TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM
European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship
Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
The Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Centers (JHU BC)
Rome, 8/XI/2010

a. Program
b. List of participants
c. Participants' bios
1. NATO's role in European security – and beyond / James Goldgeier (8 p.)
2. Nuclear arms and missile defense in transatlantic security / Oliver Thränert (9 p.)
3. Russia in the European security architecture: contributor or contender? / Arkady Moshes (12 p.)
4. Much ado about nothing: EU defence policy after the Lisbon treaty / Anand Menon (10 p.)

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

8 NOVEMBER 2010

With the support of

Compagnia di San Paolo, Turin
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Rome Office
Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in Köln, Germany
Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels

Venue

Palazzo Rondinini
Via del Corso, 518
Rome

PROGRAM

MONDAY, November 8

9:00-9:15 Welcome address and seminar introduction

Welcome address: **Stefano Silvestri**, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Kenneth H. Keller, Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Introduction: **Riccardo Alcaro**, Researcher, Transatlantic Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

9:15-9:45 **Opening speeches**

Sandro De Bernardin, Deputy Secretary General and Political Director, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of Defence Staff, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome

9:45-11:15 **FIRST SESSION**
European security in NATO's new strategy

Chair: **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo**, Senior Strategic Advisor, Enel Holding, Rome; former Deputy Secretary General, NATO

Paper-giver: **Jim Goldgeier**, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, and Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC

Discussants: **Ulrike Guérot**, Senior Policy Fellow, Head of Berlin Office, European Council on Foreign Relations
Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Giancarlo Aragona, Ambassador, former member of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO

OPEN DEBATE

11:15-11:30 COFFEE BREAK

11:30-13:00 **SECOND SESSION**
Nuclear arms and missile defence in transatlantic security

Chair: **Ettore Greco**, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Paper-giver: **Oliver Thränert**, Senior Fellow, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Missile Defense, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Discussants: **David Yost**, Professor of International Relations, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA
Steve Pifer, Director of Arms Control Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Pieter Van Ham, Head, Global Governance Research, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", The Hague

OPEN DEBATE

13:00-14:15 LUNCH

14.15-15:45 **THIRD SESSION**

Russia in the European security architecture

Chair: **Nathalie Tocci**, Head of the EU and the Neighbourhood Department, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Paper-giver: **Arkady Moshes**, Program Director on Russia in the Regional and Global Context, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki

Discussants: **Arthur Rachwald**, Professor of Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis (MA) and Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, London
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow, Program Director (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

OPEN DEBATE

15:45-16:00 COFFEE BREAK

16:00-17:30 **FOURTH SESSION**

The EU's security and defence policy after Lisbon

Chair: **Antonio Missiroli**, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, European Commission, Brussels, and Adjunct Professor of European Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Paper-giver: **Anand Menon**, Professor of West European Politics, University of Birmingham

Discussants: **Sven Biscop**, Director of Europe in the World Program, Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels
Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Washington, D.C.
Yves Boyer, Professor, Ecole polytechnique; Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

OPEN DEBATE

Final remarks **Erik Jones**, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Special thanks to ***Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena***
for kindly making the conference room available

(b)

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

ROME, 8 NOVEMBER 2010

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Riccardo ALCARO	Researcher, Transatlantic Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Emiliano ALESSANDRI	Transatlantic-Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC
Dana ALLIN	Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Oksana ANTONENKO	Senior Fellow and Program Director on Russia and Eurasia, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Giancarlo ARAGONA	Ambassador, former member of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO
Gulnur AYBET	Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK
Leonardo BARONCELLI	Councillor, Coordinator in the framework of the transatlantic Dialogue, Directorate General for the Americas, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Sarah BIGNAMI	Public Affairs and Communication Department, International Affairs Unit, ENI, Rome, Italy
Sven BISCOP	Director of Europe in the World Programme, Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels
Yves BOYER	Professor, Ecole polytechnique; Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
Erik BRATTBERG	Research Assistant, Europe Research Program, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm
Michael BRAUN	Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Rome Office
Vincenzo CAMPORINI	Chief of Defence Staff, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome

Michele COMELLI	Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Heather CONLEY	Senior Fellow and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC
Sandro DE BERNARDIN	Deputy Secretary General and Political Director, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Silvia FRANCESCON	Head of the Rome Office, European Council on Foreign Relations, Rome
Jim GOLDGEIER	Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, and Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC
Giampiero GRAMAGLIA	Communication Advisor, Istituto Affari Internazionali; *Il Fatto Quotidiano* Italian daily Newspaper, Rome
Ettore GRECO	Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Ulrike GUÉROT	Senior Policy Fellow, Head of Berlin Office - European Council on Foreign Relations
John L. HARPER	Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Anna JARDFELT	Director, Swedish Institute for International Affaire, Stockholm
Erik JONES	Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Kenneth H. KELLER	Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Justin LOGAN	Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC
Massimo MAROTTI	Head of NATO Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Alessandro MARRONE	Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Lucio MARTINO	Research Director on Transatlantic Relations, Italian Military Center for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS), Rome
Raffaello MATARAZZO	Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Anand MENON	Professor of West European Politics, University of Birmingham
Cesare MERLINI	Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Kharim MEZRAN	Director, Center for American Studies, Rome
Alessandro MINUTO RIZZO	Senior Strategic Advisor, Enel Holding, Rome; former Deputy Secretary General, NATO

Antonio MISSIROLI	Bureau of European Policy Advisers, European Commission, Brussels, and Adjunct Professor of European Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Andrew MONAGHAM	Research Advisor, NATO Defence College, Rome
Arkady MOSHES	Program Director, Russia in the Regional and Global Context, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki
Carlo MUSSO	Head, Research Department, Finmeccanica, Rome
Francesca NENCI	Political Analyst, Unicredit, Milan
Leopoldo NUTI	Professor of History of International Relations, University of Rome III
Soli OZEL	Lecturer, International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul
Steve PIFER	Director, Arms Control Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC
Nicoletta PIROZZI	Senior Fellow, European Affairs Area, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Arthur RACHWALD	Professor of Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis (MA) and Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Wolfgang RICHTER	Research Division International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
Nicolò RUSSO PEREZ	Program Officer, Compagnia di San Paolo, Turin
Maria Assunta SANGERMANO	Country Analysis Coordinator, Political and Institutional Scenarios and Analysis, Public Affairs and Communication Department, ENI, Rome
Tornike SHARASHENIDZE	Head, International Affairs Program, Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, Tbilisi
Stefano SILVESTRI	President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Brooke A. SMITH-WINDSOR	Senior Canadian Representative, NATO Defense College, Rome
Oliver THRÄNERT	Senior Fellow, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Missile Defense, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
Nathalie TOCCI	Head of the EU and the Neighbourhood Department, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Justin VAÏSSE	Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Pieter VAN HAM	Head, Global Governance Research, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", The Hague
Kurt VOLKER	Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Washington, D.C.

Andrew WILSON	Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, London
Amy F. WOOLF	Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC
David YOST	Professor of International Relations, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

8 November 2010

Rome, Italy

Participants' bios

RICCARDO ALCARO

Researcher, Transatlantic Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Within the Transatlantic Programme of the Rome-based Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Riccardo Alcaro is responsible for the organization of the Symposium on Transatlantic Security, an annual forum on the security priorities of the transatlantic partners. In addition he drafts and supervises a series of reports and briefs on issues of transatlantic and European interest with which IAI provides both Chambers of the Italian Parliament. He is a research fellow within the EU-wide programme "European Foreign and Security Policy Studies" (EFSPS), in the framework of which he has conducted a research on "Exploring the potential and limits of the CFSP: the EU action on Iran's nuclear issue". He is responsible for the drafting of the section on EU's external relations of the European policy analyst, the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly on the European Union.

EMILIANO ALESSANDRI

Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, USA

Presently, Emiliano Alessandri is developping GMF's work on Mediterranean, Turkish, and wider-Atlantic security issues. Prior to joining GMF, Dr. Alessandri was a visiting fellow at the Center on the US and Europe (CUSE) of Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. where he conducted research on European security issues and Turkey. From 2008-2009 Dr. Alessandri worked in the Directorate General for Enlargement of the European Commission. Alessandri has participated in several research projects regarding Turkey and Turkey-EU relations, including "Talking Turkey", a joint multi-year project between IAI of Rome, TEPAV of Ankara, and Istituto Paralleli of Turin to offer recommendations for a European communication strategy for Turkey. In 2009, Alessandri was a visiting fellow at The Center for European Studies of the Middle East Technical University (CES-METU) in Ankara, where he conducted research on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and its impact on European perceptions of Turkey.

DANA H. ALLIN

Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United Kingdom

Dana H. Allin is Editor of Survival at The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. He is also Adjunct Professor in European Studies at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He has a Ph.D. and M.A. in international relations from SAIS, and a B.A in English from Yale University (US). Dr. Allin's most recent book is The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America and the Rumors of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) co-authored with Steve Simon. He is also the author of Cold War Illusions:

America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989 and numerous book chapters and articles in Survival, International Affairs, World Policy Journal, The International Herald Tribune, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

OKSANA ANTONENKO

Senior Fellow and Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United Kingdom

Oksana Antonenko joined the IISS in 1996 as Research Associate. From 1998-2000, Ms Antonenko was the Director of the IISS research and seminar programme on military reform in Russia and the CIS, focusing among other issues on the foreign assistance to Russia for re-training and resettlement of redundant officers. In 1999-2003 Ms. Antonenko headed a research and seminar programme on Russia's regional perspective on foreign and security policy focusing on Russia's relations with Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia. In 2004-2005 Ms. Antonenko worked on a research project on Russian-EU relations and co-edited the book Russia and the European Union: Prospects for a New Relationship. In 2005-2006 Ms. Antonenko facilitated track two meetings between Georgian and South Ossetian senior officials and experts with the aim of promoting conflict resolution in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. In 2006-2007 Ms. Antonenko directed research project on Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and Security Challenges in Central Asia. At present Ms. Antonenko oversees research projects on NATO-Russia relations, regional strategy for Afghanistan and Georgian-Russian Dialogue on the post-August war regional security challenges.
Ms. Antonenko holds degrees from Moscow State University and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government .

GIANCARLO ARAGONA

Ambassador, former member of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO

1964 - International Law Degree, University of Messina; 1969 - Enters Italian Diplomatic Service Protocol Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 1972 - Second Secretary, Vienna; 1974 - Consul, Freiburg; 1977 - First Secretary, Lagos; 1981- Counsellor, Political Directorate, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 1984 - First Counsellor, London; 1987 - First Counsellor, later Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Permanent Representative, Italian Delegation to NATO, Brussels; 1991 - Diplomatic Adviser to Secretary of State for Defence; 1994 - Chief of Cabinet to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 1996 - Secretary General, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Vienna; 1999 - Ambassador, Moscow; 2001 - Political Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 2004-2009 - Ambassador to London

GULNUR AYBET

Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, United Kingdom

Gülnur Aybet is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent, England. Between 2009-2010 she was a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, working on a book on Turkey's transatlantic relations. She is the co-author with Rebecca Moore, of NATO in Search of a Vision (Georgetown University Press, 2010). She is also the author of A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy (Macmillan 2000) and The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991 (Palgrave 2001). Between 2007-2009 she was principal investigator of a British Academy funded project entitled: 'NATO and EU Conditionality: From Peace to State Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. Her most recent publication is an article in Problems of Post Communism September/October issue, entitled: 'NATO

Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Defense Reform and State Building', which is an output of this project. She has also published many articles in journals such as Security Dialogue, International Spectator, International Journal and the Journal for South East Europe and the Balkans. She also writes frequently for the media and is a regular commentator mainly for BBC World News television and many other international television and radio stations.

LEONARDO BARONCELLI

Coordinator in the framework of the Transatlantic Dialogue, Directorate General for the Americas, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy

Leonardo Baroncelli has been Italian Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo until March 2010. In his past positions he has served also as Alternate Director General of the Executive Secretariat of Central European Initiative(CEI) in Trieste, Italy; Consul General in Shanghai,China; Head of the Multilateral Division at the Department for for Development Assistance; First Counselor of Political Affairs at the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York; Consul General in Chicago, U.S.; Head of the Asia section at the Emigration Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Political Counselor in Warsaw, Poland; Commercial Counselor in Baghdad, Iraq; and Second Secretary in Bonn, West Germany. Baroncelli was awarded the titles of Knight Officer and of High Officer of Merit of the Italian Republic and the Medail of Honour of the Central European Initiative.

SARAH BIGNAMI

Public Affairs and Communication Department, International Affairs Unit, ENI, Rome, Italy

Sarah Bignami is an International Relations specialist at Eni, working in the International Affairs Unit, Public Affairs and Communication Department; Rome headquarters. She holds a B.A. in International and Diplomatic Relations from University of Bologna and a M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Bologna & Washington DC (2005-2007). Concentrations: International Energy and Environment Policy and International Economics. She worked at the European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport between 2007 and 2008. Publications: La Regione del Caspio: Interessi Convergenti, Pipelines e Sicurezza Energetica, Nomos&Khaos, Rapporto Nomisma 2009-2010 sulle Prospettive Economico-Strategiche; La politica energetica europea (5 febbraio 2008), on Portale AGIEnergia (www.agienergia.it).

SVEN BISCOP

Director of Europe in the World Programme, Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, Belgium

Sven Biscop is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and at Ghent University. He is a member of the Executive Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and a Senior Research Associate of the Centre for European Studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing.

YVES BOYER

Professor, Ecole polytechnique; Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, France

Yves Boyer is Professor at Ecole polytechnique, the most prestigious French Grande Ecole, teaching "Geopolitics and Strategy". Deputy Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) in Paris he is a former senior researcher at the French Institute for International Affairs (IFRI), at the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) and a Woodrow Wilson Scholar (Washington D.C.). He is also vice-president of the board of the Comité d'Etude de Défense Nationale, member of the editorial board of Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, the Revue de Géoéconomie (Paris) and Questions Internationales (Paris).

ERIK BRATTBERG

Research Assistant, Europe Research Program, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden

Erik Brattberg's research interests are European security and defense policy and transatlantic relations. Erik's previous professional experience includes research appointments with the Global Public Policy Institute (Berlin) and the Hudson Institute (Washington, DC). He holds an M.A. and B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Uppsala University. He has also been a visiting graduate student at the University of Maryland, USA. During 2011, he will be a Fulbright scholar in the USA."

VINCENZO CAMPORINI

Chief of Defence Staff, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome, Italy

General Camporini joined the Air Force Academy in 1965, where he graduated in 1969. He served mainly as a F-104 RECCE pilot with the 3rd Wing in Villafranca (Verona), where he commanded the 28th Squadron with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, after graduating from the NATO Defence College in 1979. After attending the ITAF War College in 1982, he served as Staff Officer in the Personnel Division of the Air Staff. From 1983 to 1985, he was Aide-de Camp to the Chief of Staff and in 1985, with the rank of Colonel, he served in the R&D Weapon Systems Office. In 1988, he commanded the Air Force Flight Test Centre and represented Italy in the Aerospace Application Study Committee of AGARD. Posted again to the Air Force Staff, he was appointed Chief of the Office for the technical development of new weapon systems, including EFA, and was the Italian Representative in the NAEW program. On January 1st 1993, with the rank of Brigadier General, he became Chief of the Plans, Operations, Training and International Cooperation Division. In April 1996, he was Inspector of the Navy Aviation. From November 1997 to November 1998, with the rank of Major General, he headed the Inspectorate for Safety of Flight. Then, he was appointed Chief of the Military Policy and Planning Division of the Defence General Staff. From April 2001 to February 2004, with the rank of Lt. General, he covered the position of Deputy Chief of the Defence General Staff. In March 2004, he was appointed President of the Italian Centre for High Defence Studies. From September 20th 2006 to January 29th 2008, he was Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force. On February 12th 2008, General Camporini was appointed Chief of the Defence General Staff. He is a combat pilot experienced on 24 different types of aircraft including F-104, Tornado, AMX, heavy transport aircraft and helicopters. Up to June 2009, he had flown about 3.050 hours. He earned University degrees in Aeronautical Sciences and International and Diplomatic Sciences. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. His awards and decorations include: Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic, Gold Medal for Extended Air Navigation, Gold Medal for Length of Command, Gold Cross for Extended Length of Service, Italian Defence General Staff Commendation Medal, Commander of the Order of Merit of the French Republic, Knight Grand Cross of Merit of the Sacred Military

Constantinian Order of Saint George, Santos Dumont Medal for Merit of the Republic of Brazil and Paul Tissandier Diploma awarded by the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale.

MICHELE COMELLI

Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Michele Comelli is dealing with the institutional reform of the European Union, European foreign and security policy, European Neighbourhood Policy and is a member of the steering committee of the IAI-Compagnia di San Paolo Convention. He has spent research periods at the IEP in Berlin and at the SIIA in Stockholm within the "European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme". Michele holds a PhD in EU Law at the University of Udine, an MA in International and Diplomatic Studies from the University of Trieste.-Gorizia and an MA in European Political Studies at the College of Europe of Bruges (Belgium). He is a Marshall Memorial Fellow of the GMF.

HEATHER CONLEY

Senior Fellow and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, USA

Heather Conley serves as director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Conley served as senior adviser to the Center for European Policy Analysis, an independent, nonpartisan public policy research institute dedicated to the study of Central Europe. From 2005–2008, Ms. Conley served as the executive director, Office of the Chairman of the Board of the American National Red Cross, where she focused her efforts on developing the first comprehensive reform to the governance structure of the American Red Cross Board since 1947, incorporating best governance practices for nonprofit and for-profit sectors.
From 2001–2005, Ms. Conley served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs, with responsibilities for U.S. bilateral relations for the 15 countries of northern and central Europe. Previously, she was a senior associate with an international consulting firm led by former U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage. Ms. Conley began her career in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, where she served as the State Department liaison for the U.S. Department of Defense's Global Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ms. Conley was selected to serve as special assistant to the U.S. coordinator of U.S. assistance to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Ms. Conley received her B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and her M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

SANDRO DE BERNARDIN

Minister Plenipotentiary, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

Degree in Political Sciences, University of Padua. Entered the Diplomatic Service in 1973. After serving at the Permanent Representation to the OECD in Paris and the Embassy in Kinshasa, in 1985-1986 Sandro De Bernardin was Deputy Head of the Italian Delegation to the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures. Subsequently he dealt with CSCE/OSCE and CFE matters at the MFA. From 1990 to 1998 he served as Political Counsellor at the Embassy in Paris and Minister Counsellor at the Embassy in Ottawa. From 1998 to 2004 he was European Correspondent and then Coordinator for CFSP and ESDP at the MFA. Ambassador of Italy to Israel from 2004 to 2008. Back in Rome, he was appointed Deputy Secretary-General and Political Director. Following the reformation of the MFA, in July 2010 he was appointed Director-General for Political and Security Affairs.

SILVIA FRANCESCON

Head of the Rome Office, European Council on Foreign Relations, Rome, Italy

Before joining ECFR, Silvia Francescon coordinated the G8/G20 team at the Prime Minister's Office (Sherpa Office) in the run up and during the Italian Presidency of the G8.
SF served the United Nations as Coordinator of the Millennium Campaign in Italy and is a former negotiator for the Ministry for the Environment. SF has also worked at the OECD, WTO and European Commission and was research fellow at the International Law Department of the Universities of Leiden (NL) and Ferrara.
SF holds a Master in International Environmental Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, London) and graduated cum laude in International Law at the University of Ferrara.

JAMES GOLDGEIER

Professor of Political Science and International Affaire, George Washington University

James Goldgeier is also a 2010-11 senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D.C. After receiving his Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, he was a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation and an assistant professor of government at Cornell University. He has held appointments at the State Department, the National Security Council staff, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Library of Congress, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Hoover Institution. From 2001-2005, he directed GWU's Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies. His most recent book (co-authored with Derek Chollet) is America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (PublicAffairs 2008).

GIAMPIERO GRAMAGLIA

Communication Advisor, Istituto Affari Internazionali; Il Fatto Quotidiano Italian daily Newspaper, Rome, Italy

Giampiero Gramaglia is a journalist since 1972. In 1980 he joined the ANSA Brussels office, where he became Bureau Chief in 1984, covering the European Community and NATO for 10 years. In 1989, Gramaglia returned to Rome as ANSA Foreign Desk Editor, responsible for the Foreign Desk and the ANSA bureaus abroad. In 1995, he took responsibility for the ANSA New Media Services. In 1997, he became ANSA Deputy Editor in Chief. In 1999, he took charge of ANSA Paris office. Then in 2000, he became the ANSA North America Bureau Chief in the Washington, DC office. From 2006 to the last June, he was ANSA's Editor in Chief (Director)..

ETTORE GRECO

Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Ettore Greco is also editor of the institute's journal The International Spectator and heads the transatlantic program of the IAI. He worked as visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution from January 2006 to July 2007. He taught at the universities of Parma and Bologna. From 2000 to 2006 he worked as correspondent for the Economist Intelligence Unit. From 1993 to 2000 he directed the IAI's program on Central and Eastern Europe. He was also Deputy Director of the IAI from 1997 to 2008.
He is the author of a number of publications on the EU's institutions and foreign policy, transatlantic relations and the Balkans. He has been a free-lance journalist since 1988.

ULRIKE GUEROT

Senior Policy Fellow, Head of Berlin Office - European Council on Foreign Relations, Germany

Ulrike Guérot joined the European Council on Foreign Relations in July 2007 as a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Berlin Office. Previously she was Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund (2004-2007), and prior to that she headed the European Union unit at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin (2000-2003). Ulrike has also worked as an Assistant Professor on European studies at Johns Hopkins University, as a Senior Research Fellow at Notre Europe in Paris, and as a staff member of the German Bundestag's Commission on External Affairs. She has been publishing widely on European and transatlantic issues in various journals and newspapers, and is frequently invited to comment on several EU issues in the media. She has been awarded the prestigious 'Ordre pour le Merite' for her engagement on European integration.

ANNA JARDFELT

Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden

From 2006 to 2010 Sweden's Permanent Representation to the EU (Brussels). 2008-2010: responsible for the EU's bilateral relations with countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Responsible for the Middle East team during the Swedish EU Presidency 2010. Chaired the EU Working Group on the Middle East. From 2006 to 2008: Coordinated the work of the EU's Political and Security Committee under the PSC ambassador. From 2001 to 2005: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus (The Hague): Personal Advisor/"Chief of Cabinet" of the HCNM. From 1998 to 2001: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, European Security Policy Department (Stockholm). From 1997 to 1998: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Department for Control of Arms Exports. From 1996 to 1997: European Parliament: MEP Assistant, Foreign Affairs Committee

ERIK JONES

Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, Italy

Erik Jones holds a BA (AB) at Princeton University, and MA and PhD at Johns Hopkins SAIS. As an academic, he has worked at the Centre for European Policy Studies, the Central European University, the University of Nottingham, and most recently the Johns Hopkins Bologna Center. In addition, he is a contributing editor to the IISS journal Survival and he sits on the international advisory board for Acta Politica and on the editorial boards for the Journal of European Public Policy, Government and Opposition, and the Journal of European Integration. He also serves on scientific committees for the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo and for the Collegio Europeo di Parma, the executive committee for the European Union Studies Association and the steering committee for the Standing Group on the European Union of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Finally, he is a frequent contributor to Oxford Analytica. His research interests fall broadly in the field of political economy. In essence, this means that he tries to answer questions about how politics influences economics and how economics influences politics. he wrote his first book on the politics surrounding Europe's economic and monetary union published by Rowman & Littlefield.

KENNETH H. KELLER

Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, Italy

Professor of Science and Technology Policy; President emeritus, University of Minnesota
Background and Education: University of Minnesota (1964-2008): professor of chemical engineering and materials science; department chairman (1978-1980); academic vice president (1980-1985); president (1985-1988); senior fellow for science and technology (1990-96) and senior vice president of

programs (1993-95) at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York; M.S.E. and Ph.D. in chemical engineering, Johns Hopkins University (U.S.); B.A. in liberal arts, Columbia University (U.S.); B.S. in chemical engineering, Columbia University (U.S.)
Publications: "From Here to There in Information Technology," in American Behavioral Scientist(2008); "Nanotechnology and Society" in Journal of Nanoparticle Research (2007); "Improving the Understanding of Science and Technology," in Technology in Society(2006); numerous articles in academic journals related to science, technology and international relations; widely published in medical and scientific journals on subjects including, fluid mechanics, blood flow and mass transfer.
Awards and Affiliations: Member of National Academy of Engineering; fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; founding fellow of the American Institute of Medical and Biological Engineering; member of the Council on Foreign Relations; former chairman of the National Research Council's (NRC) Board on Assessment of National Institute of Standards and Technology Programs; former member of the NRC committees, including NASA Astrophysics Performance Committee (chairman), Board on Life Sciences, and Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Applications; former chair of the Medical Technology Leadership Forum; former member of Science and Technology Advisory Panel to Director of Central Intelligence

JUSTIN LOGAN

Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington DC, USA

Justin Logan is associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is an expert on U.S. grand strategy, international relations theory, and American foreign policy. His current research focuses on the formation of U.S. grand strategy under unipolarity; the growing role of counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation building in U.S. foreign policy; and the intellectual lineage of COIN.
He has authored numerous articles on topics including international relations theory, U.S. China policy, U.S. Russia policy, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and the policy approaches to a nuclear Iran. His articles have appeared in Strategic Studies Quarterly, the Harvard International Review, The National Interest, Orbis, National Review, the Foreign Service Journal, The American Conservative, Reason, the American Prospect, the Chicago Sun-Times and other publications. He has lectured on American strategy at the Pentagon and at universities in the United States and abroad, and has made appearances on a variety of broadcast media including the BBC, MSNBC, Fox News, Voice of America, and others. In 2007 he was named a Young Leader by the American-Swiss Foundation.
Logan holds a master's degree in international relations (with Committee Honors) from the University of Chicago and a bachelor's degree in international relations (Phi Beta Kappa, magna cum laude) from American University. He lives with his wife Jessica in Washington, DC.

MASSIMO MAROTTI

Minister Plenipotentiary, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy

Massimo Marotti is an Italian diplomat since 1986. Graduated cum laude in Law at the Federico II University of Naples, he is 53 years old. He is currently the European security director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. He has been responsible for international security, NATO and political military affairs. Between 2007 and 2008 he was senior member of the Italian delegation to the UN Security Council.
After participating in several diplomatic missions to support business abroad, between 2000 and 2003 he held the position of economic counsellor at the Italian Embassy in Washington. At an early stage in his carrier, he has served in Iraq, France and Luxembourg.

ALESSANDRO MARRONE

Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Researcher in the Security&Defence Area, Alessandro Marrone has obtained in 2009 a Masters in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Previously he has worked at IAI in both Transatlantic Relations and Security&Defence Areas. He holds a BA degree in Political Science and a MSc degree in International Relations from the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome, in both cases with first class honours. He is interested in European security and defence policy, the relations between industry, technological innovation and security/defence, NATO and US foreign policy. He currently collaborates with several Italian magazines and webmagazines, including: AffarInternazionali, Aspenia online, Charta Minuta, Geopolitics of the Middle East, L'Occidentale, Risk.

LUCIO MARTINO

Research Director on Transatlantic Relations, Italian Military Center for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS), Rome, Italy

Lucio Martino earned a Doctorate in History from the University of Bologna. He has been the Research Director on Transatlantic Relations for the Italian Military Center for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) since the year 2000. He is also a member of the advisory council of the Guarini Institute at the John Cabot University in Rome.

RAFFAELLO MATARAZZO

Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Researcher at the IAI since 2003, Raffaello Matarazzo works on the EU integration process and transatlantic relations. He is PhD candidate at the University of Rome "Sapienza" and Adjunct Professor in Government and Politics of Western Europe at the St. John's University of New York's Rome Campus. At the IAI, he is also editor-in-chief of the IAI's webzine AffarInternazionali and of the Yearbook on Italian foreign policy edited by IAI and ISPI. From July 2006 to April 2008, he acted as advisor to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. In 2002 - 2003 he worked at the European Parliament in Brussels, and in 2003 received a Master's degree in European studies from the University "Roma Tre".

ANAND MENON

Professor of West European Politics, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom

Anand Menon was previously founding Director of the European Research Institute, one of the largest academic institutions devoted to the study of Europe. Prior to this, he taught for ten years at the University of Oxford (St Antony's College), and has held positions at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Boston University, Columbia University and New York University. Professor Menon has written widely on many aspects of contemporary European politics, particularly the institutions and policies of the EU and on European security. He is author of Europe: The State of the Union (Atlantic Books 2008) and France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-1997: The Politics of Ambivalence, (Macmillan, 2000). In addition, he has edited 9 books on the European Union, and published widely in the media, including the Financial Times and Wall St Journal. He is currently preparing the Oxford University Press Handbook of the EU.

CESARE MERLINI

Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Cesare Merlini is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of IAI, the Italian Institute for International Affairs in Rome since 2001. He was the Institute President from 1979 to 2001, after joining it as Director General in 1970.
He is Non Resident Senior Fellow with the Center for the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution. Until the end of 2009 he was Executive Vice Chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he helped to set up in 1983. Studies and publications in the fields of Transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation and, more recently, on the impact of societal change on international relations. His recents publications in English are "Europe in the International Scene: a Union of Necessity after a Union of Choice?" a chapter in "The European Union in the 21st Century. Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty" CEPS, 2009, Brussels."The Lessons of Ancient History and the Future of Transatlantic Relations", The International Spectator, 44/1, March 2009.

KHARIM MEZRAN

Director, Center for American Studies, Rome, Italy

Kharim Mezran is professorial lecturer in International Relations at Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at John Cabot University. He is Director of Center for American Studies of Rome. He has obtained a Master in Arab Studies at Georgetown University in 1993 and a Ph.D. in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS of Washington DC in 2001. He is the author of I Fratelli Musulmani nel mondo contemporaneo with Massimo Campanini, UTET Libreria 2010; Arcipelago Islam. Tradizione, riforma e militanza in età contemporanea with Massimo Campanini, Editori Laterza 2007; Negotiation and Construction of National Identities, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden Boston, May 2007; Negotiating National Identity: the Case of North Africa, Antonio Pellicani Editore, Rome 2002; also book reviews, working papers and numerous articles in foreign and Italian journals.

ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO

Ambassador, Senior Strategic Advisor at Enel Holding, Rome; Former Deputy Secretary General, NATO

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo a distinguished ambassador and diplomat, has much experience in a number of areas, not just international relations. In particular, he has held terms of office in Washington, Prague, Paris, and Brussels, and has experience in European structural funds, European policies, the European Space Agency, and also the Italian Space Agency of which he has been a member of the Management Board. He has taken part and chaired a number of committees concerned with economic and industrial issues both in Italy and abroad. In 1994, he was appointed the Prime Minister's personal representative for the finalization of the Trans European Transport and Energy Masterplan.
Since 1997 he has acted as diplomatic adviser to Professor Andreatta the Minister of Defence and his successors; occupying a front line role in the various Balkan crises during this period. In 2000 he became a founding a member of the Policy and Security Committee of the European Union under the supervision of Javier Solana. Between 2001 and 2007 he held the position of Deputy Secretary General at the Atlantic Alliance. His mandate was mostly carried out in the political area, especially in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean.

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo has travelled extensively in Asia and has visited Afghanistan and Pakistan on a number of occasions, chairing the Atlantic Council on several official missions. He has published a number of articles and essays in specialist journals on Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign and Defence Policy. He is currently assisting the top management at ENEL, a multinational company in the energy sector, in their strategic evaluation and geopolitical analysis of countries of interest.
Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo is a teacher of European Security and Defence Policy at LUISS University in Rome.

ANTONIO MISSIROLI

Bureau of European Policy Advisers, European Commission, Brussels, and Adjunct Professor of European Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Antonio Missiroli was Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre in Brussels from 2005 to 2010. Previously, he was a Research Fellow at the W/EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris (1998-2005). He was also Head of European Studies at CeSPI in Rome (1994-97) and a Visiting Fellow at St.Antony's College, Oxford (1996-97).
He holds a Ph.D. degree in Contemporary History from the Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa) and a Master's degree in International Public Policy from SAIS/Johns Hopkins.
He is also a professional journalist (he was i.a. correspondent from Germany right after unification for an Italian daily) and commentator on EU and international affairs. He has taught European Politics at the university of Bath, European Security at the university of Trento, Transatlantic Security at Boston University and, most recently, European Foreign Policy at SAIS/Johns Hopkins.

ANDREW MONAGHAM

Research Advisor, NATO Defence College, Rome, Italy

Andrew Monaghan is a Research Advisor in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome. In this role, he directs the Russia/EAPC research programme. He is also the NDC's senior researcher on energy security matters and NATO's contribution in this field, and he represents the NDC in NATO's Energy Security Task Force.
Additionally he is the Founder and Director of the Russia Research Network, an independent organisation for the generation of information and expertise on Russian politics, security and economic issues based in London. In this capacity he has served as an expert witness to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. He is also a Senior Research Associate at the Advanced Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), part of the Defence Academy of the UK.
Previous employment includes a position as a Visiting Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King's College, London, the civilian academic arm of the Joint Services Command and Staff College at the Defence Academy.
He received his PhD in Russian foreign policy (Russian perspectives of Russia-EU security relations) from the Department of War Studies, King's College, from where he also obtained an MA in War Studies.

ARKADY MOSHES

Programme Director for Russia in the regional and Global Context research programme, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finlandia

Arkady Moshes is an Associate Fellow at the Russian and Eurasia Programme of the Chatham House. Before moving to Finland in 2002, he has been since 1988 working in the Institute of Europe in Moscow. His expertise areas include Russian-European relations, Russia's policy towards the Western CIS and Baltic States, internal and foreign policy of Ukraine and Belarus, and region-building in the

Baltic and Black Sea regions. He has been a guest lecturer at several universities and institutes, has authored over 120 academic and analytical publications and is a frequent commentator in European and Russian media. He holds a Ph.D in history of international relations from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Recent publications include "Practise what you preach. The prospects for visa freedom in Russia-EU relations" (FIIA Report no. 18, 2009), "EU-Russia relations: unfortunate continuity" (European Issues, no. 129, 2009) and "Avenue of Independence. Will Russian-Belarusian Relations Take the Ukrainian Path?" (Russia in Global Affairs, 2010, N.2, April-June).

CARLO MUSSO

Head, Research Department, Finmeccanica, Rome, Italy

Carlo Musso holds a diploma in classical studies, graduated in physics at the Università di Genova. He is Head of the Research Department of Finmeccanica, the Italian leading high-technology group (more than 73,000 employees and 18 billion euros of revenues in 2009). The Group, which is quoted on the Milan Stock Exchange, operates in the sectors of aerospace, helicopters, electronics, defense and security, transportation, energy and information technology.
Professional experience: From Oct '93 to Dec '97 he was researcher at the Istituto di Fisica Cosmica, CNR, Milano. From Jan '98 to Oct '02 he served at the Italian Space Agency. From November '02 to March '06 he worked in Finmeccanica's Strategy Department. From 2006 to 2008 he was professor on annual contract at LUISS "Guido Carli". Currently he is Deputy board member of the US-Italy Fulbright Commission, Deputy board member of the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Secretary of the Scientific Commission of the Fondazione Ansaldo, Member of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. He published the novels: "Nell'ora che non sai", L'Autore Libri Firenze (1999); "Il segno di Jonas", De Ferrari (2002); "Delitti dal Vangelo secondo Giovanni", Fratelli Frilli (2004, "Premio Tedeschi" 2003 finalist); "Sede vacante", Fratelli Frilli (2006). With the short tale "Fil rouge" has been finalist at the "Gran Giallo Città di Cattolica" 2010 prize.

FRANCESCA NENCI

Political Analyst, Unicredit, Milan, Italy

Francesca Nenci holds a degree cum laude in Political Sciences with a specialization in Public Economy from "La Sapienza" University in Rome. Her final dissertation was on the Pubblic Choice Theory. She is currently Senior Political Analyst in the Political Studies Dpt. of UniCredit Group. She analyzes the political situation of the countries in which the Group is present or is interested to invest in to monitor their stability. She is responsible of a new risk system, the "Political Risk Assessment", finalized to quantify the political risk.
She has published several articles about international politics as: "Migration from a national, European and global perspective"; "The European foreign policy"; "Italian Turkish Forum"; "Kazakhstan political stability"; "A new reason for Europe" . Our ancestors' objective "No more wars among us" has been accomplished. Now, what's next?" ("east" and "Global Competition" magazines).

LEOPOLDO NUTI

Professor of History of International Relations, University of Rome III, Italy

Leopoldo Nuti is also Coordinator of the International Studies Section of the Doctoral School in Political Science at the University of Roma Tre. Since March 2006 he is Director of CIMA, an Italian Inter-university Center for Cold War Studies linking six Italian universities. A graduate of the Universities of Florence (laurea), George Washington U. (M.A. in International affairs) and Rome (Ph.D. in History of International relations), Prof. Nuti has been a Fulbright student, NATO Research Fellow, Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Research Fellow at the CSIA,

Harvard University, Research Fellow for the Nuclear History Program, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and Visiting Professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris.
He has published extensively in Italian, English and French on US-Italian relations and Italian foreign and security policy.

SOLI ÖZEL

Lecturer, International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey

Soli Özel holds a BA in Economics from Benningon College (1981) and an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University (1983).
Mr. Özel is currently a full time Professor at Kadir Has University. He is also a columnist at Habertürk Daily newspaper, and an advisor to TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). He edits TUSIAD's magazine, Private View. He has guest lectured at Georgetown, Harvard, Tufts and other US universities. He is a regular contributor to German Marshall Fund's web site's "ON Turkey" series and a regular contributor to World Affairs Journal blog. Most recently he is the co-author of "Rebuilding a partnership: Turkish-American relations in a new era" with Suhnaz Yilmaz.

STEVEN PIFER

Director, Arms Control Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA

A former ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer's career of more than 25 years as a Foreign Service officer centered on Europe, the former Soviet Union and arms control. In addition to Kyiv, Pifer had postings in London, Moscow and Warsaw, as well as on the National Security Council and the U.S. delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations. At Brookings, Pifer focuses on arms control, Ukraine and Russia issues.

NICOLETTA PIROZZI

Senior Fellow in the European Affairs area, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Nicoletta Pirozzi works mainly on CFSP/CSDP, EU civilian crisis management and EU relations with other organisations – particularly United Nations, NATO and African Union - in the field of peace and security. She has been research fellow in the European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme and visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. In 2005-2006, she was Project Officer responsible for the Responding to Conflict programme area at the International Security Information Service (ISIS) - Europe in Brussels. She also collaborated with the Italian Permanent Representation to the EU and the European Parliament in Brussels. She graduated in Political Science at the University of Pisa and at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. She also obtained a MA Degree in European Political and Administrative Studies from the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium). She is currently PhD candidate at the Catholic University in Milan.

ARTHUR RACHWALD

Professor of Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis (MA), USA

Arthur Rachwald is a visiting professor at SAIS in Bologna, Italy (1996/7, Fall 2003 and 2010/11), and a visiting professor at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Austria.
He has earned a law degree from the School of Law, University of Marie Curie-Sklodowska, Lublin, Poland (1967) and a doctorate from the University of California
(Santa Barbara, 1975). His publications include Poland between the Superpowers (1983)

In Search of Poland (1991), co-authored with Gale Mattox Enlarging NATO. The Domestic Debate (2001) and an editor of Transatlantic Relation, The View from Europe, (2004), in addition to numerous book chapters, articles, professional papers and commentaries.

WOLFGANG RICHTER

Research Division International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany

Colonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter is a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). He has been working on NATO's nuclear strategy, global and European arms control, the OSCE and the European security order as well as remaining territorial conflicts in Europe with an emphasis on the war in Georgia in August 2008. He served as representative of the German Ministry of Defense in German delegations to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament (New York/Geneva) and to the OSCE in Vienna up to 2009. There, he was the German representative to the Joint Consultative Group of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 2009 he contributed as a military expert to the Independent Fact-Finding Mission of the European Union on the Conflict in Georgia.

MARIA SANGERMANO

Country Analysis Coordinator, Political and Institutional Scenarios and Analysis, Public Affairs and Communication Department, ENI, Rome ofessor

1999 - Laurea cum laude in Humanities, Contemporary History, University La Sapienza, Rome;
2001 - Master Degree in "Politics, Security and Integration in Eastern Europe", School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) – University College London (UCL), London, UK;
2001-2003 - Russian Federation and the Former Soviet Union – Research Officer - European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) – UK and Centre Vozhvrashenye - Krasnodar (Russian Federation);
Since 2006 – Senior Analyst and Country Analysis Coordinator at the Political and Institutional Scenarios and Analysis Unit - Public Affairs and Communication Department eni S.p.A., Rome

TORNIKE SHARASHENIDZE

Head, International Affairs Program, Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, Tbilisi

BA in Applied Mathematics (Tbilisi Javakhishvili State University), MA in Public Administration, PhD in International Relations (Georgian Institute of Public Affairs).
From 1995 to 2002 worked as International Politics Analyst for Resonance daily and 24 Hours Daily newspapers. From 2003 to 2004 worked as a senior analyst for the National Security Council Staff of Georgia. In 2005 worked as a foreign policy assistant to the Prime Minister of Georgia. In 2006 worked as a director of NATO Information Center in Georgia. In 2007 worked as a research fellow for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Has worked as a lecturer for the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs since 2004. From 2008 works for the School of Law and Politics at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs as a head of MA Program in International Affairs and a Full-time Professor.

STEFANO SILVESTRI

President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Stefano Silvestri has been President of the International Affairs Institute since 2001. He has been a lead writer for Il Sole 24 Ore since 1985. Between January 1995 and May 1996 he served as Under Secretary of State for Defence, having been an advisor to the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for European matters, in 1975, and a consultant to the Prime Minister's Office under various Governments. He continues to act as a consultant to both for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Defence and Industry. As a professional journalist, he has been a special correspondent and columnist for Globo (1982), member of the Policy Committee of Europeo (1979), and has contributed articles on foreign and defence policy to numerous national daily papers. He was Professor for Mediterranean Security Issues at the Bologna Centre of Johns Hopkins University (1972-76), and has worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (1971-1972). He is currently a member of administrative council of the Associazione Industrie per l'Aerospazio, i Sistemi a la Difesa, (AIAD), and of the Trilateral Commission.

BROOKE A. SMITH-WINDSOR

Senior Canadian Representative, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy

In 2007, Brooke Smith-Windsor was appointed Canada's Senior National Representative at the NATO Defense College (NDC) where he is deputy to the Director, Research Division. Dr. Smith-Windsor's research agenda centers on the evolution of NATO's strategic relations with international organizations such as the United Nations, Alliance maritime strategy and arctic security. Prior to his current appointment, Dr. Smith-Windsor was the Director of Strategic Guidance at Canada's National Defense Headquarters where he co-authored Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 as well as two transformational defense policy White Papers that secured unprecedented funding for the Canadian Forces. Outside the NDC and Canada's national strategic headquarters, Dr. Smith-Windsor has deployed with Allied forces to Baghdad, Iraq as part of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), mentoring senior government officials in crisis management planning. In addition, he has been a lead facilitator for the NATO Military Committee in coordinating the 28 national Military Representatives' input into the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept. Dr. Smith-Windsor has also served at the operational level as the Political Advisor (POLAD) to senior Canadian and Allied Commanders including Admiral Michael Mullen, current Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Gary Roughead, incumbent Chief of US Naval Operations. In the same capacity, he has been a regular contributor to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (DSACEUR) annual Steadfast Pyramid and Pinnacle training in operational art and planning for newly appointed NATO general and flag officers. Dr. Smith-Windsor has spoken and written widely on defense issues ranging from Effects Based Operations/Comprehensive Approach to maritime strategy and arctic security. In addition to his NDC Research and Forum Papers, Dr. Smith-Windsor's commentaries have appeared in leading current affairs and defense publications including Security Dialogue, The Financial Times, Jane's Defense Weekly and Defense News.

OLIVER THRÄNERT

Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany

From July 2002 to June 2008 Oliver Thränert served as the head of German Institute for International and Security Affairs - SWP's Research Unit on Security Policy. Prior to joining SWP in September 2001, Dr. Thränert was a Senior Research Fellow of the Department of Foreign Policy Research, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, in Bonn (1986-1999) and Berlin (1999-2001). From 1990 to 1993 he also

served as a lecturer for International Relations at the University of Darmstadt. In spring 2000, Dr. Thränert taught at the Free University of Berlin. In the summer of 1991, Dr. Thränert was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Center of International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston/Ontario and in the summer of 2009 at the Center of Security Studies, ETH Zurich. In 2008, Oliver Thränert won the Marcel Cadieux Distinguished Writing Award of the International Journal (Toronto).

NATHALIE TOCCI

Director of the Area the EU and the Neighbourhood, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Area the EU and the Neighbourhood of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome and Associate Editor of The International Spectator. She received her PhD in International Relations at the LSE in 2003. She was a research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels from 1999 to 2003, a Jean Monnet and Marie Curie Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, from 2003-2007, an Associate Fellow at the CEPS from 2007-2009 and a Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington from 2009-2010. Her research interests include European foreign policy, conflict resolution, the European neighbourhood, with a particular focus on Turkey, Cyprus, the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Dr Tocci is the winner of the 2008 Anna Lindh award for the study of European foreign policy. She is currently researching a book on relations between Turkey, the European Union and the United States.

JUSTIN VAÏSSE

Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, USA

Justin Vaïsse is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and serves as the Director of research for its Center on the United States and Europe. An accomplished expert on American foreign policy and European affairs, Vaïsse has held several positions in government and academia. He is the author of several books, including Neoconservatism - The Biography of a Movement (Harvard University Press, 2010). From 2003 to 2007, he served as a special adviser on the United States and transatlantic relations at the Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision (the Policy Planning Staff) of the French Foreign Ministry. During that period, he was also an adjunct professor at Sciences-Po in Paris. He is currently an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, teaching classes on France and European security. His more recent field of research is European construction. Vaïsse is currently working on a scorecard of European foreign policy to track Europe's performance on the world stage, in partnership with the European Council on Foreign Relations (First report expected for February 2011).

PIETER VAN HAM

Head, Global Governance Research, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", The Hague, The Netherlands

Pieter van Ham is also Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium). He is a member of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to the Dutch Government (Peace and Security Committee), as well as a member of the editorial boards of Security Dialogue (Sage) and Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (Palgrave). He recently published Social Power in International Politics (Routledge, 2010) and Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism (Brookings, 2007).

KURT VOLKER

Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Washington, D.C., USA

Kurt Volker is also a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and a member of its Strategic Advisory Group, as well as a Senior Advisor at McLarty Associates, a global consulting firm. Ambassador Volker was a career member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, with over 23 years of experience working on European political and security issues under five U.S. Administrations. He served as Ambassador and the 19th U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from July 2, 2008 until May 17, 2009. Prior to his service at NATO, Ambassador Volker served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, from July 2005 until June 2008, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on U.S.-European Union relations, NATO, the OSCE, and numerous bilateral relationships. Ambassador Volker had previously served as Acting Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), as Deputy Director of the Private Office of then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, as a Legislative Fellow for Senator John McCain, and in a variety of State Department positions in Washington and Europe.

ANDREW WILSON

Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, United Kingdom

Andrew Wilson has previously held academic positions at the LSE, Cambridge, UK and University College London. His most recent books are The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (Yale UP, third edition, 2009), Ukraine's Orange Revolution (Yale UP, 2005) and Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (Yale UP, 2005). His publications at ECFR include Dealing with Yanukovych's Ukraine, The Limits of Enlargement-lite: EU and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood , Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession and Can the EU Win the Peace in Georgia? (available at www.ecfr.eu)

AMY F. WOOLF

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA

Amy F. Woolf provides Congress with information and analysis on issues related to U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and arms control. She has addressed such topics as nuclear weapons strategy and doctrine and force structure, the U.S-Russian arms control agenda, ballistic missile defense policy, and threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. Before joining CRS, Ms. Woolf was a member of the Research Staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia. She also spent a year at the Department of Defense, working on the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Ms. Woolf received a Masters in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1983 and a BA in Political Science from Stanford University in 1981.

DAVID S. YOST

Professor of International Relations, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA

David S. Yost was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., in 1996-1997, and a Senior Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College, Rome, in 2004-2007.
His publications include NATO and International Organizations (NATO Defense College, 2007), NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), and The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

(1)

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

ROME, 8 NOVEMBER 2010

NATO's Role in European Security – And Beyond

by

James Goldgeier
German Marshall Fund of the United States

NATO is as busy as ever—but not primarily in Europe. Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation in the Mediterranean, and counter-piracy off the coast of Africa, among other operations, mark the emergence of a global alliance since NATO's last strategic concept was unveiled in 1999. As NATO heads of state and government prepare to meet in Lisbon to unveil a new strategic concept, it is clear that the alliance continues to undergo dramatic change.

Traditional security concerns in Europe have declined dramatically since 1990. Peace remains fragile in the Balkans, and those parts of Europe not included in NATO and/or the European Union (EU)—in particular, the Caucasus—remain dangerously unstable. But the objective of a Europe whole and free is largely achieved. As a result, American national security attention has shifted away from Europe as a primary theater of concern. The United States still needs to provide reassurance that Russia will not be allowed to intimidate alliance members in the East, and America is funding the effort to provide missile defense across the continent (a project that ideally will include Russia's participation), but otherwise, European security affairs will become Europe's affair. To remain relevant to American national security considerations, NATO must embrace its global future.

The United States has a strong interest in NATO's ability to continue its evolution into a major global actor. While the bonds across the Atlantic are frayed, they remain stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. The allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies, the member states are threatened jointly by Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. The United States gains legitimacy by working through NATO; Europe gains a vehicle for projecting hard power. While NATO alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing alliance members, it can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries necessary for the common defense.

It is remarkable how far the alliance has come since 1990, from enlargement to the East and the Balkans operations to the far-flung operations today. But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention too much away from Europe and seek to return NATO to its more traditional role defending against threats arising on the continent. This attitude has strengthened as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To remain relevant, however, NATO must continue to expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) both to states and non-state actors, and cyberwarfare. By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to counter these modern threats, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more robust NATO offers it the chance to counter them. Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-EU cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region.

NATO still needs to provide assurance to its East European members that Russia will not be allowed to intimidate them. But the Lisbon summit offers NATO a new opportunity to develop closer ties with Russia. Ultimately, improved relations with Russia will do more to address Eastern European fears than contingency planning and military exercises. A better relationship with Moscow is also necessary in a world of transnational threats. Although NATO is, and must remain, a values-based institution, collaboration among the world's democracies is not enough to combat threats like terrorism and proliferation. The Cold War ended two decades

ago; the U.S.□Russia "reset" must serve as the basis for a more productive long-term relationship between NATO and Russia.

The summit is an important chance for the alliance to provide assurance that the bedrock of NATO—Article V—remains sacrosanct but in the process affirm that the institution is prepared to respond to global challenges. A Europe that is largely at peace and secure within its borders is one of the most important results of the end of the Cold War and enables the United States and Europe to turn their attention jointly to the threats arising elsewhere.

Why NATO must go global

The core of the alliance has been, and always will be, Article V, which states, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

In 1949, "an armed attack" meant a Soviet land offensive in Europe, and the purpose of the treaty was to tie the American military machine to Western Europe's defense. It was easy for the Western community to understand why solidarity was essential: a Soviet assault on West Germany would immediately imperil the citizens of the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Soviet domination of the continent would in turn directly affect North American vital interests. To argue that a Soviet armed attack against any member should be "considered an attack against them all" was fairly straightforward. To recreate that sense of solidarity today across the European continent is difficult, if not impossible. When Russian troops went to war in Georgia in 2008, states like Poland and Estonia grew immediately fearful. But citizens in France and Portugal are not lying awake at night worrying about a resurgent Red Army.

More threatening are the types of terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States in 2001, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. Recently, we have heard about the need to balance Article V threats (the possibility of "armed attack" in Europe) with the need for NATO to act as an "expeditionary alliance" (a term introduced by President George W. Bush at the 2008 Bucharest summit) against threats arising from places like Afghanistan. But acting as an expeditionary alliance is not something to "balance" with Article V operations; in certain cases today, it is the essence of Article V.

Furthermore, not all threats to states and society are military or even violent in nature. Russia does not have to send tanks into a neighboring country to devastate it. Cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, originating from Russian territory, were the face of a new type of warfare, and periodic shutoffs of energy supplies have left populations in NATO countries such as Bulgaria and Romania vulnerable.

Should we think of cyberattacks or energy cutoffs as Article V threats? After all, they are not by definition "armed attacks." But Article V was designed to create a sense of solidarity among countries in the face of significant threats to their way of life.

One can argue that Article IV is sufficient to manage these non-military contingencies: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." What's more important than trying to determine whether Article IV or Article V is the better vehicle for responding to a threat is to reaffirm that a threat to any member of the alliance will be met

collectively. In the strategic concept, NATO members should reiterate that any action initiated by an external state or non-state actor that threatens the political and economic security or territorial integrity of a NATO member will engender a collective response.

To be effective in responding to the array of threats facing its members, NATO has to further its global character. As U.S. permanent representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder has argued, "The North Atlantic Area is no island. It is submerged in a globally integrated world. Today, the right lens for transatlantic relations is not so much American or European—it is global. And NATO, too, must increasingly view itself not only from a transatlantic perspective, but a global perspective."

Having a global perspective does not simply mean recognizing that threats can arise anywhere. It means enhancing ties with partners around the world. Alliance relationships with other institutions and non-member countries are not new. NATO worked with the United Nations to take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003, and established Operation Allied Provider to counter piracy after the UN requested escorts for its World Food Program vessels traveling near the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. The alliance also created a Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to expand relationships with countries across the broader Middle East.

Most significantly, the alliance has developed closer ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, which were the target of then-NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's call for "global partnerships" in 2006. None of these countries is likely to seek membership in the organization, a step that would require revision of Article X of the NATO Treaty (which restricts expansion of alliance membership to European nations) and would impose obligations on each of them that they are unwilling to adopt. But NATO should work individually with these partners to develop a pace of coordination that fits their needs through the tailored cooperation packages, created in 2007. Australia has been a major contributor to the military mission in Afghanistan, and is an ideal partner to participate more closely in the alliance's efforts at military transformation and the development of a rapid response force. Japan began its structured dialogue with NATO in 1990, participated in the Balkans peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s and has provided support in Afghanistan; it could also play a major role in missile defense and in countering WMD proliferation. South Korea is a more recent NATO partner, but has provided personnel to the mission in Afghanistan and participated in the counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia.

If NATO's main purpose is to ensure security within Europe through the U.S. commitment to the continent, as was the case during the Cold War, then these partnerships will remain peripheral. But if the alliance is serious about the need to deal with global challenges, then partners such as the Asia-Pacific democracies become much more central.

NATO Capabilities to Meet New Threats

In response to the new threat environment, NATO has to prepare itself for a range of military contingencies, including responding to states and groups around the world that are planning attacks on European and North American targets. Unfortunately, Europe has little capability to transport troops across significant distances—more than 70 percent of European land forces cannot deploy. The minimal requirements the alliance set for itself to establish a NATO response force (twenty-five thousand combined land, air, and naval forces) have gone unmet, as has the provision of important equipment such as helicopters.

In addition to fulfilling these requirements, NATO will need to develop greater maritime and missile defense capabilities. Under Operation Active Endeavor, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean to counter terrorism and interdict weapons of mass destruction. Operation Ocean Shield, the current NATO counter-piracy operation, involves the NATO standing maritime groups (and has cooperated with countries such as Japan and India to protect shipping off the coast of Africa). As individual countries are unable to maintain or increase investments in maritime capabilities, as for example is the case in the United Kingdom, then greater collaboration among them, as is envisioned for Britain and France, will have to occur. In an era when smaller navies are more likely, NATO's provision of interoperability will be important for coordinated action.

President Obama's decision to focus on short- and medium-range Iranian missile capabilities rather than on long-range missiles as in the previous administration, has centered attention on the threats to Europe emanating from the Middle East, thereby changing the missile defense discussion from how to protect the American homeland to how to defend NATO territory. At the Lisbon summit, the key step will be recognizing that the creation of a missile defense system to protect territory and populations (not just forces) is a NATO mission, which means developing a NATO command and control capacity.

Given their military nature, maritime operations and missile defense capabilities are logically part of NATO's traditional scope. Non-military threats are less so. Although NATO has established the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability to respond to cyberagression, for example, the alliance has insufficient technological capabilities within the organization to respond to cyberwarfare. Similarly, while NATO officials have expressed the need to "protect critical energy infrastructure," energy security is largely a political challenge.

Developing non-military as well as military capacities to deal with future contingencies makes little sense for an organization that has trouble enough funding its military requirements. More preferable is coordinating policy with institutions such as the EU that have the resources and experience to complement NATO's military role. NATO should focus on the hard power necessary to deal with a range of threats, including missile and WMD proliferation, terrorism, and piracy, while working closely with other institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private corporations to resolve the non-military threats facing alliance members.

NATO can take the lead role in military operations, as it did in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, even if, as in the case of the Balkans (and hopefully Afghanistan in the future) it eventually turns to organizations such as the EU to take over once a situation is stabilized. But on issues such as cyber-security and energy security, it should be the EU that takes the lead role, while NATO assists with logistical support and personnel as needed.

It is in their capacity as EU members that most NATO members can play a significant role in the future in managing security threats in Europe. In countering terrorism, for example, Europe has developed significant tools for both intelligence gathering and disrupting terrorist finances. The EU has established a Joint Situation Centre in Brussels, composed of national intelligence experts, that briefs EU policymakers on terrorist activities. It has linked national criminal databases, and it is able to monitor extremists and seize financial assets of suspected criminals. The EU maintains a twenty-four-hour monitoring and information center for emergency civilian assistance in the event of a WMD attack.

Enhancing the EU's partnership with NATO by allowing for more joint action is the most important way that European members of the alliance can make a greater contribution to NATO. The EU's adoption of the Lisbon Treaty allows for more flexibility by a subset of EU members willing to engage in military and defense cooperation, and it also expands the scope of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to "joint disarmament operations; military

advice and assistance tasks, peace-making and post-conflict stabilization; conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization missions."

In spite of the Lisbon Treaty, NATO-EU collaboration remains stymied by the ongoing dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. Cyprus vetoed the EU commitment to end the trade blockade on Northern Cyprus; in return, Turkey reneged on its promise to open its ports to Cypriot shipping. Cyprus has blocked Turkey's participation in the European Defense Agency (EDA), and Turkey will not let Cyprus work with NATO. Although working-level contacts between the two institutions are significant (e.g., there is an EU staff cell at SHAPE), high-level interaction is minimal, and therefore so is any serious collaboration in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management.

The United States has long been concerned about Europe's limited military capacity, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been particularly critical of Europe's attitudes toward defense. But countries like Germany and Italy are not going to spend more on their military no matter how much the United States complains. Where they could devote their energies is creating more opportunities for serious NATO-EU cooperation. Turkey wants greater access to the European Defense Agency and the CSDP before it will support greater institutional collaboration. The major European powers should make finding a compromise a top priority.

Beyond the Turkey-Cyprus issue, the most serious problem is that the countries that are members of both the EU and NATO have two separate foreign policies when it comes to each institution. They do not coordinate their efforts or their missions. European diplomats who want to advance in their careers will increasingly choose to serve at the EU rather than at NATO, particularly now that the EU is building its own diplomatic service, which decreases NATO's effectiveness.

It makes more sense for NATO's hard power and Europe's soft power to complement one another than it does for each institution to expand its reach into the other's writ. For example, why create a NATO stabilization and reconstruction force, as some have proposed? The United States and Europe should develop these capacities through their civilian agencies (and the United States should get serious about supporting the State Department's office of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction) and then work jointly with NATO military planners to prepare for future post-conflict situations.

The NATO-EU relationship will also be stronger if the U.S. and EU develop closer ties. The U.S. needs to beef up its mission to the EU and create closer ties between the staffs at its EU and NATO missions in Brussels. Currently, only one person at the U.S. mission to the EU is assigned to defense cooperation. In addition to increasing the number of personnel to work on defense at the EU mission, the United States should install a deputy at both its NATO and EU missions who would be responsible for liaison with the other mission.

European Security

Although NATO's attention must increasingly become global, insecurities persist within Europe. A core problem is that parts of the continent remain outside of NATO and the EU. In the Balkans, the integration of Serbia into the EU will be critical to stability in that region. Harder to solve is the problem of the former Soviet Union's space, which Moscow views as its privileged sphere of interests.

The Russia-Georgia war exposed a gap in European security and signified that the Helsinki Final Act's norm that borders be changed through peaceful means is only assured for NATO members. And the 2008 war reminded us that the West and Russia have two contrasting visions of European security.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has sought a full voice in European security affairs, but NATO will not allow Russia to have a veto over alliance decisions. The West was so powerful after the collapse of the USSR that it could pursue policies even if Moscow objected. Russia's resurgence has enabled it more recently to block further NATO enlargement into its neighborhood. But the issue is not just about a balance of power; it is about the vision each side has about Europe's future. NATO has used enlargement of the alliance to build security and stability across Eastern Europe. Russia, meanwhile, has sown discord and instability in places like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in order to increase its control over its neighbors and prevent further NATO encroachment.

The process of enlargement is essentially over. While Montenegro and Bosnia can continue to pursue membership, Ukraine and Georgia cannot. Ukraine under its new leadership is making its own choice not to do so; Georgia will not be able to do so because of Russian objections. NATO will—and should—continue to proclaim that the door is still open, but in reality, the process of enlargement has run its course, at least until Russia takes a different attitude toward NATO.

NATO should continue to promote practical cooperation with Russia that builds greater confidence on both sides. The NATO-Russia Council should expand the number of joint exercises and training operations to deal with issues such as terrorism and nuclear safety.

In the aftermath of the American "reset" of relations with Russia and the forging of the New Start arms control agreement, the most significant potential area of cooperation between NATO and Russia is missile defense.

Efforts to work with Russia on missile defense have arisen periodically since the collapse of the USSR. In 1992, working groups were established in the United States and Russia to explore cooperation under the leadership of State Department official Dennis Ross and Russian Foreign Ministry official Georgy Mamedov. These groups discussed developing common threat assessments, early warning, regional threats, and space-based advances.

Similarly, in the late 1990s, Clinton's top Russia hand, Strobe Talbott, had his own discussions with Mamedov on issues such as "assistance [to Russia] in completing a missile-tracking radar station in Mishelevka near Irkutsk, access to early warning data, joint missile defense exercises, greater intelligence sharing on rogue threats, and the possibility of collaboration on satellite systems."

The discussions in the early and late 1990s were bilateral, and they were held in conjunction with proposals on modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was a major stumbling block given Russian displeasure that the United States wanted to change the treaty. Once the George W. Bush administration scuttled the ABM Treaty, it eliminated the earlier problems that linkage produced. But of course, it has left the Russians wary of American intentions on missile defense, mitigated somewhat by President Obama's decision to move away from the Bush plan on deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has agreed to attend the Lisbon summit, and the opportunity exists to create a new foundation for collaboration on missile defense. The United States has long argued that Russia is threatened by the Iranian nuclear and ballistic programs and should welcome the opportunity to participate in the system. The bilateral discussions between the two countries foundered in the past; perhaps a broader discussion among Americans, Europeans, and Russians will enhance the prospects for cooperation in this area.

Conclusions

The central focus of American national security policy in the twentieth century was keeping Europe free from domination by any single power, first Germany and then the Soviet Union. That Euro-centric focus of American national security policy has changed dramatically. It has changed because of the great success of post-Cold War Transatlantic policy. The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty eliminated the possibility of a major surprise attack in Europe; the enlargement of NATO and then the EU has consolidated political and economic reform across the continent. The Balkan wars resulted in the eventual overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic and created the prospect that the Yugoslav successor states will become full members of Europe.

It is true that each of these issue areas remains problematic. The CFE Treaty needs to be adapted, and NATO and EU enlargement has stalled. Peace in Bosnia and Kosovo is tenuous.

One could therefore argue that NATO should focus on the problems of Europe rather than become a more global organization. But the problems of Europe are ones that Europeans should solve. At the Lisbon summit, NATO should embrace its global missions and its global partnerships, explaining to its populations why the main threats arise far from the North Atlantic Area.

There are those who fear that after Afghanistan, NATO member states will choose to turn inward. After all, that mission has become unsustainable, and those countries that have engaged in serious combat are heading for the exits. The Dutch recently ended their combat role in Afghanistan, the Canadians are scheduled to depart in 2011, and American and British troops will begin their withdrawals at that time.

It is certainly hard to imagine as American and European troops leave Afghanistan that any political leader would be able to generate troops for a similar mission that might arise elsewhere. But acting globally does not necessarily mean having tens of thousands of troops engaged in counter-insurgency.

As argued in this paper, NATO's primary global role will be two-fold. One will be providing maritime and missile defense capabilities to ensure freedom of navigation, stem proliferation, and protect against states like Iran. The other will be serving as a support organization, working with institutions like the EU, to deal with the range of non-military challenges that threaten the security of alliance members, for example, by disrupting terrorist financing and combating cyber-attacks.

NATO's ability to evolve depends on a number of factors. It must convince its publics that these efforts are essential to protecting the societies, economies and territories of the member states. That is the strategic concept's most important role. Countries must be willing to invest where they can in either the military or non-military capabilities (or both) to deal with the range of threats. And the alliance will have to make clear to both Russia and China that a robust global institution is a partner for them, not a threat. None of this will be easy, but NATO has no choice if it is to serve as the central institution of common defense for the United States and Europe.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

(2)

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

ROME, 8 NOVEMBER 2010

Nuclear Arms and Missile Defense in Transatlantic Security

by

Oliver Thränert

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

The debate about the future role of nuclear arms in Europe for transatlantic security has intensified. It can expected to be continued even after NATO's Lisbon summit of November 2010, for the document to be adopted on this occasion will only describe NATO's nuclear future in broader diplomatic terms. One important reason why the debate within NATO about nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament will go on is US President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. To make its contribution to this long-term goal, Germany wants all the remaining US nuclear forces on its territory to be removed, albeit not without consultation within the Alliance. Some NATO partners that also host US nuclear forces, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, support Germany, others, like Italy and Turkey, are less enthusiastic. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed five principles to guide any debate about NATO's nuclear future, the first of which is that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. At a meeting held in Tallinn in April 2010, NATO foreign ministers discussed the Alliance's nuclear future and concluded that none of the US weapons would be removed unless all NATO members reach consensus.

After Lisbon, two important topics will remain on NATO's agenda for the coming years. If US nuclear forces in Europe are to remain, decisions will have to be taken about the modernization of the respective delivery systems. At the same time, the US and NATO will have to decide if and to what extent non-strategic weapons should become part of future arms control negotiations with Russia.

These discussions will be held against the background of developments in the Middle East. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, NATO's security landscape will be altered significantly. In this paper I argue that if Iran cannot be stopped to develop a nuclear weapons option, Iran will become a new focus of NATO's deterrence thinking. Missile defenses and "deterrence by denial" strategies will gain more importance for NATO, while at the same time nuclear weapons and "deterrence by punishment" will become less significant. The NATO summit at Lisbon will be an important milestone on this way, but the Alliance will need years to adjust to a new security environment and to find common ground on the future nuclear weapons and missile defense relationship. An important element of this adaptation process needs to be a new partnership with Russia. For if NATO wants to avoid its missile defense projects to stand in the way of improved relations with Russia and of further nuclear reductions, it has to find ways of discussing possible cooperation in this field with Moscow.

US Nuclear Forces in Europe: Still Relevant?

Extended deterrence based on the threat of punishment has always been the bedrock of NATO's nuclear policy. The United States guaranteed its European non-nuclear partners as well as Canada that its nuclear forces would not only counter a potential Soviet attack on the US homeland, but also one on the territories of its allies. More specifically, a special arrangement called "nuclear sharing" was established, according to which European delivery systems and their crews were prepared and trained to deploy US nuclear weapons based in Europe in times of war.

Extended deterrence has never been an easy undertaking, mainly because the requirements of deterrence and assurance often are not identical. What has become known as the "Healy Theorem" illustrates this best: "It takes only five per cent credibility of US retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans."

More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, extended deterrence is still relevant for NATO, as has been pointed out by NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, when he described the stationing of US nuclear forces in Europe as an essential part of a credible deterrent. Likewise, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review argues that the presence of US nuclear weapons combined with NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements

contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.

The US deployed nuclear forces in Europe for the first time in 1953-54. Their numbers peaked in 1971 at around 7,300 nuclear warheads of thirteen different types. Since the end of the Cold War, these numbers have been drastically reduced. Today, only 150-200 air-launched gravity bombs remain. They are stored in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey, and would be deployed by aircraft that are on extremely low-level alert. The NATO Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 defined the role of theses weapons as political: to deter potential adversaries and to preserve peace.

It is widely acknowledged that in today's strategic environment, NATO's non-strategic systems have little or no military operational relevance. The respective combat aircraft have limited flight-ranges and would be vulnerable during combat operations when attacking well defended targets. Moreover, there are even concerns regarding the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons at US sites in Europe, making them potential targets of theft.

While the argument above provides a rationale for the withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe, such a decision would contribute to already widespread sensitivities, particularly in new NATO countries. They might interpret such a move as evidence that their security needs are not well taken care of. Central and East European NATO members would apprehend that such a nuclear withdrawal would only be the pretext of a complete American retreat from Europe, making them more vulnerable to Russian assertiveness and intimidation.

This is not to say that old NATO members do not value the US nuclear presence in Europe; they do. In the view of new and old members alike, US nuclear forces in Europe are an essential link with the strategic US forces and help maintain allied cohesion and solidarity. Furthermore, those countries that host US nuclear bombs and participate in nuclear sharing (the so-called DCA countries) are aware that in doing so they have a special status within the Alliance. Their impact on NATO's nuclear policy making is more significant than that of other NATO members. True, apart from France, all NATO countries take part in the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. But this body would certainly loose its prominence if the US and the UK would remain as the only members directly related to nuclear affairs. The US on its part welcomes the participation of allies in nuclear extended deterrence including NATO's nuclear sharing, because the latter is an instrument of burden-sharing in terms of financial costs as well as political risks and responsibilities.

However, the group of DCA countries does not speak with one voice. While Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium speak out in favor of a US nuclear withdrawal, Italy and Turkey are opposed. In the case of Italy, the country's status within the Alliance seems to be an important factor. In Turkey many fear to be confronted with a dilemma. If Iran becomes a nuclear power and at the same time the US removes all its nuclear weapons from Turkish territory, Ankara's security would be diminished. If, however, the US removes its nuclear forces from other NATO countries but not from Turkey in a situation where it would remain unclear whether Iran would develop a nuclear option, then Ankara would have a hard time to explain to its non-NATO neighbors why it still hosts nuclear weapons while all other NATO countries are pulling them out. This problem might become particularly delicate as the 2010 NPT Review Conference decided to convene a conference to discuss a WMD free-zone in the Middle East in 2012.

Finally, one should also not forget that the stationing of US nuclear forces in Europe has always had a non-proliferation dimension. The idea of nuclear sharing was developed in the 1960s to convince the Federal Republic of Germany to renounce nuclear weapons. Today, few believe that Germany would ever develop nuclear weapons of its own (in fact, Germany is legally bound by the two-plus-four treaty handling German unification to renounce nuclear weapons).

But other NATO members might change their mind in case nuclear proliferation at NATO's periphery was to take place. Again, this particularly applies to Turkey. While a nuclear weapons program would not be an easy undertaking for Ankara both politically and technically, some already fear that one of the reasons why Turkey currently is so eager to establish a civilian nuclear program is to keep the nuclear weapons option open. The non-proliferation aspect of nuclear extended deterrence is particularly valuable from an American point of view. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review argues that the forward deployment of US nuclear forces reassures non-nuclear allies that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear capabilities.

Modernizing US nuclear forces in Europe?

In case NATO does not abandon US nuclear forces in Europe, certain modernization decisions would be unavoidable. Otherwise, nuclear sharing will wither away over time as ageing platforms become obsolete within the next five to ten years. But any modernization of nuclear-capable platforms would be a hard sell to the public in most European countries. Most importantly, such a decision would signal that the Alliance is inclined to extend nuclear deterrence until 2050 and beyond – a proposition in stark contrast to current initiatives to abandon all nuclear weapons.

Today, there is only one type of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, the B-61 free-fall bomb. This warhead, first produced in 1966, belongs to the oldest US nuclear weapons. However, it has been modernized several times. The Obama Administration has made it clear that it will conduct a full scope B-61 Life Extension Program to enhance safety and security. As far as platforms are concerned, the US will replace its F-16 based in Italy and Turkey for nuclear missions with dual-capable F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) beginning in 2016.

There seems to be much more uncertainty regarding the modernization of aircraft used by European forces. To begin with, it is publicly not known to what extent Greece (where no US nuclear weapons are stationed anymore) and the Turkish Air Force still participate in NATO's nuclear sharing. Both countries continue to take part in exercises that are related to nuclear training, but reports indicate that their pilots are not any longer certified for nuclear missions. Apparently, both Air Forces serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort.

Belgium and Germany are the countries most unlikely to replace their current platforms for nuclear use, the F-16 and the Tornado, respectively. Belgium is not participating in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but rather concentrating on the Airbus 400M transport aircraft project. Brussels may in the future abandon all its fighter aircraft, leaving no room for future nuclear missions. Germany does not take part in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project either. In replacing the Tornado dual-capable aircraft, it is introducing the Eurofighter Typhoon into its air force for conventional operations. This new aircraft could be licensed by the US for nuclear missions, but this would make cost-expensive changes of the aircraft necessary. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the European consortium that is producing the Typhoon would be willing to disclose all technical details of the Eurofighter to the US - the Pentagon's precondition for issuing a nuclear license. Most importantly, the current conservative-liberal government seeks the complete abandonment of US nuclear forces from German territory. This policy rests on a parliamentary consensus reaching across the entire party spectrum and resonating well with the German public. Any decision to modernize rather than forgo nuclear weapons would be opposed by the vast majority of Germans. Against that background, such a decision seems extremely unlikely.

The Netherlands and Italy present a slightly different picture in that regard. Both countries participate in the F-35 JSF project, granting themselves the option for the introduction of such aircraft for nuclear missions. As of yet, both governments have not passed any decisions

in that regard. The Hague gives Germany some political support in its efforts to make the European NATO allies nuclear-free. Italy so far keeps away from such initiatives.

In light of these political, financial as well as technical uncertainties, a modernization of European platforms for nuclear use in most cases is doubtful. Whether individual countries would take such a decision if others deny, is an open question.

Negotiating Nuclear Forces in Europe?

Russia's non-strategic arsenal is estimated at between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads. Uncertainty as to the exact numbers calls for more transparency to be reached through arms control initiatives. Provided the US-Russian New-START agreement on the reduction of strategic warheads is ratified, a new round of arms control talks that could include also non-strategic weapons could begin soon. But such negotiations face a number of complicated issues.

For starters, there is no commonly accepted definition of the term "non-strategic" nuclear weapons. The best that one can say is that this category covers all those US and Russian nuclear systems that are not subject to the START and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Such weapons range from gravity bombs to sea-launched systems such as torpedoes or cruises missiles based on submarines and surface vessels, as well as to nuclear warheads for air- and missile defense systems still stored in Russia. These weapons serve different military purposes. For example, the Russian navy apparently perceives nuclear weapons on attack submarines as absolutely essential to confront the US navy in a conflict, but the Russian Air Force believes its remaining gravity bombs to be insignificant. Whether such a great variety of weapons systems can be negotiated within the next round of arms control talks remains rather questionable.

Verification would be difficult, too. In recent agreements, verification mainly focused on the destruction of delivery systems. In the case of the remaining non-strategic nuclear forces, though, most of the delivery systems are of dual-use nature and are mainly operated in a conventional role. Therefore, verification would need to concentrate on the destruction of warheads. This would imply complicated issues of confidentiality. For the first time, accounting for individual warheads would become necessary, so that inspections would need to take place at nuclear warhead storage sites.

Furthermore, it today remains unclear to what extend Russia has any interest in negotiating its non-strategic forces. Mirror-imaging NATO's Cold War attitudes, Russia in general is relying upon nuclear weapons as a counterweight to NATO's conventional advantages. More importantly, many in Moscow would see negotiations on strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons as an unwelcome political concession in case the imbalance between NATO and Russia in terms of conventional weapons is not addressed in parallel.

In addition, when negotiations begin, there would be a temptation for Russia to impact Western publics and to separate NATO governments from each other. Moscow's goal is to introduce the basic principle that nuclear weapons should only be based on the territories of the countries that own them. This implies the complete withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe - a long-standing demand of Russian and Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, Russia is unwilling to completely abandon its own non-strategic weapons. Such a Russian approach would be popular with many European publics and governments alike, but opposed by others. Maintaining Alliance cohesion, therefore, would be a tough challenge.

Finally, Russia can be expected to argue, as it already did in the 1980's, that British and French nuclear forces should become part of a future agreement. Particularly Paris can be expected to heavily oppose such a move on the grounds that it does see all its nuclear forces as strategic and the maintenance of its force de frappe as an element of its independent foreign

policy. London, too, is not enthusiastic to complicate its already difficult decision-making on the future of its Trident nuclear forces with a participation in arms control negotiations.

On top of all these difficulties, one should not forget that the next round of US-Russian arms control talks will be a complex matter anyway. Specifically, such strategic reductions seem unfeasible as long as Washington and Moscow do not reach consensus on how to deal with the missile defense issue.

Against the backdrop of all these complexities, the report of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO carefully argues that there should be an ongoing NATO dialogue with Russia on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines and transparency. These talks should help set the stage for the further reduction and possible eventual elimination of the entire class of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. A next step might be the consolidation of non-strategic weapons in fewer locations, which might help to establish transparency and build confidence. Indeed, such an approach seems to be promising at least as a first step.

Refocusing Extended Deterrence I: From Russia to the Middle East

Despite numerous efforts to improve the NATO-Russia relationship, including through the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council, lingering suspicions on both sides remain. Russians perceive NATO's policy of enlargement as a challenge to Moscow's own goal of establishing a sphere of influence in what many still call the "near-abroad". Against the background of their still vivid memories of Soviet occupation, new NATO members continue to perceive Russia as a threat. Russian oil cut-offs, trade embargos, cyber-attacks as well as the 2008 war against Georgia have all contributed to this threat perception. Indeed, it can hardly be expected that Western and Russian interests will become identical in the near future. This is due to Russia's sheer seize, making it both a European as well as an Asian player; its possession of a nuclear arsenal only comparable to the American one; as well as its domestic development, which combines both democratic and autocratic elements.

Still, Russia and the West share important interests. One of the latest examples has been the signing, after a relatively short period of negotiations, of the New-START agreement to limit US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces. Another example is Moscow's acceptance of new and more forceful sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council that are meant to convince the Iranian leadership to change its current nuclear course. The NATO-Russian relationship can be characterized as a mix of cooperation and confrontation.

But NATO's extended deterrence is not only dependent on Russia and may continue, even if NATO and Russia were to achieve substantial progress in their relationship. Rather, its regional focus may shift from Russia to the Middle East. We do not know yet whether the E-3 plus 3 will be successful with their two-track approach of sanctions as well as incentives to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapons option. Nor do we know whether military action will be taken to end Iran's controversial nuclear projects, or what the result of such military operations would be. What we know is that an Iranian nuclear capability would definitely change NATO's security environment significantly – although it will never be comparable to the threat the Soviet Union imposed during the Cold War. NATO partners at its Southern flank would not be the only ones to feel less secure. Given the possibility that Iran might not only develop a nuclear option but also ballistic missiles that could reach Berlin or Brussels within this decade, Central European NATO countries would also need to be reassured and protected. In addition, NATO could hardly be indifferent in case Israel or one of those Arab countries that participate in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative became the victim of Iranian military pressure. In sum, as a consequence of a possible nuclear dynamic in the Middle East, this region would gain importance for NATO.

The US is already cooperating with Israel as well as a number of Arab countries in the field of missile defenses and deploys such systems in some of these countries. If these efforts already underway were to become part of an American containment policy vis-a-vis a nuclear Iran, NATO would be affected. This holds true, even if NATO's own missile defenses would not be directly linked to regional defense architectures in the Middle East.

Refocusing Extend Deterrence II: From Nuclear Weapons to Missile Defense

The aim of the Obama Administration is to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. At the same time, its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review values conventional power-projection capabilities as well as effective missile defenses for regional security architectures. Particularly missile defenses can be expected to gain importance.

As the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO observed, NATO missile defenses could enhance transatlantic sharing of responsibility and reinforce the principle that security is indivisible. In fact, an extended deterrence-by-denial strategy might be preferable to a deterrence-by-punishment approach, provided that effective defense systems become available. Because such a strategy stresses the importance of defenses, it might overcome credibility problems always involved in extended deterrence mainly based on nuclear threats. During the Cold War, Europeans have always questioned Washington's promise to escalate to the strategic nuclear level in case a conflict with the Soviet had occurred. If extended deterrence relied more upon defenses, such credibility problems might become negligible, as the US would not put its own existence at stake.

President Obama's missile defense plans include a number of important advantages as compared to George W. Bush's approach. In contrast to the plans of the previous Administration, the Obama defense architecture is not American-centric. Rather, the US now intends its missile defense effort to be multinational and integrated with NATO members' defense capabilities - a fact that led NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen to welcome Obama's decision. Washington, moreover, focuses on more realistic and immediate threats, i.e. medium-range missiles that could hit Europe rather than intercontinental missiles that could reach US homeland. The envisioned stationing of the sea- and land-based versions of the Navy's SM-3 interceptors is more capable of defending Europe including its Southern flank (which was neglected by Bush). At the same time it is more flexible.

A NATO missile defense system would make sense particularly with a view to a potential nuclear dynamic in the Middle East. Nuclear newcomers of that region would most likely not be as irrational as to directly attack NATO, which is still the most powerful military alliance in the world. But they might behave assertively or even conduct aggression against their neighbors. The Alliance might want to respond to such action, because it feels responsible for maintaining international order. Moreover, NATO might be mandated by the UN Security Council for military operations in the Middle East. But if the aggressor possessed nuclear weapons, NATO might be deterred from intervention. To be sure, a first use of nuclear weapons against NATO would be without doubt responded to with a devastating counter-attack. But NATO could never be sure whether its deterrence would work.

This scenario suggests that a fundamental change is taking place in terms of the circumstances, under which deterrence needs to work. In the past, during the Cold War period, the main idea of deterrence was not to use military force in a relatively stable situation between East and West, at least in Europe. In the future, in a world with more nuclear powers equipped with long-range ballistic missiles, those countries that feel responsible to protect international order would need to decide whether to use their forces against aggressions in a contingency that might result in severe damage caused by the use of nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Deliberately accepting one's own vulnerability, as was the case during the Cold War, does not

seem the appropriate strategic approach in such a context. Instead, effective damage limitation options would be a useful tool. Moreover, even limited missile defenses would have an impact on an aggressor's calculations.

Missile defenses moreover will have an alliance dimension. Step-by-step, they could replace in many ways the importance that nuclear-sharing has for NATO today. A NATO effort to establish missile defenses would keep the US committed to European defense. Allies could find new opportunities to actively participate in NATO force planning through arrangements similar to the Nuclear Planning Group. Finally, missile defenses would have a non-proliferation impact on allies.

A shift from extended deterrence based on punishment and nuclear weapons to one based on denial and missile defenses can be expected in the years to come. But this process certainly will take time. To make sure missile defenses do not have a negative effect on NATO-Russia relations, NATO's missile defense activities must be accompanied by efforts to cooperate in this field with Moscow. As has been rightly observed by many, without such an offer for dialogue and cooperation, missile defenses could severely damage NATO-Russian relations.

At first glance, the prospects for NATO-Russia cooperation regarding missile defenses seem relatively positive. Both sides perceive current trends in missile proliferation as increasingly threatening their interests. For the Obama Administration and NATO alike, missile defense cooperation with Russia is attractive for several reasons. For one, US and NATO missile defense plans are not directed against Russia, as has been reiterated by the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010. Second, missile defense cooperation would help to enhance NATO-Russia relations in general and to align Moscow in an effort to confront proliferation states, most notably Iran. Third, Western governments are aware that without NATO-Russia cooperation, missile defenses would stand in the way of further nuclear reductions. However, Washington has no intention to provide Russia with a veto concerning missile defense planning or operations.

From Moscow's perspective, the picture looks different. After the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, Russia was suspicious that the Bush Administration's missile defense plans aimed to undermine Russia's nuclear second strike capability. While such fears could be diminished with the Obama Administration's new missile defense approach, they still persist, particularly within the Russian military. Whether Russia today is prepared to begin missile defense cooperation with the US or NATO is an open question. Some in Moscow may still hope that public resistance in European NATO countries as well as budgetary constraints will compel the Alliance to reduce or even abandon its missile defense plans. Such an outcome might be preferred by Russian military planners, with Russian-NATO missile defense cooperation being only the second-best solution. In addition, Russians are aware that their own defense projects in many ways are not comparable with US efforts. Any US-Russian cooperation would thus uncomfortably reflect the imbalance between the two Cold War antagonists. Moreover, Moscow recognizes that any NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation might negatively impact its relations with China. In any event, Russia's main interest is to reduce the unpredictability of US and NATO missile defense efforts. To that end, Moscow aims at integrating early warning and defense systems. Only the exchange of data would not be enough for Russia. Russia's proposals of 2007 to make its Gabala and Armavir radars available for NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation have to be seen in that context.

In practical terms, already in 1998, the United States and Russia signed a common statement on the establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow, the purpose of which would be the prevention of accidental nuclear war through the exchange of information from each country's early warning system. The JDEC, however, could also be used for the data exchange of missile launches by third countries. Regrettably, though, the planned JDEC has not been opened yet. Since President Barack Obama took office, discussions about

activating the JDEC have been revived. In June 2010, the US and Russia published a joint statement, renewing their commitment to exchange data on ballistic missile launches with the ultimate goal of creating an international system to monitor, and exchange data on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. On the NATO-Russia level, in 2002, a working group on theatre missile defense was established within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. This group conducted several simulation exercises aimed at enhanced NATO-Russian interoperation ability. After the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, these activities became the victim of the temporary suspension of the NATO-Russia Council meetings.

In any event, many hurdles to cooperation remain. Not only are technologies complex and cost-expensive, there are also difficult command-and-control issues. For instance, Russia would like to control the use of any asset it may make available to a common architecture, but at the same time, NATO commanders have no intention to make the use of the missile defense system dependent on Russian authorization. The main problem, therefore, remains the lack of confidence of the parties. As long as more confidence has not been built, both sides would hesitate to reveal their vulnerabilities in the course of enhanced missile defense cooperation. Moreover, as far as NATO is concerned, many still fear that information about Western missile defense capabilities – and hence its deficiencies – could end up in Tehran or Beijing.

As has been proposed by the Obama Administration, a dialogue with Russia should be intensified to consider topics such as research or simulations and exercises with the aim of gradually developing elements of a joint missile defense architecture. In the longer term, consultations with China should also begin, since from Beijing's perspective, US-Russian missile defense cooperation would be a nightmare, given China's still limited offensive nuclear capabilities. But if it turns out that Russia is unwilling to cooperate with NATO in terms of missile defenses – a possibility that cannot be ruled out giving current Russian hesitance – NATO might conclude that it needs to meet new strategic requirements on its own.

The future of nuclear weapons and missile defenses for NATO

Significant changes in NATO's nuclear posture as well as its missile defense policy will not occur over night. But slowly and steadily, missile defenses will become more important for the Alliance defense posture, while at the same time the significance of US nuclear forces stationed in Europe will diminish. Still, NATO will remain to be a nuclear alliance, but deterrence by denial will gain importance over deterrence by punishment. This process can expected to be accelerated in case Iran becomes a nuclear power and the Alliance's extended deterrence focus shifts from Russia to the Middle East. In case NATO was not confronted with a nuclear Iran, missile defenses would be developed at slower pace, given defense budget constraints.

In any event, NATO is required to talk to Russia both about the future of nuclear arms in Europe and the prospects of cooperation in the sphere of missile defenses. But if Moscow proves to be uninterested in close cooperation with NATO, the Alliance in the end would need to meet its strategic requirements alone.

In the coming years NATO should

- Develop a missile defense posture in coordination with the Obama Administration's missile defense plans;
- Further reduce the salience of nuclear weapons;
- Establish a dialogue with Russia about transparency and confidence building regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons with a view to integrating this weapon category into the overall arms control agenda;
- Engage Russia in missile defense cooperation projects.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

(3)

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

ROME, 8 NOVEMBER 2010

Russia in European Security Architecture: Contributor or Contender?

by

Arkady Moshes
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki

Introduction: duality that is not to be overcome soon

As it was frequently and correctly pointed out, in August 2008 the European security system demonstrated a fundamental deficiency. Multiple multilateral and bilateral structures that have been created earlier to guarantee peace, stability and cooperation on the continent proved to be unable to prevent a war between two countries, Russia and Georgia, which were both members of several of those structures, starting with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Since that moment serious attempts have been undertaken to address this deficiency on both conceptual and practical levels. The expert discussion has produced a solid body of recommendations on how to foster long-term and all-inclusive security in Europe[1]. In turn, the institutions concerned have launched a series of consultations and debates, aimed at raising their effectiveness within the allocated spheres of competence.

The underlying problem, however, does not seem to have been solved, and is in all fairness very difficult to approach in a comprehensive manner. This problem is the inherent dualism of Russia's role in European security, a deep internal antagonism which affects both what Russia does and even more so the external perceptions of its actions.

On the one hand, it is a common sense to believe that Europe cannot hope to have a sustainable security regime without Russia's participation. Apparently, no one would be willing to contest the conclusion that if Russia for whatever reason chooses not to be a responsible stake-holder – let alone to undermine whichever emerging or existing arrangement – it will be difficult to make it work, especially if one deals with the territories of the so-called "Common Neighbourhood" between Russia and the enlarged EU/NATO. Consequently, it becomes crucial to involve Russia into the construction of a cooperative regime, and this is why President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative to conduct negotiations on a new European Security Treaty, put forward in summer 2008, was received in the West as an invitation to a serious discussion[2].

On the other hand, it is equally self-evident that for a number of European countries Russia primarily represents a security concern - not one part of the problem, but the entire and

---

[1] To name just a few, one can see the following publications. Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths. EastWest Institute, 2009; *K novoi arkhitekture evropeiskoi bezopasnosti* (Towards a new European security architecture). Russian experts' report for the Valdai club conference, London, 8-10 December 2009; M.Klein. Russia's Plan for a New Pan-European Security Regime: A Serious Proposal or an Attempt at Division? – *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 55, 18 February 2009, pp. 6-9; S. Dias Fernandez. Time to reassess European security architecture? The NATO-EU-Russia Security Triangle. *European Policy Institute Network Working Paper No. 22*, March 2009; R. Mutzenich. Security with or against Russia? On the Russian proposal for a "European Security Treaty". *International Politics and Society*, No. 2, 2010, Electronic Ed.; U.Kuhn. Medvedev's Proposals for a New European Security Order: A Starting point or the End of the Story? *Connections*, Vol.9, No. 2, 2010, pp.1-16;V. Baranovsky. Russia's Approach to Security Building in the Euro-Atlantic Zone. The International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 41-53; A.Arbatov, V.Dvorkin, S.Oznobishchev. *Moskva-Brinssel: voprosy ostayutsya. Otnosheniya Rossii i NATO: vozmozhno li realistichnoe partnerstvo?* (Moscow-Brussels: questions remain. Relations between Russia and NATO: is real partnership possible?). *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, July 2-8, 2010; J.Vaquer I Fanes. Focusing again on European Security: The Medvedev proposal as an opportunity. *Documentos CIDOB* Seguridad y politica mundial 06, July 2010. Some other relevant publications will be also quoted below.

[2] A 14-point draft was finally made public in November 2009. It is limited to the principle of indivisibility of security, stipulates that security measures taken by one party shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of other parties and essentially places allegiance to the treaty above the allegiance to all other existing alliance obligations.

only problem. Traditionally, observers attribute this view to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have historical reasons to reproduce anxiety vis-à-vis Russia, but in reality the list is not fully exhausted by those countries, even though the apprehensions may be weaker and are not expressed too vocally[3].

The task of engaging Russia is thus automatically becoming bi-dimensional. As rightly emphasized by Russian scholar Vladimir Baranovsky, "among the challenges that Europe is facing in terms of organizing its own security space, the most serious one could be defined as alleviating concerns *in* and *about* Russia" (italics come from the original text)[4].

The dilemma is easily solved on a theoretical level, if the objectives are - somewhat mechanically – united within a single political framework. A good example of this approach can be found in the recommendations of a high-level expert group on a new strategic concept for NATO, which state that allies "should endorse a policy that combines reassurance for all Alliance members and constructive re-engagement with Russia" and that the goal of cooperation must be pursued "while also guarding against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction"[5].

But whether this can be achieved in practice remains an open question. It is totally possible that one of the two components of the strategy will be given a priority. It is easy to declare that European security should be indivisible and address the concerns of all participating states. It is more difficult, when agreeing that today's European security regime cannot neglect the interests of Russia, not to imply that this would ignore the interests of Georgia – and vice versa - because their bilateral conflict leaves no hope to be solved soon.

This unique dualism of the Russian position will affect European security in the foreseeable future and determine the uncertainty concerning the future of Russian-Western re-engagement in the security field. It would be definitely wrong at the moment to predict the reversal of the current trend, but it would be equally wrong to forecast a smooth advancement towards sustainable partnership. It can only be hoped that pragmatic cooperation will be possible on specific issues and, if successful, that it will gradually decrease mutual mistrust.

Seeing an opportunity

The positive momentum in Russian-Western security relationship is undeniable. Its key elements can be easily identified and assessed. A number of problems was solved or at least said to have been solved.

The main driver is, naturally, the reset between Moscow and Washington, which has produced extremely important results such as a new START agreement, signed in April 2010, the scrapping by the Obama administration of the plans to deploy elements of a strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia's confirmed commitment to support US and NATO effort in Afghanistan and, most recently, Russia's backing of new sanctions on Iran and the cancellation of the sale of S-300 air defence system to Tehran[6]. The atmosphere in the bilateral relations changed for the better to the degree that even a spy scandal that broke out in July 2010 does not seem to have had any negative political impact. But most importantly,

---

[3] As an illustration, a leading Finnish columnist writes: "Whether Russia is a great power or not, it remains Finland's only security policy risk". K.Huhta. The voice of Finland: audible, but still rather quiet. – *Helsingin Sanomat – International Edition,* 24 August 2010, http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NEWS+ANALYSIS+The+voice+of+Finland+audible+but+still+rather+quiet/1135259588056

[4] V.Baranovsky. Op.cit., p. 42.

[5] NATO 2020: assured security; dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendation of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO, 17 May 2010, pp. 27, 16.

[6] For details see R. Craig Nation. Results of the "Reset" in US-Russian relations. *IFRI Russie/Nei/Visions*, No. 53, July 2010

taking the role that US plays in defining the security discourse in the West at large into account, the Obama administration's readiness to view Russia primarily as a partner in enforcing the global non-proliferation regime and fighting terrorism and to seek compromises with Moscow on the basis of this understanding triggered a similar wave of re-thinking in other countries. Voices of Russia-sceptics have not disappeared, but have largely gone out of fashion.

Consequently, NATO-Russian contacts that had been frozen since the Russian-Georgian conflict were normalized. The sessions of the NATO-Russia Council resumed. NATO's new Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made an improvement of the Alliance's relations with Moscow his priority and has even become a champion of a joint missile defence project that would include Russia. Suggestions to invite Russia to join NATO have been aired by various academic and public figures[7], and recently President Medvedev has agreed to get to Lisbon in November 2010 to attend the NATO-Russia summit.

What is crucial, the current normalization is based on a solid underpinning, namely on an implicit recognition on both sides that the plans of further eastern enlargement of NATO have been shelved *ad infinitum* or abandoned altogether. NATO's public position may still refer to the decisions of the 2008 Bucharest summit according to which Ukraine and Georgia one day would be members of NATO, but that does not look credible. The reason is not only the fear to get involved into a real military conflict with Russia in case of further enlargement nor the logic according to which "NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is not commensurate with an agenda for resetting US-Russian relations"[8] – after all the Alliance as a whole will probably never produce consensus around this view. There are two other, no less important reasons. One is the conclusion in several leading old member states that their security interests have been sufficiently guaranteed during previous rounds of enlargement and further extension would not add anything to their national security. The other one is the lack of internal support for the membership cause in the Ukrainian case and territorial disputes in the Georgian case, which undermines the legitimacy of the membership bids of both. In this way, the issue that for one and half decades has been the primary irritant for Russia as far as its relations with NATO were concerned, has been taken off the agenda.

In the meantime, the OSCE has been revitalized. The Corfu process, launched in June 2009 with the goal to raise the efficiency of the organization, can be called a success story. First, Russia, despite its general cold attitude towards the organization (Russia has developed a sort of allergy to the OSCE's emphasis on the upholding of democratic standards, which it believes serves as an instrument to exert diplomatic pressure on it), nevertheless chose to take part in the process rather than derail it. Moscow continues to see the Corfu process as a not fully adequate format for the debate and is reluctant to channel the discussion on its proposed European security treaty through the OSCE, but it does not attempt to replace it with a different forum. Second, the Corfu process includes all three baskets of the Helsinki process (political-military, socio-economic, and human dimension) and does not reduce the debate to issues of hard security. On a separate note, but possibly having a linkage to Corfu, Russian attitude to the Council of Europe has changed for the better, which is revealed both in the official appraisal of the organization and the ratification of the so-called 14th Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights[9]; Russia's refusal to do so earlier had blocked the reform of the European Court of Human Rights.

---

[7] See for example, *"It's Time to Invite Russia to Join NATO"*. Open letter by V.Ruhe, K.Naumann, F.Elbe and U.Weisser, Spiegel Online, 8 March 2010, http://spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682287,00.html ; Ch.Kupchan. NATO's Final Frontier. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, Issue 3, May/June 2010, pp. 100-112.

[8] R. Craig Nation, Op. cit., p. 14.

[9] See the article of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "Euro-Atlantica: equal security for all" in *Defence National*, May 2010; here Russian translations of the article is cited which is available at

EU-Russian relations are lagging behind. The negotiations on a new comprehensive framework agreement progress very slowly if at all, reciprocal frustration accumulates in the field of energy relations, whereas the EU initiative on Eastern Partnership is viewed in Moscow as aimed to weaken Russia's influence in the common neighbourhood. The Lisbon treaty's entry info force does not seem to have made Moscow believe that the EU will become a prominent foreign policy actor or that the Union will finally gain the ability to speak with one voice on international and security matters. The mutual interest in launching the so-called Partnership for Modernization is manifested mainly at a level of political declarations and even action plans are yet to be prepared. Several flourishing bilateral relationships between Russia and key EU member states have not grown into an all-encompassing partnership with the Union. Noteworthy, however, in this situation the parties seem to believe that re-invigorating security cooperation may be a way out of the impasse. At least the Russian-German joint proposal, issued in June 2010, to set up the EU-Russian Political and Security Committee is expected to be implemented without major difficulties.

There is a noticeable progress between Russia and some countries, whose relations with Moscow were complicated until recently. Above all, one should mention the Russian-Polish normalization that followed the tragic death of president Lech Kaczynski in Smolensk in April 2010. But the growing Russian-Danish cooperation, which was earlier impeded by Copenhagen's support of the NATO membership of the Baltic States and the non-opposition to the Chechen émigré activity, as well as the solution found by Moscow and Oslo to their old dispute concerning the borders of their respective economic zones in the Arctic, should not be overlooked either. One can also sense a softening of Russia's approach towards the Baltic States.

The election of Viktor Yanukovich as president of Ukraine should have eased Russian concerns about a possible Euro-Atlantic drift of that country. In April Kiev agreed to extend the lease of the naval base in Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2042 and in July Ukraine's parliament adopted the legislation proclaiming country's so-called "non-bloc" status, according to which Ukraine is barred from joining any military alliance. The medium-term future of Russian-Ukrainian relations is not clear. Obviously, the controversies resulting from Russia's interest in taking control of the Ukrainian gas transit system, assets in aircraft and chemical industry as well as railway and port infrastructure will push Yanukovich towards balancing Russia with the help of the West, while the deplorable state of the national economy will make him seek the support of international financial institutions, which will open the possibility for the West to approach Ukraine by means of a conditionality policy. Moscow would hardly view such developments with indifference. However, it would simply not be feasible to exert on Yanukovich the same kind of pressure (gas supply cuts, withdrawal of an ambassador, break in top-level contacts) as the previous Ukrainian administration had to withstand. The conflict potential is thus diminishing also here.

Finally, the very nature of the current debate should facilitate the engagement between Russia and the West. The renewed and narrowed focus on hard security should raise Russia's interest to continue it, because this is the only field where it can substantiate the claim to be considered equal to the West.

Understanding the Complexity

Welcoming the change for the better, it would be nevertheless simply wrong to underestimate those powerful factors that impede the sustainability of the process. The context in which Russia and its Western partners try to re-define the role of the former in European security has not yet evolved to the extent that would make positive trends irreversible.

---

http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/11767a9c3045022cc325772d00415746?OpenDocument

First of all, the gap in rules and norms that regulate both internal and external behaviour of Russia and the EU/NATO states respectively has not narrowed and apparently is not narrowing. "Rules" here may be a more meaningful word than "values" which can be illustrated by looking into less sensitive issues than security. For example, Russia's inability to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) after almost two decades of negotiations, which is difficult to interpret as hinging on something other than a lack of interest, reveals that Moscow is not ready to play by rules set by others. In turn, "the others" do not want to change the rules that they have set up before and which, they believe, still work. Absence of common rules minimizes the window of opportunities by definition. Ad hoc cooperation on specific issues becomes the only available option as opposed to a comprehensive all-out engagement.

It is easy to come across the same feature when one returns to the security domain. Given the absence of normative convergence between Russia and Western countries, it does not come as a surprise that only Russia promotes the idea of a new European security treaty while other states are essentially happy with the existing NATO-based and OSCE-based continental security arrangement, and that only Russia of all member states of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty believes that its interests will be better guaranteed if it withdraws from the treaty than if it complies with it.

Second, when analysts say that today's opportunity is comparable with those that emerged after the cold war and 9/11, their logic is not fully convincing[10]. In the two previous cases the fundamental changes in the global security situation were obvious. Today, one rather deals with a reassessment and new understanding of priorities than with a revolutionary transformation of the security landscape. For as long as the current political choices can be again revised, they can hardly serve as a firm background for re-engagement. What will happen if the next US administration for whichever reason decides to again focus on democracy promotion globally or in the former Soviet Union? What will happen if the oil prices return to the levels of 2008 diminishing – not the objective need but – the immediate urgency for the Russian government to seek economic interaction with the West? What will happen if personal foreign policy style of Russia's next leader will be closer to the assertive content of Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech than to the more cooperative wording of Dmitry Medvedev? These questions are not rhetorical, but of direct practical relevance.

In reality, besides the European security treaty initiative - associated, noteworthy, with the name of president Medvedev rather than with a ruling tandem as a whole - Russian diplomacy displays more continuity than change. It has not given up the post-imperial claim to have special rights in the post-Soviet space. It continues to see NATO's actions with extreme suspicion[11]. It is reluctant to make even those insignificant but symbolically important gestures that would create a more open and more cooperative image of Russian leadership[12]. It is candid, provocative, self-confident and certain about the correctness of the *fait accompli*-type of policy

---

[10] A.Lieven. Spies aside Moscow has Come from the Cold. – *Financial Times*, July 1, 2010.

[11] Russian Military Doctrine adopted in February 2010 identifies attempts to give NATO global missions and advancement of NATO states military infrastructure towards Russian border as the major external danger of war. http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/2a959a74cd7ed01f432569fb004872a3?OpenDocument

[12] NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, for instance, expressed his regrets that whereas NATO while preparing its new Strategic Concept had invited Russia to provide input, Moscow published the Military Doctrine without any consultations with NATO. – T.McNicoil. Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Reaching Out to Russia. *Newsweek*, Vol. 155, Iss.8, Feb. 22, 2010.

when discussing the most divisive issue on the Russian-Western agenda – the outcome of 2008 war with Georgia[13].

To sum up, Russia perceives itself as a pole in the multi-polar world and it does not seem that it would feel uncomfortable to be in a position defined by analysts as "strategic solitude"[14]. To what extent this is a genuine self-assessment or diplomatic appearance may be worth a separate discussion, but it is clear that the great power thinking, "red-line" and "zero-sum" attitudes, remain rather strong.

Third, one cannot ignore a striking asymmetry of reciprocal interests. The interests that are not antagonist and could be harmonized in principle do not match with each other and, therefore, do not lead to an easy trade-off. To be more specific:

a) Whereas the Western interest in partnership with Russia is very much security-driven, Russian interest is to a large extent determined by economic factors. However, in order to attract foreign investment and technologies a country does not necessarily have to develop security cooperation with the West, as proven by Asian states. It would suffice to open the economy, to accede to the system of global rules and to fight crime, corruption and abuse at home. In short, the recipe as to how to create a favourable economic regime for foreign investment is well-known. Furthermore, a kind of trade-off in this particular sphere has already taken place in the middle of the past decade when the West chose to pursue the so-called "pragmatic interests" in relations with Russia while agreeing to put the value gap on a backburner;

b) Whereas the primary interest of the West is to secure Russian cooperation on global issues, the price that it might have to pay would concern issues of European security per se. Whether the commonality of global interests can be successfully decoupled from disagreements in the continental affairs is doubtful;

c) Whereas the West urges Russia to proceed from the commonality of soft security risks, Russia would more likely gain the recognition of its status raising the hard security agenda where it is by definition a primary player;

d) Within the soft security sphere (internal security, justice and home affairs) Russia has strongly voiced its interest in two objectives: more effective fight against Afghan drugs trafficking and introduction of the visa freedom for reciprocal travel of Russian and EU citizens. It is hard to predict whether, when and how Russian demands could be met. But it is obvious that if Russia and the EU do not trust each other (and each other's law enforcement system) to such an extent that they cannot agree to allow mutual short-term visa-free visits, the road to soft security cooperation will be very long.

Fourth, it remains to be seen whether the platform of security partnership between Russia and the West will be supported by public opinion. If not, the mutual rapprochement will be lacking democratic legitimacy. Admittedly, this is a relatively less important factor to be taken into account by foreign policy practitioners, but nevertheless it is not possible to restore the mutual confidence unless the process relies on a broad public support. The Russian public opinion, due to the governmental control of the broadcast media is more likely to follow the

---

[13] Minister Lavrov said in an interview: "For us the question is settled finally and irreversibly. I would dare say that it is equally and irreversibly settled for other serious countries. It's just due to political correctness or other political reasons they cannot officially admit that". – *Kommersant*, June 11, 2010.

[14] Term by a French analyst T.Gomart. See Russia Alone Forever? The Kremlin's Strategic Solitude *Politque étrangère*, special issue "World Policy Conference", 2008, p. 23-33.

change in the official rhetoric, and this explains why in May 2010 33% of respondents of the opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center said that rapprochement with NATO would be in Russia's interest compared with only 23 % a year earlier. But at the same time 34 % still thought it would be against Russia's interest (49% in 2009) and 33% found it difficult to answer (28% in 2009). Noteworthy, between 2004 and 2010 the share of opponents to this cooperation was always bigger than that of supporters[15]. In turn, in Europe, including the countries viewed to be Russia's close partners like Germany or France, Russia's image also worsened considerably throughout the last decade (even though further studies are needed), not least as a result of its conflict with Georgia[16].

Fifth, banal as it could sound, European security today is not bipolar. There is a group of countries – especially Ukraine, but Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan should be borne in mind as well – which are not members of the Euro-Atlantic zone of security and prosperity, but which also consistently refuse to take part in Russia-cantered security projects , even though some of them do not have aspirations to join EU or NATO. Unless they are integrated into a new regime, the system will not be stable.

Institutions over-locking and over-blocking: what to expect?

One of the conceptual premises of the current round of the debate on how to re-engage Russia into security cooperation is the assumption about its isolation and exclusion by the West which is supposed to explain Russia's discomfort. American scholar Charles Kupchan, for example, even though he admits that this outcome was in part a product of Russia's own making because its stalled democratic transition and because certain foreign policy actions warranted NATO's role as a hedge against re-emergence of Russian expansionism, emphasizes that the West constructed "a post-Cold War order that effectively shuts Russia out"[17].

It is difficult to accept this conclusion in its entirety. A holder of the permanent seat in the UN Security Council and a member of a large number of continental as well as regional organizations in Europe, Russia can hardly be viewed as having no say in European security. What is true, however, is that more than once this say was not loud enough to be able to prevent the developments that Moscow would have liked to prevent. First of all, one should refer to several decisions adopted by the West in the Balkans. Russian opposition was ignored, and the West chose the same *fait accompli*-based approach for which it later criticized Russian actions in the South Caucasus. But most importantly, this concerns the inability of Russia to affect decisions taken inside NATO in any systemic way, if at all. If this is the main embodiment of isolation and marginalization and the source of Moscow's major discontent, then there is little reason to believe that the situation can dramatically evolve for the better.

To change the substance of NATO-Russian relations is extremely difficult because whereas Russia's membership in the Alliance is neither sought nor can be seen as easily feasible, any status which is short of membership – and thus short of the full veto right – will hardly satisfy Moscow. The latter explains why the cooperative arrangements which have been tested first in the shape of the Permanent Joint Council established in 1997 and than the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) set up in 2002 have not lived up to expectations.

Russian official position, according to which the country should not try to join NATO even if invited, reflects a near consensus that exists in the analytical community. More conservative analysts arrive at this conclusion because they realize that the accession to the alliance based on values would require fundamental and, from their point of view, not desirable internal transformation of the country. It would again imply the agreement to fulfil membership

---

[15] http://www.levada.ru/press/2010061502.html

[16] See St.Szabo. Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia? – The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32. No. 4, October 2009, pp. 26-28.

[17] Ch.Kupchan. Op. cit., p. 100.

criteria set up by others and would make all the attempts to prevent membership of other countries – notably Georgia and Ukraine – ahead of Russia logically unsustainable and practically futile. Both conservatives and liberals agree that by entering NATO Russia would lose its geostrategic identity and would have to accept US unquestionable leadership, which would not be in its interest. Separately, a warning against provoking China by joining NATO is sometimes made[18].

Lack of membership aspirations as such is not necessarily an obstacle for cooperation. On the contrary, officially Moscow emphasizes the usefulness that it sees in the activity of the NATO-Russia Council[19], and some experts have explored the opportunities of evolution towards a "strategic partnership" and even the prospect of a union between Russia and NATO in the long term[20]. One of the lessons that seems to have been learned from the conflict between Russia and Georgia is that Russia-NATO security dialogue and consultations should continue also in difficult situations and that the NRC should not be a "good weather" platform. All this notwithstanding, it is clear that a body that brings together a group of states which can have prior consultations and an agreed position, and an outsider, has essential structural limits.

This dilemma was addressed by the Russian proposal on the new European Security Treaty. As recalled above, this initiative triggered a very useful discussion. But now, after two and half years of debates, it can be firmly argued that the attempt to circumvent the problem of Russia's lack of partnership and even understanding with NATO by means of creating a new regime is not going to succeed. As concluded by a prominent Brussels-based commentator, "President Medvedev's draft European Security Treaty is not going to fly"[21].

Agreeing to discuss the issues of European security, both Americans and Europeans from the outset remained sceptical towards the specific proposal. It is hardly possible in this paper to go through all the reasons explaining this scepticism which are identified in the literature, but the three most important can be summarized as follows. First, the willingness to make NATO less relevant and to get a say in NATO's affairs was too easy to sense. The Russian initiative was perceived as "proposing a new tier to European security architecture that stands above all existing security arrangements"[22]. Second, the initiative was viewed as intending to be a symbol of the final recognition of Russian political and military resurgence. Third, the proposal was not comprehensive enough and too vague to produce a legally binding document. It omitted important issues, arms control above all. Taken together, this analysis determined Western refusal to negotiate a new security regime for Europe.

It is not clear whether, facing such a reaction, Russia will lose interest in its own initiative. But in either case the situation urgently demands that Russia redefines its attitude towards the OSCE. Moscow can either accept its return to centrality in European security affairs and further contribute to its revitalization, or undermine the whole process, in which case the 2010 Astana summit of OSCE might be followed by the reversal of recent negative trends and the organization's slide toward a status of a "talk shop" at best. Both options are open. On the one hand, fears to indirectly promote human rights and democratization agenda, which is inevitable if the OSCE gains in importance, will work for the latter option. But on the other hand, the OSCE

---

[18] For details, and to compare, see S.Kortunov. *Edinye pravila dlia evroatlantiki* (Same rules for the Euro-Atlantic region). *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 11, 2009; D.Trenin. "Modernization of Russia's Foreign Policy". Public Lecture Polit.Ru, 10 March 2010, http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2010/03/25/trenin.html

[19] Sergei Lavrov in an interview to *Kommersant*, 11 June 2010.

[20] A.Arbatov, V.Dvorkin, S.Oznobishchev. Op. cit.

[21] M.Emerson. Russia in Europe and the West. *CEPS Commentary*, 1 April 2010.

[22] P.Nopens. A New Security Architecture for Europe? Russian Proposals and Western Reactions. Part II. *Security Policy Brief* 10, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, April 2010, p. 5.

may provide at least some balance vis-à-vis NATO, and so raising the effectiveness of this body may be viewed in Moscow as a lesser evil, since otherwise the centrality of NATO will be even more difficult to oppose.

Two new formats of security interaction between Russia and the West are worth exploring. If successful, they can increase confidence between the partners, although results could be limited at the beginning, materialise only gradually and mostly concern a niche capability of cooperation" . One, more promising, format is the above-mentioned EU-Russian Political and Security Committee, the value of which is twofold. First, it would show whether EU and Russia together, not having the possibility to blame - or rely on - the US, can actually take responsibility for solving security problems that are of concern for both. Second, the field for cooperation seems to have been identified: conflict resolution in the common neighbourhood, starting with Transnistria, the pro-Russian, de facto independent enclave in eastern Moldova.

Another format is a platform for cooperation between NATO and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Some observers have suggested that NATO should drop its opposition to this cooperation[23]. Indeed, this would be a good test case to prove whether Western recognition of Russia's leadership within a group of post-Soviet states can actually increase its willingness to cooperate in practice. However, this idea needs to be developed much further before its real added value could be understood. The primary question is not whether individual CSTO member states can invest more in security cooperation with the West (which is already taking place within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme and logistical support for NATO troops in Afghanistan), but whether the CSTO as a whole will develop a capacity to act as a security provider. So far, as attested to by its failure to intervene into the situation in Kyrgyzstan in spring 2010 despite the request from the authorities of this member state, the CSTO in this respect remains more a political organization and lacks either the military potential or the will to use it or both.

Conclusions: what can be done?

Trust in relations between Russia and the West as well as between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours is an absolutely necessary precondition for a stable and cooperative security order in Europe. There are two ways to achieve trust and partner spirit. One is to focus on the common interests and common goals. Another one is to successfully resolve the divisive issues. The former approach, and this is what seems to be happening now according to the proponents of the Russian-Western "reset", often looks and sometimes actually is more promising. The problem, however, is that unless the backlog of old problems is cleared away, they will come back and eventually make the "agreement to disagree" just a figure of speech and disagreement an acute reality. Therefore, in order to proceed towards a real security partnership and strengthen European security the sides must be able to reach progress both on the new, common agenda, which unites Russia and the West, and on the old one, which has so far separated them. This may turn out to be mission impossible, but this is the only workable approach in the long term.

The following steps seem to be appropriate to this end.

First of all, the discussion should continue. If the West wants to have Russia as a security partner it is worth conveying the message again and again. If Russia wants to secure the change it seeks, it may have to produce new, more convincing arguments why this would benefit everybody. The dialogue, however, will only be beneficial if two conditions are met. To begin with, the two sides should make an effort to avoid fuelling the feeling that one side is more

---

[23] T.Graham. Transatlanticheskaya bezopasnost: nuzhna li reviziya (Trans-Atlantic Security: Is Revision Needed?). – Russia in Global Affairs, 1 July 2010, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/transatlanticheskaya-bezopasnost-nuzhna-li-reviziya-14877 The article is based on author's testimony at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on March 17, 2010.

interested in cooperation than the other. Just as the EU and Russia have finally realized that their relationship is one of interdependence and not dependence, the security players should be aware that all will lose something if security cooperation between West and Russia does not work. On top of this, the discussion should go into details of possible practical cooperation. Initiatives can be bold and provocative, like the one to build a join missile defence system, or small and uncontroversial. There is no problem if some of them are rejected quickly as non-starters. But this is the best way to define the real potential for cooperation. The sooner the sides know how strong or weak it is, the better.

Since it is clear that there will be no revision of the institutional design of European security system, it is crucial to raise the efficiency of the current organizations and existing dialogues, starting with the OSCE. The Corfu process should go on. But at the same time before thinking about taking new obligations it would be essential to guarantee the implementation of the old commitments or at least provide an explicit and consensus-based explanation of why non-compliance with some of them can be tolerated or ignored – even though this is clearly suboptimal.

The OSCE seems to be an appropriate venue to raise the issue of conventional arms control. The CFE treaty may be beyond rescue, but the lack of transparency and verification in this sphere destabilizes the whole relationship between Russia and the West. Conditions for re-establishing some kind of a verification regime should be discussed. Sad and ironical as this may sound two decades after the declared end of the Cold War, it might be timely to return to the foundations of confidence-building and remember about non-provocative military exercises etc[24]. However, it would not be realistic to expect that contingency planning based on the scenario of an attack of one participant of the European security system by another would stop in the foreseeable future, even if this type of contingency planning is by itself a crucial component of remaining mistrust.

The idea of providing joint – Russian and Western - security guarantees to the countries that may be willing to accept them can be seriously explored. Precedents of multilateral security assurances of this kind exist – for instance, they were given by US, Britain and Russia to Ukraine when in 1994 the latter finally decided to get rid of nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the USSR – but the analysis of whether and how this regime actually worked for the recipient countries is not available. At the same time these joined guarantees should not be imposed upon the states which are willing to gradually integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community. Freedom to choose security arrangements must be honoured.

Along with, and maybe even ahead of, the hard security partnership, Russia and the West should build up cooperation on soft security matters. EU and Russia should take their agreement on the common space on justice and home affairs more seriously and step up the fight against drug- and human-trafficking. But most importantly, they should proceed from words to deeds on the issue of visa freedom. This is the most effective instrument of building trust between countries and demonstrating that security cooperation can bring tangible benefits to ordinary people.

One should be fully realistic about the fact, however, that all conceivable security cooperation will not be enough to remove the critical boundaries between membership and non-membership in NATO and the EU. This implies that outsiders cannot be given the same influence and access to decision-making in these institutions as insiders. Diplomatic efforts to blur these boundaries, divisive use of most advanced bilateral relationships and even public rhetoric about the need to give non-members a full say on the agenda of the EU and NATO will be a serious factor of disappointment and tension.

---

[24] For a detailed analysis and recommentations on this particular point see U.Kuhn. DOVSE: vykhod iz tupika (CFE: the way of the impasse). - Russia in Global Affairs, 1 July 2010, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/DOVSE-vykhod-iz-tupika-14883

Finally, if NATO and EU are to remain value-based institutions – and there are no reasons to think otherwise – sooner or later they will have to think about how to bridge the value gap in relations with Russia. Without deep democratic changes inside Russia individual joint actions will be, of course, possible, but a comprehensive and lasting security partnership is not likely. This is a key lesson which needs to be learned following the evolution of the European security system since the end of Cold War.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

The Johns Hopkins University
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BOLOGNA CENTER

(4)

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010

European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

ROME, 8 NOVEMBER 2010

Much Ado About Nothing: EU Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty

by

Anand Menon
University of Birmingham

Introduction

If there is one thing that political science has taught us over the last decade, it is the importance of institutions, which both constrain the actors within them and can become powerful actors in their own right.

Nowhere is the notion that 'institutions matter' more strongly subscribed to than in Europe. Here, it seems obvious not only that institutions have helped prevent war in a continent traditionally plagued by conflict, but also that they represent the most effective means of dealing with the vicissitudes of broader international politics.

Such thinking has much to commend it. The European Union has played a crucial role in transforming relations between its members (albeit that NATO is too often overlooked in self-congratulatory European explanations for the continent's stability). Meanwhile, the power of attraction it exerts has helped tame relations both with and between those of its neighbours that aspire to membership within it (albeit that its influence further afield has been far more limited).

Little wonder, then, that the latest revision to the EU's founding texts - the Lisbon Treaty - has generated so much breathless commentary. Nor that the primary target of this excitement have been its provisions for foreign and security policy. After all, 25 of the 62 amendments it ushers in apply to treaty provisions on foreign and security policies.[1] And the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) not only merits more space than the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that preceded it, but has had its remit expanded to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilization and (as if these were not taxing enough of themselves) the 'fight against terrorism'.

As in all things connected with European integration, analyses of these changes range from the clinically depressed to the massively optimistic. A recent Financial Times article remarked on the absence of evidence that Lisbon has improved the Union's ability to act as a major international power.[2] Others, in contrast, have been quick to voice their conviction that the new provisions will make the EU a more effective international security actor.

In what follows, I adhere largely to the former line, arguing that the Lisbon Treaty will not exert a noticeable impact upon the effectiveness of CSDP. Certainly it addresses some important problems that have long bedeviled EU security policies - though even here its success is far from guaranteed. More fundamentally, the treaty does precious little to address perhaps the fundamental challenge confronting CSDP: the reluctance of member states to take their responsibilities seriously. Given this, a narrow focus on institutions and institutional evolution at the EU level not only largely misses the point, but may also be actively counterproductive. By shifting attention from the national sources of the EU's lackluster performance as an international actor, it encourages member states to utilize European level initiatives as a means of avoiding, rather than meeting, their international responsibilities.

Lisbon and ESDP

The key security policy ambitions of the Lisbon treaty can be summarized in two words: 'coherence' and 'capabilities.' In this respect, policy makers have at least managed to identify the two crucial problems confronting CSDP.

---

[1] Unlike the Constitutional Treaty, which would have replaced all existing treaties with a single new one, the Lisbon Treaty remained faithful to the method adopted by previous Intergovernmental Conferences in merely amending existing treaties. It thus amends both the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), which it renames the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

[2] David Gardner, 'EU Struggles to Project Itself as a world power,' Financial Times 19 September 2010.

Coherence

Issues of coherence have been a perennial problem for the EU's dealings with the outside world. Certainly, it benefits from its ability to deploy numerous different tools in its external relations, ranging from trade to aid to military force.[3] At the same time, however, the deployment of distinct policy instruments necessitates the mobilization of different policy actors using different decision-making procedures, which in turn can lead to friction and incoherence. It has become something of a truism in the literature to remark on the internecine rivalries that exist between different institutions with a role in shaping EU foreign policy and their deleterious effects.[4] Two senior officials intimately connected with ESDP have commented that the Union's reaction to a crisis can be driven 'more by institutional rivalry than by a truly result-oriented approach'.[5] By way of example, conflict and inconsistency have dogged the Union's ongoing mission in Kosovo, not least because of the different policy instruments it has deployed.[6]

A central ambition of the Lisbon Treaty is to address such problems head on. In particular, it includes provisions intended to improve relations between the two key institutions involved in EU external policies – the Commission and the Council. Two innovations in particular are worthy of note in this regard – the creation of a new post of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (combining the old HR post with that of Vice-President of the European Commission), and the setting up of a European External Action service, intended to draw on expertise from within both the Council and the Commission.

Clearly, it is still too early to come to any definitive judgments regarding the new external relations machinery – indeed the External Action Service is not yet even operational. Yet early indications suggest that the institutional frictions that have hamstrung EU action in the past are not about to be consigned to the past.

Member states have hardly led from the front. From the first it was clear that political expediency rather than any real desire to foster effectiveness would shape their attitudes towards implementing the treaty provisions. The choice of Catherine Ashton as first holder of the new High Representative post was clearly - whatever her merits or indeed eventual success in the post - based considerations of politics rather than on any real debate as to who was best qualified for what is undoubtedly a hugely challenging role.[7]

Moreover, the (unavoidable) ambiguity of a treaty that represented a fragile compromise between differing national preferences and priorities merely meant that conflicts avoided at the drafting stage could be fought out during implementation. Given that it is virtually impossible to divine from the text itself how responsibilities should be divided between institutions in the reformed system, little wonder these have mobilized to ensure the greatest possible influence in the new structures.[8]

The whole point of the External Action Service was to combine as much of EU foreign policy under one roof – and under the authority of the High Representative – as possible. Yet the European Commission, quick to see in this a challenge to its authority, moved first. President Barroso transferred two sections of DG External Relations – dealing with climate change talks

---

[3] Solana, J. (2000). Improving the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action in the Field of Conflict Prevention: Report presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission. Brussels.

[4] T Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48 (2010): 58.

[5] Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, "European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty," *Egmont Papers*, no. 21 (2008): 6.

[6] Steven Blockmans and R.A Wessels, "The European Union and Crisis Management," (The Hague: CLEER Working Paper, 2010), 19.

[7] Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton," 56, Brendan Donnelly, "Europe in the World: All Change or No Change in Foreign Policy after Lisbon?," *The International Spectator* 45, no. 2 (2010): 18-19.

[8] Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton," 59.

and energy issues – to new DGs for climate change and energy - so keeping them outside the purview of the EAS. Neighbourhood policy was similarly entrusted to DG enlargement, whilst a cumbersome fudge over development policy raises the prospect of continued incoherence when EU attempts to deploy the full range of its instruments. The jostling of member states to ensure the placement of their nationals within the new systems suggests that merit will prove about as central as it did in the choice of High Representative. Meanwhile, the continued relevance of inter-institutional rivalries was revealed all to clearly by the public grumbling of some governments at the decision by Ms Ashton to maintain her office within the Commission building.

Capabilities

Coherence has certainly been a serious a problem afflicting EU security policies, yet it is far from being the major one. This is widely acknowledged to be the problem of generating sufficient capabilities to allow the European Union to play the role to which it aspires. Anecdotal evidence of the problems caused by capabilities shortfalls are legion. To take but one example, it took months of squabbling between member states before EU forces were finally deployed to Chad in 2008, and this only once the Russians had agreed to provide four helicopters.

Such failings are not necessarily the result of under investment (although the deep cuts foreseen all national defence budgets may well make this an issue too). In 2006 member states together spent the equivalent of 60% of the total US defence budget - almost quarter of global defence spending.

Rather, the problem is one of spending that fails to address the requirements of modern warfare. The latter is increasingly expeditionary and multinational in nature. Yet, although European Union member states have some half a million more men in arms than the US, around seventy per cent of their land forces cannot operate outside national territory. According to figures from 2007, only two member states (the UK and Ireland) had met the NATO target of being able to sustain eight percent of their ground forces on operations (Finland and Norway also had impressive records in terms of levels of deployment).[9]

Even those forces that exist and can be deployed cannot always work together effectively. Four European states use Chinooks, but with different configurations, meaning that spare parts are not interchangeable. As for communications, one senior NATO commander moved to comment that :

> *I had to have nine different systems sitting on my desk just to communicate with all my units [in Afghanistan]. All these different national systems are useless and it's unacceptable that we don't have a common operational network.*[10]

Lisbon marks a break from previous versions of the EU treaties by squarely addressing the question of capabilities. In particular, a new mechanism by the name of 'Permanent Structured Cooperation' is intended to enable the Union to tackle capability deficits head on. A number of observers have emphasized its 'considerable promise for dealing effectively with the problem of inadequate and irrational defence spending by member states,'[11] in particular by allowing for the creation of 'pioneer groups' necessary for the creation of meaningful European defence capabilities absent the required political will on the part of all member states.[12]

Permanent Structured Cooperation is open to any member state that either enhances its defence capacities or possesses the capacity to supply combat forces. Uniquely amongst decisions

---

[9] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations," (London: IISS, 2008), 13.

[10] Ibid., 22.

[11] Angelet and Vrailas, "European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty," 4.

[12] Witney, "Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy."

with defence implications, it can be established by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), thereby preventing blockage by laggards. Perhaps most interestingly, any member of any such group that subsequently fails to live up to its commitments can be suspended on the basis of a decision by a qualified majority of other participants.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is crucial here. Under the new treaty it is meant to help in assessing member state contributions in the light of the criteria created for pioneer groups. It is based on these assessments that the Council can decide to suspend participants for failing to respect the criteria established. As this were not enough, the EDA is also charged with 'identifying, and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure...improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.'

If it is too early to assess the effectiveness of measures designed to enhance coherence, it is all the more so for those aimed at improving capabilities - these have, to date, not been utilized. Yet there are grounds for legitimate doubts about the ability of the new provisions to achieve their stated objectives. For one thing, it is not at all clear what the benchmarks to be used for assessing performance actually are. Will member states qualify on the basis of their willingness to cooperate with partners, their progress in developing capabilities, or their readiness to deploy these capabilities on missions?[13] Clearly this choice will do much to determine how effective the Union is in practice at confronting security challenges.

More fundamentally, however, the single greatest flaw in the new treaty provisions concerning both capabilities and coherence is their failure to take into account the - in many cases debilitating - centrality of all twenty seven member states in all major decisions relating to CSDP.

The Perennial Problem: Member States

Nowhere is the role of member states more pronounced than in defence policy. ESDP and CFSP were always characterized by strict intergovernmentalism, with a highly limited role for community institutions. For all the fact that the treaty of Lisbon formally removes the pillar structure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, that same system is in reality alive and well as far as the second pillar, and particularly defence, are concerned. Member states dominate decision making and are responsible for taking all major decisions on the basis of unanimity. Provisions for foreign security and defence policies remain within the TEU rather than being grouped with all other EU policies in the TFEU.

As if this were not enough, the prerogatives of member states are restated *ad nauseam*. Largely at the insistence of the British Government (which declared itself satisfied with the defence provisions of the constitutional treaty then insisted on further changes when negotiations on the successor document commenced) Article 11(1) TEU stipulates that the 'common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures.' On defence itself, Article 3a TEU states that the Union: 'shall respect [member states'] essential state functions, including enshrining the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'. It goes on, for good measure, to recapitulate that in 'particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.'

Perhaps most strikingly, the so called mutual assistance clause (Art 42 TEU) effectively empties itself of all significance with the assertion that any obligation of assistance it entails 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states,' adding that any such obligations must also be 'consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treat Organization, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the

[13] Ibid., 15.

foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.' So, non-NATO members need not feel bound to provide assistance, whilst members should use the Atlantic Alliance as the forum for any call for collective defence.

The Lisbon Treaty thus aims to enhance coherence and capabilities - but without in any way impinging upon the behaviour of the member states. Yet it is precisely this behaviour that has spawned the most severe problems in these areas.

It is because member states must reach unanimous accord on CSDP operations that these have largely been - where they have taken place at all - small scale. Profound divisions between national capitals – over the need for intervention in certain geographical areas and over the primacy to be accorded to military as opposed to 'softer' forms of power – mean that consensus is often elusive and action, consequently, limited. Whether or not the capabilities exist to facilitate rapid and effective EU action, therefore, it is an open question as to whether member states would be able to agree on their deployment. Even states that do commit troops to missions often layer their contribution with restrictive caveats that severely limit their operation effectiveness.[14]

Above and beyond different attitudes towards the use of military force, member states are further divided by the thorny issue of the costs of such deployments. According to the principle of 'costs lie where they fall,' a system of perverse incentives means those member states willing to contribute forces for an EU mission also pick up the tab. The so called Athena mechanism makes provision for some 'common costs,' whereby all member states contribute towards around 10% of overall mission costs on the basis of a GDP scale. Yet not only does this leave contributors to pick up the bulk of the expenses, but it also renders certain member states still less anxious to see deployments occur. Germany in particular has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas it does not consider to be a political priority.

Lisbon does little to change all this. All twenty seven member states must approve CSDP operations – which do not fall under the purview of Permanent Structured Cooperation. The treaty also maintains the prohibition on charging operations with military or defence implications to the EU budget (41(3) TEU). And whilst it includes a provision for a 'start up fund' for initial expenditures on CSDP missions, the fact that this will be made up of member state contributions means that pre-existing problems are replicated rather than resolved. Until they are resolved, however, money will remain yet another obstacle in the way of timely and effective EU action.

Of course any decision to deploy military force depends on the existence of adequate military means to deploy. As we have seen, the Lisbon treaty addresses squarely the need to enhance European military capabilities. Yet the control exercised by member states again provides reasons to doubt the effectiveness of its provisions.

The idea of pioneer groups of states certainly makes sense. Huge disparities exist between member states in terms not only of spending on defence and capabilities (the UK and France between them account for over 40% of EU defence spending) but also of the differential willingness to invest in appropriate capabilities and deploy these. Yet the question then arises as to how these groups are constituted and who ensures they stick to their commitments.

Clearly, any pioneer group of states should be constituted on the basis of defence related criteria. Yet this is not always how member states see things. Perhaps most insidiously, those most anxious to press ahead with ESDP are not always those best equipped to do so. The so-called 'Chocolate summit' of April 2003, with its ambitious calls for a European Security Defence Union involved, alongside France, a member state at best hesitant about many ESDP interventions (Germany) and two of the lower spenders on defence as a proportion of GDP (Belgium 1.14%, Luxembourg 0.67%). When, in early, 2008 Pierre Lellouche, French UMP deputy and spokesman on defence policy published proposals for the creation of a defence 'G6'

[14] Ibid., 145-147.

to take the lead in cooperation on defence matters,[15] these excluded not only two of most active member states when it comes to force deployments (the Netherlands and Sweden.[16] but several with a track record of deploying an above average number of troops (notably Austria, Finland and Ireland).[17]

There tends to be, in other words, something of a 'disconnect between public commitments to European military integration...and practical deployments of forces.'[18] Yet ideological commitment to European integration is of little use when it comes to running operations, and says little or nothing about the willingness of a state to enhance its capabilities or deploy them. It is an open question as to whether the fact that Germany – with all its political and financial doubts about military deployments - was at one point scheduled to participate in 8 different battlegroups was a cause for celebration or unease.[19]

The fundamental reason why European military spending is often inefficient is because of the way national governments choose to spend the money they allocate to defence. The treaty addresses this, albeit in a tentative fashion, by providing the European Defence Agency with an important, if improbable, oversight function. It is expected, *inter alia*, to monitor national defence budgets and to assess whether participants in pioneer groups under permanent structured cooperation are meeting the criteria they have set themselves.

The daunting scale of these tasks has moved some to compare the process of capabilities improvement with that whereby member states achieved monetary Union, and the role of the EDA within it to that of the European Commission in the single market.[20] The Agency should thus serve as a 'conscience' or 'catalyst' for the development of military capabilities for ESDP.[21]

Such optimistic analogies, however, are flawed. For one thing, neither the European Monetary Union (EMU) nor the single market provide grounds for optimism concerning the ability of EU institutions to shape member state behaviour. It was inadequate enforcement of the convergence criteria that allowed Greece to join the single currency on the basis of (at best) misleading fiscal data. And the successful flaunting by France and Germany in November 2003 of the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact bore eloquent testimony to the unwillingness of member states to punish those amongst their number who breach the rules of the game. And as for the Commission, its role in policing the single market has itself come under sustained challenge from member states wiling to flaunt the rules and unwilling to provide it with the resources necessary for it to fulfill this task.

Yet compared to the EDA the Commission is impressive indeed. College members are at least nominally independent, whilst the EDA steering board is made up of 27 Defence Ministers (plus a non voting Commission representative). It in turn appoints the Chief Executive and two deputy Chief Executives. The Agency is thus prey to the whims of the national ministers that control it. It is thus hard to see it opting to suspend a participant in permanent structured cooperation, and harder still to see such a decision upheld by the Council.

As for effective monitoring of national defence spending, it is virtually inconceivable that member states will take the Agency's recommendations seriously. After all, even in apparently technical areas like the liberalization of the services sector, perceived intrusion by Community institutions has generated angry retaliation from national capitals. How much more angry would

---

[15] Pierre Lellouche, 'Huit Propositions Pour Donner À L'union Une Défense Commune ', *Le Figaro* (2008).
[16] Witney, 'Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy'.
[17] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations'. pp. 13, 16.
[18] Giegerich and Wallace, 'Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment', 164.
[19] Jacoby and Jones, 'The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic: What National Defense Reforms Tell Us About European Rapid Reaction Capabilities', 322.
[20] Angelet and Vrailas, "European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty," 44-48.
[21] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations," 28.

be the reaction of a state whose defence spending priorities are questioned? And this particularly in a time of recession, of savage cuts in defence spending across the Union, when 'rationalization' equates to redundancies. Already the siren voices are being raised, warning of desperate consequences if cuts are made.[22]

The odds, then, are not good for a weak institution, lacking both material resources and legitimacy, and operating in arguable the most sensitive area of public policy, to really shape and change member state policies.

Conclusions: achieving limited ambitions

The Lisbon treaty accurately identified two of the crucial problems that have hamstrung the EU's effectiveness as an international actor. The solutions it proposes may conceivably focus the minds of the relevant actors on attempting to mitigate the most glaring problems of the past. Yet even this is far from certain. After all, the very process of implementing a treaty intended, in part, to overcome damaging inter-institutional rivalries has itself profoundly shaped (it is as yet too early to say derailed) by those same rivalries.

And then there is the elephant in the room. Member states negotiate, agree, sign and (for the most part) ratify EU treaties. Little wonder, then, that these treaties tend to have little to say about the constraint that national capitals represent when it comes to enhancing the effectiveness of European integration.

At heart, the crucial constraint on CSDP is a need for political will: the will to spend enough on defence; the will to spend wisely, and the will to deploy the capabilities so acquired. Generating this will is not something that can be accomplished by a treaty. As FT Brussels bureau chief puts it, 'The Lisbon Treaty, so EU leaders assure their publics, provides the instruments for…projecting the EU's influence more effectively across the globe. What the treaty does not contain, however, is that vital ingredient for success – political willpower'.[23]

The above has argued that, whatever the institutional fixes created by the new treaty, it is unreasonable to expect them to alter the preferences of national governments in a policy sector as sensitive as defence. Ambitious rhetoric, by policy makers and observers alike serves merely to raise expectations excessively, paving the way for subsequent complaints that the Union has failed.

In reality, given the jealousy with which governments, whatever the limited potential of their national armed forces, protect their control over defence, significant progress in terms of a more coordinated European response to capabilities shortfalls is unlikely. Whilst some claim that the current round of swingeing defence cuts provides a perfect setting for greater collaboration on research, manufacturing and purchasing of defence equipment, it is just as likely to increase the sensitivity of governments when it comes to the inevitable job cuts that such rationalization would imply.

Better, then, to start with more modest, achievable objectives as a first step towards greater interstate collaboration. And an obvious place to start is with better information sharing. The former head of the EDA has pointed out that member states are at liberty not to provide data to that organization, to the point where no objective information exists on who has contributed what to operations.[24] More pressingly, it seems sensible that member states coordinate when deciding on the cuts to impose on their armed forces. It would be too much to ask for them to defer to an institution like the EDA, but a useful first step would be to ensure that Defence Ministries inform their partners about planned cuts, in order that these can be coordinated as far as possible. We can at least aspire to some kind of Open Method of

---

[22] Nick Butler and Jeffrey Sterling, 'Defence Cuts will hit Britain's Industrial Capacity,' *Financial Times*, 30 September 2010.

[23] Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton," 66.

[24] Witney, "Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy," 16, 23.

Coordination type system for defence spending – non-binding, and based on bench marking – rather than aspiring to first pillar type decision making. Even here, however, it should be noted that the absence of an institution of the stature of the European Commission capable of agenda setting and compliance monitoring could undermine even such limited hopes.

Reasonable ambitions are the best starting point. It is unlikely in the extreme that the EU will ever become the kind of high profile and effective international security actor that some seem to think it should be. Yet it would be wrong to attribute the blame for this to the Union itself. Rather, it is up to member states to step up to the plate in order that, collectively, they manage to achieve those things that none amongst them can manage individually. Debating institutions is all well and good. Yet this should not serve as an alibi for member states that are responsible for the major failings of EU security policies.

All this matters because the European Union provides an obvious mechanism by which European states can attempt to enhance their ability to deploy military force. Their failure to date to do so has led not only to the relatively underdeveloped nature of EU security policies, but also contributed to a failure to live up to broader security responsibilities. For all the popularity of, and heavy pressure from, President Obama, member states in 2009 came up with only some 5,000 troops (of which 3,000 only on a temporary basis) to supplement the 26,000 already deployed in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The increasingly disinterested, not to say contemptuous, tone of commentary even from American Europhiles testifies to a growing disillusionment with Europeans that could conceivably undermine not only the Union but the transatlantic relationship itself. Remedying the problems of CSDP, then, is far more than simply a priority for the EU.

Bibliography

Bruno Angelet, and Ioannis Vrailas, "European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty," **Egmont Papers**, No. 21 (2008).

T Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton," **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 48 (2010), pp. 55-67.

Steven Blockmans, and R.A Wessels, *The European Union and Crisis Management*, 2010 (The Hague: CLEER Working Paper), pp. 1-49.

Brendan Donnelly, "Europe in the World: All Change or No Change in Foreign Policy after Lisbon?," **The International Spectator**, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2010), pp. 17-22.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations*, 2008 (London: IISS).

Nick Witney, *Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy*, 2008 (London: European Council on Foreign Relations).