ISSUE 1

THE DEFINITION OF EXTERNAL SECURITY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION MODEL

INTRODUCTION

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The process by which national governments and multinational organizations undertake strategic reviews, assess their external or national security and develop strategic rationales, goals and objectives profoundly influences the review's ultimate assessment of the threat environment and its policy impact. The United States and Europe possess fundamentally and historically different review processes, purposes, strategic communities and cultures, and therefore the strategic reviews that are produced are quite diverse. However, greater transatlantic alignment of both strategic assessment and review processes can produce improved cooperative models and operational synergies.

This chapter examines how Europe and the United States define external security and how each conduct strategic security reviews. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section provides analysis of two national (French and American) strategic reviews and the second section assesses two multinational (the European Union and NATO) strategic security reviews. To overcome the challenges of analyzing four very different strategic reviews, the authors analyzed their respective strategic reviews to determine: (1) the situational and historical context in which the review occurred, (2) the process, purpose and value of the review, (3) the content, terminology and conceptual framework of each review and (4) the impact and net effect of the review. From this analysis, several emerging trends and common themes were identified as were common challenges to the articulation and implementation of each security review.

In the first section, Camille Grand, Director of the Paris-based *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)*, describes the 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security (*Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*) as an historic review which last occurred in France in 1994. Similarly, the 2008 French assessment was commissioned by a newly elected president; it combined the concepts of both defense and national security for the first time; and, an external commission was tasked to draft the *Livre Blanc*, utilizing the assessment as both an opportunity to redefine French strategy (which led to French military re-integration with NATO) and as a public diplomacy tool. In his list of recommendations, Mr. Grand makes a persuasive argument for instituting external commissions which combine experts and senior government officials and allowing for an extended consultative process to ensure strong buy-in from policymakers, the public and allies. He further suggests that the European Union should initiate a similar White Paper process, which could be the launching point for a Euro-Atlantic White Paper.

Heather Conley, Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program, and Manuel Lafont-Rapnouil, Visiting Fellow, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. examine the 2002 and 2010 U.S. National Security Strategies (NSS) and describe the complex nature of American strategic security reviews. There are striking differences and similarities between the two U.S. National Security Strategies initiated by two American administrations with dissimilar tactical approaches to national security policy yet confront a similar and daunting threat environment. The authors examined the internal consistency of the two strategies, the strategic durability of the threat assessments, significant organizational restructuring, and its budgetary impact. In their conclusion, they argue that, as the United States continues to fully integrate the concept of homeland and national security and minimize the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, there is a growing commonality between Europe and the United States both in assessing the international security environment as one of growing complexity and calling for greater international cooperation and partnerships. The authors call for greater international consultation by U.S. officials before, during and following the drafting of U.S. National Security Strategy to maximize collaboration and gain a better common understanding of strategic terminology, the current threat assessment, and best implementation practices.

In the second section, Mark Rhinard, Senior Research Fellow and Erik Brattberg, Research Assistant of Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) in Stockholm, assess the first overarching strategic framework to guide European security policymakers in 2003 and its 2008 "review." The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and its subsequent review in 2008 were deemed necessary due to the EU's ongoing institutional and organizational development, the launch of the EU's first military operation outside of Europe and in reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The process surrounding the ESS was insular and controlled by a very small number of senior EU officials, although select European think-tanks were later engaged in a consultative process. The final document was relatively brief (fifteen pages) yet lacked strategic prioritization and was not tethered to budgetary resources in any meaningful way. From this experience, the authors urge the full utilization of think-tanks in both Europe and the United States when strategic reviews are initiated and recommend creating a 'transatlantic white paper' to identify critical transatlantic issues that can be integrated into respective national and multinational strategies.

Finally, authors Stefano Silvestri, President, and Alessandro Marrone, Researcher, of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, analyze the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. Because the international security environment has grown more complex, they argue that it has become increasingly difficult to forge a solid transatlantic consensus on NATO's future role which has led its strategic review process to become a political exercise that redefines core tasks and develops key partnerships, particularly with Russia, in contrast to its previous military activity. The authors emphasize the growing importance of the role of public diplomacy and cite NATO's use of external officials and extensive consultations as an example of NATO's growing effectiveness in this arena. The authors conclude by strongly recommending greater EU-NATO strategic cooperation by initially undertaking a common strategic review of theatre operations that both organizations conduct with the eventual implementation of a joint EU-NATO assessment of threats, risks and strategic priorities.

THE FRENCH CASE: LIVRE BLANC SUR LA DÉFENSE ET LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE

Camille Grand, *Director, FRS*

Introduction

Before delving into the 2008 *White Paper on Defense and National Security*, it is important to underline that France does not have an outstanding track record in producing formal strategy papers, which have not been part of French military tradition or strategic culture. When tracing the roots and turning points of French security policy and strategy, officials and commentators alike tend to refer more to speeches delivered by the President or other senior political figures (Prime minister, defense minister, etc). Moreover, there are no mandatory processes to produce any such document, and the executive branch is under no obligation to produce regular reports or reviews for parliamentary purposes. The only thing which comes close to such a mandatory process is the five-year procurement bill which usually contains an opening chapter dealing with the strategic environment.

As an example, nuclear policy has been primarily defined and explained through a series of major "nuclear" speeches by the seven presidents of the Fifth Republic (since 1958) which often preceded formal strategy documents or White papers: De Gaulle in 1959, Mitterrand in 1983 and 1994, Chirac in 1996 and 2001 (Ile Longue), and Sarkozy in 2008 (Cherbourg) delivered such speeches. This applies as well to other fields of national security strategy. President Sarkozy rolled out his decision to re-integrate French forces in NATO's military structures in a speech at a public event hosted by the *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* in March 2009. However, these speeches should not be interpreted as a process which ignores inter-agency debates or as a by-product of the French presidential regime restricting parliamentary action when it comes to foreign and security policy: far from it. These speeches are carefully drafted and often reflect fairly accurately the end-product of long decision making processes.

Having pointed at some French distinctiveness, it is however fair to admit that France has nevertheless is entering a period of normalization by preparing White Papers on a more regular pace and adopting more open processes. In the last few years, there was a *White paper on internal security and terrorism* in 2006, a *White paper on foreign policy* in 2008 and the 2008 *White paper on defense and national security*. It can't therefore be excluded that in the future such documents will be adopted on a more regular basis.

Historical Context

Since the early days of the Fifth Republic, France has only adopted three defense white papers, on average one every seventeen years! The first one was commissioned and released in 1972 by President Pompidou. The second one only came 22 years after, in 1994; it was prepared and released in a strange period, during a "cohabitation" between a socialist president (Francois Mitterrand) and a conservative parliamentary majority and government led by a Gaullist Prime minister (Edouard Balladur). The most recent one was decided by President Sarkozy after his 2007 election and released in 2008. Since there are no legal obligations to produce such reviews, the White papers are always very significant events and are always decided at the highest political level with specific policy and political objectives, although policy decisions might be taken after the release of the paper itself.

The most significant historical evolution is the visible name change which reflects a set of broader strategic issues: the 1972 White Paper was a *Livre blanc sur la défense nationale* (National defense white paper), the 1994 paper was a *Livre blanc sur la défense* (Defense White Paper) and the 2008 was a *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (National security and defense white paper) incorporating national security and defense.

The 1972 *Livre blanc* was very much focused on defense policy and nuclear deterrence, and served a sole purpose: to formalize the Gaullist legacy after de Gaulle had resigned (1969) and died (1970) as if after his death it had become important to put in writing the core principles of the Gaullist defense policy legacy after France had become a nuclear weapon state.

After the end of the division of Europe during the Cold War, in 1994 France undertook a reassessment of its strategy and force structure which prepared the 1996 decisions to:

1. transition to all-professional armed forces,
2. reduce nuclear forces and,
3. build up a substantial force projection capability, in keeping with the new strategic situation.

Interestingly, the 1994 *Livre blanc* did not address these decisions as political disagreement remained in the cohabitation era as the socialist President Mitterrand opposed two of the three major policy choices (professionalization of the armed forces and resumption of nuclear testing to finalize the post-cold war modernization of nuclear forces).

The 2008 White Paper also came into being during a specific political era -- the post-Chirac period. After a 12-year long presidency, President Sarkozy wanted to provoke changes at all levels of government including in the national security sector. The *Livre blanc* was a tool to drive change and build a new national consensus around defense and security. Unfortunately consensus was not reached as socialist parliamentarians left the expert Commission to protest that some decisions with regard to nuclear policy and Afghanistan had already been taken by the government before the White Paper was released. This move nevertheless should not be interpreted as an overall disagreement as it was motivated by domestic political constraints. In the end, the 2008 White Paper represented a fairly wide mainstream consensus among French elites and decision-makers that went beyond political lines.

The Process and Purpose of the 2008 French Livre Blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale

In August 2007, the newly elected French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, set up a Commission entrusted with the crafting of a White Paper on Defense and National Security. Chaired by Jean-Claude Mallet (former *Secrétaire général de la défense nationale*, i.e., top national security adviser to the Prime minister), the Commission was given a broad mandate and few limitations to fulfill its task, without many taboos. The composition of the Commission reflected this innovative approach: in addition to the representatives of the relevant government agencies and of the armed forces, parliamentarians and qualified individuals from academia and strategic think-tanks were actively involved in the work of the Commission along with independent experts and personalities with an industrial background. In a break with past practice, the Commission proceeded with far-ranging publicly televised and on-line hearings of some 52 personalities from 14 countries and 5 continents. Numerous closed-door consultations were also held. Members of the Commission proceeded with more than twenty visits in the field in defense and national security units and facilities, in France and abroad on the various theatres of operations where French forces are engaged. The Commission's website received more than 250,000 individual visits, bearing witness of the public interest in defense and security affairs; the corresponding on-line forum provided the Commission with useful input. Exchanges with trusted foreign partner-states and with the European Union and NATO were part of this unprecedented comprehensive process.

New Strategic and Conceptual Thinking

At the outcome of this process, the White Paper substantially redefined French strategy in a 15-year perspective, embracing both defense and national security. It included foreign security and domestic security, military and civilian means, tools and approaches and responded to risks emanating from either States or non-State actors. The White Paper dealt with active, deliberate threats but also with the security implications of major disasters and catastrophes of a non-intentional nature.

The definition of a comprehensive security strategy is a consequence of the challenges of our times, faced by France together with its allies and partners, and the fundamental changes of the age of globalization as reflected in an in-depth, wide-ranging strategic adaptation. Some key findings can be extracted from the 2008 *Livre Blanc*:

1. The world has changed profoundly since the publication of the previous White Paper in 1994, in particular due to the impact of globalization. The formidable acceleration of information exchanges, the increased trade in goods and services as well as the rapid movement of people, have transformed our economic, social and political environment in both positive and negative ways, as well as the paradigms of national and international security. The hierarchy of powers has changed and will continue to evolve. The world is not necessarily more dangerous, but it has become more unstable, more unforeseeable. New crises, in particular from the Middle East to Pakistan have come to the fore and have become more inter-connected. Jihadism-inspired terrorism aimed directly at France and Europe places France in a situation of greater direct vulnerability. In this context, the White Paper attempted to capture the strategic threat

assessment for the next fifteen years to come, and to understand the consequences as part of a comprehensive new defense and security policy.

2. One major innovation was that security interests are assessed globally without restricting the analysis to defense issues. A national security strategy is defined in order to provide responses to "*all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation*." The scope of national security includes defense policy, but is not limited to it. In order to better ensure the defense of French interests and the mission of protecting its population, the national security strategy calls upon interior security policy, for anything which is not directly related to individual security of persons and property or law and order, as well as the civil security policy. Other policies such as foreign policy and economic policy also contribute directly to national security.

3. The national security strategy includes five strategic functions for the defense and security forces: knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention. The combination of these five functions must be flexible and evolve over time, adapting to the changes in the strategic environment. One major change is that the White Paper will henceforth be updated before the discussion of each new Military Program and Interior Security Bills.

4. Intelligence, knowledge and anticipation represent a new strategic function and have become a priority. In a world characterized by uncertainty and instability, knowledge represents the first line of defense. Knowledge guarantees autonomy in decision-making and enables France to preserve its strategic initiative. It is knowledge which must be provided as early on as possible to decision-makers, military commanders and those in charge of internal and civil security in order to go from prediction to informed action. Intelligence of all kinds, including from space and prospective studies, takes on major importance.

5. Protection of both the population and territory is at the very heart of France's strategy as the country is directly exposed to new vulnerabilities. The goal is to protect the nation in times of major crisis while increasing its resilience defined as the "*capability of public authorities and the French society to respond to a major crisis and rapidly restore normal functioning*." Reinforcing resilience requires a change in the means and methods of surveillance used over the national territory including land, sea, air and now space and to develop a more rapid and wider in scope, response capability for French public authorities. Communication, information systems and civil warning systems lie at the centre of the crisis management and preparedness system. One new element is the coordination between civilian and military departments and agencies as a fundamental principle of the new strategy where operational goals to protect the population and nation are assigned jointly to both internal security services, civil security services and the armed forces.

6. As regards conflict prevention and intervention capabilities, the White Paper prioritizes the geographic axis stretching from the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Arab-Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. This axis corresponds to the areas where the risks related to the strategic interests of France and Europe are the highest. The White Paper also takes into account the growing importance of Asia for national security and support presence and cooperation throughout this axis. In parallel, France will preserve its prevention and action capabilities on the Western and Eastern sea-boards of the African continent as well as in the Sahel, in particular to

fight against human and contraband trafficking and acts of terrorism. The White Paper also announced radical changes with regards to the existing system of French defense and military cooperation agreements to strengthen the partnership between Europe and Africa, focusing on the developing defense and security cooperation and peace-keeping capabilities in Africa. The White Paper also set forth a series of guidelines for the intervention of French armed forces in foreign theatres.

7. Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. It is the ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear deterrent is to prevent any State-originated aggression against the vital interests of the nation, wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or form. Given the diversity of situations with which France might be confronted in an age of globalization, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options. Even though there may not be any direct threat of aggression today against France, it is imperative to retain the capability to preserve the freedom of action of our nation if our vital interests are threatened with nuclear blackmail. France will have the means to develop its capability as long as nuclear weapons are necessary for its security. However, France has taken the initiative in the area of nuclear disarmament and shall continue to do so. France is particularly active in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as of the missiles capable of delivering WMD.

8. The European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of France's security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability. The White Paper recalls several concrete goals for European defense in the coming years: set up an overall intervention capability of 60,000 soldiers, deployable for one year; achieve the capability to deploy for a significant duration two or three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations and several civilian operations of lesser scope in separate theatres; increase the European planning and operational capability both military and civilian; and restructure the European defense industry. In addition, the White Paper emphasizes four priority areas for the protection of European citizens: the reinforcement of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime; the development of European civil protection capabilities; the coordination of the defense against cyber-attack; and the securing of energy and strategic raw materials supply. Lastly, the White Paper advocates the drafting of a European White Paper on defense and security.

9. The White Paper emphasizes that the European Union and NATO are complementary. France is committed to the reform of NATO. The White Paper acknowledges that Europe and NATO have changed considerably General de Gaulle withdrew French forces from the NATO integrated military command in 1996 and since the previous White Paper was published in 1994. The European Union has emerged as a major player in the international community. NATO has maintained its responsibility for the collective defense of the allies but is also a peacekeeping instrument (Afghanistan, Kosovo). There is no competition between NATO and the European Union. The two are complementary.   It is imperative that both organizations come to grips with the complexity of international threats and crises.

10. This reality leads the White Paper to advocate the full participation of France in the structures of NATO. For the authors, this evolution will go hand in hand with the reinforcement of the European Union in the area of crisis management and the search for a new balance between the United States and Europe within NATO. With regard to France's position, the White Paper reaffirms the three main principles in direct continuity with those defined by General de Gaulle: complete independence of nuclear forces; full freedom of assessment, which implies the absence of automatic military commitment and the maintenance of assets allowing for strategic autonomy, in particular by increasing intelligence capabilities; and lastly, permanent freedom of decision which means that no French forces shall be permanently placed under NATO command in peace time.
11. The new format of French armed forces is to be determined on the basis of operational goals decided by the government based on the proposals made by the White Paper Commission. The main force levels proposed are as follows:
    a. An operational ground force (*Force Opérationelle Terrestre*) of 88,000 men, enabling a force-projection capability of 30,000 soldiers with six month notice, 5,000 soldiers on permanent operational alert, and the capability to mobilize 10,000 soldiers on the national territory to support civilian authorities in case of a major crisis;
    b. An aircraft-carrier group including combat, surveillance and rescue aircraft and helicopters, 18 frigates, six nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and the capability to deploy one or two naval groups either for amphibious operations or for the protection of sea lines;
    c. A joint fleet of 300 combat aircraft, regrouping the combat aircrafts of both the Air Force and the Navy, which will allow the permanent deployment of 5 squadrons on national territory and a force projection capability of 70 combat aircraft.
12. The White Paper defines a consistent defense effort based on the dual concern of improving without delay the availability and modernization of the most frequently used equipment and launching programs related to intelligence and preparation for the future. The White Paper also calls for the launch of new programs, during the same timeframe, in the field of intelligence and anticipation (knowledge-based security, observation, electronic intelligence, early warning) on land, at sea and in the air with the development of surveillance and armed drones, as well as both offensive and defensive cyber-war capabilities. The White Paper states that France shall devote significant finances to its defense, consistent with the priorities and choices made for its operational capabilities. This statement gave a sense of assurance that defense spending would not decrease. During the initial period (2008-2012) annual resources should be constant in volume—that is, increase at the same pace as inflation. Then, during a second phase, starting in the year 2012, the budget will increase at the pace of 1% per year in volume, that is, 1% above the inflation rate. Between now and 2020, the aggregate funding devoted to defense excluding pensions will amount to €377 billion. The procurement budget will increase from an average of €15.5 billion in past years to €18 billion on average per year for the period 2009-2020, and will also impact defense personnel training and living conditions. However, these ambitious objectives now seem difficult to fully implement given the unforeseen global financial crisis which occurred following the release of the Livre blanc was released.

13. It also devoted significant sections to the importance of the French defense industry and emphasized that France must retain its industrial capabilities and its political autonomy, particularly in the areas of: nuclear deterrence, ballistic missiles, nuclear attack submarines, and cyber-security. It also recognized that individual European countries can no longer master every technology and capability at a national level and therefore, France believes that the European industrial and procurement framework must be prioritized in the areas of combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc., although procurement policy must include acquisitions on the world market.
14. Finally, it recommends the reorganization of public authorities in order to take into account this new national security strategy.

Based on these key finding the White Paper details precise specifications in terms of future procurement for force protection and land combat capabilities to include: drones for surveillance and combat drones for air-land operations, nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) carrying conventional cruise missiles (by 2020), four large amphibious ships (*Mistral* class) with 18 first-line frigates, detection and early warning capabilities aimed at ballistic missile capabilities, a single pool of 300 combat aircraft for the Air force and the Navy (*Rafale* and modernized *Mirage* 2000), and a doubling of funds available for space military programs (from a base of 380 million euros in 2008) is prescribed as well as the establishment of a Joint Space Command, a new concept of cyber-defense and the establishment of an offensive cyber-war capability, intelligence collection and signal interception, civilian and civil-military crisis management operations, a new system will combine targeted messages via SMS, media or e-mail together with the current modernized siren network, and an inter-ministerial Crisis Management Centre for the direction and control of crisis response operations on national territory.

All these policy recommendations derive from the following new security parameters which have been factored into the strategy enshrined in the *Livre blanc*:

- The growing interconnection between threats and risks: This is a direct consequence of globalization which removes barriers between conflicts and risks, much as it does in benign or positive fields such as trade and communication. These risks must be dealt with first by actions aimed at preventing the outbreak or spread of armed conflict. These risks of interdependence and the cascading effect of crises call for large-scale responses and the integration of economic, social, environmental, and security policies.
- The continuity between domestic and foreign security: The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign security has lost its relevance. This continuity has taken on strategic significance, of which France and Europe have to draw the full implications. Comprehensive strategies and the integration of the different dimensions of security are required.
- The possibility of sudden strategic surprises or strategic shocks: International uncertainty and instability lend plausibility to scenarios of strategic upsets and surprises which our defense and security systems may not be fully prepared to address. Apart from terrorism, the White Paper acknowledges that developments related to as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-warfare, and the emergence of new weapons as a result of technological breakthroughs will likely be found in a future strategic surprise scenario. The risk of a nuclear attack (breaking the "nuclear taboo") also cannot be ruled out. Many potential major regional

contingencies have the potential to degenerate into a world-wide strategic upset. The offensive use of outer-space, applications flowing from nanotechnologies, bio-technologies, massive strides forward in computer technology, new sources of vulnerability of space-based assets, come to mind as well. Other "black swan" events may well arise with substantial and unexpected strategic consequences.

– Developments impacting future military operations: Future military operations will increasingly be conducted for and in the midst of civilian population centers, generally in an urban environment. A more worrying trend is that current "peace operations" are increasingly lethal, which puts a premium on force protection. Superior technology does not, *per se*, guarantee operational superiority. The human factor will remain prevalent in complex international operations where all instruments of power and influence are brought to bear.

Ultimately all of these factors lead to the establishment of a new national security strategy. Its goal is to deal with the risks or threats which may affect the life of the nation. Its first aim is to defend population and territory. The second is to contribute to European and international security. The third is to defend the values of the French Republic which binds together the French people and their State: the principles of democracy, including individual and collective freedoms, respect of human dignity, solidarity, and justice.

These aims are achieved by:

– Defense policy, *in toto*. Defense policy has to ensure the security of the nation vis-à-vis the risk of an armed aggression, the fulfillment of our international defense commitments, the contribution of France to international peace and security, its participation in the protection of the population on French soil and French citizens abroad in support of domestic security and civil security organizations.

– Domestic security policy, in matters other than the day-to-day security of individuals and their property, and civil security policy. As part of national security, these policies must ensure on a permanent basis the protection of the population, the functioning of our public institutions and the maintenance of a degree of normality in the country's life in times of crisis, and defend the security interests of the nation against non-military threats.

– Other public policies, particularly diplomatic and economic policy, insofar as they contribute directly to national security.

There is an obvious and fundamental difference between security threats resulting from hostile intent and unintentional events, such as natural catastrophes. However, the need for anticipation, advance planning, preparation and timely action are the same in both instances. Terrorism in Europe is staged both from outside and within our societies. Large-scale criminal networks take advantage of borderless globalization. Energy security cannot be envisaged outside of a global perspective. Information systems are vulnerable regardless of borders. The same applies to natural disasters or health risks.

The Impact and Net Effect of Strategic Reviews

The last French White paper laid the groundwork for a major overhaul of the French national security strategy by establishing the very concept of national security at the core of the French approach to security. In terms of foreign and security policy, it played a decisive role in preparing the French "full participation" in NATO and the 2009 decision to reintegrate into NATO's command structure. Many organizational reforms were also undertaken following the recommendations of the White Paper and have led to the most significant transformations of the national security apparatus since the early days of the Fifth Republic. The 2008 White Paper will therefore remain a milestone in terms of defense reform and strategic review. It is likely to have shaped national security structures for an extended period of time.

Due to budgetary constraints, some of the White Paper's key prescriptions in terms of procurement or force structures have not been implemented in the last 3 years and could be further postponed or abandoned. This trend was already visible in the preparation of the 2009-2012 procurement bill, which fell short of implementing all recommendations of the White Paper. This was further emphasized when the global financial crisis hit. It should, however, be noted that the overall force structure and defense priorities have not been massively reviewed at this stage, and that political authorities continue to insist that key objectives will be met even though some procurements could face delays. This affirmation might not resist post-crisis budgetary reform, and remains to be tested beyond the 2012 presidential election.

The influence of the French White Paper beyond French borders is interesting to assess. There was great interest among the international security community and the Paper is often quoted as a reference document for other national strategic reviews in Europe and beyond. The value of its analytical framework is usually recognized and has not raised major criticism abroad.

Although they were adopted the very same year, the 2008 revised EU European Security Strategy (ESS) fell short of French expectations as the EU failed to endorse some of the recommendations of the French White Paper; Paris was unsuccessful in its attempt to launch the drafting of a genuinely new ESS; and only had limited successes in introducing fresh ideas and concepts into the ESS. The current ESS has been criticized in French security circles for its lack of ambition and its failure to truly tackle some major security challenges. The French continue to advocate the adoption of a *Livre blanc européen* on defense and security, which was a formal recommendation of the 2008 White Paper.

Within the NATO strategic concept process, France has so far been more successful. The choice of an influential member of the White Paper commission (Bruno Racine, Chairman of the National Library) as the "French" expert in the NATO Group of Experts on the Strategic Concept has led to the endorsement of some ideas derived from the *Livre blanc* in the Group's final report. Although it is difficult to identify direct ideas or quotations, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept does reflect this indirect influence.

The French *Livre blanc* also influenced, to a certain degree, other national processes. The British 2010 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR) does offer a very close assessment of the security environment which underscores the broadly similar approaches of the security and defense challenges that the two leading European players in the field perceive. Other national white papers in Europe

have benefited from exchanges with the French on the *Livre blanc,* a Dutch team for instance visited Paris for exchanges in preparation of their own white paper.

Searching for Transatlantic Methods

When discussing opportunities for a transatlantic cooperative effort, some useful lessons and recommendations can be drawn from the *Livre blanc* experience:

1. Time constraints should not be too tight for the strategic reviews. The *Livre blanc* process lasted more than six-months, which allowed extended consultations in France and abroad with officials and non-officials, and enabled the drafting process to take place without excessive time constraints. This also facilitated a consensus-building process.
2. A commission combining external experts and senior government representatives, military and non-military participants, proved a fruitful process balancing the creativity of outsiders with the realism (and sometime conservatism) of insiders and the other way around. This also facilitated validation of various recommendations and prescriptions by those policymakers on the Commission by facilitating the implementation of most of the recommendations.
3. Consultations abroad *during* the writing process, not just *after* the interagency debate had been closed, were extremely useful and fruitful according to the members of the Commission. They also facilitated future common approaches, as inputs may be fed into future strategic reviews.
4. The French Cartesian (or French garden) approach has proven quite efficient in developing policy recommendations from an in-depth assessment of the security environment and turning them into specific prescriptions.
5. Some concepts as the management of "strategic surprises" are probably relevant far beyond the French case, and are worthy to be considered by future strategic reviews.

In practical terms, a genuine transatlantic effort is difficult to envisage (beyond the NATO process) for a series of reasons. First, calendars which are often driven by domestic legal or political constraints do not match and it is very difficult to bring them much closer. Second, each strategic review serves a different purpose, and the fact that it is carried out by a nation state or an organization such as the EU or NATO differentiate both process and output of strategic reviews. Third, substantial differences related to security issues continue to exist both from a transatlantic perspective and within Europe itself.

It could however be useful to undertake policy actions aimed at fostering transatlantic cooperative efforts. First, the EU should initiate a strategic review and prepare a real EU White Paper/New Security Strategy which would serve as the basis of engagement with the U.S. and other partners on a consolidated EU analysis.

- It should also examine the feasibility of establishing a wise-men group (with officials and non-officials) on transatlantic security. The last NATO strategic concept remained focused on the role of the Alliance itself, but there is room to reflect on how U.S., EU, and EU

member states may share their understanding of security issues and creatively explore ways of cooperation.

- In this context, transatlantic ties between research institutions and policy-planning staffs should be expanded and deepened to create a solid web of formal and informal connections which facilitate a transatlantic security dialogue.
- Finally, security issues beyond the Euro-Atlantic area should be analyzed jointly. At times, Europe does not think in strategic terms on issues such as Asia, which is a good example of the type of problem that could be overcome through deeper dialogue. Asia has become a priority for the U.S. agenda, and it may represent a fruitful field of transatlantic engagement.

THE U.S. CASE: 2002 AND 2010 U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Heather A. Conley, *Senior Fellow, Director of the CSIS Europe Program*, with Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, *Visiting Fellow, CSIS Europe Program*, and Michael Cass-Anthony, *CSIS Europe Program*

Dating back to World War II and at a time when the United States was challenged both domestically as it emerged from the Great Depression and internationally as it fought militarily on two continents, the Roosevelt administration initiated a process that strategically assessed how America would meet future international security challenges. Since that time, the United States has developed a rich culture of strategic security planning. However, it was only in 1987 when the United States Congress formally required, under the auspices of the Goldwater-Nichols (Department of Defense Reorganization) Act,[1] the Executive Branch to provide a National Security Strategy (NSS) annually to Congress. The NSS serves as the principle strategic tool through which an American administration defines U.S. "national security" and addresses issues related to its implementation.

A national security strategy relies first and foremost on a clear definition of what "external security" means. For the United States, external security is its national security and therefore its national security strategy identifies, defines and prioritizes these threats, identifies the constraints placed upon national security policy, and finally articulates policy recommendations on how to deal with these documented threats and constraints. The series of strategic documents that follow the strategic cornerstone of the NSS identify what is needed and what must be completed in terms of policy, legislative tools, human and financial resources, military capabilities, and administrative structures.

In recent years, the NSS has diminished as the penultimate U.S. national security document, although it most certainly plays a role in giving public voice to an American President's tactical approach to the conduct of foreign and security policy. Rather, the annual budget process, particularly the Defense Department's budgetary process, has become the most critical U.S. strategic document which shapes and prioritizes U.S. interests. Other major U.S. strategic documents, to include the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the recently launched Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), attempt to provide more direct strategic guidance to the annual budgeting process. But, regardless of their larger strategic impact, which can widely vary, U.S. strategic reviews do make one important contribution: they bring together a large number of agencies that are engaged in formulating national security policy and make them produce a final, unified

product. Simply put, there is an intrinsic "value of the process" to the national security community as a whole.

The following paper focuses on the formulation of U.S. national security strategies over an eight year period, beginning with the Bush administration's NSS released in 2002 and concluding with the recently produced NSS by the Obama administration which was released in May 2010. From a U.S. perspective, this paper will examine the historical context, purpose, value, and accomplishments (both attempted and achieved) in which strategic reviews take place as well as the identification of the noteworthy patterns of the American strategic model in the last decade and possible transatlantic applications to these patterns.

Historical Context

Over the past twenty years, the U.S. national security strategy has continuously referred to the global strategic environment in a post-Cold War context. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush referenced an international order after the fall of the iron curtain, "The Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new era, one whose outline would have been unimaginable only three years ago…this new era offers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the even greater uncertainty we face."[2] The strategic environment was shaped by the creation of a new, yet unclear and uncertain world order that would challenge U.S. power both in its ability to ensure its security and to advance its declared national interests. These national interests consisted of promoting and disseminating democratic principles, preventing terrorists and terrorist networks from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and engaging as well as strengthening international alliances. The NSSs of the 1990s prescribed America's capacity to shape this new world order into a more secure, prosperous and stable direction as "the United States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension -- political, economic and military. In these circumstances, our natural desire to share burdens more equitably with newly-strong friends does not relieve us of our own responsibilities."[3]

The 2002 NSS is perhaps the most interesting of America's national security strategic literature as it describes U.S. national security interests following the September 11th terrorist attacks. The 2002 NSS was meant to respond to a very different strategic environment than was envisioned in the 1990s. Although terrorist attacks were articulated in previous U.S. security strategies (the 1991 security strategy often mentions combating different forms of "international terrorism"), attacks of comparable audacity to the September 11 assault on the U.S. homeland were not considered. Beginning with the 2002 NSS and continuing to the most recent review, the United States has defined itself as being "at war" consistently and by two separate Administrations. The 2002 NSS notes that the U.S. is fighting a war against "terrorists of global reach;"[4] the 2006 NSS states in its introduction that "America is at war;" in 2010, the NSS declares that we are "at war with a specific network, Al-Qaida, and its terrorist affiliates…."[5]

The Obama Administration's 2010 NSS concentrates on a repudiation of and differentiation from the policies and overall tone of the previous administration and articulates its own framework for tackling new challenges. However, the politics of foreign policy differentiation are nothing new: they

are more the norm. It is interesting to note that the 2002 NSS was a reaction against the previous Clinton administration's policies in light of the 9/11 attacks. The tactical differences in approach from one American administration to another and the message these differences send to the world are essentially what makes these documents of value and interest perhaps more than the way the United States perceives the current and future state of play of the international environment.

The Process, Purpose and Value of U.S. Strategic Reviews

In theory, an American administration first formulates its overarching national security strategy and then subsequent strategic and budget reviews are developed to align national objectives with capabilities and means. Once the NSS is released, the major national security agencies, particularly the Defense Department, begin to develop their documents with an eye to minimizing gaps between objectives and means, eliminating budgeting redundancies and ensuring that agencies do not work at cross-purposes. All such documents are expected to derive from a shared and integrated strategic vision with the NSS serving as the point of alignment. This rich collection of strategic review documentation is meant to offer a comprehensive and articulated view of America's national security strategy and the means to achieve this strategy. Practice, however, can be different from theory. For example, when President Obama came into office in January 2009, the reverse strategic review order occurred: the Defense Department released its budget (May 2009); the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a four-year strategic review of DoD's strategies and priorities was released (February 2010); and then the NSS was completed (May 2010).

Because the United States does not rely only upon the NSS, a broad and diverse array of strategic reviews is also considered an integral part of the strategic review landscape. The major U.S. strategic reviews are shown in the following table.

Major Strategic Documents as of 2010

	When was it instituted?	Who is in charge?	How often is it conducted?	For whom is it mandated?
National Security Strategy (NSS)	1987 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act	White House (NSC)	Every year (in theory; in practice, NSS were not released in 1989, 1992, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009)	Congress
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)	1996	Department of Defense	Every four years (in theory; in practice 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2010)	Congress
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)	2010	Department of State (with USAID)	Every four years First one completed 2010	The White House
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)	2010	Department of Homeland Security	Every four years First one completed 2010	Congress

Source: Heather A. Conley, CSIS.

Note: Other important U.S. strategic review documents include:

- **Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review** issued once every four years, this report is compiled by the Director of National Intelligence, and directly contributes to the QDR.
- **Nuclear Posture Review** is conducted by the Department of Defense in close consultation with the Departments of State and Energy. It looks at nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next five to ten years.
- **Ballistic Missile Defense Review** first released in 2010, with input from across the government, assesses the threats posed by ballistic missiles and coordinates a missile defense policy responsive to those threats. Its analysis feeds into the QDR report.
- **Space Posture Review** reviews and analyzes the space strategy from both a military as well as a national security perspective, in addition to researching new technologies. The report feeds directly into the QDR.
- **National Defense Strategy** provides a framework for achieving the objectives set forth in both the NSS and reflects the results of the QDR. It informs the National Military Strategy and is released every two years in order to provide the best assessment.
- **National Military Strategy** draws from the NSS and QDR and delivers the strategic aims of the armed services every two years.

Most of these documents are legislatively mandated and part of their content may be classified.

In light of this dizzying array of strategic documents, one could fairly argue that these reviews are simply an overgrown pile of bureaucratically constructed paper designed to fulfill Congressionally-mandated obligations and sooth certain political constituencies, rather than actually play a strategic role. This raises an important question: who exactly is the American audience for strategic reviews?

Clearly, there is a hierarchy of audiences: first and foremost, the U.S. Congress. Congress requests these documents from the administration as part of its oversight responsibilities but the strategic review is also designed to place each administration on the record (both in unclassified and classified forms) with its assessment of the challenges and how it believes U.S. strategy should meet these challenges. To underscore how important these reviews are to Congress, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave her views on the importance of the strategic review process as a Senator serving on the Armed Service Committee. She noted,

> … it became very clear to me that the QDR process that the Defense Department ran was an important tool for the Defense Department to not only exercise the discipline necessary to make the hard decisions to set forth the priorities, but provided a framework that was a very convincing one to those in the Congress, that there was a plan, people knew where they were headed, and they had the priorities requested aligned with the budget, and therefore, people were often very convinced that it made good sense to do whatever the Defense Department requested.[6]

The next audience of priority for these strategic reviews is the U.S. administration itself and the countless number of departments and agencies that must be engaged to write these often lengthy and complex reports. As noted earlier, there is an intrinsic "value of the process" in bringing the interagency community together to engage in a task, coordinating with one another and ensuring the multitude of strategic reviews are not contradictory. Just as the National Security Strategy involves a wide inter-agency process, each subaltern document involves its own mobilization of the relevant administrations and bureaucracies which reinforces a sense of ownership, ensures sufficient clarity of mission, provides consistency in implementation and secures the leadership's commitment to an agreed set of priorities and a subsequent strategy. Once the strategic document is finalized, the U.S. national security bureaucracy is provided with an overarching framework that the bureaucracy must (in theory) utilize in its future policy formulation. This may be particularly true with regards to the newly formed Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Although it is premature to assess the QHSR and the QDDR, these new strategic efforts, at the administration's initiative, may be an administration's attempt to reorganize recalcitrant bureaucracies more than it is an attempt to be strategic and comprehensive.

The audience of growing importance for these strategic reviews (if they are publicly released in unclassified form) is foreign governments, the international media, the think-tank community, international opinion leaders, political pundits and, to a lesser extent, the American people themselves. The NSS, in particular, and the QDR initiate an important foreign policy conversation as these documents are closely scrutinized by other nations, friends and foes alike. These strategic reviews serve as an essential public diplomacy policy tool as they channel key policy messages to a wide range of international actors. All of these audiences influence the conduct of the American strategic review process, overtly and inadvertently, and on occasion, these external audiences can influence the final strategic project.

New Strategic and Conceptual Thinking

American national security strategies have helped shape new language and descriptions for today's foreign policy challenges. In the 2002 NSS, a significant number of new phrases and vocabulary emanated from the Bush administration's post–September 11 description of the world. For instance, the phrase "global war on terrorism" terminology was introduced.[7] In 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld promoted a change in wording to "Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism," but that phrase did not catch on, and the "War on Terror" expression was again used in the 2006 NSS; early on, the Obama administration decided to avoid using the term and replaced it with "Overseas Contingency Operations."[8] The 2010 NSS eventually uses the phrase "violent extremism."[9]

Any significant bureaucratic exercise, particularly one as important as the NSS, pays a great deal of attention to the selection of words and strategic terminology. Some newly introduced concepts, as was the case with the 2002 references to "preemptive actions" or to a "global war on terrorism" can become highly contentious internationally, but new terminology can also provide enduring terms, such as "coalitions of the willing." For instance, "free trade" is a recurring term in the 2002 and 2006 documents although this term does not appear in the Obama administration's strategy. Another case would be the 2010 NSS refers to Pakistan in most instances when Afghanistan is addressed. Noticeable wording and new terminology may reflect the administration's priorities, particularly "engagement" as opposed to unilateralism, and to signal a new initiative, "a world without nuclear weapons" or President Obama's Global Zero initiative. New areas of interest are the most fruitful areas to find fresh terminology, such as in the field of "cyberspace" and "cybersecurity."[10]

The following chart depicts the striking differences between the 2002 NSS (excluding for the moment the 2006 NSS which is similar to the 2002 in many respects) and the 2010 NSS on several critical issues:

NSS 2002	NSS 2010
A unipolar posture "forces of freedom," "unparalleled military strength," "preemptive actions"	An avowed need for international cooperation "engagement," "cooperation," "leadership," "partnerships" and "rules-based international system"
A focus on external threats	More attention paid to the domestic foundations of national security (including attention to homegrown radicalization)
Prioritization of hard security threats in general, and the risk of terrorists resorting to weapons of mass destruction in particular	A broader vision of national security that incorporates domestic policy challenges (e.g. environment, technology, and development)
A narrow vision of the national security toolbox "make use of every tool in our arsenal-military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing"	A broader, "smart power," "whole of government" approach "Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries."

Source: Heather A. Conley, CSIS.

For some, the U.S. NSS appears to be less strategically relevant and designed more to be a political statement of intent, meaning that the greater the public fanfare associated with the unveiling of an American security strategy the greater the risk that the NSS becomes rhetorical window-dressing rather than a serious strategic document. Particularly on contentious or controversial policies, there is a temptation to use the NSS as an opportunity to posit grand expectations and ambitions that may or may not be achieved or reached. More often than not, the U.S. administration will use the occasion of a strategic review to espouse a more positive vision for the world and how U.S. policies and engagement will achieve this vision. This is particularly true for the 2010 NSS. The first chapter provides a description of "the world as it is" and then articulates "the world we [the U.S.] seek[s]." This phenomenon may be culturally specific in some respect to the United States as it has historically struggled between two different visions of its role in the world: a proactive, global leadership vision of the United States as a shining model or the more isolationist vision, designed to avoid foreign entanglements.

How common is it then for strategic terminology to migrate transatlantically (in both directions)? We can identify occasional examples. The 2010 NSS incorporates the concept of "resilience," which is defined as the "the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption."[11] This term was first found in a security strategy first officially endorsed by the U.K. in 2008[12] and adopted in the French National Security Strategy later that same year. It is a rare case when a foreign concept is imported to the U.S. for use in its official national security doctrine. In another example, the 2010 NSS makes reference to a "whole of government" approach to characterize strategy to make all the tools of U.S. power, military, economic and diplomatic more efficient and effective. Some could argue that this term was introduced much earlier in European security documents as taking a "comprehensive approach" when bringing all instruments of power together for greater intended effect.

The Impact and Net Effect of Strategic Reviews

Although the overall impact of a U.S. strategic review process is difficult to quantify, four measurements of success can be identified: internal consistency, strategic durability, organizational restructuring, and budgetary impact.

Internal consistency of strategic language is a significant measurement particularly given the wide array of required U.S. strategic review documents and coupled with the fact that not all reviews are conducted simultaneously or in a particular order. In fact, more narrowly focused reviews may be written well before overarching documents, such as the NSS, are completed. There was language consistency between the 2010 NSS and the 2010 QDR (despite the fact that the QDR was released prior to the NSS), both in substance (on the role of military power[13]) and in general strategic terminology (references to "engagement" and "a world free of nuclear weapons"). Another dimension of consistency is the relation between strategic language and the creation of implementation processes. The 2010 NSS articulates an ambition to integrate national and homeland security which was borne out in the administration's first attempt to undertake a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). Although the QHSR's first output was not entirely successful, it does respond to the call for greater integration of national and homeland strategies. More recently, the State Department

launched a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development review (QDDR) to better integrate diplomacy and development more fully and strategically.

Strategic consistency can also be identified in either: (1) a theoretical (top-down) approach, whereby the strategic assessment affects how resources and capabilities are allocated or, (2) an organic (bottom-up) approach whereby budget data is examined and the implementation of the strategy is reflected "in the numbers," so to speak. Since the Obama administration's strategic approach was organic in nature, we can more readily observe whether the budget numbers conformed to the overarching NSS framework.

One of the strategic aims of the 2010 NSS was to attempt to rebalance U.S. foreign policy away from hard power-projection toward greater diplomatic and development engagement, so-called "smart power[14]" in order to achieve an integrated national security policy. Therefore, the budget should reflect an effort to shift resources away from the Defense Department (both in programs and personnel) to the State Department and the Agency for International Development (USAID) or an effort to increase or make existing resources more effective and efficient. Indeed, in the fiscal year 2010 International Affairs Budget and in its fiscal year 2011 request, the administration asked Congress for additional funds (the administration seeks to double foreign assistance by 2015) and in personnel (500 more positions at the State Department and 200 more personnel at USAID) in order to enhance civilian post-conflict capabilities. Clearly, there was internal consistency in the Obama administration's strategy. But overemphasis of budget analysis can be equally problematic: a strategy that looks like a shopping-list in order to be consistent with budget requests rather than a series of strategic priorities will likely be either trumped by the budget process or will miss its strategic target.[15] Moreover, the drive for international consistency (particularly through budgetary means) should not marginalize the need to adjust strategy by taking into account a new assessment of the international environment or a lessons learned process during implementation. A very clear example of the need to adjust a strategic framework was the 2002 NSS, which was redrafted following the September 11th attacks to reflect the changing priorities and security paradigm. Here, the NSS was not completely consistent with the 2001 QDR (which was released on September 30, 2001). Unfortunately, administrations often avoid adjusting strategy in the interest of being politically consistent. The 2006 NSS was a concerted effort to validate the course of the 2002 NSS when strategic adjustments were clearly needed and eventually took place in the 2010 NSS.

The second criteria, the durability and credibility of the strategic assessment, is best analyzed in hindsight. Does the strategic assessment remain valid over an extended period time? With hindsight, it is easy to point to shortcomings in the 2002 NSS, which dismissed too quickly the remaining challenges in Afghanistan and overlooked the non-proliferation crises in North Korea and in Iran. The 2002 NSS position on Russia would be characterized as overly optimistic, "Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror."[16] But the 2006 NSS offered a more candid assessment identifying that "recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions,"[17] therefore, an adjustment was clearly made. It will be another year or two before we can make similar assessments of the 2010 NSS: what did it get right or what did it get wrong? Even if the NSS was prescient in its assessment of risk and clairvoyant in its declaration of U.S. policy, it may still be insufficient to provide the necessary political "cover" for any given U.S. administration. For example, the 2000 NSS

correctly identified the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities, interests or individuals overseas, the grave risk of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the need for a "consequence management ability to significantly mitigate injury and damage" in case of an attack against the United States. However, there was a significant political backlash in the United States that America was unprepared and not on alert for this type of eventuality. Strategic surprises are a major concern for strategic planners. Forecasting in an uncertain, fluid and fast-paced environment is a difficult exercise although not making strategic choices or defining strategic priorities makes it impossible to build a durable and credible strategy in an environment of budget constraints.

The third leading indicator of the lasting impact of a strategic review is how bureaucratic structures and intergovernmental coordination are affected. Are organizations created, eliminated, or streamlined? Frequently, NSSs dedicate a section strictly to organizational structure. In the 2002 NSS, the section was entitled, "Transforming America's National Security Institutions" and in the 2010 NSS, it was called "Strengthening National Capacity." The most compelling example of organizational transformation and reform stems from the 2002 NSS' creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the position of Director of National Intelligence.[18] A growing trend in U.S. strategic thinking as a result of lessons learned in America's intervention in Iraq and in Afghanistan is the need for greater interagency coordination and more integrated action by relevant national security agencies, particularly a whole-of-government approach and greater intelligence integration. This approach is what is strategically driving the QDDR effort to clarify the respective role and mission of the State Department and USAID (to either separate or integrate these agencies) in order to create a more integrated approach to working more effectively with the military. Another example of organizational change due to the strategic need for greater post-conflict integrative demand is the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State. Although the organization was created, sufficient budget resources have not been allocated for the office to realize its potential to provide the civilian response or "surge" the Defense Department has requested to ensure a more comprehensive crisis management policy.

The final measurement for a NSS is an assessment of its overall performance, measured not only in terms of accomplishing its stated goals but also in tangible outcomes. Obviously, no strategy is fully successful. But it is clear that a strategy which is vague, its objectives too broad and encompassing, and which focuses more on means than ends is doomed to fail. To be as successful as possible, a strategic document must accurately define the challenges and effectively articulate what is to be done to meet those challenges. Subsequent reviews must convey clearly defined and measurable, short and medium-term goals that respond to the stated challenges as well as the means and resources to accomplish them. For example, if a NSS identifies terrorism as a threat and suggests a robust counter-terrorism strategy, then the QDR and subsequent defense budget would include increasing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources, acquiring additional predator drones and enhancing other key enabler capabilities.

In the 2002 NSS, America's national strategy derived from a combination of two assessments: the U.S. held unprecedented and unequaled strength and influence in the world and the greatest challenges were threats posed by global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and authoritarian regimes, "We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred."[19] The document emphasized the need for alliances, coalitions, working

with others, cooperative action, "this path is not America's alone. It is open to all. "[20] In response to a profound national shock, the 2002 NSS sought deep organizational transformation: "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed" [21] and placed extraordinary emphasis on hard power projection: "It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength"[22] and intelligence. Diplomacy was primarily viewed as a means to more effectively communicate, with a view to helping the Muslim world understand the United States and its ideals as a counterweight to extremism. In analytical hindsight, America did transform its bureaucracy and relied heavily on its military might. But the U.S. government did not work with alliances and partners, particularly in Europe, and its efforts to reach out to the Muslim world and implement more effective public diplomacy was negligible.

The 2010 NSS identifies a need for a more balanced vision of the national security toolbox, utilizing the whole-of-government approach to "update, balance and integrate all of the tools of American power"[23] while expanding the notion of national security to include homeland security and economic issues, including trade and energy. Well before the release of the 2010 NSS, the Obama Administration requested, under the authority of Presidential Study Directive 1, a study analyzing a merger of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. In May 2009, President Obama approved the merger,[24] creating the National Security Staff (NSS). The NSS also mentions the importance of ensuring accountability of policy ownership both within the administration and beyond. Coordination across U.S. departments and agencies, "alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs"[25] are mentioned as important examples of the 2010 NSS's call to align actions and words.[26] Finally, the 2010 NSS also outlines a new strategy of engagement with "adversarial governments" which would place the United States in a much more favorable negotiating position, "Through engagement, we can create opportunities to resolve differences, strengthen the international community's support for our actions, learn about the intentions and nature of closed regimes, and plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that their governments are to blame for their isolation."[27] It is too early to predict how the 2010 NSS will perform. Due to the delay in its release, the 2010 NSS has had to codify the new administration's strategy and policies. Its efforts to engage with adversarial governments, such as Iran, North Korea or Burma, have thus far not produced results at this early stage.

Searching for Transatlantic Methods

Whereas the U.S. refers to its "national security," most countries would use the term "international security" or, at least, to the formulation of their "foreign policy." As a concept, *national* security is relatively new in both France and the UK. In a more technical perspective, American strategic thinking converges with Europe on the need to integrate external and internal security. Such a concern was already visible in the 2002 NSS ("Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing"[28]), but is even more obvious in the 2010 NSS. Transatlantically, the national security concept also has been broadened to fully integrate homeland security concerns.

The 2010 NSS and a growing body of European bilateral and multilateral strategic reviews demonstrate a growing commonality regarding the international security environment, with emphasis on its complexity, uncertainty and fluidity. The 2010 NSS also echoes European calls for more international cooperation and partnerships, in stating that "the very fluidity within the international system that breeds new challenges must be approached as an opportunity to forge new international cooperation,"[29] although the U.S. strategy does not go so far as to call for "effective multilateralism" found in the European Security Strategy.

Because the United States and Europe face similar challenges and constraints, American and European strategic documents demand a flexible, whole-of-government approach but frequently receive external criticism for not having clear strategic and budget priorities. The most recent U.S. discussion on creating greater synergies between diplomacy and development budgets may hint at increasing similarities between the United States and Europe. The focus on improving the balancing of resources and identifying greater organizational efficiencies in the U.S. speak to the EU's current experience and experiment with creating the European External Action Service.

However, some important transatlantic differences remain, particularly on the use of force. Although there are important tactical differences in approach, the 2010 NSS does not radically alter the traditional U.S. view on the use of military force, "The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force."[30] The United States continues to see itself as a "nation at war" which has operational consequences and gives the U.S. military a significant if not dominant role in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

There is one particular transatlantic method that would be especially helpful during the strategic review process: consultation with other governments *prior to* the completion of the document. For example, the French White Paper committee held a series of meetings with U.S. officials and experts, as well as other senior officials from Europe, the EU, NATO, Asia, the Middle East and Africa during the drafting process. Prior to the public release of the U.S. QDR, Defense Department officials visited several European capitals to provide an overview of the document. There is a critical difference between informing another government and opinion leaders about a finalized strategic document and inserting the consultative process into a point in the review process prior to finalization. While other governments clearly appreciate receiving information before the general public, allies and partners are unable to provide input to shape the final product. An allied government does not have to endorse a particular threat assessment or approve a new concept or approach, but an ally should have an opportunity to comment on it. Another important opportunity would be for the senior officials and experts tapped to draft American and European strategic documents to meet for a candid discussion of the challenges and opportunities of drafting these documents prior to the initiation of the process in order to develop better common understanding of strategic terminology, concepts and threat assessment. This would assist in the transatlantic migration of strategic concepts and best implementation practices.

REVIEWING EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGIES

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Introduction

Strategic thinking on security matters is not new to the European Union, but previous strategic statements were limited to individual issues or regional challenges. The EU turned over a new leaf when it published the European Security Strategy, the EU's first attempt to formulate an explicit, overarching strategic framework to guide security policymaking.

This paper provides an overview of both the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and its 2008 'review'.[31] The paper's aim is to illuminate the process by which these strategies were initiated, formulated, implemented and reviewed, as well as to ask whether those strategies have had the desired effects. This aim is situated within a broader goal: to improve transatlantic understanding of these processes with the hope of integrating transatlantic security concerns into future review processes.

Towards these stated ends, this paper examines each strategy (or revision) in terms of the situational and historical context in which it was conceived, the process by which it took shape, the final content of the strategy, and its effect on outcomes. Each section concludes with suggestions for integrating transatlantic security concerns through better U.S. and EU coordination.

The authors find that each strategy went through an elite-led and fairly insular formulation process, with little input from actors outside the EU institutions (or even outside of selected national capitals). One exception is the ESS, which was formulated by an 'inner core' of EU policymakers, but with systematic consultation with European think-tanks. Although finding consensus on a strategic statement amongst 15/25/27 member states is an accomplishment in itself, common weaknesses remain: (a) the strategies have had little impact on other policy or operational outcomes, as currently measured, and (b) the lack of wider consultation undermines the integrating potential of such strategies in a transatlantic context.

European Security Strategy (2003)

Situational and Historical Context

Although novel in the European Union context, the ESS did not emerge from a strategic void. The idea that a coherent set of shared ideas and principles should guide European foreign policy decision-making existed for at least a decade prior to the adoption of the ESS. In the Maastricht Treaty (1993), for instance, European governments sought to build a new 'pillar' for EU foreign policy-making, complete with distinct procedures and security-oriented policy officials. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) subsequently reformed this 'Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)' pillar and introduced the notion of 'common strategies' designed to set goals, priorities, and means to frame joint actions and common positions. Such strategies were subsequently created for Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999), and the Mediterranean region (2000). In 2003, the EU created a European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD, and by 2005 a European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy had been put in place, each with a 'strategic' dimension.

The EU's institutional developments also played a role in paving the way for the ESS. Growth of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) organizational apparatus, for example, led to an institutionalized web of new officials, committees, and processes focused solely on external security matters.[32] These institutions provided the foundation and resources for new ways to consider, formulate, and debate strategic concepts that included military officials more familiar with thinking in strategic terms. Ironically, the European Commission, the EU institution more traditionally associated with strategic and long-term thinking on the European stage, was sidelined from ESDP matters further highlights the need for more strategic and conceptual capacity-building on EU security in general.

Other institutional developments further enabled the potential for more comprehensive, strategic security thinking in the EU. By early 2003, the European Convention, a major undertaking aimed at producing a 'Constitution for Europe', was wrapping up its deliberations and moving towards an intergovernmental conference to reform the EU's founding treaties. The deliberations largely focused on security and defense issues, with many delegates voicing support for new conceptualizations of security and a better defined articulation of Europe's security role in the world. Many debates took place in the working group on defense, chaired by Michel Barnier, which was tasked with considering the winding down of the Western European Union (WEU) and the transfer of its security commitments to the EU. These debates opened up intellectual space for strategic thinking, making explicit calls for the formulation of a strategic concept[33] appear more feasible than ever before.[34]

The launch of the EU's first military operation outside of Europe in the summer of 2003 to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also contributed to development of the EU's global security role and more defined strategic statements. The mobilization of the DRC mission, which took place without NATO participation and involved a level of troop risk not seen before, further raised awareness of the need for more coherent strategic thinking. The mobilization of the DRC mission (and the risk of EU troops being put in harm's way) had the affect of 'breaking the taboo on strategic thinking at the European level', bringing to light the need to align national and European objectives.[35]

International events at the turn of the millennium revealed a widening gap between the EU's practical tools and its vision of its own security role. This 'strategic gap', which might be tolerable in national systems familiar with setting vague goals and generic principles, led increasingly to an EU external policy 'unable to coordinate member state resources and translate this into actual influence'[36] which 'lacked direction, determination, and consistency'.[37] Previous strategic statements were too fragmented as the EU was becoming more ambitious in its global role.

Within ESDP -- which had become the main tool of the EU's security projection -- military and civilian capacities were being developed without an overall set of strategic principles for when they would be used, for what purposes, and towards what long-term goals. For example, the Headline Goal agreed to in Helsinki in 1999 was a purely operational statement. Or, one might also review Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), but that too only reiterated the Petersburg Tasks which indicates what kinds of missions the EU can launch (e.g., humanitarian tasks, rescue operations, peacekeeping, and peacemaking) and includes no guidelines for judging when they should be deployed.[38] It had become increasingly clear that the EU lacks an overarching strategic framework for rationalizing its role in international security matters.

If the context was ripe for a strategic statement on the EU's role in the world, the U.S. invasion of Iraq propelled the process of working towards such a statement, sparking a crisis in Europe and testing the coherence of the EU. Several EU states (notably the UK, Spain and Poland) joined the American-led 'coalition of the willing' whereas other EU states (e.g. Belgium, France and Germany) opposed a military invasion in the absence of a UN mandate and before all other options had been exhausted. One way to soothe tensions and repair diplomatic wounds was to initiate a process of reaffirming what binds EU member states together in terms of foreign policy. All member states could agree to such an endeavor: for some governments, a European strategic statement would allow them to distance themselves from U.S. security perspectives; for other member states, a European strategy would allow them, through an expanded security worldview, to demonstrate solidarity with the U.S. in terms of tackling new security threats. From there, the process of devising a security strategy was born.

Process

In what came to be known as the 'Rhodes Agreement for a strategic concept', Javier Solana was tasked by the EU foreign ministers on 2-3 May 2003 with drafting a document identifying key traits and security challenges facing the EU, and making recommendations for an overall European Security Strategy.

The drafting team formed by Solana was a fairly small group and kept under close control by a few key individuals, including Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat. The perceived advantage of this style of process was that it offered the chance of preserving a 'personal' and non-bureaucratic approach to drafting. The team worked quickly and after one month had produced a first draft. 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', was unveiled by Solana at a Council meeting on 16 June 2003. Subsequently, the Thessaloniki European Council agreed on 20 June 2003 (without substantial discussion) to endorse the recommendations and to commission Solana with presenting the document for adoption by heads of state and government in December 2003. In the meanwhile, Solana was asked to work with 'Member States and the Commission' to refine

the text, which 'should also encapsulate Member States' interests and citizens' priorities.[39] The remaining time from October to December was used for internal discussion among member states and with the Commission and Council officials. Insider accounts suggest harried discussions and considerable tensions between Solana's policy unit (directly appointed by Solana) and the Council's permanent civil servants.

Following the Thessaloniki European Council, Solana turned to select European think tanks to solicit expert opinion on the draft. Three research workshops were held in Rome (19 September 2003), Paris (6-7 October 2003), and Stockholm (20 October 2003) under the overall coordination of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) in Paris. Participants included academics and experts from Europe and beyond, including the U.S. The first workshop, which was held in Rome, focused on the threats facing Europe. Conference proceedings show that participants agreed that terrorism had become a major global threat and should remain high on the ESS threat list; they also agreed that threats like terrorism had to be understood and addressed within a broader socio-political context: 'Terrorism is rooted not so much in poverty as in political hopelessness.'

The participants also discussed WMD non-proliferation and organized crime. There was general agreement that Europe is both a base and a target for organized crime, terrorism and other threats. Debate emerged, however, around the definition of terrorism; the use of military pre-emption, especially against suspected illegal WMD facilities; and the need for EU priorities in its neighborhood, notably its Eastern neighborhood. Finally, the workshop participants recommended that the document should focus less on al-Qaeda and acknowledge that terrorism does not only target Europe and the U.S. They stressed the need to consider giving some negative security guarantees, in order to deter some states from engaging in weapons proliferation; and they further encouraged following up the EU Security Strategy with specific Action Plans (with a regional focus) or policy papers on structural issues (such as aid and conditionality).[40]

The Paris workshop focused on the EU's global objectives, including the importance of effective multilateralism, preventive engagement, working through the United Nations, and the need to secure a UN mandate prior to military engagement in external crises. Discussion also covered the importance of the EU's engagement in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and especially with Russia and its neighbours. The debate focused on the role of pre-emptive deployment, whether to pursue an EU seat at the UN Security Council, the role of future EU foreign policy high representatives, the link between enlargement and security, and the nature of the EU's cooperation with the U.S. and Russia. The participants encouraged Solana to stress the importance of the UN, both militarily and politically, and to emphasize the EU's unfinished role in the Balkans.[41]

Finally, the Stockholm workshop focused on capabilities and coherence of EU foreign policy. Participants here agreed that the price of non-coherence in Europe is unsustainably high (in CFSP), that civilian capabilities in Europe require further development, and that the EU needs to prioritize strategic partnerships. The debate revolved around how to finance security policy (whether more or better spending is necessary), how to better use the EU's diplomatic force and its delegations, what NATO's role should be, and the nature of the transatlantic relationship. The workshop recommended that the final ESS must emphasize the links between internal and external security, focus more on Russia, and pay tribute to the OSCE as an important partner for the normative dimension of foreign policy.[42]

In the period following the expert workshops and the adoption of the final draft, member states were also invited to provide input. According to some experts, the reason the ESS is vague on a number of points is because consensus could not be found amongst member states. Conversely, some issues were included in the ESS only because of potentially strong criticism if they had been excluded. The final draft was adopted by the European Council in December 2003, titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'.[43] At the time, governments recommended several priority areas for action (see below), but no specific deadlines or procedural instructions were presented.

Content

There are some notable differences in content between the first and second public drafts of the ESS, partly as the result of consultation with think-tanks. Most noticeably, the references to 'pre-emption' were removed to instead include 'prevention'. Furthermore, state failure and organized crime became separate entries in the list of key threats (while regional conflicts was added as a threat), and proliferation of WMD was downgraded from the 'single most important threat' to the 'potentially the greatest threat'. References to a new European defense agency were also softened, and a distinction between 'old' and 'new' terrorism was removed.

The ESS is a relatively short document with only 15 pages of text. After a brief introduction, the current security environment is detailed. Then, a discussion takes place on the EU's strategic objectives and the strategy concludes with a section on the policy implications for Europe. When discussing the security environment, the ESS distinguishes between 'global challenges' and 'key threats'. Global challenges include the security-development nexus, competition for natural resources, and energy dependence, whereas the five key threats identified by the strategy are terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. The strategy presents three strategic objectives for the Union to defend its security and promote its values. These are: addressing threats through a mixture of instruments, building security in the neighborhood, and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, the strategy notes that the EU must become more active in pursuing its strategic interests, more capable, especially in terms of military capabilities, more coherent, by bringing together the various instruments and capacities, and better at working together with its partners, including the U.S. but also Russia and the rising powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The ESS represents, for the first time, an explicit, overarching statement on the EU's external security perspective. Moreover, it is one of the more pithy policy statements ever made by EU governments. It managed to bring together 15 diverse governments to outline a set of shared goals in international affairs. It contains a common threat assessment, and agrees on principles for global action even if not stipulating specific steps forward or conditions for triggering EU involvement. The process leading to the ESS, and the ESS itself, must be judged a success by these criteria.

However, the ESS remains vague on a number of key points (as mentioned above, mainly because consensus could not be found). Moreover, some issues were included in the ESS only because there would have been strong criticism from abroad had they been excluded. Most noticeably, the ESS contains no meaningful statement regarding Europe's view on the nature of transatlantic relations (especially on whether approval should be given to non Security Council-mandated military interventions by the U.S.) or on the degree of independence of the EU as an international actor.

Some analysts have challenged the claim that the ESS represents a 'real security strategy'.[44] They argue that while a strategy typically defines goals and sets priorities for policy objectives, and describes the means to be used and under what conditions they will be used, the ESS contains goals without setting any priorities. Furthermore, regarding means by which to implement the strategy, the ESS lists some tools but does not elucidate under what conditions these will be applied.[45]

Effects on Outcomes

By most accounts, the practical effect of the ESS has been limited. Originally intended to be a 'living document' subject to subsequent revisions, the ESS contains no mechanisms for review or evaluation of the strategy. When endorsing the ESS at its December 2003 meeting, the European Council decided that a follow-up up should focus initially on four priority areas for implementation: 'effective multilateralism' with the UN at its core, terrorism, the Middle East and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this regard, a number of strategies and policies, including the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy, and the strategy on WMD proliferation were subsequently adopted (but not all related directly to imperatives contained in the ESS). It is even more difficult, as noted in the next section, to assess the effects of the ESS on actual EU policymaking and resource allocation. With regard to the policy implications outlined in the ESS, it is difficult to assess how much more 'active', 'capable', and 'coherent' the EU is today compared to how it was in 2003. The effects of the Lisbon Treaty, including the creation of the External Action Service and the position of foreign policy High Representative/Vice President, may have significant bearing on the influence of the ESS, but these developments are too recent to fully assess their impact.

ESS Review (2008)

Situational and Historical Context

As discussed above, the ESS was never intended to be a static document. In the years following the adoption of the Strategy in 2003, a number of key developments took place, both within the Union and abroad. One particularly important development was the enlargement of the EU, from 15 to 27 member states, in 2004 and 2007. One rationale for reviewing the ESS was to enhance these new members' sense of ownership of the document.[46] Another argument for reviewing the strategy was to update it in light of the evolving security environment. In particular, Russia's role in its regional zone of interest was seen as troubling by many EU states, who wanted the new strategy to take a harsher stance toward Russia. The debate around Russia intensified following the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008. Similar to the process in 2003, individual personalities played a major role in pushing for revision. Sweden's Carl Bildt and France's Nicolas Sarkozy were especially supportive of revising the ESS. In addition to inter-state warfare in Europe's neighborhood, the emergence of post-modern security threats such as the possibility of a global pandemic, climate change and the global financial crisis – all of which the ESS said little or nothing about – prompted arguments that a revision was necessary.

Not all governments agreed on the need to revise the strategy, however. Some countries, including Germany, feared that reopening the ESS would unleash an uncomfortable debate about Russia, creating or even reinforcing divisions between new and old member states. Other concerns included

the risk of the ESS being watered down into a less successful product and that rewriting the ESS would hamper efforts to approve the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, some countries had reservations about Solana's drafting method (e.g. a small team and revision by a committee of member states), and concerns about the breadth of a drafting mandate.[47] In fact, Solana himself appears to have been reluctant to update the ESS for fears that the policy climate was not conducive to such an undertaking.

The European Council finally agreed on a compromise: to write an 'Implementation Report' on the ESS. Such a report would not replace the ESS, but rather examine how it has fared in practice, and discuss what more needed to be done. For the sake of simplicity, and with some caveats discussed below, this paper refers to the Implementation Report as the 'ESS Review'.

Process

The drafting team for the ESS Review was slightly larger than the initial ESS process. It included several Commission representatives and a similar mix of practitioners and experts. Similar to the 2003 process, a number of high-profile seminars hosted by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) were held during the latter half of 2008. Rome (5-6 June) provided an overview of the security environment, Natolin (27-28 June) focused on the neighborhood, Helsinki (18-19 September) focused on ESDP, and Paris (2-3 October) focused on EU strategic considerations.

However, the drafting process suffered from a lack of political will to review the ESS. Unlike the 2003 process, the institutional expert groups in 2008 lacked a draft from which to work, and therefore discussions lacked focus. Workshop topics were broad and unwieldy. The absence of member state consensus on both the need to revise the ESS and the nature of the current security environment undermined meaningful debate, both in the workshops and in the broader policy community. As a result of these impediments, the role of think-tanks in the revision process proved to be less influential than in 2003. Recommendations were wide-ranging and lacked specificity, resulting in fewer recommendations being adopted in the final document. Doubts again surfaced as to whether the EU had an adequate platform, and process for discussing and debating strategic questions.

Nevertheless, the ESS review process was completed and the 'implementation report' endorsed by the European Council on 12 December 2008 as the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy'.

Content

At first glance, the two documents – the 2003 ESS and the 2008 Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy – look quite similar. They share similar titles and follow roughly the same structure. However, the Implementation Report[48] should not be confused as a revision or update of the ESS. The ESS Review did manage to slightly expand the scope of the threats to include non-strategic threats such as cyber-security, climate change, and pandemics. By some accounts, this expansion was driven not just by functional realities, but also by the fact that different departments within the Commission (allowed a greater role in the 2008 ESS Review) pushed 'their' respective threat. Furthermore, the implementation report included a broader inventory of tools and resources as the means by which the EU could pursue security goals.

On the other hand, the report offers neither guidance as to the kind of situations where military instruments may be called upon nor does it acknowledge the considerable difficulties facing the pursuit of security policy in the EU, not least regarding issues of institutional coordination. It offers few concrete recommendations for change and does not, despite loud criticism following the 2003 ESS, include any mechanisms for follow up and review. As such, the implementation report cannot be described as a 'strategic review' in the sense that it does not assess effectiveness, address the interaction between sub-strategies, policies and actions, or define the EU's foreign policy priorities.

Whereas the ESS considered terrorism a top priority, the ESS Review lumps terrorism together with organized crime. WMD proliferation, however, has been upgraded to a top priority again. Another notable change between the ESS and the ESS Review is that 'failed states' and 'regional conflicts' have been replaced by 'energy security' and 'climate change'. At the same time, the ESS Review offers little advice on prioritization of threats. When it comes to 'preventive engagement' the ESS report uses the same language as the ESS, but also lists sanctions, diplomacy and aid as tools. It also reiterates the importance of multilateralism and stresses partnerships.

It is also interesting to note that the ESS implementation report does not make a reference to a European 'strategic culture' or 'security culture' but instead introduces the concept of 'human security'. Some experts have interpreted this shift in language as an indicator of the EU moving away from its great power ambitions, as outlined in the ESS, and/or downplaying the importance of the transatlantic relationship.[49]

Effects on Outcomes

The ESS Review notes that the ESS remains a work in progress and that the EU still needs to become more capable, coherent and active international actor in order to implement the strategy. While the ESS Review covers a wide range of threats, some member states have been reluctant to discuss threats such as energy and climate change, fearing the ill-effects of 'securitizing' EU policies in these areas. It still remains to be seen to what extent the new External Action Service and the High Representative/Vice President will facilitate new strategic-level debates.

One positive note is the EU's move towards achieving an aim highlighted in both the ESS and the ESS Review: the formation of strategic partnerships with rising powers. For instance, High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton visited India in June 2010 in an effort to boost and institutionalise relations with that country. EU's attempt to establish strategic partnerships with other developed and developing countries around the world, however, is still very much an ongoing process.

Patterns and Policy Recommendations

This brief analysis of the ESS and the ESS Review reveals some common patterns in terms of the context in which each strategy was initiated, the process through each strategy was formulated, the key concepts and substance of each strategy, and the effects on action and outcome.

<u>Situational and Historical Context</u>: Both strategies were initiated at a time of uncertainty, and even insecurity, about the future of European security cooperation. The initiation of a strategy was

seen largely in terms of procedural benefits: bringing governments together to affirm a common set of concepts and principles. The actual effect of the strategy (see below), or a desire to change the course of European security action, were secondary to the act of agreeing on a common policy.

Process: Both strategies were created (and, in the case of the ESS, revised) in elite-led, insular processes. This stems from the perception that achieving agreement among 15 (and then 25/27) national governments requires a closed process. An exception can be found in the original formulation of the ESS, when Solana's team organized a series of topic-specific seminars in cooperation with European think-tanks. Most indications confirm that the results from those sessions were fed into the formulation process in a meaningful way. That model of practitioner-academic interaction succeeded rather well (although was given less of a priority in the ESS Review). Also the model of circulating a draft text during the ESS drafting process was deemed successful.

Content: The content of both strategies reflects the need to reconcile many different national positions. For the ESS, this is apparent in the use of broad, encompassing, and sometimes rather vague formulations of threats and principles, as well as a lack of precision in describing when the EU is likely to act and with what instruments. The documents are rather short on details and imperatives, which in turn undermine the impact of each strategy. On a positive note, the ESS has much in common with the recent U.S. National Security Strategy in terms of threat assessment and a focus on multilateralism. Such commonalities should provide stepping stones towards more coordinated security strategies in the future.

Effect on Outcomes: The effect of each strategy on actual outcomes (policy, budgets, and behavior) is difficult to measure, and the ESS has not been in existence long enough to make an informed judgment. Thus far there is little evidence to show that the ESS has led to significant policy reforms, increased budget, or renewed energy for certain missions or actions. On the contrary, there is a widely perceived slowdown in momentum for the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy, formerly the ESDP), for example.[50] Much of this has to do with Europe's preoccupation with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which may give renewed impetus to the ESS and possibly lead to a revision. The new High Representative, and External Action Service, requires more strategic guidance than ever before as it takes shape with unclear capacities and aims.

Recommendations

The purpose of the preceding analysis was to improve understanding of European Union-level strategic review processes, with the aim of improving transatlantic coherence on security questions. This analysis suggests areas where improvements can be made toward that end.

1. When future strategic reviews are initiated, utilize think-tanks in the U.S. and EU to cultivate transatlantic links. Those links can provide the foundation for policymakers to meet and discuss commonalities, shared perspectives, and possible obstacles to strategic coherences. When bringing in outside experts, it may be wise to circulate a 'straw-man text' providing a base for discussions.

2. In advance of reviewing their respective security strategies, EU and U.S. officials should each consider floating a 'transatlantic white paper' to pre-identify key transatlantic issues that can be discussed and fed into their respective strategies.
3. Build a more structured transatlantic venue for the discussion of strategic concepts, principles, and priorities. Currently there are few venues for strategic thinking outside of NATO. A new venue (a council, 'dialogue', or the like), perhaps along the lines of the EU-U.S. summit process, could be designed to facilitate broader security discussions and forge common views between the U.S. and EU.
4. The previous recommendation is predicated on the need for the EU to build its own strategic debate forum. On the European side, there are few European level venues for considering strategic questions. A 'strategic culture', along with government officials charged with strategic thinking, has yet to emerge at the European level. An annual European security conference, to advise a group of EU-level policy advisors dedicated to long-term planning, could be initiated.
5. Create a review process as a way to translate security strategies into tangible policy steps and then to evaluate progress on a regular basis. Such a process would go a long way towards rectifying the current problem of strategy-making as a process in and of itself, typically with little or no follow-up.

THE 2010 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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Historical Context

The NATO Strategic Concep2t (SC) is the main document providing political and operational guidance to the Alliance. The most current SC was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, while the previous one dated back to 1999. Throughout NATO's history the Alliance has adopted Strategic Concepts at irregular intervals, when NATO members became convinced that major internal or external strategic changes required them to undertake an urgent – albeit complex and sensitive – political process.

The international system has recently seen the emergence of new powers such as China and the re-emergence of old ones like Russia. Globalization has encouraged a redistribution of economic power but a corresponding effective global governance structure has not yet been created. This underlying international development affects many issues which NATO must address ranging from relations with Russia to international crisis management.

The greatest shock was the 2001 terrorist attack against the U.S., which caused the activation of the Article 5 provision by the Alliance for the first time in its history. In the years following, the NATO intervention in Afghanistan has become by far the largest Allied operation in terms of troops deployed, casualties suffered and prolonged military efforts. The operation has also had a deep impact on the Alliance's capabilities, finances, organization and doctrines.

Since 1999, NATO has enlarged its membership to 13 Central and Eastern European countries. This process, together with EU enlargement, has contributed to peace and stability in Europe but also has had a complex impact on the Alliance. The expansion of member nations from 15 to 28 required the Alliance to seriously consider more national security priorities and threats, and, due to different threat perceptions among NATO members, it is more difficult to achieve a common vision and strong Alliance cohesion. The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 signalled a less benign European security environment which influenced the security perceptions of the new Eastern European NATO members and underscored the need to enhance strategic reassurance among some NATO members vis-à-vis Russia. However, other member states would have rather devoted additional NATO energies and efforts to out-of-area operations.

A fundamental part of the strategic review context is the current status of transatlantic relations and relations between NATO and the EU. In the latter case, the nature of the two organizations remains very different, as do their respective political mandates despite the fact that 21 states are members of both organizations. Nevertheless it seems that a certain degree of compatibility is emerging, particularly within the framework of complex operations and with the so-called "comprehensive approach," as the EU has a wider set of policy tools to address contemporary threats and challenges. On the ground, a pragmatic cooperation often takes place where EU and NATO missions are deployed together, for example in the Gulf of Aden and in the Western Balkans. However, there are problematic political dimensions due to the different membership composition of the two organizations—for example, Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU and the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU but not NATO with both countries preventing the two organizations from working together. Unfortunately, these issues simply cannot be resolved by officials who are implementing operational requirements. On a positive note, the reinsertion of France in NATO's integrated military command has contributed to improved relations between Americans and Europeans and between the two organizations, after the tensions that occurred during the Iraq crisis subsided.

Another important change in the security environment is the increasing importance of new threats such as cyber attacks. Beyond the 2007 Estonian case, a number of examples have prompted cyber-security to be placed as a top NATO priority, and the Alliance is establishing structures and instruments to deal with this new threat. The EU has similar concerns on cyber security, though considered strictly related to internal security.[51]

Finally, the U.S. appears to be less interested than in the past in European security per se and more interested in having an effective European contribution to global security issues: a challenge that the Europeans are still debating. Meanwhile, European countries are reducing their defense budgets in order to reduce the amount of sovereign debts accumulated over the past decade. Therefore, the effect on NATO will be an overall reduction of the defense resources available and a widening of the transatlantic defense capabilities gap since very few European countries in 2010 spend more than 2% of their GDP on defense (some NATO members spend less than 1% GDP), in comparison to the 4.3% that the U.S. spends on defense. This has a direct impact on NATO capacities, finances and ambitions, as well as on transatlantic solidarity, which undermines the possibility of significant burden sharing.

As a whole, the international security environment seems to be less benign and more complex today than in 1999, making it more difficult to forge a solid transatlantic consensus on NATO's role.

Process

While all Strategic Concepts have been approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) at the level of Heads of State and Government, there is no legal or institutional template which defines the NATO strategic review process, and which actors and bodies must be included in the process.

Traditionally, the strategic review involves a complex set of political, diplomatic and bureaucratic negotiations. Subject to NATO's functioning and rationale, this process does not happen in a vacuum,

rather it draws from the daily work of negotiations in various NATO committees, past adopted practices and previously released communiqués. To a certain extent, the strategic review process codifies past decisions and activities and organizes NATO's evolution into a new, coherent and overarching document.

Since the 1990's, possibly because external threats were less evident and compelling, the elaboration of the SC has become more of a political exercise than a military one, dealing with the redefinition of core tasks, institution building, enlargement, and partnerships. In contrast, strict defence planning draws less attention. Thus, the political-diplomatic structure of the Alliance has increased its role in the elaboration of the SC. The "public diplomacy" character of the process has gained more and more importance in the last two decades.

The 2010 strategic review has been further modified, if compared with 1999. Rather than beginning negotiations directly within the NATO structures, the NATO Heads of State and Government approved the concept that a Group of Experts appointed by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen would offer advice and insights on the new Strategic Concept to NATO. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright chaired the Group, which included diplomats and experts from the private sector and academia. Working in close coordination with the Secretary General, the Group organized several seminars with officials from NATO and member states, relevant stakeholders and members of the transatlantic defense policy community. The Group presented its report "*NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*" to the NAC in May 2010.[52]

Following the presentation of the Expert's report, the strategic review process was led by the Secretary General.[53] First, he consulted the member states directly to collect and solicit feedback on the Group's report. Second, he wrote a draft of the SC and discussed it with the NAC at the level of Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers where he received general approval and further input. Finally, in November 2010 the NATO Heads of State and Governments approved the new SC "*Active Engagement, Modern Defence.*"[54] Broadly speaking, the final document had been largely drawn from the work done by the Group of Experts, underlining the significance of this innovative procedure.

NATO's military committees were also consulted and had been involved in the strategic review through consultations by the Group of Experts and the Secretary General, and they publicly outlined their proposals on the 2010 SC and the future of NATO. Also, other Alliance bodies have adopted a proactive role: the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, for example, released a set of proposals and recommendations regarding the Strategic Concept.[55]

Overall, the 2010 process was more inclusive than in the past. In fact, the Group of Experts involved a large portion of the transatlantic defense community, including not only diplomats and military personnel but also academics, and individuals from think tanks and the private sector. In addition, partners such as the EU had the opportunity to provide input to the Alliance's strategic review. Moreover, the process increased NATO's transparency with respect to the wider public and used information sharing technology, such as a dedicated official NATO website.

This thorough and inclusive process had three main purposes. First, it improved the quality of the Strategic Concept through the gathering of new ideas and external contributions from a wider range of policy actors. Second, it strengthened the practice of "consensus building" by involving national polities at the initial phase, and reduced disagreements among member states also at this initial stage.

This consensual process allowed for early support for the SC's preliminary findings which facilitated the final approval of the SC and avoided difficult last-minute negotiations.

Finally, the process produced a more durable result in terms of "public diplomacy." Out of area operations, particularly in Afghanistan, with great costs both in personal sacrifice and treasure, have eroded positive public opinion regarding NATO. The economic crisis and the increasing weight of public debts also negatively impacts the level of NATO member's defense spending. The Alliance's *raison d'être,* which was existentially straightforward when Soviet troops threatened Western Europe, has become less and less evident in the current situation where the fundamental NATO goal of Europe whole, free and at peace has been almost achieved. The new Strategic Concept process attempted to increase domestic consensus in favour of the Alliance, demonstrating NATO's openness and transparency. This public diplomacy effort also has a positive "external" dimension, aimed at potential partner and third countries, particularly Russia and the Middle East, which project an image of NATO as security provider rather than as a risk or threat itself.[56]

In fact, this process is not an absolute novelty. Interestingly, the NATO strategic review had *de facto* replicated the EU practice, involving relevant stakeholders in the drafting of European directives and regulations from the very beginning.

Content

While the 1999 SC was meant to justify NATO out of area operations in its new role as global security provider, the 2010 SC aimed to strike a balance between a pro-active posture, including operations and partnerships and the Alliance's traditional core task of collective defense.

The 2010 SC presents some similarities and some innovative thinking with respect to the 1999 document, as it attempted to balance different priorities and formulate strategic guidelines in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary way.

First, the document redefines the Alliance's "*core tasks.*" Collective defense is the first task listed in the SC, reinforcing the very *raison d'être* of NATO established in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and re-stated by every Strategic Concept, including the 1999 and 2010 ones. Yet the newest SC renews its affirmation that "*NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or of the Alliance as a whole.*"[57] This formula intentionally allows NATO leaders to include, on a case-by-case basis, new security threats under the Article 5 umbrella. For example, the capability to defend member states against ballistic missile attacks is defined in the SC as a "*core element of our collective defence.*"[58] Also cyber attacks represent another emerging security challenge included in the SC priorities, and it is recognized that core NATO defense tasks include the development of capabilities intended to defend member states and Alliance structures against cyber attacks.

A second core task outlined in the Strategic Concept is crisis management. This innovation with respect to the Washington Treaty was introduced in the Alliance's strategy by the 1999 SC when NATO initiated the first out-of-area operations in the Balkans and has been retained by the 2010 document. This core task not only includes crisis management and prevention, but also stabilization

operations and support for reconstruction in post-conflict situations. The scope of out of area operations is broadened when taking into account the kind of mission NATO is currently managing in Afghanistan.

The last NATO core task established by the 2010 SC is "*cooperative security.*" Under this broad definition, cooperation and partnership activities are re-introduced as Alliance tasks (first included in the 1999 SC) and have risen in importance in the last decade. Cooperative security also includes the continuation of the "*open door policy*" (the further expansion of NATO membership), disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The inclusion of these policies among the NATO core tasks enhances their importance in the Alliance's strategy but does not necessarily imply radical changes in NATO's rationale and management of these challenges. For example, any enlargement decision must be approved on a case by case basis by the NAC.

However, possibly the greatest innovation of the new SC is its format. First, it is a relatively brief document compared to the 1999 one, narrowing its focus on a few fundamental guidelines and leaving a large part of the implementation provisions to the Declaration approved by the heads of state and government in Lisbon together with the SC. The thinking behind this strategy was that subsequent NATO Summits would elaborate on and update the existing Strategic Concept, while leaving the SC as unchanged as possible. It was believed that this method would provide the necessary flexibility to concretely adapt NATO strategy to changing circumstances, and avoid the possibility that an overly detailed or prescriptive Strategic Concept would become rapidly obsolete. Moreover a relatively short SC document makes it more easily read and reviewed by the general public, consistent with public diplomacy objectives.

Following the outlined core tasks, the SC provides a general assessment of the security environment. With respect to the 1999 SC, there was an implicit prioritisation of threats and risks that emerged; however, the lack of a more explicit prioritisation would have been difficult due to the requirement of achieving the unanimous consent of all 28 members.

The 2010 SC also specifies how NATO shall deal with each of its three core tasks. On defense and deterrence, a large part of the guidelines are traditional elements concerning NATO's military posture, such as conventional capabilities, nuclear deterrence, and the need for more expeditionary military forces. However, the goal to develop new capacities to deal with emerging threats, such as ballistic missile, cyber and terrorist threats is not new. Beyond the usual emphasis on comprehensive approach, the SC does take a new approach regarding crisis management as NATO seeks to develop an internal civilian capability, aimed to act as liaison with actors such as the EU, and to complement Alliance's military operations should other partners be unwilling or unable to act in support of NATO operations. Finally, on cooperative security, the most interesting new development arises from the decision to further develop partnerships, particularly in the NATO commitment to be "*open to consultation with any partner country on security issue of common concern*," and to give to operational partners a "*structural role*" in shaping the strategy and the decisions on common missions.[59]

Overall, the main value of the new SC is that it takes stock of the changes that have occurred in the security environment since 1999, adapts and updates NATO tasks and posture. There is no dramatic break from the previous 1999 document; on the contrary, there is a clear effort to stress continuity. The emphasis on continuity is justified by two main reasons. First, diverging threat

perceptions among the Allies require the SC to strike a balance between "conservative" and "innovative" positions. This balance forges a kind of "*acquis atlantique,*"[60] consolidated through previous strategic reviews, which weighs powerfully against any "new thinking" and avoids all risky, dramatic and contentious strategic shifts. Second, there is a strong "conservative" bias within all defense establishments which is found in their doctrines, structures and capabilities. Furthermore, the defense community is normally very reluctant to completely scrap older military capabilities and platforms, even if they appear of limited in their utility in present circumstances on the basis that it would be difficult if not impossible to rebuild them rapidly should a need for them re-emerge abruptly. The consequence of this mentality, however, is that new ideas and initiative have to carry forward the burden of the old, fighting for scarce resources and sometimes even adopting less than optimal strategies in the name of strategic continuity. That is why the new SC also has the appearance of a complex patchwork than the smoothness of completely coherent tissue. A case in point, but not the only one, may be the decision to keep tactical nuclear weapons based on the European territory.

Impact

The NATO SC, like the European Security Strategy, is a non-legally binding document adopted by consensus within an international framework. Although it is too early to reasonably assess the impact of the Strategic Concept approved on November, 2010, we have attempted to measure the effect of the 1999 strategic review. Traditionally, the Strategic Concept has played some role by providing political guidance for future decisions with the caveat that as far as security and defence are concerned. Therefore, the SC has a limited impact on the development and operations of NATO and an even more limited effect on member states. Because NATO and the EU remain strictly multilateral forums where decision-making is very different and distinct from unilateral, national processes, it is extremely difficult to measure the "net effect" of the strategic review as well as its success.

The 1999 strategic review has arguably influenced the Alliance' policies and posture in several ways, but it is difficult to measure how much as well as the existence of causal links between it and subsequent NATO operations and evolutions. In that sense, it appears more useful to assess five "likely" effects of the 1999 SC.

First, the 1999 SC performed a "consensus building" function among the Allies. The political compromises reached through the strategic review identified common ground among different national perceptions, priorities and agendas creating an *acquis atlantique*. However, the changes occurring in the international security scene—the enlargement of NATO and the impact of new strategic priorities—are challenging the old "*acquis*" and driving the need for a new consensus. Although single SC can deliver such a perfect result, the review process—begun in 1991 further developed in the 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts—has most likely helped to maintain the Alliance cohesion and permitted NATO to confront the necessary changes in an orderly and cooperative way.

Second, the 1999 SC has, to a certain extent, justified the old threats and challenges and prepared the way for the new, non-Article 5 and out-of-area operational challenges. The 1999 SC certainly has contributed in making the case for these new tasks of the Alliance which was almost unthinkable 20 years ago and quite contested 12 years ago, but finally included in the NATO core task by the 2010

SC. Despite important disagreements, for instance on Iraq, NATO unanimously agreed to embark on several out-of-area and non-Article 5 missions, such as the maritime operation Ocean Shield and the peace enforcing mission in Kosovo.

Third, the 1999 SC influenced the national security strategies of several NATO member states, particularly the smaller and newer countries. A European country with limited global projection and military capabilities may usefully shape its defence and security policy on the basis of NATO's concepts to better align its domestic assessment with NATO's strategic outlook. It may sometimes be just a "declaratory policy," but it suggests a process of "socialization" of the military, diplomatic and political national elites which is convergent with NATO interests.

Fourth, the 1999 SC performed a "public diplomacy" function, contributing to making the case for the continued relevance of the Alliance in the future. Moreover, one purpose of the SC was to create a new official narrative and demonstrate to NATO members' domestic audiences and non-NATO publics that NATO was placing greater emphasis on "cooperation," "partnership," "dialogue," "peace," and "security" in order to explain and support NATO's purpose, role and operations.

Fifth, the 1999 SC accompanied the structural changes and organizational developments of the Alliance. In 2002, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was established to lead the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrines advocated by the SC. The new SC tasks NATO to "*engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximize efficiency,*"[61] thus "authorizing" the ongoing negotiations on the reorganization of NATO headquarters, commands, agencies, committees and structures, mainly aimed to cope with cuts in the member states' defense budgets. The Lisbon declaration on the implementation of the SC states that the Alliance will reduce its standing personnel in the headquarters by 35%, and NATO agencies will be reduced from 14 to 3. The only certainly that one can glean from the effect of the 1999 SC is that it had no effect on member states' defense budgets which continued to decrease despite the call for adequate military forces and resources.

Key Variables

This chapter will analyze four key variables which have influenced NATO strategic review in 2010: political leadership, institutional context, bottom-up pressure and public opinion.

Political Leadership

In 2010, political leadership played a fundamental role in initiating the strategic review. Undertaking this process is risky, because it forces actors to confront sensitive and uncomfortable issues. The NATO strategic review, like the EU and French ones, is not a periodical exercise to be undertaken at regular intervals, as happens with the American QDR. Therefore, the beginning of a strategic review largely depends on political decisions taken at the highest level of policy-making.

In the NATO case, deep divisions among member states caused by the war in Iraq made it almost impossible to undertake a common strategic review. Promising significant changes to U.S. foreign policy and emphasizing multilateralism, the election of Barack Obama removed an important political obstacle coupled with the electoral victories of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French

President Nicolas Sarkozy also played a role in creating a transatlantic "rapprochement." In 2006 Chancellor Merkel declared that a new NATO strategic rethinking was necessary and in 2008 President Sarkozy made the decision to reintegrate France into NATO's integrated military command. As a result, the 2009 Strasburg-Kehl Summit Declaration on Alliance Security initiated and provided procedural framework for the 2010 strategic review.

Institutional Context

NATO's organization and the roles of its internal structures, such as the Secretary General and the NAC, have a significant impact on all its activities including the strategic concept. NATO works under strong intergovernmental control and strategic decisions are only taken within the NAC and by consensus.

The NATO Secretary General increased his role in the 2010 strategic review marking the first time that a Secretary General was in charge of drafting the SC which in the past had been primarily accomplished within NATO committees and particularly by the NAC. Nevertheless, the NAC remained the main decision-making body of the Alliance, and it made the final modifications to the SC draft during the meeting of Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers. Later the Heads of State and Government gathered within the NAC format in Lisbon for the last word and final approval of the SC.

The Secretary General generally has less power than his counterparts in the European Commission. Because the position is unable to exert political pressure on its members, the NATO Secretary General's role depends mainly on his personal, political ability and leadership quality as he performs the role of secretariat which can exert only a limited role as chairman of the NAC as a consensus builder. In no case does the Secretary General have the power to force the NAC or an individual member states to perform a task it does not wish to do.

Bottom-up Pressure

NATO already began to deal with non-traditional security challenges during the 1990s by implementing out-of-area operations and establishing new structures well before the 2010 SC provided such guidelines. Examples of this include non-Article 5 operations in the Balkans and the establishment of a new NATO division on emerging threats prior to the inclusion of energy or cyber security as a challenge to NATO. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the evolution and transformation of NATO has been increasingly operational and mission-driven.

It was also widely recognized within[62] and outside of NATO that the Alliance had to take stock of its recent practices, lessons learned on the ground, as well as its doctrinal and organizational evolution. In that sense, the "bottom-up" pressure was a key variable for the 2010 strategic review because it created the need to initiate a strategic review and provided part of the content of the new SC. For example, the experience in Afghanistan ensured that stabilization operations and reconstruction support would be part of the 2010 SC as they fall under the "crisis management" section as core tasks.

Within a crisis management context, a comparison can be made between NATO and the EU. On the one hand, the two organizations work in similar ways: there is a "mission creep" dynamic from

past or present tasks which create the need to undertake further missions. For the EU, the "neo-functionalist" theory explains how the tasks connected to the single market goals would push for further European integration. For NATO at the end of the Cold War, the Alliance expanded its tasks and its areas of interests, reaching a range of activities never dreamed of in 1949. On the other hand, the process is different. In the EU framework the EC launches top-down initiatives through "*white paper*," directives, strategies, institution building, which later on became part of the Community "*acquis*," also through a constant update and upgrade of the treaties. In contrast, at NATO the pressure comes mainly from the need to tackle new and unexpected security crises or challenges—from piracy in the Gulf of Aden to cyberattacks against member states—which in turn lead to new NATO missions, operations and structures before the codification in the Alliance's official strategy. Moreover, NATO has never modified the 60 year-old provisions of the Washington Treaty. The Washington Treaty remains a very short and simple document with NATO relying on SCs and its political leadership to steer its evolution.

Public Opinion

The last key variable to consider is public opinion in NATO member states. This is not to say that European or North American public opinion have directly shaped the 2010 SC as there is little interest in NATO strategy among the wider public. It is exactly this lack of interest and the corresponding scarcity of support to NATO military operations and member states' defense policies that represents a key variable. Indeed, one of the reasons NATO carried out the latest strategic review in a more open way was to reach out as much as possible both to the security policy community and to the general public. This has largely influenced the content and the language of the 2010 Strategic Concept as well as its length.

Recommendations

In the light of the previous analysis, it is possible to draw some policy recommendations aimed at improving cooperation between NATO, EU and member states in Europe and North America with particular regards to the actions the EU can undertake in the near future.

Doing a European Strategic Review

The EU should undertake a new strategic review of its security and defense policy. This review is necessary to take stock of the changes which have occurred in the security environment, the evolution of EU to include its enlargement and the approval of the Lisbon Treaty, and the strategic security reviews carried on by France, the U.S. and NATO after the ESS was released in 2003. Security strategies have become more important as the strategic environment gets more complex and the need for international cooperation grows while available resources are constrained.

The creation of a new ESS should be aimed to fulfill four tasks which the 2010 SC pursued regarding NATO: 1) build consensus among member states on the EU's role in the security field; 2) provide guidelines for the evolution of EU security and defense policy; 3) encourage the convergence of national security strategies; 4) improve domestic public opinion perceptions of the EU at home and in third countries through public diplomacy. The public diplomacy goal should be secondary with

;regards to strategic prioritization. The contested issues have to be discussed among member states, because a "hollow consensus," (meaning a few EU member states feel strongly about an issue and push for an outcome while other member states either do not express an opinion or care about the issue but "go along" from a political standpoint) does not help strengthen the EU's foreign and security policy. In order to fulfill these goals, the strategic review should receive a strong political mandate by the EC, the Council and the European Parliament, and these institutions should maintain their full involvement during the process. The EES should also adopt an open and inclusive process, including the appointment of an *ad hoc* group of experts.

In addition, a new ESS would hopefully clarify an EU vision on several security issues and facilitate cooperation with counterparts such as NATO or the U.S. on issues of common interest. A specific part of the new ESS should be focused on relations with NATO, as the 2010 SC does with the partnership with the EU, in order to define the Union's policy towards the Alliance and provide new impetus for cooperation.

Building up a Better EU-NATO Strategic Cooperation

Better EU-NATO strategic cooperation should be pursued as the two institutions not only share the same values but they also share 21 member states, 21 sets of armed forces and taxpayers. So far there has been no satisfactory coordination at the highest level between the two institutions. Improved cooperation should be employed on a range of activities where the complementary nature of the two organizations would facilitate a cost-effective and comprehensive approach. This implies more regular participation of each organization's representatives in each other's committees at various levels, where security issues of common interest are debated; deeper communication and exchange of views between the two military staffs, also through enhanced liaison offices;[63] and more coordination with regards to crisis management, in terms of prevention, intervention and post-intervention.

The 2010 SC welcomes an active and effective EU, as well as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, while recommending the fullest involvement of NATO members which are not EU members in the efforts to address common security challenges.[64] It also pledges NATO to work to "*strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations.*"[65] Such an approach by NATO, underlined by the invitation of the President of the EU Council to the NAC meeting in Lisbon, paves the way for better EU-NATO strategic cooperation but the institutional partnership needs concrete follow-up actions.

Having Closer Coordination between High Representative/VP and Secretary General

The two leaders responsible for security and defence policy, namely the EU High Representative and the NATO Secretary General, play important, if different, roles within their respective organizations in fostering cooperation among the two institutions.

Complete implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, including the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the inclusion of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in the EU institutional framework, represents an opportunity to improve the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP). At the same time, the current NATO Secretary General is very interested in

strengthening cooperation with the EU and particularly with the High Representative with the full approval of NATO expressed in the Lisbon Declaration. Productive meetings between Secretary General Rasmussen and High Representative Ashton have already taken place in 2010. As a result, it is feasible to seek closer coordination between the two individuals as a foundational element for better cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Riding the Bottom-up Pressure

The EU and NATO should undertake common strategic reviews of the operations they carry on in the same theatre. Putting aside the most problematic example represented by Afghanistan, the EU and NATO deploy anti-piracy maritime missions in the Somali basin and peace-keeping/peace building missions in the Balkans. At the operational level, more cooperation is likely to unfold based on the urgency of saving resources and avoiding duplication.[66] Moreover, the mantra of a comprehensive approach provides the necessary rationale for increased coordination and cooperation between the two organizations. Particularly, the establishment of a modest civilian capability within NATO envisaged by the 2010 SC should become an opportunity to improve the communications and cooperation in this domain between the EU and NATO, and thereby avoiding the possibility of a new useless competition.

A joint EU – NATO strategic review of on-going operations would have two positive effects. First, it would improve the management of missions in the Balkans and in the Somali basin and contribute to their overall mission success. Second, cooperation on the ground between the two organizations would continue to improve,[67] and useful lessons could be learned to improve cooperation at the strategic level. Both organizations should be responsive to the bottom-up pressures to fuel further evolutions at the strategic level in order to push for a better high-level cooperation.

Making a Joint EU-NATO Threat Assessment

The EU and NATO should manage a joint assessment of threats, risks and strategic priorities. This exercise has already been carried out between NATO and Russia as it has positively contributed to fostering strategic convergence in the very initial phase of a security policy, namely the identification of the threats to address. This positive effect should be, in theory, even greater between NATO and the EU.

While the EU continues to work out its own threat assessment, in line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the entry into force of the new assistance and solidarity clauses, the compatibility of a common approach with NATO is highly useful. Working jointly with NATO could deepen common understanding between the two organisations.

Exploring Cooperation on Internal Security

A potentially fruitful area of cooperation between EU and NATO is internal security. The EU has been increasingly involved in this field in recent years. The 2010 SC does not consider internal security as a NATO core task but includes terrorism and the disruption of vital communication in the ranking of security threats which are usually considered by the EU as internal security matters. NATO leadership also recognizes that it does not have the leading role on challenges affecting the internal security of the Alliance.[68] This paves the way for a fruitful cooperation in internal security, as both the

EU and NATO are interested in the issue while their competencies and assets are complementary thus avoiding duplication. The EU is particularly well placed to take the initiative and lead common efforts in this field.

Removing Indirect Obstacles

An indirect but very tough obstacle to improving cooperation between EU and NATO is the disagreement between Turkey and Cyprus. As Cyprus is part of the EU but not of NATO and the opposite is true for Turkey, the long standing dispute among the two hampers practical and strategic cooperation between the two organizations. In fact, both countries slow down, limit and even halt opportunities for cooperation on several dossiers between the two organizations because of their bilateral stalemate.[69]

The EU, NATO, North American and European member states should make an additional effort to resolve this dispute which is not only a problem *per se* for the Euro-Atlantic area but also a relevant obstacle for transatlantic cooperation on security issues. Meanwhile, pragmatic steps could be taken to ease the respective concerns on EU-NATO cooperation. The EU should negotiate a framework agreement with Turkey on Turkish cooperation in support of CSDP, including data sharing and Turkish participation in EDA activities. This would ease Turkish concerns on enhancing strategic NATO cooperation with the EU as Ankara would no longer perceive the intra-EU dynamics regarding CSDP as a "black box." In parallel, NATO should negotiate a similar agreement with Cyprus to ease its security concerns about the Alliance's activities and Turkey's role.

Notes

[1] The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization, the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders.
[2] "National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991," *Federation of American Scientists*, [http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm].
[3] "National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991," *Federation of American Scientists*, [http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm].
[4] 2002 NSS, 5.
[5] 2010 NSS, 20.
[6] Hillary Clinton, "Town Hall on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review at the Department of State," Washington, DC, July 10, 2009, [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/125949.htm].
[7] The terms were not settled yet, and the 2002 NSS mentions "a war against terrorists of global reach" (p. 5), "war against global terrorism" (p. 7) or "global war on terrorism" (p. 27) as well as "war on terrorism" in several instances.
[8] Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, "'Global War On Terror' Is Given New Name," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2009.
[9] 2010 NSS, p. 20.
[10] 2010 NSS, p. 27.
[11] 2010 NSS, p. 18.

[12] Cabinet Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Security in an interdependent world,” March 2008, p. 41.
[13] 2010 QDR, pp. 9 ss.
[14] CSIS Commission on Smart Power, *A Smart, More Secure America*, November 6, 2007, [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf].
[15] Gordon Adams, “Assessing the QDR and 2011 defense budget,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2 March 2010, [http://www.thebulletin.org/node/8325].
[16] 2002 NSS, p. iv.
[17] 2006 NSS, p.44.
[18] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Final Report*, July 22, 2004. The position was eventually established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed the same year.
[19] 2002 NSS, p. 30.
[20] 2002 NSS, p. 7.
[21] 2002 NSS, p. 29.
[22] 2002 NSS, p. 29.
[23] 2010 NSS, p. 14.
[24] 2010 NSS, p. 14.
[25] 2010 NSS, p. 14.
[26] Adm. Mike Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” *Foreign Policy*, August 28, 2009, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/28/strategic_communication_getting_back_to_basics].
[27] 2010 NSS, p. 11.
[28] 2002 NSS, p. 34.
[29] 2010 NSS, p. 9.
[30] 2010 NSS, p. 22.
[31] Another strategic statement from the EU pertains to the ‘Internal Security Strategy’ agreed in March 2010, the first of its kind and a possible corollary to the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy. For reasons of space constraints, however, we will not include the ISS in this particular study.
[32] Bailes, Alison (2005) ‘The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History’ SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10. [http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf].
[33] As was for instance done by Wim van Eekelen, a prominent member of the convention and former WEU Secretary-General.
[34] Biscop, Sven (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels [http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/conference%202004/Session%204/biscop_paper.doc].
[35] Biscop, Sven (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, page 7. [http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/conference%202004/Session%204/biscop_paper.doc].
[36] Toje, Asle (2005) ‘The 2003 European Union Security Strategy – a Critical Appraisal’, *European Foreign Affairs* Review, 9 (1), 117:134.
[37] Biscop, Sven (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, Page 4. [http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/conference%202004/Session%204/biscop_paper.doc].
[38] Biscop, Sven (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, page 4. [http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/conference%202004/Session%204/biscop_paper.doc].
[39] (Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 1 October 2003)
[40] Minutes from the seminar [in French] “Strategie de Securite de l’Union Europeenne” 2003 [http://www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/ESS_seminar_reports/report-Rome.pdf]
[41] Minutes from the seminar [in French] “Strategie de Securite de l’Union Europeenne” 2003 [http://www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/ESS_seminar_reports/report-Rome.pdf]
[42] Minutes from the seminar [in French] “Strategie de Securite de l’Union Europeenne” 2003 [http://www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/ESS_seminar_reports/report-Rome.pdf]

[43] Council of the European Union "A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy" December 12, 2003 [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf].
[44] Toje, 2005
[45] Except in the case of failed states, where the strategy mentions that military instruments should be used to restore order.
[46] This is despite the fact that all candidate countries were involved in the 2003 drafting process.
[47] The instructions from governments to Solana in December 2007 were lukewarm, at best: 'Examine implementation of the ESS, and if necessary, ways to complement it'. According to Biscop, 'this caution betrays a lack of confidence on the part of the Member States in the strength of the EU's – and thus their own shared – strategic culture…' Biscop, Sven (2009) 'Odd Couple of Dynamic Duo? The EU and Strategy in Times of Crisis'. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14, 367-384.
[48] Council of the European Union. "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World." Brussels, December11, 2008.
S407/08 [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf].
[49] Toje, Asle (2010) 'The EU Security Strategy Revisited: Europe Hedging Its Bets', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 15(1): 171-190.
[50] For a helpful overview of the state of play of the CSDP, see Greco et.al. (2010) 'EU Crisis Management: Institutions, and Capabilities in the Making', Istituto Affari Internazionali, Paper No. 19.
[51] This issue is assessed by UI's paper. Noticeably, the EC has financed through the Framework Programmes researches on protection of critical infrastructure, border control and maritime security.
[52] NATO Group of Experts, "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement" 2010.
[53] Private talks with officials at NATO HQ, Brussels, October 2010.
[54] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[55] NATO PA, "Proposals and Recommendations for a New NATO Strategic Concept" 2010.
[56] Private talks with officials at the NATO HQ, Brussels, June 2010.
[57] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[58] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[59] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[60] It can be defined as a sort of un-contested political and strategic understanding, established through the six decades of NATO existence. See: Shea, J. "NATO at Sixty – and beyond," in *NATO in Search of a Vision,* eds. Aybet G. and Moore R. R. Georgetown University Press, 2010.
[61] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[62] Private talks with officials at the NATO HQ, Brussels, June 2010.
[63] The liaison office of the EU Military Staff at NATO Supreme Headquarter Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), in 2010 was composed only by 5 officials, which have to deal with thousands of NATO military official there.
[64] Noticeably, in 2010 Turkey has become the largest contributor in terms of military personnel to the EU operation Althea in Western Balkans although it is not a EU member.
[65] NATO "Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defence" 2010.
[66] Private talks with officials at NATO HQ, Brussels, June 2010.
[67] Private talks with officials at NATO HQ, Brussels, October 2010.
[68] Private talks with officials at NATO HQ, Brussels, June 2010.
[69] Private talks with officials at NATO HQ, Brussels, October 2010.