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# The OSCE, the Global Mediterranean and the Future of Cooperative Security

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PAPER

## Some features of the Post Arab Spring and their implications for the Mediterranean

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## Introduction

Throughout history, the Mediterranean has been a lake of continuous exchange and interaction between civilisations, ideas, people, and commerce. In war and in peace the oneness of geography intersected with the divisions of tribes, nations and states. To this was added, particularly as of the 19th century, the battles of larger powers, with confrontations, agreements and lines of division drawn across the Mediterranean and along the fault lines that separate social groups, their leaders and their economies. After the Second World War, the countries on the shores of the south and east of the Mediterranean were captured by the dynamics of nationalism, resisting the late, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempts of empires trying to hold on. But thereafter, these very forces of independence and social revolution fell short of delivering the promise of progress, democracy and regional integration.

Today the South and East Mediterranean stands at another crossroads with the hopes of the Arab Spring blowing in the wind, the forces of chaos and division unleashed and the role of international intervention ever present. The stakes are high and a new vision is required. What are the key emerging features of this region? What is the remaining impact of the Arab Spring? What structural factors will govern the direction of future changes? What are the alternative scenarios that may unfold? And what are the possibilities of influencing this process of shaping the future through choices made today?

This paper seeks to tackle these questions through an analysis of four key features or dimensions:

- Identifying and analyzing recent key strategic shifts in the South and Eastern Mediterranean;
- Analyzing the fate and results of the Arab Spring;
- Identifying structural drivers of future change in the South Med; alternative future scenarios.
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## I. Identifying and analyzing strategic shifts

This section of the paper seeks to provide some perspectives from *inside* the Middle East looking *outwards* to identify the key strategic changes that occurred, or are occurring, in the south and east Mediterranean over the last 3 years or so.

An important caveat to start with is to caution against hasty interpretations of a scene characterized by fluidity as some of the shifts have occurred and completed their cycle, while others are evolving. Also to note that the environment surrounding the debate on strategy inside the region is loaded with tensions, sensationalism and conspiracy theories.

Two sets of shifts seem to be in evidence, one in the context of the global strategic balance, more specifically in the relationship between the region and the international order, the other in the regional order itself amongst its component elements.

In general, perceptions in the region are that several trends have now peaked.

1. The effort of the US and Russia to co-manage the Middle East region (e.g. agreements on Iran's nuclear programme, Syria chemical weapons, Geneva II) has been superseded by a perception of competition. The current situation displays some of the features of the cold war era (aka Cold War II). While Ukraine developments have consolidated this view, its beginnings precede that milestone. Many see a Russian re-entry to the Middle East as a challenger to the position of the U.S and the EU, albeit this process is in its early days.

2. The US role in the Middle East is regressing. In this context, the pivot to Asia is viewed as a sign of further disengagement from the region, downsizing its importance and destabilizing its security and power formulas. (Interestingly, Secretary Kerry denied this in Munich last February[1]). Washington's limited capacity to control Israel's attack on Gaza in 2014 indicates the problems associated with this changing image of the U.S.[2] Yet, some may argue that the current US intervention in Iraq, with limited EU support, demonstrates continued influence and willingness to act.

3. Western direct military intervention in the region has peaked after Libya with a pronounced loss of political support for such strategies (expressed by both the British parliament and US Congress at the time when intervention in Syria was proposed in September 2013). There is a search for new policies and instruments to maintain influence or "control" (including use of surgical airstrikes, drones and supporting the role of regional powers). While the US is seeking to continue its withdrawal from the "Greater Middle East" and to avoid new commitments that result in "boots on the ground", the EU is reticent about assuming new responsibilities and challenged in formulating joint policy[3]. The EU appears torn between the idealism of defending principles (e.g. human rights, democratic institutions, etc.) on the one hand, and ensuring its self-interest (e.g. markets, energy supplies) on the other. The question for Europe remains: how to engage and "ride the tiger" of change in the Middle East.

Moving to the regional shifts:

1. The Arab Spring appears to have run its course, certainly in terms of its horizontal expansion to other countries in the region but also as a project for democratization and hope. We shall return to this issue shortly.

2. Several Arab countries in transition (ACTs) are facing multiple challenges:

    - The disintegration of the "state project" and its machinery.

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[1] http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221134.htm : Secretary Kerry said: "(W)e're not withdrawing from anything, folks...I can't think of a place in the world that we are retreating, not one. .. So I think this narrative, which has, frankly, been pushed by some people who have an interest in trying to suggest that the United States is somehow on a different track, I would tell you it is flat wrong and it is belied by every single fact of what we are doing everywhere in the world."

[2]

[3]

- A dynamic towards redrawing the maps that have been in place since World War I (i.e. the Sykes-Picot / San Remo agreements) with the emergence of new identities and borders reflecting a rapid fragmentation of states and actors.
- The deterioration of the economic situation and quality of life for a large number of people;
- The pressures of the youth factor, representing a high percentage of the population, as a force for change with demands for education, jobs and housing beyond the capacity of national economies.

3. The Islamic wave that appeared to be poised to inherit power in many Arab Spring countries is now at an impasse, particularly in Egypt after July 2013. This tipping point is significant because it captures the emergence of a new regional anti-Moslem Brotherhood alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE [4] with an opposing alliance of Turkey, Qatar and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia together with non-state actors like Hamas. This will have implications for the direction of change and regional politics over the next decade and beyond. Significantly, extremist Islamic movements (particularly ISIL, but also others) have claimed the Islamic political space by presenting simplistic ideologies that disenfranchise rulers and regimes as well other opposition groups, minorities and women while enlisting foreign fighters and applying terror tactics.

4. There are changes within both the Arab and Middle East regional orders[5], and the relationship between them.

    - In the "Middle East order", Iran is reengaging following its rapprochement with the West, with concerns in other Gulf countries that this will be at their expense. Despite setbacks in Syria, Egypt and Libya, and internal preoccupations, Turkey seems to remain interested in an active role in Middle East issues, even when access is difficult (e.g. Gaza ceasefire negotiations, August 2014). Meanwhile, Israel remains at an acute impasse with the Palestinian people and in its relationship with the region, following the recent attack on Gaza and the collapse of the Kerry efforts to mediate an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

    - In the Arab order the weight of the "central" causes (e.g. Palestine, Arab integration) has changed with issues like Syria, ISIL and terrorism replacing them as a focus for debate division and alliance building.

    - There is also a growth in the list of "failed states" together with a tendency towards the rapid internationalization of issues and increased instances of international intervention via global

[4] For example, see: David D. Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt, "Arab nations strike in Libya, surprising U.S", *New York Times*, 25 August 2014.
[5] The "Arab order" is the regional system of Arab states and peoples; the "Middle East order" includes Turkey, Iran and Israel together with the Mashrek Arab actors. These two systems reflect two opposing approaches to regional organization, security and politics.

institutions like the UN Security Council, the ICC, or other mechanisms (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen)[6].

- Regarding ideological and identity challenges: Arab nationalism is being challenged on three fronts: by emerging identities (e.g. Sunni vs Shia, Kurdish vs Arab); as well as by the influence of globalisation on the one hand and Islamic movements on the other.

- The multiplication of hybrid entities with quasi-state authority (e.g. Hizb Allah, Hamas, ISIS/ISIL, Kurdish areas in Iraq and Syria) is detracting from the functions of existing states.

- The absence of a regional security order, either through tacit arrangements by the leading regional states or through the leading regional organization, the League of Arab States (LAS),reduces the availability of instruments and mechanisms for conflict management and resolution.

5. In Syria, following a series of government military successes, coupled with schisms and confrontations between opposition forces and unclarity on the strategy of countries supporting the rebels, the situation is turning into a low intensity protracted conflict with escalating repercussions for the neighbouring countries. We may be looking at a decade long struggle, maybe longer.

6. While the Gulf states have moved to playing a central role in influencing the direction of change in the region, they remain challenged by the requirements of regional leadership which no single country is capable of assuming single-handed. Importantly, the GCC has become a key, organic actor in the Arab regional system at large and needs to be factored into international initiatives directed at the region (e.g. Saudi and Qatari roles in Syria; UAE role in Libya).

7. Arab frustrations are being expressed concerning the modalities of international discussions and decisions on the region (e.g. 5+1 and Syria), which ignore the views and concerns of leading regional countries.

8. The newly energized relationship between Moscow and Cairo, supported by Saudi Arabia, may be more of a game changer than presented by the initial reactions in Washington. Indeed, some see it as a signal of closing the 40-year old US-Egypt bracket of strategic relationships, with Cairo reverting to its preferred posture of neutralism[7]. If so, this will have significant regional implications.

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[6] In the case of Yemen a GCC sponsored settlement is monitored by a group of Ambassadors (the "G10") including: China, France, Kuwait, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UK, UAE, EU, USA. On 11 July 2014 a Security Council resolution demanded that the Houthi rebels withdraw from areas they have seized by force and return arms and ammunition stolen from military institutions.

[7] Egypt's neutrality goes back to its posture during the WWII, amplified in the Nasserite years after 1952.

## II. The paradoxes of the Arab Spring[8]

The key contemporary milestone event that demands closer analysis is that of the Arab Spring. This watershed brought with it huge hopes of progress in meeting popular demands for higher standards of living, expanding democracy and freedoms, and improving the status of women. The images of youth in the streets, the slogans that rallied people to the squares and the very active participation of huge masses of people were welcomed by much of the world as a sign of the end of the "Arab exceptionalism"[9] and the launch of another regional democratic wave that would join previous transitions in Europe, Latin America, and other parts of the world. Yet, the course of history chose to move in different, more complex, directions.

Uncertain leadership of the uprisings was reflected in a political vacuum at the top, a lack of vision on the future and competition amongst new, inexperienced groups of activists, and between them and other institutions (e.g. the army and security edifice, *ancien regime* remnants and political movements and parties, both of the rising Islamic variety and others with older secular colours). Meanwhile, the assault on regimes that had over-lived their shelf life necessarily weakened state structures and opened space for underlying forces with economic demands or suppressed identities (e.g. religious, tribal and ethnic groups in Libya, Syria and Yemen). As state fragmentation and insecurity increased, there were measurable economic costs (e.g. in 2011, the annual growth rate of Egypt's economy slumped to just over 1% from its previous growth rate of 5%)[10]. In some cases, the rapid rise of Islamic parties, seemingly intent on reversing legislation protecting women and children, frustrated activists promoting human rights. In a historical context, the 200 year arc of intermittent progress towards building secular models of government in the Arab world seemed to be turning decisively backwards towards precedents from earlier centuries. The ISIL declaration of an Islamic State in parts of Syria and Iraq fits into this pattern.

### Four paradoxes

This landscape reflects *the first paradox* of the Arab Spring: that hopes of a progressive wave of democratization have ended with nostalgia for stability and the powerful role of the state, a fear of political Islam, and concerns of women and minorities that their rights were more vulnerable in the chaos of change.

*The second paradox* is the resilience of structural factors unresponsive to quick fix solutions, thus making governance even more difficult (witness the change of six Prime Ministers in Egypt over a period of three years or so). The challenges

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[8] This section is based on an analysis prepared for the Fifth Euro-Med Survey of Experts and Actors conducted by The European Institute for the Mediterranean, September 2014. European Institute for the Mediterranean, "The Euro-Med Survey reveals the optimism regarding progression of the Mediterranean region in the long term", http://www.iemed.org/actualitat-en/noticies/lenquesta-euromed-veu-amb-optimisme-levolucio-de-la-regio-mediterrania-a-llarg-termini?set_language=en

[9] The idea that the Arab world did not join the successive global waves of democratic transition.

[10] Egypt witnessed 2,782 labour protests in the first three months of 2013 in comparison to 2,532 in 2012 as a whole and 2,782 in 2010. For more details see : Adly, Amr, " The economics of Egypt's rising authoritarian order", Carnegie Middle East Center, 18 June 2014, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/18/economics-of-egypt-s-rising-authoritarian-order/hdzr

include the high percentage of youth, the high percentage of unemployed, particularly amongst youth and women, the overall gender gap, the low literacy rates, the low allocations to vital services (e.g. health, education, social security), the addiction to government subsidies in addition to major population shifts to urban centers[11] where slums bring a new political force to the streets.

*The third paradox* is the sense of demoralization and despair currently clouding the mood of elites and the public in the region in contrast to the huge wave of optimism felt in 2011. Again this is based on perceptions of reality and reactions to a series of synergistic developments.

*Finally*, there seems to be an absence of vision and ability to formulate clear, pro-poor social policies or strategies to address deep structural problems of demographic imbalance, low quality education, employment, urbanization, food security, the status of women and many other related issues.

The recently completed Euro-Med 2014 Survey of Experts and Actors captures this mood in several key trends[12]:

1. ***Deteriorating living standards:*** Two thirds of all respondents to the expert survey indicate that living standards have "highly deteriorated" or "deteriorated", with another 20% feeling they have "stagnated". Those surveyed in the Arab Mashrek countries are even more negative, with almost 80% seeing deterioration of some degree and another 14% seeing stagnation. Significantly perhaps, respondents from Algeria, an oil-based economy[13], are more divided, with 44% seeing deterioration, while 43% see some degree of improvement. In early 2014, the World Bank was hardly less negative: "Economic growth is slowing, fiscal buffers are depleting, unemployment is rising, and inflation is mounting in seven transition countries in the region. Long overdue reforms, that could help spur growth and create jobs, have continued to be delayed to avoid further social and political discontent".[14]

Insert Table :

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[11] See report by National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, 2012 where urbanisation is identified as a tectonic shift. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf

[12] The 2014 Survey, entitled "The European Union in a Transformed Mediterranean: Strategies and Policies", has been answered by 838 opinion leaders, experts in the international field and major actors from the Mediterranean world. Out of the total number of people who completed the Survey from 19 February to 31 March 2014, 51% are from the EU and 48% from Mediterranean Partner Countries. Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, Mauritania and Jordan are the most represented countries while France, Hungary, Spain, Italy and Croatia stand out among European countries.

[13] The World Bank reports: "The economy remains highly dependent on the hydrocarbon sector, which accounts for about a third of GDP and 98 percent of exports". http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria/overview African Development Bank assessment of 3% GDP growth in 2013: http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/algeria/algeria-economic-outlook/ Also see CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html

[14] http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/02/07/slow-growth-middle-east-north-africa-economic-reform See also more detailed WB report: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/QEBissue2January2014FINAL.pdf

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2. ***Economic prospective of the region:*** Here again, negative assessments prevail in relation to the last three years, with over 60% of South Med and EU-28 respondents seeing deterioration and over 20% seeing things remaining the same. More positive views were expressed by Maghrabis, with 73% of Moroccans, 41% of Algerians, but only 21% of Tunisians expressing positive assessments, dropping further in the case of Libya. In contrast, Mashrek respondents were mostly negative (71%), reaching 87% in the case of Lebanese respondents, 66% for Egyptians, 57% for Jordanians, and 55% for Palestinians. Turkish respondents saw deterioration (64%) or stagnation (24%), while 48% of Israelis saw deterioration and 38% stagnation, close to the trends expressed by South Med and EU-28 respondents.

Looking to the future economic prospective of the region, overall trends are slightly more optimistic with 54% seeing improvements against 47% seeing deterioration, again with respondents from the Maghreb tending towards optimism (61%) more than those from the Mashrek (57%). Moroccans seemed very positive on the future (87%), as were the Tunisians (66%). More optimism was expressed by Egyptians (68%), Jordanians (44%)and Lebanese (43%), joined by the Israelis in this case (45% positive), with less hope expressed by Palestinians (37%). Again South Med and EU-28 respondents were mostly positive (over 50%) with about one quarter negative, with Turkish respondents more divided (38% negative, 36% positive).

3. ***Status of Women:*** In assessing change in the status of women over the last three years15, negative views prevail overall (70%) and in sub-regions (50% in Maghreb and 66% in Mashrek) with sizeable views of stagnation (50% Maghreb, 34% Mashrek) rising in the case of EU-28 to 74%. Yet, interestingly, 57% of Moroccan respondents hold positive views, shared by 59% of Algerian respondents but only 26% of Tunisians[16]. Stagnation or deterioration appear to be the order of the day in the east, with 43% of Egyptian respondents seeing deterioration and 30% stagnation, rising to 68% stagnation in the case of Lebanon. South Med, EU-28, Turkish

[15]See UN Women *Progress of the World's Women* and its reports on the Middle East and North Africa http://progress.unwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/EN-Factsheet-MENA-Progress-of-the-Worlds-Women.pdf

[16] Despite progress for Tunisian women in certain areas: "Women have been at the forefront of the Arab Spring campaigns for democracy, demanding a say in how their countries' futures are shaped. In Tunisia, women's rights activists have secured a commitment that the new parliament will include a 50:50 quota for women's representation". *Ibid*, Fact Sheet MENA.

and Israeli respondents are hardly less pessimistic, with negative views reaching 64% in the latter case, with almost 20% seeing no change in the situation.

4. ***Freedom of expression and press***: Overall, opinion on the status of this variable over the last three years is no exception of the negative trend on other issues, with 63% seeing some degree of deterioration and another 37% seeing stagnation17. Again the Maghreb is less pessimistic than the Mashrek (38% in the former seeing deterioration compared to 59% in the latter, but 65% of Maghreb respondents see stagnation while this group is down to 41% in the Mashrek). Significantly, almost 50% of Tunisian respondents see a degree of improvement, compared with 35% of Egyptians, 39% of Palestinians, and 24% of Lebanese. Fully 65% of Egypt respondents see deterioration with another 15% seeing stagnation.

   Longer term expectations remain reserved with almost 60% seeing no change and almost 42% seeing deterioration. Indeed, almost all groups reflect majorities that predict little change from 52% to 78%). Tunisians continue to be a stark exception with 94% of Tunisian respondents expecting a degree of improvement, chased by 84% of Moroccans and 70% of Egyptians.

5. ***Minorities:*** Overall, a large majority indicates they see a high degree of deterioration over the past three years (77%), or stagnation (23%). With EU-28 even more negative (83%). Maghreb and Mashrek seem to agree on the negative trend (64% and 67% respectively). In Egypt, 59% of respondents saw a degree of deterioration. Significantly, most country samples showed sizeable groups seeing no change (52%of Lebanese, 50% of Tunisians, 33% of Egyptians). Here again, the positivism of some Maghreb respondents is clear, with 72% of Moroccans seeing progress although, untypically, only 24% of Tunisians shared this view.

6. **Migration:** In the southern Med, there is a West-East movement of people in search of jobs, with sizeable remittances going in the opposite direction. There is also a huge movement of displaced people and refugees caused by conflicts (mostly Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia), resulting in a large refugee population. In addition,

[17] These trends correspond with reports on press freedoms in the region. See, for example website of *Reporters Without Borders* which produces World Press Freedom Index where Arab Spring countries score relatively low: : *http://rsf.org/index2014/en-middle-east.php Also see Media Sustainability Index (MSI) for the Middle East and North Africa: http://www.irex.org/project/media-sustainability-index-msi-middle-east-north-africa* and Freedom House report on *Freedom of the Press 2013: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2013#.U6QZe_mSzh8*

there is a South – North movement, from Sub-Saharan Africa towards the shores of the Med. This reflects in pressures towards illegal migration to Europe, also in tensions and violations in the area of relations between migrants and refugees and host communities.

Another dimension of the movement of people is the interaction between migrant populations in Europe and countries of the South and Eastern Mediterranean. Here, together with the flows of remittances, ideas and traditions, have been added interactions in conflict situations with the movement of jihadis in both directions, including volunteers with origins in countries far away from the countries in conflict.

***Wither the Arab Spring? :*** The Arab Spring has brought much hope for those seeking solutions for long standing societal problems in their countries. The mobilisation of various social groups, including youth, workers, slum dwellers and women empowered constituencies that demanded changes in legal and economic structures. Public space for protest, debate and political participation has expanded in most cases. But retrograde forces have also responded, whether they be those seeking to destroy the old norms of state leadership, cohesion and citizenship (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen provide stark examples), or those seeking to use the state to realise their dream of transformation to an Islamic State (as was the Moslem Brotherhood aspiration for Egypt).

The overall setbacks experienced by the Arab Spring, and the resultant sense of pessimism, should not overshadow the positivism radiating from North Africa, perhaps because of a more successful transition underway in Tunisia, or the wise pre-emptive reformist steps taken by Morocco, or the confidence based on the oil revenues of Algeria. The question remains whether this sense of confidence will reflect in higher economic and social achievements or if the structural challenges facing the region will prevail. Other views have taken the longer term perspective banking on the emergence of new leaders of change in the future[18]. Only time will tell if this optimism rests on solid grounds.

## III. Structural drivers of change

This paper has alluded to the presence of structural factors that will most probably shape the future characteristics of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. These include:

[18] Juan Cole, "Why it's way too soon to give up on the Arab Spring", *Los Angeles Times*, 28 June 2014.

1. **Demographic shifts:** Much of the Arab World belongs to the "demographic arc of instability", with the total population expected to grow from circa 360 million now to some 600 million by 205019. Currently, half this population is concentrated in three countries: Algeria, Egypt and Sudan. If the fertility rates do not decline from their current levels, the population of the region will reach 780 million by 2050[20]. The implications are huge in terms of demand on resources (e.g. water, land), services (especially health and education) and economics (e.g. employment, growth, wealth distribution). Moreover, the Arab World is one of the most youthful regions in the world with approximately 54% of its people under the age of 25[21]. It is estimated that the region contains 121 million children and 71 million young people, totalling over 192 million.[22] This *'youth bulge'* is expected to continue for another two decades,[23] with the number of children and youth projected to climb to 217 million by 2050.[24]Young people are the fastest growing segment of the population in all Arab states,[25]making this demographic group the Arab region's largest ever to enter the labour market.[26]

2. ***Urbanisation***[27]**:** Today, half of the population of the Arab World is urban (over 180 million), two third of them concentrated in six countries. By 2050, almost three quarters of the Arab World will be urbanised28. In the context of modest economic growth and high rates of youth unemployment, this pattern has implications for the growth of informal settlements, protest movements and instability. Governance, particularly policing, will become more of a challenge under these circumstances.

> "Under conditions of rapid growth and large numbers of job seekers, cities will be cockpits for social unrest and political change. As shown by recent events, unbridled urbanization is likely to fuel an already explosive mixture of social discontent because of the proximity of rival ethnic and religious groups within Arab cities (Baghdad and Beirut offer good examples),the erosion of social restraints, and the anonymity conferred by urban areas. Cities are likely to be the leading theatre for political violence and terrorism, especially terrorism that aims at a national and global audience. Movements aiming to overthrow or consolidate political power will find their centre of gravity in cities"[29].

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[19]Barry Mirkin, *Population Levels, Trends and Policies in the Arab Region: Challenges and Opportunities*, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Arab Human Development Report
Research Paper Series, 2010

[20] Ibid., p. 10.

[21]JR Faria & P McAdam, *From social contract to Arab Spring: Macroeconomic adjustment under regime change*, Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Surrey, November 8 2013, retrieved 10 February 2014 http://www.surrey.ac.uk/economics/files/dpaperspdf/DP08-13.pdf

[22]O Masetti & K Korner, *Two years of the Arab Spring: Where are we now? What's next?*, Current Issues, Deutsche Bank DB Research, January 25 2013, retrieved 10 February 2014

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[27] National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, 2012

[28] Mirkin, *Op cit*, p. 17

[29] Crane, p. 79.

3. **Economics:** Over the last decade, with a few exceptions, Arab countries experienced erratic GDP growth that dipped towards negative figures after the Arab Uprisings of 2011.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-XQ-EG-SY-MA-SA-TN?display=graph

This historical performance has led many economists to make pessimistic projections on Arab economies, especially for countries showing signs of instability and insecurity, together with relatively high fertility rates that reduce real growth rates[30]. The social consequences of this macro picture impact every sector of life: education, health and employment. One of the most frequently highlighted issues is that of youth unemployment.

> "Between 2010 and 2020, per capita GDP would rise at average annual rates ranging from 3.0 percent per annum in the case of Egypt to 4.5 percent in the case of Jordan. By 2020, per capita GDP would be 34 to 55 percent higher than in 2010 in these countries, an appreciable difference. The only exception would be Yemen, the poorest in the group. Because of continued rapid rates of population growth, if Yemen continues to grow at recent rates of 4.4 percent per year, per capita incomes will rise slowly, barely increasing by 10 percent over the coming decade"[31].

From 2010 to 2012, the youth unemployment rate increased by 4.5 percent. Already very high, youth unemployment in the Arab region rose sharply in the wake of the Arab Spring reaching the highest level in the world, indeed almost four times bigger than the global youth unemployment rate (13.5%) in 2012. The three highest recorded youth unemployment rates in 2012 are in Egypt (35.7%), Yemen (34.8%) and Jordan (31.3%) respectively with Tunisia (29.3%) in fourth place (WDI, 2013)[32]. Also, significantly, unemployment rates for the educated are higher than those for the uneducated; higher for new entrants to the market than older workers; and they are higher for the urban than the rural[33].

4. **Education:** In recent decades, many Arab countries have seen substantial improvements in their investment in education: bringing up average rates of enrolment, increasing literacy rates, and providing better education opportunities for young women and girls. For example, Egypt was the fifth fastest-growing country

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[30] Keith Crane, Steven Simon, Jeffrey Martini, *Future Challenges for the Arab World: The Implications of Demographic and Economic Trends*, Rand Corporation, California, 2011. See analysis of "energy-poor" Arab economies.

[31] Ibid, p.70.

[32] Ali, etc.

[33] Crane, *Op Cit*, p. 76

in the world in terms of average years of schooling in the period 1980 - 1999, more than doubling them, from just 2.3 years to 5.5. Tunisia has had similar success with an increase from 2.5 to 5 years.[34]

Yet, serious quantitative and qualitative challenges are present in this field. Relatively high illiteracy rates, high rates of school drop-outs, irrelevant curricula, poor quality of teaching, violence towards students, limited access to tertiary education, not to mention the breakdown of education in conflict zones, are some of the prominent issues facing students in the Arab world. Although over 90% of Arab children are in primary education, there remain huge numbers (8.5 million) that are out of school and/or who drop out before completion, particularly rural girls. In too many cases, children (58% of them on average, but reaching 90% in certain countries!) are simply not learning at school[35].

> "More than half of primary age children are not reaching basic learning benchmarks. And just under half of secondary age children. Now what does this mean? At primary age, this actually means that children after four years of schooling are not able to read a sentence nor are they able to add up or subtract whole numbers, something you would expect they would be able to do".[36]

> "There is a strong connection between learning and employment opportunities. Forty percent of employers in the Arab world cite skills shortage as a serious constraint. The Arab world competitiveness reports ranks education as one of the most significant constraints to economic growth. Youth are dropping out of the labour market or even if they enter it they are not able to find jobs"[37].

5. **Governance**: the quality of governance will be a principle factor in determining the future course taken by ACTs. This includes designing policies with, more importantly, the ability to deliver on reforms in government and the public sector, including security structures, anti-corruption drives, social security networks, health and education systems and making economies more competitive and inclusive. The quality of leadership will be a critical factor in making this happen, including the capacity to formulate a clear

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35 LIESBET STEER, HAFEZ GHANEM, MAYSA JALBOUT, Adam Parker & Katie Smith, *ARAB YOUTH: MISSING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A PRODUCTIVE LIFE?*, The Centre for Universal Education, Brookings, February 2014.

36 See The Arab World Learning Barometer by The Brookings Institution.

37 *Ibid.*

vision of the future and to steer countries on a course aligned with the ideas, opportunities and markets of the 21 century. Decentralisation, even establishing federal systems of government, will be a major requirement for good governance, albeit there are very real reasons to fear from forces of separatism and the possible collapse of state structures.

6. **External factors:** Initiatives and mechanisms addressed to the Med are potentially important drivers of change and movement towards reform, economic development and stronger regional security. In retrospect, it is easy to identify shortcomings and missed opportunities in approaches by outside powers or major regional groupings. For example, the OSCE approach seemed to address the Med as a marginal issue with an over occupation with process over goals[38]. Meanwhile, some Europeans have raised doubts about the effectiveness of the EU initiatives towards the Med, asking about the impact of the 13 billion Euro committed by the EU between 1995 and 2013. Others have criticised the EU preference of political stability over democracy by developing ties with autocratic regimes. There are also doubts about a one size fits all approach to countries with deep variations. Meanwhile, it is realised that there is a lack of incentive for genuine reform as the South Med countries realise they will never be illegible to join the EU.

> "Neither have closer relations with the EU helped to boost Mediterranean countries' prosperity via increased trade. On the contrary, the EU's Southern neighbours have seen their annual trade deficit with the EU soar from €530 million in 2006 to €20.4 billion in 2010. In addition, Mediterranean countries still have to face tariff quotas on their exports of agricultural products to the EU and - with the exception of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco - remain subject to the EU's over-complicated system of 'rules of origin'."[39]

There are other challenges as well. The relationship between both sides of the Med remains largely driven by the North that provides ideas, terminology, initiatives, funding, and structures. The continuing Arab-Israeli conflict has shown its destructive capacity in several instances (e.g. Barcelona Summit, 2010), especially when combined with other conflicts in the Med (e.g. Cyprus, Sahara). Conceptual and strategic differences enhance divergence (e.g. definition of "terrorism"). Arab partners have often aspired to a more active European role in reaching a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and in balancing and influencing the role of the U.S.

Nevertheless, the role of external actors will remain influential in shaping the future course of the countries of the South and Eastern Mediterranean. Conflict resolution, particularly for the Israeli-Palestinian problem, but also in other critical areas (Syria, Iraq, Libya), involves international players and, in some cases, depends on them. Naturally, the tensions between the West and Russia but also, in some cases, competition between different Western powers, will impact the course of developments. There are also links between the South and North Med economies and markets, as well as trade

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[38] See the paper by MONIKA WOHLFELD, "OSCE's Mediterranean Engagement on the Eve of the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act", presented at the International Seminar "Towards "Helsinki +40": The OSCE, the Global Mediterranean and the Future of Cooperative Security", Rome, 18 September 2014, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[39] Open Europe Blog, "*The EU and the Mediterranean: Good Neighbours?*", *9 May 2011*http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/eu-and-mediterranean-good-neighbours.html

policies, that impact the direction of future economic growth in ACTs. There are also policies by the North directed at democratisation and human rights in the South and East Med.

Critical questions relate to the political will of external powers to invest in the future of the South and East Mediterranean, not only through a major hike in the level of funds allocated for this sub-region, but also in terms of redesigning policies, conditionalities and instruments, together with engaging in a longer term, dynamic relationship that delivers concrete results in several critical sectors. This would need to include conflict resolution, not only management, and contributing to peace building.

## IV. Future Scenarios

In a now classic article, published 16 years ago, Kemal Dervis and Nemat Shafik speculated on the situation in the Arab World in 2010 40. They identified two possible scenarios: one negative (the "bad neighbourhood"), the other positive (the good neighbourhood").

### In the bad neighbourhood scenario:

"The year is 2010. The free trade area including Europe and the MENA countries that was foreseen 15 years ago has not been realized, and most of the early bilateral agreements between the European Union and MENA countries have been put on hold or renegotiated. Instead of celebrating the full implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, high level delegates from MENA and Europe are holding an emergency meeting in Marseilles to discuss measures to stem the tide of illegal immigrants arriving in Europe. Delegates to the conference have before them data on the broad economic trends that have characterized the MENA region since the beginning of the new millennium. Despite some promising signs of economic recovery in the mid-1990s, the turn of the century saw the region return to negative per capita income growth."

"Trade union delegates to the Marseilles conference presented a devastating report on the state of labour markets in the region in the year 2010. According to the report, aggregate unemployment rates ranged between 20 and 30 percent, but unemployment of those between the ages of 18-25 had reached 50 percent in some urban areas, with profound social consequences. The failure of most MENA economies to create jobs was due in part to ...low investment rates ..., as well as

[40]Kemal Derviş and Nemat Shafik, **"The Middle East and North Africa: A Tale of Two Futures"**, *Middle East Journal* Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 505-516

to outdated regulations and the failure of the region's educational systems to prepare its youth for a competitive labor market. The consequences of these trends in labor markets was a massive increase in illegal immigration to Europe, where an aging population and wage rigidities had created significant informal job opportunities in the service sectors. Calls for greater regulation of this immigration dominated the Marseilles conference. While European delegates advocated the repatriation of illegal workers, Arab delegates focused on the need to provide protection for informal sector employees".

"The Arab-Israeli conflict remained a source of tension in the region. After years of negotiations, a partial agreement had been signed between the Palestinians and the Israelis which had created a patchwork of locally autonomous Palestinian areas but no real national sovereignty. Dissatisfaction with the agreement was being expressed by means of political violence, which periodically spilled over into Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These countries maintained huge defence budgets, and lived under a perpetual sense of crisis, very damaging to investor confidence."

**In the good neighbourhood scenario:**

"The date is 15 May 2010. Seven heads of state of MENA countries have assembled in Barcelona with the heads of state of the 22 European Union (EU) countries to celebrate the full implementation of the Treaty of Tunis, negotiated ten years earlier. That treaty followed on the heels of the bilateral European-Mediterranean agreements that had been reached in the second half of the 1990s between the European Union, and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, and Tunisia. Representatives of other countries from the region such as Algeria, Iraq, Israel, and Syria are also present. Turkey, already in a full customs union with Europe since 1996, but still involved in difficult negotiations on its political relationship with the European Union, is represented at the level of the prime minister. Barcelona is a fitting venue for this meeting, for it is here that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was launched 15 years ago in November 1995".

"This improved performance of the MENA region has been driven by a variety of factors. Foremost are the political breakthroughs that resolved the many conflicts that plagued the region. Real peace and greater regional stability have enabled many countries to focus on their domestic problems. The vibrancy of civil society can be seen in the phenomenal growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the increased sophistication of political parties, and the lively debates about public policy in the media. Subscriptions to business newspapers and financial publications have grown exponentially as citizens' attention has shifted away from confrontational political ideologies to the more practical and

mundane issues of earning a decent living. These gains in confidence and participation are reflected in the stability of those societies and higher private and overall investment rates that range between 25 and 30 percent of GDP. In addition, most MENA countries initiated important microeconomic reforms, including privatization of infrastructure and liberalization of labor markets, that substantially improved the returns on investment and the region's competitiveness. The resulting productivity gains and employment opportunities have created a reverse brain drain. Professionals and skilled workers who had migrated from MENA decades ago are returning to the region to settle and invest their savings."

> "Unemployment, .... has fallen to just below ten percent. A recent joint study by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Arab Fund, and regional think tanks, attributed this turnaround in labor markets to four factors: first, a major increase in private sector investment, including foreign direct investment inflows, which rose from $6 billion in 1998, to $20 billion in 2009; second, an impressive expansion of job-creating non-traditional exports of goods and services, rising from only $50 billion in 1998, to $200 billion in 2009-a growth rate of almost 14 percent per annum, with MENA exports almost reaching the level of Latin America's in per capita terms; third, significant reforms in education and training that got underway before the end of the last century, including far-reaching adult education and re-training programs, teaching via the Internet, and courageous restructuring of higher education with strong private sector participation; and finally, the successful development of small-scale and micro-lending programs throughout the region, increasingly integrated into the 'normal' operations of commercial banks in a sustainable and profitable manner. A special section of the report details the very important role that the tourism industry has played in both foreign exchange and employment generation. The number of tourists visiting the MENA countries has increased from 22 million in 1998 to 75 million in 2009, generating $60 billion of direct foreign exchange revenues. Tourists now visit several countries as part of integrated tours that have become very popular and that include, for instance, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. Iran too has become a major destination after the thaw in US-Iranian relations. All in all, total additional employment created by the expansion of the tourist industry is estimated at five million jobs in the Arab countries and Iran. While only seven Arab countries are in the final stage of participating in the Mediterranean Free Trade and Economic Cooperation Area, foreseen in the Treaty of Tunis, Algeria, Libya and Syria have also signed the treaty and are on their way to implementing its provisions. Moreover, the degree of policy convergence throughout the MENA region has been further enhanced by the progress made in moving ahead with the Arab Common Market, which includes all the members of the League of Arab States, and has cooperation agreements with both Turkey and Iran. However, it is the significant movement of capital to MENA from Europe, as well as from the United States, Japan and China, that is the major 'story' in factor markets."

Four years after this prophetic article was published, UNDP launched its Arab Human Development Report 2002: *Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*[41] that identified the key challenges facing the Arab region in the following manner:

"..the predominant characteristic of the current Arab reality seems to be the existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in the Arab institutional structure. These shortcomings are an obstacle to building human development. The report

[41] UNDP, 20002

summarises them as three deficits relating to freedom, empowerment of women, and knowledge. These deficits constitute weighty constraints on human capability that must be lifted." (my emphasis).

Clearly, there were ample, long standing and, unfortunately, ultimately unheeded, warnings of the dangers ahead for the countries of the South and Eastern Med, together with advocacy for alternative "good" scenarios that were not pursued. These warnings and recommendations precede the US-led efforts, with European variations, for reform in "the Greater Middle East" which followed the 2003 war on Iraq. There were also regionally generated initiatives (e.g. the Bibliotheca Alexandrina reform conferences by civil society organisations). Interestingly, several of these initiatives sought to broaden their approach to call for changes in the political environment (through democratisation, upholding human rights and resolving regional conflicts) together with improvements in education, the status of women and economic and social policies. And yet, unfortunately, it is the worse cases scenarios that seem to have been realised.

The direction of change in the South and East Mediterranean will be shaped by many factors, including some deeply rooted structural forces, but also other, more episodic forces, not least the tsunami effects of the Arab Spring. Looking to the future, say 2030, it is possible to envision four alternative scenarios:

**Option I: Chaos:** the present picture of chaos in the South and East Med may last for another decade or two. Richard Haas has argued that the region is facing another 30 year war similar to that of Europe in the 17th century[42]. "It is a region wracked by religious struggle between competing traditions of the faith. But the conflict is also between militants and moderates, fuelled by neighbouring rulers seeking to defend their interests and increase their influence. Conflicts take place within and between states; civil wars and proxy wars become impossible to distinguish. Governments often forfeit control to smaller groups — militias and the like — operating within and across borders. The loss of life is devastating, and millions are rendered homeless. That could be a description of today's Middle East. In fact, it describes Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century." The implications are that the West should follow conflict management strategies rather than risk being enmeshed in the region's labyrinth: reduce dependence on oil from the region, prevent nuclear proliferation, follow counter terrorism strategies, accept the break-up of Iraq, accept the Assad regime in Syria.

To some extent, the Northern Med has reeled back from this threatening picture, fearing waves of migrants crossing from the south, or returning jihadists from Syria and Iraq, and perhaps influenced by an environment of economic retrenchment and the difficulties of formulating a common foreign policy. And yet, a policy of disengagement may carry the higher costs of losing influence over events, prolonged crisis and disorder and living with unpalatable longer term consequences.

[42] Richard Haas, "The new thirty year war", 21 July 2014. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/richard-n--haass-argues-that-the-middle-east-is-less-a-problem-to-be-solved-than-a-condition-to-be-managed#m0eclraL27zzCjAq.99

**Option II: Salvation:** Miraculously, the transitions in the South and Eastern Med result in stable, democratic and economically promising governments. Key conflicts and difficult transitions have been resolved peacefully with solutions or de facto settlements in the Arab-Israeli context as well as in other regional problems. A nuclear-free zone is established and arrangements are in place for arms control through a regional security organisation. Fertility rates have declined as education and employment indicators have improved.

The important characteristic of this scenario is that it could only result from a participatory process of analysis and planning that involves governments and civil society from both sides of the Med, together with relevant regional organisations (League of Arab States, EU, OSCE). This should be based on a detailed longer term vision that could be called "Med 2050".

This rosy picture may be difficult to imagine in the context of the present negative reality. And yet, it may be encouraged and supported through the application of a set of wise policies including more aggressive peace building and problem solving initiatives, investment in quality education, application of EU standards in the South/Eastern Med, more flexible Free-Trade arrangements, and support to examples of good governance where it appears (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan).

**Option III: Mixed:** Reality is often complex carrying some of our preferences while frustrating us with continuing problems and setbacks. Here is where real politics needs to absorb idealistic objectives while dealing with realities on the ground. This scenario, perhaps the most probable one, would see a continuation of a certain level of conflict and disagreement as well as difficult transitions that include quasi democratic regimes, slow reform processes and faltering economic growth. But it would also show success through respect to human rights, empowering women and improving health and education services. A key factor would be to support an enlightened role for governments and state structures in the context of reforms and in the face of threats of disintegration and factionalism. Some sectors of the economy would show noted improvement (e.g. agriculture, tourism, the garment industry, small and medium enterprises). The question would be how to steer this scenario towards the more attractive Option II rather than that of Option I.

A tool kit based on practical incentives and disincentives will be needed, not only to reward success and punish failures but to actively engage in empowering leaders, people and encouraging change. The experience of OSCE in the areas of conflict management and transitions would be relevant in this context, more specifically in building democracy, containing conflicts, avoiding state failures and combatting terrorism.

**Option IV: Black Swan:** For unexpected scenarios, the question would be what it would take to move towards dramatically better situations, or much worse scenarios. Most probably, such changes would be internally driven rather

than being the result of external factors. One key element would be political leadership, whereby the emergence of one or two visionary leaders could influence the direction of change. Bad leaders would obviously take the region, or important regional powers, in the opposite direction. Another element would be the influence of economic assistance and cooperation resulting in real growth.

Herein exits a possibility for external powers : engaging and educating leaders through continuous high level dialogue and exposure to good models. This can be enhanced through a wider process of engaging civil society, media and youth. But practical results will be needed to show success and combat frustrations. Probably there will be a need to increase the level of European investments, in terms of developing common policies, launching initiatives, allocating more substantial financial resources, improving management processes and time allocation. Will this be possible in the context of the present political and economic environment in Europe?

There also needs to better contingency planning for worse case scenarios stemming from unexpected events: a conflict involving nuclear capacities, a major disaster caused by natural causes or acts of major violations of human rights. Not be coincidence, the precedents and seeds for these situations are alive and well (e.g. Israeli-Iran conflict, migrations in Sudan, Syria and Iraq, and ISIS actions).

**Conclusion**

Dramatic changes are currently taking place in the South and Eastern Mediterranean making it difficult to foresee the longer term future of the region. New conflicts have been added while older ones continue. New challenges include the confused transition processes reflected in factionalism, instability, economic deterioration and, in many cases, the threat of failed states. Hybrid entities have taken over state functions while claiming international roles. Most worrying there seems to be little capacity to analyse this picture and develop strategies to respond to it on the part of regional states, relevant intergovernmental organisations or external powers.

And yet, the hopes of the Arab Spring have not died. Wider political participation has become a reality. Youth leaders are emerging through political systems with dreams of change and experience gained from exposure to politics. Women are more actively defending their rights. Here lies a challenge for external powers and organisations like OSCE to engage with the forces of change rather than retrench behind the false security of protective walls.

There are several structural forces of change in the South / Eastern Med that will probably influence the future direction of change: population growth, economic performance, urbanisation, the status of women and education. These need to be the focus of longer term policies with substantial resources and tenacious implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Again, herein is a key role for external powers in addressing these underlying factors in favour of positive outcomes.

But there is also a need for more aggressive strategies for conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace building. The experiences of Europe will be relevant provided they are presented through creative diplomacy, more generosity in the service of longer term self-interest and a much higher level of political will and determination.

In the longer term, twenty or thirty years from now, the South and Eastern Med, reflecting the dynamics of the Arab World more than those of the Middle East, may metamorphose into one of four futures: chaotic, positive, mixed or surprising. Again, the structural drivers of change will probably play a key role in determining which scenario materialises, although the mixed option appears the most realistic one. Yet, it is the current actions of leaders and institutions on both sides of the Med that can influence the direction of future change and steer the region towards more positive results. Abdicating this responsibility should not be an option.

Here is a role that awaits true leaders.

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# Towards "Helsinki +40"

# The OSCE, the Global Mediterranean and the Future of Cooperative Security

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PAPER

## OSCE's Mediterranean Engagement on the Eve of the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

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## 1. Introduction

This paper addresses the current state of and future perspectives for the OSCE's Mediterranean engagement, in the context of the process which has been named 'Helsinki plus 40' (H+40). This review process is aimed at the preparation of the 40th anniversary of the founding document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor the OSCE - the Helsinki Final Act from 1975. The paper is not a chronological account aimed at describing the organic way that this engagement had grown and developed in the past 40 years, but rather an effort to focus on key elements of the partnership with Mediterranean countries and possible ways forward. It will not include a discussion of the Asian dialogue of the OSCE, although it is worth noting that while different by definition, and not necessarily interlinked, many of the issues discussed here have implications for the Asian dialogue as well.

The paper will first briefly present the general situation in the Mediterranean region as one marked by many challenges but also great need for co-operation. The paper will continue by focusing on the more visionary aspects of OSCE's approach to Mediterranean security and co-operation including in the context of the H+40 context. The following section will focus on the 'geographical reach' of the Mediterranean dialogue, including the issue of criteria for engaging with Mediterranean countries. The structure of the dialogue and some of its challenges will be analyzed. The themes central to the dialogue and the constituencies that it engages with will be presented in the following sections. Finally, the paper will recapitulate the key aspects of a possible way forward for the OSCE's Mediterranean engagement.

## 2. A brief assessment of the general situation in the Mediterranean region

It has to be stated from the outset that this is a difficult moment in history to be discussing co-operative engagement in the Mediterranean region. There are many reasons for this: severe geopolitical shifts are taking place, alliances are changing and new players are becoming involved in the region. The situations in Syria, Middle East, Iraq and Libya have all flared up, and will need to be addressed before co-operative structures can be focused on. Transnational threats in the Mediterranean region (migratory pressures, trafficking of human beings and SALW, and terrorism, to give some examples) are not adequately addressed. In addition, the fall-out of the so called 'Arab Spring' events has further differentiated and divided the region. The challenges of transition will remain a defining feature for a number, if not all, of the countries in North Africa for the foreseeable future.

But this is also a key moment in history, defined by peoples' movements that are reconfiguring economic, political and social realities in a number of countries, just as much as they are forcing a rethinking of the role of the state, and arguably also the relationships among states across the region. These developments beg for attention from policy-makers everywhere, but particularly in neighbouring regions, as they may provide opportunities for more interaction and joint efforts to address transnational threats and challenges of transition, and for more confidence necessary for overcoming divisions and for creating regional dynamics that are based on co-operation and not conflict. Although most of the efforts currently focus on bilateral engagement, and through organizations such as NATO and the European Union, there is certainly also a role for the OSCE.

The OSCE has some advantages in this respect: apart from its mode of working, its membership – including the USA, Russia and Turkey; its comprehensive approach to security; where consensus is found, its flexibility and ability to respond to events quickly and on a practical level; and its focus on interaction with people. OSCE's experience in supporting the transition and democratisation processes as well as with addressing conflict in a number of its participating States, provide the OSCE with experience and best practices in this realm. Although it is sometimes argued that the Central and Eastern European transition experience is not fully, or not at all, relevant for the countries in North Africa, OSCE's provide important examples and expertise, if used in a context-appropriate way. The Organization has also a long standing, structured dialogue with a number of Mediterranean Partners, based on the CSCE Helsinki Final Act from 1975 and subsequent decisions and commitments. This dialogue is a good basis for working with the countries from the Mediterranean Sea's southern shore, but there is a need to adjust it to the new realities on the ground and to review possibilities to make it more goal- rather than process-oriented. Ideally, these processes would be accompanied and supported by a clear statement of purpose and vision for the OSCE's Mediterranean dialogue. This, however, could be a very tough sell in an Organization currently so much focused on its internal divisions and conflicts.

## 3. OSCE's Mediterranean dialogue: Concept and Vision

*The guiding vision*

What is the vision that guides the dialogue of the OSCE with its Mediterranean Partners? The key reference here is the section of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 entitled somewhat cumbersomely 'Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean'. This text is often pointed to, but rarely analyzed, apart from referring to Malta's role in the process of negotiating this part of the historical document of the Helsinki Final Act. Mosser writes that while Malta

saw the Mediterranean as key to its security, 'few of the other participating States saw the Mediterranean as anything more than tangential to the 'major' issues of the process, which were the discussions surrounding the borders of East and West Europe and human rights.'[1] Malta's insistence on the inclusion of the Mediterranean Chapter, coupled with its threat to block the decision on the Helsinki Final Act, caused considerable tensions but it resulted in the inclusion of the section. The difficulties in bringing together the views of states with very different Mediterranean interests and policies were substantial. To some degree, this remained a characteristic of the Organization's dialogue with Mediterranean Partner States, and thus shapes its ability to respond to the changing situation on the ground.

The Helsinki Final Act asserts that security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole. Significantly, the participating States declare their intention 'to include all the States of the Mediterranean' in the dialogue, 'with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the region, and widening the scope of co-operation'. The document refers in broad terms to security issues, but also to economic co-operation and trade and commercial relations, and one paragraph on environmental issues in the Mediterranean. References to what is now defined as the Human Dimension are largely absent from the document, except for one mention of 'justice' in the context of peace and security in the region. The fields of co-operation are however left generally open in that it is referred to the intention 'to promote further contacts and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States in other relevant fields.'

Although numerous subsequent CSCE/OSCE documents, as well as in seminars and meetings have addressed the Mediterranean dimension of security, the substance of that relationship has been emerging only step-by-step and at times painfully slow. Several 'soul-searching' exercises on the Mediterranean dialogue did not further the agenda significantly, nor bring any clear vision to it.[2] The nature and structure of the dialogue did also not change substantially in response to dramatic events such as 9/11, EU's Mediterranean expansion, or arguably even the Arab Spring, which resulted in calling for more activities within the existing framework and rules. This could of course indicate that the framework

[1] Michael W. Mosser, 'Engineering Influence: The Subtle Power of Small States in CSCS/OSCE', in Erich Reiter and Heinz Gaertner (eds), Small States and Alliances, Physica Verlag: Heidelberg, 2001, p. 70.

[2] For example, in 2004, an informal Group of Friends was formed to explore possibilities to improve the dialogue with the Partners for Co-operation. Report of the Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on the Implementation of Permanent Council Decision No. 571, The OSCE and its Partners for Co-operation, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Twelfth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 6 and 7 December 2004, MC.DOC/1/04, Sofia.

accommodated all of the issues and events without the need for change, but it may also point to some missed opportunities.

Noteworthy is the fact that while the Helsinki Final Act has been hailed as visionary, also due to its inclusion of the Mediterranean dimension, the dialogue with Mediterranean Partners itself has since that time been largely devoid of any sweeping or visionary perspectives for the region. This has to be understood largely as a reflection of the situation on the ground in the Mediterranean region, and in particular the lack of sustainable peace in the Middle East. In the 90s, there have been ideas tabled, largely informally and unsuccessfully, but they have never been taken up seriously in the context of the Organization. One interesting discussion in this context was that on the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), and an ambitious proposal based on the CSCE model[3], which has however never gained traction. It is interesting to note that many analysts thinking about the future of multilateralism in the Mediterranean region after the Arab Spring point out that any such framework would have to be inclusive, open to all states in the region and beyond (Gulf states, Iran), open to consider the security challenges of all its members, and flexible. Indeed, the CSCE and the OSCE are often pointed to as examples of such a framework. On the other hand, it needs to also be mentioned that the multilateral and inclusive Union for the Mediterranean, has not been able to thrive in the current situation in the Mediterranean, underlining the difficulties any such framework would encounter. Consequently, *it does not appear viable at this time in history to put forward new multilateral frameworks based on the CSCE/OSCE model for the Mediterranean.*

*The Helsinki plus 40 processes*

The Helsinki plus 40 process, meant to reinforce and revitalize the Organization in the lead up to the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2015 aims at 'adding a multi-year perspective and continuity to participating States' work towards a security community' in the OSCE area.[4] While this paper cannot provide an in-depth discussion of the concept and decision on building 'a security community', some things need to be said at this stage: a security community is a bold

[3] During a 1990 CSCE meeting in Palma de Mallorca this proposal was developed by the so-called "4+5 Group. A non-binding open-ended report was issued, declaring that a meeting outside the CSCE process could discuss a set of generally accepted rules and principles in the fields of stability, co-operation and the human dimension in the Mediterranean, when circumstances in the area permitted. Since then, if mentioned at all, the CSCM concept was only discussed in informal fora. See also Stephen Calleya, Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area in the 21st Century: Mare Nostrum. Routledge: London, p. 102-104.

[4] Astana Summit Meeting 2010, 'Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community', 3 December 2010, SUM.DOC 1/10/Cor.1; Ministerial Council Dublin 2012, 'Decision on the OSCE Helsinki plus 40 Process', 7 December 2012. http://www.osce.org/mc/97974?download=true

vision, rooted in a theoretical framework first designed by Karl Deutsch and later developed by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. In short, it stands for 'a community of states and societies whose values, social orders and identities converge to such a degree that war among them becomes unthinkable'[5]. This implies efforts beyond those at the intergovernmental level, and it also implies involvement of multiple fora. But the concept of a security community also has an external dimension, as such communities cannot stay isolated from neighbouring states and regions and must be effective actors internationally. Although OSCE's efforts in the Mediterranean are useful, it can hardly be claimed that the organization is an effective actor in the region.

While the Helsinki Final Act prominently addresses the Mediterranean dimension, the OSCE decisions on H+40 speak only of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community – but not of a Euro-Mediterranean one. Indeed, browsing all relevant decisions on the Helsinki plus 40 process, there is only the following, rather marginal, reference to Mediterranean Partners: the participating States 'welcome that the forthcoming Chairmanships will further intensify contact with the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation, other relevant organizations and partners, academia, non-governmental organizations and other representatives of civil society to provide contributions to the Helsinki+40 process'.[6] The modalities of how Partner States would be involved in this work were not immediately clear, causing some dismay among the Partner States.

Indeed, two considerations need to be put forward here, given the current events in the OSCE area. The first one is that while some participating States have in the past criticized efforts to enhance dialogues with Partner States pointing out that there is plenty to do in the OSCE area, the Organization is currently even more inward-looking. The Ukraine crisis and the deep divisions within the OSCE are posing a critical test to its principles and methods of working, as well as placing a strain on its finances. Consequently, not only could this situation divert attention of its participating States from the cooperation with Mediterranean Partners, but it may also affect the Partners' perceptions of the Organization's effectiveness and usefulness. Secondly, the Ukraine crisis undermines the notion and concept of a security community,

[5] Wolfgang Zellner et al, Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision to Reality. The Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS), Hamburg: 2012, p. 7.

[6] Twentieth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Kyiv, 5 and 6 December 2013. Declaration on Furthering the Helsinki+40 Process. MC.Dec/1/13 of 6 December 2013.

thus making any far-reaching decisions at the forthcoming Summit unlikely. This applies also to the Mediterranean dialogue.

However, in view of the historical events in North Africa and the pressure by some states to join as Partner States, *it would be useful as a minimum to restate the commitment to pursue the goals of the Helsinki Final Act and spell out clearly the purpose of the Mediterranean Partnership.* To mention only some relevant questions: It is it a common space to address common problems? And if so, what are the means for addressing them? Is it a way to link up with countries interested in contributing to security in the OSCE area or with those that require OSCE's assistance in addressing their own security challenges? Or is it a path for prospective participating States? In particular answering the question of whether the dialogue is intended for countries that contribute to Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security or those that require assistance (or possibly both) would shape the future of the interaction with Mediterranean states.

## 4. Geographical Reach of the Dialogue

The Helsinki Final Act states that 'the participating States [...] declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean'.[7] Indeed this vision has not been achieved.

At the inception of the dialogue, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia as well as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Libya[8] were invited to CSCE meetings as 'non-participating Mediterranean States'. The first five (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia) requested in 1993 a closer and more structured status, which was developed in response by the participating States in 1994. In 1995, the five states became Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (MPCs). Jordan requested to become a Mediterranean Partner in 1998, and the OSCE participating States reached consensus on this matter. No country has been added to this group of six states since 1998, although the Palestinian National Authority (in 2004 and 2008) and Libya (in 2013) have formulated requests for admission as Partner States.

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[7] Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975, Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, p 37. http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true

[8] For example, representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia were invited to the Palma de Mallorca Mediterranean follow-up meeting held in 1990. See the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Vienna 1989. http://www.osce.org/mc/40881?download=true

The Palestinian requests were never formally tabled for decision by participating States, due to lack of consensus. In 2013 the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly called upon the OSCE 'to grant the status of Mediterranean Partner for Co-operation to the State of Palestine, following the Palestinian Authority's request of November 2004', but also to develop criteria for such decisions.[9] There was no response of the participating States to this resolution so far.

Clearly, some participating States and Israel refer to Palestine not being a proper state, and do not wish to see the OSCE becoming another forum for discussion of the Middle East. In the case of Libya, while some participating States feel strongly that Libya is a missing link for OSCE's dialogue with Mediterranean Partners (for example Austria and Malta[10]), and a number of them supported the Libyan application actively, some states are point out that given the current context Libya is problematic. There is scepticism about admitting what some consider a failing state as Partner.

Both the Palestinian National Authority and Libyan representatives, despite not being granted Partner States, are being involved in some activities, such as events of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly or OSCE Seminars (at invitation of the host countries).

What are the criteria on which participating States base their decisions to support or oppose the application of a State to become a Mediterranean Partner? There are no formal criteria to be fulfilled in order to obtain the status. Informal criteria have been developed in 2001 in a report of an informal open-ended working group, which the Permanent Council took note of and welcomed (the so-called Ladsous report). The document specifies that to become an OSCE Partner for Co-operation, a formal request is made to the OSCE Chairmanship. A consultation process follows, during which the participating States take into consideration several factors. These factors, described as 'neither exclusive nor cumulative' include close relations between the applicant and the OSCE, common security interests, intention to participate actively in

[9] Istanbul Declaration and Resolution, adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty Second annual session, Istanbul 29 June – 3 July 2013. Resolution on Enlarging the Partnership with Non-Member Mediterranean States to Include the Palestinian National Authority, para 7, p. 31.

[10] See 'Waldner: Libya should be granted OSCE partner Status', 6 December 2013, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/press-releases/2011/waldner-libyen-soll-partnerschaftsstatus-in-der-osze-bekommen.html.
See speech by Hon. Minister Dr. George Vella at the OSCE Ministerial Council, 6 December 2013. http://www.foreign.gov.mt/PrintNews.aspx?nid=4694

the OSCE's work, sharing of OSCE's principles, and finally value of the partnership to the OSCE.[11] There has to be formal consensus among the participating States to admit a new Partner. Informally, also existing Partner States are consulted on such decisions. The issue was revisited again in 2004, but it was felt that the majority of participating States were comfortable with this flexible approach.

In view of the Palestinian and Libyan applications, and the recommendations of the OSCE PA, it is becoming increasingly clear that although a number of countries prefer the flexibility of the current approach *the criteria for acceptance as a Partner State should be spelled out clearly, so the process would be somewhat more predictable and open. The criteria should reflect the purpose and aim of the OSCE's Mediterranean dialogue and could be based on geographical and/or functional considerations.*

The geographical criteria have already been touched upon by the Helsinki Final Act but also the referral to the OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian framework. However, surely to be effective, in particular in addressing transnational challenges, the dialogue would need all key players, going beyond the original group of countries engaged as a result of the Helsinki Final Act, and possibly even from beyond the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Gulf states, Iran).

The functional criteria could focus on states that are security providers in the context of the OSCE, that would mean that they do or wish to contribute to security and co-operation in the OSCE area, and/or security consumers, that is states that suffer from security challenges and transnational threats (that may also be affecting the OSCE area) and require assistance in addressing them. It needs to be said however that in most cases prospective Partner States could be understood as both (at least potential) security providers and security consumers.

In view of the above considerations, *it would be worthwhile restating the Helsinki Final Act goal of involving all Mediterranean states in the dialogue, as long as they fulfil the criteria for acceptance and request admission as Partner, on a case by case basis. Should this not be possible due to lack of consensus, periodic outreach meetings or specific events for all countries from the region that would have an interest in participating could be envisaged.*

However, contacts with individual Partner States in the Mediterranean are since some years not the only conduit for relations with the region. In principle, the OSCE can pursue contacts with regional organisations outside its area in the

[11] See PC.DEC/430, 28 June 2001; 'The OSCE and its Partners for Co-operation. Report of the Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on the implementation of Permanent Council Decision No. 571', Twelfth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 6 and 7 December 2004, MC.DOC/1/04, 7 December 2004.

context of the United Nations (UN), in particular under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the basis of a number of its own documents, which refer to inter alia the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the African Union. While another section of the paper focuses on the co-operation with such organizations, what is of interest here is that the links with these regional organisations, apart from giving a role to Partner States, allow for communication with states that are not part of the Mediterranean dialogue (while at the same time foregoing the need to accommodate them in the structured framework of the Dialogue itself). Thus, *the pursuit of closer relations with regional organizations such as the League of Arab States under the chapeau of the UN could allow to geographically enlarge the scope of the dialogue, and could be elaborated clearer.*

However, the body of OSCE documents does not provide a clear-cut and solid basis for co-operation with such organisations, as the key document in that respect, The Platform for Co-operative Security from 1999[12] applies to 'organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area' only. Thus, *the Mediterranean dialogue could benefit from a clear reference by participating States to a role of the OSCE as a platform for co-operation with organizations in the Mediterranean region, under the chapeau of the UN, if that is wished for by the OSCE's MPCs.*

The final issue that has to be spoken of here is the possibility for MPCs to become participating States. Arguably, there has not been any visible interest or effort to enlarge the OSCE to include Partner or other states as participating States. The situation changed recently, as Mongolia, an Asian Partner for Co-operation[13] since 2004, indicated in a letter to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in October 2011 that it would like to become a Participating State and has been accepted as one by OSCE participating States in November 2012.[14] The consensus-based decision contains however a statement by the Russian Federation which specifies that it does not see it as a precedent.[15] Russian Federation adds in this context that 'we support

[12] Istanbul Summit Document 1999, http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true

[13] While the Mediterranean dialogue has its roots in the 1975 CSCE Final Act, one more recent development was the introduction of the OSCE Asian dialogue. Japan's partnership started in 1992; Korea's in 1994; Thailand's in 2000; Afghanistan's in 2003; Mongolia's in 2004 (and Australia's in 2009).

[14] MC.DEC/2/12, 21 November 2012, Ministerial Council MC DECISION No. 2/12 ACCESSION OF MONGOLIA TO THE OSCE. http://www.osce.org/mc/97439?download=true

[15] MC.DEC/2/12 21 November 2012, Attachment INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDUREOF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE By the delegation of the Russian Federation http://www.osce.org/mc/97439?download=true

the Chairmanship's proposal to initiate a discussion within an informal working group on the elaboration of criteria for the participation and admission to the OSCE of new participants.'[16] Indeed, *it would be important for the notion of dialogue with Partner States to elaborate whether this status is also a way for those who are interested to become a participating State of the OSCE*, especially since some State may feel encouraged by the example of Mongolia. Surely, the perspective of joining the organization could have the potential of changing the dynamics of the Mediterranean dialogue.

## 5. Structure

The Helsinki Final Act in its section on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean specified a number of rather ambitious goals of this co-operation – such as development of good-neighbourly relations, increase of mutual confidence, promotion of security and stability. It did not provide input on what structures would need to be created for this purpose. These structures have been built over times, in layers of different kinds of engagement. These layers were built from 1994 on, as prior to this date relations with so called non-participating Mediterranean States were rather loose. These layers consisted of building special structures for the dialogue (Contact Group, Mediterranean seminars), creating access to deliberations of participating States (access to the Permanent Council, Forum for Security Co-operation), operational aspects (possibility to second staff, participation in election observation), and specialized activities and projects (such as workshops on specific issues of interest). It must be mentioned here that representatives of MPCs often express frustration with the structures and mechanisms in place, and have been lobbying for better use of existing structures, more access and input into the deliberations of the OSCE, and more ownership of the process. At the same time, it must be mentioned that participating States occasionally criticize low uptake of existing possibilities by the MPCs.

### 5.1. Types of engagement

*Special structures for the dialogue*

The priority for the first years of Mediterranean dialogue following the 1994 decisions on the Partner Status has been the creation of special structures for those states, and this effort was mostly at the political level, and process-oriented, rather than goal-oriented. Meetings of the informal Contact Group with the Mediterranean partners and OSCE Mediterranean

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RF stated that 'the adoption of the decision on the admission of Mongolia cannot be regarded as setting a precedent for other OSCE Partners for Co-operation and other States that are not participating States of the OSCE'.

[16] Ibid.

seminars, chaired by the incoming Chairmanship of the Organization carry the main responsibility for the dialogue. Contact Group events provide for an exchange of information and discussion on issues of mutual interest between the MPCs and the OSCE participating States. Admittedly it has not always been easy to assure adequate level of representation at those meetings, especially from participating States. The OSCE annual Mediterranean seminars allow the opportunity to explore a variety of issues, occasionally (at least until 2009) taking place in Partner States, providing an important venue for contact.

*Access to deliberations of participating States*

The Partner States have however consistently lobbied for access to deliberations of the participating States. Although participating States decided, as far back as 1994, to invite Mediterranean states to attend Permanent Council (PC) and Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) meetings devoted to Mediterranean issues, it was only in 2008 that the then Spanish Chairmanship of the OSCE changed the seating arrangements, accommodating the Partner States at the main table and making the invitation to the weekly PC and FSC meetings practically a standing one. They participate as observers in the OSCE Ministerial Council Meetings and Summits and in all annual events of the OSCE. To sum up, Partner States can observe and speak when relevant issues are on the agenda, but cannot participate in decision-making of the Organization.

Partner States also regularly could participate in deliberations on European security architecture (discussions that led up to the 1990 Paris declaration, the 'Security Model' in 1996, the 1999 Charter for European Security, to mention some) and showed a great deal of interest in such discussions. Interestingly, it is the latest such process, H+40, that (so far) does not provide Partner States with an adequate opportunity to participate and contribute to the deliberations, even on the issue of relations of the Organization with Partner States, to the chagrin of their delegations. Thus clearly, although much has been done to provide access to the Organization and its work for Partner States, and even keeping in mind the need to distinguish between states that are members and those that are not, *some areas for clarification of the extent of access and political co-operation remain.*

*Operational aspects*

The Mediterranean dialogue also took on a more operational dimension. The OSCE Permanent Council adopted a decision in 1998 providing for representatives of the MPCs, on a case-by-case basis, to participate in OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election monitoring and supervision operations, and to make short-term visits to

the OSCE Missions in order to continue to take stock of the OSCE experience and to witness the comprehensive approach to the work undertaken in the field.[17] Partner States are also invited, on a voluntary basis, to second mission members to OSCE field operations. The OSCE Secretariat also provides opportunities for Junior Professional Officers and interns from Partner States. Recently, the Secretariat also offered short-term placements for nationals of Partner States into the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network. The Mediterranean Partner States have been encouraged to take advantage of these decisions, but the response has been muted, and this discouraged further initiatives. It would be worthwhile to discuss and possibly address the root causes of this low uptake of such possibilities. Overall, *operational co-operation certainly should be enhanced and made more visible*.

*Specialized events and projects*

Since Partner States do not sign up nor are bound by the OSCE acquis of documents and decisions, participating States had to consider how to encourage them to consider some of the aspects of the OSCE's commitments of interest. The formulation that was thus developed in 2003 called for voluntary implementation.[18] The ways in which participating States and OSCE institutions have responded to this notion of voluntary implementation is significant: over time, specialized events on a number of selected themes proposed by the Partner States (for example recently on environment and security in the southern Mediterranean, sustainable energy in the southern Mediterranean, legal instruments in counter-terrorism, trafficking in human beings, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security [19]) have been implemented by various specialized structures of the Organization in a decentralized way. These may have been side events, special workshops, or low-key projects involving one or more Partner State. Quite helpful in that respect have been translations of relevant best practice documents into Arabic language, of which there is now a substantial number. Often, these seminars and workshops are one-off events, with little follow-up. Although more on funding issue will be provided below, it is worth saying here that all of them are funded by voluntary funds provided mostly by one or more participating States, which also provides for a certain lack of continuity.

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[17] PC.Dec/223, 11 June 1998.

[18] 'We will encourage them to voluntarily implement the principles and commitments of the OSCE and will co-operate with them in this as appropriate.' OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Co-operation in Europe. Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 1 and 2 December 2003, MC.DOC/1/03, Maastricht, p. 4.

[19] Derek Lutterbeck and Monika Wohlfeld, OSCE Code of Conduct: Regional Conference for the Mediterranean. MedAgenda, January 2014.

These specialized events and projects follow certain 'rules of engagement'. In the words of the Secretary General, 'for the OSCE to be activated three conditions need to be met: 1. A clear request be received from the Partner state. 2. A consensus decision by pS [participating States] would have to be taken for the implementation of any activity outside of the OSCE territory. 3. Adequate extra-budgetary resources would need to be made available to fund the activities.'[20] While point 1 and 3 are touched upon in this paper in the context of themes and publics, as well as funding, point 2 deserves particular attention. This restriction is linked to a debate in the OSCE concerning the possibility of providing assistance to Afghanistan, a Partner State of the OSCE. The different views of the participating States on the desirability and viability of such activities resulted in an agreement that they could be carried out in principle on the territory of participating States, but not Partner States (unless submitted to decision to participating States, where they would be subject to difficult and possibly prolonged debates). This applies also to efforts to render training and project assistance to the countries of North Africa. In particular, in *appears necessary to try to overcome the obstacles to the implementation of activities on the territory of Mediterranean Partner States* by agreeing on the necessity of such activities and/or streamlining the relevant decision-making processes.

Overall, *it would be useful to have a more strategic approach to such project activities.* One idea that has been floated recently and does deserve attention here is the notion of negotiating individual action plans with Mediterranean Partner States, reflecting their different needs and expectations and formalizing commitment through a multi-year framework. This could be done initially with one or two states. In fact, all Mediterranean Partner States have recently submitted more of less elaborated, formal indications as to areas in which they would wish to see further support or have an interest in learning more about. And while formalization may not be necessary or possible, *more focus on such longer-term perspective in the form of individual action plans would help avoid the problem of lack of continuity and guessing about Partner States intentions*. This would have to take place in parallel to regional efforts involving all Mediterranean Partner States, and would have to be transparent and conducive to the goals of OSCE's Mediterranean dialogue.

### 5.2. Specific aspects of the dialogue

This section focuses on a number of specific aspects of the dialogue that require attention in the context of the discussion of the future of the engagement of the OSCE with Mediterranean Partners. These are: the process of decentralization of

[20] Address by Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Mediterranean Forum: 'Making the Mediterranean a Safer Place: Creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Dubrovnik 9 October 2011. [20] See also Chairmanship Background Paper 'Instruments that the OSCE could offer to its Partner for Co-operation', CIO.GAL/41/11, 18 March 2011;

activities with Mediterranean Partner States within the Organization, the viability of pursuing a regional approach and/or one based on relations with individual Partner States, the issue of ownership and finally the funding situation.

*Decentralization*

It is worth highlighting what could be called 'decentralization' of the dialogue to various parts of the Organization. Thus, increasingly, the possibilities for support and consultations from the various institutions and offices of the OSCE are highlighted. Once a topic of common interest is identified (and funding is made available), the relevant institution or office provide expertise or organise a seminar or workshop on it. Side events for Partner States have been organised on the margins of various specialized OSCE meetings. A number of handbooks or manuals on specific aspects of OSCE commitments prepared by the various parts of the Organization have been translated into Arabic (and made relevant for the region in question) after Mediterranean Partners showed interest in them, and voluntary funds were identified for this purpose. *The decentralization of efforts to provide expertise and support is a welcome trend and should be encouraged further, but in a context of a longer term strategic perspective.*

Arguably, it is the parliamentary dimension of the dialogue and co-operation that provides strong impulses (but also further highlights the occasional rifts between the intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary approaches within the Organization). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) appoints a special representative on the Mediterranean and the holds special sessions on the region. The PA also invites parliamentarians from the MPCs to join its election observation efforts[21], and upon invitation observes elections in them. It also champions the notion of admission of new Partner States, invites Palestinian and Libyan delegations to its events and calls for a more pro-active stance of the OSCE on providing assistance to Partner States in the wake of the Arab Spring.

[21] Parliamentarians from participating States took part in election monitoring in Partner States with the first such event in 2004, when the PA sent a small delegation to monitor the Algerian presidential election. See the brief report on the mission to Algeria in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly document "The Second Decade of OSCE PA Election Observation January 2004-June 2008". http://www.oscepa.org/oscepa_content/documents/Activities/Election%20Observation/2008-EO-Summary%20Report,%20Second%20Decade-June.pdf.
The PA observed the elections in Tunisia in October 2011. Statement by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, "Elections for Constituent National Assembly signal the Tunisian people are on their way to guaranteeing human rights and democracy", Tunis, 24 October 2011. http://www.oscepa.org/election-observation/2011/679-parliamentary-observers-applaud-tunisian-elections.

OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has also been very active, particularly following the events of early 2011 in North Africa. According to its former Director, ODIHR can assist with its expertise in seven areas: elections; political party legislation; independence of the judiciary; national human rights institutions; human rights and combating terrorism; hate crimes; and facilitating participation in OSCE meeting.[22] ODIHR advanced practical support efforts in these areas by pursuing an impressive set of projects.[23] Most of the activities took place upon request of Tunisian authorities.

There has also been increased involvement of the various specialized sections of the OSCE Secretariat, working on issues such as Transnational Threats, Trafficking in Human Beings, and politico-military aspects of security.

The decentralization of OSCE's efforts corresponds to the nature of the Organization and allows it to provide support to the Mediterranean Partners on a variety of issues. *All OSCE Institutions should be encouraged further and provided with funding for activities aimed at responding to the needs and interests of the Mediterranean Partner States within their mandates.* The complex architecture of the OSCE however, and especially the nature of linkages between the intergovernmental and the parliamentary aspects of its work, must be explained clearly to the Partner States, and co-operation among them enhanced.

*Regional approach or with individual states?*

The OSCE encourages co-operation among the Partner States, including in the context of the Contact Group. This is relatively unique, as the EU's European Neighbourhood Policies and to a large extent also NATO's Mediterranean dialogue are based on a 'spoke and hub' principle, whereby individual agreements or action plans are pursued.

However, the Mediterranean Partner States are obviously not a coherent group, and they have seldom managed to speak with one voice in the OSCE, even on matters of significance to them. Furthermore, even bringing them together around

[22] Remarks of Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at the Third Meeting of the Mediterranean Contact Group, Vienna, 13 May 2011.

[23] See for example 'Co-operation between the OSCE Mediterranean Partners and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ODIHR.GAL/16/13, 12 March 2013; OSCE, 2011: "OSCE-Mediterranean Partner Countries", Civil Society Conference, Vilnius, 4-5 December. http://www.osce.org/event/medcivilsociety2011.

one table is occasionally a difficult feat, depending on the level of political tensions in the region. Nevertheless, the OSCE encourages co-operation among the Partner States, including in the context of the Contact Group. It has also become clear that in addition to encouraging MPCs to act as a group, thus *taking a regional approach, individual contacts with the Partner States should be pursued, as well as contacts with regional organizations such as the League of Arab States*. It is in this context that the idea of individual action plans also appears worth considering. However, as already mentioned, such efforts need to be transparent and available to all Partners in an equal way. They also have to be in line with the goals of the Mediterranean dialogue and principles of the Organization.

*The issue of ownership*

MPCs regularly refer to lack of ownership of the process on their part. For example at the Vilnius Ministerial, MPCs expressed frustration with the limited influence on decision-making on relevant issues, and lack of concrete results of the dialogue. Granted, some thinking in the OSCE has gone into assuring that the dialogue is not a one-way street, and that the Mediterranean Partners would be seen not only as beneficiaries but also as contributors in the OSCE context. One must see for example the attempts to ensure that annual Mediterranean Seminars take place in one of the Partner States (rather than on one of the participating States) in this light. Also the efforts to focus on topics and formats of interest for the Partner States has to be understood as aiming at increasing their ownership of the process of dialogue.

But overall, the effort to present the dialogue as a two-way street has not been very easy or credible, for several reasons, such as low attendance of the Contact Group, slow formulation of requests for assistance by MPCs, the fact that the Contact Group and other events are chaired by participating rather than Partner States (although the agendas are set in co-operation with Mediterranean Partners), and lack of follow-up by the Permanent Council of Contact Group meetings and Mediterranean Seminars. Admittedly, the Chairs of the Mediterranean dialogue (incoming Chairmanship-in-Office of the Organization) do not always have a particular interest in Mediterranean issues and some feel that the key challenge in this respect is to avoid any situations that would discredit them as future Chair of the OSCE.

The question of ownership indeed must be posed not only for Partner States but also participating States. While some regularly skip Mediterranean events, and show little interest in its debates and funding issues, it must be recalled that especially NATO and EU members have other venues for interacting with the southern Mediterranean countries. This lack of engagement does however undermine any efforts aimed at pursuing a serious dialogue with these countries in the context of the OSCE.

Thus, *there is a strong need to assure ownership of the Partner States of the process of co-operation, for example by assigning chairing or co-chairing roles in some aspects of the dialogue to Mediterranean Partners.* This would have to be done in transparent manner and in agreement with all Mediterranean Partner States. *There should also be better follow-up to Contact Group meetings and Mediterranean Seminars within the Organization, for example in the context of Permanent Council meetings, in order to make these events more effective but also to involve all participating States.* Nevertheless, assuring ownership maybe a difficult task in the absence of a clear common view of purpose. The focus of the Union for the Mediterranean on assuring ownership and its difficulties provide some indications in this regard.

*Funding*

The part of the annual budget of the Organization (which in itself, is small compared to other organizations) devoted to the Mediterranean dialogue is miniscule. The Mediterranean Partners do not pay into the annual budget, but can make voluntary or in-kind contributions (particularly by co-organising events or activities). Their voluntary contributions, if any, have been negligible. A number of participating States provide the voluntary funds needed to keep the activities going. In response to the frustrations of this process, a voluntary Partnership Fund was decided upon by the participating States in November 2007[24] after some difficult deliberations. In June 2014, the OSCE Secretariat reported that since its inception 1 675 686 Euros of voluntary funds have been channelled through the Fund.[25] This is a relatively small amount. The Fund has been used to support a number of practical activities, mostly workshops on narrower specific topics. And only a small number of usual suspects among OSCE participating States contributed to the Fund (and showed interest in other aspects of the dialogue). In addition, more recently, some participating States preferred funding activities directly, and others chose to now make funding available to other pressing needs in the Organization instead of the Mediterranean dialogue. As the Mediterranean Partner States show increased interest in some aspects of OSCE's acquis, one may really ask the question whether this funding situation does not reflect a problem of ownership not only for Partner States but also for quite a few participating States of the Organization. Thus, *the funding for the Mediterranean dialogue is not assured and current procedures are not doing it justice. Any decisions on the way forward in the dialogue need to be*

[24] Establishment of a Partnership Fund, PC.DEC/812, 30 November 2007.

[25] OSCE, 2014, OSCE Partnership for Co-operation Fact Sheet. http://www.osce.org/ec/77951.

*accompanied by a good hard look on how to assure its financial viability, possibly providing some 'seed money' in the Organization's regular budget or aiming at establishing co-operation with relevant private or publics institutions.*

### 5.3. Co-operation on Mediterranean issues with other organizations

Given the overlapping membership as well as similarities of mandates and areas of engagement of the OSCE with other organizations that make up the European security architecture, an important aspect of its work is co-operation with such organizations. This applies also to its work on Mediterranean issues. But also co-operation with regional organizations in the Mediterranean is being pursued. Both aspects deserve closer attention.

#### 5.3.1. Co-operation with organizations in the OSCE area

The OSCE, as a UN Chapter VII organization, co-operates with the United Nations as a primary partner. The UN, just like the OSCE, recognized the close interlinkage of security in Europe and Mediterranean[26], and there have been occasional joint activities and co-operation on Mediterranean issues, for example on migration in the Mediterranean. Following the Arab Spring events, the issue of possible support by the OSCE to countries in transition in North Africa has been presented in 2011 as one that has to be seen in the context of co-operation with the UN and regional organizations. In fact, the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office (CiO) corresponded on this matter and met with the UN Secretary General in March and April 2011. A press release related to one of the conversations indicates that the CiO specified that 'the OSCE, including through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights which has extensive experience in providing electoral support, stands ready to share its expertise with Tunisia and Egypt in an international effort co-ordinated by the UN.'[20] While the OSCE's offer and activities implemented (such as Parliamentary Assembly's short term election observation in Tunisia and ODIHR election-related projects, also mostly focused on Tunisia), must be applauded, it is clear that UN's primary concerns in the region lie elsewhere. The OSCE however is not in a position to contribute to addressing the challenges the UN encounters particularly in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Middle East, both because of the membership but also structure of the dialogue. Indeed, it appears that n the situation in North Africa has been dropped from the key issues on the common agenda, possibly also due to OSCE's current preoccupation with other issues.

[26] Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, G.A. res. 48/81, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993). http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/48/81GA1993.html

While the OSCE as a regional organization under UN Chapter VII pursues the goal of close co-operation with organizations in its area, and specifically with the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe, and there are numerous declarations committing the organizations to closer co-operations and co-operation mechanisms at the political level, working level (staff meetings and information exchanges), in the field and through joint projects and activities, the different Mediterranean dialogues that each of these players pursue[27] have not been at the centre of such efforts. This is changing somewhat as a result of the Arab Spring events, as the rethinking processes of these organizations combined with the at times fast-paced developments in the region, and the extent of MPCs stated needs drive the need for co-operation home. Much more could be done however, to *place the issue of efforts to respond adequately to the situation in the Mediterranean more squarely on the common agendas of these organizations*. In this respect, the OSCE's concept of a Platform for Co-operative Security, agreed upon in 1999, has occasionally been referred to. This concept specifies the goals and modalities of co-operation, and it also states that 'as appropriate, the OSCE can offer to serve as a flexible framework for co-operation of the various mutually reinforcing efforts'[28]. While it is clear that no organizations wishes to be coordinated by another, given the differences in membership, purpose and working methods, *the Platform for Co-operative Security did allow for closer co-operation efforts in the OSCE area, and could be the basis for calling one or a series of conferences with partner organizations aimed at reviewing both the needs in the Mediterranean region and the various responses to them, should partner organizations be interested in such a coordination.*

The question may be posed here in how far the OSCE can contribute to the efforts to address the challenging situation in the Mediterranean region, given the scope of activities of its partner organizations and the substantial resources that some of them are able to rely on. However, the input the OSCE provides – in a dialogue mode, with no strings or preconditions attached, focusing on interesting the Mediterranean Partner States in its acquis and explaining the functioning of a co-operative security framework with a comprehensive understanding of security, it has its role to play in the region. Although the experience of working through a regional, inclusive and comprehensive organization, based on consensus and the understanding that states are accountable to each other and to their citizens may not always have a visible and

[27] The EU pursues relations with Mediterranean states inter alia through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the multilateral Union for the Mediterranean; NATO pursues relations with Mediterranean states through its Mediterranean dialogue in the NATO+1 and NATO+7 formats and Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; the Council of Europe pursues relations with Mediterranean states through its North-South Center and the Neighbourhood Strategy. The memberships of these various initiatives overlap to some degree, but the groups of countries that are involved in each other are not the same. Also, the agendas of these initiatives overlap in some areas, however, also show substantial differences.

[28] OSCE Istanbul Summit 1999, Charter for European Security, Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, 18 November 1999. http://www.osce.org/mc/17562?download=true

immediate impact, it surely is worth pursuing. In addition, OSCE's expertise on specific issues that it shares with MPCs on a request basis is acknowledged as valuable. Thus, the OSCE certainly has a contribution to make, in co-operation with other actors.

### 5.3.2. Co-operation with other organizations in the Mediterranean region

In principle, the OSCE can pursue contacts with regional organisations outside its area in the context of the United Nations (UN), in particular under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. A number of OSCE documents[29] refer to the need to broaden dialogue on specific issues with regional organisations beyond the OSCE area, and in some cases some are named, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the African Union, and indeed contacts and exchanges have been established. The need to co-operate with the League of Arab States (LAS) is specifically underlined by the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), the Secretary General (SG) and by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)[30], and the Secretary General suggested that some projects could be channelled through LAS. Of course, it has to be kept in mind that not all of the Mediterranean Partners are members of these organizations, and such contacts or projects have to transparent to all and conducive to the goals of the dialogue. In particular the latest events in the Middle East point however to the difficulties linked to the latter aspect.

The links with these regional organisations allow for dialogue on a region-to-region basis; they give a role to Partner States; and as mentioned prior, they allow for communication with States that are not part of the Mediterranean dialogue. *The pursuit of closer relations with regional organizations such as the League of Arab States under the chapeau of the UN is a venue that could bring added value to the participating States in the OSCE, and could be elaborated clearer.*

[29] See for example 'Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism', decided upon at the Ninth Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Bucharest, 3 and 4 December 2001, http://www.osce.org/mc/40515?download=true and the 'OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century', decided upon at the Eleventh Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Maastricht, December 2003, http://www.osce.org/mc/40533?download=true.

[30] See for example OSCE PA, Statement on North Africa, 25 February 2011. http://www.oscepa.org/NEW/news-a-media/press-releases/177-osce-pa-statement-on-north-africa; "OSCE should work with regional, global Organisations to promote security: chief", *People Daily* (16 February 2011). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/7289283.html.; Address by Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Mediterranean Forum: 'Making the Mediterranean a Safer Place: Creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Dubrovnik, 9 October 2011.

## 6. Dimensions and Themes

The section of the Helsinki Final Act that focuses on the Mediterranean speaks largely of economic and environmental aspects, as well politico-military aspects (such as contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions). Human dimension aspects are largely absent, apart from a mention of 'justice' in the preamble. This is striking, as the Helsinki process is hailed for inter alia its focus on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Discomfort with the human dimension in the context of the Mediterranean dialogue continued. If it was discussed, it was by placing on the agenda the comprehensive approach to security. Little more could be expected of an Organization of its profile and membership and given the situation in the region. Arguably, the 'Arab Spring' in general highlighted the universality of human rights, and the need to place them more adequately on the agenda of frameworks that co-operate with the countries of North Africa. However, even after 2011, there are significant differences between the various Mediterranean Partners' approaches to human dimension issues.

But also other aspects of the OSCE acquis were difficult to approach in the Mediterranean dialogue. The core concepts of the OSCE political-military dimension, Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), arms control or the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, although sorely needed in a region that was marked by rivalries and militarization, could not be discussed, except in the context of comprehensive security. This also changed for some but not all of the MPCs.

It needs to be said that in the past, it was at times difficult to find a range of topics of interest to MPCs for discussion. The subjects that drew interest were issues related to tolerance and non-discrimination, migration and migrants' human rights issues, including in countries of destination, as well as water management, desertification, anti-terrorism measures and other related topics. These continue to be of interest, but it is worth noting that the post-Arab Spring political situation allows for broadening of the set of issues, while realizing that not all of them will have the same interests. Furthermore, it must be noted that now Partner States emphasize the need for more concrete, operational and results-oriented co-operation tailored to the needs to individual Partners rather than just discussion. The efforts of the Organization should thus *continue to emphasize and be guided by the comprehensive approach to security. The idea of individual action plans may allow for better responses to those Partner countries who do wish to pursue closer co-operation on specific aspects.*

A few words need to be said here about one subject that is largely kept off the agenda of the Mediterranean dialogue in the OSCE, at least in its intergovernmental form (as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly does regularly discuss it) – the Middle East conflict. While a number of participating States in the OSCE do not wish to turn the Organization's Mediterranean dialogue into another forum blocked by this issue (and some plainly do not want to weaken other fora seized with this matter), the Arab MPCs consider this issue as a key one in the context of any multilateral fora. This has several implications in the context of the Organization: from the differences on the Palestinian National Authority application to become an MPC, to Israel's standing in the group, to the Arab MPCs' occasional disappointment with the dialogue. Little can be said here about how to proceed on this issue, given the level of tension currently.

## 7. Constituencies

The Helsinki Final Act does not specify channels or publics the CSCE would use for the purposes of intensifying co-operation in the Mediterranean region. And while the agenda of the CSCE and later OSCE was quickly picked-up by civil societies and NGOs in the OSCE area, this has not happened in the context of the Mediterranean dialogue (although possibly that is also changing in some of the Partner States since 2011). Indeed, diplomatic and occasional high level political channels were primarily pursued, by both sides.

The focus on diplomatic and political channels had implications at a variety of levels, but the key problems were the lack of awareness of OSCE and its principles in the Mediterranean Partners, as well as weariness of the diplomatic and political channels in Mediterranean Partner States of some aspects of OSCE's acquis, in particular the Human Dimension and its work with civil society. Both of these aspects changed somewhat in a number of countries as a consequence of the Arab Spring events, but much remains to be done.

As discussed in the section on decentralization of efforts, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is doing a good job of reaching out to parliamentarians from Mediterranean Partner States. This is an important aspect of the effort to overcome the lack of awareness of the OSCE, its working methods and its acquis.

Some new efforts have been undertaken to reach out to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Mediterranean since the Arab Spring, the most prominent of them the ODIHR civil society event held in December 2011. The joint OSCE-Mediterranean Partner Countries' Conference for Civil Society in Vilnius, entitled 'Transparency and Pluralism in Electoral

Good Practice, Political Participation, Justice and Legal Reform' provided a number of suggestions for the OSCE and its participating States and Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation that inter alia 'call on OSCE participating States to provide for greater involvement with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. This should include a range of support programmes, such as providing expertise, training, and other activities aimed at increasing the capacity of civil society organizations, including those observing elections, and working on issues of gender equality, youth and minorities'.[31] It needs to be mentioned that *other actors, such as the European Union, are also increasingly reaching out to civil societies and NGOs in the region, and co-operation in such efforts would be beneficial.*

The New-Med Research Network proposed recently, a new OSCE-related Mediterranean Track II initiative, which aims at active participate of research and academic institutions to foundations and other actors and wants to bring together individuals from both sides of the Mediterranean for a dialogue on security and co-operation in the region may help overcome the problem of lack of awareness. 'New-Med will operate beyond diplomatic channels, but will strongly rely on inputs coming from governments, thus aiming at contributing original but viable proposals on how to strengthen 'track 1' dialogue taking place in institutions setting in the Mediterranean region.'[32] The work on the network is supported financially by Italy[33], and much of this funding comes from a private independent foundation, the Compagnia di San Paolo. This provides an opportunity to use the network to build additional bridges with civil society actors. The Network could also provide new perspectives by including members from Southern Mediterranean countries that are currently not part of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership. The Network could focus on critical new issues and challenges such as failing/failed states in the region. It could also be seen as an effective platform for discussing some of the ideas and proposals that are put forward in order to improve and/or expand the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership. It could also play an important role in generating and channelling proposals for the Helsinki +40 process. The coordinator for the H+40 cluster on partners, the Ambassador of Mongolia, as well as the future Serbian Chairmanship-in-Office of the OSCE, could therefore invest in the network development and exhort participating States to support the initiative beyond the first year of activity. *Thus, the New-Med network should be endorsed and made more sustainable.*

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[31] Mediterranean Partner Countries' Civil Society Conference Vilnius, Lithuania, 4-5 December, Conference Conclusions and Recommendations. http://www.osce.org/odihr/85800?download=true

[32] Report on the Workshop Global Mediterranean: A New Agenda for Multilateral Security Co-operation, Turin, 4-5 June 2014.

[33] On 5 June 2014, an international workshop on the "Global Mediterranean: A New Agenda for Multilateral Security Cooperation" was held in Turin, Italy, set up by a Mediterranean Focal Point recently established in the Office of the Secretary General at the proposal and with funding from Italy.

*Other venues for dialogue with broader publics in Mediterranean Partner States are needed.*

Mainly, *better outreach to different publics in MPCs: journalists, youth, civil society, would help address the lack of awareness of the OSCE. This may have to be done at least in some cases in association and possibly through the diplomatic and political channels.* In the words of the OSCE Secretary General, 'for the OSCE's potential contribution to be fully appreciated on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, we need to make out Organization better known and to engage with all facets of society.'[34]

## 8. Conclusion: the way forward in the context of the H+40 process

Forty years after the agreement on the Helsinki Final Act and in the midst of significant changes in the Mediterranean region, the OSCE is contemplating how to work towards a strong security community in its region. However, security communities have also an external dimension, which in the case of the OSCE has been elaborated for the Mediterranean region in the Helsinki Final Act and numerous subsequent decisions and documents. It is argued that the OSCE should pursue a strategy based on the one hand on re-emphasizing and restating the goals of the Helsinki Final Act, and on the other hand making the dialogue with MPCs more outcome-oriented, more practical and clearer.

The areas that deserve attention in that respect and which could be considered as part of the H+40 review have been highlighted in this paper. Some already receive considerable attention but require decisions of participating States; others have so far been largely overlooked. Some are minor adjustments, others require considerable discussion.

The paper argues that the current situation in the Mediterranean region (and in the OSCE) is not conducive to a serious debate and steps towards closer co-operation with Mediterranean Partners. However, it is now, in the case of conflicts and failing states that the comprehensive and co-operative approach to security deserves to be underlined and assistance to states who wish to move forward on some aspects of it must be provided. The regional dynamics in the Mediterranean must be in the future based on interaction, conflict prevention and co-operative-dominant relations, and there is space for frameworks such the OSCE to contribute to this endeavour, in particular if it is done in co-operation with other players, such as the United Nations, European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe, but also regional organizations from the

[34] Address by Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Mediterranean Forum: 'Making the Mediterranean a Safer Place: Creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Dubrovnik 9 October 2011.

Mediterranean region. Such a regional engagement would require a reasserting of the Helsinki Final Act vision and making the dialogue with Mediterranean Partner States more effective, responsive and operational and most importantly, less process- and more result-oriented.