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

# D-10 STRATEGY FORUM

## Agenda

June 15 -16, 2015

Rome, Italy

Atlantic Council

CIGI

IAI

*Istituto Affari Internazionali*

Atlantic Council CIGI IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali

# D-10 Strategy Forum

**June 15-16, 2015**

## Agenda

## Monday, June 15

**Location: Hotel Ponte Sisto**
Via dei Pettinari, 64
00186 Rome, Italy

**6:15 – 7:00** **Reception**

**7:00 – 9:00** **Forum Dinner**
Welcoming Remarks:

- **Ettore Greco**, *Director, Institute of International Affairs*
- **Walter Slocombe,** *Secretary of the Atlantic Council*
- **Fen Osler Hampson**, *Director, Global Security & Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation*

**Discussion: State of the International Order**
An assessment of global threats and strategic challenges currently facing the international order. To what extent are the prevailing norms and values of the post-World War II order under siege? How can likeminded states strengthen cooperation to sustain and advance this order?

**Speaker:**

- **Philip Stephens,** *Chief Political Commentator, Financial Times*

## Tuesday, June 16

**Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation**
Piazzale della Farnesina, 1
00135 Rome, Italy

**8:45 – 9:00** **Registration**

**9:00 – 9:30** **Call to Order and Introductions**

**Co-Chairs:**

- **David Gordon**, *Senior Advisor, International Capital Strategies; former US State Department policy planning director*
- **Hugh Segal**, *Chairman of the Atlantic Council of Canada; former senator and chief of staff to the Canadian prime minister*
- **Ferdinando Nelli Feroci**, *President of the Institute of International Affairs; former Italian ambassador to the EU*

**Opening Remarks:**

- **Antonio Bernardini,** *Deputy Secretary General, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation*

**9:30 – 11:30** **Session One: Toward a Collective Strategy for Russia**

What are Moscow's strategic objectives in Europe and beyond? Is the current policy track having an impact on Russia's calculus and behavior? What are the elements of a longer-term, strategic approach toward Russia that D-10 states should adopt?

**Speakers:**

- **Camille Grand**, *Director, Foundation for Strategic Research*
- **Kurt Volker**, *Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council, and former US Ambassador to NATO*

**Respondents:**

- **Thomas Bagger**, *Head of Policy Planning, German Foreign Office*
- **Masafumi Ishii**, *Ambassador for Public Diplomacy in Europe and Representative to NATO, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

**11:30 – 12:00** **Coffee Break**

**12:00 – 1:30** **Session Two: China and the Liberal Order**

The rise of China could have significant consequences for the liberal international order. What are the implications of Beijing's efforts at building new multilateral institutions? What is the role of other emerging powers in China's foreign policy calculus? How should D-10 states respond to China's growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific?

**Speakers:**

- **David McKean**, *Director, Policy Planning, US State Department*
- **Beomchul Shin**, *Director General, Policy Planning Bureau, Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

**Respondents:**

- **Keith Scott**, *Assistant Secretary, Policy Planning, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*
- **Alfredo Conte**, *Head, Strategic Planning, European External Action Service*

**1:30 – 2:30** **Lunch**

**2:30 – 4:30** **Session Three: Rising Instability in North Africa and the Middle East**

Failing governance and escalating conflict have provided an opening for ISIS to expand its reach into Libya and North Africa. What are the strategic implications for D-10 states? Is a new approach needed to stem the tide of refugees and promote stability along Europe's periphery?

**Speakers:**

- **Roberto Aliboni**, *Scientific Advisor, Institute of International Affairs*
- **Florence Gaub**, *Senior Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies*

**Respondents:**

- **Armando Barucco**, *Head, Policy Planning, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation*
- **Hilary Childs-Adams**, *Ambassador, Foreign Policy Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada*

**4:30 – 5:00** **Closing Comments / Future Plans**

- **Ash Jain**, *Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council*
- **Fen Osler Hampson**, *Director, Global Security & Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation*
- **Riccardo Alcaro**, *Senior Fellow, Institute of International Affairs*

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The organizers would like to thank the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, as well as Compagnia di San Paolo, for their support of this meeting.




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## D-10 Strategy Forum
**June 15-16, 2015**

## Participant List

**Riccardo Alcaro**
Senior Fellow
Institute of International Affairs
*Italy*

**Roberto Aliboni**
Scientific Advisor
Institute of International Affairs
*Italy*

**Thomas Bagger**
Head of the Policy Planning Staff
German Foreign Office
*Germany*

**Armando Barucco**
Head, Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
*Italy*

**Célia Belin**
Analyst, Policy Planning Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development
*France*

**Antonio Bernardini**
Deputy Secretary General
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
*Italy*

**Anthony Bubalo**
Research Director
Lowy Institute for International Policy
*Australia*

**Hilary Childs-Adams**
Ambassador, Foreign Policy Bureau
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
*Canada*

**Massimo Carnelos**
Member, Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
*Italy*

**Tommaso Coniglio**
Member, Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
*Italy*

**Alfredo Conte**
Head of Division, Strategic Planning
European External Action Service
*European Union*

**Silvano Frigerio (Brig. Gen.)**
Deputy Head
Plans and Policy Division
Italian Defence General Staff
*Italy*

**David Gordon**
Senior Advisor
International Capital Strategies
*United States*

**Camille Grand**
Director
Foundation for Strategic Research
*France*

**Ettore Greco**
Director
Institute of International Affairs
*Italy*

**Fen Osler Hampson**
Director, Global Security & Politics
Centre for International Governance Innovation, and Chancellor's Professor
Carleton University
*Canada*

**Toshiro Iijima**
Deputy Director General
Japan Institute of International Affairs
*Japan*

**Masafumi Ishii**
Ambassador for Public Diplomacy in Europe and Representative to NATO
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Japan*

**Ash Jain**
Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security
Atlantic Council
*United States*

**Ricardo López-Aranda**
Director, Policy Planning Unit
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
*Spain**

**David McKean**
Director, Secretary's Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
*United States*

**Stefan Meister**
Head of Program on Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Robert Bosch Center
German Council on Foreign Relations
*Germany*

**Sean Misko**
Member, Secretary's Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
*United States*

**Antonio Missiroli**
Director
EU Institute for Security Studies
*European Union*

**Ferdinando Nelli Feroci**
President
Institute of International Affairs
*Italy*

**Fernando Pallini Oneto di San Lorenzo**
Deputy Head, Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
*Italy*

**Henning Riecke**
Head of Program, Transatlantic Relations
German Council on Foreign Relations
*Germany*

**Hugh Segal**
Master, Massey College and Chairman, Atlantic Council of Canada
*Canada*

**Keith Scott**
Assistant Secretary, Policy Planning Branch
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
*Australia*

**Teruyo Shimasaki**
Deputy Director, Policy Planning Division
Foreign Policy Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Japan*

**Beomchul Shin**
Director General, Policy Planning Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*South Korea*

**Chang-Hoon Shin**
Director and Research Fellow, Center for Global Governance
Asan Institute for Policy Studies
*South Korea*

**Walter Slocombe**
Secretary of the Atlantic Council, and
Senior Counsel
Caplin & Drysdale
*United States*

**Cornelia Sorabji**
Head of Research Analysts
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
*United Kingdom*

**Philip Stephens**
Chief Political Commentator
Financial Times, and
Vice Chairman, Ditchley Foundation
*United Kingdom*

**Masatoshi Sugiura**
Director, Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Japan*

**Nathalie Tocci**
Deputy Director
Institute of International Affairs
*Italy*

**Kurt Volker**
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council and
Executive Director
McCain Institute for International Leadership
*United States*

**Xenia Wickett**
Director, US Project and Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
Chatham House
*United Kingdom*

**James Young**
Programme Manager
Defence Strategy and Priorities
Ministry of Defence
*United Kingdom*

**Wojciech Zajączkowski**
Director, Foreign Policy Strategy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Poland**

**Poland and Spain have been invited as observers for this meeting.*

# D-10 Strategy Forum

## Background and Purpose

The *D-10 Strategy Forum* is a Track 1.5 framework aimed at advancing strategic coordination among a select group of democratic partners. The Forum brings together senior officials and experts from ten likeminded and capable states -- transatlantic and transpacific – that have been at the forefront of building and maintaining a liberal world order. It provides a venue for collective assessments of the most important challenges facing the international order and an opportunity to develop joint approaches and strategies for addressing them.

Participants in this "Democracies 10" — Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the European Union — have demonstrated a commitment to a shared set of values and interests, and possess the requisite diplomatic, economic, and military resources to act on a global scale. The states represented in the D-10 together account for more than sixty percent of global GDP and over three-fourths of the world's military expenditures.

The meeting in Rome takes place amidst continuing uncertainty about the future of the international order. States such as Russia and China have made assertive efforts to challenge the status quo and test the limits of the liberal order, while the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other extremists present growing threats to stability in North Africa and the Middle East. More broadly, the global diffusion of power, the lingering effects of the global financial crisis, and the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised questions about the willingness and ability of leading democratic states to sustain their roles in managing global challenges.

With the world facing a complex set of interrelated crises, a more coordinated strategic approach among likeminded and capable states could prove useful in efforts to advance a rule-based international order. Norms central to this order include democracy and human rights, territorial sovereignty, freedom from foreign interference, universal access to the global commons, and the prevention of mass atrocities. The *D-10 Strategy Forum* seeks to promote collaborative efforts to advance these and other norms and achieve a more stable and secure order.

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# D-10 Strategy Forum

**June 15-16, 2015**

## Speaker Biographies

**Riccardo Alcaro**
*Senior Fellow, Institute of International Affairs*

Riccardo Alcaro is a senior research fellow with the Instituto Affari Internazionali (Institute of International Affairs; IAI) in Italy, and a visiting fellow with the Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution, in Washington, DC. Within the IAI's Transatlantic Programme, Mr. Alcaro is co-coordinator of the 7th Framework Programme-funded Transworld project on the future of the transatlantic relationship and its role in the world; he is responsible for the organization of the annual Transatlantic Security Symposium on the security priorities debated by the transatlantic partners. He is a fellow of the EU-wide program European Foreign and Security Policy Studies, jointly organized by the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Riksbankens Jubilaeumsfond. From 2006 to 2011, he was responsible for the drafting of the section on the European Union's external relations of the European Policy Analyst, the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly on the European Union.

**Roberto Aliboni**
*Scientific Advisor, Institute of International Affairs*

Roberto Aliboni is currently scientific advisor at IAI, and formerly IAI's general director and vice president. He taught international economics at the Universities of Naples and Perugia from 1972 to 1979, and held research positions in different Institutes. In 1994, he conceived of, and successfully established, the Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo), the network of Mediterranean Institutes dealing with international and security affairs, transformed into EuroMeSCo in 1996.

**Thomas Bagger**
*Head of Policy Planning, Federal Foreign Office (Germany)*

Thomas Bagger is head of Policy Planning at the German Federal Foreign Office. From 2009 until July 2011, he served as head of the foreign minister's office in Berlin. His previous postings abroad were Washington, DC (2006–2009), Ankara/Turkey (2002–2006) and Prague (1996–1998). Before joining the German diplomatic service in 1992, he worked as a research associate

at the Institute of International Affairs in Ebenhausen, Germany. Mr. Bagger holds an M.A. in government and politics from University of Maryland, College Park, and a doctorate from Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich.

**Armando Barucco**
*Director, Unit for Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Italy)*

Armando Barucco is the current director of the Unit for Analysis and Policy Planning at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He served as Italian Ambassador to Sudan from November 2011 to February 2015. From 2007 to 2011, as counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, he was in charge of general coordination, institutional affairs (including implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service [EEAS]) and preparation of EU summits. In 2006-2007, he was a fellow at the Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University. Previously, he was the directorate general for European Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was in charge of EU financial and development cooperation. Other previous assignments were consul general of Italy in Mumbai (Bombay), India; to the Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union; the Italian embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where he served as deputy head of mission; and in Somalia, where he was deputy head of the Italian diplomatic delegation for Somalia during the United Task Force and UN Operation in Somalia operations (1992-1993). He studied at the University of Rome La Sapienza (LL.M, Faculty of Law), at the College of Europe in Bruges (Diploma of Higher European Legal Studies) and at the University Gregoriana of Rome (Institute of Studies of Religions and Cultures).

**Antonio Bernardini**
*Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Italy)*

Mr. Bernardini was appointed Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 September 2013. Previously he served as Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations (2010-2013) and as Diplomatic Adviser to the Minister of Environment (2006-2010). Previous responsibilities include Multilateral Coordinator at the General Directorate for Development Cooperation; First Counsellor at the UN Permanent Representation in New York, in charge of the development desk, including the follow-up to the Millennium Summit; head of the Trade Section and coordinator of the "Italy in Japan 2001" Festival at the Italian Embassy in Tokyo; EU external relations officer at the General Directorate for Economic Affairs; First Secretary to the Permanent Mission of Italy to International Organizations in Geneva; Second Secretary at Italian Embassy in New Delhi; Chief of Staff of the Director General of Immigration.

**Hilary Childs-Adams**
*Ambassador, Foreign Policy Bureau, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (Canada)*

Hilary Childs-Adams began work at the House of Commons in 1976 and joined the public service in 1978, serving first with the deputy solicitor general before joining the Department of External Affairs in 1980 as a foreign service officer. She has served abroad in Mexico City, New York City, Brussels and Berlin, and in Canada with Teleglobe Canada in Montreal. At headquarters, she has held a variety of positions in the fields of energy and environment, public diplomacy and federal-provincial relations, and was director of the Western Europe Division. In 2006, she was appointed minister and deputy head of mission at the Canadian embassy to Germany. She has a B.S.L. (honours) from Laurentian University.

**Alfredo Conte**
*Head of Strategic Planning Division, European External Action Service*

Alfredo Conte is a career diplomat from Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, under Cathy Ashton, has been appointed head of the Strategic Planning Division in the EEAS. He was part of the Italian Delegation at the G7 Summit in Naples, the first to be open to Russian participation. In 1997, he served as DHoM at the Italian Consulate General in Hong Kong. In 2001, he was posted at the Italian Embassy in Berlin, and in 2008, after a stint at the HQ in Rome, he joined the Policy Unit of the Council Secretariat, where he dealt with the aftermath of the crisis in Georgia, focusing in particular on EU-Russia relations. Mr. Conte has been the adviser of a number of Italian Foreign Ministers — Franco Frattini, Gianfranco Fini and Massimo D'Alema. In Brussels, he has been a member of HR Javier Solana's team.

**Florence Gaub**
*Senior Analyst, European Union Institute for Security Studies*

Florence Gaub works on the Arab world with a focus on conflict and security, with particular emphasis on Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. She also works on Arab military forces more generally, conflict structures and the geostrategic dimensions of the Arab region. Previously employed at NATO Defence College and the German parliament, she wrote her PhD on the Lebanese army at Humboldt University Berlin and holds degrees from Sciences Po Paris, Sorbonne and Munich universities.

**David Gordon**
*Senior Advisor, International Capital Strategies*
David F. Gordon is a senior advisor for International Capital Strategies. He is also adjunct professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served as director of

Policy Planning for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after playing a leading role in the creation of the Directorate of National Intelligence as the head of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Earlier in his career, he served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff, as well as led the State Department's and the NIC's strategic dialogues with more than 20 countries around the globe and was a principal in the Senior Dialogue with China. After September 11, Mr. Gordon played a leading role in the development of strategies and tools of financial coercion. He has personally briefed every US president since George H. W. Bush. After leaving government service, Mr. Gordon was chairman and head of research at Eurasia Group, the global political risk advisory firm. He is a frequent contributor to discussions of global politics and international economics on television and in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Financial Times*, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. His latest book is *Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from risk Management and Risk Assessment*. Gordon was awarded the CIA's Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal in 2009; and, in 2011, was the recipient of Bowdoin College's highest alumni honour, the Common Good Award. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.

**Camille Grand**
*Director, Foundation for Strategic Research*

Appointed managing director of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique by its board in May 2008, Camille Grand has been in office since September 2008. Prior to this assignment, he was deputy assistant secretary for disarmament and multilateral affairs in the directorate for strategic, security and disarmament affairs of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006–2008). In this capacity, he was in charge of chemical and biological non-proliferation, conventional arms control, small arms and light weapons, land mines and cluster munitions, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe affairs, and has been directly involved in several arms control negotiations. He has also been the French representative in several groups within the European Union and NATO. He was previously the deputy diplomatic adviser to the French minister of defence, Alliot-Marie (2002–2006), and served as an expert on nuclear policy and non-proliferation in the strategic affairs department of the French (1999–2002). He was an associate fellow in the Institut français des relations internationales (2000–2002). Mr. Grand teaches graduate courses in international and security affairs at Sciences Po Paris since 1998 and at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration since 2006. His publications include several books and monographs and numerous papers in European and US books and journals, on current strategic affairs primarily focused on nuclear policy, non-proliferation and disarmament. Mr. Grand holds graduate degrees in international relations, defense studies and contemporary history, and is a graduate from the Institut d'études

politiques de Paris. He also followed the training of the Institut diplomatique of the French ministry for foreign affairs.

**Ettore Greco**
*Director, Institute of International Affairs*

Ettore Greco is Director of the IAI and also heads the transatlantic program of the institute. He worked as visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution from January 2006 to July 2007. He taught at the universities of Parma and Bologna. From 2000 to 2006 he worked as correspondent for the Economist Intelligence Unit. From 1993 to 2000 he directed the IAI's program on Central and Eastern Europe. He was also Deputy Director of the IAI from 1997 to 2008. From 2000 to 2006 he was Editor of the *International Spectator*. He is the author of a number of publications on the EU's institutions and foreign policy, transatlantic relations and the Balkans. He has been a free-lance journalist since 1988.

**Fen Osler Hampson**
*Distinguished Fellow and Director, Global Security & Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation*

Fen Osler Hampson is a distinguished fellow and director of CIGI's Global Security & Politics Program, overseeing the research direction of the program and related activities. He is also co-director of the Global Commission on Internet Governance. Most recently, he served as director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) and will continue to serve as chancellor's professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. Under his leadership, NPSIA established its reputation as a Canadian leader in international relations, expanding the student enrollment and faculty members, and increasing the research budget. Fen was instrumental in creating collaborative learning approaches to international security at NPSIA and in establishing several new research centres at Carleton University.

He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, where he also received his A.M. degree (both with distinction). He also holds a M.Sc. degree (with distinction) in economics from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. (honours) from the University of Toronto. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, he is the past recipient of various awards and honours, including a Research and Writing Award from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellowship from the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. Mr. Hampson is the author or co-author of nine books and editor or co-editor of more than 25 other volumes. In addition, he has written more than 100 articles and book chapters on international affairs. His most recent book, *The Global Power of Talk* (co-authored with I. William Zartman) was published in March 2012. He is a frequent commentator and contributor in the national and international media. His articles have appeared in the *Washington Post*, the *Globe and*

*Mail, Foreign Policy Magazine*, the *Ottawa Citizen, iPolitics* and elsewhere. He is a frequent commentator on the CBC, CTV and Global news networks.

**Masafumi Ishii**
*Ambassador of Japan for Public Diplomacy in Europe and Representative to NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)*

Masafumi Ishii is the newly appointed representative of Japan at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels. He simultaneously serves as Ambassador for Public Diplomacy in Europe and Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. He is one of the principal advisers on international conflicts to the Japanese government. He was born in Hiroshima, matriculated from the University of Tokyo at the Faculty of Law and took a postgraduate course in international relations at the University of Cambridge. He joined the Foreign Service in 1980 and embarked upon a successful career within the Japanese ministry, serving as director of the Foreign Policy Bureau's Planning Division, private secretary to the minister of foreign affairs and presiding over the Second Southeast Asian Division. For years, he was deployed in the diplomatic service. He was the head of Political Section in the Japanese Embassies in London and Washington, DC. Prior to becoming ambassador, he was director-general of the International Legal Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Ash Jain**
*Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council*

Ash Jain is a senior fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He previously served as a member of the Secretary of State's policy planning staff, focusing on US alliances and partnerships, as well as global and regional security challenges. Previously, Mr. Jain was a Bosch Public Policy Fellow with the German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Academy and executive director for the Project for a United and Strong America, where he coordinated a bipartisan foreign policy task force to produce a blueprint for a values-based national security strategy, Setting Priorities for American Leadership. He also served as an adviser for the White House Office of Global Communications and with the staffs of Senators Fred Thompson and Dan Coats. Mr. Jain is the author of several publications, including *Like-Minded & Capable Democracies: A New Framework for Advancing a Liberal World Order* (Council on Foreign Relations) and *Nuclear Weapons and Iran's Global Ambitions: Troubling Scenarios* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy). His published articles and commentary have appeared in various news outlets, including the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Los Angeles Times, The Hill*, C-SPAN, BBC, Canadian Broadcasting, Australian Broadcasting and France 24. Mr. Jain earned a J.D./M.S. in foreign service from Georgetown University and a B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan.

**David McKean**
*Director, Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (United States)*

David McKean is the director of policy planning. He joined the US Department of State in April 2012 as a senior advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. In 2011, Mr. McKean was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, he was the staff director for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Chief of Staff in Senator John Kerry's personal office from 1999 to 2008, playing a key role in laying the groundwork for the senator's presidential campaign in 2004 and was a co-chairman of the Senator's presidential transition team. Mr. McKean is the author of three books on American political history: *Friends in High Places* (with Douglas Frantz); *Tommy the Cork*; and *The Great Decision* (with Cliff Sloan). He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1980 and holds graduate degrees from both the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Duke Law School. He has served as a member of the board of directors of the Foundation for the National Archives. He is the recipient of a Distinguished Honor Award.

**Ferdinando Nelli Feroci**
*President, Institute of International Affairs*

Ferdinando Nelli Feroci is president of the IAI. A diplomat from 1972 to 2013, he was permanent representative of Italy to the European Union in Brussels (2008–2013), chief of staff (2006–2008) and director general for European Integration (2004–2006) at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, he served in New York at the United Nations, and in Algiers, Paris and Beijing. He also served as diplomatic counsellor of the vice president of the Italian Council of Ministers (1998). In June 2014, he was appointed to the post of European Commissioner in the commission chaired by Manuel Barroso, a position he held until the end of the mandate of the commission in November 2014. Formerly a fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1985-1986), and visiting professor at the Istituto Universitario Orientale of Naples (1989), he is currently a professor at the School of Government of LUISS, Rome. He is the author of many articles and essays on international relations, European affairs and political affairs.

**Keith Scott**
*Assistant Secretary, Policy Planning Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)*

Keith Scott has been Assistant Secretary, Policy Planning Branch, in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) since February 2015. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Bilateral Branch (2014) and Assistant Secretary, ASEAN and Regional

Issues Branch (2010-2013). He has also served as Director, Asia Section (2007-2009) and Director, Pacific, Multilateral and International Legal Section (2005-2007), in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Director Pacific Regional Section in DFAT (2003-2005). He served in the former Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) from 1998-2003. Prior to joining the Australian Public Service, Mr. Scott was a political and international affairs journalist and from 1990-1993 was media adviser to the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. He is the author of *Gareth Evans* (Allen and Unwin, 1999) and *The Australian Geographic Book of Antarctica* (Australian Geographic, 1993).

**Hugh Segal**
*Master, Massey College; Chairman, Atlantic Council of Canada*

Hugh Segal, the fifth Master of Massey College, joined Massey after four decades in the public, private, academic, and not-for-profit sectors. He is a former chief of staff to the prime minister (1990s), former associate cabinet secretary in Ontario (late 1970s–early 1980s) and in June 2014, he finished a nine-year term as senator representing Ontario, with work including chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism, vice chair of the Sub-Committee on Poverty of the Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, and member on the Senate National Security and Defense Committee. While in the Senate, legislative proposals initiated by Mr. Segal to protect the jobs of Canadian Forces' Reservists deployed abroad and to impose quarterly financial reporting requirements for all federal government departments, agencies and Crown Corporations, were adopted and implemented by the government. Mr. Segal was a Skelton-Clark Fellow in Queen's University's Political Studies Department and holds honorary doctorates from his alma mater and the Royal Military College of Canada. He is an Honorary Captain of the Royal Canadian Navy, chair of the Atlantic Council and honorary chair of the Navy League of Canada. Hugh is a graduate in Canadian history from the University of Ottawa, was a senior fellow at both the School of Policy Studies and Business School (Queen's), where he taught at the graduate level.

**Beomchul Shin**
*Director General, Policy Planning Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea)*

Beomchul Shin is Director General for Policy Planning at the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has held this post since July 2013. Before joining the Ministry, Mr. Shin was Head of the North Korean Military Studies Division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses since 2011. Prior to that, from 2009 to 2010, he worked for the Minister of National Defense as Senior Policy Advisor. He had also served in many advisory positions in government, including at the Korean National Security Council and National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. He

is currently a member of the Board of Directors at the Korean Society of International Law. Mr. Shin has published a number of articles on the U.S.-Korea alliance and Northeast Asian politics and security, and is also the author of several books on law and security, including *North Korean Military: A Secret Report* (2013), *International Law and the Use of Force* (2008). Mr. Shin received his B.A. degree from Chungnam National University and completed his graduate studies at the Seoul National University School of Law. He received his doctor's degree (Doctor of Judicial Science, S.J.D.) from Georgetown University Law Center in the U.S.

**Walter Slocombe**
*Secretary and Executive Committee Member, Atlantic Council*

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Mr. Slocombe is also a Senior Counsel at the Washington DC law firm of Caplin & Drysdale. He is a member of the State Department International Security Advisory Board and of the international advisory committee of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and has previously been a member of the presidential Commission on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, of the Defense Policy Board, and of National Academies of Sciences committees that conducted studies of prompt global strike, legal and ethical considerations in information operations, and ballistic missile defense. He also serves on the board of the South Africa Education Project, which supports enrichment activities for students in the townships of Cape Town, and on the advisory committee of Our Military Kids, which provides support for the children of deployed Guard and Reserve personnel.

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**Kurt Volker**
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Kurt Volker is a former US Ambassador to NATO, executive director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University, and senior adviser to the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, as well as a member of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group. He is also senior fellow of the Center on Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Prior to joining SAIS, Mr. Volker was a career member of the US Senior Foreign Service, with over 23 years of experience working on European political and security issues under five US administrations. He served as ambassador and the nineteenth US permanent representative on the NATO Council from 2008 until 2009, leading a staff of 156 at the US Mission to NATO. Prior to his service at NATO, Mr. Volker served as principal deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs (2005–2008), was deputy director of the Private Office of then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (1999–2001), and was first secretary at the US Mission to NATO from 1998 to 1999, responsible for the Membership Action Plan and Partnership for Peace issues. As a State Department legislative fellow in the US Senate from 1997 to 1998, he worked on foreign policy matters for Senator John McCain. His prior foreign service assignments include Budapest, London and several positions in the US Department of State.

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

# D-10 STRATEGY FORUM

## Memos

June 15 -16, 2015

Rome, Italy

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**Strategy Memo**

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| **Prepared for:** | **D-10 Strategy Forum**<br>**Rome Meeting** |
| **By:** | **Camille Grand, Director**<br>**Foundation for Strategic Research (France)** |
| **Subject:** | **Russia** |
| **Date:** | **June 9, 2015** |

**Key points**

- Putin's Russia poses a long-term and deep strategic challenge to the liberal democratic order.
- Russia has mutated from a partner to a non-cooperative revisionist player.
- Declining powers are the most difficult to manage.
- Robust defense and deterrence are the best way to preserve peace and stability.
- Unity, firmness and consistency are key to manage Russia's behavior.

Events of the last 18 months in Ukraine have led to the most serious crisis with Russia in decades. These events point at a deeper rift between Moscow and liberal democracies than at any point since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, they signal a transformation of the nature of the West's relationship with Russia, which rapidly mutated from a partner (somewhat difficult, but a partner) into a non-cooperative and revisionist player pursuing strategic objectives conflicting with Western democracies interests and *de facto* challenging the Western liberal order. In short, Russia has decided to breakout from the post-Cold War system.[1]

Western democracies should not engage in a new Cold War with Russia and should refrain from engaging in rhetorical escalation. What is clear however is that a new chapter in the relationship with Russia has opened and may last for a significant period of time. In such a 'Cold Peace'[2], war remains unlikely, but engagement and cooperation are no longer the dominant narrative or reality.

[1] Dmitri Trenin, *Russia's Breakout of the Post-Cold War System*, Carnegie Moscow Center, December 2014.
[2] Camille Grand, « La Russie, L'Occident et la paix froide », *Commentaire*, Summer 2014.

**Russia's Challenge to the Liberal Order**

Russia's foreign policy challenges the D-10 states beyond Ukraine. The crisis in Ukraine appears more as the gravest symptom of the degraded deteriorated relationship with Russia than its deep cause. The cooperative relationship that marked the end of the Cold War and the period that followed is now history.

The unraveling process started before Ukraine. Over the last few years, Russia's President Vladimir Putin's policy has challenged the main pillars of the European security order established during and after the Cold War: the annexation of Crimea and Russia's direct involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine violate the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Paris Charter (1990), and the Budapest Memorandum (1994). In addition, Russia's unilateral suspension in 2007 of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990) (following years of NATO-Russia disputes over the entry into force of the Adapted Treaty and the fulfillment of the 1999 'Istanbul commitments') and its suspected breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) reverse more than 25 years of arms control efforts in Europe.

The Russian leadership's use of force and multiple explicit threats – including nuclear threats – drastically transforms the nature of Russian relations with the EU and NATO. The West might have at times mismanaged Moscow, but the deliberate decision to move away from the post-Cold War order is a Russian decision. It is accompanied by a growing reliance on nationalism and a geopolitical project called Eurasian Economic Union which aims to reestablish uncontested Russian influence in its near abroad and restore Russia as a major power. Domestically, Putin promotes a semi-authoritarian political model that he presents as an alternative to modern liberal democracies. Internationally, he challenges the liberal model endorsed by the D-10 nations and the rule-based international system they support. Interestingly after decades of being a status quo power in Europe and upholding the post-WW II order, Russia decided to break out of the European security order in an unprecedented fashion.

**Understanding the New Russia**

This new Russia should not be confused with the Soviet Union. Sometimes described as Soviet but not communist, its ideology is enshrined in a mix of Russian nationalism combined with authoritarian tendencies. It is economically fragile and further weakened by the decline in oil prices, as well as by limited Western economic sanctions that have also discouraged foreign investors from doing business in Russia. In spite of a rapidly growing defense budget and an ambitious military and nuclear modernization program,

the Russian Federation is no match for NATO, at least in the realm of conventional weapons.

The future of Russia's domestic politics remains unpredictable. Putin could well stay in power until at least 2024, but the popularity of the Russian president may also not last that long. After fifteen years in office as President or Prime minister, he remains popular. Putin is credited with moving Russia out of the chaos of the nineties and for restoring the Russian state's authority. These successes – at least in the eyes of many Russians – have taken place in the context of a state-controlled economy, putting oligarchs under the tight control of a vertical power system. This system might however be more fragile than it appears as the economy becomes increasingly dysfunctional and faces a severe recession. Corruption is widespread and the target of criticisms that do not come only from the liberal opposition, and regional imbalances within the Russian Federation become more difficult to sustain without growth and as long as oil prices remain low. If not reversed, these trends could undermine Putin's popularity in the mid to long term. It is currently unlikely to expect Putin losing power, but it would unwise to take for granted that he will remain President for another decade. This is the most plausible scenario, but alternatives exist. Some of them could prove more dangerous, as a scenario of a liberal/democratic shift through fully free and fair elections seems unlikely.

The economic challenges (which preceded the Ukrainian crisis) may explain the choice of an increasingly nationalist discourse and the growing anti-Western rhetoric. The new Russia is not only a revisionist power challenging the post-Cold War order (viewed as unfavorable to Russian interests), but also reflects the attempt to present an alternative narrative based on conservative and nationalist values as opposed to the 'decadent' West. Putin's Russia deliberately distanced itself from the block of democracies, which its aspired to join in the post-cold war era. Domestically, Putin is developing a semi-authoritarian regime, increasingly failing to respect the basic principles of liberal democracies. Internationally, Putin seeks to take the lead and rally non-Western, non-democratic regimes such as China in this challenge to 'Western domination' and intrusiveness in domestic affairs.

**What are the Strategic Objectives of the New Russia?**

The most often stated objective of the New Russia seems to regain control of the ex-Soviet space. Putin does probably not seek to re-conquer former Soviet republics beyond specific region of strategic or historical importance such as Crimea, but intends to consolidate Moscow's influence in its "near abroad". Putin's policy in the post-Soviet space reminds of the Brezhnev doctrine about the Warsaw Pact countries, which could only be allowed "limited sovereignty". His priority in the post-Soviet space seems to be

two-fold: prevent a further expansion of the "West" (NATO or EU) and its influence; prevent the development of "color revolutions" or new "Maidans" that might lead to the fall of friendly governments.

Domestic politics counts as much as geopolitics, Putin fears a "Maidan" movement in Russia. Internally, this justifies the tight control over the NGO scene and the description of "color revolutions" or "Maidan" as foreign-sponsored conspiracies. In short, a successful democratic Ukrainian government is perceived as an indirect threat to Putin's domestic power, by offering a powerful counter-model. Russia's direct or indirect involvement in domestic political processes in the near abroad also pursue this untold objective. Furthermore, a Ukraine turning West through an Association Agreement with the EU undermines the prospects of a meaningful Eurasian Economic Union as Ukraine's participation is a key to the project's success. From this perspective, and to its own surprise, the EU appears as much of a threat than NATO from a Russian perspective, as the promotion by the EU of democratic values such as rule of law, transparency, challenge the very core of the Putin system.

Lastly, Russia pursues a classic revisionist agenda aiming at its lost major power status. As repeatedly stated by Putin, Russian political elites view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a "catastrophe". In this harsh geopolitical logic, Putin wants to see Russia recognized as an uncontested major power in its post-soviet region and beyond. This project leads to Russia to distance itself from the West to pursue its geopolitical ambitions and portray itself as an alternative source of power. Being fully aware that Russia is punching above its weight, Putin tries to develop ties with non-Western countries such as the BRICS and to secure a leading role amongst these emerging economic powers.

Russia has however limited means to achieve these three strategic objectives. In contrast with the Soviet Union, it is a "poor power" that struggles to develop a fully coherent "grand strategy" combining its influence on oil and gas, its modernized military, and a neo-imperial narrative.[3] Ultimately, Russia has not been able to develop a coherent Alliance network and appears quite isolated. It can pursue limited wars in its immediate environment, but no longer appears, outside the nuclear realm, as a global military power. This does nuance the nature of the Russian "threat". The problem remains that declining powers are often the most difficult to manage as they tend to overestimate their weight and to underestimate their weaknesses, and to adopt brinkmanship postures.

[3] On this point, see Thomas Gomart, « Russie de la 'grande stratégie' à la 'guerre limitée' », *Politique étrangère*, n°2/2015, Spring 2015.

**Developing a D-10 Strategy**

Overcoming these challenges and taking into account the lessons of 2014, a new Russia strategy should rely on the following pillars:

1. First and foremost, the West needs to recognize the reality of a deeply transformed European security environment and relationship with Russia and should no longer expect to go back to "normal" as it did after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. The current state of affairs is the "new normal." A naive approach underestimating these changes to preserve our comfort would only be perceived as weakness and trigger further unwelcome action by Putin.

2. Second, NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities need to be bolstered in order to make any aggression – even in the form of hybrid warfare – against a NATO or EU member state unthinkable. The September 2014 NATO summit in Wales was a first opportunity to address the shortfalls of the alliance's military posture and improve its ability to address a European contingency. These efforts should continue. The best way to preserve peace in Europe is to make a major war impracticable through robust defense and deterrence, including its nuclear component. The Allies should be unimpressed by Russian efforts to bully some of them and ready to display unconditional solidarity should the need arise.

3. Third, on Ukraine, a two-track policy should be pursued. The Minsk II agreement offers a fragile and narrow path towards a settlement. Its full implementation, including a robust and monitored cease-fire, the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over its entire territory and borders, is the real test of Russia's attitude in this crisis. Events since the first Minsk agreement and the latest developments, however, only allow for very moderate optimism. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, it is urgent to strengthen Ukrainian democracy and foster better governance through democratic, economic, and military assistance in order to reduce its vulnerability to Russian pressures, either direct or by proxy. This will come at significant financial cost, but it does not compare with the much higher price of Ukrainian collapse.

4. Fourth, Moscow stands as a difficult but important player in the management of a number of international crises (Iranian nuclear negotiations, Syrian Civil War, etc.) and will continue as such for the foreseeable future. Russia also remains a significant economic partner for Europe. A policy combining realistic engagement on issues of mutual concern with, when necessary, firmness and further direct sanction of Putin's unacceptable behavior currently seems the best

way forward. However, this needs to be pursued with the mid- and long terms in view, as the effectiveness of sanctions does increase as time passes, when Putin has the advantage in the short term. Should the situation arise, the EU and the West should not hesitate to immediately sanction the breakdown of the Ukrainian peace process or further Russian actions in Ukraine or elsewhere.

**Meeting the Challenge**

The most difficult challenge for the D-10, Europe and the West in general, is to manage two major asymmetries. First, Russia has the upper hand in the short term, while in the longer term the sustainability of Putin's policy is questionable. Second, there is an asymmetry as far as political will on both sides is concerned. Putin is ready to use force and has already sent weapons and troops to Ukraine and lost soldiers, whereas Europeans and North Americans have often appeared divided and reluctant to fully acknowledge the gravity of events. Against the backdrop of these two imbalances, Putin retained the initiative, whereas the West has often seemed only to react.

In this context, the real challenge for Europe and the West vis-à-vis Putin's Russia is to preserve firmness and consistency of policy: deterring further aggression through a robust defense posture, staying firm on democratic and governance principles, supporting Ukraine, and refusing to enter into rhetorical escalation, all while sanctioning violations of agreements and rules. The Russian behavior is not only a challenge to the Europeans, or to NATO countries, it is a challenge to the liberal-democratic rule-based international order, with potential consequences far beyond Europe. This requires a permanent effort to preserve the unity of the D10 democracies as Russia is actively seeking to divide them.

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**Strategy Memo**

**Prepared for:** **D-10 Strategy Forum**
**Rome Meeting**

**By:** **Kurt Volker**
**Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council, and Executive Director, McCain Institute for International Leadership, ASU (United States)**

**Subject:** **Russia**

**Date:** **June 10, 2015**

## Long-Term Versus Short- Term

The starting point for developing any strategy to deal with Russia must be clarity on goals. The relationship we have with Russia today – tense and adversarial – is clearly not the relationship we want. Indeed, the nature of Russia itself – with an, authoritarian government, closed media, extraction-based economy, and nationalist ideology – is hardly the Russia we would want. It is bad for the Russian people, bad for Russia's neighbors, and of growing concern to states within the D-10.

But what, in fact, do we want? We would like to see a Russia that:

- Protects human rights;
- Is governed by the rule of law;
- Experiences democratic, peaceful transitions of government;
- Benefits from an increasingly prosperous and diverse market economy;
- Respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors;
- Engages in market-based international trade and investment;
- Contributes to a stable and mutually beneficial security environment; and
- Maintains positive relations with the West and the international community

These goals may seem a far cry from the situation with Russia today, and indeed they are. Russia does not live up to these hopes in either its domestic politics or its relations with the outside world. To put this squarely on the table, Russia:

- Is increasingly authoritarian at home;
- Is weak economically, able only to sustain extractive industries competitively;
- Is dominated by a former-KGB cadre of individuals connected to the Kremlin, security services, mafia, and state-owned enterprises;
- Is shaped by government controlled media, especially television;
- Has an increasingly nationalist, xenophobic domestic mindset;
- Projects an anti-Western narrative of blaming the West for aggressively encircling and humiliating Russia;
- Has maintained and used a dominant position in oil and gas to pressure and influence others;
- Finances and projects anti-Western propaganda both globally (through RT), and in the Russian-language aimed at Russian-speaking populations among its neighbors;
- Has invaded and occupied parts of both Georgia and Ukraine;
- Has annexed Crimea, and still supports the insurgency seeking to expand control of Eastern Ukraine;
- Is building up its military forces and exercising them provocatively, including with frequent violations of others' air and sea space; and
- Has targeted missiles on Europe and Japan and openly discussed nuclear attacks.

It is important to note that today's Russia is shaped top-down, by a non-democratic elite with Putin at the center. Putin has effectively used propaganda and the nationalist ideology to strengthen public support, including among young people. This does not mean, however, that Putin's Russia operates in the best interests of the Russian people. Rather, it operates with a view toward perpetuating the system of Putin-ism. One of our considerations, therefore, must be differentiating between the Putin elite, and the people of Russia.

**Strategy and Policy**

With this vast discrepancy in mind – between what we would like, and what we have with Russia today – the question becomes: How do we get from where we are, to where we want to be? What should be the strategy of D-10 states in dealing with Russia in the short-term, in the hopes of getting to a different long-term position with Russia? And how, in so doing, can we focus our efforts on changing the behavior of the Russian government, while maintaining positive outreach toward the Russian people?

Too much of the discussion about policy toward Russia focuses on military considerations. This is true on both ends of the spectrum, whether it is standing up to Russia militarily or, in contrast, asserting that we must do everything possible to avoid military escalation. In reality, the military component is but one of a wide range of policy areas to pursue, including economic, political, cultural/social, and information.

We should use a full spectrum of tools to blunt the impact of the excesses of Putin-ism, support Russia's neighbors, and reach out to the Russian people. The latter is particularly difficult – and needs careful attention – given that Putin's propaganda has convinced perhaps 70 percent of the population to support his rule. We should have a mixture of tools that are "positive" in nature – building the kinds of states, institutions, and development we seek generally, as well as those that are "negative" aimed at "countering" Russia where necessary.

The following is a menu of policy areas worth discussing and pursuing in the D-10 context (and then taking these into other areas and organizations such as NATO, the EU, WTO, and OECD, to name a few). Other options will certainly present themselves in discussion. There are tough options at the end, but it is important to note that they are not stand-alone measures, but part of a balanced strategy covering the full spectrum of political, economic, and security instruments. For convenience, the list is divided into "investments" and "counter-measures" – though in some cases these may overlap.

**"Positive Investments"**

- **Transparency and Anti-Corruption:** One of the hallmarks of Russian negative influence on neighboring states is the lack of transparency in many dealings. The ability of the Kremlin to buy influence through preferential business deals, crack-downs on civil society and foreign assistance groups, contributions to extremist political parties, outright bribery of corrupt officials, and mafia activities is one of the major tools Russia uses to cement its influence.

  D-10 states should consider initiatives aimed at ensuring that Russian entities act transparently and without preferential or corrupt business practices. This could take the form of common transparency and anti-corruption clauses in contracts with Russian entities; stronger campaign finance and lobbying disclosure laws in D-10 states; restrictions on Russian entities known to have engaged in corrupt practices, or to have cracked down on foreign aid entities or civil society inside Russia.

D-10 states should also focus specifically on measures to assist Russia's neighbors (mainly former Soviet states) put in place stronger transparency and anti-corruption regimes. A critical component in fighting corruption could be adoption of e-government practices as has been championed in Estonia.

- **Global Liberal Economic Order:** A corollary to the micro-level focus on transparency and corruption issues in Russia and its neighborhood is to use the power of D-10 states to strengthen transparent, non-corrupt, liberal, market-driven rules to shape the broader global economy.

  This is good policy on its own merits. But additionally, because of Russia's need to participate effectively in the global economy, insistence on such standards generally will also have a derivative effect on Russian behavior. Many tools already exist for this purpose – e.g., in the WTO and OECD – but have been under-utilized for fear of creating confrontation with Russia. We should consider instead whether such economically driven confrontation is actually a necessary step at this point.

- **EU Association and/or Partnership with European Neighbors:** As Russia's immediate neighbors in Europe continue to implement effective political and economic reforms, the EU should consider proceeding with EU Association status for those states. Such association provides a strong incentive for nations to reform, as well as a clearly established framework for what is required. This does not automatically mean a country would be on a path to EU membership. It would, however, make the territory around Russia far less fertile for corrupting influence over time.

- **Promoting Pluralism and Civil Society in Russia and More Broadly:** Despite the harsh pressure on civil society inside Russia, there remains a broad-based demand for civil engagement within the public. To keep options open for the long-term, it is essential that D-10 governments and NGO's continue to seek engagement with Russian civil society groups. These need not be explicitly political in nature, but could include professional associations, educational exchanges, cultural exchanges, etc.

  Likewise, the successful development of pluralistic politics and civil society organizations within Russia's neighbors – especially involving Russian-speaking communities there – can have an important demonstrative effect for society within Russia. The ability of Russian citizens to see that there are other ways of

fulfilling one's potential as a Russian through means other than those sponsored or condoned by the Kremlin is critical can have a significant impact.

**"Counter-Measures"**

While pursuing these investments for the long-term, Russian behavior warrants some short-term responses aimed and stopping Russia's immediate destructive behavior, and giving time and space for the more positive, long-term agenda to have impact. Such counter-measures include:

- **Sanctions:** Sanctions on Russia – tied to its annexation of Crimea and failure to implement fully the ceasefire in Ukraine – have been put in place by both the United States and the EU. This is the most utilized tool in responding to Russian aggression to this point. While sanctions are clearly having some impact on the Russian economy, they have not impacted Kremlin decision-making. Maintaining existing sanctions, and expanding and extending them as needed – should remain a key consideration for the D-10.

- **Information / Counter-propaganda:** The Kremlin is winning the information war. It has invested massively in advancing anti-Western, Russian-nationalist narrative – both through global, English-language broadcasting, as well as Russian language broadcasts locally in areas near Russia. It has also taken over most Russian media, paid and empowered surrogate speakers globally, and even launched "troll farms" designed to project a Kremlin point of view in social media platforms. All of this effort is paying off, as the younger generation in Russia is avidly supporting the Kremlin line, many in the global public give equal credence to Kremlin propaganda, Russian-speaking populations in neighboring countries are influenced by Kremlin ideology, and even external publics such as those in China or the Middle East see Vladimir Putin as an admired and strong leader. Russia is particularly successful at this in part because it is throwing government resources at an information sector that is facing severe financial and sustainability challenges.

  D-10 states need to consider how best to project non-biased, fact-based information, in ways that reach populations in Russia, Russia's neighbors, and publics globally. This should include all means of media, from television and radio to social media, and internet-based sources. Simply "spinning" a positive policy narrative is unlikely to be as successful as Russia's negative narrative. Rather, ensuring access to high quality, and highly credible information appears again to be necessary – in both English for a global audience, as well as in

Russian and local languages in other target countries, particularly surrounding Russia.

The BBC is the gold standard in this area, but its resources and foreign languages services have been cut dramatically. The U.S. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have likewise faced budget cuts and suffered from a perception of bias. Deutsche Welle has failed to gain significant traction as an alternative source of information. A detailed analysis and set of proposals in this area would be a particularly worthy topic of consideration.

- **Energy Diversification:** Russia adroitly uses its ability to supply oil and gas – particularly to Europe – to exercise economic and political influence. It prices gas at a level designed to dissuade investment in alternative sources of supply, and where necessary seeks to influence Western politicians or dangle its own potential new investments to maintain dependence. This dependency, in turn, indeed has an impact on outside governments' willingness to apply harsh sanctions or push back on Russia in other ways.

  The EU has already made substantial progress toward reducing excessive dependence on Russian oil, and to a lesser degree gas, through investment in energy diversification initiatives. Still, far more needs to be done. Under consideration should be renewed use of nuclear power, new exploration of shale gas, construction of LNG infrastructure, more extensive networking of two-way flow pipelines to create multiple supply options, and development of alternative supply networks and pipeline routes.

  As the potential availability of Russian investment financing and the competition among European state champions in the energy sphere in fact impede Western investment in many of these potential means of easing energy dependence, D-10 states should consider developing their own financing options which would be made available only to international consortia of companies competing for projects specifically designed to reduce energy dependence.

- **Anti-insurgency preparation:** In its use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine – a refinement on the techniques used in Georgia – Russia has found a wedge issue: an ability to undermine its neighbors to the point of changing borders by force, without resorting to an outright, conventional military invasion that could provoke a more serious response. While Russia deliberately sends intelligence officers, special forces, heavy equipment, and even regular troops into Ukraine,

it has done so gradually, and always denying its actions. This has had the result of blunting any response, even while Russia advances its objectives.

Faced with a direct military attack, particularly on an Allied nation, democratic nations would find it necessary to respond militarily. However, the instinct of democratic nations when faced with this kind of hybrid threat is to seek to de-escalate and avoid conflict. This has the effect of reinforcing the Kremlin's advantage in taking the initiative through this kind of hybrid warfare.

With this in mind, D-10 states could consider developing an anti-insurgency package of support for nations that could be affected by future Russia efforts at subversion. This could include specially trained interior and justice ministry advisors and response teams, a legal framework for granting temporary, additional powers to response teams, and multinationalizing the response from the outset, including positioning of multinational observers and border assistance task forces to prevent a subversion from ballooning into a change of borders or creation of areas beyond state control.

- **Security partnerships:** A further step in this direction of providing a more focused security-sector response to these new security challenges is the strengthening of security partnerships – both through NATO, and in bilateral relations. The frameworks for such cooperation already exist – whether the Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine Commissions, and NATO's external partnerships (such as with Japan and Australia) but they have not been fully utilized. Within these existing frameworks, one could envision developing multinational platforms for providing defense advisors, trainers, arms sales, planning, exercising, and establishment of multinational observer missions.

- **Alliances and military counter-pressure:** Alongside sanctions, this is the area where the West has done the most to begin to respond effectively to Russia's new aggressiveness. The development of a serious planning and exercise schedule, alongside a "persistent" presence of NATO forces in Poland, the Baltic States, and the Black Sea NATO states, has helped put in place needed capabilities and given a signal of NATO resolve.

  Still, more can be considered. NATO should consider converting its "persistent" presence into one that is "permanent, operationally capable, and multinational." As the security environment has changed substantially from that foreseen in 1997 (due mainly to Russian actions) and NATO's overall deployment levels are far below those of even the 1990s, it is clear that even a permanent presence in

the Baltic States would not constitute "additional," "significant," "combat" forces. Such a permanent deployment would thus be fully consistent with the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Globally, we need to respond in each case to Russia's forward presence of submarines, bombers, ships and missile targeting – not with threats of our own but with presence, interception, tracking and public exposure.

- **Helping Ukraine defend itself:** Perhaps the most controversial way to counter Russia directly in the short term is to help Ukraine defend itself – politically, financially, and militarily. If Putin feels he is unchecked in Ukraine, he may be tempted to test NATO's resolve in defending Allied territory, such as in the Baltic States. (A recent Pew survey found that a majority of West European publics would rather avoid confrontation with Russia than defend NATO members in the East.) The best way for NATO to avoid being tested, therefore, is to ensure that Putin is stopped in Ukraine.

  Stopping Putin in Ukraine means helping Ukraine financially to get through its deficit and debt issues leftover from the Yanukovych government, helping them implement significant economic reforms, encouraging political inclusiveness, and supporting Ukraine militarily with advisors, equipment, trainers, and multinational presence. Militarily, the objective is not to defeat Russia per se, but to increase the costs to Russia of pursuing its present course. Once confronted with unacceptable costs, particularly military, Russia will become more interested in seeking a genuine negotiated solution.

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**Strategy Memo**

**Prepared for:** D-10 Strategy Forum
Rome Meeting

**By:** Roberto Aliboni
Institute for International Affairs (Italy)

**Subject:** Libya

**Date:** June 10, 2015

Today, violent conflict and extremism are centered in the Fertile Crescent and Yemen, with instability spilling over to almost everywhere in the region. North Africa, especially the Maghreb, remains somehow apart. In Tunisia there is even a promising trend towards the installation of a democratic regime. The civil war and power vacuum in Libya, however, are opening the way for violent conflict and extremism in the whole of North Africa. Egypt, already significantly affected by both political and economic instability, is particularly threatened by the Libyan crisis.

Thus, the crisis in Libya, a country lying dead centre in North Africa, cannot but be foremost in Western and international concerns and has to be tackled. On the other hand, success in Libya would represent a breakthrough for the entire region and offer international diplomacy a chance to shed its present helplessness. While implausible in Syria, a diplomatic breakthrough is still possible in Libya. Therefore it is worth being pursued.

So what collective action could the D-10 countries undertake in order to prevent the Libyan crisis from affecting all of North Africa and worsening the region-wide trends towards instability?
Collective military action, in the form of counterterrorism and police interventions, is often being proposed internationally as a way to counter the expansion towards and in Libya of ISIS and the criminal organizations that direct illegal migration towards Southern Europe across the Mediterranean Sea.

As the UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) mediation has not succeeded so far in reaching a political agreement supported internationally (and by the D-10 countries), collective military action has been invoked as a Plan B to solve the crisis. The point of this paper is that, while a political solution in Libya, once enforced, would help

solve security spillovers affecting the West and the region, the reverse is not necessarily true. Military or police action in the framework of the current state vacuum can only be weak and ineffective, and would inevitably be biased in favor of the internationally-recognized Tobruk faction. This would therefore exacerbate and perpetuate the civil conflict in Libya and open the door even more to extremism.

For these reasons, collective action should be aimed primarily at bringing the UNSMIL mediation to a successful conclusion. This does not exclude the use of military or police instruments. They should be seen, however, only as a component part in the implementation of a political agreement and agreed upon by a national unity government in the framework of international law. This is why this paper looks at paths to pursue for achieving a political solution.

**Improving the UNSMIL draft agreement**

At the end of April, UNSMIL submitted a draft agreement to the parties. UNSMIL proposed (a) to form a government of independent and/or trusted national figures with a Cabinet composed of a President and two Deputies that decides by consensus; (b) to maintain the House of Representatives (HoR); and (c) to establish a new large consultative body, the State Council, whose members would be selected by the civil society organizations participating in the Libyan Political Dialogue.

The draft was promptly rejected by many representatives of the coalition sitting in Tripoli (the Misratan "revolutionary" elite and Islamist groups). Yet, the moderates recently emerged in Misrata, while rejecting the UN draft, have nevertheless underscored their willingness to continue to negotiate.

What they resent the most is that the HoR, the parliament they do not recognize, would remain. Furthermore, their perception is exacerbated by the possibility that the Constitutional Committee may prove unable to draft a Constitution within the one year the draft agreement gives the government and the HoR, as in this case both of them would be extended by one more year.

Misrata expects and deserves an appropriate signal from UNSMIL aimed at emphasizing/clarifying its role in the government and the State Council (where they would be represented by a strong and qualified civil society) and toning down the significance and role of the HoR in the new transitional period.

This could be done by underscoring that the UNSMIL proposal provides for a strong government to lead the transition, while de-emphasizing the HoR's powers. It would

seem only natural that one of the two Deputies will represent the Misrata coalition in a Cabinet (where the rule of consensus should prevent prevarications). Furthermore, a stricter deadline should be set for the Constitutional Drafting Committee – which has already been at work for a long time - and new legislative elections scheduled alongside the constitutional referendum.

The split in the Misrata coalition offers the only substantive opportunity to change the course of events in Libya. It cannot be missed. For Libya to pull itself out of chaos, the polarization between the two camps of revolutionaries and conservatives resulting from the 2012 elections needs to be turned into a broad national understanding between moderate conservatives and the Misrata moderates, pushing Islamists back into the minority, which they in fact are, and excluding extremists from the national political process. While confrontation is a non-starter, an understanding among moderates for a workable democratic arena is a feasible framework to aim at.

To that purpose, moderation must also win in the Tobruk camp, though, where the trend instead is towards extremism and exclusion. This is based on a narrative in which all opponents are Islamists and all Islamists are terrorists, as well as an inclination towards President Al-Sisi's regime that is so strong that it makes both Misratans and Islamists suspect that another dictatorship is around the corner.

**Western biases towards Tobruk: General Heftar, Islamicist extremism, terrorism**

The key factor in Tobruk's lack of moderation is the role assigned to General Heftar, the main sponsor of the just-mentioned narrative and its regional consequences. The Tobruk institutions, while providing Heftar and the forces around him with ample legitimacy, have failed to frame this move in any broad reform of the security sector. Can Heftar and the military forces gathering around him be sidelined? The draft agreement says that the new government would assume the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army - thus relieving Heftar and the generals of their present roles. Furthermore, it would issue a law regulating the military sector within three months of its inception. These provisions are too general to be credible. To reassure Misrata and Libyan citizens, more details on the implementation of a security sector must be included in the draft agreement – openly calling for assistance from the "UN, the Arab League and the international community".

Amb. Léon has set next Ramadan (at mid-June) as the deadline for endorsement of the draft agreement. Instead, he should launch another round of negotiations and submit a fourth version of the draft introducing the amendments suggested here and elsewhere with a view to correcting perceptions, asking for new efforts and enabling the parties to

compromise. Some authoritative observers suggest, however, that the draft is flawed in any case because of a more or less open Western bias in favor of Tobruk.

That the Western countries (those most engaged in supporting UNSMIL mediation) are biased towards Tobruk can hardly be denied - although this bias does not always come from a conscious policy orientation. There is no doubt that, even if Western countries are in good faith, the bias has reverberated through the UNSMIL draft agreement commented above. Western concerns about terrorism in the region and Tobruk's anti-Islamist and anti-terrorist narrative quite naturally make the West tilt toward it, as do other Western alliances and coalitions in the region, such as the anti-ISIS coalition.

It is certain that whatever Plan B Western countries and the international community may resort to will require that Western biases be attenuated. Correcting them can be attempted by enforcing two kinds of measures: (a) amending the UNSMIL proposal (and accompanying these amendments with the necessary pressure – personal sanctions, freezing of assets, limitations on business – so often devised but never enforced), and (b) reconsidering and redefining the West's regional policies. Let's turn to the latter.

**Redefining Western regional policies in a Libyan perspective**

Until the beginning of 2015, the political struggle in Libya had aligned the conservative Tobruk coalition and the revolutionaries/Islamists with conservative Sunni regimes (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt) and reformist Sunni regimes (Turkey and Qatar), respectively. The shifts in the balance of Misrata's political forces, on the one hand, and the strengthening of Tobruk's ties to Egypt, on the other, have changed these alignments and their significance: while Tobruk is more bound than ever to the conservative Sunni regional coalition, Misrata, albeit with important differences within the coalition, is tilting towards the UN and has loosened its links to the reformist regional coalition.

Then again, the regional picture regarding the contest between the two Sunni coalitions has also changed. Turkey looks weakened by its confused and inconclusive policies towards the Fertile Crescent. Its regional approach will be reshaped by the outcome of the June elections, and how remains to be seen. Qatar has been pushed into a corner by its GCC fellows, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It has not abandoned its goals of an independent foreign policy, but is cautiously revising its stance and moves. Most of all, the Saudi succession has brought about a shift in the Kingdom's concerns, from the Muslim Brothers to Iran and the Fertile Crescent.

All these factors impact on Libya. In a recent interview with "Al-Hayat", Tripoli Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell, in confirming his government's interest in a political solution to the Libyan crisis based on dialogue between the parties, underlined "the positive role played by Saudi Arabia in order to support stability in Arab countries". A delegation from Misrata even visited Riyadh.

All this attests to a deep change in regional perspectives and in the Libyan factions' regional alliances. This change should be brought to bear in working toward a political solution in Libya. On the one hand, Misrata's rapprochement with Riyadh is helping to tip the balance between the two Libyan coalitions. Western countries should encourage Riyadh (and the UAE) to continue in this direction. On the other hand, in the new context, the Western countries' diplomacy should seek to influence and shape links between Tobruk and Cairo.

The West – which has already proven to be very sensitive to Egypt's requests for economic support - must recognize that Cairo's concerns about infiltration of its borders from Libya are fully justified and that it requires help. Egypt must be heartily reassured. The West must offer it full support and cooperation to defend its Libyan border, while making it clear however that this can be done only if Libya exits from its crisis and is led by an effective non-partisan government. The West should ask Cairo for more restraint and less interference with respect to Libya and ensure the military forces and resources to effectively control its border with Libya. Egypt's natural partners in patrolling the border in the UN framework would, no doubt, be the Arab League and the European Union separately or, even better, in cooperation with one another.

**Recommendations**

Continuing support for UNSMIL mediation should be ensured by improving the draft agreement, in particular:

- emphasizing/clarifying Misrata's role in the government and the State Council, while toning down the HoR's significance and role in the new transitional period;
- giving the Constitutional Drafting Committee a stricter deadline for presenting the Draft Constitution so as to avoid prolonging the HoR's contested legitimacy;
- providing for new elections immediately after the Constitution is submitted to a referendum or, better yet, holding new elections at the same time as the referendum with a view to restoring Misrata's chances of being more fairly represented;
- including more detailed provisions concerning the broad reform of the security sector in the draft agreement;

The possibilities of success of UNSMIL mediation should be strengthened by redefining Western regional policies, in particular by:

- encouraging Saudi Arabia's new approach toward Libya and promoting that approach as a GCC policy;
- reassuring Egypt by recognizing its concerns with regard to its border with Libya and providing generous economic and military assistance to help the country, in return for Egyptian restraint and non-interference towards Libya; as well as stating Western readiness to support a military mission to enforce border security between Libya and Egypt in the UN framework as soon as Libya has a government of national unity;
- reassuring Libya and its neighbors by confirming Western readiness to send in police and military forces to enforce cease-fires, protect infrastructure and keep order where needed, as soon as Libya has a government of national accord unity.