



# Consolidating African and EU assessments in view of the implementation of the Partnership on Peace and Security



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*Nicoletta Pirozzi is Senior Fellow, European Affairs Area, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome*

*Valérie Vicky Miranda is Junior Researcher, Security and Defence Area, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome*

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## Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANB	Africa News Brief
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers' Association
ASF	African Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
AU ECOSOCC	African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council
AULOs	African Union Liaison Officers
AUPST	African Union Peacekeeping Support Team
CAOG	Ouakam Gendarmerie Officers School (Senegal)
CAR	Central African Republic
CCCPA	Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Ethiopian national Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CMD	Conflict Management Division
COAFR	Africa Working Party
COPS	Peace and Security Committee
CPADD	Humanitarian Mine Action Training Centre of Western Africa of Ouidah (Benin)
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
CPPJ	Criminal Investigation Training Centre of Porto Novo (Benin)
CPTMO	Riot Control Training Centre of Awaé (Cameroon)
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSID	Yaoundé Advanced Joint Services Defence College (Cameroon)

CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DG AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations
DPA	(UN) Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EAI	Infantry Branch School of Thiès (Senegal)
EAS	Military Medicine School of Menen (Gabon)
EASBRICOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EC-JRC	European Commission Joint Research Centre
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIFORCES	International Security Forces School of Awaé (Cameroun)
EMA	Military Administration School of Koulikoro (Mali)
EEM K/L	Staff College of Libreville (Gabon) and of Koulikoro (Mali)
EMP	Peacekeeping Centre of Bamako (Mali)
EMTO	Military Logistic School of Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso)
ENVR	Network of national schools with a regional scope
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EPPAN	Niamey's Armed Forces Paramedics School (Niger)
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
ESSAL	Lomé Military Medical School (Togo)
EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EWS	Early Warning System
FOMUC	Multinational Force Central African Republic
FPU <sub>s</sub>	Formed Police Units
GIS	Geographic Information System
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HR/VP	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security

	Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IAI	Istituto Affari Internazionali/International Affairs Institute
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPSTC	International Peace and Support Training Centre
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
IT	Implementation Team
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEG	Joint Expert Group
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission
MICROPAX	Mission for Consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic
MLD	Military Logistic Depot
MS	Member State
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	Northern African Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFPs	National Focal Points
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
NIP	National Indicative Programme
PANVR	Garoua national Regionally-Oriented Aeronautic Centre (Cameroon)
PBOs	Peacebuilding Operations
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PKOs	Peacekeeping Operations
PLANELM	Planning Element
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Directorate
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme

RM	Regional Mechanism
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SR	Situation Room
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ToT	Training of Trainers
UK	United Kingdom
UMA	Union du Maghreb Arabe
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSR	United Nations Security Council Resolution



## 1. Description on the study

The proposed study is based on the background research and the outcomes of the conference on “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: implementing the new Africa-EU Partnership and developing cooperation in de-mining and disarmament”, held at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on October 7-9, 2009. The event was organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), in cooperation with the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and Chatham House, with the support of the European Commission, the African Union and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It gathered together about 100 high-level stakeholders, including representatives from national, regional and international institutions (UN, EU, AU and African sub-regional organisations), experts from the research community and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

The Rome conference outlined a series of critical issues that affect the implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security and jeopardise ongoing efforts to promote peace and security in the African continent. In particular, the following aspects were stressed:

- The unbalanced involvement of African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in the implementation process and the lack of coordination between African RECs/RMs and the AU still hamper the effective operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and represent a major obstacle in the establishment of an enhanced Africa-EU dialogue on peace and security issues;
- Contributions from the various European actors, including EU institutions and individual member states, still respond to largely uncoordinated and often diverging priorities. Different interventions (in terms of financial and logistic support, direct or indirect participation in security activities, etc.) often lead to overlaps and mismanagement, with negative consequences on the effectiveness of the initiatives undertaken.

An in-depth analysis on these shortfalls and a reflection on possible improvements are necessary steps in view of the review of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in 2010.

## 1.1 Objectives

A number of reports on the implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security are in the process of being finalised. They contain relevant data on the operationalisation of the APSA and the establishment of APSA components by African stakeholders (AU institutions, RECs/RMs), as well as on the impact of external support from various donors.

This study is built on existing mappings of EU and AU efforts for the implementation of the Partnership on Peace and Security, in order to accomplish two main objectives:

- to compare and aggregate existing data on the efforts undertaken by the various European and African actors for the operationalisation of the APSA, in order to offer an overall analysis of the progress achieved towards a functioning African peace and security architecture.

On the African side, it is not only relevant to assess capacities at continental and sub-regional levels, but also to develop concrete proposals for more coordinated and balanced developments in the different RECs/RMs. In this regard the AU should maintain the overall leadership while ensuring at the same time subsidiarity.

On the European side, the analysis of the diverse activities put in place by the EU institutions and individual member states should lead to an in-depth evaluation of their impact on the development of an effective EU policy for enabling African ownership in peace and security.

- to identify guidelines for a comprehensive and coherent approach to African peace and security, which encompasses both capability development and enhanced cooperation at the political level.

In order to make the APSA work, it is crucial to elaborate a forward-looking plan of action on capacity-building, including the elaboration of an innovative policy approach that looks at real African needs and provides predictable and sustainable resources.

Finally, these aspects should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the progressive establishment of a real partnership between EU and Africa, including the identification of common priorities and the convergence towards a shared security thinking.

Ideally, this process of convergence should also involve other relevant actors, first among them the United Nations.

## 1.2 Content

The first part of the study is dedicated to the assessment of progress achieved so far in the three priority actions of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: a) political dialogue; b) operationalisation of the APSA; c) funding. The analysis revealed an enhanced political dialogue between the EU and the AU, even if structures and mechanisms need to be improved. The aggregation of relevant data on AU and RECs/RMs capacity-building development in the framework of the APSA has shown a number of delays, which led us to question the validity of current configuration and priorities of the Architecture. The lack of AU financial resources devoted to peace and security also raised questions on the sustainability of its actions in this field.

The second part of the study is focused on the investigation of the European support to African peace and security, taking into account not only the operationalisation of the APSA, but also other sectors of cooperation. The analysis has been targeted to:

- a) the allocation of funds and technical cooperation carried out by:
  - the European Commission through the African Peace Facility (APF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) and other instruments;
  - contributions from individual member states, within the Partnership, bilaterally and/or acting in other frameworks of cooperation (United Nations and G8);
  
- b) the possible cooperation between the EU and the UN in the support to African peace and security.

The third part offers an overall analysis of current and future priorities for the major actors involved in the Partnership on Peace and Security (AU, RECs, African states, but also EU institutions and its member states). In particular, in view of the next Africa-EU Summit to be held in Tripoli in November 2010, some conceptual and policy inputs on how to reconcile bilateral and multilateral dynamics, on both the African and European sides, for the effective implementation of the Partnership on Peace and Security were elaborated.

### 1.3 Methodology and activities

This analysis was produced by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome (Italy). The IAI's team included a Senior Researcher (Nicoletta Pirozzi), a Junior Researcher (Valérie Vicky Miranda) and a Project Manager (Rossella Cazzato). The study greatly benefited from the expertise of IAI's network of European and African institutes. The project combined conceptual approach, policy analysis and field research relying on different sources:

1. Documentary sources, including AU and RECs needs assessments on APSA and other sectors relevant for African peace and security as well as reports by the European Commission and EU member states on support to African peace and security (listed in ANNEX I);
2. Structured and semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in the AU and EU institutions (in Addis Ababa and Brussels), representatives of EU member states (in EU capitals and representations in Brussels), experts (both African and European), members of civil society organisations (listed in ANNEX II).

The preliminary findings of this study were presented in a dedicated workshop at Chatham House in London (UK) on October 27-28, 2010. This final report thus benefited also from the London discussion, as well as from the results of other assessments released before the Tripoli Summit. The final version of the study will be presented to the European Commission and then circulated amongst the scientific community and officials from relevant countries and organisations in Europe and Africa.

## Part I: Achievements of African Union and RECs in the framework of the Partnership on Peace and Security

The first Action Plan (2008-2010) of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security identified three priorities:

- enhancement of the dialogue on challenges to peace and security, including through systematic and regular dialogue, consultations, coordination of positions, sharing of information and analysis, joint assessment missions and exchange of experience;
- operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including working towards the development of a fully fledged Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, overall strengthening of conflict prevention mechanisms and effective post-conflict reconstruction, as well as operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force;
- predictable funding for African-led peace support operations, in particular through the establishment of an EU predictable and sustainable funding scheme, as well as through working with the international community to achieve a UN mechanism to provide sustainable and predictable financial support for these operations.

The analysis on the implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security showed that some progress has been achieved since the endorsement of the JAES in December 2007, but also underlined serious delays and challenges to be faced in the near future.


### Priority I: Political dialogue

Most of the involved stakeholders agreed on the fact that the Partnership on Peace and Security is one of the most successful among the eight partnerships identified in the Action Plan (2008-2010). In particular, the adoption of the JAES and its Action Plan

seems to have triggered political dialogue between the EU and its African counterparts, stimulating discussions on common security challenges and exchanging information and analysis.

As shown by the diagram below, an institutional architecture was created to make the Joint Africa-EU Strategy work.

DIAGRAM I: Institutional Architecture of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)



Source: <http://europafrica.net/jointstrategy/diagram-on-the-jaes/>

Peace and security issues are currently discussed in various institutional frameworks and at different levels:

- a. Africa-EU summits, held every three years;

- b. periodical ministerial-level meetings;<sup>1</sup>
- c. joint meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council;
- d. annual College-to-College meetings between the European Commission and the AU Commission. Moreover, AU and EU Commissioners with similar portfolios meet regularly on a bilateral basis and staff from both Commissions meet twice a year (alternatively in Europe and Africa) as a Joint Task Force to review sectoral and institutional cooperation;
- e. contacts and meetings between ad hoc delegations from the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament;
- f. an AU Representation to the EU in Brussels and an EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, set up to ensure ongoing dialogue;
- g. an Interim Steering Group established in both the EU and AU by civil society organisations;
- h. a Europe-Africa Policy Network, which brings together European and African non-governmental research institutions with the aim of providing independent political analysis;
- i. Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) on Peace and Security, involving AU and EU representatives.

In particular the Joint Expert Group on Peace and Security was created to ensure regular consultations and exchange of experience among experts coming from both Africa and the EU. This objective has been partially missed for a series of reasons.

On the EU side, for each of the eight Partnerships, an Implementation Team (IT) – composed by the European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat and EU member states representatives – has been set up and forms the EU component of the Joint Expert Groups. The work of the Implementation Team dealing with peace and security is facilitated by the EU Council Secretariat and is organised in line with the three priority actions identified in the Action Plan: priority n. 1 (dialogue) is led by

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<sup>1</sup> These usually involve: on the AU side, foreign ministries from the country holding the AU presidency and the country that held it previously plus the AU Commission (AUC); on the EU side, foreign ministries from the country holding the EU presidency and the country that will hold the next plus the European Commission (EC) and the EU Council Secretariat. The first Africa-EU Defence Ministers meeting was held in November 2009.



the European Commission and the EU Presidency; the priority n. 2 (APSA) is led by France (military aspects) and Italy (civilian and police aspects); priority n. 3 (PSOs funding) is led by the Commission and the United Kingdom.

EU member states showed initially significant participation, even if at different degrees and on different aspects. This engagement has constantly been decreasing and the current participation of national delegates is, on average, very low. Moreover, participation of member states is often ensured by diplomats serving in the Permanent Representations in Brussels, which are still in the process of developing specific expertise on African peace and security.

On the African side, the JEG on Peace and Security includes Algeria (as chief of the file) Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt and Cameroon and is under the responsibility of the Department of Peace and Security (PSD) of the AU Commission. The African contribution to the JEG suffered from initial delays in the identification of representatives and is still challenged by irregular participation of national delegates.

The JEGs also envisage the regular participation of civil society. On the European side, the involvement of civil society is ensured by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in representation of its member organisations. On the African side, the institutionalised procedures for the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) are very complex and time-consuming, as everything must pass through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (AU ECOSOCC), and in particular through its Cluster Committee on Peace and Security. The general perception of EPLO is that, while civil society in Europe and in Africa is willing to support the implementation of the Partnership and to strengthen existing African peace and security mechanisms and policies, it has not been provided yet with the needed room and resources.

At the institutional level, the appointment of Mr. Koen Vervaeke as both the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the AU and Head of the EU Delegation in Addis Ababa has certainly streamlined the EU's interface with Africa, combining the

representation of both the Council and the Commission. One of the sections in the EC Delegation in Addis Ababa specifically deals with peace and security.

The lack of a clear division of labour between the Head of Delegation/EUSR in Addis and the Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities, appointed in February 2008 by the former High Representative Javier Solana with the mandate to coordinate all related activities in the EU Council Secretariat and currently exercised by General Pierre-Michel Joana, has been overcome on a practical basis. In particular, they have been implementing their respective mandates and coordinating their roles on the basis of a constructive ambiguity, where the EU Special Representative is in charge of the overall continent-to-continent strategic partnership and the Special Advisor focuses more on the relations with the RECs.

A number of innovations have been introduced at the institutional level by the Lisbon Treaty and are now in the process of being implemented. The double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Lady Catherine Ashton, has eliminated the position of the Special Advisor in the EU Council Secretariat: General Pierre-Michel Joana will continue to exercise his functions until February 2011. In the meantime, the position of a Managing Director for Africa has been created in the framework of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). The role of the EU Delegation in Addis Ababa will probably be reinforced in the new system by enhancing its autonomy in managing and disbursing funds. However, it is also important to improve the political outreach of the EU institutions towards the AU authorities. For example, the HR/VP should develop closer ties with her counterparts in AU bodies, and in particular with the Chairman of the AU Commission and with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.

Joint assessment projects could significantly help in the definition of a common understanding and planning of actions to address peace and security issues in Africa. An interesting precedent is the joint European Union/African Union/Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) evaluation mission, conducted in June 2009 to assess the impact of the Mission for the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX). On that basis, the joint team decided to

extend the EU's support to the mission in 2010, in consideration of the necessity to guarantee a smooth electoral process in the country. Similar exercises should be conducted also for other missions, starting with AMISOM (the AU mission in Somalia). Joint lessons learned on projects of ended missions (namely AMIS in Sudan and the AU Operations of the securitisation of the elections in the Comoros) could also be useful. Finally, joint fact-finding missions in unstable areas should also be intensified with the same objective.

## Priority II: Operationalisation of the APSA

The assessment of progress achieved in the operationalisation of the APSA, in view to identifying further priorities and capacity needs, is the scope of the APSA needs assessment, which is in the process to be conducted by AU and RECs/RMs. Pending the publication of the results of the APSA needs assessment, this study will analyse the progress achieved so far in the different APSA components, in order to identify policy priorities for the next phase of the Partnership. In particular, this analysis is aimed at developing guidelines for donors' support to the operationalisation of the APSA. The benchmarks for assessing the evolution of the APSA components are those illustrated in the First Action Plan (2008-2010) on the basis of the founding documents of the African Union, and in particular the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted in Durban in July 2002.

- Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council (PSC), solemnly launched in May 2004, is the “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”, conceived as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, 9 July 2002, Art. 2(1).

The PSC meets at the level of Permanent Representatives (as often as required, but at least twice a month), Ministers or Heads of State and Government (at least once a year, respectively).<sup>3</sup> However, AU member states are not always able to ensure a regular participation in PSC meetings, due to the lack of human and financial resources in their Embassies in Addis.

The PSC is composed of fifteen countries, five of which are elected for a term of three years and ten for a term of two years. Members are elected by the Assembly of the AU on the basis of the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation, together with a series of other criteria, including capacity to contribute militarily and financially to the Union, political will to do so, and effective diplomatic presence at Addis Ababa.<sup>4</sup> These requirements are weakly defined and do not enable a correct identification of suitable members of the PSC.

The PSC is in charge of wide-ranging responsibilities, which include, among others, the mounting, deployment and review of peace support operations (PSOs); the recommendation to the Assembly and approval of the modalities of intervention by the Union in a member state; the implementation of the common defence policy of the Union; the promotion of close harmonisation, coordination and cooperation between Regional Mechanisms and the AU; and the development of a partnership with the UN and its agencies for peace and security.<sup>5</sup>

In order to make the PSC able to cope with these tasks, it would require a flexible and sustainable budget, as well as a functioning apparatus to deal with its day-to-day workload. The Protocol permits the PSC to establish subsidiary bodies in order to cope with this broad array of mansions, but for the time being the PSC has not established any ad-hoc working group. The Peace and Security Council Secretariat, located in the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) of the AU Commission, still lacks available and qualified personnel.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, it is hardly able to provide enough

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<sup>3</sup> Art. 8 of the Protocol.

<sup>4</sup> Countries are immediately re-eligible upon the expiration of their terms. The Chair of the PSC rotates every month (Art. 5 of the Protocol).

<sup>5</sup> Art. 3 of the Protocol.

<sup>6</sup> In order to support the AU in developing the staffing structure of the PSD up to the level approved at the Maputo Summit in July 2003, a Joint Salaries Financing arrangement (€10 million) has been established by the European Commission, which funds over 110 positions.

capacity and requisite support services to cope with the increasing volume, complexity and frequency of PSC meetings.

A special role is foreseen for the Chairperson of the Commission, who can bring to the attention of the PSC and to the Panel of the Wise any matter that may threaten peace, security and stability in the continent and use its good offices for conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the PSC, including those related to PSOs, and prepare comprehensive and periodic reports. He shall also ensure the implementation of the decision of the Assembly regarding the intervention in a member state in case of grave circumstances.

In these tasks, the Chairperson is assisted by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security and relies on the human and material resources of the Peace and Security Council Secretariat. The Commission is the Secretariat of the AU and it is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners (each responsible for a portfolio) and staff members. The Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) is headed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and contains a Conflict Management Division (CMD), a Secretariat to assist the Peace and Security Council and a Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The CMD is composed of an Early Warning Unit and a Conflict Management and Resolution and Post Conflict Unit. The PSOD is comprised of two units, an Operations and Support Unit and an African Stand-by Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee Unit.

Beyond the difficulties linked to the lack of staffing in the Secretariat, the unclear definition of role of the PSC Chair and the Chairperson of the AU Commission has also created a number of obstacles in ensuring the timing and effective response to crises and emergencies.

Among the most urgent needs, there is the establishment of effective links between the PSC and other similar bodies in partner organisations.

Beginning in 2007, the AU PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC) started holding annual meetings, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York. The main themes

discussed during these meetings have been the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur and other situation-specific topics, as well as the central issue of the modalities for UN support to AU peacekeeping operations. Another key topic was the overall relationship between the two bodies: for example, the 2009 meeting was complicated by differences related to the status of the event, with some UNSC members insisting it was not a formal meeting of the two Councils. The fourth meeting, held in Addis Ababa in July 2010, registered some progress in terms of exchange of information and consultation between the two organisations.

Joint consultative meetings between the AU PSC and the EU Peace and Security Committee (COPS) have also been organised every year (alternatively in Brussels and Addis Ababa) since October 2008. The meetings focus on peace and security issues of common concern, especially EU support to AU PSOs and further fields of cooperation. These consultative exchanges of views could be enhanced and become formal meetings for fully-fledged coordination and cooperation tasks.

- Military Staff Committee

A Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed by Senior Military Officers of the members of the PSC, was established in October 2004 to advise and assist the PSC in all military and security questions.<sup>7</sup> The MSC can address briefings to the members of the PSC on the military aspects of ongoing AU-led missions, advise the PSC on their mandates and revise the planning documents, conduct evaluation, inquire and assess missions in the field.

The African Stand-by Force and Military Staff Committee Unit, located in the PSOD of the Commission, provide the MSC with administrative services and ensure a certain degree of continuity in its work. However, the absence of clear rules of procedures, the human resources deficiencies in the PSOD, the lack of Attachés de defence in the Embassies of member states to Addis Ababa and the irregularity of its meetings have prevented the MSC to become fully operational and carry out its tasks effectively.

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<sup>7</sup> Art. 13 of the Protocol.

These shortcomings have led some to advance the proposal to dismantle this body and replace it with periodical meetings of Chiefs of Defence. However, it could be worth preserving the current structure and reinforce it in order to enable the MSC to provide with military advice the PSC, as well as the other relevant bodies in the AU Commission. The APSA should also include a body devoted to civilian crisis management, which could support the planning, organisation, management and follow-up of civilian PSOs.

As in the case of the PSC, closer links should be established between the Military Staff Committee and similar bodies in the European Union, in particular with the EU Military Committee (EUMC). A joint meeting between the two Committees was held for the first time in October 2010: on this basis, regular contacts could be developed in order to facilitate the exchange of expertise and lessons learned on military planning, conduct of missions and evaluation.

- Continental Early Warning System

The CEWS aims at facilitating the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. As defined in the PSC Protocol, it shall consist of:

- an observation and monitoring centre - a Situation Room (SR) located at the Conflict Management Division within the PSD of the Commission – responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module;
- observation and monitoring units of the RMs that shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the SR, to which they shall be linked directly through appropriate means of communications.<sup>8</sup>

A Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS was agreed in December 2006 in Kempton Park, South Africa: on that basis, implementation started at the beginning of

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<sup>8</sup> Art. 12(2) of the Protocol.

2007 and the CEWS was foreseen to be fully operational by the end of 2009. However, a number of delays in its implementation led to an extension of the initial deadline. The Roadmap identified three key elements of the CEWS:

1. ongoing information collection and monitoring, in order to produce alerts on situations and areas where further analysis and possible action may be required;
2. interactive conflict and cooperation analysis, aimed at interpreting and explaining dynamic events in their appropriate structural and relational context;
3. formulation of policy and response options, through the development of alternate scenarios and paths of influences.

The Situation Room was established in Addis Ababa. Point 1 of the CEWS Roadmap is technically based on a software (Africa Media Monitor) developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC) in Ispra, Italy. This system was installed and tested at the AU premises in March 2010, but it will not be ready for daily use by the Situation Room until the infrastructure at the AU has been improved. The biggest shortcomings concern the lack of reliable network infrastructure (both internet and intranet).<sup>9</sup>

Work is in progress for: a) the development of a generic local newswire application, which allows the AU to include its own information sources; b) a new tool called NewsDesk, which allows human moderation and dissemination of the automatically gathered media reports; c) an event recognition software, which extracts structured information such as event type, location and number of victims on certain security and disaster-related events from unstructured news text in English, French and Portuguese; d) new modules for the CEWS portal and the finalisation of a licence agreement to hand over source code of software.

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<sup>9</sup> European Commission Joint Research Centre, *Scientific and Technical Support to the African Union's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)*, Progress Report 4 (January-June 2010), July 2010.



Beyond the development of adequate infrastructures and technical resources, the achievement of quality assurance in terms of monitoring and evaluation requires the existence of sufficient and well-trained personnel with appropriate expertise (Point 2 of the CEWS Roadmap). For the time being, the sustainable development of the CMD to support the CEWS still has to be ensured, even if a number of staff exchange and various training sessions are being organised by the EU. In particular, it is important to focus on the support of the CMD in Addis Ababa, also through the presence of European Commission staff in its premises, in order to increase the capacity to interpret, define and monitor information for developing early warning analysis.

A final key step (Point 3 of the CEWS Roadmap) can be identified in the reporting and interaction with decision-makers. In fact, on the basis of the PSC Protocol, the information gathered through the CEWS should be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of its responsibilities and functions under the Protocol.<sup>10</sup> Translating early warning information into early action implies the development of routines and procedures to ensure regular exchange of information, but also the actual political will to use them and intervene in crisis situations.

Progress has been registered at the RECs/RMs level: ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, ECCAS, EAC and COMESA have established their Early Warning Systems, while CEN-SAD and EASBRICOM are in the process of establishing them. Nothing has been done in the NARC. However, the real challenge is to ensure the effective link between the SR and observation and monitoring units of the RECs/RMs. This encompasses the development of effective communication, coordination and harmonisation between SR in Addis Ababa and RMs. Beyond the development and implementation of a system of regular exchange of data, the sharing and co-development of strategic conflict and cooperation assessments or exploration of policy options must be ensured.

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<sup>10</sup> Art. 12(5) of the Protocol.

- African Stand-by Force

The African Stand-by Force (ASF) aims at enabling the AU to carry out PSOs as decided by the PSC and interventions authorised by the Assembly. It should be composed of stand-by multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.<sup>11</sup> Through the ASF, the AU should be able to intervene in low intensity conflicts in which the UN may not be involved (i.e. Comoros), to play a leading political role in conflict situations by co-deploying a mission with the UN (i.e. Ethiopia-Eritrea), to provide a bridging mechanism in order to allow the UN time to mount an operation, to rapidly intervene in cases of grave circumstances (i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes).<sup>12</sup>

The ASF includes a central Headquarter with a Continental Planning Element (PLANELM) and a Continental Military Logistic Depot (MLD) located at the AU Commission, and sub-regional structures, namely a permanent planning element, a Stand-by Brigade, a Military Logistic Depot and training facilities in each REC/RM. The targets designed for the military component include a stand-by roster of military observers (300 to 500) centrally managed by the AU and five regional brigades with units on stand-by in MS. The police component should encompass a stand-by roster of individual police officers (about 240) and at least two formed police units (FPU) on stand-by. The civilian component should dispose of an AU centrally managed roster, including mission administrators and experts in the various civilian sectors (i.e. human rights, humanitarian interventions, good governance, DDR, etc.).

According to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases. Phase I was supposed to be completed by June 2005, but this deadline was postponed to June 2006. During this period, the AU was to establish a PLANELM, while the five regions developed regional stand-by forces up to brigade size. Phase II was supposed to end in June 2010: by then, it was envisaged that the AU should have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, including two large missions

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<sup>11</sup> Art. 13(1) and 13(2) of the Protocol.

<sup>12</sup> ASF tasks include: observe and monitoring missions; classical PSOs; intervention in a member state in case of grave circumstances; preventive deployment; peacebuilding, including DDR; humanitarian assistance; any other functions mandated by the PSC or the Assembly. PSC Protocol, Art. 13(3).

and one smaller mission at the same time, while the five regions would continue to develop their capacity.

Substantive progress has been made: the AU, ECOWAS, EASBRICOM and ECCAS have significantly improved their capabilities; protocols and framework documents are in place and institutional structures are being built. However, developments at the sub-regional level show significant imbalances, especially regarding the slow path of development of Northern and Southern Brigades by NARC and SADC. In general terms, operational capacity remains limited vis-à-vis raising demand and expectations: the dates set were too ambitious and initial aspirations had to be lowered. Command and control structures are still to be developed and PLANELMs at both continental and regional level are understaffed and lack adequate expertise. In particular, civilian capabilities remain critically underdeveloped and the sector as a whole needs to be further equipped with expertise and operational instruments. Other sectors that have shown the greatest gaps concern logistics, financial management and legal aspects.

A validating Command Post Exercise (CPX) took place from the 13 to 29 October 2010 in Addis Ababa in the framework of AMANI Africa. The AMANI Africa cycle was launched in November 2008 at the Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa as a framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa. Its original aim was to offer strategic-level training to African partners in both military and civilian fields and to contribute to the operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force by 2010. It has achieved some successes in terms of reinforcement of personnel, additional equipment and growing capacity to plan and conduct a PSO. The CPX trained and evaluated the state of play of AU capabilities, involving 120 military, civilian and police personnel coming from both the AU and the regions. EU institutions and member states, UN, NATO, the ICRC and NGOs also participated in the exercise. Its results will be crucial to inform discussions on the ASF at the next Summit and the next Action Plan (2011-2013).

- Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) supports the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, by providing advise and

undertaking action.<sup>13</sup> It is composed of five highly respected African personalities, one for each African region, who made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent.<sup>14</sup>

Even if its creation was foreseen in the PSC Protocol, the adoption of the modalities for its functioning and the operationalisation of the PoW were delayed until the end of 2007, mainly due to lack of office space, human and financial resources. On the basis of its programme of work, the PoW decided to undertake, each year, a thematic reflection on an issue relevant to conflict prevention: for 2010-2011, the PoW decided to focus on the problem of women and children in armed conflicts. The Panel also agreed to carry out information-gathering missions to evaluate the situation on the field and examine the modalities of its involvement. However, for the time being, the Panel has not succeeded in translating its intentions into effective mediation actions.

A series of reasons can be identified. First of all, the Panel cannot rely on experts that can assist its members in designing, managing and evaluating peace processes, facilitating dialogue and liaising with parties in conflict and other groups. It is therefore of primary importance that a Mediation Advisor or a Mediation Advisory Team is established within the CMD of the AU Commission, in order to support the work of the Panel.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, the Panel of Wise was established without a clear mandate and is not guided by a strategic approach to mediation. In particular, the relationship between the Panel of the Wise and the mediation mechanisms created by some of the RECs/RMs has not been clearly specified. This would require the development of a sound system of communication, information-sharing and decision-making between AU and RECs/RMs in the field of mediation.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Art. 11 of the Protocol. The PoW reports to the PSC and, through the PSC, to the Assembly. It meets as may be required for the performance of its mandate. Since its launch in Addis Ababa on 18 December 2007, the PoW has held 8 meetings.

<sup>14</sup> Members are selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with concerned member states and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years.

<sup>15</sup> Laurie Nathan, *Plan of action to build the AU's mediation capacity*, UNDP, 6 November 2009.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*.

Other recommended measures include the creation of a roster of AU Envoys and Technical Mediation Experts; the establishment of review and evaluation systems, the support to comparative research and case studies; the development of mediation training for AU officials, mediators and national delegates; the exchange of experience with civil society organisations that are involved in peacemaking at regional, national and local level.<sup>17</sup>

### Priority III: Funding

A Special Fund or Peace Fund was created in the framework of the APSA with the view to providing the necessary financial resources for PSOs and other operational activities related to peace and security. This fund was conceived as an instrument that should primarily rely on financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from member states and other sources within Africa (i.e. private sector, civil society and individuals). As a complementary source of funding, the Chairperson of the Commission is tasked to raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa. Concerning the PSOs, states contributing contingents are invited to bear the cost of their participation during the first three months, and are to be refunded within a maximum period of six months by the Union, which then proceeds to finance the operations.<sup>18</sup>

However, experience so far has demonstrated that a number of member states have difficulties in honouring their financial obligations, thus jeopardising efforts to make AU institutions work effectively and maintaining them heavily dependent on external funding. The assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping have not been done and the AU reimbursement within six months of states contributing with contingents to PSOs has not always been met. On average, only 6% of the AU regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund (the budget of the African Union for the year 2010 amounting to 250,453,697 US dollars). Member states have however recently decided

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<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>18</sup> Art. 21 of the Protocol.

to increase their contribution to the Peace Fund to 12% over a period of 3 years starting from 2011.<sup>19</sup>

Against this background, most of the structures and activities of the AU in the field of peace and security are covered by external sources. This poses serious and urgent questions of sustainability in the longer period. While external donors have to reconsider their support to the AU in order to achieve greater cohesion, predictability and flexibility, both the AU and RECs/RMs should embark on thorough considerations of possible means to ensure continuity and sustainability of action. On the whole, there is an increasing recognition of the necessity for the AU to take a longer-term perspective on measures to reduce external dependency in the area of peace and security and get related activities funded through the AU regular budget.

#### The role of the RECs/RMs

RECs/RMs are the pillars of the overall security architecture, and regional components are key component of the CEWS and the ASF.<sup>20</sup> For a summary of the developments of RECs/RMs in the framework of the APSA, please see TABLE I.

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<sup>19</sup> *Decisions of the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government, 14th Ordinary Session*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 31 January-2 February 2010.

<sup>20</sup> Art. 16 of the Protocol.

TABLE I: SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS BY RECs/RMs IN THE CONTEXT OF APSA

RECs/RMs	Regional Peace and Security Organs	Regional Early Warning Systems	Mechanism For Management And Resolution of Conflict	Africa Stand-by Force	Panel of the Wise	Remarks
CEN-SAD	Has a Security Charter and a High Community Mediator.	Is in the process of establishing an EWS. This year, three seminars have been organised in collaboration with the AU to kick-start the EWS. A mechanism of information already exists.	Recognises the imminent need for a CPMR mechanism and is in the process of establishing one. An Office of the High Mediator on Peace and Security already exists and has facilitated the signing of six peace accords in the region.	Does not have its own stand-by brigade as it hosts three brigades in the region (NARC, ECOWAS and ECCAS). It works closely with these brigades, especially NARC.	A mechanism for the establishment of a Committee of the Wise has been drafted. It awaits ratification by the Member States for its operationalisation.	CEN-SAD's APSA mechanisms are pending ratification by Member States, hence are not yet operational.
COMESA	Has a special structure on peace and security. Also COMESA's Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet annually to consider matters relating to peace and security. There is also a Committee of Officials, which meets at the technical level.	Has an EWS complemented by the Geographic Information System (GIS) and a series of indicators have been developed.	CPMR framework is in perspective.	Does not have a stand-by force.	Has a Committee of Elders with emphasis on preventive diplomacy	COMESA focuses mainly on the economic dimensions of conflicts.
EAC	Has a Draft Protocol on Peace and Security already endorsed by its Council.	Has an EWS and an analytical software and database; and makes use of the Africa News Brief (ANB).	A CPMR framework is in process of development. The first draft has already been completed pending revision and approval by its relevant statutory authority.	Expressed the need for its own mechanism.	Modalities for the establishment of a panel of Eminent persons are being worked out	EAC is working in tandem with AU on the five pillars of APSA.
EASBRICOM	Has a Council of	A situation room is under	Is anxious to play a role in	Coordinates the Eastern	A Panel of Elders for	

	Ministers of Defence which deals with issues relating to peace and security.	development. This will monitor and analyze emerging conflict situations in the region.	the region with respect to activities such as elections monitoring and CPMR in general and wishes to have the necessary mandate to do so.	Africa Stand-by Brigade which has military, police and civilian components.	preventive purposes and in-mission intervention is envisaged.	
ECCAS	Participates in AU Peace and Security Council meetings pertaining to the issues of the region.	Has a regional EWS (MARAC) and VSAT connectivity. It also transmits weekly reports to the AU on the security situation of the region. Participates in the CEWS meetings held every three months on a rotational basis, the last of which was hosted by ECCAS.	CPMR in election context under development.	Recently certified its Multinational Force (FORMAC) during the 2010 Kwanza Exercise.	The Secretary General and Ambassadors of the Member States are engaged in ongoing reflections on the setting up of a Committee of the Wise.	Participates in the continued evaluation of APSA.
ECOWAS	Has set up three Committees responsible for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.	Has a portal for information collection; and convenes regular meetings on early warning issues. In addition to four early warning observation centres in four ECOWAS capitals as part of ECOWAS secretariat structure.	Has a long experience in such processes having dealt with all conflict situations in its regions. It has also established an International Contact Group on Guinea and is in the process of establishing one for Niger. It intends to establish a Panel of former Heads of States for mediation purposes.	Has a task force (rapid deployment capability) consisting of three battalions posted in three Member States. It has no police or civilian components.	A Council of the Wise which operates as a conflict prevention tool.	
IGAD		Has a CEWARN that works in collaboration with CEWERUs. IGAD's CEWARN gives priority to pastoral conflicts and contributes to CEWS.	Has peace facilitators and special envoys for CPMR in Somalia and Eritrea and Sudan (with respect to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement).	Does not have a stand-by force. Has been instrumental in developing the Eastern African Stand-by Brigade.	Has no Panel of the Wise.	



NARC	Does not have an organ on Regional Peace and Security.	NARC has so far not seen the need to set up a regional EWS.	Does not have a Mechanism for Management and Resolution of Conflict.	Has both permanent (Command and Administrative Structures) and national components (Stand-by Military and Police Units as well as military observers). NARC has three national training centres. It does not yet have a civilian component.	No Panel of the Wise has been set up as this requires a political decision. However, once this is made, NARC is willing to contribute to its formation.	
SADC	SADC's Organ on Politics Defence and Security has an institution – the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee charged with peace and security in the region.	Has an EWS with the necessary equipments for its operationalisation.	The Organ represents a regional CPMR for SADC. SADC also has a Mediation Reference Group and a Mediation Support Unit which intervenes in conflict situations in the region.	Has a brigade at a high level readiness; a Planning Element in Gaborone; a training centre at Harare and a Force Training Exercise involving all the components of ASF.	Considering proposals for the establishment of a Panel of Elders.	

Source: Mr Felix G. N. Mosha (Team Leader), Dr Belkacem Iratni, Ms Melvis M. Ndiloseh, Mr Abebaw Tezera, *Final report: study on the establishment of liaison offices by the African Union within the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs)*, 21 August 2010.

In this view, the engagement of RECs/RMs should be ensured through a constant interaction with AU structures in Addis Ababa and their perspectives must be taken into consideration for further developments. Only a bottom-up approach can ensure the required degree of involvement in the APSA components to make them work.

A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU and the RECs/RMs has been adopted on 28 January 2008 and is considered as an important step towards better relations between the parties. However, a lot more can be done to improve communication, coordination and harmonisation between the AU and RECs/RMs. RECs/RMs expressed the need for a more concerted and integrated framework of activity in the area of peace and security, which should go hand in hand with an enhanced recognition by the AU of the crucial role of the RECs/RMs as AU building blocks.

A first step in this direction has been the appointment of RECs Liaison Officers at the AU financed by the EU, with a view to favour the daily collaboration, the exchange of information and expertise, as well as the conduct of joint activities between the AU and RECs. The official launching of the Liaison Officers took place on June 13, 2008. However, IGAD, ECCAS, EAC and COMESA had already sent their Liaison Officers before funding by the EU was released. With the exception of UMA and CEN-SAD, all RECs/RMs have already appointed their Liaison Officers to the AU.<sup>21</sup>

This experience has shown a number of shortcomings in terms of office facilities and operational requirements: RECs/RMs Liaison Offices at the AU are composed of one-staff personnel (the Liaison Officer) that encounters a number of difficulties to manage the workload. Facilities at the AU are shared by the RECs/RMs Liaison Officers and results are inadequate, with namely a lack of shared and commonly understood terms of references.

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<sup>21</sup> Mr Felix G. N. Moshia (Team Leader), Dr Belkacem Iratni, Ms Melvis M. Ndiloseh, Mr Abewaw Tezera, *Study on the establishment of Liaison Offices by the African Union within the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs). Final Report*, 21 August 2010.

On the basis of these lesson learned, the creation of AU Liaison Offices (AULO) in each of the RECs/RMs is now under consideration.<sup>22</sup> This initiative should be complemented by the organisation of periodic consultative meetings between the AU and the RECs/RMs for a joint review of evolving situations and measures to address them.

The RECs/RMs themselves are facing a number of internal problems, linked to the slow pace of integration process in their regions and the issue of overlapping membership that interests several member states. Their horizontal coordination is hampered by the differences in their mandates, visions, direction of integration and policy priorities. This should discourage a “one-fits-all” approach by both the AU and external donors in approaching the various RECs/RMs.

Some improvements are registered: an ongoing tripartite process of negotiations has started among ECA, COMESA and SADC, which could lead to the merging of the three organisations in the next future; at the same time, the ECA has assigned some economic and development experts in other RECs, thus initiating an interesting practice of mutual exchange among RECs/RMs.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem.

## Part II: Allocation of funds and technical cooperation by the EU, EU member states and the UN

- African Peace Facility and other financial resources allocated by the EU

The African Peace Facility (APF) is the main financing tool to support the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. It was established in 2004 following a request of African leaders in order to provide funding for African-led PSOs and capacity-building activities.<sup>24</sup>

The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) under the Cotonou Agreement. This implies that the use of the APF is subject to significant limitations. The most important one concerns military expenditures: the APF can be used to finance costs incurred by African countries in deploying their peacekeeping forces in Africa (i.e. per diems, rations, medical consumables and facilities, transport, fuel, troop allowances, and communication equipment), but under no circumstances to cover ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, salaries for troops and military training for soldiers.<sup>25</sup> These kinds of expenditures have to be financed through other financial resources, in most cases by bilateral contributions from EU member states.

The initial APF allocation of €250 million came from the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF (2000-07).<sup>26</sup> However, these funds proved soon to be insufficient, mainly due to the financing of the AMIS mission, and the APF financial envelop raised to €440 million by 2007. Additional funding to the original allocation was provided through four successive

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<sup>24</sup> At the Maputo Summit in 2003, AU Heads of States and Governments proposed that a facility be set up from funds allocated to their countries through EU development cooperation agreements with Africa. See Assembly of the African Union, Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Dec. 21 II, *Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union*, Maputo, 10-12 July 2003.

<sup>25</sup> ACP/EC Council of Ministers, *Decision 2003/3 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelop of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa*, 11 December 2003.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem. Of this, €126.4 million came from each African country's contribution of 1.5% from its allocated envelop, while the remaining €123.6 million were transferred from unallocated resources (reserves) of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.

replenishments, the last of which relied on contributions from EU member states (mostly Germany and France), as no more funds were available under the EDF.<sup>27</sup>

Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the bulk of the APF was directed to the support of AU-led PSOs: the greatest part of these resources was devoted to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), with a contribution of over 305 million euros. Only €34.5 million (€27 million from the APF and 7.5 million from South Africa's contribution) has been allocated to capacity-building. Among the activities planned to be financed through this component of the APF were:

- €1 million to finance ASF workshops;
- €6 million to strengthen the role and leadership of the AU Commission, mainly directed to finance the staff in the PSD;
- €20 million + 7.5 million to reinforcing institution building at the AU and the RECs/RMs linked to APSA, including administrative and financial staff, training, equipment for the EWS, ASF and PLANELMs, and coordination between AU headquarters and RECs through the establishment of liaison officers from RECs to Addis Ababa.

Of these contracted funds, the amount actually paid is of €18.9 million (slightly more than a half). This is mainly due to the AU's difficulties in recruiting personnel and implementing related projects.

Under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (2008-13), the APF initiative has been expanded by allocating €300 million under the Intra-ACP Indicative Programme. The funds allocated to PSOs have been reduced to €200, while a greater part of the available resources (€65 million) has been devoted to capacity-building. Among the additional programmes and components to the current APSA capacity-building support programme that will be funded by the APF, there are:

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<sup>27</sup> APF replenishments in 2006-2007: €50 million in September 2006, €45 million June 2007, €39.2 million in November 2007 and €55 million in December 2007.

- the creation of a Pool Funding Mechanism for salaries of personnel at the PSD of the AU Commission. This would allow a more coordinated and continuous support to staffing, currently financed on a project basis by multiple donors (EU, UNDP, bilateral contributions);
- support to the work of the Panel of the Wise and the development of mediation units at the RECs level;
- support to the African training capabilities in peace and security.

The EU's support to the training of African personnel has been a priority of the Partnership on Peace and Security since 2008. A joint AU-EU assessment of training needs and capabilities for African-led peace support operations was undertaken in order to implement possible EU support to training institutions in peace and security in Africa. The aim of the study was to assess and elaborate on EU long term programmes of support to African training institutions - with a regional or continental vocation - responsible for training in the three components of ASF for PSO, i.e. civilian, police and military.

However, a number of difficulties emerged in the finalisation of the project, concerning in particular the compilation of the list of African training institutions to be supported by the EU and the coordination between RECs/RMs and regional training institutions. On the EU side, the project was affected by the diverging priorities of EU institutions and those of the most active member states in this field, namely France, Italy and Germany. An agreed list of priorities was finally adopted in Nairobi on February 2010.<sup>28</sup> It also included a series of short-term actions, to be implemented before the Africa-EU Summit, which had to be postponed pending the completion of an institutional assessment of the AU finance and control systems. In order not to lose momentum and to retain the credibility of the actors involved, it would be recommendable to ensure a rapid follow-up of this project in the second phase of the APF.

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<sup>28</sup> *Report of the African Union and European Union support to African Training Institutions Workshop*, Nairobi, Kenya, 8-12 February 2010.

On the basis of past experiences, it would be important to focus on the development of the AU's management capacity, looking in particular at back-office activities such as recruitment and audit. On the part of the European Commission, a rationalisation of reporting procedures would be required, in order to make the funding system simpler and more flexible for the African counterparts. This could be done in cooperation with other donors and discussed in the AU Partners Group in Addis Ababa. While there is a constant need for better financial accountability and transparency by the AU, the harmonisation of reporting requirements on expenditures fixed by external partners would considerably lighten the burden and transaction costs on the AU.

Some improvements have been designed for this phase of the APF. For example, additional contributions from EU member states, exceptionally authorised in the last part of the previous phase, become a permanent feature in the new cycle: this means that no specific calls for contributions are needed anymore, thus simplifying the approval process and reducing the transaction costs. In order to speed up the decision making process when necessary and to inject funds faster, the new APF also includes an Early Response Mechanism (ERM), which is aimed at financing activities such as first stages of mediation actions in the framework of preventive diplomacy, identification and fact-finding missions to initiate the planning process of PSOs, temporary and ad hoc reinforcement of the planning cell for a potential PSO. It will rely on an ad hoc, shortened decision-making procedure and has an allocation of €15 million.<sup>29</sup>

In order to address the shortage of resources, priority should be given to building bridges between the different agreements and related financial arrangements that exist between EU and Africa.

We can find some cases of effective coordination between the APF and the Instrument for Stability, a tool created in January 2007 to address a number of global security and development challenges in complement to geographic instruments. For

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<sup>29</sup> The usual APF procedure for the disbursement of funds corresponds to a timeframe of 2-3 months: it involves a request from the AU or a REC through the AU to the EC, consideration by DGs DEV/AIDCO/RELEX in the EC, presentation of the proposal to the PSC to have a green light, evaluation by the EDF committee, internal consultation in the EC among the relevant DGs, financial decision by the EC, conclusion of an agreement with the beneficiary.

example, in 2007 €5 million from the IfS have been used to finance the Strategic Planning Unit for AMISOM, as the APF was in need of replenishment. For the period 2009-2011, the IfS will also address trans-regional security threats, among which: a) improving counter-terrorism capabilities in the Sahel region; b) fight against drug trafficking along the new cocaine route from Latin America and the Caribbean to Western Africa and further on to the EU; c) improving maritime security in the Gulf of Aden; d) preventing the trafficking of small arms and light weapons. The use of the IfS in a more coordinated manner with the APF should be enhanced in this phase, in particular to ensure the EU's support to specific peace and security areas outside the APSA.

Other instruments that could be further exploited in a more coordinated manner are the National/Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs/RIPs) for African countries, which usually have a substantive peace and security component. In this phase, their resources could be used in particular to address regional challenges in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

For the global financial overview of the APF, please see the table on the next page.



## GLOBAL AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

Total Envelope for	Funds Contracted per action	Funds Paid per action
<p style="text-align: center;">Peace Support Operations:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>€ 400m (9th EDF)</b> including € 8.3m foreseen for contingencies + <b>€ 200m (10th EDF)</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">AMIS (Darfur / SUDAN) € 302.8 m including € 8.3m foreseen for contingencies</p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOMUC/MICOPAX (CAR) € 53.8m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AMISEC/MAES (COMOROS) € 8.5m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AMISOM (SOMALIA) € 95.5m</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">AMIS (Darfur / SUDAN) € 262.5 m including € 8.3m foreseen for contingencies</p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOMUC/MICOPAX (CAR) € 47.8m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AMISEC/MAES (COMOROS) € 4m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AMISOM (SOMALIA) € 55.7m</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Capacity-building Programmes:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>€ 27m (9th EDF)</b> In addition to this amount, a € 7.5m South Africa Contribution has been signed in February 2007 for Capacity-building in Conflict prevention in Africa. So far € 3.8 m have been paid. + <b>€ 65m (10th EDF)</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">AU Commission € 6m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ASF workshops € 1m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AU/ REC/ ASF Brigades € 20m</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">AU Commission € 4.6</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ASF workshops € 0.6m</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AU/ REC/ ASF Brigades € 9.9m</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Early Response Mechanism</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>€ 15m (10th EDF)</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ERM € 15m</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ERM € 3m</p>
<b>€ 707m</b>	<b>€ 502.6m</b>	<b>€ 388.1m</b>

Source: European Commission, *Annual report. The African Peace Facility 2009.*

- Financial and technical support by EU member states

European support to African peace and security is ensured not only by funds and technical cooperation coming from the EU institutions, but also by a series of initiatives implemented by EU member states, both in the framework of the Africa-EU Partnership and in their bilateral relationships with African actors. In particular, some EU member states have longstanding ties with African countries, dating back to the colonial period and maintained after decolonisation in the form of privileged trading relations, development cooperation or military presence. These historical legacies and economic relations have a direct impact on the formulation of their priorities in the continent and inevitably influence the EU policies towards Africa.

Investigating the nature and the scope of the activities carried out by different EU member states is important in order to accomplish three main objectives: to understand what are the priorities of the most active EU member states in their relationship with African actors in the field of peace and security; to assess how these policies impact on the elaboration of the EU policy towards Africa; to elaborate future strategies of intervention to reconcile bilateral and multilateral frameworks of cooperation.

Relevant stakeholders in the EU institutions recognise the added value of bilateral activities conducted by member states in African peace and security, especially when they are conceived as additional contributions to the Africa-EU Partnership or as a complement to it. In particular, EU member states release matching funds for the African Peace Facility in order to support AU-led PSOs, offer support to AU and RECs for the operationalisation of the APSA, and regularly contribute to training, technical cooperation and exchange of expertise with African personnel.

Concrete initiatives have been developed by member states in the framework of the Partnership in order to offer:

- Funding to cover AU staff costs and salaries;
- Funding to RECs liaison officers to the AU;
- Capacity-building for the development of the CEWS;
- Mediation support to the Panel of the Wise;

- Training of civilian and police components of the African Stand-by Force;
- Funding to the AU Peace Fund.

Moreover, member states provide funding salaries for military personnel, military training for soldiers, transportation, military equipment and logistics in AU-led PSOs, covering costs that cannot be financed through the African Peace Facility and other EU instruments. Some member states have focused their activities on the development of rapid deployable capabilities of the ASF and regularly provide the relevant structures of the AU and the RECs with military advise.

In other cases, member states are involved in specific activities outside the APSA framework, particularly in the fields of:

- Mediation, including analysis and support to mediation initiatives conducted at continental and sub-regional levels by ad hoc mechanisms and panels;
- Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- maritime security, including bilateral programs for the development of maritime capability action, the fight against piracy, training on maritime security;
- border control, including training for customs agents in order to address arms and drug trafficking, and support to the AU border program;
- small arms and light weapons;
- post-conflict reconstruction;
- fragile states, including support to electoral processes and institution building.

Member states have also developed strong relations with specific RECs and AU member states, as well as with African training centres.

Nevertheless, experience so far has evidenced a low degree of transparency by EU member states concerning their bilateral activities on African peace and security. The reticence of EU member states is partly due to the sensitivity of the actions implemented in this field and the need for cautious release of information. It is also linked to the difficulty of national institutions to have a clear picture of activities

planned and realised by different instances (such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defence, Ministries of Interior, national training centres, NGOs) and to transmit them effectively to their representatives in Brussels.

It is undeniable that the involvement of EU member states has registered a constant decrease since the launching of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, as witnessed by their declining participation in the Implementation Team and in related EU activities. It seems that the multilateral framework of the JAES is attractive only for a few aspects, while the bulk of national activities remains to be conducted bilaterally and without sufficient coordination with other initiatives. In most cases, the EU umbrella is seen as a good vehicle of cooperation only when it can serve national interests and give them a broader political legitimacy. This is true especially for countries that have vested interests in the African continent, while small member states consider the possibility to contribute to the Partnership highly valuable.

In line with these considerations, this study collected information and data on national activities of some EU member states in the field of peace and security in Africa. The tables below summarise the main results for Italy, Sweden, Finland, Germany, France and the UK. The data have been collected through interviews with national representatives in Brussels, Addis Ababa and national capitals. In two cases (Germany and Italy), implementing agencies (GTZ and Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna) have also been consulted.

## ITALIAN SUPPORT TO AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

*Italy is the lead nation within the Implementation Team on Peace and Security for the civilian and police components of Priority Action 2*

### AU

#### Ongoing Activities

Panel of the Wise: Mediation Support (800.000 Euros)

African Stand-by Force: Training of civilian and police components (750.000 Euros)

AU in Sudan: Mediation Support to the African Union High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD, 1.5 million Euros); Comprehensive Peace Agreement (500.000 Euros)

Training: pilot project for a database gathering information on PSOs capacity-building initiatives in Africa; organisation of 3 workshops for the harmonisation of training curricula for the civilian component of PK/PB Op. (2010-2011; Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna)

#### Past activities

AU-EU Joint assessment of training needs and capabilities for African-led PSOs: 1) desk study and mapping exercise; 2) workshop in AA (5-6 March 2009); field study (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna + Carabinieri for 3))

ToT Course for Egyptian citizens (27-20 Sept. 2009; funded by CCCPA and implemented in cooperation with Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna)

Training course for the police (22 Nov.- 3 Dec. 2009; funded by IAPF; run by CCCPA + GTZ+ Italian Carabinieri)

### Eastern Africa

#### SOMALIA 2009-2010

- Support to Somali National Security Force (5 million Euros)
- Support to AMISOM (5 million Euros)
- Support to TFG institutions (3.8 million Euros)
- Police training (planned activity)


### Fragile States

- Guinea: support to electoral process
- Training for customs agents carried out by Guardia di Finanza also addressing arms and drug trafficking (Somalia, Angola, Sao Tomé, Mali, Mauritania, Kenya, Uganda)


## SWEDISH SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY




**Eastern Africa**



**Western Africa**



## FINNISH SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY



# GERMAN SUPPORT TO AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

## AU

AUC, PSD: support to capacity development (CEWS, PSD Staff, Panel of the Wise); (2004-2012; 11,2 million Euros) + construction of the new PSD Building (2008-2011; 0,6 million Euros)  
 AUC, CMD: support to AU Border Program at AU and MS levels (2008-2012; 15,1 million Euros)  
 AUC, PSOD: financial support for police component (personnel costs, workshops, training, technical advise) (2008-2011; 0,6 million Euros)  
 APSTA: direct financial support to APSTA Secretariat (2008-2011)

Support to AU PSOs: financial support, transport, equipment

### Western Africa

#### ECOWAS

(2008-2013; 4 mil. Eur)

- Military advise to the Stand-by Brigade
- Support to the civilian component of the Stand-by Brigade
- Support to the operationalisation of the Conflict Prevention Framework
- Organisational and management advise

#### KAIPTC

(2004-2012 ; 7,5 mil. Eur)

Secondment of short/long term advisors; pol/mil/civ training, org. and man. advise; support to cooperation with CSOs

#### EMP

Police training, infrastructure financing, support to workshops on exchange with EASBRICOM and on civ elements

### Eastern Africa

#### IGAD

(2008-2011; 3 mil. Eur).

- Support to CEWARN
- Support to the IGAD Strategy for P&S
- Support to mediation efforts

#### EASBRICOM

(2008-2011; 3 mil. Eur).

- Support and training to the civilian component of the EASTBRIG
- Support to AMISOM police pre-depl. courses
- 2 long term advisors
- Organisational and management advise

#### IPSTC

Civ and integrated training; Police training, infrastructure financing

#### EAC

(2005-2012; 4,5 mil. Eur)

- Support to SALW Control Programme
- Support to the establishment of the P&S Dept.

### Southern Africa

#### SADC

(2004-2013, 12 million Euros)

- Support to the civilian component of the SADC brigade
- Support to Election Observation missions + training
- Support to the establishment of a mediation mechanism

#### RPTC

Training needs assessment; curricula development; support to CSOs initiatives



# UK SUPPORT TO AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

## AU

- AMISOM: military equipment and logistics, salaries for military personnel (15 million pounds)
- ASF: support to rapid deployable capability
- APSTA: support to training
- PoW: study funded by the UK government
- UK political liaison officers in Addis Ababa
- PSD: salaries for AU personnel

Western Africa

ECOWAS

EMP

Training;  
capacity-  
building

KAIPT

Support to  
training

Eastern Africa

EASBRICOM

Support to EASTBRIG HQ

IPSTC

Support to training

Southern Africa

SADC

RPTC

Support to training

## Other fields:

- SSR: niche for UK activities in support of African P&S. Strong involvement of civil society in this field

# FRENCH SUPPORT TO AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

*France is the lead nation within the Implementation Team on Peace and Security for military component of Priority Action 2*

## AU

- Support to the entire continental architecture over 4 phases: planning/design; training/evaluation (partly via the Eurorecamp/Amani Africa 2008-2009 cycle, for which France is the framework nation); staff training (ASF); experience feedback.
- Establishment of a network of seconded counsellors to the AU + RECs (see below) + military advisor to the RSUE in Addis

### Western Africa

#### ECOWAS

Seconded military Counsellors

Support to the Network of national school with a regional scope (ENVR)

15 schools (10 million Eur/year)

#### EMP

Training;  
capacity-  
building

#### KAIPT

Support to  
training

### Central Africa

#### ECCAS

Seconded military Counsellors

### Eastern Africa

#### EASBRICOM

Coopérant next to the Director

#### IPSTC

Support to training

### Other fields:

- Maritime security: bilateral programme with Cameroon to strengthen its maritime capability action + with Djibouti in the fight against piracy. For the future, proposed a maritime training centre in Equatorial Guinea.
- Proposed Sahelian Security College: public forces training + capacity-building in the fields of border protection, justice, welfare and development.

## The network of ENVR


ENVRs began to operate in 1997. They now comprise 15 schools in sub-Saharan Africa, one of them multinational, located in 8 countries.

These ENVRs are made up of 8 poles of excellence that contribute to the 3 essential operational functions of Peace keeping operations:

- Planning and conduct of operations:
  - PKO planning and management (CAOG, CSID, EAI, EMM K/L, EMP);
  - Operational administration (EMA);
  - Logistics and operational maintenance (EMTO);
- Law enforcement and local security:
  - Air surveillance (PANVR);
  - Judiciary police (CPPJ);
  - Public order and area control (CPTMO, EIFORCES);
- Survival in a damaged environment:
  - Health support (EAS, ESSAL, EPPAN);
  - Humanitarian mine clearance (CPADD).

The ENVR provide 2 responses to Africa's needs:

1. they are part of the African strategy embodied in APSA and contribute to implementing it;
2. they are able to meet both short-term and long-term PKO needs.



Source: Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense, National schools with a regional scope in Sub-Saharan Africa, ENVR Brochure

- UN support to the AU

The UN is currently in a process of deeply rethinking its relationship with regional organisations, and in particular with the African Union, to address peace and security challenges. UN assistance to the AU operates under the umbrella of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union, a framework agreement concluded by the two organizations in December 2006.<sup>30</sup> UN support is organized around numerous thematic clusters, with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) leading UN initiatives in the area of peace and security, the primary focus of capacity-building efforts for the first three years of the Programme. The UN is now conducting an assessment of the first phase of implementation of the Programme, with a view to planning activities for the next three years (2010-2012).

Activities under the Ten-Year Programme include: a) regular UN-AU meetings on conflict prevention and crisis management; b) capacity-building for mediation, in particular through the support to the Secretariat of the Panel of the Wise and tailored training courses on AU mediation support; c) electoral assistance, including the establishment of a database of African electoral observers and experts; d) assistance to the Secretariat of the AU PSC, including advise on the establishment of a sanctions committee. The UN also established an AU Partners Group on peace and security that meets regularly in Addis Ababa and sees the participation of several actors, among which the UN, the AU, the EU, the US, Australia, Canada and others.

In 2007, the UN also established an AU Peacekeeping Support Team (AUPST) in Addis Ababa, which works under the supervision of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. The AUPST offers support to AU-led PSOs in the military, police, logistics, finance, information and communication sectors., AUPST activities concentrate in particular on expertise exchange and training, input to the AU planning of peacekeeping related activities, advise to the ASF especially on early deployment. For example, the AUPST is now actively engaged in the AMANI Africa CPX and has developed guidelines for its planning process.

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<sup>30</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Enhancing UN-AU cooperation: framework for the ten-year capacity-building programme for the African Union*, A/61/630, New York, 12 December 2006.

The UN considers the AU as its main counterpart on African peace and security issues. However, a gradual political shifting can be foreseen for the next future: the AU's political leadership still needs to be reinforced through a bottom-up approach, which involves directly the RECs/RMs, and particularly those RECs/RMs that have made significant progress in preventing and managing conflicts. For this reason, the UN has recently reinforced its relationship with some regional organisations, i.e. ECOWAS, through its United Nations Office for West Africa, and IGAD.

A new UN Office to the AU has been set up by the UN General Assembly on July 1, 2010 in Addis Ababa, with the aim of establishing closer links between the UN and the African Union and other African sub-regional organizations. The Office is headed by an Assistant Secretary General and will work through different components: political, long-term capacity-building, post-conflict reconstruction and development, human rights and reconciliation. While the creation of the UN Office to the AU can be considered a step towards a more comprehensive approach of the UN to African peace and security, a number of UN officials have harshly criticised the decision to set up a new institution without clarifying its relationship with existing structures. Moreover, this decision has been taken in New York, not taking into account the inputs from Addis Ababa and before the completion of the ongoing assessment of the Ten-Year Programme. Nevertheless, the new Office will function as a unique point of contact not only for the AU, but also for the other organisations in Addis Ababa, and has the potential to facilitate the daily working relationship with the EU Delegation to the African Union.

The UN is also exploring options to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of resources for AU peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council. This is the result of a reflection initiated in the early 1990s on how to face the expanding needs and the existing gaps of UN peacekeeping, which led to the identification of regional entities as burden-sharing partners and to the recognition of the need to expand UN support to their peacekeeping capabilities. Funding for regional peacekeeping usually relies on voluntary contributions by UN member states: it remains ad hoc, uncoordinated and depends on the vagaries of donors' financing.

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSR) 1809 (2008) recognised the challenges in accessing UN contributions for funding regional organisations and welcomed the establishment of a Panel to consider in-depth lessons from past and current AU peacekeeping efforts and consider in-depth modalities of how to support them, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics.<sup>31</sup> On that basis, an AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping has been appointed with the mandate to deliver a report on this subject by the end of 2008.<sup>32</sup>

Concerning the funding issue, two options were identified by the Panel's Report.<sup>33</sup>

1) the establishment of a voluntary-based multi-donor trust fund to focus on comprehensive capacity-building.

The UN already created in 1993 a trust fund to finance activities aimed at enhancing African peacekeeping capacity, but it proved to be insufficient and unsustainable. However, there are recent success stories that can be used as terms of reference for this purpose. For example, the peacebuilding fund, created by the General Assembly as a result of the 2005 World Summit, proved to be a flexible and responsive funding mechanism: it exceeded the initial targets for funding and attracted contributions from traditional and non-traditional donors.

It may be worth exploring similar mechanisms to support the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. However, one of the major challenges in this direction remains to guarantee stable funding and this implies the engagements of other actors such as China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

2) the use of UN-assessed funding for AU-led and UN-authorized peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis, for up to six months, to be provided mainly in kind and only when there is an intention to transition the mission to a UN peacekeeping operation.

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<sup>31</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Peace and Security in Africa*, S/RES/1809 (2008).

<sup>32</sup> The AU-UN Panel was chaired by Romano Prodi (Italy) and includes James Dobbins (USA), Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mauritius), Monica Juma (Kenya), Toshi Niwa (Japan), and Behrooz Sadry (Iran).

<sup>33</sup> United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, *Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations*, A/63/666-S/2008/813, New York, 31 December 2008.

This mechanism would ensure a more predictable source of funding for AU operational capabilities and is the most suitable proposal to the AU. However, there are a series of unresolved issues about regional peacekeeping operations being financed by assessed UN budget contributions. As a preliminary step, it would be critical to ensure that there is prior agreement between the AU and the UN on the scope of activities that would fall under the parameters of the support package. Moreover, funding authorized by the UN would be subject to UN management regulations and procedures, and imply the necessity for the AU to offer adequate guarantees for oversight and financial accountability.

The pioneering proposals made by the Panel were significantly watered-down in the follow-up phase, as shown by the assessment of those recommendations made by the Secretary General in his Report of 18 September 2009.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, the ongoing reflection process would represent a great opportunity to stimulate a wider dialogue between international actors on how to improve their support to the AU peacekeeping capabilities. In particular, it could prove to be extremely useful in order to overcome budgetary constraints within the UN and design a grand strategy to make AU-UN-EU triangular relations work in an effective way. This would imply a burden sharing of both funding and capabilities to cope with peacekeeping needs in Africa, without relegating the EU in a role of simple payer of others' initiatives.

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<sup>34</sup> United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations. Report of the Secretary General*, A/64/359-S/2009/470, New York, 18 September 2009.

## Part III: Enhancing the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security

- Going Beyond APSA

The analysis above has shown some progress and serious constraints in the operationalisation of the APSA components, taking as a starting point the objectives defined in the AU foundation documents and the priorities that have been jointly identified by the AU and the EU through the JAES and its First Action Plan. African actors and their international partners have encountered a number of difficulties in understanding how to translate all the normative intentions embedded in the APSA into practical realities.

The considerations formulated in the previous paragraphs suggest that a change of perspective is needed, especially in this crucial period of reconsideration of past experiences and planning of future scenarios. The evaluation of the different APSA components can result in a sterile exercise if it is not underpinned by a constant attention to its ultimate goal. In fact, the APSA was created as a structural, long-term response to the peace and security challenges on the continent. As such, *the APSA should be considered as an instrument to attain this objective and not as an end in itself.*

Therefore, time has come for all the actors involved *to go beyond the formal benchmarks identified in the first phase of the APSA development and understand how to measure it against the functions it is called to perform.* This could also lead to a *partial reconsideration of the current structures and mechanisms of the APSA,* but it is a precondition for further reflections in this field.

1) A first consideration is linked to the tendency to over-emphasize the peacekeeping aspects at the expense of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. An effective understanding of the root causes and drivers of conflict in Africa has been hampered by the dysfunctional links between APSA structures and its policy priorities. In particular, activities have not been based on systematic conflict analysis that would



have enabled a better understanding of the profile, actors and dynamics of a conflict and incorporated the expertise of local actors.<sup>35</sup> This goes in the direction of:

- *strengthening the instruments for early warning analysis.* The full operationalisation of the CEWS requires the development of adequate infrastructures and technical resources, as well as the establishment of effective links between the SR in Addis Ababa and RMs. However, this is not enough. One main challenge is to ensure the capacity to interpret, define and monitor information for developing early warning analysis. Moreover, reporting and interaction with decision makers should be reinforced. Institutional mechanisms should be established with a view to allow the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC to regularly rely on the analysis developed by the CEWS and use them in the elaboration of the best course of action to address potential conflicts and threats.

- *developing a mediation concept and expertise beyond the Panel of the Wise.* The Panel of the Wise is still unable to carry out effective mediation actions, whilst other mediation mechanisms have been established both at continental and regional level. Against this background, two options can be identified: to dismantle the PoW in favour of ad hoc mediation panels (on the model of the AU High-level Implementation Panel on Sudan) and regional mediation mechanisms; or, in alternative, to reinforce the PoW through the development of a mediation concept and the establishment of a Mediation Advisory Team that can ensure the design, management and evaluation of mediation processes.

- *creating new spaces for the development of civilian expertise.* The civilian aspects of crisis prevention, management and resolution should be included in a more effective way in the APSA. The development of civilian expertise in relevant departments of the AU Commission should be accompanied by the creation of an ad hoc body for the planning, management and follow-up of civilian PSOs. The work of this new body should rely on the inputs and participation of civil society actors, in the effort to implement a more coherent and inclusive strategy for peace and security.

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<sup>35</sup> European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), *Recommendations for the Second Action Plan for the Peace & Security Partnership of the Joint Africa - EU Strategy.*

2) The African Stand-by Force is a valuable instrument for conflict management, but still consists of a capability-development exercise that has not been tested on the field. Instead, the AU and ECCAS have already entered in their operational phase and deployed PSOs in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan/Darfur (AMIS/UNAMID), Somalia (AMISOM), Central African Republic (FOMUC/MICOPAX) and Comoros (AMISEC/MAES). It is important to look at these experiences in order to identify the elements that might have an impact also on the operationalisation of the ASF. In particular, *the development of the ASF should be based on the lessons identified from previous missions conducted by the AU and sub-regional organisations*. These include:

- *availability of well-trained military, police and civilian personnel to be deployed at short notice;*
- *clear chain of command;*
- *interoperability among the various Regional Stand-by Brigades and with the AU;*
- *adequate logistical support, communication equipment and transportation (including airlift or sealift to a mission area and vehicles for the mission once in the field);*
- *predictable funding and fair management.*

3) Finally, new areas of cooperation in the field of peace and security have emerged in the last years. The needs of African actors should determine the functions of the continental structures devoted to the maintenance of peace and security, and not vice versa. *The analysis of the mechanisms developed by the RECs/RMs in areas that are not included in the APSA reveals the necessity to rethink the priorities of the entire envelop and suggests fields that should be prioritised in the planning of further cooperation at the continental level*. Both the AU and its donors should consider the importance of these new fields of action and reflect on the possibility to integrate them in the APSA framework. As detailed in TABLE II, they include:

- *Humanitarian action and disaster response;*
- *Post-conflict reconstruction and development;*
- *Counter-terrorism and fight against organised crime;*

- *Arms control and disarmament;*
- *Fight against human trafficking;*
- *Maritime security.*

TABLE II: SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS BY RECs/RMs IN OTHER PEACE AND SECURITY AREAS

RECs/RMs	Humanitarian action and Disaster response	Post-conflict reconstruction and Development	Counter-terrorism and Fight against organised crime	Arms control and Disarmament	Fight against human trafficking	Maritime security
CEN-SAD	Has set up a special fund to deal with natural catastrophes and conflict-situation.					
COMESA		A PCRCD programme is undergoing, with a special focus on the Great Lakes Region and on trade as a mechanism for peace and security (Trading for Peace Programme).	A Committee of Central Banks Governors deals with issues of money-laundering and financing of terrorism.	Within the framework of the PCRCD programme, special attention is given to SSR, DDR and the SALW issues with specific programmes devoted to them. It is part of the National Coordination Agency on SALW in Zambia. It will undertake a study on the issue of the transport of SALW across borders.		
EAC	Undergoing efforts to establish a Regional Disaster Management Mechanism endowed with a disaster management centre.			Is actively promoting the destruction of small arms through dedicated workshops and studies; technical support and training to NFPs; equipment procurement. Activities planned in the future include: further support to NFPs; further work on legislation harmonisation; enhancing cooperation with other RECs (i.e.IGAD and COMESA).		

				Under the APF it has been assigned the responsibility to coordinate SALW activities across regions IGAD, COMESA and EAC.		
EASBRICOM						Conducts activities to combat maritime piracy along the East African coast.
ECCAS		Has carried out a study on the needs of PCRD in Chad, Burundi and DRC.			Has set up a unit to deal with problems of human trafficking (abuses on women and children).	Conducts activities to ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea.
ECOWAS		Conducts humanitarian and social activities, especially in post-conflict countries, and cooperates and coordinates with the AU to this end.	Its Member States have ratified the AU framework on counter-terrorism. It cooperates with the Centre for counter terrorism studies based in Algiers. It deals with terrorism-linked activities (drug smuggling and money laundering).	Has concluded a convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Has set up registers with databases fed up by Member States to control SALWs. Is part of the Steering Committee on SALW in the AU.		
IGAD			Has started a capacity-building programme against terrorism to monitor and research on terrorist activities.			
NARC						
SADC				Has concluded a Protocol on		Has established

				the Control of Fire Arms and Related Ammunition.		a maritime component operating from Angola to South Africa.
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Source: IAI elaboration on Mr Felix G. N Mosha (Team Leader), Dr Belkacem Iratni, Ms Melvis M. Ndiloseh, Mr Abebaw Tezera, *Final report: study on the establishment of liaison offices by the African Union within the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs)*, 21 August 2010 and European Commission, DG Development, October 2010.

- Developing a Joint Africa-EU Roadmap 2020

The objectives detailed in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security were considered highly ambitious from the outset. The goal of both African and European stakeholders at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 was to establish a framework of cooperation, with the aim of enabling African institutions to address peace and security challenges in the continent. Since its inception, the new relationship between the EU and Africa is anchored to the principles of ownership, partnership and solidarity.

In particular, the concept of ownership became a cornerstone of the EU's approach to African peace and security. On the basis of this principle, the EU embraced the cause to make the newly created African institutions able to develop effective mechanisms to address peace and security challenges. In the same vein, the entire system of cooperation established under the Africa-EU Partnership, at least in the declared intentions, was conceived to meet the needs and expectations of the African partners. All the actions planned and implemented under the Partnership should have come from a request of African counterparts and been demand-driven.

Inevitably, during these two years of implementation, the concept of African ownership crashed against the difficulty to adapt capabilities with expectations. The young architecture constituted by the African Union had to face serious challenges, among which the most serious one is the scarce commitment by RECs/RMs and African member states to work for a stronger and more credible continental organisation. This was the result of a combination between the still embryonic integration culture and the political, financial and socio-economic difficulties for AU member states, a great part of which are amongst the poorest and least developed countries in the world.

As a consequence, the African Peace and Security Architecture still suffers from inadequate implementation of the mechanisms envisaged; resource deficiencies in terms of funding, staffing and logistics; lack of synergy between continental and regional structures; imbalances between and within regional arrangements. These acknowledgements are not intended to dismiss the ownership principle as one of the

pillars of the Africa-EU Partnership, but call for a careful rethinking of the time span envisaged for its implementation.

*Both the EU and the AU should be realistic in the definition of their common objectives in the Second Action Plan (2011-2013) and consider it as a partial step of a more long-term and comprehensive strategy. In our opinion, a Joint Roadmap 2020 for the realisation of the Africa-EU Partnership, subject to periodical revision, would be much more credible. In its framework, two-year Action Plans should serve as implementation instruments and should detail concrete actions and phases that can realistically be carried out within a limited time span. Periodical review of results and assessments on future requirements are pre-conditions for a more effective management and planning.*

- Enhancing EU strategic thinking

Lessons learned should be jointly identified by the African Union and the European Union before embarking in a new phase of implementation. An APSA assessment is in the process to be conducted by a group of experts before the incoming Summit. As decided in Akosombo (Ghana) on 10-11 December 2009, AU and RECs should carry out an assessment of progress achieved in the operationalisation of the APSA and the challenges ahead, with a view to identifying further APSA-related priorities and capacity needs. The priorities identified by this assessment should be consolidated in a roadmap, which would serve as a reference framework for support to APSA under relevant sources of funding. It should also rely on the alignment of EU member states support and contribute to the enhancement of the Partnership before the Summit.

This is a commendable effort and can result in a useful exercise to evaluate the state-of-the-art in the establishment of the different APSA components, at both continental and regional level, as well as to provide a picture of partners' assistance towards the different APSA components. However, it must be pointed out that *the preparation of the Summit should have included a deeper internal reflection on the side of the European Union on the first phase of implementation of the entire Partnership, in order to clarify its own strategic objectives and expectations for the next phase.*



A new Action Plan (2011-2013) is in the process of being developed. However, it seems that EU institutions have not put enough thinking in it and the engagement of member states has been lukewarm at best. Following a request from the African side, the Summit will probably concentrate on the identification and realisation of heading projects in the different Partnerships, including that on Peace and Security. This idea responds to the necessity to deliver concrete results and obtain political visibility at the Summit, in the effort to gain the consensus of RECs/RMs and African states. However, it cannot be considered as an effective response to the need for a forward looking and comprehensive strategy, and could be detrimental to the credibility of both parties in the longer term.

*An assessment of the African Peace Facility, which is the main financial instrument for the implementation of the Partnership will probably be conducted in 2011. This should also include a comprehensive lessons learned process on EC support to African peace support operations (PSOs), building on current assessment efforts (namely the joint EU/AU/ECCAS evaluation mission conducted in June 2009 in Central African Republic for MICOPAX or the audit process initiated on the EC support to AMIS in Darfur).*

*A consultation mechanism should be established between DG DEVCO in the European Commission, EU Delegations (especially the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa), intergovernmental bodies at the EU Council (i.e. COPS and COAFR), the structures created under the Africa-EU Partnership (i.e. the Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities, the Implementation Team for Peace and Security), the recently appointed Managing Director for Africa and other relevant personnel of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). The objective would be to finalise a deep analysis of the current state of Africa-EU cooperation in Peace and Security.*

- Coordinating bilateral initiatives in the framework of the Partnership

*Only an inclusive dialogue, which involves all stakeholders beyond the well-established Brussels-Addis Ababa axis, can ensure a real implementation of the Partnership on Peace and Security.* In the post-Lisbon phase, the EU Delegation in Addis will probably play a more assertive role in Africa-EU relations and take the lead of the implementation of the Partnership. This can be considered as a step forward for a more coherent interaction between the EU and Africa. Nevertheless, *the concentration of responsibilities in the hands of the EU Delegation should be accompanied by the elaboration of mechanisms for a more effective involvement of EU member states.*

It is clear that no substantial change will occur in the EU's African policy if member states do not abide by a genuine European approach to Africa, and also allow for a gradual Europeanization of the bilateral means of assistance and cooperation inherited from the post-colonial period. The current economic and financial crisis is likely to have a severe and long-lasting impact on the resources allocated by the EU member states to peace and security in Africa. It increases the need for better spending, and might act as a catalyst for pooling and sharing initiatives.

In order to address the shortcomings identified in the EU financial support to the Partnership, *action on two levels is required. First, identification of internal restructuring and rationalisation potential: the procedures for the disbursement of funds under the APF and the Instrument for Stability should be simplified and made more transparent.* This could favour better understanding and greater engagement of EU member states in the decision-making phase and expand their involvement beyond the ex-post acceptance of the decisions taken by the European Commission on the allocation of available resources.

*Second, specialisation and better coordination should be promoted among the different financial instruments at the EU level (including also the peace and security components of NIPs and RIPs) and at national level.* EU institutions should

take into consideration the experience gained by member states in their longstanding ties with African countries. *The areas of cooperation identified by EU member states through their bilateral relations with African actors in the field of peace and security – including mediation, Security Sector Reform (SSR), maritime security, border control, small arms and light weapons, post-conflict reconstruction, fragile states – should be considered and eventually integrated in the framework of the Partnership.*

In order to promote a more inclusive approach to the Partnership, *EU institutions could also rely on the relationships developed by member states with sub-regional organisations, as well as African training centres.* A closer look to these initiatives could be beneficial in order to further integrate different stakeholders beyond the institutional partners in Addis Ababa. Moreover, an improved coordination among European actors could serve as an instrument to avoid duplications and ensure better spending of available resources.

On their side, *EU member states should make more use of pooling and sharing (P&S) and actively engage in joint initiatives. This could be done by using more effectively the existing bodies and mechanisms, either established in the framework of the Partnership (Implementation Team on Peace and Security) or in other relevant fora (UN, G8, G20).* First and foremost, the next Summit should be considered as a crucial occasion to boost current efforts of information sharing and coordination at the EU level, in line with a renewed strategic approach to the Partnership.

- Establishing an EU-AU-UN Triangular Dialogue

The UN, the EU and the AU are three unequal organisations. Each of them has developed specific structures and mechanisms to deal with peace and security issues in the African continent. Both the UN and the EU support the AU politically, institutionally, financially and technically, in order to equip it with the necessary capabilities to ensure stability in Africa. These organisations are directly involved in

African conflicts with their own missions and personnel. Time has come to get the three actors together and think about a shared approach to African peace and security. Initial attempts have been made both by the EU and the UN to set up a Triangular Dialogue. The perception by officials in both organisations, as well as by representatives of member states, is that the AU is not inclined at the moment to engage in a fully-fledged Triangular Dialogue, preferring to maintain distinct channels of dialogue with the two partner organisations. AU officials seem to consider the UN as a model for their organisation, as well as a source of legitimacy for its actions, while the EU is perceived more as a payer of their initiatives.

*The objective of a strategic cooperation among the three organisations could be achieved through a gradual approach, starting with a regular collaboration at the operational level. The establishment in Addis Ababa of the EU Delegation first and the UN Office to the AU more recently is a positive progression towards streamlined relations between these organisations – and between them and the AU – which could facilitate daily interaction and enhanced political dialogue on issues of common concern.*

*Multilateral fora could be reinforced to guarantee not only a regular exchange of views, but also an effective coordination. Beyond the AU Partners Groups in Addis Ababa, another framework for collaboration is the G8 ++ Africa Clearing House, which regroups representatives from G8 countries, AU, EU, UN and other donors – including Scandinavian countries, China and others. This is the most inclusive framework in which donors to Africa can come together with African actors, exchange information on their respective activities and look at ways for improving coordination and cooperation.*

*A rapprochement between the three organisations would have been facilitated also by an EU-AU-UN joint assessment of past activities for the operationalisation of the APSA. Both the UN and the EU are currently in the process of assessing APSA achievements and further needs for capacity-building, together with the AU, in the framework of – respectively – the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. These assessments will constitute the basis for UN and EU action plans for the next three years. A common process on this*

issue would have been highly beneficial to increase the flow of information and the coordination of initiatives in support to the APSA and its components. *This missed opportunity could be a lesson learned for the next revision of joint action plans.*

*Operational activities that could trigger a common plan of actions include also: a) joint EU-AU-UN training and exercises for the ASF, on the basis of the AMANI Africa 2010 exercise; b) joint EU-AU-UN fact-finding missions and assessments on completed and ongoing AU-led missions; c) harmonisation of EU and UN reporting procedures for the AU.*

Ensuring sustainable and predictable funding for African capacity-building and peacekeeping is a priority for the UN, the EU and the AU. Therefore, *the EU and the UN should work together in order to ensure an effective follow-up process of the recommendations contained in the AU-UN Panel Report of December 2008. Pressure on the AU to equip the Peace Fund with adequate resources and to develop transparent and accountable management and reporting procedures, should be accompanied by an ongoing reflection on new funding instruments, including a joint peace fund.*

- Involving civil society

The growing institutionalisation of the Africa–EU dialogue risks reducing the space for non-institutional voices on both continents. The full and active participation of non-state actors, civil society organisations and the private sector is the only way to make sure that initiatives and programmes address the actual rather than the perceived needs of populations. Moreover, African and European civil society organisations can be instrumental in disseminating results and acting as a watchdog for the implementation of the partnership. In the field of peace and security, this is in line with a comprehensive approach that goes beyond political and military concerns to address human-centred problems such as economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

However, civil society involvement in the first phase of implementation of the

Partnership has been rather poor. This is partly due to the reluctance of some institutional actors to make the policy-making process fully transparent and inclusive or, more simply, to their lack of awareness of the importance of CSOs involvement in the partnerships. The lack of funding is also an obstacle to regular civil society participation and engagement. The result is the growing hostility and disillusionment of non-state actors vis-à-vis the Partnership, which risks severely hampering its effective implementation.<sup>36</sup>

*The bottom-up approach to African peace and security can be achieved only through the effective involvement of African civil society, especially by providing more capacity and opportunities for African CSOs to engage within the Partnership with regard to conflict prevention, resolution, mediation and post-conflict peace consolidation initiatives.*

A proposal put forward by EPLO is *to promote the inclusion of civil society experts in mediation support structures like the Panel of the Wise at the AU level or regional committees of elders. Civilian experts from African CSOs could also contribute to African PSOs, namely by offering civilian expertise in African training centres or in the PLANELMS of the ASF in Addis Ababa and in the RECs/RMs.* In general, it is important that both the EU and the AU create further opportunities for African and European civil society to work together on meaningful activities that contribute to meeting the objectives of the Partnership on Peace and Security.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Veronica Tywuschik and Andrew Sherriff. *Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa- EU Strategy*, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 87. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, February 2009.

<sup>37</sup> European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), *Recommendations for the Second Action Plan for the Peace & Security Partnership of the Joint Africa - EU Strategy*.

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## ANNEX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

NAME	ROLE	INSTITUTION	DATE	PLACE
Sam Geremy	African Union Peace and Security	Embassy of the UK in Addis Ababa	6-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Alberto Vecchi Col. Antonio Di Gregorio	Counsellor Defense Attaché	Embassy of Italy to Addis Ababa	7-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Thomas Peyker Timothy Baines Daniel Venturi Sandy Wade Umberto Tavolato Ib Kok Hansen	Peace and Security Section	EU Delegation to the AU	8-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Dawit Toga	Conflict Management Division	African Union	8-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Col. Gianmarco Bellini	NATO Senior Military Officer to the AU	NATO	9-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Valerio Bosco	Political Affairs Officer	UN Liaison Office with the AU	9-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Abdel-Kader Haireche Col. Nurudeen K. Azeez	AU Peacekeeping Support Team	UN DPKO	9-09-2010	Addis Ababa
Franck Paris	Counsellor (Military Committee)	Permanent Representation of France to the EU	6-10-2010	Brussels
Claus Lerker Lindroos	Counsellor ACP (Africa)	Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU	7-10-2010	Brussels
Natascha Wessel	International Relations	European Commission -	7-10-2010	Brussels

	Officer	DG Development & relations with ACP States		
Jens Moeller Kai Schaefer Francesco Carboni	Unit C/6: African Union and Peace Facility	European Commission – EuropeAid – Cooperation Office	7-10-2010	Brussels
Alessandro Prunas	General Affairs and External Relations - Africa	Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU	7-10-2010	Brussels
Pierre-Michel Joana	Conseiller Spécial Paix et Sécurité en Afrique	Secrétariat Général du Conseil de l'Union Européenne - DGE Affaires extérieures et politico militaires	8-10-2010	Brussels
Sandra Thorsson	Second Secretary, Africa Working Group	Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU	8-10-2010	Brussels
Daniela Dicorrado	Head of Sector – Peace and Security	European Commission - DG Development & relations with ACP States	8-10-2010	Brussels
Bernadette Schultz	P&S Coordinator Africa Department	GTZ	12-10-2010	Phone interview (Turin)
Mathias Kruger	First Secretary	Embassy of Sweden to Addis Ababa	13-10-2010	Phone interview (Rome)
Josephine Liebl	Policy Officer	EPLO	15-10-2010	Phone interview (Rome)