


EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

E-newsletter of the European Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks

EU NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PRIORITIES - AN INTERVIEW WITH STEPHAN KLEMENT



Mr. Stephan Klement is the current EU Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (appointed in February 2024), representing the EU commitments against the spread and use of weapons on the international stage. He leads EU diplomacy in multilateral arms control fora and meets with foreign leaders to advance disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Stephan Klement has served as EU Head of Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna between 2019 to 2023. Since 2016 he has also been the Special Advisor for the Iranian nuclear issue in the European External Action Service, Brussels

One of the pillars of the EU role in non-proliferation and disarmament is its strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Do you think it has been effectively implemented? Doesn't it need to be reviewed or updated considering the changing international environment?

Over recent years, the EU's SALW strategy has proved to be a very effective tool. The EU's actions have contributed to preventing and curbing the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to their legal trade worldwide. Nevertheless, the deteriorating security environment and developments in SALW technology require constant adaptation to both new challenges and opportunities.

During the 4th UN conference on the Programme of Action on SALW the EU has proposed the establishment of an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group to address new developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design - including 3-D Printed Weapons. The EU is also pursuing other key objectives: tackle illicit SALW in conflict-affected areas by supporting national capacities to track and trace the origins of illicit SALW and ammunition; enhance the exchange of information between States on identified diversion in order to expose and cut-off arms trafficking channels; and increase States' capacities to perform well-informed risk assessments in the context of arms export control, and promote the gender sensitive approach to SALW-control and promote the role of women in implementation of the Programme of Action as a condition for their effectiveness.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, what can be done to counter Russia's escalating nuclear rhetoric and ensure that it withdraws from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)?

Threats of any use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine are unacceptable. They undermine the NPT regime and disregard Russia's commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. The EU condemned and keeps condemning Russia's actions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in all relevant fora. The ongoing illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) is a sad new development. It is the first time a country has illegally seized a nuclear power plant of its neighbour, which put into serious risk nuclear safety and nuclear security of the plant.

This situation is fraught with potentially severe consequences for Ukraine and beyond, should any serious nuclear incident happen. We highly appreciate and continue to support all diplomatic efforts by Mr. Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, to ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP, including the permanent presence of IAEA experts at the site as well as in Ukraine's other nuclear power plants. DG Grossi's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security and his five principles for avoiding a nuclear accident at the ZNPP must be respected. The EU also provides funding for the IAEA's nuclear security assistance to Ukraine. In the framework of multiple EU actions more than € 3 million was provided to finance, inter alia, the deployment of the IAEA staff at Ukraine's nuclear power plants in early 2023.

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will be held in Geneva from 22 July to 2 August 2024. What does the EU expect from the meeting and what will be its main proposals?

After two review conferences without agreement on an outcome document, we are all aware of the difficulties that the NPT is going through. The EU will continue to work with all States Parties genuinely committed to the NPT with a view to a consensus outcome at this session of the Preparatory Committee. But preserving the NPT's credibility requires that we continue to share honestly and openly our concerns. The EU will therefore continue to press for advancing nuclear disarmament and arms control, urging for concrete work on strategic and nuclear risk reduction. We have already shared in a working paper our proposals to improve transparency and accountability in the review cycle. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the start of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will also figure prominently among our priorities. We will also continue to share our concern regarding certain regional nuclear proliferation files, and support the IAEA's indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. As for the peaceful uses pillar, we will further promote the highest standards of nuclear safety and security.

THE STICKING POINTS OF THE US-SAUDI NUCLEAR DEAL

Following the Trump administration's successful sponsorship of Israel's four bilateral 'Abraham agreements' with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the UAE, the Biden administration has attempted to broker a similar deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia aimed at normalising relations between the two countries. With the Gaza war raging, the prospect of such an agreement, which the Saudis want to include a credible path towards a Palestinian state, now seems remote. Consequently, Washington and Riyadh have decided to work on a bilateral agreement that does not include Israel.

The US has a clear interest in closer ties with Saudi Arabia, not only as part of a broader effort to stabilise the region, but also to prevent China from expanding its influence in the Middle East. However, it will not be easy for Washington to meet the Saudis' demands. First, they demand a credible US defence commitment. However, it is doubtful that Congress will approve a defence treaty if it is not accompanied by the normalisation of relations with Israel. Secondly, the Saudis want the US to provide them with technologically advanced defence equipment, but this would probably be considered contrary to US law, which directs the President to ensure that "a proposed sale or export of defence articles or services to a Middle Eastern country other than Israel... will not adversely affect Israel's qualitative military advantage... over military threats". Third, Saudi Arabia seeks US support and assistance in developing a civilian nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions go back a long way. However, it was not until 2017 that the kingdom launched its National Atomic Energy Programme, which includes the construction of both large nuclear power plants and small modular reactors, as well as the development and control of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The US Congress is unlikely to approve a civil nuclear technology deal with Saudi Arabia unless it is accompanied by a Saudi commitment to forgo enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear material. A widespread concern in the US is that Riyadh wants to develop nuclear expertise so that it can sooner or later build its own nuclear arsenal. This concern is further heightened as a result of statements by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has said that if Iran, the rival regional power, were to build nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would do the same.

Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Academic Advisor at the Institute for World Economics of the Center for Economic and Regional Studies

Latest Publications

[Poland set to bolster its long-range strike capability](#). Zuzanna Gwadera. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). April 2024

[La roca de Sísifo. Pasado, presente y futuro del régimen de no proliferación nuclear](#). Ignacio Cartagena y Vicente Garrido. Bosch Editor. April 2024

[A Tale of Two Systems: Alignment, Divergence and Coordination in EU and US Dual-use Export Controls](#). Mark Bromley & Kolja Brockmann. IAI Papers. May 2024

[How Useful Are Nuclear Weapons in Practice? Case-Study: The War in Ukraine](#). Tom Sauer. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. May 2024

[Arms Supplies to Ukraine: Does the European Arms Export Control System Need Revision?](#). Esther Sabatino. EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper No.89

Network Calls

The University of Leicester is looking for a Research Associate specialized in Nuclear Politics. This role is to provide research assistance on the European Research Council-funded project, "Towards a Third Nuclear Age", led by Principal Investigator Professor Andrew Futter.

More info: [Here](#)

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) seeks two Research Assistants in the field of armament and disarmament to support the work of the Military Expenditure and Arms Production (MILAP) Programme.

More info: [Here](#)

EU NEWS

EU STATEMENT – 4TH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

THE EU STATEMENT AT THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION HIGHLIGHTS THE EU'S COMMITMENT TO PREVENT AND REDUCE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW). THE EU EMPHASISED THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION AT NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS, SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ADDRESS THE RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT OF AMMUNITION. IT ALSO UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF A GENDER-SENSITIVE APPROACH, THE INCLUSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND GUN-RELATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

READ THE FULL STATEMENT: [HERE](#)

NETWORK NEWS

COURSE ON NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT'

THE TWO-DAY "COURSE ON NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT", ORGANISED BY THE RACVIAC - SOUTH EAST EUROPE SECURITY COOPERATION CENTRE IN COLLABORATION WITH THE ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI (IAI), TOOK PLACE ON 18-19 JUNE.

THE IAI, AS A MEMBER OF THE EU NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CONSORTIUM (EUNPDC), A PROJECT SET UP BY THE COUNCIL OF THE EU, IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO ESTABLISHING COOPERATIVE LINKS WITH INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS RACVIAC, WHICH PLAY A KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING STRATEGIC THINKING THROUGH A RANGE OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

THE COURSE, TAUGHT BY PROFESSORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF EUROPEAN THINK-TANKS AND UNIVERSITIES SUCH AS THE IAI, THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) AND LUDOVIKA - UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE IN BUDAPEST, WAS ATTENDED BY STUDENTS, RESEARCHERS, ADMINISTRATORS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

MORE INFO: [HERE](#)

2024 GCSP PRIZE FOR INNOVATION IN GLOBAL SECURITY

THE PRIZE IS DESIGNED TO REACH ACROSS ALL RELEVANT DISCIPLINES AND FIELDS. IT IS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE AND RECOGNISE EXCELLENCE IN CONTRIBUTING TO NEW APPROACHES TO ENHANCING SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL SECURITY. A BROAD RANGE OF PROJECTS COULD QUALIFY FOR CONSIDERATION, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL INNOVATIONS, ORIGINAL RESEARCH OR GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES.

THE WINNERS (FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD PLACE) WILL BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY DURING AN EVENT TO BE HELD IN NOVEMBER 2024. THE PRIZE FOR THE APPLICATION COMING IN FIRST POSITION IS CHF 10'000 AND A CERTIFICATE OF EXCELLENCE. THE TWO OTHER FINALIST APPLICATIONS WILL RECEIVE A CERTIFICATE OF RECOGNITION.

THE DEADLINE FOR APPLICATIONS IS 23 SEPTEMBER 2024 AT 23:59 UTC+2. THE WINNERS WILL BE ANNOUNCED IN NOVEMBER 2024.

MORE INFO: [HERE](#)



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