PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MOZAMBIQUE
Ministero degli Affari Esteri
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a. Programme
1. Lessons learned from the Mozambican Peace Process / Anna Maria Gentili (13 p.)
2. Towards a Stronger Africa-EU Cooperation on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organizations and Civil Society / Valérie Vicky Miranda, Nicoletta Pirozzi, Kai Schäfer [pubbl. come Iai working papers 1228] (17 p.)

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PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MOZAMBIQUE

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PROGRAMME

8.30 – 9.00 *Registration of participants*

9.00 – 9.45 **OPENING SPEECHES**

- **Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy
- **Oldemiro Baloi**, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mozambique
- **Marco Impagliazzo**, President, Community of Sant'Egidio, Rome

9.45 – 11.30 ***SESSION I – TWENTY YEARS OF PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE***

Moderator:

- **Pietro Veronese**, Journalist, Rome

Introduction:

- **Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca**, Professor of Contemporary History, "Roma Tre" University

Speakers:

- **Raul Domingos**, former Chair of Renamo Delegation, Maputo
- **Teodato Hunguana**, former Minister of Mozambique and member of Frelimo Delegation, Maputo
- **Mario Raffaelli**, President, African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF), Rome
- **Mons. Matteo Zuppi**, Community of Sant'Egidio, Rome
- **Aldo Ajello**, UN Special Representative in Mozambique '92-94, Rome

11.30 – 11.45 *Coffee break*

11.45 – 13.30 ***SESSION II – LESSONS LEARNED IN PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY***

Moderator:

- **Giampiero Gramaglia**, Journalist, Rome

Introduction:

- **Anna Maria Gentili,** Professor of History and Institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa, University of Bologna
- **Nicoletta Pirozzi,** Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
  (presentation of a study in the framework of the IAI-FEPS project "Strengthening the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security: how to engage African sub-regional organisations and civil society")

Speakers:

- **Samia Nkrumah,** Chairwoman of the Convention People's Party, Accra
  (video-message)
- **Massimo D'Alema**, President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), Brussels
- **Francesco Caetano Jose Madeira**, Ambassador, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Counter Terrorism Cooperation, Addis Ababa
- **Alain Le Roy**, Ambassador of France to Italy and former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Rome
- **Jeremy Lester**, Adviser on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, Africa Department, European External Action Service (EEAS), Brussels
- **Alex Vines**, Head of Africa Programme, Chatham House, London
- **Alfredo Mantica**, former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Italy

13.30 **CLOSING REMARKS**

- **Gianni Bonvicini**, Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
- **Staffan de Mistura**, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Italy

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Draft paper on

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MOZAMBICAN PEACE PROCESS

by

Anna Maria Gentili

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DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

The Mozambican Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), followed by the ONUMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique) implementation mission, is considered a peace process "test case" of a "second generation" multidimensional peacekeeping operation.[1] Its success is due mainly to policies which prioritized consensus-building between the parties to the conflict, negotiated through the mediation of a "third party" and supported by the international commitment to guarantee the country's political and economic reconstruction by means of democratic development.

The end of the Cold War in the '90s had given rise all over Africa to a wave of democratizations, preceded in the '80s by the conditionality of austerity measures negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in the name of structural adjustment programs. Stringent commitments to reshape the economic structures and priorities defined a set of new development policies: these were the gradual phasing out of State intervention in the economy, asset privatizations, and free market reforms. Democratization through "free and fair" multiparty competitive elections, the rule of law and institution-building geared towards the adoption of best practices of governance, was considered the second fundamental step to stabilize and secure countries where economic development had been blocked by authoritarian regimes. At the time, the West's engagement in helping to solve African conflicts was mainly dictated by the assumption that instability was the greatest impediment to economic and democratic development, meaning free market and multiparty competition.

At the crossroad: the end of the Cold War and the changing context of pre-negotiations

Rather than representing a model, the Mozambican process was considered a "test case", one in which the United Nations (UN) and the international community invested heavily to try to avoid the failure that for years had prevented the peace in Angola. The process should be read as an experience that has contributed to add substance to the debates taking place in international, regional and national policy-making institutions on how to achieve sustainable solutions to civil conflicts. It was one of the first cases in which the agreement (CPA), followed by implementation, increased the complementarities between simple peacekeeping and peace-building priorities such as confidence-building, demilitarization of the political context, electoral assistance, financing, institutional support to government, and security sector reforms.

[1] In 1992 the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, published the "Agenda for peace" that outlined the relevance of preventive diplomacy and the relationship between peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building, out of the recognition that the late 20th century conflicts affected civilians to a much greater degree. To build bridges between peace support operations and human security was to be an international responsibility. Peace-building was defined as the component that makes peace sustainable, preserving its gains in the medium and long terms. Very relevant for understanding the Mozambican case is the document declaring that the peace-building component of the peace process was to be implemented by the affected populations themselves chiefly with the support of the government and aid structures present in the country (international, bilateral donors, INGOs, business enterprises).

The challenge was not primarily financial, but political and conceptual, as it laid in the realm of policy relations between the different actors and was, of course, a function of the response and assistance tools at hand in the given period.

A not irrelevant reason for its success was that the whole period of pre-negotiations functioned like an international, regional and national workshop, where different positions and interests were gradually brought to support a peaceful negotiated solution. Last but not least, the parties to the conflict were from beginning to end the subjects, not the objects of the process.

Thus the first fundamental lesson we draw from the Mozambican "test case" is that there is no blueprint for conflict resolution, and therefore the decision to intervene and modes of intervention must be fully embedded, understood and applied in the context specific to particular countries, regions and international scenarios. There are no ready-made fast-track solutions. Knowledge and a thorough grasp of the complexity of root causes and interests implicated in the conflict, time, adequate financing and the authority to apply innovative solutions to overcome stalemates are indispensable not to "buy" peace, but to create and stabilize the terrain and the conditions on which peace is going to be built, not by foreign intervention but by the parties themselves.

First of all, it is necessary to contextualize the Mozambican case and the changes that took place in the country's politics and in the regional and international alignments. A flurry of formal and informal diplomacy that informed the '80s brought the two conflicting parties first to meet, then to accept face-to-face negotiations. At the end of the '80s, Mozambique had survived three decades of uninterrupted war and destabilization. It was, by any measure, the martyr country of Africa. The Mozambican conflict resolution became possible at the cross-road of a fundamental change in the international system dictated by the winding down of the Cold War. The complexity of the issues was well known. The national liberation and the antiapartheid struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa had become a primary theatre of Cold War competition. Superpowers, and neighboring countries vested political and ideological agendas, had a primary responsibility first in instigating wars in the region, then in financing and supporting military and political, overt and/or covert dissident organization and actions.

Notwithstanding a heated and much politicized debate on whether the Mozambican case can be labeled a civil war, it is on the whole acknowledged that the causes and the development of the conflict were not solely the radical ideological opposition to the political choices of FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)*, aligned with the Soviet Union and the socialist block.

With the approaching end of the Cold War the United States - that under president Ronald Reagan had a soft spot for RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*) but always kept clear of any official endorsement - Southern Africa political priorities were in shelving the apartheid regime through a democratic process that would avoid a major deflagration in South Africa and in the region. Since the

Lancaster House Agreement (1979) and the March 1980 elections that brought an end to the white minority regime in Zimbabwe, US and European priorities were to put an end to the militarization of the region[2] through negotiated settlements under the umbrella of free market style democratization. The first relevant success, in the web of negotiations that paved the way to the consensual demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, was the Namibia referendum (1989) that led to that country's independence through multiparty elections. The case of Namibia functioned internationally and regionally as a negotiation workshop between the major players of the Cold War.

The decision to send the first accredited ambassador to the US at the end of 1982[3] was a clear sign that the leadership of FRELIMO was becoming realistically aware of the changes dictated by the 1979 economic recession and by the election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency. FRELIMO slowly and painfully acknowledged the consequences of the Soviet drawdown, the stalemate in the war, and the impact of the fighting on the living conditions of the population. With the demise of the Soviet Union, FRELIMO realized the need to use the government lines of credibility, especially with African friends as well as foes and European sympathetic countries, to have access to emergency aid and for a more decisive diplomatic support, while negotiating a new set of relations with the only remaining superpower: the United States. Economic realities, exacerbated by the "seca" (drought) that hit the country between 1981 and 1984,[4] made matters more urgent. The application for membership to the WB and the IMF and in 1984 the signature of the Nkomati treaty with South Africa, the erstwhile archenemy, followed rapidly. The first secret meeting with RENAMO took place the same year.

Although both the internal and external parties to the conflict in the second half of the '80s were reconsidering – slowly but firmly – their strategies in the light of the new emerging realities in Southern Africa and the world, on both sides of the conflict various initiatives at the national, international and regional level towards a negotiated solution were not decisive to convince FRELIMO and RENAMO to openly accept the military stalemate and recognize that the only viable option was a bilaterally negotiated settlement. The intensification of diplomatic activity apparently did not help to ease the war; on the contrary the conflict reached its widest extent in 1986. Furthermore, on October 19th, 1986, the government of Mozambique suffered a major blow when President Samora Machel died in a still not fully clarified aircraft crash on the border between South Africa and Mozambique while returning to Maputo

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[2] C. A. Crocker mediated the negotiations between South Africa, Angola and Cuba that led to the New York agreements of 1988. These laid the foundation for the referendum and free elections for the independence of Namibia.

3 V. Ferrão, *Embaixador nos Usa*, Maputo, Ndjira, 2007.

4 J. P. Borges Coelho in "Estado, Comunidades e Calamidades Naturais no Moçambique Rural", in B. de Sousa Santos, T. Cruz e Silva (dir.), *Moçambique e a Reinvençao da Emancipaçao Social*, Maputo, Centro de Formaçao Juridica e Judiciaria, 2004, pp-49-76, underlines how the drought affected the rural areas making even more unworkable the policy of "socializaçao do campo". From 1983 Mozambique had to import basic foodstuffs and became a recipient of food aid coming from Western countries. The country policy started to change because of this emergency. Similarly the severe drought that hit the country in the 1990's was a relevant factor in pushing the negotiations for the Acordo de Paz.

after a regional summit meeting with African leaders, that had been convened to seek the support of regional allies for a diplomatic solution.

Joaquim Chissano, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, became President. Building on the still narrow overtures of the Machel era, Chissano cultivated better relations with the US as well as a relationship of trust with the Catholic and the Protestant churches. This meant the launching of an informal and later on formal church diplomacy persistently trying to build bridges between the two sides of the conflict. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe evolved in favor of negotiations. From the main regional and African ally of FRELIMO and provider of armed protection of the Beira corridor, Mugabe teamed up with Arap Moi of Kenya and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, both friendly with RENAMO. Foreseeing a turn to majority rule in South Africa, Roland "Tiny" Rowland, chairman of the Lonrho conglomerate based in the United Kingdom and a contributor to RENAMO, offered his good offices and a lot of money to favour a settlement in order to protect his investments in the region.

The government's bolder measures, such as the launch in January 1987 of a comprehensive economic and political reform process, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the constitutional change (1990) that abandoned Marxism-Leninism as well as the single party regime in favor of a multiparty system and free elections, a free market and private property, civic and religious freedoms and a free press, were instrumental in winning financial and political support from several Western governments. But the measures failed to convince RENAMO, which remained suspicious of a liberal dispensation administered and controlled by FRELIMO.

The liberation of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and the opening of the multiparty conference in South Africa signaled the foreseeable end of apartheid. Notwithstanding the scaling down of the South African military aid, RENAMO continued to demonstrate it was willing and capable of organizing major attacks. Meanwhile, after meeting with President Reagan in 1988, President Chissano was once again in Washington to meet President George Bush in March 1990.

Although the US administration did not consider Mozambique a priority, Herman J. Cohen, in charge of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs (1989-1993) under President George Bush, and previously Senior Adviser for African Affairs to President Ronald Reagan, became a knowledgeable and efficient promoter of a policy of diplomatic intervention to push the government towards liberal reforms. Using discretion, he worked mainly behind the scenes to round up consensus and collaboration for a negotiated settlement from European and African interested parties alike,[5] Cohen asserted that: "the collaboration of

[5] "The shackles of the East-West struggle no longer bound our hands in Africa". See H. J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa. Superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent*, Macmillan Press, London, St Martin press, New York, 2000. According to Cohen the issue of apartheid in South Africa is what complicated the development agenda of the US. Mozambique had never really been an element in US/Soviet competition.
George Bush proclaimed a "new world order", approved a number of UN operations (Angola, Cambodia, Central America, Mozambique, Namibia, Western Sahara, former Yugoslavia, El Salvador, and the US-led intervention in Somalia 1992 as a "primarily humanitarian peace settlement"). Clinton policy of "assertive multilateralism" (Georgia,

two American presidents (Reagan and Bush) in helping Chissano break the political logjam in Mozambique probably constituted the principal US contribution to this particular peace process".[6]

The road to negotiation required an acceptable "third party" as mediator. This party could not be the US, nor any Western country previously involved in supporting one or the other side of the conflict, nor it could be an African power, be it Kenya and/or Zimbabwe, or Malawi, suspected by one or the other side to harbor their own agenda and interests; nor could it be Portugal, the former colonial power.
Negotiations became a working reality only in 1990, the year of the very end of the Cold War, when a decision was finally taken by both sides to meet face-to-face. Nevertheless, in spite of the talks, FRELIMO and RENAMO continued for long time to be stuck in a game of deadlock, harboring deep mutual distrust, while attempting to advance their conflicting strategies to win political legitimacy.

Mediation: confidence-building versus power diplomacy?

A "third party" mediation proved to be the winning solution: Italy with the unflagging support of the US, the Mozambican Church and the Community of Sant'Egidio were able to integrate power diplomacy with confidence-building. The Italian government appointed Mario Raffaelli as its representative, whose knowledge of Mozambican and regional politics and policies was deep and extensive. Italy made available a venue (Rome), logistics, and financial support. While a galaxy of Italian aid workers or "cooperantes", men and women who lived and shared the daily plight of the urban and rural people, voiced their yearning for peace.
At the time Italy was the main provider of aid and investment to the country. It also had a relevant cultural presence which invested in human development through University cooperation and capacity-building programs in many sectors from industry, transport, agriculture and service delivery in education and health. Missionaries and aid workers inevitably came in contact with RENAMO, mainly in the course of negotiations to save lives, to free kidnapped religious and civilian personnel, and to provide relief to all

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Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia (1993)) was spoiled by the Rwandan and Somali disasters that opened an era of US restraint and caution. From there G.W. Bush insisted on the necessity of developing international peacekeeping as a burden-sharing tool.

[6] "Our role as the world remaining superpower often makes the US imprimatur an essential contribution to lasting settlement". H. J. Cohen, *Statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee*, Washington D.C., March 31st, 1993. Cohen in it assessment of his years as Senior adviser on Africa to President Reagan and Assistant secretary of State for African affairs under George Bush supported a strategy of conflict resolution and political reforms while the main African crises in hand were Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan. He relates how the national security community considered these conflict situations of no "vital" interest for the US and to make the policy pass plenty of caution and diplomacy was needed. Cfr H. J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa. Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, London, 2000.

victims of the conflict. Theirs was a contribution to confidence building as far as it helped to bridge the terrible divide of the civil war, to ease fears and prevent vendettas.

The mediation had vision, which was developed through the understanding of the different interlocking levels of the conflict, through direct lines of information and communication not only with FRELIMO and RENAMO top brass and with the main power dealers in the southern African region, in Europe and the US, or with the catholic church and the protestant denominations present in all the provinces and with a multitude of "cooperantes", working in state services, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and entrepreneurs, but above all listening to grassroots Mozambicans.

The lessons of the Mozambican mediation experience have helped advance and refine the theory and practice of mediation.[7] Mediations are more likely to be successful if there is adequate institutional support founded on up-to-date information and effective lines of communications with all interested parties and supporters. Above all impartiality and neutrality must be maintained if the process is based on confidence-building.

On the other hand, confidence-building would have been neither attainable nor sustainable if the power diplomacies had not backed up the political will and skills of the mediators. The winning formula of the Mozambican mediation was confidence-building **with** power diplomacy. It was power diplomacy that made certain the political arrangements in the CPA were not left in the vague or undefined and that democracy was to be supported by adequate political and economic incentives. Consensus was reached and maintained because of the willingness of third parties, superpowers, international and bilateral donors and their constituencies, to assure the support and bear the necessary costs.

If Italy funded most of the Rome expenses, the US was always in the background throughout the negotiations. From "visiting supporter" Washington became an official observer providing essential financing and technical support to the peace process, ready all along to intervene with persuasive diplomatic tactics to convince parties that the end of conflict and the easing of distrust would open an era of rewarding economic development that the US as well as European countries were ready to promote.

The UN was brought into the negotiations in August 1992 to participate in the commission responsible to supervise the implementation of the peace accord. This early involvement reinforced the commitment of the international community and proved to the parties the steady support of the Security Council. Thus when deployment of peacekeeper and political personnel started, the specific problems of the transition were well known. Pre-implementation aid for social and economic reforms, designed to soften the effects of structural adjustments, in particular on the side of service delivery, had been deployed since 1988.

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[7] "Mediation is perceived mainly à la Kissinger, as "tough diplomacy". Therefore, mediators are often appointed on the basis of their political status rather than their competence. A strict commitment to non-partisanship was one of the reasons of the success of Sant'Egidio". Cfr L. Nathan, *Mediation in African conflicts: The gap between mandate and capacity*, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 23 April 2007.

The lesson to be drawn is that a guarantee will only be as effective as the political will of its backers, as long as the commitment to bear the costs is not left undefined. The UN's early involvement in the process made for a better strategic assessment concerning the implementation mission. As a result, questions of socio-economic instability were dealt with special attention.

Peace costs a lot of money, Tiny Rowland used to say. Mozambique's sustainable success, even with the problems experienced in these 20 years, proves that money was necessary to comply with the terms of the agreement on which confidence-building was based. A fair assessment of the asymmetry between FRELIMO and RENAMO was also essential. The former maintained sovereignty as the legitimate government of the country throughout the transition to the elections. The latter had to be enticed to come out of the bush and become an organized legitimate party, able to participate in the democratic process. The Mozambican case shows how long-term costs can be greatly reduced if integrated with peace-building measures to achieve lasting solutions. If we consider the cost-benefit analysis, twenty years of peace are worth the price.

The CPA: a "robust" guideline to peacekeeping and peace-building

The inspiring principle of the Accord was that it was owned by the Mozambicans and it was their will, determination and sense of responsibility that could make it work or fail. The Accord was a detailed document, backed by credible commitments to build a platform for implementation on which both parties could agree. It was followed by the ONUMOZ implementation mission, which was deployed towards the end of 1992, not without political and bureaucratic wrangles and delays. The mission ended in 1995, after successfully monitoring the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers, and supporting the institution building, the organization of the first multiparty elections, besides the coordination of humanitarian emergencies through the collaboration of a vast array of donors. The UN underwrote the mechanisms as well as the financial and organizational resources for the promotion of multiparty democracy, governance and economic reforms.

The CPA and its implementation are judged by all observers as one of the most successful post-Cold War peacekeeping and peace-building processes. Analysts agree on the elements that have contributed to it: timing, credibility, impartiality, and skill of the mediation team; the coordinated and uncompromising institutional and financial support from an international donor community led by Italy, positively supported by the US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, the like-minded-Nordic countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands that made their political and economic leverage felt on the arduous process of confidence-building between the warring parties.

The CPA produced a "robust" mandate for implementation that had the strong support of the then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, whose special representative Aldo Ajello proved to be exceptionally capable to walk the tight rope between the parties, easing differences and diffidence, finding inventive solutions to keep the process on track with flexible priorities on tasks and financing.

The implementation mission was supported by a vast array of international and bilateral donors, most of which knew the terrain thoroughly and were willing to contribute, not only in emergency situations, but also to lay the foundations for social and economic development. Last but not least, Mozambique was not a failed state. Though weakened by the war, the government proved capable of executing the tasks required by the CPA.

Organization hazards and UN Security Council willpower

The time of greatest uncertainty comes after the signing of a peace agreement. The Angolan parallel process, which had been under-funded and over-hyped, failed in the same days the Mozambican was getting on track. Even if the CPA was an early example and a model of a "robust agreement" as later advocated in the Brahimi Report, the danger of failure loomed: bureaucratic and organizational problems at UN headquarters delayed the mandate of ONUMOZ, which was signed only on December 3rd, 1992. A slow budget approval process delayed the deployment of troops essential to carry out the monitoring of the cease fire, the demobilization, and the departure of foreign troops from the Nacala, Beira and Maputo corridors, basis of the realization of the political legitimating process of the whole exercise through the organization of multiparty competitive elections.[8] Without the deployment of the UN military component, the political component of the Accord was stalled, while the humanitarian efforts were rendered more difficult. The most vulnerable parts of the population could not be reached and the return and resettlement of the refugees and displaced populations was hindered.

The process was saved by the fact that the UN Security Council, the Secretary General and all the parties to the CPA were determined to deliver, and in continuity with the spirit of negotiations got the parties finally to live up to their commitment to peace.

Ownership, flexibility and innovative financing

[8] At the level of the UN headquarters, the relationship among the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Peacebuilding Support Office remain inadequate to this day, judged by the UN itself not yet working in coordination and integration. Add to that, the peacekeeping burden has grown substantially. The budget of UN peacekeeping in 2010-11 stood at US dollars 7.83 billions, due not so much to the increase of civil wars but to the expanding nature of the peacekeeping mandate to peace-building activities.

Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), was given full responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the CPA. His tasks were to manage the input of the Secretariat, mobilize the support of the operational funds and programs for humanitarian and development activities, and lead the team of autonomous specialized agencies. On the basis of detailed guidelines, with the support of Boutros-Boutros Ghali and negotiating skillfully with the concerned parties, first of all the government and RENAMO, the SRSG found flexible and innovative ways towards implementation, working in coordination with the donors to organize financial and material support.

Flexibility meant that rules and procedures had to adapt to reality in the field. It was necessary to raise RENAMO's stakes in the peace process, given the asymmetrical situation in which FRELIMO held the reins of the government and controlled the State institutions, while RENAMO had to be supported in converting from armed guerrilla to a legal political party thus able to contest elections. The innovative instrument was the establishment of a trust fund of some 15 million US dollars, financed mainly by Italy and another trust fund for other parties' organizations.
Demobilized soldiers obtained monthly stipends for a two-year period, so that they could go back to civilian life with some savings to start a new life.

Elections that were scheduled to take place in 1993 were postponed by one year, as a result of the delay in deploying the 7,000 strong monitoring force for demobilization and integration of the two armies. Quick election ignoring the context is a recipe for disaster. The basic principle here too was ownership: all measures had to be agreed by the government and the RENAMO leadership, as more time was necessary to demobilize the soldiers, to involve the population, and to advance the process of reconciliation in the country at large through local initiatives.
Ajello's success in prioritizing goals and getting the parties to live up to their commitment to peace was largely due to his style of direction and coordination. Following the methodology of the Rome negotiations, decisions were taken in consultation with all parties. Grievances were balanced with commitments already made. Essentially and realistically, all the possible spoilers of the Accord were to be aware that the consolidation of democratization and the protection of human rights had little chance to progress without demobilizing armies, disarming troops, finance the return of soldiers to civilian life, transforming an armed movement into a legal and legitimate party, support civilian security through police and judicial reform and local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation. And that the demilitarization of politics and society needed inventive financing and methods tailored on the reality at hand, as a prerequisite for organizing successful elections, refugee repatriation and the support of civil society reconciliation.

Donors' quality and coordination

Overall, the Mozambican case provides insight into the complex interactions that underpin effective leverage for outside actors during the peace implementation process. The humanitarian mission, led by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), which was to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger, was hampered by bureaucratic and financial problems, thus the capacity and willingness of donors to step in was an essential contribution to peacemaking and stabilization.

International donors' activism and financial support set a precedent in peacekeeping and peace-building.[9] For example, after extensive discussions with Mozambican government officials, donors decided to increase the resources available for demobilization by an additional US dollars 35.5 million, in order to extend cash payments to demobilized soldiers for an additional 12 months.[10] Government and donors worked together to facilitate the return of 1 million refugees from outside the country and 2 million displaced persons from within. Flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of major donors, all committed to making peace work, fostered mutual trust and lowered uncertainty, giving international actors a deep understanding of the priorities and conditions that were necessary to successfully establish peace in Mozambique.

No condition is permanent: democratic consolidation needs a shared understanding of all stakeholders

Democratization was the key factor in the confidence-building and Mozambique was one of the first cases in which donors provided relevant financial support for the establishment of viable political parties as part of the organization of free and fair elections.[11]

Highlighting the fundamental contribution of donors to the stabilization of peace through "flexible, coordinated efforts to support the implementation of the peace accord activities", C. L. Manning[12]

[9] A. Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement," Chester Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall Washington (eds), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, US Institute of Peace, 1999.
[10] S. Barnes, "Reintegration Programs for Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," United Nations Development Programme/Reintegration Support Services Report, Maputo, March 1997.
[11] Thirteen countries, plus the European Commission (EC), contributed to that fund. Italy made by far the largest contribution, over US dollars 11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of over US dollars 1.96 million to RENAMO's trust fund (twice the contribution of the United States), with the Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States. The contributions of these donors make clear how important these donors believed it was to secure RENAMO's full participation in the political process and the lengths to which they were willing to go to underwrite success.

considers bilateral donors to have been the most effective peace-makers. Most of them had a longstanding friendly relation with the Mozambican government and were aware of the financial and resource constraints of the State. They insisted in investing in humanitarian as well as in development projects and in institution-building, laying the basis for the sustained post-war reconstruction of legitimate and effective governmental institutions. To date, donor contributions are essential for budget support, while aid continues to be indispensable to safeguard the livelihood of the most vulnerable. Private sector investments are increasing at a sustained pace, and considering their long term interests they could play a more crucial role in a more equitable development, not only investing in good practices, but reaching a common platform to prod and/or support government reforms towards improvements in labor legislation on working conditions, salaries and welfare provisions, in all economic sectors, not excluded the often marginalized agricultural sector.

Twenty years have passed since the signing of the CPA in Rome. Since then there have been no major disruptions of peace. The State has held on to its unity. Since 1994, multiparty national and administrative democratic elections have been held regularly. The government has promoted the most extensive privatization of State assets in Africa, while the economy has experienced high growth rates and on the whole has continued to enjoy the confidence of donors and of an increasing number of investors.

There is a wide-ranging and overt debate in academic research, in civil society, by donors and in the media concerning the consolidation of inclusive democratic stability and its functioning at the national and local levels. A debate that calls for an honest assessment by the government on how democracy has been consolidating, whether the asymmetry of the political system is narrowing or increasing, and on how rising inequalities in citizens' access to resources came to be and above all how they are politically recognized.

This is the most important lesson and contribution to the stabilization of peace and development. Internationally, and specifically after the 9/11 attacks, the priority of the political agenda has concentrated on security as a precondition of development. The Mozambican case sheds light on how the leadership and the population of a very underdeveloped country endorsed and was able to support democracy for more than 20 years. But as evident from many interlocked episodes of violent protest and local conflict it is high time to go to the root causes of social insecurity. When growth is not accompanied or followed by an adequate trickle down in the redistribution of resources, social conflict is inevitable.

Democracy in the Sub-Saharan Africa of the '90s was endorsed as a new "revolution of rising expectations". Similarly to the Arab spring, protests and revolts were against leaderships that had not been true to the hopes and the promises of independence, against governments who had made the most vulnerable sectors of their population, mainly young people, pay the harshest price for structural adjustment, economic

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[12] C. L. Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique. Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*, Prager, Westport, London, 2002; and C. L. Manning, "Learning the Right Lessons from Mozambique Transition to Peace", in *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, 1, 2009, pp.77-91.

austerity conditionality, slashing jobs, and made them even more precarious and badly paid, cutting back educational, health and welfare provisions.

In an economy that grows, but where the trickle-down effects are not felt by the majority, the reality and perception of inequality has already demonstrated its disruptive effects at the national and local body politics. An example is in post-apartheid South Africa where mineworkers protest is over jobs becoming ever more precarious, badly paid and with disgraceful working and living conditions given the absence even of minimal levels of welfare and public service provisions.

Inequality is more important than poverty in driving conflicts in the social body, a well-known and studied question in development literature, including recent WB reports. The unfair distribution of growth assets, not poverty *per se*, is the main cause of protest, revolts and in more destabilized regions the possibility that terrorist groups may take root and reproduce the cycle of martyrdom of the majority of helpless innocent civilians.

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Towards a Stronger Africa-EU Cooperation on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organizations and Civil Society

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Abstract

The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was intended to overcome an unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. However, in the first implementation phase it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized. In particular, the Partnership on Peace and Security has shown a tendency to institutionalize dialogue and crystallize practices of cooperation along the well-established Brussels-Addis Ababa axis, while efforts to engage with other crucial actors remain to some extent limited. This paper focuses on the sub-optimal involvement of two crucial stakeholders, namely African regional organizations and civil society actors. It presents the main findings and policy recommendations of a study concluded by IAI in September 2012, with the support of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the European Parliament.

Keywords: *European Union / African Union / Joint Africa-EU Strategy / African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) / Africa / Regional organizations / Civil society / Crisis management / Mediation / Early warning / Capacity building*

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Towards a Stronger Africa-EU Cooperation on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organizations and Civil Society

by Valérie Vicky Miranda, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Kai Schäfer*

Introduction: Africa-European Union relations five years after Lisbon

The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (referred to as JAES or Joint Strategy in this paper), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was intended to overcome an unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. The first Action Plan (2008-2010) identified eight priorities or Partnerships for cooperation, the first of which refers to peace and security,[1] and indicated the concrete initiatives required to operationalize the Joint Strategy. The new approach in Africa-European Union (EU) relations in the field of peace and security was based on a series of assumptions, including the convergence of strategic approaches and shared threat perceptions between the two partners, as well as the gradual development of effective African capabilities to address African crises.

During the first implementation phase it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized, and that more time would be needed to achieve them. On the one hand, African and European stances *vis-à-vis* security challenges in the African continent were often divergent, such as in the cases of the crises in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Libya. Europe is still seen as an external actor that tries to impose its own agenda on African counterparts, and is accused of applying double standards concerning military interventions and the application of international justice. On the other hand, African structures and instruments to prevent and manage crises have evolved at a slow pace, due to a number of factors including, among others, lack of political commitment by African countries, scarce absorption capacity of funds, dependency on external funding and poor transparency in internal management.

As a result, the Partnership on Peace and Security has been hampered by a number of ties that have jeopardized European efforts to promote stability in the African continent. The Tripoli Summit in November 2010 and the second Action Plan (2011-2013) have

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Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), October 2012. This paper presents the main findings and policy recommendations of a study concluded by IAI in September 2012, with the support of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the European Parliament. The study has been published as *Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: How to Engage African Regional Organizations and Civil Society* (IAI Research Papers No. 6).

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[1] The eight Partnerships identified in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy are: 1) Peace and Security; 2) Human Rights and Governance; 3) Trade and Regional Integration; 4) Millennium Developments Goals; 5) Energy; 6) Climate Change; 7) Migration, Mobility and Employment; 8) Science, Information Society and Space.

tried to address some of these problems, but the full implementation of the Joint Strategy is still a work in progress.

In particular, previous assessments of the operationalization of the Joint Strategy and the Partnership on Peace and Security have shown a tendency to institutionalize dialogue and crystallize practices of cooperation along the well-established Brussels-Addis Ababa axis, while efforts to engage with other crucial actors remain to some extent limited. In this contribution, we focus on the sub-optimal involvement of two crucial stakeholders, namely African regional organizations - Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)[2] - and civil society actors - including, among others, non-governmental organizations, academia and think tanks, community and religious organizations, women's groups, and political parties and foundations.

The first part of this paper addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the contribution of African regional organizations to the Joint Strategy. The most significant gaps in the involvement of REC/RMs lie in communication, coordination and harmonization with the African Union institutions, which have only been partially improved by the establishment of liaison mechanisms. Moreover, due to their different degrees of integration and overlapping memberships, African regional organizations themselves face a number of challenges which negatively impact on coordination in terms of mandates, visions and policy priorities. In general, both the existence of competing centres of power and the scarcity of resources are obstacles to an improved engagement of regional organizations in the Africa-EU Partnership, which need to be overcome through political and financial means.

The second part of this article is devoted to the current and potential role of civil society actors in the Africa-EU political dialogue on peace and security and implementation activities, with particular regard to their involvement in conflict analysis and early warning, capacity building and mediation. The JAES was conceived of as a people-centred strategy, at least on paper. However, despite formal commitments, civil society has not yet found adequate room to express itself and to have a real impact on the decision-making process. This situation is exacerbated by significant differences between the two sides, with African civil society organizations lagging behind their European counterparts in terms of human and economic resources and organizational and networking abilities. Therefore, it is crucial to reflect on how civil society could be enabled to provide real added value to the achievement of the Strategy's objectives.

Finally, the third part of this article identifies some selected policy recommendations to institutional and non-institutional stakeholders, with the aim of putting forward possible ways of engagement of regional organizations and civil society actors and of further improving the existing strategic framework of EU-Africa relations.

[2] The African Union officially recognizes eight Regional Economic Communities and two Regional Mechanisms with a mandate on peace and security. These are: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), as well as the East African Stand-by Force Command (EASF) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).

1. African regional organizations and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security

The changes in the nature of violent conflicts in Africa over the last decades require adaptation and increased capacity by conflict management actors to provide security and political stability to states and their citizens. The contribution of African regional organizations (REC/RMs) to conflict prevention, management and resolution is still an under-researched and mostly overlooked topic,[3] even though regional organizations "are playing an ever more important role in securing peace and security"[4] on the African continent. Often, REC/RMs are considered to have significant comparative advantages in this regard in terms of cultural understanding, geographical closeness and personal links. In addition, as the regional dimension of many violent conflicts has a direct impact on neighbouring countries, REC/RMs have a legitimate and vital interest in being at the forefront of peace and security initiatives.[5] The REC/RMs are one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), created in 2002, particularly in relation to certain of its components, as follows: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), and the African Stand-by Force (ASF). However, their involvement in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security remains to date sub-optimal and constrained, due to a number of factors.

In the interactions between the AU and the REC/RMs, the continental level is expected to take a leadership role in providing orientations on policy directions and the implementation of programmes. Although the existence of many RECs predates the constitution of the AU in 2002, such a hierarchical division is now generally accepted, albeit sometimes with reluctance. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governing the relationship between AU and REC/RMs was concluded in January 2008.[6] All REC/RMs have signed the MoU, with the North African Regional Capability (NARC) being the last to do so in September 2011. In the framework of this MoU, the AU and REC/RMs hold regular meetings, joint missions and consultations. Nevertheless, some questions concerning when to act, who goes first and who does what are still open, as demonstrated by the varying or even contradictory positions taken by AU and RECs in cases such as the recent crises in Madagascar and Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, it must be recalled that the AU recognizes ten REC/RMs with a mandate on peace and security,[7] while other regional groupings remain outside this framework.[8]

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[3] Fredrik Söderbaum and Rodrigo Tavares, "Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security", in Fredrik Söderbaum and Rodrigo Tavares, *Regional Organizations in African Security*, London and New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 4.

[4] Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), *Overstretched and Overrated? Prospects of Regional Security Policy in Africa and its European Support*. international conference, 9-10 February 2011, Berlin, FES, 2011, p. 3, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08405.pdf.

[5] Ibid., p. 7.

[6] Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, "The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Toward an Evolving Security Regime?", in Fredrik Söderbaum and Rodrigo Tavares, *Regional Organizations in African Security*, cit., p. 20.

[7] These are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-

In what follows we assess the interactions between the AU, the EU and REC/RMs within the Partnership, focusing on: 1) political dialogue; 2) the operationalization of APSA and its components; and 3) the issue of consistency of EU support.

1.1. Political dialogue

The involvement of the REC/RMs in the Partnership remains limited as far as political dialogue is concerned. The JAES's leitmotiv of "treating Africa as one" is difficult to translate into the area of peace and security, as it is heavily influenced by different regional interpretations, despite the continental approach promoted by the Joint Strategy and the central role of the AU. The political dialogue established by the European Union with the REC/RMs in the context of the Cotonou negotiations has not been sufficient to trigger a more comprehensive approach, as it does not provide for a direct link to peace and security. In this respect, the JAES offers a good framework, but its political dialogue needs to be reactivated and improved.

Since the last summit in Tripoli in November 2010, the overall level of dialogue in the framework of the Joint Strategy seems to have decreased, given the lower number and level of interactions during this period, in part as a result of the crisis in North Africa. In the traditional EU narrative of the Partnership on Peace and Security, political dialogue is where progress is made with the AU, but not necessarily with the REC/RMs (some would even go so far as to state that with regard to political processes, the REC/RMs are absent from the Partnership, which seems dominated by Addis Ababa and Brussels-based diplomats). At this stage, experience of the Partnership has demonstrated the limits of the continental dimension of cooperation, and brought about the realization that the REC/RMs have a political role in peace and security.

One issue of concern is for instance a clash of interests between the AU and REC/RMs over questions of seniority between organizations. The REC/RMs have difficulties in entering into a political dialogue, as the relevant questions for their own agendas might be different from the agenda of the AU, as demonstrated by the example of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. While in both cases the issue at stake is piracy, this phenomenon has different causes and requires different responses in the two regions concerned, which underlines the fact that there cannot be a continental blueprint to deal with this issue.

Hence, on this policy issue the AU might be best served by developing a regional policy jointly with the relevant region. Ideally, "[t]he relationship between the AU and the RECs is supposed to be hierarchical but mutually reinforcing: the AU harmonizes and coordinates the activities of the RECs in the peace and security realm".[9] One of the biggest coordination challenges is to determine what takes priority, especially when national interests trump regional interests, thus raising questions about political will. In

SAD), the East African Stand-by Force Command (EASFCOM), the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

[8] Such as the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

[9] Paul Williams, *The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 6 (IIGG Working Paper), http://www.cfr.org/african-union/african-unions-conflict-management-capabilities/p26044.

addition, at both regional and continental levels the same themes are developed, in relation to such issues as security sector reform. In theory, regional and continental strategies should enhance each other, but this is not always the case. For the Partnership to function correctly, instruments for dialogue need to be adapted.

In AU-EU high-level gatherings, such as the Commission-to-Commission (C2C) meetings and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) - Political and Security Committee (COPS) meetings, there is a political void, since they take place once or twice a year without the presence of the REC/RMs. At present, the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) of the African Peace Facility (APF), which is the principal financial instrument of the Partnership, is the only forum where all parties - including the REC/RMs - are involved, but it takes place at the lowest political level. The Akosombo process, that has brought together high-level officials of the AU, EU and REC/RMs in a series of consultative meetings twice a year since November 2010, could be a way to fill this gap.

In addition, all liaison offices of regional organizations to the AU in Addis Ababa are now in place,[10] with the exception of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which is currently on minimal operational capacity. The REC/RMs liaison offices are one of the success stories of the Partnership, but their role depends largely on the efficiency of the relevant officer. Overall, they ensure closer links between the AU and RECs, and contribute to the coordination of activities. The last AU-REC/RMs Memorandum of Understanding meeting also agreed on an extended mandate for the liaison offices besides their original focus on peace and security. However, as those liaison offices are completely funded by the EU through the APF, the question of their sustainability must be raised. The establishment of AU liaison offices to the RECs is also under preparation, and staff positions have been advertised.

1.2. The operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The APSA aims to give the AU and REC/RMs "the necessary instruments to fulfil the tasks of prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa", as set out in the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol.[11] The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is conceived in such a way that, with regard to most of its components, the REC/RMs can be seen as the pillars of the architecture. The challenges in involving the REC/RMs are manifold. Some parts of APSA are functional, but the APSA components are progressing slowly. In this context, the elaboration of an AU-REC/RMs APSA Roadmap, as a result of the triangular consultations with the EU carried out during the Akosombo process, has been an important development. Adopted by the AU and REC/RMs in January 2012, the APSA Roadmap is to guide all

[10] African Union, *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the AU, the RECs, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa*, Algiers, 28 January 2008, http://www.paxafrica.org/areas-of-work/peace-and-security-architecture/peace-and-security-architecture-documents/mou-in-the-area-of-peace-and-security-between-the-au-and-the-recs.

[11] European Commission, *African Peace Facility (APF) The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Support Programme*, Brussels, European Commission Directorate-General Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO), 2012, p. 1, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2011/af_aap-sup_2011_hti.pdf.

future support by partners, but it still lacks prioritization and benchmarks. It actually overburdens the partners with a wide range of subjects, with the AU and the REC/RMs having difficulties in responding to all the demands coming from international donors. A rationalization of the APSA Roadmap in terms of thematic priorities is therefore absolutely necessary, especially if the AU and REC/RMs are expected to align their strategic plans to it. In our contribution, we focus on the following areas: 1) early warning; 2) peace and security governance; 3) mediation; and 4) crisis management.

Early warning

RECs form an integral part of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The PSC Protocol states that CEWS shall consist of the "observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room [in Addis Ababa], and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room".[12] Several RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, SADC, COMESA) have already established their early warning systems to varying degrees.[13] While in particular ECOWAS and IGAD are quite advanced, ECCAS is lagging behind. Efforts are underway to harmonize methodologies and to coordinate the different elements of the early warning system, despite the varying mandates and legal constraints of the RECs, and their different perceptions of conflict prevention. For example, a CEWS portal for information exchange between RECs and the AU has been set up. However the CEWS indicators are set by Member States, and include red lines not to be crossed in terms of early warning signals. Understandably, no country wants to be on the watch list. Therefore, each REC is developing its early warning system with varying methodologies, and interconnectivity is yet to be realized, operationally but also technically.[14] Finally, challenges remain regarding the analysis of data and how to transmit them to decision-makers on the regional and continental levels so that early warning can become early action.

Peace and security governance

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is at the heart of peace and security governance in Africa. Within the PSC, regional groupings play an important role when it comes to the coordination of issue stances within a region, or when regional clusters take the lead in formulating policies on specific issues.[15] At PSC meetings on a specific country or region, the REC and the Member State representing the chair of that REC are invited. If a specific conflict is addressed in the PSC, the chair ambassador of the REC concerned briefs the group, while the REC liaison office can attend as an observer. With regard to the relations between the PSC and its regional counterparts, implementation of the provisions in the PSC protocol is lagging behind. For the time being, ECOWAS and SADC are the only RECs with similar PSC bodies at the regional level. Questions that need to be resolved in this regard are how to engage the other RECs in a political process specific to each region, and what format this engagement

[12] African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, Durban, 9 July 2002, Art. 12, 2b, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf.

[13] See for instance IGAD http://www.cewarn.org, and ECOWAS http://www.ecowarn.org.

[14] Paul Williams, *The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities*, cit., p. 9.

[15] Ibid., p. 7.

should take, for example in the form of bilateral or joint continent-wide meetings. There is also a need for greater coherence in approaches between the different bodies in the AU and the RECs, as demonstrated by the case of Niger, where ECOWAS made a strong pronouncement following the *coup d'état* in February 2010, while the PSC's reaction was more timid.

Mediation

Mediation issues in the framework of APSA are mainly referred to the Panel of the Wise (PoW). For quite some time, the only regional body similar to the PoW existed within ECOWAS. This was the ECOWAS Council of the Wise, created in 1999. SADC and COMESA established similar bodies in 2011. For the time being, cooperation between these various panels occurs on an ad hoc basis. However, RECs systematically participate in PoW meetings, where experience and lessons are shared. RECs also participate in PoW missions, as was the case of the good offices deployment of the PoW to Tunisia and Egypt prior to the elections in these countries in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Most recently, at the beginning of June 2012, a retreat took place in Burkina Faso, regrouping the PoW and its regional counterparts, where election-related violence and mediation prospects were discussed. In general terms, the issue around mediation is one of sequencing and the allocation of responsibility between RECs and the AU. This question has been raised as a result of the difficulties encountered by RECs in dealing with the protracted political crises in Madagascar (2009 - 2012) and Côte d'Ivoire (up to the end of 2011), when SADC and ECOWAS activities were taken over by the AU.

Crisis Management

The African Stand-by Force (ASF) has not yet reached full operating capability, and will most likely not do so before 2015. Similarly to other APSA components, the readiness of the five stand-by brigades that should compose the ASF varies greatly. Probably the most advanced is the Eastern African Stand-by Force (EASF), which sent its first deployment of eight staff officers to the AU peace support operation in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011. As for the other regions, "the regional brigades for West Africa and Southern Africa are works in progress. In contrast, the ECCAS Brigade exists only in a rudimentary way and NARC is embryonic at best".[16] The recent conflict in Mali illustrates that there is the political will to deploy ECOWAS forces,[17] but the initiative lacks everything from soldiers to equipment. Furthermore, ECCAS is leading a regional peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. Hence, the ASF is slowly advancing to an African rhythm, and an assessment of the regions will take place this year, starting with SADC.

1.3. Consistency of EU support

For the EU, the AU has been the foremost interlocutor with regard to peace and security issues on the African continent over the last decade, and the EU is the biggest

[16] Ibid., p. 20.

[17] "Ecowas schickt Truppen nach Mali", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 April 2012, p. 7.

donor to AU peace and security activities (EUR 1 billion for the period 2008-2013).[18] However, the EU has also invested heavily in a wide range of REC/RMs.

The main challenge in the relationship between the EU and RECs is often expressed in terms of absorption capacity, that is an organization's ability to use all the funds provided by a donor in a given period for the implementation of its programmes, but the question could also be asked if the entry points identified by the EU are the right ones. There are many types of funding instruments, which are confusing and cumbersome for staff of REC/RMs, which in turn makes access to the funds more difficult. Harmonizing and standardizing various national and European programmes is a central issue of coordination, which the EU so far has not sufficiently addressed.

Through the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), managed by the EU Delegations, the EU has invested considerably in a wide range of REC/RMs (for instance, the ECOWAS RIP allocates EUR 120 million for political integration, including peace and security activities). In most cases, the RIPs are prepared in silos and therefore the question of how they interlink and are linked up to the continental level is rarely addressed. In this regard, some of our interlocutors pointed out that the REC/RMs do not necessarily understand the EU system and how the EU programming cycle works, as there appears to be a lack of a consistent picture across the EU between Headquarters, the Delegation to the AU and the regional Delegations. This is further complicated by the fact that EU Headquarters has to clear all programmes with Member States, the latter also often having their own programmes in the African regions.

The interaction between the EU and REC/RMs is improving thanks to the African Peace Facility (APF), which is the main financial instrument for the APSA, and its ongoing programmes that are channelled through the AU. There are regular exchanges and missions as well as consultations in the framework of the AU-REC/RMs MoU. Increasingly, requests for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) (an innovative tool within the APF that funds the first stages of African-led mediation initiatives) are prepared jointly by the AUC and a REC/RM, which includes a division of labour between the continental and regional levels of the mediation initiatives in question. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is trying to bring some coherence by working hand-in-hand with the European Commission, especially on how the APF is used, and by providing a political reading of the various financial instruments to better shape EU support. Still, competencies on the EU side are in the process of being established and defined more clearly.

2. The role of civil society

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy was meant to be a people-centred partnership,[19] and pledged to create the conditions for civil society to play a more active role in formal and

[18] Philippe Darmuzey, "Interview with H.E. Mahamat Saleh Annadif", in *Europafrica Bulletin*, No. 33 (22 April 2010), p. 2, http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/annadif-europafrica-interview-english1.pdf.

informal dialogue between the two continents, as well as in its implementation process. Five years after its adoption, however, it seems that despite good intentions it has not lived up to expectations. It is common opinion that in terms of objectives achieved the Partnership on Peace and Security is the most successful of the eight priority areas identified in the JAES. But to what extent is civil society actually involved in the implementation of the Partnership? What added value could civil society organizations (CSOs) bring to peace and security activities in relations between the EU and Africa? How could the JAES take advantage of them?

As far as peace and security issues are concerned, civil society can provide a significant contribution in at least four broad areas, namely dialogue, early warning, capacity building and mediation, which ultimately support the achievement of two priority objectives of the Partnership on Peace and Security, i.e. political dialogue and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The contribution of CSOs to the Africa-EU dialogue on issues related to peace and security is organized through both formal and informal channels. According to the Livingston formula, adopted by the PSC in December 2008, the PSC may call upon CSOs to organize and undertake activities in the areas of conflict prevention (early warning, reporting and situation analysis), peacemaking and mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian support and post conflict reconstruction, provision of technical support, training, monitoring and impact assessment of peace agreements, etc.[20] The results of such activities are supposed to feed information into the decision-making process of the PSC. Unfortunately, there is still a gap between commitments on paper and reality, and the proposed initiatives are yet to be implemented on a regular basis. On the EU side, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been working as a channel of dialogue between EU bodies dealing with security issues and civil society. In a way similar to that foreseen by the AU Livingstone Formula, the EU Political and Security Committee (COPS) invites to its meetings experts from CSOs in order to have opinions from the ground on specific countries and regions on an ad hoc basis.

As regards the operationalization of the APSA, civil society from both Europe and Africa has direct engagement with many of its components. By taking advantage of its well-established presence on the ground and expertise in analysing and assessing the root causes and drivers of conflict, for instance, CSOs support early warning activities and directly feed into one of the pillars of the APSA, namely the continental and regional early warning systems. For instance, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) signed an agreement with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2002 for the implementation of a regional early warning and response system (ECOWARN) as an observation and monitoring tool for conflict

[19] Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership - A Joint Africa-EU Strategy* (16344/07 Presse 291), Lisbon, 9 December 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf.

[20] African Union, *Conclusions on mechanisms for the interaction between the Peace and Security Council and Civil Society Organizations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa* (PSC/PR/(CLX), 4-5 December 2008, http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/retreat-of-the-peace-and-security-council-of-the-au.pdf.

prevention and decision-making.[21] On the EU side, CSOs' potential contribution to early warning activities is similar to that on the African side. Information and analysis collected through civil society actors can for instance feed into EU open-source intelligence platforms, such as Tariqa 3.[22] Civil society also provides the African Stand-by Force, the Panel of the Wise and other AU organs with capacity building and training on specific security issues[23] or on mediation techniques.[24] In addition to national governments and regional organizations, civil society can also have an important role in conflict resolution,[25] as is the case for instance of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique, or a number of women's associations in the Mano River Basin.[26] The engagement of civil society actors at both the Track I and Track II[27] levels has proved crucial in providing a voice to marginalized groups, such as women, in official peace processes. At the same time, civil society actors can also prove key in local conflicts, as in the case of the District Peace Committees (DPCs) in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence.

However, despite some positive examples and formal commitments, the Partnership on Peace and Security is still monopolized by institutional stakeholders, with civil society playing a marginal role. Opinions collected throughout the study revealed that most of the remarks made on the first Action Plan still apply today, as no major shift has occurred in the second Action Plan. The strategic framework of the JAES is perceived as too bureaucratic, and both African and European CSOs feel they are hardly having an impact on the institutions' agenda through a bottom-up and structured approach. A common remark from CSOs is that, although they acknowledge being consulted (especially on the European side), they feel this happens only to allow officials to tick the CSOs box. They maintain that consultations take place only on ad hoc basis, and their opinions are not really taken into account in shaping policy. In this regard, however, it is fair to underline the different perceptions existing between CSOs and

[21] Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), *Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, Lomè, 10 December 1999, http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf.

[22] Originally developed by the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations, Tariqa is now managed by the EEAS. Tariqa is an open source intelligence platform supported by a multimedia content database with the ultimate aim of providing real-time support for early warning and response. See for further information http://joinup.ec.europa.eu/software/tariqa/description.

[23] On the African side, it is worth mentioning the African Peace and Support Program launched in 2010 by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University and the African Union Commission, and the activities implemented by the African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA) since 2002. On the EU side, there is Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) funded by the European Commission for the period 2011-2013.

[24] Such as in the case of the African Union Mediation Support Capacity project, jointly implemented by the AU's Conflict Management Division (CMD), Accord, and a European NGO, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

[25] Interview with senior expert, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and with FES, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2012.

[26] For a complete overview of the several CSOs involved, see Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, *Civil society perspectives from the Mano River Union*, New York, International Peace Academy (IPA), 14 June 2002 (Civil Society Dialogue Report), http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/meeting-notes/detail/175-civil-society-perspectives-from-the-mano-river-union-.html.

[27] Track I diplomacy refers to official initiatives led by institutional and governmental actors. Contrariwise, Track II diplomacy is conducted by non-governmental actors (including for instance academics, NGOs and public figures), with the aim of confidence-building and providing support to conflict resolution.

institutional stakeholders. EU institutional actors indeed observe that CSOs tend to intervene and to actively participate in dialogue only when specific issues, especially funding, are at stake.

The main causes of the limited achievements in CSOs' participation in the JAES and in its Peace and Security Partnership can be divided into three categories: i) CSOs' capacity; ii) mechanisms of participation; and iii) funding.

2.1. CSOs' capacity

Effective dialogue and joint initiatives are first hampered by the uneven engagement of civil society in the JAES, with African actors still lagging behind. Though the degree of involvement of European CSOs varies somewhat, they can rely on long-established structures and dialogue with EU institutions. This is not the case on the African side, where local human resources and expertise (and funds) are sometimes lacking or, where present, are not sufficient to ensure regular dialogue with institutional actors and active participation in the JAES structured framework. The result is that direct engagement is often limited to "multinational" NGOs to the detriment of local ones. What is more, the high personnel turnover makes it difficult to keep the momentum going, to maintain the flow of knowledge or the expertise already acquired, and to ensure continuity and consistency in joint activities, including those on peace and security, as well as engagement with institutional stakeholders. Additionally, according to some of its representatives, African civil society's access to and direct involvement in the JAES are limited by the role played by the African Union's Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOCC) which acts, in a nutshell, as the only channel through which African CSOs can be involved in the Strategy. Whereas in principle the establishment of a body overseeing and working for civil society's engagement towards the AU institutions and the JAES is positive, many African CSOs and their European counterparts complain about the excessive bureaucratization and slow procedures, as well as a lack of transparency in the selection of local organizations represented within ECOSOCC, with the result that the smaller and more independent organizations are often underrepresented. Again, different perceptions exist. ECOSOCC indeed maintains that difficulties in engaging civil society derive mainly from poor cooperation among local CSOs, which hampers direct dialogue with them. Besides, with regards to joint Africa-EU initiatives, it is the different formal setup, namely the limited institutionalization of European CSOs, that prevents the two partners from "speaking the same language" and from fully understanding and recognizing each other.

2.2. Mechanisms of participation

In principle, the two main channels allowing CSOs to actively participate in the Strategy and make their voices heard are the Implementation Teams (ITs) in Brussels and the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) in Europe and Africa. For each Partnership, the former bring together representatives from the European Commission, the EEAS and Member States, as well as the civil society's contact point, and monitor, as their name suggests, the implementation of the Joint Strategy. JEGs are informal and open-ended groups composed of African, European and international actors, CSOs included, with an expertise on the issues they address and a willingness to work on the priority action concerned. Both have proved somewhat ineffective. For instance, EU IT meetings tend

to work more as a vague information sharing platform without setting common objectives for action. On their side, JEGs, despite their name, in most cases do not bring together real experts, being composed of political officers from national embassies in Brussels and Addis Ababa who may not necessarily have an expertise in the specific partnership area to which they are called to contribute. Such problems apply to representatives from both sides, but are particularly true of the African side due either to limited local expertise or to difficulties in swiftly identifying existing expertise. Moreover, civil society representatives are not regularly invited to JEGs or to other meetings, such as those of the AU-EU Joint Task Force (made up of representatives from the African Union Commission, the European Commission and the EEAS and meeting twice a year). Delays in informing CSOs and in involving them are quite frequent. In the specific case of the Partnership on Peace and Security, CSOs maintain that dialogue with institutional stakeholders has also been slowed due to internal reorganization on the European side after the establishment of the EEAS.

2.3. Funding

As of 2009, after the endorsement of the First Action Plan, CSOs have been asking institutional stakeholders to ensure better organization of meetings and that adequate resources be allocated to allow their participation in the Strategy. The issue at stake, however, does not only concern the availability of funds, but also the capacity of CSOs, especially African CSOs, to access them. This is particularly true for the smaller organizations that are not familiar with EU mechanisms and do not have the adequate human resources to deal with "civil society unfriendly" procedures.

3. How to better engage African regional organizations and civil society?

The analysis above has shown the need for a more effective involvement of African regional organizations and civil society actors in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. This increased engagement can result from the implementation of targeted actions in crucial sectors such as **dialogue, coordination and outreach, capacity building and funding**.

Promoting dialogue between the continental institutions and African regional organizations during the strategic elaboration and programming phase of peace and security actions would significantly facilitate their operationalization. For example, joint assessment missions conducted by the AU and the EU in post-conflict countries should include the participation of concerned REC/RMs on a regular basis, as they are closer to the particular conflict and could offer a better understanding of the relevant dynamics. At the same time, the promotion of a systematic dialogue between AU and EU institutions on one side, and civil society on the other, could trigger the latter's contribution to the design and implementation of official policies. Such opportunities already exist outside the Partnership's framework - i.e. the Peacebuilding Partnership on the European side. It would therefore be useful, for the sake of consistency between EU policies, to establish formal links and synergies between on-going initiatives so that they benefit from each other. In this perspective, both the REC/RMs and civil society have precise duties in terms of proactive engagement in the Partnership, such as

inquiring about progress made and informing the institutions of the activities they carry out in relation to the implementation of the Action Plans.

A solid political dialogue requires **closer links between institutional representatives and stakeholders in REC/RMs and civil society**, which remain high-level and selective in nature. Cooperation at expert level should be encouraged, and there should be more context- or theme- specific interactions. This would help avoid the "talk shop effect" that is common in political meetings, and would improve the outcome of existing gatherings, such as the Joint Expert Groups in Europe and Africa, the Implementation Teams in Brussels or the African Union Partners Group in Addis Ababa. As an alternative, a Peace and Security Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) could be created to replace all existing technical meetings and act as an inclusive forum for participation. In addition, different gathering formats "à géométrie variable" could be promoted, such as seminars with politicians, experts and civil society representatives in the context of meetings between the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the Political and Security Committee of the EU; regional meetings between the AU, the EU and REC/RMs or meetings with a geographical or thematic focus involving all interested actors, including the relevant REC/RMs and local civil society organizations.

Beyond political dialogue and institutional coordination, it is crucial to **reinforce the outreach capacity** of the Partnership, ensuring adequate information about the results achieved and publicizing the opportunities offered in its framework. The JAES cannot be confined to Brussels and Addis Ababa, but needs to be owned by all the key interlocutors, including REC/RMs, AU and EU Member States, and African and European civil society actors. In short, the Partnership needs a communication plan. In addition, internal EU communication between the Delegations, the EEAS and the European Commission needs to be improved.

Another major issue hindering the active participation of African regional organizations and civil society is the uneven and sometimes limited capacity of REC/RMs and CSOs, or their difficulties in accessing formal and structured mechanisms of cooperation with continental institutions. On the one hand, **coordinated efforts between international actors** to enhance African capacities are strongly recommended. A key partner for the EU could be the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), especially its Governance and Public Administration Division, which is extremely active in this field, and benefits from a well-established presence on the ground. At the same time, the EU should take into greater account the alternative solutions coming from the African side, with a crucial role to be played by regional organizations.

The effectiveness of **capacity building efforts** can be guaranteed only if a realistic timeframe is established and the actions to be implemented are targeted to specific priorities. For instance, the three-year political commitment foreseen for capacity building programmes within the Action Plans is not sufficient and should be expanded. When cooperating with REC/RMs, the EU should direct capacity building to some selected areas in a differentiated manner, instead of covering the full list of the Partnership with each of them. Moreover, this engagement should be deepened beyond the peacekeeping and financial aspects.

As far as civil society is concerned, the main challenge is to make capacity building programmes sustainable in the long run. It is worth recalling that stronger participation of CSOs entails better and more structured organization in most cases. Networks could prove useful to this end, with the bigger and longer-established organizations being the driving force behind the others. The **networking process among CSOs** is still at an early stage in Africa, but some relevant examples already exist - in West Africa for instance - with a focus on early warning and mediation issues. Networks are also a valuable means of accessing REC/RMs in an easier, but formal, way. The WANEP or the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) and their structured cooperation with ECOWAS are cases in point.

The ineffectiveness of instruments and mechanisms within the JAES is often attributed to a lack of funds. This may indeed be an important obstacle, but it is also crucial to see beyond the **financial issue** and to avoid using it as an excuse for an absence of political will. Work is therefore needed in both directions.

The African Peace Facility, as the main financing instrument of the Partnership on Peace and Security, and the political integration components of the Regional Indicative Programmes ensure the significant availability of funding for strengthening REC/RMs' involvement in the Partnership. While well-known challenges persist in terms of human resources and management expertise on the African side, and in terms of internal coordination and the slow pace of the disbursement of funds on the European side, it is unlikely that procedures will become any easier, more flexible, faster or better. The EU, therefore, should **promote stronger synergies among the different financial resources** and **rationalize the JAES with clearer objectives** in terms of its financial engagement with both the AU and the REC/RMs. These actions, in turn would help the African side to prioritize its objectives. This kind of reflection on the prudent application of limited resources should take place in both the EEAS and DG DEVCO at the European Commission.

Local CSOs need to be supported in order to acquire expertise on how to obtain access to funding, which is perceived as one of the main obstacles to their effective participation in the JAES. The recently-created Support Mechanism could be used to **enhance CSOs' capacity to contribute to the Strategy**. At first sight and in accordance with what has already been committed to on paper, the Support Mechanism could facilitate the organization of joint meetings and initiatives, as well as the provision of real technical expertise in JEGs or other venues, making up for the lack of funds that has been identified as one of the main causes of the failure of the people-centred approach and the successful implementation of civil society's entry points into the JAES.

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