

Green Deal Watch

Issue no.17

Pressure on all
fronts: a rough
summer for
Europe

About the Green Deal Watch

The “Green Deal Watch” was launched in 2020 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. The aim of the project is to follow the evolution of the ambitious and cross-cutting “European Green Deal” (EGD) strategy towards climate neutrality launched by the Von der Leyen Commission in December 2019. The “Green Deal Watch” follows the “Energy Union Watch” which IAI published from 2015 to 2019 to monitor the evolution of energy and climate policies under the previous legislature. IAI covers the debate among national and European stakeholders and reports the key dynamics in order to help the reader better navigate the challenges and opportunities of implementation of the EGD. The Watch is produced on a quarterly basis, collecting official documents, public information and open source data, which are processed and analysed by the IAI team.

About IAI

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation, focusing on topics such as European integration, security and defence, energy and climate policies, as well as key regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas. The IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffariInternazionali), two book series (Trends and Perspectives in International Politics and IAI Research Studies) and other paper series related to IAI research projects.

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This is the 17th issue of the Green Deal Watch, a quarterly report produced by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. This publication aims at monitoring and analysing the initiatives launched by the European Commission and discussed by EU institutions and member states under the umbrella of the Green Deal.

A timeline of initiatives envisaged under the European Green Deal concludes this report.

1. PRESSURE ON ALL FRONTS: A ROUGH SUMMER FOR EUROPE

It was not a relaxing summer break in Brussels. Donald Trump's economic coercion and attacks on multilateralism have been a constant background, the situation in Gaza has completely deteriorated, and Russia is intensifying its aggression against Ukraine – to the point where it is comfortable in **violating** the airspace of EU member states, such as **Poland** and **Romania**. Following the US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in June **US WTI crude** rose more than 2 per cent to \$75.22 a barrel, while global benchmark **Brent** was up nearly 2 per cent at \$78.53 a barrel. Threats of blocking the Strait of Hormuz have contributed to market uncertainty. However, the modest oil price bounce quickly disappeared.

The official rentrée was, however, as usual, marked by the State of the Union (SOTEU) address in Strasbourg the 10th of September – the first one in two years, essentially serving as an appeal for European self-reliance and a heartfelt call to unity. Von der Leyen successfully conveyed her core message despite frequent disruptions from right-wing members: the themes of security, defence and economic competitiveness dominated her speech, in line with the executive's policy agenda and communications since December 2024. While climate change has been officially designated as a priority area, it only received superficial attention in her address, with minimal concrete policy details provided. The topic remains indeed problematic, with the whole bloc showing "implementation fatigue" and difficulty in respecting its own targets (see chapters 2 and 3 of this Green Deal Watch issue).

During von der Leyen's speech, the EU-US deal signed at the end of July at Trump's Turnberry resort in Scotland ignited fierce backlash from different parts of the EU political spectrum. According to many MEPs, the deal involved major concessions with little reciprocity, commitments that are neither realistic nor enforceable (e.g., the promise that the EU would buy €750 billion in US energy

– mostly fossil-based), and undermined WTO principles. The deal would imply to more than triple current volumes for the next three years, something that is quite unlikely for many reasons. First, additional US export capacity might take longer to develop than the 3-year horizon; secondly, the Commission has no say on market dynamics that ultimately define companies' choices. In any case, rather than appeasing the US President, the deal additionally seems to have enticed him to come back for **more** – most recently over the Digital Services Act. This style has been a constant reality: Trump recently told the EU it should put 100 per cent **tariffs** on both China and India to pressure them into abandoning support for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his war against Ukraine. In her speech, von der Leyen did not respond to these requests but anticipated the 19th round of measures, which were then presented a few weeks later.

In parallel with having introduced greater flexibility to gas storage refilling rules, a strong acceleration in the phase-out of Russian energy took place in the past months. In the 18th package of sanctions, **adopted** by the Council in July, the EU has agreed to lower its price cap on Russian oil exported to third countries around the world to 15 per cent below market value. Brussels had however **failed** to convince Trump to go along with the plan. Under the new EU scheme – which was backed by allies like Britain and Canada – the new level will start off at \$47.6 and can be adjusted as oil prices change. This round of sanctions was approved after **Slovakia** dropped a weeks-long block and after getting what PM Fico called separate “guarantees” over gas prices. Hungary had also **opposed** such plans, claiming it would have led to higher prices at home. The cap is a G7 initiative aimed at limiting Russian earnings from oil exports to countries across the globe: set at \$60 in 2022, it is designed to limit the price at which Moscow can sell oil globally by prohibiting shipping firms and insurance companies dealing with Russia to export above that amount. Additionally, the EU is imposing sanctions on more than 100 additional ships within Russia's “ghost fleet” of aging oil tankers employed to bypass export restrictions. The package also includes provisions to prevent the decommissioned Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea from being reactivated. The Commission then only reinforced this trend. In the (only proposed) 19th **package** of sanctions, the executive targeted refineries, oil traders, and petrochemical companies in third countries, including China – a diplomatic overture to Trump by hitting Beijing.

Moreover, in the June Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Council, Ministers exchanged views on the REPowerEU roadmap, published by the European Commission in May – a plan aimed at fully removing Russian energy (gas, oil and nuclear) from EU markets. After discussions on the roadmap, the then Polish presidency endorsed conclusions focused on bolstering the Energy Union to enhance energy security. Central to this initiative is decreasing the EU's strategic reliance on critical sectors, investing in infrastructure and streamlining regulations. However, member states underline the challenges that different member states must face due to their specific circumstances (i.e., landlocked, isolated countries). The following day, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen **unveiled** detailed proposals designed to eliminate imports of fossil fuels from Russia by 2027. Starting 1 January 2026, the EU will ban Russian natural gas imports via pipelines and LNG shipments, with limited exceptions for short-term contracts signed before 17 June 2026, and for landlocked nations with existing long-term agreements. Some European companies may continue imports under long-term contracts until 1 January 2028. In a notable provision, any gas entering the EU through Russia – including via transit countries like Serbia – will be classified as

Russian unless clear documentation proves otherwise. Member states must also develop “diversification plans” outlining how they will eliminate dependence on Russian oil and gas. Spain, the EU’s third-biggest buyer of Moscow’s LNG, was **accused** of trying to dilute the measures despite publicly backing the plan – an accusation that Spanish VP Ribera claimed as false. At the same time, Russia is pursuing a diplomatic pivot toward Asian markets. The proposed **Power of Siberia 2** pipeline could help restore Russia’s global energy influence following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Denmark has taken over the rotating Council presidency. Under the slogan “A strong Europe in a changing world”, aiming to work for a secure, competitive and green Europe, the Danes will continue to work towards an EU that is independent of Russian energy. They have furthermore put strong emphasis on reducing greenhouse gas emissions across all sectors and on advancing clean energy deployment in the Union. Whether this latter objective will be feasible remains to be seen.

Indeed, a key focus of work is the 2040 climate target, on which Copenhagen’s plan was to strike a deal in September. Back in July, the European Commission **proposed** an amendment to the EU Climate Law, setting a 2040 EU climate target of 90 per cent reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions, at the lower end of what has been **recommended** by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. The Commission’s proposal includes the use of “flexibilities” to facilitate the achievement of the 2040 target, including through international carbon credits and carbon removals as an option to give member governments leeway on the 2040 target. The EU’s scientific advisory board on climate change warned against using international carbon credits to meet the bloc’s 2040 emissions-reduction goal, saying doing so would undermine the EU’s climate credibility. This has sparked a debate inside the Commission as well, with Vice President Ribera and Commissioner Hoekstra taking **different** positions, also echoing the views of their two competing political families.

The target is meant to showcase the bloc’s green credentials – first at September’s United Nations General Assembly in New York and then in November at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil – and pressure big polluters around the world to step up their own efforts. With the US withdrawing from international climate efforts, many are looking to the EU to fill the leadership vacuum. The EU’s biggest countries are however **trying** to thwart Denmark’s efforts to fast-track an agreement on the 2040 target. At least seven member states have demanded that Copenhagen cancel a vote by ministers scheduled for September 18 and kick the decision up to national leaders – something that became reality as Germany sided with **France** to elevate discussions to heads of governments. While the emissions target can pass with just a qualified majority in ministerial voting, securing leaders’ approval would demand unanimous consent – requiring support from all EU nations, including reluctant members like Hungary. Moreover, since the European Council won’t convene until late October, awaiting this high-level endorsement would postpone the target’s adoption. This timing problem could **force** the European Commission and Denmark to separate the 2040 emissions target from the EU’s linked 2035 objective, undermining the strength of the 2035 goal, creating a problematic and embarrassing situation.

In parallel, the European Commission in July presented its proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), laying out a draft of the spending priorities for the EU's 2028–2034 budget cycle, with a second package of proposals for legal acts that **followed** in September. The proposal officially opens discussions on the next European budget, which will continue until the end of 2027. The current proposal fails to increase available finance for climate and other environmental objectives. Although it amounts to almost EUR 2 trillion (or 1.26 per cent of the EU's gross national income on average between 2028 and 2034), out of which €700 billion would be earmarked for green investments, adjusted for inflation, this represents a reduction compared to the current EU budget period. Indeed, the Commission has set a horizontal minimum spending threshold of 35 per cent for climate and environmental goals, calculated from the total budget minus defence and security expenses. This constitutes only a modest improvement over the existing MFF 2021–2027 benchmark of 30 per cent and remains below the 37 per cent requirement established for member states' National Recovery and Resilience Plans. Furthermore, the proposal lacks a dedicated minimum commitment for biodiversity protection. There are however interesting upgrades: for instance, the Connecting Europe Facility Energy – the EU's fund for cross-border infrastructure – would grow fivefold, from €6 billion to €30 billion, with investments targeted at interconnectors, distribution grids, offshore-grids, EV charging infrastructure and smart technologies.

Europe is however incredibly weak. One year **after** the Draghi report, the bloc has started to react to the difficult geo-economic and competitiveness challenges it faces. Nevertheless, it is in an even frailer position compared to 12 months ago. Natural gas prices in the EU are still almost four times higher than in the United States. Industrial energy prices have more than doubled on average. Superpowers in the bloc appear congested by lack of leadership: France, in particular, plunged into its third political crisis in one year. With Russia's war in Ukraine grinding on, the US retreating from Europe and Germany's military in disarray, no matter how much European leaders have talked about "strategic autonomy", the continent is a long way from achieving it.

2. ASSESSING THE PACE OF THE TRANSITION AND THE STATUS OF EU ENERGY GOVERNANCE

As geopolitical tensions rise, shifting priorities are increasingly threatening to stun the bloc's decarbonisation efforts.

In many European capitals, attention to climate issues is fading and doubts are growing over the EU's own timeline to deliver its energy transition. Earlier this year, the European Environment Agency had already [warned](#) that despite progress in key areas, the EU as a whole was "only partially on track to achieve the EU's 2030 climate, environment and sustainability objective". In this context, the Commission's [assessment](#) of the updated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), published on 28 May, provides an informative stocktake on where member states are in relation to the 2030 climate targets. The NECPs, regulated by the 2018 Governance [Regulation](#), allow an iterative planning system between member states and the Commission. The initial drafts were designed in 2023 and received a round of recommendations highlighted by the Commission in 2024. Now the Commission is evaluating how fully member states have integrated its previous recommendations. Ambition remains the guiding principle: member states' proposals are evaluated against national and European targets to identify gaps. However, the submission of NECPs, most of which were delivered to Brussels after the 30 June 2024 deadline, already anticipated how this exercise was not fully regarded as a priority by many governments. The EU-wide assessment and the accompanying [working document](#) show uneven progress across different action areas. Across main climate and energy indicators deployed by the Commission, proposed reductions on final and primary energy consumption show significantly gaps when compared to EU targets. Almost all member states are falling significantly below expectations (apart from Cyprus, Denmark, Portugal and Spain for final consumption, and Bulgaria and Denmark for primary consumption.) The picture is slightly brighter on the development of renewable share in national energy mixes, with only Croatia, Czechia, Germany and Ireland being below or slightly under target and only Hungary being significantly below.

Overall, the EU is projected to miss its major 2030 goals, but narrowly so.

If all plans were fully implemented, the emission reduction would remain roughly 1 per cent short of 2030 targets. Planned emission cuts do not show ambition in agriculture and waste, which lack substantial tailored decarbonisation strategies at the European level. More worryingly, other sectors scoring low on emissions reduction are road transport and buildings, which are currently not covered

by the Emissions Trading System (ETS), but that are planned to be addressed by its upcoming expansion, the ETS2, by 2027. However, the timeline for its operationalisation is now facing **pushback**, complicating projections for these sectors. This slower-than-expected pace toward the established 2030 targets will also fail to motivate legislators to increase ambition regarding the 2040 goals, whose negotiations are **stalling**. NECPs fall short on renewables development too: the planned roll-out would bring the EU to about 41 per cent of its gross final energy consumption by 2030, below the 42.5 per cent **target** established by the 2023 Renewable Energy Directive. Ambition gaps are also found in the improvement of energy efficiency and reduction of final energy consumption, both areas in which member states' proposals are quite limited. Final shortfalls remain in land-sector removals, adaptation strategies and fossil-fuel subsidy phase-out.

Even if these ambition gaps were to be addressed on paper, actual implementation is far from guaranteed. Indeed, many NECPs have scarcely integrated Commission recommendations on operational aspects. Most notably, clear financing strategies are often missing. Although several member states have partially addressed recommendations about estimating total investment needs, various plans do not provide the financial resources needed to address specific sectors. In some cases, such as Czechia, Denmark, Finland and Portugal, investment projections are entirely missing. Italy's updated NECP already offered a mixed picture and its national **assessments** showed the majority of the recommendations being only partially addressed. Italy plans to cut total emissions by 49 per cent in 2030 compared with 1990 levels, but it is expected to fall short of its Effort Sharing Regulation obligation, which prescribes the target for non-ETS sectors: instead of the required 43.7 per cent, Italy projects only a 40.6 per cent decrease. Renewable expansion depicts a brighter situation, although with a reduced ambition in comparison to the originally submitted draft. Indeed, installed renewable capacity has grown significantly in recent years (+13.2 GW in 2023–2024 combined), but the updated NECP lowered the share of renewables in gross final energy consumption to 39.4 per cent, compared to the 40.5 per cent described by the previous version. The NECP target of an additional 70 GW by 2030 could become unfeasible without enabling policies, especially since new installations **slowed** in the first part of 2025. Indeed, the Commission highlights that criteria for defining unsuitable areas for installation are unclear, potentially leading to bottlenecks for the announced deployment. On energy security, the Commission judged Italy's plan to replace Russian gas feasible, noting planned additional imports from Angola, Egypt and the Republic of the Congo alongside already established supply channels from Qatar and Algeria. Nonetheless, ongoing tensions around methane regulation increase medium-term **uncertainty**. The Commission has also urged Italy to strengthen demand-response measures and energy-storage strategies to better withstand potential shocks.

The Commission still hopes that the situation will improve with the just-introduced tools of the Clean Industrial Deal. Measures such as the Affordable Energy plan, the sectorial strategic action plans and more importantly the new State Aid Framework (CISAF), all announced after submission of the plans, will permit resources to be mobilised and allow measures not considered in member states' plans. However, quantifying their potential impact remains difficult. Nonetheless, member states should reconsider mid- and long-term planning and coordination among themselves, particularly because the next NEPC round will be due only in January 2028. Indeed, new state-aid rules will require stronger EU coordination, as

without precautions, they risk triggering a “subsidy race” between member states. Member states have already overcome fears that increased freedom for state-aid would have endangered the Single Market. Indeed, the necessities of the pandemic and the energy crisis led to the adoption of the temporary state-aid [framework](#) and then of the temporary crisis and transition [framework](#), facilitating national schemes to support industries. The [State Aid Scoreboard 2024](#), published on 8 April, illustrates the scale of this newfound flexibility, as well as the unevenness of recent state support. In 2023, in nominal terms, Germany was the largest spender (EUR 50.59 billion, around 27.1 per cent of total EU27 state aid), followed by France (EUR 36.43 billion, 19.5 per cent) and Italy (EUR 21.61 billion, 11.6 per cent). At the other end of the spectrum, Estonia, Latvia and Cyprus accounted for roughly 0.19, 0.16 and 0.1 per cent, respectively. The temporary state-aid framework and the temporary crisis and transition framework were, as their names imply, emergency and provisional tools with limited duration. In the absence of a new standard and non-emergency state-aid framework some member states began devising their own national schemes. In May, Germany unveiled a [plan](#) to lower electricity prices for industrial consumers by around 5 cents per kilowatt-hour, combining an energy tax cut and reduced grid fees, which was largely regarded as incompatible with EU rules on state subsidies.

On 25 June 2025, the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework (CISAF) was adopted. CISAF amends its predecessor and establishes itself as the “new normal” for industrial state aid, remaining in force until 31 December 2030. It outlines the conditions under which the Commission will approve national aid schemes for investments in clean industry, while also accelerating authorisation procedures for individual measures. A main focus is placed on strengthening Europe’s manufacturing capacity for clean technologies, in terms of both final products and key components, in line with the Net-Zero Industry Act. Among other innovations, the framework effectively normalised the German proposal by granting all member states the option to compensate energy-intensive industries for high electricity costs. The new framework covers both support for the rapid deployment of clean energy and relief on electricity costs. In particular, it allows for temporary price reductions for energy-intensive industries, enabling national governments to lower up to 50 per cent of the annual average wholesale electricity price, provided it does not fall below a minimum threshold of €50 per MWh. CISAF also introduces conditionality and compensation mechanisms to ensure alignment with the green transition. Beneficiaries of these measures will be required to reinvest at least 50 per cent of the aid in projects that reduce emissions or enhance energy efficiency. Another safeguard prohibits making aid conditional on the relocation of industrial activities from one European Economic Area country to the one offering support. This provision comes at a moment of heightened tension over inter-EU competition, as recently underscored by France’s accusations of [tax dumping](#) against Italy. CISAF also extends to schemes supporting specific Innovation Fund projects and initiatives aimed at de-risking private investments linked to the Clean Industrial Deal, through instruments such as loans or guarantees.

Nuclear power is also receiving attention following the publication, on 12 June 2025, of the Commission’s eighth nuclear illustrative programme ([PINC](#)). The document maps the evolution of the European nuclear sector considering the innovation planned by the NECPs, which hint at a stronger than previously anticipated expansion of nuclear capacity. Current EU nuclear capacity stands at 98 GWe, already exceeding the previous PINC projection of 80 GWe by 2025. Looking ahead to 2050, the Commission’s baseline scenario foresees an increase

to around 109 GWe. This is due to both the lifespan extension of current reactors and new installed capacity, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe (notably in [Hungary](#) and the [Czech Republic](#)). However, if currently active reactors' lifetime is extended and all planned projects proceed, capacity could rise to as much as 144 GWe. Attention is also increasing around small and advanced modular reactors, not only for electricity generation but also for hybrid energy systems, such as district heating and hydrogen production. The Commission also presented its dedicated [EU Fusion Strategy](#) to support [ITER](#), the project aiming to develop industrially usable fusion technologies. The project however remains largely behind schedule despite partial [breakthroughs](#).

In parallel to these ambitions, there seems to be more space for cooperation, signalling a shifting attitude. Notably, on 1 September, the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors - the platform to coordinate public and private actors to facilitate support for SMR projects - has adopted its Strategic Action Plan. The Plan covers Initiatives over the next five years, highlighting key actions like revitalising the supply chain, promoting R&D and skills development and unlocking financial opportunities. Looking at individual member states, France, has increasingly [bonded](#) with Germany, despite Berlin's completed phase-out and previous anti-nuclear stance. Indeed, signs of a German policy shift have surfaced, with Economy and Energy Minister Robert Reiche [attending](#) a recent meeting of pro-nuclear countries to discuss potential cooperation. The group, which has recently expanded to include [Italy](#), counts now in total 13 member states in support of nuclear development. The favourable conjuncture for the pro-nuclear bloc is weighed down by the largely unaddressed role of dependency on Russia. Differently from natural gas and oil, the approach to the phase-out of Russian influence over the nuclear sector has been more gradual. Commissioner Jørgensen's [proposal](#) to make Russian enriched uranium "[economically unattractive](#)" by imposing tariffs was ultimately abandoned. [Dependency](#) remains high: in 2023, 38 per cent of enriched uranium consumed in the EU still came from Moscow. Dependency is particularly severe in member states operating Soviet-era reactors, such as Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary, which maintain close ties with Russia's state-owned Rosatom. The PINC emphasises the urgency of diversifying supply, recommending the renewal and renegotiation of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with reliable partners such as Canada and Kazakhstan, but Kazatomprom remains largely tied with Rosatom and increasingly with the [China General Nuclear Power Corporation](#). Russian influence also extends beyond fuel supply. Indeed, Hungary's planned Paks II nuclear power plant, which would add 2400 MW of capacity to the Hungarian power system, is being developed by Rosatom under a 2014 deal, financed largely through a €10 billion Russian state loan. Despite longstanding concerns voiced by the EU and the United States, the project continues to advance. In June, the Trump administration even lifted [sanctions](#) that had blocked certain companies from participating.

The capacity of the EU to deliver a coherent energy strategy is further complicated by the political fractures inside the European Parliament. The European People's Party (EPP) is increasingly clashing with its allies in the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), over their willingness to cooperate with the right spectrum of the Parliament, specifically the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) and the Patriots for Europe (PfE), whose [influence](#) over key climate legislation has grown markedly. Indeed, the EPP leaned heavily towards the ECR and the PfE for support when establishing a new body tasked with scrutinising European funding, including Green Deal-related resources, to NGOs. This prompted liberals,

socialists and greens to demand clarity on the EPP's "red lines" in cooperating with the far-right. The fragility of the coalition appeared in full display on 7 July, when von der Leyen faced a motion of [censure](#), which although spearheaded by the ECR, saw centrist, centre-left and Green MEPs expressing frustration with the Commission, even if ultimately backing up her in the vote. The attempt of no confidence, which ultimately failed, was initiated due to perceived ambiguities over von der Leyen's exchanges with Pfizer's CEO during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The socialists refused to endorse a motion initiated by the far-right but used the occasion to signal their [discontent](#) with the Commission's rightward drift and the EPP's overtures to the ECR. The Commission survived comfortably, with 360 votes against the motion, 175 in favour and 18 abstentions (out of 553 MEPs present). However, the motion stressed how much the EPP could ask its allies to endure, while continuing to secure their support in future confidence tests. It is far from clear whether this balance will hold as new [motions](#) of censure have been proposed respectively by the far-right and the extreme left.

3. REGULATORY STREAMLINING OR DEREGULATION?

A changed approach to the Green Deal has also impacted other debated regulations and directives, which were already approved during the first von der Leyen Commission. As most are going through a simplification process (see Green Deal Watch issues 15 and 16), several environmental groups **fear** this may result in the watering down of some of the most critical legislation. A few **member states** (particularly Czechia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) have indeed **asked** the Commission to include the **Regulation** on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector in the ongoing simplification process. Indeed, it remains to be seen if the attempt to cut red tape related to environmental legislation will be merely a simplification or a full blown deregulation - with some posing this question when looking at the **Omnibus Simplification Package**, which primarily bundles together reporting requirements related to the sustainability reporting (CSRD), sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), and the EU Taxonomy and makes some previously mandatory reporting voluntary for small and medium-sized companies. The expansion of this simplification approach to methane emissions rules was already being **considered** by the Commission in late April, mostly with the idea of favouring US imports, and it has also been spearheaded by the Polish Presidency, which indeed **proposed** in mid-June to add the Regulation to the Omnibus simplification package.

These propositions come after intense pressure on the Commission by US and EU energy groups, particularly a **November** and a **March** letter from US trade groups, including the US Chamber of Commerce, stating the risks the Regulation poses to US LNG imports into Europe. This development also follows extensive attempts by the Trump administration to **roll back** or cancel air-pollution regulations approved by the Biden presidency; while these changes in the US initially did not **concern** methane emissions, this is rapidly changing – for instance through the recent **delay** in compliance deadlines for oil and gas operators to submit plans for the reduction of methane emissions – and may put additional pressure on the EU as well. While energy groups **underline** the risk posed by overregulation on the security of supply and energy prices for Europe, environmental groups remark the need to uphold the Regulation as it is, because of the major environmental impact of methane emissions. Currently, the Commission is seeming to respond negatively to the pressure of energy groups, as it recently **stated** during US-EU trade talks that no modifications to the methane emissions regulation are expected. On the same occasion, the Commission however signalled its openness to flexibility in implementation, particularly for reporting duties. Considering the significant uncertainty in EU and US relations, and given that details about the energy trade

deal between the two are still being discussed, no final word can be said on this matter.

In the past few months, the Commission has also seemed keen to halt two crucial (and quite different) pieces of environmental legislation: the Forest Monitoring Law and the Green Claims Directive. The Forest Monitoring Law was first proposed in November 2023 as part of the EU forest strategy for 2030 and was meant to deliver a critical tool to monitor the health of European forests. This tool would integrate a series of instruments and data, such as forest cover information and biodiversity indicators, but also largely focus on the information provided by the satellite monitoring of the EU Copernicus Programme. It would also propose a system to standardise and harmonise data collected among member states and consolidate them in an identification system mapping forest units, a forest data collection framework, and a forest data sharing framework to disseminate the latter among users and organisations. Building on existing EU instruments (particularly the Copernicus programme), this would have been a relatively cheap but extremely effective tool to provide data on EU policy priorities such as climate change, landscape management or environmental crimes – a tool that is still largely missing, as often data rely on different definitions or collection methods and are hard to evaluate at the European level. The Commission proposed to withdraw the proposal following a change in the Council position, which demanded the deletion of key environmental indicators and the possibility of sharing information across member states and entities. At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether the law will actually go forward, and in what shape.

The Green Claims Directive has followed a similar, yet different, path. The Directive was first proposed in March 2023 to counteract the rising and already widespread use of unsubstantiated claims over the environmental performance of all products sold on the European market. The piece of legislation indeed aims at solving a major issue: according to the Commission, more than half of green claims have vague or misleading information, and half of green labels offer little verification. Negotiations over the legislation have been steady since its proposal, and the Directive was supposed to go through its third (and last) round of trilogue negotiations on 23 June. However, a week before that date the EPP published a letter addressed to Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy, Jessika Roswall, requesting the reconsideration and ultimately withdrawal of the proposal, which the group considered excessively burdensome for companies and against the current simplification trajectory of EU policies. Shortly thereafter, the Commission complied with the request and announced in a press conference that it was withdrawing the proposal, also cancelling the third round of trilogues. Following criticisms from several MEPs, the Commission clarified that it has not yet withdrawn the proposal, but would do so if microenterprises were not excluded from the Regulation. This statement has however been the subject of further criticism, as Rapporteur Sandro Gozi said that the mandate of the Parliament already included the exclusion of micro enterprises, and the issue would not then justify the cancellation of the trilogue meeting and the withdrawal of the proposal. Also in this case it is not clear yet if the proposal for the Directive will actually go forward, and when.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has also been part of this simplification rampage of the Commission. On 14 May, the Commission indeed proposed a second “simplification package” for the CAP, following another enacted in 2024 to address farmers’ protests. This set of new rules mixes support to farmers (particularly smallholders and organic farmers) with a general relaxation of environmental standards that could bring mixed results. Among the provisions, the proposal doubles the current lump-sum payment ceiling for smallholders receiving CAP support (from 1,250 to 2,500 euros), limits the checks national officers can perform on small farms to one per year, and introduces automatic compliance with certain standards and environmental regulations for organic farms. The proposal however also includes a downgrading of several environmental provisions, which is in stark contrast with previous attempts to reduce the environmental impact of CAP subsidies (often destined to intensive or high-impact agriculture). Among other downgrades, the proposal doubles the amount of grassland farmers can degrade before having to perform restoration activities, weakens the protection of water bodies and rivers (particularly from pollution), and suggests that farmers could receive subsidies even for basic compliance with existing regulations protecting peatlands and other key ecosystems. Furthermore, this simplification package proposes to cancel the CAP Strategic Plan review mechanisms meant to coordinate national plans with the EU legislation; these were meant to align with new Green Deal regulations, and some analysts believe this to be a political sign to guarantee that no further legislation will be proposed touching CAP-related matters for this policy cycle (ending in 2027). The proposal also assigns further discretion in the application of rules to member states. This downgrade of the CAP could be however a compensation for the remarkable cut in CAP budget that the Commission presented in July to cover the 2028–2034 cycle, slashing it from the circa 386 billion for the previous period, to the 300 billion currently proposed. In this sense, the position the European Parliament adopted on the future of the CAP in September is largely close to the Commission proposal, and it is a strong sign that this is likely the direction trilogue negotiations will proceed in the next months.

In the meantime, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has undergone relevant action. The European Parliament and the Council indeed reached a provisional agreement over the simplification of the mechanism in June 2025, which was then finalised on 10 September. The amendment was included in the Omnibus I package in February 2025, and already at that time Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Wopke Hoekstra stated that more than 80 per cent of EU companies affected by the Regulation would become exempt. This seems to be indeed the case, as MEP Antonio Decaro, rapporteur for the deal, recently stated that 90 per cent of importers of CBAM goods have been exempted. The simplification included a few technical details, but the main change concerns the introduction of a so called “de minimis mass threshold”, which requires only companies exceeding 50 tonnes of imports per year to comply with the mechanism. According to MEPs, this will not affect the climate ambition of CBAM, as 99 per cent of CO₂ emissions from key sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers and iron) will still be included in the mechanism. While maintaining a strong contribution to climate action, according to Commission’s estimates it will nonetheless benefit some 182,000 enterprises (of the total 200,000 that are involved in the CBAM).

In addition the Commission has also advanced other key Green Deal legislation. This is the case for the Net Zero Industrial Act (NZIA), which witnessed the publication of a communication and four pieces of secondary legislation on 23 May 2025. The documents contain extensive and key details for the NZIA, which were much awaited by the green tech sector; among other details, they lay out the specific components that will be subject to the NZIA and define the elements for a “consistent selection process” to choose net-zero technology manufacturing initiatives eligible for the status of “strategic project” proposed by the Act. They also introduce a system hosted on the Commission website to provide guidance on the selection process. The most important element is however the adoption of rules for the so-called “non-price criteria”; the Act indeed introduced the use of variables covering topics such as business conduct and cybersecurity, although sustainability and resilience contributions will likely be the most relevant. These rules have the potential of playing a significant role, as they should be applied to at least 30 per cent of auction volumes (or 6 GW per year) in each member state. The “resilience” criterion is particularly relevant since it will refer to projects having a “direct impact on the Union’s supply chain security, energy independence, or strategic autonomy”, and will be activated automatically when more than 50 per cent of the components originate outside the EU (but only if these components belong to the list published in June). This is meant to avoid excessive dependency on individual suppliers for crucial products for the transition. These criteria will be applied both as pre-selection and award criteria, either favouring access or granting additional points to bidders respecting these principles. The hope by many in the solar and other industries is that this will represent the much-awaited tool to favour the still-struggling European supply chains, while for civil society this could be the chance to include instances related to ecosystem protection and impact on local communities.

IN DEPTH

This interview has been realised through written questions by IAI, followed by written replies from the Minister which have not been edited.

INTERVIEW

GILBERTO

PICHETTO FRATIN

MINISTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT
AND ENERGY SECURITY OF ITALY

The Clean Industrial Deal launched by the Commission represents the EU's new attempt to promote industrial competitiveness while preserving climate protection. What is Italy's position on the proposed measures and initiatives?

At the beginning of its term, our government was among the first to propose a different and more realistic path compared to the ideological environmentalism that had characterised the Green Deal. We did this with green homes and cars, for example, by asking our European partners, the Commission, the Council and individual Member States a very simple question: is the goal - zero emissions - more important or are the means to reach it? At a certain point, we began to suspect that for many, the means had become more important than achieving the goal. What made you "suspicious"? We were sure about green cars. And we remain absolutely convinced today: electric cars will be the engine of the future, but politics cannot decide fifteen years in advance what scientific research will deliver. Today, we already have hydrogen-powered trains and internal combustion engines ready to run on biofuels. In short, promotes sustainability that is not only environmental but also economic and social. The goals we have agreed on remain unchanged, but the paths and methods must be different, just as the needs of European businesses and families differ, - those in Denmark are not the same as those in Italy.

Climate policy is becoming increasingly polarised in the EU and in Member States, including Italy. What can be done at national and local level to ensure a fair and rapid transition that enjoys the necessary consensus and leaves no one behind?

As Mario Draghi himself suggested, the next revision of the CO2 Emissions Regulation should follow a technologically neutral approach and take stock of developments in technology markets. We cannot be guided by ideology but by economic, social and scientific reality. And There is nothing "rapid"

about it, if by rapid we mean the wave of a magic wand that can erase the consequences of mistakes made over years or decades. Short-term measures are needed alongside medium- and long-term ones. This is why we have included mitigation and adaptation actions in our National Climate Change Adaptation Plan. And we also need an ideological change: without new-generation nuclear power, while we wait for fusion energy, we will never be able to achieve the climate targets set by the Member States. Energy and climate are two sides of the same coin.

With Europe's growing interest in the Mediterranean, Italy's role is becoming increasingly central. What can be done in the energy and climate sectors to shape a more effective and integrated Euro-Mediterranean partnership?

This is exactly what we are doing with the Mattei Plan, an ambitious project that aims to strengthen strategic cooperation between Italy and African countries through equal partnerships. The goal is to promote sustainable and lasting local development in key sectors such as energy, agriculture, education, health and infrastructure. With the Mattei Plan, Italy is consolidating its central role as a bridge between Europe and Africa. At the same time, our country is diversifying its energy supply sources, making Italy and Europe more secure.

Recent global trade tensions have raised concerns about the feasibility of achieving European industrial net-zero emissions targets. What are the main consequences for Italy, particularly with regard to the supply of clean technologies?

Just a few days ago, I attended the Environment Council meeting in Brussels, which was called to decide on the proposal to reach 90% of the 2050 climate targets already by 2040. The serious international crisis we are facing requires us to reflect realistically and pragmatically. We have a duty to respond to our citizens with joint actions that do not undermine the commitments we have made, but that look to the future through serious economic planning. We cannot ask our businesses to compete globally with stricter rules without adequate financial instruments. We cannot ask citizens to bear the cost of the transition without guarantees on energy accessibility. Without a coherent European system and effective protections, the transition risks fuelling inequalities and divisions rather than strengthening the Union.

AP- PEN- DIX

TIME LINE

This timeline highlights the main elements proposed by the Commission under the umbrella of the Green Deal since the re-election of Ursula Von Der Leyen in July 2024. Previous activities are listed under the “Timeline Archive”, available at the end of this report.

The lists are not exhaustive, but aim to provide an overview of the Commission’s work during these years. The list started as an expanded version of the Commission’s own timeline, available here:

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

10 September 2025

The Parliament adopts [simplifications to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism](#).

9 September 2025

The Parliament adopts new EU rules on [design, reuse and recycling in the automotive sector](#).

The Parliament adopts new EU rules to [reduce textile and food waste](#).

8 July 2025

The Commission publishes a [new EU methodology for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels](#).

2 July 2025

The Commission presents [a new 2040 climate target](#) amending EU Climate Law.

17 June 2025

The Commission proposes gradual [phase-out of Russian gas and oil imports](#) into the EU.

5 June 2025

The Commission adopts the [European Ocean Pact](#).

4 June 2025

The Commission adopts the [European Water Resilience Strategy](#).

20 May 2025

The Commission announces almost [€1 billion investment towards renewable hydrogen](#).

14 May 2025

The Commission proposes a [simplification of the Common Agricultural Policy](#).

6 May 2025

The Commission presents its [roadmap](#) towards ending Russian energy imports

3 April 2025

European Parliament votes to [delay](#) the application of sustainability and due diligence reporting rules

19 March 2025

The Commission presented the [Action Plan on Steel and Metals](#).

5 March 2025

The Commission presented the [Action Plan on the Future of the Automotive Sector](#).

The Commission proposed to prolong the [Gas Storage Regulation](#) until the end of 2027.

4 March 2025

The Commission President launched the [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Steel Sector](#).

26 February 2025

The Commission presented the [Clean Industrial Deal](#), aimed at accelerating decarbonisation while securing the future of manufacturing in Europe.

The Commission adopted a proposal for the [Omnibus Package](#), providing simplification in the field of sustainability and EU investment programmes.

30 January 2025

The Commission launched the [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry](#).

29 January 2025

The Commission presented the [Competitiveness Compass](#).

14 January 2025

The Commission published an independent [study](#) detailing the net-zero manufacturing industry landscape in Europe and a [Regulation](#) on the verification of CO2 emissions for heavy-duty vehicles.

9 January 2025

The Commission President established 14 [Project Groups](#) chaired by Members of the College to ensure coordination on political priorities.

1 January 2025

[Poland](#) assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

18 December 2024

The Council formally adopted the regulation on the one-year postponement of the application of the [EU Deforestation law](#).
The Commission President announced the launch of a [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry in Europe](#).

17 December 2024

The Council affirmed its position on a [Regulation](#) for the prevention of plastic pellet losses.

16 December 2024

The Council formally adopted a [Regulation](#) on packaging and packaging waste and approved [conclusions](#) on promoting geothermal energy.

12 December 2024

The Energy Community Ministerial Council adopted the first [Projects of Energy Community Interest](#).

9 December 2024

The Council approved [conclusions](#) on the post-2027 CAP.

6 December 2024

The Commission finalised negotiations with four Mercosur countries for an EU-Mercosur partnership [agreement](#).

5 December 2024

The Commission launched the [European Board on Agriculture and Food](#).

The [16th Citizens' Energy Forum](#) took place in Budapest, kickstarting the Commission's work on developing the Citizens Energy Package.

3 December 2024

The Commission established the [cap](#) on emission allowances under the ETS2 for 2027.

The Commission earmarked €4.6 [billion](#) for two calls for proposals to accelerate the deployment of decarbonisation technologies and announced a new [partnership](#) with the European Investment Bank to support investments in the battery manufacturing sector.

1 December 2024

The [Commission 2024-2029](#) took office.

24 November 2024

The Commission and EU Member States [negotiated](#) a New Collective Quantified Goal for Climate Finance at COP29, broadening the global contributor base.

19 November 2024

The Council adopted a new regulation on ESG rating [activities](#) and greenlighted the [proposal](#) for an EU certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and storage.

The [2024 Carbon Market Report](#) showed that carbon pricing drove emissions from power and industry installation to a 16,5% reduction in 2023.

14 November 2024

The Parliament agreed to the one-year [postponement](#) of the Deforestation Regulation.

12 November 2024

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Stéphane [Séjourné](#) (Prosperity and Industrial Strategy) and Teresa [Ribera](#) (Clean, Just and Competitive Transition).

The Commission [launched](#) a new Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap at COP29.

8 November 2024

The Council released the [Budapest Declaration](#) on the New European Competitiveness Deal.

7 November 2024

The Commission launched an [Ecodesign Forum](#) to accelerate progress on sustainable products.

The Parliament conducted the confirmation hearings of Commissioner-designate Wopke [Hoekstra](#) (Climate, Net-Zero and Clean Growth)

5 November 2024

The Council adopted the [Construction Products Regulation](#) and

called for swift [implementation](#) of the EU's regulatory framework for renewable hydrogen.

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Dan [Jørgensen](#) (Energy and Housing) and Jessika [Roswall](#) (Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy).

4 November 2024

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Christophe [Hansen](#) (Agriculture and Food) and Apostolos [Tzitzikostas](#) (Sustainable Transport and Tourism).

29 October 2024

The Commission [imposed](#) duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China for a period of five years.

22 October 2024

The European Parliament [approved](#) the reform of Single European Sky rules for a more efficient and greener airspace.

16 October 2024

The Council [agreed](#) to postpone the implementation of the Deforestation Regulation by one year.

The Commission adopted a delegated act [clarifying](#) the inclusion of offshore vessels in the emissions monitoring system.

The European Network for Transmission System Operators for Gas's annual winter supply outlook [confirmed](#) the security of gas supplies for the upcoming winter and summer season.

14 October 2024

The Council [asked](#) the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide action plan against desertification, land degradation and drought.

8 October 2024

The Council [approved](#) conclusions on climate finance ahead of COP29.

2 October 2024

The Commission [proposed](#) a one-year postponement of the application of the EU Deforestation Regulation and [published](#) an international cooperation framework to support stakeholders in the implementation.

27 September 2024

The Commission [launched](#) a consultation on the draft methodology for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels and published the final Terms and Conditions for its second auction for the production of renewable hydrogen via the Innovation Fund.

17 September 2024

The Commissioners-designate are [announced](#)

11 September 2024

The EU Governance Regulation report [shows](#) that the EU has a comprehensive integrated legal framework and tools in place to meet its decarbonisation goals.

9 September 2024

The Draghi Report on “The future of European competitiveness” is [published](#)

30 August 2024

New monitoring rules [agreed](#) for the EU ETS.

22 July 2024

The Council [renews](#) economic sanctions for a further 6 months towards Russia.

18 July 2024

The Parliament [re-elects](#) Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President. The new Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation [enters](#) into force.

TIMELINE

ARCHIVE

2019-2024

27 June 2024

The EU [notifies](#) its withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty.

24 June 2024

The EU [adopts](#) 14th package of sanctions against Russia for war against Ukraine.

17 June 2024

The Council [gives](#) final green light to Nature restoration law.

30 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) final approval to right-to-repair directive.

29 May 2024

The Commission [hosts](#) the first General Assembly of the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors.

28 May 2024

The EU and Australia [sign](#) partnership on sustainable critical and strategic mineral.

27 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the ecodesign regulation.

The Council [gives](#) final approval to the net-zero industry act.

24 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the corporate sustainability due diligence regulation.

24 April 2024

Parliament approves a review of the [Common Agriculture Policy \(CAP\) Strategic Plans Regulation](#) and the [CAP Horizontal Regulation](#).

12 April 2024

The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive [is formally adopted](#).

11 April 2024

Parliament [adopts reform](#) of the EU electricity market.

10 April 2024

The Parliament [adopts](#) new law to reduce emissions from energy sector, especially methane emissions.

12 March 2024

The Commission publishes the [Communication on managing climate risks in Europe](#) as a response to the first ever European Climate Risk Assessment.

4 March 2024

The Council reaches [political agreement](#) on a recommendation to continue coordinated demand-reduction to secure sufficient gas storage for next winter

20 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on EU-wide certification scheme for carbon removals.

Political [agreement](#) on new air quality standards in the EU

19 February 2024

European Hydrogen Bank pilot [auction](#): 132 bids received from 17 European countries.

8 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) to ban all remaining intentional uses of toxic mercury in the EU.

6 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on the Net-Zero Industry Act.

The Commission adopts an EU Industrial Carbon Management [Strategy](#), setting out how to sustainably capture, store and use CO₂.

Commission [presents recommendation](#) for 2040 emissions reduction target to set the path to climate neutrality in 2050.

31 January 2024

Commission [proposes](#) to allow EU farmers to derogate for one year from certain agricultural rules.

25 January 2024

The Commission launches [Strategic dialogue](#) on the future of EU agriculture

19 December 2023

Council approves Commission's proposals to [prolong energy emergency measures](#).

18 December 2023

Commission publishes the [assessments](#) of the 21 member states which submitted updated draft National Energy and Climate Plans.

8 December 2023

Council and the Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package](#), establishing common internal market rules for renewable and natural gases and hydrogen. The agreement also proposes the creation of the European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH).

7 December 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional political agreement on the [Energy Performance of Buildings Directive \(EPBD\)](#).

Council adopts negotiating positions on [Net-Zero Industry Act](#) and proposes an expanded list of ten strategic net-zero technologies.

28 November 2023

Commission proposes to [prolong energy emergency measures](#) by 12 months.

Commission proposes the [Electricity Grid Action Plan](#) and publishes the [sixth list of key infrastructural energy projects](#).

23 November 2023

Commission presents the first pilot auction [under the European Hydrogen Bank](#) for a total of €800 million of subsidies for renewable hydrogen production.

22 November 2023

Commission proposes a new [forest monitoring law](#) to improve resilience of European forests.

16 November 2023

Council adopts [EU position for COP28](#) and stresses that it will call for a “phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.

Council and European Parliament reach provisional agreement on a [proposed EU law](#) that would improve the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes.

15 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Regulation on Methane Emissions Reduction in the Energy Sector](#), agreeing on deadlines for monitoring, reporting and inspection of sources of methane emissions.

13 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional agreement on the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#).

9 November 2023

Parliament and Council reach agreement on [Nature Restoration Law](#). Member states will put in place restoration measures in at least 20 per cent of the EU's land areas and 20 per cent of its seas by 2030.

24 October

Commission presents the [European Wind Power Action Plan](#).

Commission publishes the [2023 State of the Energy Union Report](#).

17 October 2023

Council adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#). The Council agrees that two-way contracts for difference will be the mandatory model used when public funding is involved in long-term contracts.

5 October 2023

European Parliament [approves](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action and Maroš Šefčovič as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal.

14 September 2023

European Parliament adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#) and Critical Raw Materials ([CRM](#)) Act.

13 September 2023

Ursula von der Leyen delivers State of the European Union [speech](#); European Parliament adopts negotiating position on recast of the Clean Air Directive.

12 September 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) amendments to Renewable Energy Directive (RED III).

29 August 2023

Ursula von der Leyen [proposes](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action.

22 August 2023

Frans Timmermans [resigns](#) as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal; Maroš Šefčovič is appointed as new Executive Vice-President and Acting Commissioner for Climate Action.

19 July 2023

Beginning of trilogues on nature restoration law; ITRE Committee [adopts](#) report on electricity market reform.

12 July 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) negotiating position on nature restoration law.

11 July 2023

Commission presents Greening Freight Transport **Package**; Parliament adopts agreement on recast of Energy Efficiency Directive; European Parliament **adopts** negotiating position on Industrial Emissions Directive.

7 July 2023

Commission **presents** a proposal for coordinated withdrawal from Energy Charter Treaty.

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **tender** for joint gas purchases.

27 June 2023

Amended version of the Nature Restoration Law does not reach the **majority** in the Environment Committee; final vote sent to plenary.

26 June 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **round** of demand pooling for joint gas purchases by EU companies.

20 June 2023

The Commission publishes the two delegated **acts** defining the rules for the production of renewable hydrogen.

16 June 2023

EU ambassadors reach political deal to **approve** the Renewable Energy Directive (REDIII).

8 June 2023

European Parliament reaches political **agreement** to approve the Nature Restoration Law after facing opposition from MEPs of the European People's Party (EPP).

16 May 2023

25 gas supplying companies **respond** to EU's joint gas demand, providing more than 13.4 bcm of gas.

After being approved by the European Parliament, the CBAM enters into **force**.

The EU Deforestation-free Regulation (**EUDR**) is adopted by the Council after its adoption by the Parliament and thus enter into force.

15 May 2023

EU Member States **agree** to raise renewable target from 32% to 42.5% by 2030.

4 May 2023

First joint gas **purchase** attracts demand from more than 65 EU companies.

26 April 2023

The European Parliament and the Council reach a political [agreement](#) on the ReFuelEU Aviation proposal

25 April 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches first [call](#) for companies to jointly buy gas

Council [adopts](#) key pieces of legislation delivering on 2030 climate targets: Revision of the ETS Directive; Amendment of the MRV shipping Regulation; Revision of the ETS Aviation Directive; Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund; Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

21 April 2023

The Commission proposes a [revision](#) to the existing marketing standards of agri-food products

18 April 2023

The European Parliament [approves](#) the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

30 March 2023

European Green Deal: EU agrees [stronger legislation](#) to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy.

28 March 2023

Member states [agree](#) to extend voluntary 15% gas demand reduction target.

28 March 2023

EU ministers sign off on [legislation](#) phasing out sales of new polluting cars and vans by 2035.

16 March 2023

Proposal for a [European Hydrogen Bank](#).

16 March 2023

EU proposes the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#), a comprehensive set of actions to ensure the EU's access to a secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

16 March 2023

EU releases [Net Zero Industry Act](#) establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem.

14 February 2023

The Commission proposed [new CO2 emissions targets](#) for new heavy-duty vehicles from 2030 onwards. These targets will help to reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.

13 February 2023

The Commission proposed [rules](#) to define what constitutes renewable hydrogen in the EU, with the adoption of two Delegated Acts required under the Renewable Energy Directive.

1 February 2023

The Commission presented a [Green Deal Industrial Plan](#) to enhance the competitiveness of Europe's net-zero industry and support the fast transition to climate neutrality.

24 January 2023

The European Commission introduces the revision of the [EU Pollinators Initiative](#).

18 December 2022

The European Commission welcomed the [provisional agreement](#) reached with the European Parliament and Council to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, apply emissions trading to new sectors for effective economy-wide climate action, and establish a Social Climate Fund.

9 December 2022

The Commission welcomed the deal reached between the European Parliament and the Council to help make the aviation sector 'Fit for 55', setting in law its contribution to our target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

6 December 2022

EU agrees [law](#) to fight global deforestation and forest degradation driven by EU production and consumption and the a political agreement is reached on the revision of the EU Emission Trading System rules on aviation.

30 November 2022

The Commission proposed new EU-wide [rules](#) on packaging, to tackle this constantly growing source of waste and of consumer frustration.

24 November 2022

During the extraordinary Council for Energy, EU energy ministers agreed on a Council [Regulation](#) "enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks", as well as on a Regulation speeding up permits to deploy renewable energies.

27 October 2022

The Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans.

26 October 2022

Commission proposes stronger [rules](#) for cleaner air and water, including

PFAs, several pesticides, bisphenol A and some pharmaceuticals.

15 September 2022

Commission proposes for an [emergency market intervention](#) to reduce energy bills for Europeans, through reduced demand and a revenue cap on some producers (among other measures).

20 July 2022

Commission proposes a "[Save gas for a safe winter](#)" plan to reduce gas consumption until the following spring.

22 June 2022

Commission launches a [Nature protection package](#), focusing on restoring ecosystems and halving pesticide use by 2030.

18 May 2022

Commission launches the [REPowerEU plan](#), a set of measures triggered by the invasion of Ukraine and focusing on energy saving, supply diversification and the promotion of renewables.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes two [Regulations](#) to phase down fluorinated greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes an [update](#) to the Industrial Emissions Directive, to modernise EU industrial emissions rules to steer large industry in long-term green transition.

30 March 2022

Commission launches [Proposals](#) to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, boost circular business models and empower consumers for the green transition, as part of the Circular Economy Action Plan.

23 March 2022

Following the REPowerEU Communication, Commission publishes [options](#) to mitigate high energy prices through common gas purchases and minimum gas storage obligations.

8 March 2022

As a direct response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Commission publishes the [REPowerEU Communication](#) focused on energy prices, storage and diversification.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a set of [proposals](#) for a new EU framework to decarbonise gas markets, promote hydrogen and reduce methane emissions, namely a Directive and a Regulation.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a [Communication](#) on Sustainable Carbon Cycles, to remove, recycle and sustainably store carbon, which will be followed by a proposal for a regulatory framework by the end of 2022.

14 December 2021

Commission launches a new transport [proposal](#) targeting greater efficiency measures.

17 November 2021

Commission [proposes](#) two Regulations and a Strategy to stop deforestation, innovate sustainable waste management and make soils healthy.

15 September 2021

Commission publishes a Communication launching the project [New European Bauhaus](#), focusing on initiatives and funding dedicated to energy efficiency in buildings.

14 July 2021

Commission adopts a large [package](#) of proposals to achieve a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030. The comprehensive package deals with revision of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, a ReFuelEU Aviation Initiative (on air transport), a Regulation on Land Use, Forestry and Agriculture, a proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.

17 May 2021

Commission proposes a [Communication](#) on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU.

12 May 2021

Commission adopts a [Zero Pollution Action Plan](#) for Air, Water and Soil, to improve quality standards for all three, and reduce the impact on health, among other goals.

25 March 2021

Commission publishes an [Organic Action Plan](#) as part of its Farm-to-Fork strategy.

24 February 2021

Commission adopts a new [EU strategy on adaptation](#) to climate change.

18 January 2021

Commission first launches the design of the [New European Bauhaus initiative](#), dedicated to energy efficiency in building.

10 December 2020

Commission proposes an upgrade on the legislation on batteries, also trying to boost the [European Battery Alliance](#), launched in 2017.

9 December 2020

Commission launches a [European Climate Pact](#), to spread awareness and increase the involvement of citizens.

19 November 2020

Commission presents an [Offshore Renewable Energy strategy](#), aimed at increasing the current 12 GW capacity to a minimum of 60 GW by 2030 and 300 GW by 2050.

14 October 2020

Commission publishes three significant elements for the Green Deal: a [Renovation Wave](#) initiative on energy efficiency for building, a [Methane Strategy](#) focused on decarbonised gases, and a [Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability](#) to strengthen legislation on hazardous chemicals.

17 September 2020

Commission presents its [2030 Climate Target Plan](#), raising its ambition to reach a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030.

8 July 2020

Commission adopts [EU strategies](#) for energy system integration and hydrogen to pave the way towards a fully decarbonised, more efficient and interconnected energy sector.

20 May 2020

Commission presents two key strategies: its [EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030](#), and its [Farm-to-Fork Strategy](#) to make food systems more sustainable.

11 March 2020

Commission proposes a [Circular Economy Action Plan](#), to expand and integrate previous work on circularity into the Green Deal.

4 March 2020

Commission proposes a [European climate law](#), aimed at reaching climate neutrality by 2050.

14 January 2020

Commission presents two founding elements of the Green Deal: the [European Green Deal Investment Plan](#) and the [Just Transition Mechanism](#).

11 December 2019

Commission presents the [European Green Deal](#).

