn 2026. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen recently stressed that the EU must "significantly scale up renewable electricity generation" to address energy market instability. Consequently, expanding and modernising the electricity grid will be essential to accommodate such rapid expansion of electricity generation. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), EU electricity demand is expected to increase by approximately 300 TWh over the next five years. Without substantial investments in transmission and distribution networks, grid congestion is expected to increase. According to estimates by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), up to 310 TWh of renewable electricity could be curtailed by 2040 as a result of insufficient grid capacity. The European Parliament has also emphasised the need to mobilise additional financial resources to support grid development, including through existing instruments such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and it is currently debating the amount of funding destined to grid expansion in the larger Multiannual Financial Framework. The Commission is pushing - together with increased funding - for more centralisation in network planning on cross-border decisions. However, achieving such centralisation remains politically challenging. Virtually all member states remain wary of devolving more powers currently held by national TSOs and regulators to a more centralized form of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Additionally, significant differences in member states' energy mixes and industrial structures continue to lead to tensions regarding cross-border interconnections. France, for example, has historically been cautious about expanding interconnection capacity with Spain, partly due to concerns over increased imports of lower-cost renewable electricity. Similarly, Norway has expressed reservations about further integration with continental European markets, arguing that growing electricity exports - particularly towards Germany - could contribute to higher domestic energy prices.

On 10 March 2026, the Commission also adopted the Clean Energy Investment Strategy and the Citizen Energy Package. The two proposals are designed to work in tandem, with the strategy developed to foster capital mobilisation in the energy sector and the package reducing costs and increasing communities' and stakeholders' engagement in the larger governance of the transition. In the framework of the Investment Strategy the European Investment Bank (EIB) has announced its intention to provide more than €75 billion in financing over a three-year period. The strategy also foresees an expansion of the EIB's role as a provider of derisking instruments. This will be achieved mainly through an increased use of venture debt in targeted sectors, such as clean tech and long-duration storage. The strategy is also instrumental in the future development of the Grid Package, as the EIB will establish a strategic infrastructure investment fund designed to provide equity support to electricity grid operators. The Citizen Energy Package instead attempts to ensure that the benefits of such investments are adequately distributed across different communities and sectors. The social implications of Europe's energy transformation are not new topics across Europe, but they have been again exacerbated by the energy price spike following the Iran war. Affordability and energy costs remain among the main European worries and according to the Commission, nearly one in ten Europeans is unable to adequately heat their home, while more than 30 million citizens report difficulties in paying their energy bills. The Package mainly focuses on how electrification and renewable deployment can create new opportunities for consumers. It proposes several actions, grouped in three pillars - "lowering energy bills for households", "Protecting and empowering consumers" and "Tackling energy poverty and vulnerability". Many of the proposals under the first pillar, particularly those aimed at reducing electricity taxes and levies and lowering network costs for local consumers, are likely to clash with the current crisis and with the immediate responses of national governments. Some emergency measures adopted by national governments in response to the price surge partially reflected the broader objective of shielding consumers from higher prices, but such broad tax cuts on energy have been considered poorly targeted and they may end up being counterproductive both in responding to the current conjuncture and in developing a more sustainable system when markets stabilize.

Alongside the newly proposed initiatives, several dossiers have reached completion. The Union Registry Regulation - which enables the accounting framework for the use of flexibility mechanisms between member states, such as the transfer of emission allocations - has been amended to be in line with the revised Effort Sharing and the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation of the Fit for 55 package. At the same time, the Council formally adopted the amended European Climate Law, introducing the 2040 target of a 90 per cent reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels. The target also includes the possibility to use international carbon credits to reach the emission reduction - however, just for up to 5 per cent and by 2036 onwards. The adoption also marks the date for the future biannual assessment by the Council itself, which will monitor potential changes and eventually propose a revision of the decarbonization target.

3. Securing the trade flow

Much has also happened on the side of trade, following months of hard work by the Commission to deliver agreements and FTAs with key partners. The Mercosur in particular started as a temporary agreement (so called "provisional application") on the 1st of May; this is a reduced version, which contains only the trade component of the agreement and excludes the investment one, which should be ratified by all member states before coming into effect – a requirement that was instead not needed for the temporary version. This partial version was required as the full agreement suffered from heavy opposition from the European Parliament and was even referred to the European Court of Justice in January. Even this partial version is however substantial: it will significantly decrease duties on more than 90 per cent of trade taking place between the EU and Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay), slashing tariffs on cars by half for internal combustion engines, and by 10 per cent on European electric and hybrid cars, for example. Duties on machinery produced in the EU will also gradually be phased out over a ten-year period, with an impact on a variety of other sectors – pharmaceutical, textiles, and services in particular. Opposition is however still there, within and outside the EU: while opposing MEPs wait for the Court of Justice's opinion on the deal, Switzerland has instead rejected a similar deal in a vote of its lower house of Parliament on the 18th of June. This is however not the case for Japan, which is instead trying to replicate the EU's agreement, and so is Canada and several other Asian countries.

The one with Mercosur is however not the only agreement the EU is working on. An FTA with India is being discussed, and it has witnessed recent positive developments: after a meeting with India Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the latest G7, Von der Leyen stated that the FTA will be finalised by the end of the year. This follows the deal the two struck in January, and which dramatically curbed duties in traded goods (covering 96.6 per cent of trade). The agreements not only could represent a major economic occasion for both India and the EU, as the January deal alone will likely save 4 billion euros in duties to European companies, but will also likely strengthen political ties; this is particularly relevant in a moment when US-India relations are strained (although the recent meeting between Modi and Trump during the G7 may have changed the situation).
The Commission also finalised another crucial deal in March, in this case with Australia; the FTA signed by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Von der Leyen eliminates more than 99 per cent of tariffs, with a major impact on the automotive, dairy products, and chemicals. The EU is set to obtain significant benefits in terms of increased exports (+33 per cent expected over the next ten years), and in opening preferential lanes to access the much-needed Australian critical raw materials. The deal received some backlash, being even labelled as a "Mercosur II" deal by farmers' lobbies in France, but export quotas for Australian meat broadly

contained the opposition.

Critical raw materials have also been the centre of the Commission's focus in these months, thanks to the publication of the Raw Materials Mechanism. The instrument expands the EU Energy platform (which has now become the EU Energy and Raw Materials Platform), and aims at aggregating buyers so as to increase the purchasing power of the EU as it struggles to diversify its supply. Part of the RESourceEU Action Plan published in December 2025, it aims at connecting off-takers and suppliers, providing particular support for smaller companies that have access to limited networks. The platform has already been working for hydrogen since November 2025, and indeed the EU already published relevant results for the resource in April; however, the challenge for this new mechanism will likely be greater, considering the consolidated position of China in the vast majority of the materials considered by the platform.
The mechanism is however not the only action the Commission has taken on the topic. The EU and the US have indeed signed a strategic partnership on critical minerals in April, deepening their cooperation on the development of trade instruments such as standards-based markets, offtake agreements, and price gap subsidies, among others. Perhaps even more importantly, the two parties also launched an "Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience", which will likely prelude further joint initiatives on trade.

European trade has been affected by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entering its definitive regime. By January 2026, companies have the obligation to purchase certificates corresponding to the embedded emissions of imported products. The price of these certificates - directly linked to the EU ETS allowance price - has fluctuated between approximately €60 and €80/ tCO_2 during 2025 and in the first quarter of 2026, sits at €75.36/tCO_2. CBAM will now prove if it's capable of shielding European markets from unfair competition with higher carbon intensity. The system does not lack opposition. Italy, France and Slovakia have advocated for adjustments to the CBAM framework ahead of its full operationalization, raising concerns about its potential impacts on key industrial sectors. Even before the Hormuz Crisis, Italy had pushed for a more flexible approach towards fertilizers. There has also been criticism by European companies that consider the current benchmark to be too generous to their competitors. On the other side of the border, Chinese firms are also criticizing the measure, while reorganizing their production and trade practices to limit its impact. This is particularly evident in the steel sector. Indeed, while a significant share of Chinese steel production remains highly carbon-intensive, the country's rapid expansion of electric arc furnaces could allow producers to develop differentiated supplies in which lower-carbon steel is exported to the EU market, while more carbon-intensive production is directed towards third markets with weaker environmental standards. The EU also still needs to address a limitation of the current CBAM framework that the definitive regime will soon make even more apparent. Among issues yet to be resolved are the restricted number of covered commodities and the possibility of circumvention with exports increasingly shifting towards finished or processed goods that incorporate those same materials.

Tension with the US administration on trade remains high, but compromise seems to prevail. Despite confusion over the US tariff regime's legality after the Supreme Court struck it down in February, the EU decided not to reopen the discussion. Indeed, Trump's threats of even higher tariffs convinced the EU to maintain the line of the trade deal signed by the Commission in July 2025. To do so, on 16 June, the European Parliament approved legislation cutting duties on many U.S. goods imports. The measure comes, however, with multiple provisions to halt its effect if conditions change. Indeed, despite the deal, Bernd Lange, the German social democrat chairman of the parliament's international trade committee, said that "we have a strong suspension clause, so that if the US breaches the deal, we come back to our tariff system," suggesting some worries remain regarding the US continuing to economically coerce the EU. These fears have partially already materialised on a different but related issue, as Trump pressured France to amend its tax on digital companies (which would also affect US giants), threatening 100 per cent tariffs on French wine. At the same time, Europe maintains its own tariffs on the steel sector, with a new tariff-rate quota that reduces the overall volume of steel imports by approximately 47 per cent compared to previous safeguard quotas (18.3 million tonnes of import volumes per year) and increases the out-of-quota duty to 50 per cent. Indeed, the EU remains worried that the US will not fully comply with its own end of the trade deal - meaning to reduce duties on European steel and aluminum products by the end of 2026. Indeed, while the Trump administration has reduced tariffs for certain products that use steel, aluminum and copper, such as agricultural machinery and HVAC equipment, it has not yet signalled it will do the same for steel, with imports in the US drastically declining. The measure however triggered significant opposition from some countries; while Ukraine is worried this may impact its wartime economy, the UK has been particularly vocal in its opposition. As the global situation over trade complicates, the EU seems to walk a fine line by balancing new and old trading partners, diversifying supplies and maintaining its convoluted yet much-needed relationship with the US stable. Time will tell if this will be enough to counteract further, and perhaps unexpected, disruptions.

IN DEPTH

This interview has been realised through written questions by IAI, followed by written replies from the Commissioner which have not been edited.
Answers to this interview date back to March 2026.

Interview

Jessika Roswall

Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy

Regarding the forestry sector, the EU is increasingly challenged in the initiatives proposed – from the EUDR to the Forest Monitoring Law. The EUDR in particular is facing major obstacles to achieve success, as the continuous uncertainty surrounding its implementation added to the already complex application of such a debated Regulation. Is the future of the EUDR at risk, how would it be possible to achieve its objectives without weakening its scope?

The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) is a turning point in the global fight against deforestation and forest degradation. It is already triggering positive changes worldwide, encouraging greater transparency and sustainability.
To ease implementation, to reduce the pressure on the EUDR IT system, and to ensure a smooth and effective roll out, the Commission has proposed some targeted amendments to which co-legislators agreed before the end of the year. I believe this strikes the right balance between effectiveness and feasibility and gives much-needed certainty to economic operators, while providing real simplification on the ground. We are committed to making the EUDR work in a spirit of close partnership, transparency, and open dialogue.

The Nature Restoration Law was finally adopted after bruising political battles. With Member States required to submit their draft national restoration plans by 1 September 2026, what technical and financial support will the Commission provide to ensure quality and consistency across plans, particularly for Member States with limited administrative capacity or significant political opposition to the Law's implementation?

The goal of the Nature Restoration Regulation (NRR) is to reverse the alarming decline of our ecosystems. We have to make sure that nature

can continue to provide the ecosystem services which our economy and resilience depend on – food production and climate resilience to name a few.
The NRR puts EU Member States in the driving seat because they are best placed to tailor their National Restoration Plans to local ecological and socio-economic circumstances. The NRR provides the framework and targets, allowing Member States to make their political choices.
Many Member States are preparing their Draft National Restoration Plans. After the 2026 submission, the plans will be further improved and finetuned with the support of the Commission.

The Commission has made guidance and technical resources available for Member States, as well as a format to follow. There is also targeted financial support for technical assistance. I have communicated to all Member States just before the end of the year that the Commission will intensify its support to Member States to make implementation as efficient and workable as possible.

Under the current EU budget framework, there is no single dedicated fund for the NRR, but there is a wide portfolio of EU instruments that Member States and stakeholders can tap into for measures contributing to restoration.
Looking ahead, the next EU budget proposals foresee that at least 35% will be dedicated to climate and environmental objectives, including nature restoration. This target will apply across the major EU funds. In practice, this means that the EU budget can contribute to financing parts of Member States' nature restoration plans, as well as certain EU-wide restoration measures.

At the same time, we are fully aware that public funding alone will not be sufficient and that financing will remain a challenge for many Member States. I will therefore follow this very closely. This is why mobilising private capital, alongside public funding, will be essential — including through innovative, credible approaches such as nature-positive investment and, where appropriate, nature credit schemes.

The EIB has committed €15 billion for water resilience during 2025-2027, yet Parliament's resolution explicitly called for a dedicated water resilience fund within the next Multiannual Financial Framework. Why did the Commission not propose such a fund, and what is your response to concerns that relying on existing financial instruments—designed for broader purposes—will continue to leave water systematically underfunded relative to its strategic importance?

First, I would like to stress that it's important that Member States make good use of the existing EU funding and the extra financing window we have foreseen in the EU cohesion funds to tackle water challenges and *become more water resilient.*

The proposal for the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) sets aside at least 35% of the budget for climate and environment spending, including water resilience. This funding can be used to develop, modernise and maintain water infrastructure and nature-based solutions for water resilience. We will also continue to support research and innovation projects that accelerate the green transition, including water resilience.

The main EU funding programmes and the national and regional partnerships plans, include water resilience as a key objective.
The MFF proposal, and in particular the European Competitiveness Fund, will give Member States more options to use EU financial support for investments in water resilience and water-smart technologies.
The Commission and the EIB are working together on assessing water resilience investment needs. More needs to be done because the investment gap is big, that is why we are stepping up our work together.

The Green Claims Directive tried to reassure consumers that products marketed as sustainable are indeed so, and to avoid greenwashing. However, it seems to have faced much opposition and has now been left behind. What went wrong, and what does this say about the current appetite for environmental legislation? What should be done to ensure that similar measures are adopted?

We don't want to lower our environmental ambition. It is about how the Green Claims Directive would apply to micro-enterprises. Small companies form the backbone of the EU economy and make up about 96% of all EU companies. The Commission wishes to support them by reducing the administrative burden they face, which is why our initial proposal for Green Claims included exemptions for micro-enterprises.

Meanwhile, the Commission remains fully committed to fighting greenwashing and ensuring consumers are correctly informed. In 2024 the Commission adopted the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, designed to stop false environmental claims and help consumers make more sustainable choices.

The new EU budget proposal shows that the Commission is still committed to environmental objectives. The Commission's priority is to help Member States better implement our existing and environmental policies and ensure that regulatory burden is not an obstacle

How will the Commission address the potential tension between the upcoming Circular Economy Act's circular design requirements and EU industrial competitiveness in global markets, and what specific mechanisms will ensure consistent implementation across Member States with varying administrative capacities and industrial structures?

I don't see any contradiction between circularity and competitiveness. On the contrary, the circular economy is a crucial step that will boost Europe's competitiveness and strategic autonomy.

The Circular Economy Act that we will present in 2026 aims to boost Europe's economic growth and resilience, in line with our "Competitiveness Compass". This is no longer only an environmental issue, it is also an economic necessity.

It will focus on improving economic security by reducing reliance on materials from outside the EU, which can cause price swings and supply issues.
We have to become more competitive, by promoting circular practices that lower costs of manufacturing. Innovative circular economy models like repair and product-as-a-service will be encouraged.

If we go circular, we can reduce our emissions by one third which will helps us reach our climate goals and climate neutrality by 2050.

We will also work to strengthen the Single Market for secondary raw materials, reducing administrative hurdles, and supporting industry.

In light of the EU's growing emphasis on water resilience and ecosystem restoration, hydropower can play a dual role — both as a source of renewable electricity and as a key contributor to water management, flood control, and storage. How does the Commission intend to integrate hydropower more effectively within broader water resilience and nature restoration strategies, ensuring environmental safeguards while maintaining its contribution to the EU's decarbonisation goals?

We understand the importance of hydropower in moving away from fossil fuels and promoting renewable energy projects, to achieve our 2050 climate targets. At the same time, the European Water Resilience Strategy points out the complex challenges related to dam use.
Action on water management should first and foremost prioritise nature-based solutions and the restoration of natural environments and ecosystems.
Hydropower plays an important role in Europe's transition away from fossil fuels and in strengthening energy security. At the same time, water management presents complex challenges that require careful balancing. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Europe needs a pragmatic mix of

approaches — combining nature-based solutions, ecosystem restoration and, where needed, modern and well-designed water infrastructure — adapted to local conditions and resilience needs.

We have set ambitious but important targets in the Nature Restoration Regulation, such as restoring at least 25 000 km of rivers by 2030. This means removing obsolete barriers without impacting those actively used for hydropower.

The planning of new dams and reservoirs should carefully evaluate their environmental impacts, involving all relevant actors, and ensure that such actions are part of an integrated and sustainable water management strategy.

Member States are encouraged to prioritize the upgrading and refurbishing of existing hydropower facilities and avoid constructing new ones.

Environmental protection remains a cornerstone of EU policy, yet the complexity and fragmentation of permitting frameworks can impact investments in infrastructure and renewable energy projects. In the context of the broader simplification agenda, how does the Commission plan to reconcile the need for faster and more predictable permitting with the imperative to maintain high environmental standards and avoid a patchwork of national interpretations?

Our goal is to reduce the fragmentation of applicable rules and legal uncertainty - while keeping environmental safeguards in place and ensuring we can meet our climate goals. This fragmentation is due to on the increasing demand for fossil free energy, net-zero industries and critical raw materials, which are necessary for our transition, resilience and competitiveness

The European Commission's upcoming legislative proposal will streamline and accelerate environmental assessments, which are an essential part of permit granting.

For environmental assessments across sectors, the proposal will include establishing "single contact points" in Member States.

It will also set up joint or coordinated procedures for environmental assessments and will digitalise applications, as well as improving information sharing between different stakeholders and the Commission.

The last important step will be to accelerate procedures for strategic sectors that are key to reaching our 2030 climate targets.

AP-PEN-DIX

TIME LINE

This timeline highlights the main elements proposed by the Commission under the umbrella of the Green Deal since the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen in July 2024. Previous activities are listed under the "Timeline Archive", available at the end of this report.
The lists are not exhaustive, but aim to provide an overview of the Commission's work during these years. The list started as an expanded version of the Commission's own timeline, available here:

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

16 June 2026
The European Parliament approves legislation implementing the EU–US trade arrangement, while including a suspension clause allowing the EU to reintroduce tariffs if the United States breaches the agreement.

22 April 2026
In response to the Hormuz energy crisis, the Commission presents the AccelerateEU Plan, combining emergency measures with long-term actions to accelerate electrification, renewable deployment and energy resilience.

10 March 2026
The European Commission adopts the Clean Energy Investment Strategy and the Citizen Energy Package, aiming to mobilise public and private investment, strengthen citizen participation, and reduce energy poverty.

4 March 2026
The Commission publishes the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), introducing "Made in Europe" procurement criteria, strategic FDI screening and Industrial Manufacturing Acceleration Areas to strengthen Europe's industrial competitiveness.

27 January 2026
The EU and India conclude a **landmark FTA with** strong sustainability commitments, cutting tariffs while strengthening climate, environmental and labour standards, supporting green industrial transformation and rules-based, sustainable trade.

22 January 2026
The Commission launches **a new portal under the EU Mission on Adaptation**, offering tools, data and guidance to help regions and cities strengthen climate adaptation.

14 January 2026
The Commission updates the **Union Registry Regulation** to ensure transparent accounting of Member States' emissions, transfers and carbon removals

1 January 2026
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism **enters into force.**

23 December 2025
The Commission amends **ETS State aid Guidelines** to protect energy-intensive industries from rising carbon costs.

16 December 2025
The Commission introduces **new rules** to standardise the calculation of the life-cycle Global Warming Potential of new buildings under Energy Performance Buildings Directive.
The Commission introduces a **package** to simplify food and feed safety while maintaining high environmental and health standards.
The Commission launches an **Automotive Package** to support the sector's transition to clean mobility.
The Commission announces the entry into force of the first **Soil Monitoring and Resilience Directive.**
The Commission announces the entry into force of the **new regulation** on preventing plastic pellet losses to reduce microplastic pollution.

12 December 2025
The Council and Parliament agree on **Regulation on End-of-Life Vehicles.**

11 December 2025
The Commission invests **€14 billion** through Horizon Europe to boost R&S on climate neutrality, clean technologies and decarbonisation.

10 December 2025
The Commission proposes **European Grids Package and the Energy Highway initiative.**

9 December 2025
The Commission announces reinforcement of **controls** on food, animal and plant products.

4 December 2025
The Commission launches **€5.2 billion of EU ETS for clean transition technologies under the Innovation Fund.**
The EU agrees to delay the entry intro application of the Deforestation Regulation.

3 December 2025
The Commission adopts **RESourceEU** to secure the EU's supply of critical raw materials.
The EU reaches a **political agreement** to permanently end Russian gas imports by 2027 and complete the phase-out of Russian oil.

1 December 2025
The Commission grants **PCI and PMI status to 235 projects to boost energy interconnectivity.**

27 November 2025
The Commission presents new **Bioeconomy Strategy** to drive green growth, competitiveness and resilience across Europe.

20 November 2025
The EU and South Africa launch a **Clean Trade and Investment Partnership** ahead of G20 Summit.

15 November 2025
The Council and the Parliament find an agreement on the EU's **2026 annual budget**, allocating 56.5 millions to natural resources and environment.

12 November 2025
Commissioner Hoekstra confirms a **legally binding 90% emissions reduction target** by 2040 during Parliament's Plenary.

10 November 2025
The Council and the Parliament agree on a **simplification package** for the Common Agricultural Policy.

7 November 2025
At COP30 in Belém, European Union endorses the **Leaders' Declaration** on the Open Coalition on Compliance on Carbon Markets.

7 October 2025
The Commission proposes a **plan** to protect steel industry from unfair impacts of global overcapacity.

10 September 2025
The Parliament adopts **simplifications to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.**

9 September 2025
The Parliament adopts new EU rules on **design, reuse and recycling in the automotive sector.**
The Parliament adopts new EU rules to **reduce textile and food waste.**

8 July 2025
The Commission publishes a **new EU methodology for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels.**

2 July 2025
The Commission presents **a new 2040 climate target** amending EU Climate Law.

17 June 2025
The Commission proposes gradual **phase-out of Russian gas and oil imports** into the EU.

5 June 2025
The Commission adopts the **European Ocean Pact.**

4 June 2025
The Commission adopts the **European Water Resilience Strategy.**

20 May 2025
The Commission announces almost **€1 billion investment towards renewable hydrogen.**

14 May 2025
The Commission proposes a **simplification of the Common Agricultural Policy.**

6 May 2025
The Commission presents its **roadmap** towards ending Russian energy imports

3 April 2025
European Parliament votes to **delay** the application of sustainability and due diligence reporting rules

19 March 2025
The Commission presented the **Action Plan on Steel and Metals.**

5 March 2025
The Commission presented the **Action Plan on the Future of the Automotive Sector.**
The Commission proposed to prolong the **Gas Storage Regulation** until the end of 2027.

4 March 2025
The Commission President launched the **Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Steel Sector.**

26 February 2025
The Commission presented the **Clean Industrial Deal**, aimed at accelerating decarbonisation while securing the future of manufacturing in Europe.

The Commission adopted a proposal for the **Omnibus Package**, providing simplification in the field of sustainability and EU investment programmes.

30 January 2025
The Commission launched the **Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry.**

29 January 2025
The Commission presented the **Competitiveness Compass.**

14 January 2025
The Commission published an independent **study** detailing the net-zero manufacturing industry landscape in Europe and a **Regulation** on the verification of CO2 emissions for heavy-duty vehicles.

9 January 2025
The Commission President established 14 **Project Groups** chaired by Members of the College to ensure coordination on political priorities.

1 January 2025
Poland assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

18 December 2024
The Council formally adopted the regulation on the one-year postponement of the application of the **EU Deforestation law.**
The Commission President announced the launch of a **Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry in Europe.**

17 December 2024

The Council affirmed its position on a **Regulation** for the prevention of plastic pellet losses.

16 December 2024

The Council formally adopted a **Regulation** on packaging and packaging waste and approved **conclusions** on promoting geothermal energy.

12 December 2024

The Energy Community Ministerial Council adopted the first **Projects of Energy Community Interest.**

9 December 2024

The Council approved **conclusions** on the post-2027 CAP.

6 December 2024

The Commission finalised negotiations with four Mercosur countries for an EU-Mercosur partnership **agreement**.

5 December 2024

The Commission launched the **European Board on Agriculture and Food.**

The **16th Citizens' Energy Forum** took place in Budapest, kickstarting the Commission's work on developing the Citizens Energy Package.

3 December 2024

The Commission established the **cap** on emission allowances under the ETS2 for 2027.

The Commission earmarked €4.6 **billion** for two calls for proposals to accelerate the deployment of decarbonisation technologies and announced a new **partnership** with the European Investment Bank to support investments in the battery manufacturing sector.

1 December 2024

The **Commission 2024-2029** took office.

24 November 2024

The Commission and EU Member States **negotiated** a New Collective Quantified Goal for Climate Finance at COP29, broadening the global contributor base.

19 November 2024

The Council adopted a new regulation on ESG rating **activities** and greenlighted the **proposal** for an EU certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and storage.

The **2024 Carbon Market Report** showed that carbon pricing drove emissions from power and industry installation to a 16,5% reduction in 2023.

14 November 2024
The Parliament agreed to the one-year **postponement** of the Deforestation Regulation.

12 November 2024
The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Stéphane **Séjourné** (Prosperity and Industrial Strategy) and Teresa **Ribera** (Clean, Just and Competitive Transition).
The Commission **launched** a new Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap at COP29.

8 November 2024
The Council released the **Budapest Declaration** on the New European Competitiveness Deal.

7 November 2024
The Commission launched an **Ecodesign Forum** to accelerate progress on sustainable products.
The Parliament conducted the confirmation hearings of Commissioner-designate Wopke **Hoekstra** (Climate, Net-Zero and Clean Growth)

5 November 2024
The Council adopted the **Construction Products Regulation** and called for swift **implementation** of the EU's regulatory framework for renewable hydrogen.
The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Dan **Jørgensen** (Energy and Housing) and Jessika **Roswall** (Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy).

4 November 2024
The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Christophe **Hansen** (Agriculture and Food) and Apostolos **Tzitzikostas** (Sustainable Transport and Tourism).

29 October 2024
The Commission **imposed** duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China for a period of five years.

22 October 2024
The European Parliament **approved** the reform of Single European Sky rules for a more efficient and greener airspace.

16 October 2024
The Council **agreed** to postpone the implementation of the Deforestation Regulation by one year.
The Commission adopted a delegated act **clarifying** the inclusion of

offshore vessels in the emissions monitoring system.
The European Network for Transmission System Operators for Gas's annual winter supply outlook **confirmed** the security of gas supplies for the upcoming winter and summer season.

14 October 2024
The Council **asked** the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide action plan against desertification, land degradation and drought.

8 October 2024
The Council **approved** conclusions on climate finance ahead of COP29.

2 October 2024
The Commission **proposed** a one-year postponement of the application of the EU Deforestation Regulation and **published** an international cooperation framework to support stakeholders in the implementation.

27 September 2024
The Commission **launched** a consultation on the draft methodology for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels and published the final Terms and Conditions for its second auction for the production of renewable hydrogen via the Innovation Fund.

17 September 2024
The Commissioners-designate are **announced**

11 September 2024
The EU Governance Regulation report **shows** that the EU has a comprehensive integrated legal framework and tools in place to meet its decarbonisation goals.

9 September 2024
The Draghi Report on "The future of European competitiveness" is **published**

30 August 2024
New monitoring rules **agreed** for the EU ETS.

22 July 2024
The Council **renews** economic sanctions for a further 6 months towards Russia.

18 July 2024
The Parliament **re-elects** Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President.
The new Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation **enters** into force.

Timeline Archive 2019-2024

27 June 2024
The EU notifies its withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty.

24 June 2024
The EU adopts 14th package of sanctions against Russia for war against Ukraine.

17 June 2024
The Council gives final green light to Nature restoration law.

30 May 2024
The Council gives final approval to right-to-repair directive.

29 May 2024
The Commission hosts the first General Assembly of the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors.

28 May 2024
The EU and Australia sign partnership on sustainable critical and strategic mineral.

27 May 2024
The Council gives its final approval to the ecodesign regulation.
The Council gives final approval to the net-zero industry act.

24 May 2024
The Council gives its final approval to the corporate sustainability due diligence regulation.

24 April 2024
Parliament approves a review of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) Strategic Plans Regulation and the CAP Horizontal Regulation.

12 April 2024
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive is formally adopted.

11 April 2024
Parliament adopts reform of the EU electricity market.

10 April 2024
The Parliament adopts new law to reduce emissions from energy sector, especially methane emissions.

12 March 2024
The Commission publishes the Communication on managing climate risks in Europe as a response to the first ever European Climate Risk Assessment.

4 March 2024
The Council reaches political agreement on a recommendation to continue coordinated demand-reduction to secure sufficient gas storage for next winter

20 February 2024
Political agreement on EU-wide certification scheme for carbon removals.

Political agreement on new air quality standards in the EU

19 February 2024
European Hydrogen Bank pilot auction: 132 bids received from 17 European countries.

8 February 2024
Political agreement to ban all remaining intentional uses of toxic mercury in the EU.

6 February 2024
Political agreement on the Net-Zero Industry Act.

The Commission adopts an EU Industrial Carbon Management Strategy, setting out how to sustainably capture, store and use CO_2.

Commission presents recommendation for 2040 emissions reduction target to set the path to climate neutrality in 2050.

31 January 2024
Commission proposes to allow EU farmers to derogate for one year from certain agricultural rules.

25 January 2024
The Commission launches Strategic dialogue on the future of EU agriculture

19 December 2023
Council approves Commission's proposals to prolong energy emergency measures.

18 December 2023
Commission publishes the **assessments** of the 21 member states which submitted updated draft National Energy and Climate Plans.

8 December 2023
Council and the Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the **Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package**, establishing common internal market rules for renewable and natural gases and hydrogen. The agreement also proposes the creation of the European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH).

7 December 2023
Council and Parliament reach provisional political agreement on the **Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD).**

Council adopts negotiating positions on **Net-Zero Industry Act** and proposes an expanded list of ten strategic net-zero technologies.

28 November 2023
Commission proposes to **prolong energy emergency measures** by 12 months.

Commission proposes the **Electricity Grid Action Plan** and publishes the **sixth list of key infrastructural energy projects.**

23 November 2023
Commission presents the first pilot auction **under the European Hydrogen Bank** for a total of €800 million of subsidies for renewable hydrogen production.

22 November 2023
Commission proposes a new **forest monitoring law** to improve resilience of European forests.

16 November 2023
Council adopts **EU position for COP28** and stresses that it will call for a “phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.

Council and European Parliament reach provisional agreement on a **proposed EU law** that would improve the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes.

15 November 2023
Council and Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the **Regulation on Methane Emissions Reduction in the Energy Sector**, agreeing on deadlines for monitoring, reporting and inspection of sources of methane emissions.

13 November 2023
Council and Parliament reach provisional agreement on the **Critical Raw Materials Act.**

9 November 2023
Parliament and Council reach agreement on **Nature Restoration Law**. Member states will put in place restoration measures in at least 20 per cent of the EU's land areas and 20 per cent of its seas by 2030.

24 October
Commission presents the **European Wind Power Action Plan.**

Commission publishes the **2023 State of the Energy Union Report.**

17 October 2023
Council adopts negotiating positions on **electricity market reform**. The Council agrees that two-way contracts for difference will be the mandatory model used when public funding is involved in long-term contracts.

5 October 2023
European Parliament **approves** Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action and Maroš Šefčovič as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal.

14 September 2023
European Parliament adopts negotiating positions on **electricity market reform** and Critical Raw Materials (**CRM**) Act.

13 September 2023
Ursula von der Leyen delivers State of the European Union **speech**; European Parliament adopts negotiating position on recast of the Clean Air Directive.

12 September 2023
European Parliament **adopts** amendments to Renewable Energy Directive (RED III).

29 August 2023
Ursula von der Leyen **proposes** Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action.

22 August 2023
Frans Timmermans **resigns** as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal; Maroš Šefčovič is appointed as new Executive Vice-President and Acting Commissioner for Climate Action.

19 July 2023
Beginning of trilogues on nature restoration law; ITRE Committee **adopts** report on electricity market reform.

12 July 2023
European Parliament **adopts** negotiating position on nature restoration law.

11 July 2023
Commission presents Greening Freight Transport **Package**; Parliament adopts agreement on recast of Energy Efficiency Directive; European Parliament **adopts** negotiating position on Industrial Emissions Directive.

7 July 2023
Commission **presents** a proposal for coordinated withdrawal from Energy Charter Treaty.

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **tender** for joint gas purchases.

27 June 2023
Amended version of the Nature Restoration Law does not reach the **majority** in the Environment Committee; final vote sent to plenary.
26 June 2023
EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **round** of demand pooling for joint gas purchases by EU companies.

20 June 2023
The Commission publishes the two delegated **acts** defining the rules for the production of renewable hydrogen.

16 June 2023
EU ambassadors reach political deal to **approve** the Renewable Energy Directive (REDIII).

8 June 2023
European Parliament reaches political **agreement** to approve the Nature Restoration Law after facing opposition from MEPs of the European People's Party (EPP).

16 May 2023
25 gas supplying companies **respond** to EU's joint gas demand, providing more than 13.4 bcm of gas.

After being approved by the European Parliament, the CBAM enters into **force**.

The EU Deforestation-free Regulation (**EUDR**) is adopted by the Council after its adoption by the Parliament and thus enter into force.

15 May 2023
EU Member States **agree** to raise renewable target from 32% to 42.5% by 2030.

4 May 2023
First joint gas **purchase** attracts demand from more than 65 EU companies.

26 April 2023
The European Parliament and the Council reach a political **agreement** on the ReFuelEU Aviation proposal

25 April 2023
EU Energy Platform: Commission launches first **call** for companies to jointly buy gas

Council **adopts** key pieces of legislation delivering on 2030 climate targets: Revision of the ETS Directive; Amendment of the MRV shipping Regulation; Revision of the ETS Aviation Directive; Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund; Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

21 April 2023
The Commission proposes a **revision** to the existing marketing standards of agri-food products

18 April 2023
The European Parliament **approves** the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

30 March 2023
European Green Deal: EU agrees **stronger legislation** to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy.

28 March 2023
Member states **agree** to extend voluntary 15% gas demand reduction target.

28 March 2023
EU ministers sign off on **legislation** phasing out sales of new polluting cars and vans by 2035.

16 March 2023
Proposal for a **European Hydrogen Bank.**

16 March 2023
EU proposes the **Critical Raw Materials Act**, a comprehensive set of actions to ensure the EU's access to a secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

16 March 2023
EU releases **Net Zero Industry Act** establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem.

14 February 2023
The Commission proposed **new CO2 emissions targets** for new heavy-duty vehicles from 2030 onwards. These targets will help to reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.

13 February 2023
The Commission proposed **rules** o define what constitutes renewable hydrogen in the EU, with the adoption of two Delegated Acts required under the Renewable Energy Directive.

1 February 2023
The Commission presented a **Green Deal Industrial Plan** to enhance the competitiveness of Europe's net-zero industry and support the fast transition to climate neutrality.

24 January 2023
The European Commission introduces the revision of the **EU Pollinators Initiative.**

18 December 2022
The European Commission welcomed the **provisional agreement** reached with the European Parliament and Council to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, apply emissions trading to new sectors for effective economy-wide climate action, and establish a Social Climate Fund.

9 December 2022
The Commission welcomed the deal reached between the European Parliament and the Council to help make the aviation sector 'Fit for 55', setting in law its contribution to our target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

6 December 2022
EU agrees **law** to fight global deforestation and forest degradation driven by EU production and consumption and the a political agreement is reached on the revision of the EU Emission Trading System rules on aviation.

30 November 2022
The Commission proposed new EU-wide **rules** on packaging, to tackle this constantly growing source of waste and of consumer frustration.

24 November 2022
During the extraordinary Council for Energy, EU energy ministers agreed on a Council **Regulation** "enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks", as well as on a Regulation speeding up permits to deploy renewable energies.

27 October 2022
The Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans.

26 October 2022
Commission proposes stronger **rules** for cleaner air and water, including

PFAs, several pesticides, bisphenol A and some pharmaceuticals.

15 September 2022

Commission proposes for an **emergency market intervention** to reduce energy bills for Europeans, through reduced demand and a revenue cap on some producers (among other measures).

20 July 2022

Commission proposes a "**Save gas for a safe winter**" plan to reduce gas consumption until the following spring.

22 June 2022

Commission launches a **Nature protection package**, focusing on restoring ecosystems and halving pesticide use by 2030.

18 May 2022

Commission launches the **REPowerEU plan**, a set of measures triggered by the invasion of Ukraine and focusing on energy saving, supply diversification and the promotion of renewables.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes two **Regulations** to phase down fluorinated greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes an **update** to the Industrial Emissions Directive, to modernise EU industrial emissions rules to steer large industry in long-term green transition.

30 March 2022

Commission launches **Proposals** to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, boost circular business models and empower consumers for the green transition, as part of the Circular Economy Action Plan.

23 March 2022

Following the REPowerEU Communication, Commission publishes **options** to mitigate high energy prices through common gas purchases and minimum gas storage obligations.

8 March 2022

As a direct response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Commission publishes the **REPowerEU Communication** focused on energy prices, storage and diversification.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a set of **proposals** for a new EU framework to decarbonise gas markets, promote hydrogen and reduce methane emissions, namely a Directive and a Regulation.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a **Communication** on Sustainable Carbon Cycles, to remove, recycle and sustainably store carbon, which will be followed by a proposal for a regulatory framework by the end of 2022.

14 December 2021

Commission launches a new transport **proposal** targeting greater efficency measures.

17 November 2021
Commission **proposes** two Regulations and a Strategy to stop deforestation, innovate sustainable waste management and make soils healthy.

15 September 2021
Commission publishes a Communication launching the project **New European Bauhaus**, focusing on initiatives and funding dedicated to energy efficiency in buildings.

14 July 2021
Commission adopts a large **package** of proposals to achieve a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030. The comprehensive package deals with revision of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, a ReFuelEU Aviation Initiative (on air transport), a Regulation on Land Use, Forestry and Agriculture, a proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.

17 May 2021
Commission proposes a **Communication** on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU.

12 May 2021
Commission adopts a **Zero Pollution Action Plan** for Air, Water and Soil, to improve quality standards for all three, and reduce the impact on health, among other goals.

25 March 2021
Commission publishes an **Organic Action Plan** as part of its Farm-to-Fork strategy.

24 February 2021
Commission adopts a new **EU strategy on adaptation** to climate change.

18 January 2021
Commission first launches the design of the **New European Bauhaus initiative**, dedicated to energy efficiency in building.

10 December 2020
Commission proposes an upgrade on the legislation on batteries, also trying to boost the **European Battery Alliance**, launched in 2017.

9 December 2020
Commission launches a **European Climate Pact**, to spread awareness and increase the involvement of citizens.

19 November 2020

Commission presents an **Offshore Renewable Energy strategy**, aimed at increasing the current 12 GW capacity to a minimum of 60 GW by 2030 and 300 GW by 2050.

14 October 2020

Commission publishes three significant elements for the Green Deal: a **Renovation Wave** initiative on energy efficiency for building, a **Methane Strategy** focused on decarbonised gases, and a **Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability** to strengthen legislation on hazardous chemicals.

17 September 2020

Commission presents its **2030 Climate Target Plan**, raising its ambition to reach a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030.

8 July 2020

Commission adopts **EU strategies** for energy system integration and hydrogen to pave the way towards a fully decarbonised, more efficient and interconnected energy sector.

20 May 2020

Commission presents two key strategies: its E**U Biodiversity Strategy for 2030**, and its **Farm-to-Fork Strategy** to make food systems more sustainable.

11 March 2020

Commission proposes a **Circular Economy Action Plan**, to expand and integrate previous work on circularity into the Green Deal.

4 March 2020

Commission proposes a **European climate law**, aimed at reaching climate neutrality by 2050.

14 January 2020

Commission presents two founding elements of the Green Deal: the **European Green Deal Investment Plan** and the **Just Transition Mechanism.**

11 December 2019

Commission presents the **European Green Deal.**

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