ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA:
IMPLEMENTING THE NEW EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
Ministero degli Affari esteri
European Commission
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Rome, 7-9/X/2009

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5. G8 and EU support of African efforts in peace and security / Alex Vines (11 p.)
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Ministero degli Affari Esteri

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

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Simultaneous translation: Italian/English/French

7-8-9 October 2009

ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
-SALA ALDO MORO-
Piazzale della Farnesina, 1

ROME

In cooperation with

EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) - Chatham House

Centre de Recherche et Formation sur l'Etat en Afrique (CREA)

Compagnia di San Paolo

PROGRAMME

WEDNESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 2009

14.45 – 15.45 **Registration**

15.45 – 17.00 **AU-EU relations, political dialogue and inter-institutional cooperation**

Chair:

- **Gianni Bonvicini**, Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Speakers:

- **Franco Frattini**, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome
- **Romano Prodi**, Chair, AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping
- **Stefano Manservisi**, Director General, DG Development, European Commission, Brussels
- **Mamadou Kamara Dekamo**, Ambassador of the Republic of Congo to Italy, Rome
- **Marika Fahlen**, Sweden's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm

17.00 – 17.30 **Coffee break**

17.30 – 19.00 **SESSION I: Ensuring peace and security in Africa: implementing the new Africa-EU partnership**

Chair:

- **Pierre Michel Joana**, Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, Council of the European Union, Brussels

Speakers:

- **Nicoletta Pirozzi**, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internationali (IAI), Rome
- **Georges Nzongola**, Centre de Recherche et Formation sur l'Etat en Afrique (CREA), Abidjan, and Institut Africain de la Gouvernance (IAG), Dakar

Discussant:

- **Aldo Ajello**, former EU Special Representative for Great Lakes Region, Rome

Discussion

20.30 **Dinner**

THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER 2009

9.30 – 11.00 **SESSION II: EU and AU missions in the African continent: lessons learned and future scenarios**

Chair:

- **Maurizio Moreno**, President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), Sanremo

Speakers:

- **Damien Helly**, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), Paris
- **Ferdinand Kwaku Danso**, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra

Discussant:

- **Jaotody Jean de Matha**, Head of the Operations and Support Unit, Peace Support Operations Division of the AU, Addis Ababa

Discussion

11.00 – 11.30 **Coffee Break**

11.30 – 13.00 **SESSION III: In the aftermath of the G8: EU coordination with other international donors to support African efforts in peace and security**

Chair:

- **Mario Raffaelli**, Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry's Expert for Peace Initiatives in the Horn of Africa, Rome

Speakers:

- **Alex Vines**, Research Director, Regional and Security Studies; and Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London
- **Andebrhan W. Giorgis**, Consultant, Revival Africa Initiative

Discussant:

- **Gerrard Quille**, DG for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, European Parliament, Brussels

Discussion

13.00 – 14.30 **Buffet Lunch**

EXPERT SEMINAR:

A SPECIAL FIELD OF COOPERATION: AU-EU SECURITY DIALOGUE ON A COMMON AGENDA FOR DE-MINING AND DISARMAMENT

14.30 – 17.00 — ROUND TABLE 1:
International frameworks and state of co-operation: AU and EU policies in the areas of SALW, ERW, APL State of play

Co-Chairs:

- **Fiona Lortan**, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
- **Daniela Dicorrado**, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels

Speakers:

- **Peter O. Otim**, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
  - Member of AU PSC
- **Cyriaque Agnekethom**, Representative of ECOWAS, Abuja

17.00 – 17.30 — **Coffee break**

17.30 – 18.30 — **Panel-Audience Discussion**

20.00 — **Dinner**

FRIDAY, 9 OCTOBER 2009

09.00 – 11.00 — ROUND TABLE 2:
Joint initiatives. Implementation.

Chair:

- **Damien Helly**, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), Paris

Speakers:

- **Joseph Dube**, Africa Coordinator, IANSA, Johannesburg
- **Elizabeth Mutunga**, Representative of COMESA, Lusaka
- **Jacqueline Seck**, Representative of UNREC, Lome

- **Daniela Dicorrado**, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels
- **Francis Wairagu**, Representative of RECSA, Nairobi

11.00 – 11.30 **Coffee break**

11.30 – 12.30 **Panel-Audience Discussion**

12.30 – 14.00 **Buffet lunch**

14.00 – 16.00 **ROUND TABLE 3:**
The contribution of disarmament and arms control to building Peace and Security

Chair:

- **Francis Wairagu**, Representative of RECSA, Nairobi

Speakers:

- **Marlen Gomez-Villasenor**, Director for Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mexico City
- **Federico Grandini**, SESAR Joint Undertaking, Brussels
- **Singo Stephen Mwachofi**, Representative of ICGLR, Bujumbura
- **Hugh Griffiths**, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- **Annalisa Giannella**, HR Solana's Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation, EU Council, Brussels

16.00 – 16.30 **Panel-Audience Discussion**

16.30 – 17.00 **Conclusions and Wrap up**

- **Gianni Bonvicini**, Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
- **Daniela Dicorrado**, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels
- **Fiona Lortan**, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
- **Giuseppe Morabito**, Director General, DGAS, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

(b)

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PAPER ON

ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: IMPLEMENTING A NEW AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP

BY

Nicoletta Pirozzi

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DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

1. EU-Africa co-operation in peace and security: from Cairo to Lisbon and beyond

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 can be considered the capstone doctrine of EU-Africa relations, consolidated in about fifty years of trade and development cooperation and substantially revisited in the last decade. The EU is still the largest trading partner for African countries and the largest donor to the African continent.[1] However, there are new aspects of their relationship that have assumed an increasingly important role, which range from governance to regional integration, from energy to climate change, and from migration to science and technology. The Joint Strategy and the Action Plan, designed to implement the Strategy between 2008 and 2010, take stock of this evolution and identify eight priorities for cooperation, the first of which refers to peace and security.[2]

Addressing the instability of the African continent represents a major concern for the EU member states, as they are experiencing the repercussions, such as illegal immigration, drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism and organised crime, of African crises and conflicts. . The African continent also represents the main field of intervention for international peacekeeping. This is a constant burden for European countries, which are committed to deploying their civilian and military personnel in the framework of ESDP, UN and NATO operations.[3]

Due to the multiplication of demands for direct engagement in crises areas and the failure of international interventions in responding to African conflicts in the 1990s, the EU has contributed to a mounting reticence by the Western countries to send their troops in Africa. At the same time, African governments have been called to contribute the biggest share of peacekeeping efforts to guarantee peace and security on their own continent. This has been partially compensated by an enhanced cooperation in the field of security, substantiated in a transfer of expertise and financial resources from external donors to Africa.

This external push for a more active participation of African countries in peace and security has united with the internal African self-determination discourse, epitomised in the concept of providing 'African solutions to African problems'. In the current context, this approach is perceived as part of the 'African renaissance'. The 'African Renaissance' refers to the revival and renewal of the continent through the maximum use of its resources, both human and natural, and the need for Africa to assume responsibility for its own future.[4] This has been accompanied by increasing recognition of the strong connection between the issue of stability on one side and the challenge of economic and social development on the other, convincing African leaders to place peace and security matters at the core of the political agenda.[5]

The main steps of this evolution can be identified in the establishment of the Conference on Security,

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[1] US and China are, respectively, the Africa's second and third biggest trading partners. The EU and its member states provide 90% of the additional aid ($25 billion) pledged to Africa by 2010 at the G8 Gleneagles Summit.

[2] See 'The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan', 8-9 December 2007.

[3] Four ESDP missions are currently deployed in Africa, including EU SSR in Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo and EU NAVFOR Atalanta for a total of 1,645 personnel. UN missions include MINURCAT in Central African Republic and Chad, UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Operation) in Darfur, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, UNMIL in Liberia, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MINURSO in Western Sahara and BINUB, a UN Integrated Office in Burundi. UN personnel deployed in the African continent amounts to 68,296, 3,704 of which is pledged by EU countries. Since June 2007, NATO assists the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support and in August 2009 has deployed the counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa.

[4] See Francis, David J., *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.

[5] See Assavno, William and Pout, Christian E.B., *The European Union (EU): African Peace and Security Environment's Champion?*, Points de Vue, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 27 novembre 2007.

Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) in 1999, followed by the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) in 2001, the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union (AU) in 2002 and the deployment of the first AU peacekeeping mission in Burundi in October 2003. Most importantly, a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is in the process of being developed, resulting from the cooperation between continental (AU) and sub-regional (RECs) approaches and including a Peace and Security Council, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System and an African Stand-by Force.

The African Union is building its credentials at the international level as a reliable partner in peace and security and has already derived its legitimacy from the membership of the quasi-totality (with the exception of Morocco) of African states. This has also produced an increasing interaction with the EU, in the spirit of a comprehensive 'continent-to-continent' dialogue. The most important developments in EU-Africa relations are the following: the EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo in 2000 which set in motion a structured political dialogue, the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa which was the first attempt to establish a single framework for continental engagement, the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy aimed at taking the Africa-EU relationship to a new strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels.

This paper aims at assessing, one year and a half after the adoption of the Joint Strategy and in view of its first revision in 2010, what has been achieved in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security based on the objectives proclaimed in its original formulation. The analysis of the successes and shortfalls of the implementation process will then allow the author to identify the main challenges ahead and to offer some policy recommendations to the EU in order to refine its approach and actions in this field.

2. Implementing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in peace and security: achievements and shortfalls

2.1. Beyond development: enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is based, at least in its declared principles, on a consensus of common values, common interests and common objectives. However, this unity of intents is still challenged by a series of contradictions. First of all, the inadequacy of AU capabilities and resources in addressing peace and security issues and the need for material support by the EU risk compromising the view of EU and Africa as equal partners. Moreover, the EU's tendency to project its normative power and promote its own values and agenda in its relationship with the African continent has reinforced the African perception of a one-way dialogue, ultimately aimed at imposing EU conditionality on its partner.

This reciprocal scepticism of the other's motivations and actions can be only overcome through a mutual understanding of the partner's specificities and interests. Elaborating a real political partnership between EU and Africa in the field of peace and security means launching frank dialogue on respective strategic priorities and finding shared ground to better guide policy formulation and implementation. A positive dynamic can be then created by the daily cooperation on concrete policy issues, resulting in a gradual convergence of intents and practices. In other words, through the constant interaction necessary for the implementation of agreed objectives, for example the establishment of the African Stand-by Force in 2010, EU and Africa can realistically become closer.

A series of common activities have already been carried out or put on the agenda during the first phase of implementation of the Joint Strategy: an AU-EU joint visit has been conducted in Central African Republic, while additional Joint Assessment Missions have been planned in Burundi and Comoros for 2009 and in Somalia as soon as the situation in the field will allow it. Another planned initiative is the establishment of a centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa. Meetings

between African and European mediators, as well as consultations at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York, are foreseen in order to facilitate the exchange of information, expertise and lessons learned. Dialogue is already underway in specific areas of common concern, such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL).[6]

Other security challenges should now be addressed through enhanced communication at all levels - technical, senior official and political – and there should be active involvement of member states, beyond the already well-established channel between Brussels and Addis Ababa. Systematic joint conflict analysis should help in understanding the root causes and drivers of African conflicts and in elaborating a common strategy for prevention. Other key sectors to explore jointly are the fight against terrorism, maritime security and Security Sector Reform.

2.2. Beyond Africa: building a global security partnership

The twenty-first century has been defined by former South African President Thabo Mbeki as the 'African Century'. This statement can be supported by a series of factors, first of which is the renewed interest of old and new powers towards the forgotten continent. For example, both the United States and China have remarkably expanded their economic and military presence in Africa.

Under the George W. Bush administration when Africa's oil supplies started to be defined as a strategic national interest and Africa – especially Sudan and the Horn – became crucial in the global war on terrorism, the US attention to African security received a definite boost. One example is the creation of a US military command for Africa, AFRICOM - even if headquartered in Italy and equipped with very modest capabilities. This growing focus on African is likely to continue under Barack Obama administration, which is already planning a more assertive policy aimed at restoring governance and peace in Africa, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Rwanda. China has also become a major player on the African scene, as confirmed by the impressive increase in trading flows and the significant surge of Chinese investments, especially in infrastructures, in the African continent.

A second element supporting the idea of the 'African renaissance' is the multitude of efforts by African countries to consolidate regional integration and develop common mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The assertiveness of the African Union in dealing with peace and security issues has been acknowledged within the United Nations. This acknowledgement was apparent in the UN Secretary General Report of March 2008 which included an intensified reflection on the possible AU-UN shared role in maintaining stability in the African continent and on the better definition of the respective competences of the two organisations.[7] The UN is also developing new strategies to ensure adequate financial resources for the AU and to guarantee the effectiveness and continuity of its action in this field. This latest concern was at the core of a Report produced in December 2008 by an AU-UN Panel chaired by Romano Prodi.[8]

Moreover, the G8 made Africa a centerpiece of each of the last eight summits, which were full of commitments for sweeping debt relief and increasing aid budgets.

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[6] See Draft Joint Roadmaps for the implementation of the 1st Action Plan (2008-2010) of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 28 April 2009.

[7] See 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security', Doc. S/2008/186, 24 March 2008.

[8] See 'Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peca-Keeping Operations', Doc. A/63/666-S/2008/813, 31 December 2008.

However, in spite of the new prominence of Africa on the international stage, its presence in international fora is still limited and the elaboration of policies for its development is the apanage of global powers and international donors. In the UN Security Council, Africa can only count on two non-permanent members. As for the G8, some progress has been made since the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 in the framework of the so-called outreach process, which has involved representatives from seven African countries and the AU. The 2009 Summit in L'Aquila saw the introduction of the G14 format, with South Africa and Egypt representing the African continent. Nevertheless, there is no structured and permanent involvement of African countries in the G8's work and decisions. Moreover, the new global grouping of the G20 has only one African member, South Africa, which itself faces a very different set of challenges than the rest of the continent.[9]

Ensuring that Africa occupies powerful decision-making positions in multilateral fora should be an important objective for the EU. Strong African representation in international institutions will ensure that the continent benefits to the maximum amount from their initiatives, encouraging an effective implementation of planned actions and an improved allocation of resources. Moreover, Africa has the potential to become a strong and credible partner for the EU on global security issues.

Therefore, EU member states are called to take concrete initiatives in the context of the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations to actively support an increased representation of Africa within the UN Security Council. The EU, in close coordination with other industrialised democracies, should also campaign for the constant involvement of representatives of the AU, or at least of key African countries, in G8 discussions and decisions, even beyond African issues. In addition, new initiatives for coordination should be promoted and developed, as for example the triangular dialogue among EU, China and Africa that was proposed by the European Commission and envisaged in the EU Council Conclusions of November 2008.[10]

2.3. Beyond institutions: launching a people-centred partnership

In order to make the Joint Africa-EU Strategy work, a multi-level institutional framework has been set up:

- African and EU Heads of State and Government meet every three years in Africa-EU Summits;
- periodical ministerial-level meetings also include, since October 2008, meetings between the EU PSC and the AU PSC and, since November 2009, Africa-EU Defence Ministers meetings;
- annual College-to-College meetings between the EC and the AUC are accompanied by regular bilateral meetings between AU and EU Commissioners with similar portfolios and meetings between staff from both Commissions take place twice a year in the form of a Joint Task Force that reviews sectoral and institutional cooperation;
- there are contacts and meetings between *ad hoc* delegations from the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament;
- Joint Expert Groups involve AU and EU representatives in order to implement the eight areas for strategic partnership;
- an AU representation to the EU in Brussels and an EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa have been established . The Head of the EU Delegation, Koen Vervaeke, is also EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the AU, thereby combining the representation of both the Council and the Commission.

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[9] See Moss, Todd J., *Africa's Place in the World through the Lens of the Economic Crisis,* in L'Africa nelle relazioni internazionali, Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, n.10, Maggio 2009.

[10] See 'Trilateral relations with Africa and China – Council Conclusions', 2902nd General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 10 and 11 November 2008, Press:318 Nr: 15394.

This large assembly of bodies and actors is called to ensure the daily interface between Africa and the EU and to carry out the implementation of the identified strategic objectives. Beyond the need for semplification of existing working arrangements, it is also important to limit any excessive institutionalisation of the Africa-EU dialogue and give space to non-institutional voices in both continents. A full and active participation of non-state actors, civil society organisations and the organised private sector should be demanded and promoted in all phases of the relationship, as it is the only way to make sure that actual rather than perceived needs of populations are reflected in selected initiatives and programmes. Civil society can also be instrumental in the widespread dissemination of results and act as a watch-dog for the partnership's implementation. In the field of peace and security, this is in line with a comprehensive approach that goes beyond political and military concerns to address human-centred problems such as economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

One of the aims of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy is to promote 'a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership'. In line with this statement, the European Commission has identified possible entry points for the intervention of civil society organisations in the implementation and monitoring of the Strategy.[11] An interesting example is the establishment of a platform, the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), for European and African non-governmental research institutions with the aim of providing independent political analysis. The Strategy also aims at facilitating consultation with representatives from European and African civil society before the Ministerial Troika meetings and inviting them to participate in the eight Joint Expert Groups.

However, civil society involvement in the first phase of implementation of the Strategy has been rather poor. This is partly due to the reticence of some institutional actors to make the policy-making process fully transparent and inclusive or, more simply, due to their lack of awareness of the importance of CSOs involvement in the partnerships. The lack of funding is also an obstacle for civil society regular participation and engagement. The result is a growing hostility and disillusion of non-state actors *vis-à-vis* the Joint Strategy, which risks severely hampering its effective implementation.[12]

2.4. Beyond fragmentation: ensuring coordination among instruments and resources

One of the objectives of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is to establish a comprehensive partnership, treating Africa as one body and ensuring balanced development in the whole continent. However, it must be acknowledged that the new Strategy coexists and overlaps with pre-existing arrangements, which still shape EU-Africa relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy and the newly created Union for the Mediterranean (former Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) with North African countries; the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with sub-Saharan countries (former Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions); the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa. These frameworks for cooperation correspond to different decision-making and financial procedures, which make the interaction between the EU and its African counterparts fragmented and dispersive, characterised by time-consuming procedures and high transaction costs.

Through the African Peace Facility (APF), which was established in 2004 to provide funding for African-led peace operations and capacity-building of African organisations (African Union and sub-regional organisations), the EU has tried to establish a more coherent framework to support African peace and security agenda. In the first phase of its implementation (2004-2009), an initial amount of €

[11] See European Commission, 'Entry Points for civil-society organisations intervention in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy', 2008.

[12] See Tywuschik, Veronica and Sherriff, Andrew, *Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* European Centre for Development Management, Discussion Paper No. 87, February 2009.

250 million was allocated to the APF, the largest part of which has been used in financing peace support operations. However, in order to cope with the growing demand from Africa, the first APF has required three subsequent replenishments (for a total of € 150 million) and additional voluntary contributions from EU member states (of about € 40 million). By the end of 2009, the total APF allocation was € 440 million. Additionally, € 7,7 million was taken from the South Africa budget line.[13]

It should be noted that the APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) under Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement and is subject to significant limitations in terms of the destination of funds (military and arms expenditures are excluded) and geographical scope (North African countries and South Africa are not eligible). In the new context of the 2008 Strategy, the APF has been revised in order to financially support the Africa-EU Joint Partnership on Peace and Security and its scope has been enlarged to ensure an integrated approach. Under the 10th EDF (2008-2010), € 300 million have been allocated to the APF, with a larger portion (€ 65 million) devoted to supporting capacity-building of the African Peace and Security Architecture and Africa-EU dialogue.[14] A more flexible decision-making process was ensured through the introduction of a Early Response Mechanism that immediately provides available funding for urgent needs, i.e. launching of an African-led mediation initiative and planning of an African-led peace operation. Moreover, co-financing has become a permanent feature of the second APF, which is open to contributions from EU member states and other donors.

While helpful, these innovations do not involve the thorough overhaul of the existing instrument that would be necessary in order to achieve tangible improvements. Some of the main problems of the current APF functioning are likely to continue into the next phase, namely the exclusion of military expenditures from the APF budget, the limitations in its geographical scope, the lack of sufficient funding and the limited resources devoted to longer-term capacity building actions. In order to overcome these obstacles, it is imperative for the EU to ensure a more effective coordination with other funding sources and initiatives: EC/EU instruments (the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instruments for Stability and ESDP), but also bilateral means of cooperation between EU and African states.

Building links between the different agreements and related financial arrangements that already exist between the EU and Africa should be a priority for the EU in order to promote a continent-wide approach that also addresses the realities of its sub-regions and countries, to implement integrated actions that respond to a comprehensive concept of security, and also to address the current shortage of available resources.

3. Towards a new Africa-EU partnership? Main challenges ahead

The analysis conducted above has produced a mixed assessment of the first phase of implementation of the new Joint Partnership on Peace and Security. What are the main factors that have impacted on its effectiveness and could affect the future EU-Africa relations in the field?

3.1. Capability development of AU and RECs

[13] Over € 305 million have been spent to support the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), € 53, 2 million for the FOMUC/MICROPAX Mission in the Central African Republic (CEMAC/ECCAS), € 35,5 million for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), € 8,5 for the African Union Missions in the Comoros (AMISEC + MAES). Only € 35 million went to capacity-building and € 15 million have been reserved for contingencies, audit, evaluation and monitoring.

[14] € 200 million go to peace support operations, € 15 million are allocated to the Early Response Mechanism, € 7 million are for audit, monitoring, evaluation, technical assistance, lessons learned and visibility, € 13 million for contingencies.

The possibility for Africa to offer its own solutions to the many challenges it faces ultimately depends on its ability to develop adequate capabilities and to exercise the political will to use them. The full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is at the centre of the new African role on peace and security issues. However, the objective of building up collective efforts on conflict prevention and management interventions entails serious political, financial and socio-economic difficulties for AU member states, a great part of which are among the poorest and least developed countries in the world.

The APSA is composed by a Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the 'standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts' and works in close cooperation with the AU Commission, in particular with the Commissioner for Peace and Security and its under-staffed Peace and Security Directorate (PSD).[15] A Panel of the Wise (PoW) – which is composed by five respected African public figures, one for each African region – has only recently began to exercise its functions in the area of conflict prevention.[16] A Continental Early Warning System, designed as a conflict anticipation and prevention tool that consists of a central observation and monitoring centre called Situation Room (SR) and regional units, is planned to be fully operational by the end of 2009.[17] A Special Fund or Peace Fund has been created with the intention of providing the necessary financial resources for PSOs and other operational activities, but it amounts to only 6% of the already limited AU regular budget and suffers from the inability of a number of AU member states to honour their financial obligations.

Most importantly, the AU has committed itself to establish an African Stand-by Force, through which it would be able to conduct peace operations and other security-related interventions in the African continent. The ASF will be composed of a central headquarters located at the AU Commission and sub-regional structures, including stand-by contingents with civilian, police and military components, and it will be ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. By June 2010, the AU should develop the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, validated by a Command Post Exercise. For the time being, AU structures can only count on a very limited staff for the planning and the deployment of peace operations and there also exists huge gaps among the five regional brigades.

In the overall assessment of the functioning of peace and security structures within the AU, it is clear that African peace and security structures still contain huge resource deficiencies in terms of funding, staffing and logistics. Poor financial and human resource management, together with lengthy procurement procedures, are key factors contributing to this gap. To this must be added the lack of coordination between central and regional structures and imbalances between and within regional arrangements. Therefore, all the stakeholders are called to maintain a cautious attitude in defining what can be achieved through the young African institutions with limited capacities, considering the full African ownership of peace and security maintenance as the goal of an incremental process based on stable financial support and long-term capacity building initiatives.[18]

3.2. Enhancing governance and transparency

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[15] See 'Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union', adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, 9 July 2002.

[16] See 'Audit of the African Union', submitted by the High Level Panel to the President of the African Union on 27 December 2007.

[17] See 'Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System' as adopted by Governmental Experts meeting on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention held in Kempton Park (South Africa) from 17 to 19 December 2006.

[18] See Pirozzi, Nicoletta, *EU support to African security architecture: funding and training components*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper N. 76, February 2009.

The instability of African states and the phenomenon of failing or failed states have always represented a major concern for EU countries. The objective of promoting democratic institutions and the rule of law has been entrenched in the development of cooperation and trade relationships between EU and Africa, through both direct actions and conditionality provisions. In the current EU security approach, peace is indissolubly linked to good governance, intended as the product of the action of democratic, stable and accountable state institutions.[19]

Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act contains a fundamental tenet for a new African peace and security approach: it recognises the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 'in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.[20] This provision creates a radical shift from a firm logic of state sovereignty and non-interference, which characterised and paralysed the conduct of the Organisation of African Unity, to a stance of non-indifference and the institutionalisation of the 'responsibility to protect' principle. In the framework of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has also been established. Under the APRM, teams of external assessors coming from other African states would, on invitation, appraise the economic development structures and wider governance environment of individual member states.[21]

Nevertheless, some suspicions remain about whether or not this principle has been fully internalised by the AU, as demonstrated by the AU's refusal to invoke Article 4 in relation to the crisis in Darfur and its rejection of the ICC indictment of Sudan's President Omar Al-Bashir. While the AU's condemnation of the *coups d'état* in Togo and Mauritania in 2005 was relatively straightforward, changes of government that occurred through undemocratic elections remained essentially unchallenged, as in Zimbabwe's presidential elections in 2008.

It must also be recognised that the approach of the EU towards African governance is not always univocal in its formulation and implementation. This has fuelled a number of accusations of EU double-standards and has caused the EU's role as an impartial guarantor of the principles of democracy and rule of law to be questioned. The challenge to develop a like-minded coalition of African states that would turn into reality the new thinking enshrined in the AU project can only be achieved with a firm and fair EU stance on justice and governance.

3.3. Shortfalls in CFSP and ESDP

Some EU member states have a long history of relationships with African countries, dating back to the colonial period and maintained after decolonisation in the form of privileged trading partnerships, development cooperation or military presence. UK, France, Portugal, and Italy have individual interests and policies in certain African countries, which correspond to different historical legacies, economic relations and political priorities. These interests have negatively affected the coherence of the EU's African policy, which is heavily influenced by the preferences of a few member states and alternatively guided by their diverging priorities. Such a policy cannot be supported by those member states that do not have such a strong interest in the African continent, like Germany or the Central and Eastern European countries.

This lack of coordination and complementarity in the framework of the EU's African policy is but one of the manifestations of the more general deficiencies of CFSP. The iterated delays imposed by national referenda to the Lisbon Treaty in the last years have marked a significant setback for the already

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[19] See 'European Security Strategy. A secure Europe in a better world', Brussels, 12 December 2003.

[20] See 'Constitutive Act of the African Union', Togo, 11 July 2000.

[21] See Clapham, Christofer, *Tasks and Responsibilities of the African State,* in L'Africa nelle relazioni internazionali, Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, n.10, Maggio 2009.

agonizing common foreign and security policy. Some of the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to promote a more coherent and effective EU foreign and security policy system. This is the case of the permanent President of the European Council, which will be elected with a mandate of two and a half years, renewable once, and which will eliminate the discontinuity of Union's foreign policy. The double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will coordinate policies and actions of the two pillars by combining the current functions of Javier Solana and those of the Vice President of the Commission. An European External Action Service (including functionaries from the EU Council, the European Commission and the diplomatic services of member states) will ensure an singular representation of the Union around the world.

Nevertheless, no substantial change will occur in the EU's African policy if member states do not sideline their own national interests, abide by a genuine European approach to Africa, and also allow for a gradual Europeanisation of the bilateral means of assistance and cooperation inherited from the post-colonial period. A positive sign in this direction is the increasing amount of resources committed by EU members under the Africa-EU peace and security partnership. Another example is the recent revision of the ten-year bilateral project for military cooperation between France and ECOWAS, named Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP). This initiative is now designed as a framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa, aimed at offering strategic-level training to African partners in both military and civilian fields and at contributing to the operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force.

However, it is not enough to talk about a common European approach to African peace and security. Moving from the principles and instruments elaborated in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the EU should find ways to develop a coherent African policy before, beyond and even without the Lisbon Treaty.

4. Redefining EU's approach to peace and security in Africa

On the basis of the analysis conducted above on the actual implementation and the future challenges of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, it is possibile to put forth some elements necessary for a renewed Africa-EU partnership on peace and security.

Africa has assumed a new strategic relevance for the EU on the international stage. In the current context of growing international instability and interdependence, a peaceful African continent is crucial in order to face complex threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, organised crime, drugs and arms trafficking, and piracy. But the EU should also look more at the potentials of a prosperous and powerful African continent as a neighbour and as a partner in multilateral fora. Africa represents the test field *par excellence* for CFSP and ESDP and can become a credible allie for the EU in its campaigns at the global level.

This new strategic awareness should be translated by the EU in a series of policy priorities and maxims for action. First of all, building bridges with African players means establishing a real partnership with the AU, in the spirit of a continent-to-continent relationship in the field of peace and security. Cultural misunderstanding and different expectations have so far played a huge role in hampering a smooth implementation process. Practical cooperation on specific projects and continuous interface of relevant actors are key factors for stimulating political understanding and agreement on basic concepts. This regular dialogue should be promoted in a wide range of areas of common concern, including conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism, maritime security and SSR.

Only an inclusive dialogue, which involves all the stakeholders beyond the Brussels-Addis Ababa axis – EU and AU member states, but also the RECs – can ensure a real implementation of the Joint Strategy.

Moreover, political and financial constraints to the full participation of civil society actors should be overcome in the name of the agreed mechanisms and for the benefit of all the parties involved.

EU-Africa partnership needs to be extended beyond the African continent and reach the relevant international frameworks: the UN, the G8/G20, the international financial institutions. The ultimate objective is establishing a solid alliance on common interests such as terrorism, climate change, trade agreements, and global governance. This can only be achieved through a greater African presence in multilateral fora, promoted by the EU in accordance with the principle of equitable representation and democratic accountability of governing institutions.

A partnership among equals also requires a balanced development of structures and capabilities. The EU must remain engaged in the African continent, especially by ensuring stable financial support and long-term capacity building initiatives. Different types of interaction, financial instruments and implementation procedures at the EU level, must be unified and harmonised accordingly. Most importantly, the EU should better coordinate with other international donors, thus helping African stakeholders to establish priorities among external offers and reduce the transaction costs in their implementation.

The EU and the AU represent two worlds that, beyond the commonalities established by historical ties and geographical proximity, still need to be reconciled. In the field of peace and security, the additional incentive for this reconciliation is represented by the immediate threats that can be addressed only through reinforced dialogue and combined action. The new Joint Africa-EU Strategy can be the viable means in creating a progressive convergence and a path for increasing cooperation. Nevertheless, it must be sustained through mutual comprehension, realistic expectations, firm commitment and sustainable resources.

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PAPER ON

ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

BY

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

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INTRODUCTION

I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, and particularly the Rome Institute of International Affairs (IAI), for the opportunity given to me to present an African perspective on the implementation of the new Africa –EU partnership in the field of peace and security in Africa. I am proud to represent two new African think tanks on governance and international affairs, the Centre de Recherche et de Formation sur l'Etat en Afrique (CREA) and the Africa Governance Institute (AGI). However, the views expressed in this paper are my own, and they do not pretend to be the official positions of these two institutions of which I am an active member. I am speaking as an African scholar with a long interest in conflict prevention, peace and security in Africa, as well as a strong commitment to sustainable peace and development in our continent.

The Africa-EU strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 represents a new phase in cooperative relations between Africa and Europe. Under the joint leadership of the African Union and the European Union, the two continents have committed themselves to forge strong links based on a consensus around values, interests and strategic objectives. The guiding principles of this cooperative strategy are interdependence between the two continents within a logic of shared responsibilities; the recognition of the legitimate aspirations of African peoples for continental unity; political dialogue involving all stakeholders; participatory approaches at all levels (local, national, regional, continental); and coherence in policies and their implementation instruments.

Of the eight partnerships comprising the new strategy, the one on peace and security is perhaps the most difficult to implement in a comprehensive and satisfactory manner. Its key objective is for Africa and Europe to cooperate with a view to strengthening their capacity to react in a timely fashion and in an adequate manner to threats to peace and security, and to unite their efforts in the face of global challenges. This objective is to be implemented through short-term action plans, the first of which is designed to run between 2008 and 2010, with the following three priority actions:

1) To reinforce dialogue concerning challenges to peace and security, with a view to formulate common positions and implement common approaches with respect to peace and security in Africa, Europe and around the world;
2) To fully operationalize the African architecture of peace and security by ensuring its effective functioning for purposes of meeting the challenges to peace and security in Africa; and
3) To ensure reliable funding of peacekeeping operations by African countries by providing to the African Union and the regional security mechanisms the financial means needed to carry out effective peacekeeping operations.

How realistic are these objectives and the related expected results in the present political context of the African continent? Are African states, regional security mechanisms and the AU Commission capable of fulfilling their end of the bargain for the success of the Africa-EU peace and security agenda? This paper attempts to answer these and related questions with regard to the respective roles of the African Union, regional security mechanisms and African states. The main argument of my presentation is that the objectives outlined above cannot be attained in the absence of a political will by African states to reinforce the AU security architecture and the regional security mechanisms, on the one hand, and to reinforce state capacity for human security domestically, on the other. To discuss this argument in a satisfactory manner, I will analyze the limitations of the African integration process historically at both the continental and regional levels, and the shortcomings of

African states in overcoming poverty, a major root cause of human insecurity and a threat to peace and security.

THE PAN-AFRICAN PROJECT AND THE AU SECURITY AGENDA

In 2002, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union. Symbolically, this was a major step forward in the unification project that pan-African thinkers and activists had advocated throughout the twentieth century. Prominent black intellectuals like Alexander Crummell, Edward Wilmot Blyden and Henry McNeal Turner were already formulating pan-African ideas during the nineteenth century. But pan-Africanism as political movement was born in 1900, when the West Indian barrister Henry Sylvester Williams convened a pan-African conference in London for purposes of promoting unity among all peoples of African descent. From 1919 to 1945, the great African-American scholar William Edward Burghart DuBois, as principal organizer and convener of the first five pan-African congresses, spearheaded the movement.

In this regard, it is worth remembering the historical connection between African unity and world peace. DuBois had planned to hold the First Pan-African Congress at Versailles, to coincide with the Versailles Peace Conference, where the future of the world was to be decided by the victors of World War I. Woodrow Wilson, the American president, then asked the French to ban this meeting, as it was organized by the theoretician of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a U.S. civil rights group established in 1910. The French authorities respectfully declined, pointing out that a member of the French National Assembly, the Honorable Blaise Diagne from Senegal, had reserved the meeting hall at Versailles. Here was a remarkable instance of partnership between Europe and Africa on peace and human rights.[1]

If the DuBois-led congresses were basically gatherings of intellectuals, a mass-based movement of black consciousness with a militant "back-to-Africa" project of solidarity and self-reliance emerged as a strong voice of pan-Africanism during the 1920s. Founded in Harlem by Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a corking-class Jamaican immigrant, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) became a mighty movement of black people in the United States and a source of inspiration to peoples of African descent all over the world. In spite of Garvey's persecution and deportation from the U.S. in 1927, his intellectual influence continued to grow in movements such as the Harlem Renaissance and in countries undergoing colonial and/or racial oppression in Africa and the Caribbean, including Cuba.[2] In the Belgian Congo, the influence of Garveyism was evident in the rise in 1921 of the prophetic ministry of Simon Kimbangu, whose religious movement influenced the course of events leading to Congolese independence 40 years later, and eventually established itself as the third Christian community in the Congo after the Catholics and the Protestants.

While the intellectual pioneers of pan-Africanism had emerged from the African diaspora of North America and the Caribbean, the realization of the pan-African dream of "Africa for the Africans" was to be the work of the continental Africans themselves. With representative delegates from all corners of the African continent, the fifth and most important of the pan-African congresses under DuBois was held at the Manchester City Hall in 1945 in England. Participants included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya of Kenya, Namdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Peter Abrahams of South Africa. The call went forth that each delegate should return home and lead the struggle for independence.

Until then, the pan-African project consisted of the vision of Africa as a single federal union. Nkrumah, a major figure at Manchester, remained committed to this idea throughout his political career, during which he worked tirelessly to convince other African leaders of the necessity of a United States of Africa for peace and development in the continent.[3] Another major champion of the project was the Senegalese scholar Cheikh Anta Diop, who envisaged a gradual process of building the political unity of the continent beginning with Black Africa. He also elaborated a comprehensive plan for the industrialization of Africa based on the rich natural resources of the continent.[4]

Unfortunately, the pan-African ideal fell victim to both the neocolonial interests of imperialism, which preferred smaller states to larger entities, and the narrow class interests of the African nationalist leaders, who stood a better chance to gain presidential and ministerial positions in smaller entities. For example, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, as well as the British territories of East Africa, could have formed a total of 4 states instead of 20!

The fragility of the new states was such that even the Bandung principle of "positive neutralism" or non-alignment would soon become an empty slogan, as the need to retain power required the protection of one or the other of the two antagonistic camps in the East-West confrontation or the Cold War. In late 1960, the result for Africa was a major split over the Congo crisis between those who supported genuine independence under the democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Emery Lumumba, and those who were prepared to pursue a policy of appeasement with imperialism and the forces of counter-revolution in the Congo. The first group, led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, became known as the "Casablanca Bloc", following its December 1960 meeting in the Moroccan city under the auspices of King Mohamed V. Led by the pro-West leaders of Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Liberia, the second group was eventually called the "Monrovia Bloc".

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia succeeded in striking a compromise between the two groups, which met in May 1963 in Addis Ababa to establish the OAU with the more limited goals of fighting for the total independence of Africa from colonialism and white settlers' rule; greater solidarity and economic cooperation among African states; and the peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts through negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. Thus, from its very beginning and in view of its cardinal principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the preservation of colonially-inherited boundaries in accordance with the 1964 Cairo resolution on borders, the OAU was not different from other intergovernmental organizations in the world with respect to peace and security. Governments were free to massacre their citizens without any sanctions from OAU member states, let alone a simple public denunciation of heinous crimes against humanity by other governments or the OAU Secretariat. In 1979, when President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania took the courageous decision to pursue invading Ugandan troops all the way back to Kampala and assist Ugandan patriots in overthrowing the murderous regime of Idi Amin Dada, he found very little support among his African colleagues.

Things began changing for the better in the 1990s, particularly with the adoption in 1993 in Cairo of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which gave the Organization a role to play in internal conflicts. However, the mechanism was too new, untested and non-operational to be activated in the face of the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda and its catastrophic repercussions in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Ironically, Rwanda's interference in Congolese affairs began in 1996 with a joint effort by a group of states in Eastern and Southern Africa to overthrow the regime of President Mobutu Seso Seko of Zaire, as the DRC was then known. At the time, the overthrow of the Mobutu regime was widely applauded across Africa as a legitimate exercise of the pan-African right of intervention. Here, as in the case of Nyerere's action against Idi Amin, the idea is that Africa as a whole has a moral duty to liberate Africans from oppression, even if their oppression happens to come from their own state. In spite of its outstanding success in the total liberation of Africa from colonialism through moral and material support to African liberation movements and spearheading the worldwide campaign to ostracize apartheid South Africa in the community of civilized nations, the OAU never recognized African struggles against African tyrants. By sending a peacekeeping force into the Darfur region of Sudan, the AU is clearly putting people's rights above state rights, and this is a very positive development.

However, the limitations of this intervention with respect to troop levels and logistics is symptomatic of the major shortcomings of the AU security architecture, which have more to do with questions of political will than those of limited finances in Africa. Are African states ready to confront the denial of fundamental human rights to large segments of our peoples by corrupt and authoritarian regimes? When the AU member states can replicate the level of commitment and sacrifice that countries like Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe were willing to accept by supporting liberation movements in Southern Africa in the face of brutal retaliation by the Portuguese Fascist regime and the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, then the AU security architecture would enhance its capacity to meet the objectives of the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security.

REGIONAL SECURITY MECHANISMS

The problem of political will is just as relevant for the successful capacity development of regional security mechanisms as it is for the overall African security architecture. Like the AU, the RECs are intergovernmental organizations whose viability depends on the level of moral and material support from member states. In the context of the Abuja Treaty on African economic integration, regional economic communities (RECs) are the main building blocks for the political and economic integration of Africa. In addition to promoting economic and political integration, some of the RECs have established security mechanisms of their own for conflict prevention, management and resolution. These regional security mechanisms are part and parcel of the African security architecture.

Of all the eight RECs in existence, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has demonstrated the will and ability to respond in an effective manner to threats to peace and security in the region. Through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (or ECOMOG), decisive military actions have been undertaken in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. A very important factor of this relative success is the leadership role of Nigeria, whose economic weight is sufficient to allow for bold initiatives with respect to military intervention. Challenges for ECOWAS and its security mechanism include the decade-long political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire; the chronic instability in Guinea-Bissau, where the traffic in narcotics seems to exacerbate political conflicts; military involvement in politics in Guinea and Mauritania; and rising tensions in Niger due to the blatant violation of the constitutional process by the incumbent regime. These areas of turbulence will continue to test the

capacity of ECOWAS to respond in an effective way to challenges to peace and security in West Africa.

Other regions of the continent are still lagging behind West Africa in setting up effective security mechanisms. This is particularly true for North Africa, where the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)[5] has not developed a common strategy for dealing with threats from militant groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are also complications for the full insertion of the UMA in the African security architecture because of Morocco's self-exclusion from the African integration process. The Cherifian Kingdom is not a member of the AU, having left the OAU in 1982 in protest to the admission by the latter of the disputed territory of Western Sahara as a member state, despite its annexation by Rabat in 1976.

On the other hand, unlike King Mohamed V, who gave strong support to African independence and liberation movements, his heirs have shown more interest for the Mediterranean region than for Africa south of the Sahara. With Tunisia showing the same orientation, only Algeria, Egypt and Libya are engaged with the rest of Africa in the continental integration process. As the country that adopted as its own the pan-African intellectual Frantz Fanon from Martinique during the liberation war and gave active support to liberation struggles in Black Africa, Algeria is also one of the initiators of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), along with Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. With the River Nile as its lifeline, Egypt is a major player in the geopolitics of the Nile Basin; it is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), one of Africa's major economic communities. Under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Kaddafi, Libya is behind the establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and a major driver of the project to realize Nkrumah's dream of a United States of Africa.

In Eastern and Southern Africa, some states may belong to three or even four separate regional groupings, for this vast region is home to COMESA, the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Of these four groupings, only IGAD and SADC have attempted to put in place reliable security mechanisms. Much of the activity in conflict prevention, management and resolution has revolved around mediation efforts in both interstate conflicts, the most prominent one being the war that broke out in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in internal conflicts, as in the cases of Sudan and Somalia. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum regime and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is an excellent example of partnership between Africa, Europe, and the USA in the resolution of conflicts in the continent. There is need to sustain such a partnership in the final resolution of the question of Southern Sudan following the proposed independence referendum in 2011. Likewise, IGAD's numerous attempts to find a lasting solution to the Somali crisis cannot succeed in the absence of a coordinated effort with the AU and the international community.

Since the end of apartheid in South Africa and of civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, Southern Africa has been virtually free of armed conflicts, both internal and interstate. However, this does not mean the absence of threats to human security or sustainable livelihoods, as state-sponsored violence by an incumbent regime clinging to power by undemocratic means in Zimbabwe and a high incidence of criminal violence in South Africa have devastated hundreds if not thousands of innocent lives. Moreover, a major challenge for the former colonial-settler economic systems, which were built on violence, is how to effect the transition to a more equitable distribution of resources

with little or no violence. With respect to the regional security mechanism, the region is even better endowed than West Africa, given the military strength of South Africa and the enormous capacity in logistics of the Angolan armed forces. However, discussion is still going on concerning the proper functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, in the wake of the dispute involving the intervention in 1998 of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC to counter the invasion of that country by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Central Africa remains the most turbulent region on the continent, with variable levels of armed conflict in the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad. It is also an area in which the regional security mechanism seems to exist more on paper than in reality. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in October 1983 within the framework of the Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Angola joined the ten original members of the former French Equatorial Africa, the former Belgian Africa, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe in 1998, but Rwanda has since withdrawn from it as from most other Central African political groupings. The mostly Anglophone leadership of post-genocide Rwanda is drawn from the Tutsi diaspora in Uganda, whose social and political ties to East Africa are much stronger than the ties of colonial inheritance to Central Africa.
Despite the existence since 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the adoption of a non-aggression treaty in 1995 and the setting up in 1998 of a Higher Council for the Promotion of Peace, the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Political Crises and Armed Conflicts in Central Africa, there are still no viable initiatives for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, and conflict resolution in the region.

The most successful experiment in conflict management and resolution in the region so far has been the Inter-African Mission to Oversee the Bangui Accords (MISAB)[6], an ad hoc mechanism established for the CAR through a partnership involving Francophone countries in Central and West Africa, the UN, the OAU and France in the wake of three consecutive mutinies between 18 April 1996 and 25 January 1997. An International Follow-up Committee, with the Malian general and statesman Amadou Toumani Touré as the international mediator, worked closely with MISAB, which had troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo plus French logistical support, to implement the agreement between the government and the mutineers.

Although the Inter-African mission and the UN peacekeeping force that replaced it did succeed in preventing the outbreak of a full-scale civil war in the CAR, they only managed to establish a temporary peace. Instability did continue until General François Bozizé overthrew President Ange-Félix Patassé in 2003, and continues today with several armed groups, including the soldiers without borders of the Lord's Resistance Army from Uganda. It is evident that no matter who is running the country, the underlying issues of human insecurity and the lack of development that gave rise to the mutinies of 1996-97 have remained the same. With the government unable to pay civil service salaries regularly and to provide the basic social services in a country with enormous natural wealth, the level of popular discontent can only grow higher.

The CAR is symptomatic of the failure of many states in Africa to ensure regular payment of salaries, scholarships, pensions, and other entitlements. Those denied of these benefits are likely to lose access to basic social services and to experience increased insecurity. For civil servants and law enforcement officers, this can only encourage petty corruption and abusive behavior toward the public. When this happens on a massive scale, a vicious circle is created. Petty corruption reduces revenue collection, and with diminished state coffers, the authorities cannot meet the state's

obligations on time, and this leads to more petty corruption, gross violations of people's rights, and popular discontent. Thus, however well structured regional security mechanisms might be, they cannot address the fundamental issue of governance in Africa, which is the threat that poverty and state incapacity to deal with it poses for peace and security around the continent.

The persistence of poverty remains the major threat to the pan-African project of unity, peace and development in Africa. It creates insecurity with respect to decent livelihood and human survival, and thus undermines respect for diversity, tolerance and solidarity in favor of the politics of identity, intolerance and social exclusion. By reducing the ability of people to lead productive and rewarding lives for themselves and their children, poverty exacerbates identity conflicts along communal, ethnic, religious and regional lines. It becomes therefore insincere to talk of a common African identity when citizenship rights are being daily denied to fellow nationals on the basis of ethnic or regional origin, and the legendary African hospitality is replaced by violence against immigrants. All this goes to say that regional security mechanisms and the overall African security infrastructure cannot function effectively in the absence of developmental states capable of maintaining state authority all over the national territory and of ensuring the promotion, respect and fulfillment of the fundamental rights of all citizens, particularly the right to human security.

AFRICAN STATES AND HUMAN SECURITY

Ultimately, the goal of peace and security is compatible with the essential task of nation building and state building in Africa, which is to enhance the capacity of the state not only to establish its authority throughout the national territory but also to serve the economic, social and cultural needs of all inhabitants: citizens, permanent residents, migrant workers and refugees. According to the British historian C. Northcote Parkinson if there is one important idea emerging from the history of political thought, it is "the ideal that government is to be judged by results".[7] And a good government, as Rousseau once suggested, is that which improves the quality of life of its people.[8] Its legitimacy and the people's sense of identification with the political order are likely to be enhanced by good performance with respect to peace and security as well as development. The present crisis of the state in Africa, or its declining capacity for stability and development, is a function of its systemic failure to develop effective state institutions and/or to use them for purposes of transforming the economy and the society to improve people's lives.

Today, more than half of the people of Africa live on less than one U.S. dollar a day. Over two-thirds of the countries classified as least developed by the UN are African. Obviously, regional integration and development cannot be built on such extreme poverty. The challenge facing the continent today is how to get rid of the political deadwood of the post-independence era in order to renew in deeds and not simply in words or on paper the commitment to the pan-African project which has now been strengthened with the decision to establish the African Union Authority.

While building together the institutions of the AU, the best contribution each state can make to the pan-African development and integration process is national reconstruction through poverty eradication and democratic governance. Poverty eradication is not going to take place through slogans and target dates adopted by multilateral agencies or international conferences. It will come about only through concrete policies and programs designed to transform the economic, political and social structures that reproduce poverty in Africa, which are local, national, and international in nature.

Of all the poverty eradication strategies, the most important with regard to peace and security are those that are needed at the *local level.* Here, the low purchasing power of agricultural and pastoral producers with few or no productive assets prevents them from meeting their basic human needs with respect to nutrition, literacy, health and security. Without sufficient income and political structures which are responsive to their needs, people cannot meet their minimum nutritional requirements, pay school fees for their children, and ensure for themselves and their families access to a healthy environment, one that includes primary health care (PHC), clean water and decent housing. Failure to meet these needs leads to greater social deprivation and therefore reinforces poverty.

Failure to transform agriculture and other economic activities in rural areas through education, training and agricultural extension and credit programs has meant a relative lack of innovations in production tools, methods and techniques, low productivity and the reproduction of poverty. This is aggravated when peasants are also subject to exploitative and discriminatory practices by private merchants or state agencies. As Samir Amin has shown throughout his monumental work, sustainable development is not possible without a revolution in agriculture.[9] Technological innovations, the manufacture of capital goods for agricultural production, and the transformation of primary products into finished goods are indispensable for the success of such a revolution.

Given the stagnation in agriculture, peasants are forced to migrate to urban areas, where they hope to earn a living wage or to enjoy a more decent standard of living generally. Urban areas are also more likely to provide an easier access to social services such as education, health, piped water, electricity and public transportation. Unfortunately, African urban areas are characterized by their exploding populations in unexploding economies. The economic stagnation of the last 30 years in the context of structural adjustment has meant growing unemployment, the informalization of the economy, and the inability of large segments of the population to pay the user fees required under liberal orthodoxy for the social services they need. In some ways, the urban poor are far worse off than their counterparts in the rural areas, who have the advantage of producing their own food.

In urban areas, squatter settlements in or near the central business district allow poor people to avoid high rents and living under the constant threat of being evicted for non-payment of rent. They also allow them to live closer to their place of work or trade, and thus avoid the need for costly transportation while having an easier access to essential services such as piped water, electricity, health centers and schools. Squatters regard these conditions as major social gains, which are worth protecting against anyone, including state authorities. They are therefore ready to use violence as a means of self-defense whenever their settlements are threatened with destruction.

As a form of self-organization by the poor against social exclusion, squatting is only a partial and at best a temporary solution. A more permanent and useful solution is for the squatters to become gainfully employed and have adequate income to take advantage of settlement programs like low-cost housing and sites and services. Having gained their right to earn a decent living and an easier access to social services, they need to be empowered economically, politically and culturally in order to overcome poverty. Just evicting them from the central business district, green areas and other protected sites to dump them in the peripheral zone as the colonialists used to do, is neither humane nor economically sound. Alternative sites and services can and need to be provided to meet their needs for decent housing and an easy access to both social services and place of employment.

CONCLUSION

The main focus of this paper is on the initiatives that African states, regional security mechanisms, and the AU must undertake if the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security is to meet its objectives. Since both the AU and the regional economic communities are intergovernmental organizations dependent on the political will of member states, the paper argues that in the long run the success of the AU security architecture and of the Africa-EU partnership will depend on the capacity of the African state to maintain its authority throughout the national territory and to transform the economy in order to eradicate poverty, a root cause of violent and armed conflicts.

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[1] David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. DuBois: The Biography of a Race, 1868-1919* (New York: Norton, 1993).
[2] Peter Abrahams, *The Coyoba Chronicles: Reflections on the Black Experience in the Twentieth Century* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, and Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), pp. 13-14.
[3] Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1964).
[4] Cheikh Anto Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State,* rev. ed. (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1987).
[5] The acronym is taken from the group's name in French, *Union du Maghreb Arabe.*
[6] Acronym for *Mission inter-africaine de suivi des accords de Bangui.*
[7] C. Northcote Parkinson, *The Evolution of Political Thought* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 310.
[8] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract,* cited in Parkinson, pp. 205 and 311.
[9] See, among other works, Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 2 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).*

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PAPER ON

EU AND AU OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

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DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

I. Introduction:

Since 1999, ESDP has been used in Africa in two ways. First, and on an *ad hoc* basis, it has served as an essential tool to respond to immediate crisis management needs (DRC, Chad and Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan). Secondly, in the framework of the 2007 Africa-EU strategic partnership, it has contributed to long-term capacity building efforts. Both approaches are pursued in coordination with a broad range of EU policies and agreements such as, among others, the Cotonou agreements and the European Development Fund (EDF) with its African Peace Facility (APF).[1] This dual approach is likely to remain a feature of the EU's engagement in Africa for the foreseeable future. While under pressure to respond and prevent crises, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is still in the making and thus is not ready yet to fill all security gaps on the continent. Africa-EU security relations are therefore still very much in a transition phase which could well last a decade or more. As long as African states or organisations are not fully willing, equipped and able to prevent or manage their own crises on the continent, they will go on calling for and partly outsourcing crisis management and peacekeeping interventions to non-African powers or organisations.[2] This paper mainly looks at EU operations through the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its crisis management operations and looks at AU operations mostly through a peacekeeping lens. This does not mean that long term prevention and capacity building efforts should be neglected, on the contrary.[3]

ESDP is still in its early days; the African Union (AU) is an even younger organisation. Created in 2002 on the ashes of the Organisation for African Unity (OUA), it has a strong peace and security focus and was founded on three major principles: 'Africa must unite', 'responsibility to protect' and 'try Africa first.'[4]
While continental in nature, the AU has to coordinate with multi-decade-old subregional organisations - Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) - which have already developed security and defence cooperation.[5] Through ESDP, the EU has therefore to take the decentralised nature of the African Peace and Security Architecture into account.[6]

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[1] Other instruments like the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS) are used in Africa. See also Nicoletta Pirozzi, 'EU support to the African security architecture: funding and training components', *Occasional Paper* no. 76, EUISS, Paris, February 2009, pp. 23-29.
[2] Jean-François Bayart, 'Africa in the World, A History of Extraversion', *African Affairs,* 2000 (99), pp. 217-67. Available at: afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/99/395/217.pdf.
[3] The present focus on crisis management and peacekeeping responds to a specific request by the organiser of the Rome seminar. Many of the developments made here come from my forthcoming book, edited with Giovanni Grevi and Daniel Keohane 'The European Security and Defence Policy: the first 10 years'.
[4] Pirozzi, op. cit in note 1.
[5] For more information on RECs/RMs, see Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, 'Options for the EU to Support the African Peace and Security Architectur'*e*, Study for the European Parliament, February 2008, p. 21 and Annex 2. For a map illustrating the overlapping of RECs/RMs, see Ludger Kühnhardt, 'African Regional Integration and the Role of the European Union', ZEI Discussion Paper C184, 2008, p. 21.
[6] Benedikt Franke, 'EU-AU cooperation in capacity building', in Joachim A. Koops (ed.), *Military Crisis Management, the challenge of effective inter-organizationalism*, Egmont Paper, August 2009, pp.84-90.

The adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and of the Africa-EU strategic partnership in December 2007 marked a turning point in the relationship between the two continents as established by the 2000 Africa-EU summit in Cairo. The joint strategy is supposed to be based on a more equal footing according to the principles of equality, partnership and ownership. The strategic partnership consists of eight thematic action plans implemented along a jointly agreed roadmap leading interlocutors from both the AU and the EU to cooperate at all levels.[7] Progress achieved should be reviewed by the next AU-EU summit in 2010.[8] In the field of peace and security, three main priorities were identified: exchanging dialogue on challenges to peace and security, full operationalisation of the APSA and predictable funding for African-led peace support operations.

Key African and European actors and instruments

The African Union has to a large extent been inspired by the EU in the design of its institutions and particularly so in the field of peace and security. However, what distinguishes it from ESDP is the important role played by RECs/RMs.
Various documents underpin the development of APSA, namely the 2000 AU constitutional act, the 2004 Solemn Declaration of Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), and the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The latter document fleshes out the design of the APSA which entails a Peace and Security Council, a Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and a Peace Fund.[9] The Commission of the AU, its administrative and executive body, also has a peace and security commissioner.
On the EU side, ESDP is one tool among many others. Bilateral cooperation from individual EU Member States plays a major role in security and defence.[10] The European Commission is a key partner for ESDP in its relationship with the African continent. It has developed a large range of programmes indirectly related to peace and security in the last 50 years in the framework of the Cotonou agreement. Its geographical financial instruments provide the lion's share of EU cooperation with Africa including for crisis management and conflict prevention. The creation in 2004 of the Africa Peace Facility – financed via the EDF managed by the Commission and the member states – and its replenishment (€440 million spent under the 9th EDF and €300 million committed for 2008-2010) opened a new era in ESDP-AU cooperation. Since then and thanks to the APF, the AU has been able to finance its own peace operations in Darfur (AMIS – African Union Mission in the Sudan), Somalia (AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia), the Central African Republic (MICOPAX - Mission de consolidation de la paix

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[7] See: http://africa-eu-partnership.org. The 8 themes are: (1) peace and security; (2) democratic governance and human rights; (3) trade, regional integration and infrastructure; (4) Millennium Development Goals – MDGs; (5) energy; (6) climate change; (7) migration, mobility and employment; (8) science, information society and space.

[8] A mid-term review report was published in 2009 by the European Commission. Commission staff working document, 'Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010) – Input into the mid-term progress-report', SEC(2009) 1064 final, Brussels, July 2009.

[9] For a more precise description of the various bodies and their role, see Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, op. cit. in note 4; Nicoletta Pirozzi, op. cit. in note 1; Veronika Tywuschik and Andrew Sherriff, 'Beyond Structures: Reflections on the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU strategy', ECDPM Discussion Paper, ECDPM, 2009; Jakkie Cilliers, 'The African Standby Force: an update on progress', ISS paper no. 160, Pretoria, March 2008.

[10] Niagalé Bagayoko, 'The EU and the member states: African capabilities building programmes' in Christophe Cazelles (ed.), *Europe's activity in Africa in the field of security* (Paris: Centre d'analyse stratégique, 2007); Pirozzi, op. cit. in note 1, pp. 23-25.

en RCA) and Comoros (AMISEC - African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros).[11]

II. ESDP operations in Africa: main lessons learned[12]

In practice, some ESDP initiatives were launched specifically to support AU peace operations in Somalia and Sudan. These contributions, though small in terms of the number of personnel, constituted a valuable test for the EU to assess the viability of practical cooperation with the AU in crisis situations. Significant EU support to AMIS and AMISOM troops and equipments have been funded mainly by the African Peace Facility.

EUSEC & EUPOL in DR Congo

EUSEC has started as a very modest mission and nevertheless managed to foster change at the heart of the security system of the DRC, by assisting in the reform of troops salaries. Implemented in a very competitive donor environment, the mission has managed to keep a high profile within the international community in Kinshasa. After the 2006 elections, the window of opportunities to implement change in the Congolese armed forces started to close and the mission had to cope with a decreasing local leadership to push for Security Sector Reform. The experience of EUSEC confirmed the importance of local buy-in not only to ensure committed implementation of reforms but also to favour multilateral donor coordination. This police reform mission has followed the paths of EUSEC and suffered from the same kind of difficulties.

EUSSR Guinea Bissau

This tiny SSR mission is, together with EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the most recent ESDP mission in Africa. After 18 months of activity, one can already draw some lessons from this experience.

First, it is absolutely key for ESDP SSR advisers to work in conditions so as to facilitate close working relationship with their local counterparts while building a genuine ESDP team spirit. Several models exist, like collocating experts within institutions or prioritising team building processes (EUSEC DRC in its first phase). Beyond collocation though, more work should be done to operationalise the concept of local ownership and to train ESDP practitioners more deeply about its culturally-sensitive implementation in fragile states. Similarly and in the view to respect the principle of separation of powers and smooth relations with local counterparts, justice sector reform advisers should enjoy full autonomy in the framework of future SSR missions.

Second, matching ambitions with capabilities and adequate human resources – not even speaking of gender-equality - is a fundamental pre-requisite as well as a constant challenge. EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is the latest confirmation of the need to boost EU member states efforts to increase EU civilian crisis management human resources.

Ultimately, the availability of adequate staff will also be linked to the strategic interests of European member states and more work should be done on the definition of EU

[11] More details on the use of the APF to support AU peace operations can be found on the European Commission's website at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-support-operations/index_en.htm.

[12] Most of this section is taken from my chapters in the forthcoming book, 'The European Security and Defence Policy: the first 10 years'.

interests and opportunities in this region and in Africa as a whole. A research that is going to be carried out in 2010 at the EU Institute for Security Studies.

Artemis

Artemis operationalised some new concepts for military ESDP: autonomous action outside the NATO framework, under the request of the UN and with a UN mandate. Plus, Artemis fulfilled some key operational goals: rapid deployment in a very remote area; the capacity to protect the civilian population with a minimum number of casualties; coordination with humanitarian actors and other international organisations. It also constituted an opportunity to test the functioning of the politico-military structures (the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS) and it showed that quick decisions could be made by these institutions.[13] Thanks to its success, Artemis has created a precedent for the ESDP and validated the concept of the 'framework nation' which, in this particular case, suited France very well. It has also created a strategic precedent by extending ESDP's remit to Africa and thus opening a new field of experimentation.

However, questions remained and challenges appeared. The mission was so limited in scope that some debates emerged about the difficulty of gauging its success, especially when new massacres erupted in the area shortly after the departure of the force.[14] Furthermore, since France was the main initiator, contributor and leader of this operation, doubts were raised about the real ability of the EU as such to do the same without a French contribution.

At the operational level, the *Artemis* experience demonstrated the military advantages of leaving considerable flexibility to the Force Commander on the ground in a very violent and volatile context, even though this option may imply less control exerted by the PSC.[15] Various shortcomings were noted regarding strategic, political or operational intelligence gathering and sharing, the obsolescence of certain equipment and the lack of standard and secured communications tools and channels. Shortfalls in secure communications channels and information technology were addressed in the course of the mission.[16]

As for UN-EU cooperation, one of the lessons learned by the operation was that both organisations were still 'discovering each other.' EU requests to use UN DPKO logistics assets (this did not match UN procedures) and to benefit from the legal agreement that MONUC had reached with the Congolese (which would have put ESDP troops under

[13] Niagalé Bagayoko, op. cit. in note 3.

[14] 'Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the massacres in the province of Ituri in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', 13526/03 (Presse 301), Brussels, 13 October 2003. Criticism was also expressed by NGOs like the International Crisis Group and Médecins Sans Frontières. See Anand Menon, 'Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten', *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2, 2009, pp.227-46, p.230. See also Catherine Gégout, 'Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 10, no. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 427-43.

[15] Niagalé Bagayoko, op. cit. in note 3, p.111-112.

[16] Kees Homan, 'Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo', in European Commission (ed.), *Faster and more united ? the debate about Europe's crisis response capacity*, (Luxembourg: OPOCE, May 2007), pages 151-55.

UN command) could not be met.[17] However, Artemis was seen as 'a remarkably positive experiment in cooperation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the domain of peace and security.'[18] The operation created rather high expectations from the UN about the prospects of ESDP launching more operations in Africa.[19] At the end of the day though, European peacekeeping in Africa has remained limited. The rapid reaction scheme set up for Artemis later inspired the creation of the Battle Group Concept which came under question in late 2008 when the EU decided not to intervene in the Kivu region.

EUFOR RD Congo

This operation proved the capacity of the EU to deploy in Sub Saharian Africa when needed although the deployment was not particularly fast. EUFOR was a testing case for EU-UN peacekeeping cooperation in Africa. The operation went well and the troops intervened three times successfully with MONUC to prevent serious incidents. However, some experts considered that it was benefited from an overall favourable environment and that the mission would have been sub-optimal in preventing serious deterioration of the security situation.[20]

EUFOR Tchad/RCA

The mandate of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was the result of a compromise between member states pushing a variety of agendas. The rather strong mandate focused on civilian and aid workers protection, with clearly defined rules of engagement, but did not provide the mission with enough guidance and strength to manage initial political ambiguities. From a broader CFSP perspective, to say the least, the EU has not obtained any progress in the internal Chadian political dialogue and on democratisation. Relations between Chad and Sudan have not particularly improved either. More generally, this raises questions about the political profile of ESDP operations and how can EU policy considerations be more strongly linked to ESDP planning and operations. In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, synergies and coherence between the ESDP operation, French diplomatic representation and the EU Special Representatives could have been optimised, through a more permanent and appropriate EU political presence in Chad.[21]

The operation's added value, however, is probably to have clarified, for European chancelleries and European public opinion, the nature of challenges inside Chad (state violence and rebellion, impunity, local ethnic and land-related conflicts) and in the region (the proxy war between Khartoum and N'Djamena and the violence in Darfur). This in return should hopefully strengthen European foreign policy in the region.

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[17] Pierre-Antoine Braud, 'Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa', in Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds.), *Securing Europe ? Implementing the European Security Strategy* (Zurich: ETH Zurich, p.77).

[18] Kees Homan, op. cit. in note 8, p. 154.

[19] Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, 'Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?' in *International Peacekeeping* vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, pp. 508-25.

[20] Claudia Major, 'The military operation EUFOR DR Congo 2006', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy, the first 10 years*, forthcoming.

[21] Ambassador Torben Brylle, from Denmark, has been EUSR for Sudan and his mandate was broadened to Eastern Chad on 12 February 2008. Ambassador Georg Lennkh, from Austria, was the EU Presidency Special Representative in charge of Chadian internal political dialogue. In practice the EU rotating presidency has mostly been ensured locally by France.

As for coordination with other international organisations, new modes of coordination were set up at all levels between the EU (mainly DG E 8, OHQ and FHQ, European Commission) and the UN (DPKO, Support office, UNPOL, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General - SRSG). Contradictions between the EU and the UN emerged frequently during the coordination process and affected the mid-term review and the handover process, but they did not hamper joint work during which, at times, both organisations had to agree to disagree. Beyond certain disagreements, EU-UN coordination has deepened and reached unprecedented levels, and put new procedures in place that will be available for future joint operations.

The whole concept of intervention, as negotiated with Chad, was a hybrid set-up combining EU and UN interventions based on the idea of a bridging operation. It proved difficult to implement efficiently. The EU was expected to provide a military umbrella in the East to civilians, the humanitarian community, UN staff and police as well as UN-trained Chadian DIS (*Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* - Chadian joint police and gendarmerie force). On paper, the components of this hybrid set-up were supposed to start their work simultaneously, but this did not happen due to the serious delays mentioned above. This experience raises questions about the mechanisms required for efficient future hybrid EU-UN formulas so as to avoid planning and deployment disconnects. Early definitive commitment of the follow-on force seems key in that respect. As for the bridging function, it would not have worked in this particular case without the significant (although temporary) re-hatting of EU contingents until the arrival of UN follow-on troops. In April 2009, there were still 817 French, 405 Irish, 316 Polish, 112 Austrians, 65 Finnish and several other European personnel deployed in Eastern Chad under the UN banner.

While strategic airlift capabilities were ensured through internal cooperation between contributors, tactical air assets proved more problematic. It took months to obtain a limited number of additional transport helicopters – thanks to, among others, a contribution from Russia[22] – to complement a small and overstretched fleet constantly exposed to harsh climate conditions.

Lessons learned should also focus on the use of local resources by the operation and the way EU forces should communicate about it. Water scarcity and management, for instance, are certainly challenges to be addressed by using adequate technologies while remaining aware of the impact on the perceptions of the local population.[23]

The Eastern Chad experience also required some flexibility and context-sensitive approaches in Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). More dialogue engagement with the humanitarian community as early as during the planning phase and early deployment is crucial in order to establish smooth working relations from day one.

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[22] The Russian contribution, delivered after its war against Georgia, was slightly controversial in Brussels but cooperation in theatre proved excellent. Interviews, EUFOR and Council staff, Brussels, 3 June and 20 July 2009.

[23] In Abéché Stars Camp, the Austrian contingent used a water recycling system and allegedly consumed 4 times less than other troops. The sometimes excessive use of water by troops was also witnessed by Chadian staff, well aware of water scarcity difficulties. Water recycling systems were also used by the Irish in Goz Beida.

In a context of economic downturn and lack of enthusiasm from other Member States, France had to agree to be the main financial (shouldering probably 80% of the total costs) and troop contributor. This predominant French role raises a fundamental question: are ESDP military operations, in Africa and elsewhere, possible without France acting as the main initiator and framework nation?

Given its size, the diversity of troops contributors, the complexity of the challenges, and the degree of cooperation with the UN, EUFOR Tchad/RCA is going to remain a milestone in the development of ESDP. It remains to be seen how and when its experience will inspire future missions in Africa and beyond.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta

First, the operation as such is not designed to put an end to piracy in the region on its own. It can tackle symptoms, but not the root causes of the issue. Its mandate does not comprise an end goal expressing a clear foreign policy strategy towards Somalia and the Indian Ocean as whole.[24] It is recognised that a comprehensive EU approach towards Somalia and to maritime security more generally, in which Atalanta could play its role, is necessary in the long term.[25]

Despite the US and UK initiatives in December 2008, there has been no consensus about what measures to adopt to combat Somali piracy on land and to address linkages between piracy and the local political elite, in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia and at the national level. The operation has engaged Somali authorities who have made anti-piracy statements, but this is not enough. Assisting fragile Somali authorities to improve coastal security may prove a double-edged sword since in the past expertise and equipment passed to coast guards has reportedly subsequently been used to upgrade piracy techniques.[26]

Thanks to its comprehensive approach involving rule-of-law and Community instruments to support judicial systems in the region, the EU is able to ensure that suspected pirates are prosecuted according to international human rights standards. However, the judicial cooperation started by Atalanta will require long-term engagement from the EU with still rather fragile partner states such as Kenya or possibly the Seychelles.

Needs have been identified with a view to enhancing judicial harmonisation and cooperation in the field of piracy in Europe and more generally increase the profile and capacities of the EU's representation abroad when, for instance, it comes to negotiate international judicial agreements or Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs). The operation has also highlighted the complexity of operations in a law enforcement environment. At the tactical level, one key issue is the need for standardised secure EU military communications. Finally, one of the innovations of Atalanta lies in the cooperation between the military and the private sector (*inter alia* through the setting up of the

[24] Interview with a maritime security expert, Paris, 5 June 2009.
[25] Valentina Pop, 'MEPs say EU anti-pirate mission is "military nonsense"', *EUObserver*, 15 October 2008; Javier Solana, 'Il faut aider la Somalie à se stabiliser', *Le Figaro*, 12 août 2009 ; James Rogers, op. cit. in note 25.
[26] This has been the case with people trained by private and security companies in Somalia. Interviews with EU military staff, Northwood, 13 August 2009.

MSCHOA - Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa) and this experience will hopefully inform further reflections on the business and security nexus.

III. EU and AU operations: AMIB, AMIS, AMISOM.

The EU is usually seen as seriously committed to support African peacekeeping and APSA in general. The available literature offers contradictory views about EU motivations to intervene directly or to support peacekeeping in Africa: some underline primarily bilateral agendas for former colonial powers (mainly France)[27] while other acknowledge the willingness of former colonial powers to Europeanise foreign policy towards Africa. Because EU relations with Africa are in a transition phase, the truth is probably on both sides of the argument. Bilateral agendas vary from one case to another, according to changes in the leadership in Europe and in Africa. However, the long term trend is there: Europeans, in long term, will continue to support African leadership in dealing more autonomously with peace and security in Africa.

The EU support to African missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia has mainly focused on finance, logistics and support in planning. EU funding represented a minor part of total costs of these operations. The integration of EU officers and advisers into African chains of command has been a learning process and would deserve to become more formalised in the future. Both AMIS and AMISOM, notwhistanding the dedication of troops on the ground, have struggled against well-known shortcomings: funding, personnel, equipment, air assets.[28] The suicide bombing which took the life of the deputy Force Commander of AMISOM in September 2009 shed some new light on the need to upgrade the quality of AU self-protection.[29]
The mission in Burundi, to some extent, may be the exception confirming the rule. Its success so far can be attributed to a combination of constructive factors: an internationally recognised African political mediator (Nelson Mandela), the involvement of a regional hegemon and a leading troop contributing nation (South Africa), strong international coordination and high level UN political leadership (UNSRSG). This example of best practice could perhaps inspire future peacekeeping/peacebuilding initiatives elsewhere on the continent.

The division of labour between foreign funders and troop contributors has raised some questions about unfair treatment between Africans taking most of the risks by deploying on the ground, and outsiders managing the financial and strategic dimension of peacekeeping.[30] For some African militaries though, this division of labour between donors and the idea that Africans are those taking most of the risks does not seem to be problematic.[31]

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[27] Olsen, Gorm Rye, 'The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, Num. 2, pp. 245 – 260 (April 2009).
[28] Benedikt Franke, 'EU support to AMIS and AMISOM', in Grevi, Helly, Keohane, forthcoming, and Bandali, Naveed, 'Lessons from African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 5, Num. 2, pp 11-12,14 (Sept – Oct 2006).
[29] AMISOM Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 27, 25 September 2009.
[30] Kristiana Powell and Stephen Baranyi, 'Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa', North South Institute Policy Brief, 2005, p.4.
[31] "Better coordination needs to be undertaken between countries that have launched peacekeeping missions, the ones that finance them and the countries taking the risk in sending troops." (Lt.Col.) Diop, Birame, 'A review of African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 4, Num. 4, pp. 25-26,30 (Jan-Feb 2009), p.30.

IV. EU – Africa relations in the field of peace and security: future scenarios

Several issues will require future ESDP-AU cooperation in theatre. ESDP staff need to be provided with diplomatic status to overcome basic obstacles when they operate in Africa. Although the negotiation of Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) with hosting authorities may be a temporary solution, ad hocery is not enough. The example of difficulties experienced at border crossing points or delays in visa delivery from the Sudanese administration are cited as examples.[32] Second, lessons learned from AMIS showed that more clarity regarding the role of EU staff seconded to AU operations will be needed in the future. The EU's say and place in the chain of command and reporting channels, and the nature of its advisory role, have to be clarified early enough to maximise the cooperation in theatre. Third, the EU's influence as main donor of AU operations will have to be complemented by a high degree of political-military synergy between the two organisations. This is necessary to avoid past cases when changes in the conduct of AMIS recommended by the EU were not implemented.[33]

In the absence of strong African political will it is impossible for the EU to foster more African ownership in the spirit of the new EU-Africa partnership. Without strongly staffed structures enjoying political back-up on the African side, it is also hard to avoid the trap of the donor-recipient relationship that the Lisbon Summit was supposed to consign to the past.

The AU must convince RECs/RMs that it is able to give them some added value. For that purpose, RECs/RMs representation to the AU is being developed in Addis Ababa with the support of the EU. A legal framework to regulate AU-RECs/RM relations *vis-à-vis* the African Standby Force (ASF) is expected to be adopted in 2010. Similarly, given the differing levels of development reached by regional brigades, it is crucial to support the set-up of the ASF in a differentiated and targeted manner. Some have suggested prioritising the most advanced brigades.[34]

Suggestions were also made to increase cooperation and skills transfer between the AU and the UN in peacekeeping logistics management.[35] Finally, in the spirit of the partnerships, dialogue on peace and security would benefit from increased participation from non-state actors, including from the private sector, so as to stimulate progress and accountability.

Beyond the EU-AU partnerships, a myriad of actors have engaged the APSA. International organisations like the UN, NATO, the G8 or the Arab League have developed their own partnerships and support programmes. Brazil, China, India and Japan also are keen to cooperate more closely with Africans on peace and security. More coordination is needed to avoid divide and rule or 'aid auction' situations from those in Africa who have a long experience of donors' competition. The report of the AU-UN

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[32] Pierre-Antoine Braud, 'Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa', in Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds.), *Securing Europe ? Implementing the European Security Strategy*, pp.72-73.
[33] Ibid., p.76.
[34] Vines and Middleton, op. cit. in note 4, p. 36.
[35] Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations, 26 December 2008.

Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations has identified solutions to avoid overlapping and limit transaction costs. It remains to be seen how the EU will support and contribute to new funding mechanisms and in particular the suggested multi-donor trust fund for capacity building.[36] Decisions will also be influenced by debates on the definition of Official Development Aid (ODA) which so far, according to the criteria established by the OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee), cannot be used to fund military activities.[37] Since the DAC criteria constrain the use of development budgets to fund peace and security efforts, some options should be considered to create or increase resources matching the hybrid nature of the security-development nexus. As for international coordination, various formats are being developed in the framework of the G8++, the trilateral EU-Africa-China partnership or the EU-AU cooperation at the UN.

V. Peacekeeping in Africa: future scenarios:

Three groups of states are key for the future of peacekeeping in Africa: the UN Security Council members, the funders, and troop contributors.[38] The future of AU operations will depend on the consensus achieved by these three groups. At the level of the UN Security Council, most of the funding has been so far ensured by the US, Europe and Japan. Russia has contributed less substantially but can always use its veto power to bargain its support to peacekeeping in Africa against other strategic issues more relevant for its domestic interests such as Central Asia, Caucasus or Middle East. China has increasingly contributed to peacekeeping in Africa and has more and more to say. The increasingly important role of main troop contributors like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, to mention a few, will also have an impact on the shape of peacekeeping in Africa. More generally, the outcome of the renewed debate on UN peacekeeping generated around the "New horizon report" will have a significant impact on AU and EU operations in Africa.[39]

On the funding front, some predict a possible decrease of resources because of successive crises (food, oil prices, financial) in the developed world.[40]

It is possible that a withdrawal from Western powers because of economic hardships could lead to an increased involvement of China in the field of peacekeeping in Africa. Such a vacuum could also be filled by Russia or even Brazil, if these powers seek for more international recognition, more support in global governance fora (like G20 or WTO) and access to new markets.

As for Africa troop contributing countries, they face numerous challenges. First of all, estimates by military experts show that even if the African Standby Force reaches its objectives in 2010, available African troops will not be enough to replace currently

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[36] Ibid.

[37] OECD DAC, 'Is it ODA?', Fact sheet, November 2008, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf

[38] (Lt.Col.) Diop, Birame, 'A review of African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 4, Num. 4, pp. 25-26,30 (Jan-Feb 2009).

[39] See the UN DPKO webpage and the report, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting the New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf.

[40] (Lt.Col.) Diop, Birame, 'A review of African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 4, Num. 4, pp. 25-26,30 (Jan-Feb 2009).

deployed peacekeepers in Africa.[41] This means that no matter how African capabilities develop, external troop contribution will be needed. The irony is that African states are caught in a irresolvable dilemma: on the one hand, they are requested to shrink and reform their armed forces so as to build stronger and accountable security systems, according to the new SSR doctrine recommended by developed countries.[42] On the other, regional security challenges and the implementation of the "Africa First" principle require more troops and more expenditure for peacekeeping forces. State building and regionalisation, in that respect, come to contradict each other.

In the future however, if current motivations to engage in peacekeeping (extra funds for peacekeeping for poorer states, state legitimisation for contested states with contested borders or controversial/conflict driving ethnic diversity[43]) remain the same, the same strategies are likely to continue being pursued by less repressive, poorer, English speaking states with "low state legitimacy" and large armed forces.[44]

Financially, current peacekeeping costs[45] cannot be covered by African budget only. The key factor here is how the funding structures suggested by the Prodi Panel, i.e. for instance a specific trust fund, will take off the ground and if they will pursue ambitious enough strategies with flexible enough means. The existence of an international framework dedicated to military relevant funding would be very useful for the EU and those of its member states who are keen to support AU operations in a sustainable way.

At the operational level, several challenges will have to be faced by African peacekeeping in the future. Corruption in the use of funds supposed to be dedicated to peacekeeping has been a long-standing issue which make foreign supporters hesitate in funding African PSOs blindly.[46] Troops efficiency will require efforts to overcome language barriers, cultural diversity, soldiers' illiteracy and improve their healthcare.[47] To what extent French speaking states have a chance to be integrated into the international (UN or AU peacekeeping) system remains to be seen. Some encourage the UN and the AU to invest in French speaking human resources in the view to strengthen and improve African capabilities and their effectiveness on the ground (for instance in the DRC).[48]

In the future as well, more questions will be raised about the role of the private sector in peacekeeping in Africa. It will be an option for logistics, catering (on this precise matter the importance of national cuisine has to be taken into account[49]) but also for arms and equipment maintenance. The recourse to private operators has created serious problem of dependency on donors for AMIS when Nigerian and Rwandan contingents could not

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[41] (Cpt.) Potgieter, Johan, 'Peacekeeping Forces for Pease Support Operations in Africa', *ISS Today* 4 August 2009, Pretoria. "If Africa wants to provide only 50% of the required forces continuously, it will need a military and police force components of about 154,000".

[42] (Lt.Col.) Diop, Birame, op. cit., 'A review of African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 4, Num. 4, pp. 25-26,30 (Jan-Feb 2009).

[43] These variables have been identified in Victor, Jonah, 'African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics & State Legitimacy', *Journal of Peace Research*, Forthcoming 2010.

[44] Ibid.

[45] De Conning, Cedric, 'The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa', Report for the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs (2006).

[46] (MAJ) Feldman, Robert L., 'Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces', *Defence & Security Analysis* Vol. 24, Num 3, pp. 267 – 279 (Sept. 2008).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Jocelyn Coulon, presentation to the Bamako forum on French speaking participation to peacekeeping, June 2009, http://operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/COULON.pdf.

[49] In the case of AMIS, a Middle Eastern company was subcontracted and according to the author the food was not adapted to African contingents cooking habits, thus undermining their morale. Bandali, Naveed 'Lessons from African Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 5, Num. 2, pp 11-12,14 (Sept – Oct 2006)

ensure their equipment maintenance. By comparison, the South African contingent, who had its own equipment, did not suffer from this situation..

Finally, harmonised training policies seem unlikely in the short term[50] although they will be needed in the long run. More research would be welcome to draw lessons from cross-regional training experiences like the Recamp Amani programme. More generally, a political emphasis should be put on the coordination between the variety of layers in African multilateralism, between regional powers, RECs/RMs, and the AU. Policy coordination and coherence between all these actors will be the most crucial factor in the future of AU operations to convince the EU to continue its support.

[50] Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, op. cit. in note 4.


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PAPER ON

EU-AU MISSIONS IN AFRICA: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE SCENARIO

BY

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DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have emerged as critical contributors to international efforts at supporting African states in transition from armed violence to sustainable peace. Their role as peacekeepers has become increasingly crucial as the rising number and complexity of crisis situations around the globe continue to exceed the United Nations' (UN) capacity for prompt and effective interventions. True, the UN's primacy in the authorization and conduct of peace support operations (PSOs) continues to enjoy universal legitimacy. Yet the organization has also come to the realization that the 'complexity of modern peacekeeping means that no single organization is capable of tackling the challenge on its own'.[1] Since the 1990s, therefore, the UN has adopted various resolutions calling for closer and deeper co-operation with regional organizations in general and the AU in particular under Chapter VIII provisions of the UN Charter.[2]

The benefits of co-operative engagement between the AU and the UN became manifest when the AU authorized the deployment of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, and latter the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 as precursor operations to more enhanced UN deployments. Currently, the Union is engaged in a joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Yet, while the AU's collaboration with the UN has been useful, it is through the EU's provision of consistent funding options through the African Peace Facility (APC) that the AU has managed to sustain its peacekeeping endeavours. Not only does the EU-AU peace support partnership enjoy the advantage of proximity to the epicentres of conflicts in Africa, it also appears to be inspired by an overlap between the sentiments of common humanity as well as real economic and strategic incentives to be derived thereby.[3] The UN sometimes finds support for intervention difficult when national interests of member states are undisturbed by conflicts.[4]

In this paper, I discuss the extent to which critical gaps regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa, left by the UN, are being filled by joint EU-AU engagements. The paper is also interested in examining how the EU-AU partnership can further be strengthened to maximize mutual security and related benefits arising from it. Ultimately, the paper seeks to explore workable arrangement by which UN, EU and AU peace operations can be harmonized towards the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and beyond.

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[1] UN Doc A/63/666-S/2008/813, at para. 10.

[2] See UN Doc. A/47/227-S/24111; A/60/L.1; S/2008/168; A/63/666-S/2008/813.

[3] See EU Doc. A/1880, *European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa*, 2004, para. 15-18; Elowson, C., *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, March 2009, p 58.

[4] See, Dallaire, R., *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, London: Arrow Books Limited, 2003, p. 6; Kapila, M. 'Why the international Community Failed Darfur' in Mempham, D. and Ramsbotham, A. (eds.), *DARFUR: The Responsibility to Protect*, IPPR, 2006, pp. 22-28.

Evolving EU-AU Peace and Security Relations

Since the beginning of the 21st century, relations between the EU and the AU have been marked by a deepening partnership of equals with economic and security interests in common. While it cannot be denied that this emerging partnership has a long pedigree dating back to the 1963 Yaoundé Convention, it was the 2000 Africa-EU Summit held in Cairo that set in motion the beginning of serious political dialogue and collaboration on the crucial issue of peace and security in Africa. The need for broader EU-Africa relations beyond the largely economic Yaoundé and the Lomé agreements became inevitable as Africa got embroiled in violent and internecine conflicts after the demise of the Cold War. At the Cairo Summit, the EU and the AU emphasized the nexus between security and development and pledged to work together towards improving Africa's stability.[5]

However, the strengthening solidarity between Africa and Europe cannot be attributed to the Cairo Summit alone. Institutional transformations taking place on the continent in terms of the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the new African Union rooted in human-centred norms and principles, together with the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the overarching aim of promoting human security in Africa, have been significant factors defining the shape of current relations. Unlike the erstwhile OAU, the AU has broader legal mandate and authority to intervene in cases of 'war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.[6]

In spite of the AU's structural and institutional developments, coupled with a genuine commitment to address existing and budding conflicts, efficient and sustained responses continue to be impaired by acute financial and logistical incapacities. The AU's position is made even more precarious by the Union's dual responsibility of both building its peace and security architecture while responding to crises situations at the same time. Indeed it is the EU's commitment to help address the AU's resource constrains through the APF that has been the defining feature of the EU-AU peace and security partnership.

At the Joint Africa-EU Summit held Lisbon in 2007, the EU and the AU were in agreement that the 'AFP has made a substantial contribution and is a good example to how partnership support can complement and reinforce ... African-led peace support operations'.[7] As a result, the EU indicated its preparedness to provide 'continued and increased support for the AU in its efforts to – in cooperation with the relevant African regional organizations – operationalize the APSA'.[8] The Lisbon summit yielded the Joint Africa-EU Strategy to serve as a strategic roadmap for future cooperation on wide-ranging issues including the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention, management and resolution.[9] The Joint Africa-EU Strategy also formally transformed EU-AU relations from the previous unidirectional pattern of interaction to a purposeful partnership of equals.[10]
But given the obvious asymmetrical power balance, economically and strategically, between the parties, and considering the disproportionate focus on the African side of

[5] See *Cairo Declaration* of 2000 at para. 64.
[6] See Article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union.*
[7] The *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* 2007, at para 20.
[8] Ibid at para. 17.
[9] Ibid at para. 13.
[10] Ibid at para 9.

the scale, is there anything to be gained by Europe in this relationship at all? If we are to adequately comprehend the mutuality of EU-AU partnership, then it is imperative to view EU-AU processes from the wider international context in which these processes are rooted.

Since the fall of communism, and later the 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the realization has grown within EU circles that 'global challenges, such as state failures and regional conflicts, affect Europe and thereby need the EU's active attention'.[11] This recognition has contributed to a more pronounced definition of EU security in global terms. In other word, if Europe is to adequately protect itself against attacks from terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, as well as other trans-national criminality such as drug trafficking and money laundering, then Africa's security concerns can no longer be ignored by European states. Put differently, Africa's diminishing *unimportance* to Europe is reflected in the fact that the EU needs a 'stable Africa in order to protect itself and to address the threats in a better manner'.[12]

Aside from European security concerns, the abundance of natural resources in Africa is another factor explaining the EU's renewed interest in Africa.[13] In the area of energy security, for instance, 'Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to Europe's dependency on Russia'.[14] Additionally, the arrival of emerging economic giants such as China and India in Africa has intensified the competition for Africa's resources giving rise to the offer of more advantageous packages by the EU. With the benefit of history and geography on its side, Europe is determined to maintain its enviable position as Africa's largest trading partner.

Undoubtedly, there is also a moral dimension to European support to Africa. Aside from the EU's international obligation to contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful and secured world environment, Europe also acknowledges that many of Africa's 'problems can be attributed to colonialism and, more importantly, to the decolonization of the 1960s'.[15] Clearly, Europe feels addressed by the share scale and intensity of human suffering in Africa, often arising from violent and brutal conflicts, and is genuinely committed to help overcome the continent's myriad security and developmental challenges.

Since the beginning of this century, the EU has actively supported the AU and other international efforts, such as those taking place within the framework of the UN, towards addressing Africa' peace and security conundrum. EU support in this regard has often come in two major strands: operational and institutional capacity support through the African Peace Facility; and direct military engagements in Africa, with the most prominent being the 2003 Operation Artemis. The two dimensions are discussed in turn.

EU-AU Peace Engagements

Operational and Institutional Support

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[11] Elowson, C., *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, March 2009, pp. 16 to 17.
[12] Ibid. p. 58.
[13] Ibid. p. 59; EU Doc. A/1880, *European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa*, 2004, para. 15
[14] Elowson, C., *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, March 2009, p. 59.
[15] EU Doc. A/1880, *European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa* (2004), para. 4.

While there is a manifest harmony of interest between the EU and the AU in their quest for sustainable peace and security in Africa, the AU's resources and institutional constraints have often served to deflate its potentials as an effective peacekeeper. In 2003, therefore, at the request of African leaders, the EU created the African Peace Facility under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) budget to help address these challenges. The APF which had a start up budget of EUR 250 million was intended to serve as a flexible and sustainable funding instrument for African-led PSOs and institutional capacity building programmes for the nascent APSA as well as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

In general, EU-AU peace support collaborations have been structured around the principle of African ownership and African-led PSOs with predictable financial and logistical backing from the EU. Within this framework, the EU has been instrumental in providing support for PSOs undertaken by the AU including the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB, EUR 25 million); the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, EUR 300 million); and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, EUR 15.5 million).[16] In specific terms, the APF is supposed to finance the following types of peacekeeping expenditures: soldiers' per diem allowances, communication equipment, medical facilities, wear and tear of civilian equipment, transport and logistics. The APF is, however, not permitted to cover military and arms expenditure.[17] Although the EU has been instrumental in all AU peacekeeping initiatives, it is the AU-EU collaboration in terms of its prosecution of AMIS that provides the best example.

From Rhetoric to Praxis: the AU and the EU in Darfur

The Darfur crisis erupted in 2003 against the background of unsavoury Sudanese polity, and the belief on the part of armed groups that a revision of the *status quo* could best be achieved on the battle field rather than through the ballot box or the courts. In March of 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the two main rebel groups in Darfur, launched a series of attacks on government targets. The attacks were intended to protest against what they called the 'systematic... policies of marginalization, racial discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and divisiveness [as well as] the brutal oppression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum Government'[18]. The Government and its *janjaweed* ally responded to the attacks in a 'ruthless and disproportionate'[19] manner, resulting in extreme violations of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law.

While the UN adopted an international *Responsibility to Protect* in the midst of the Darfur crisis, and even though the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, clearly stated in 2004 that 'genocide has occurred in Darfur and may still be occurring'[20], the UN did not know exactly what to do with Darfur. Until 2007 when the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was deployed, much of the effort at stabilizing the situation in Darfur, therefore, came from the AU and the EU.

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[16] See European Commission, Security Peace and Stability for Africa: the EU Funded African Peace Facility, July 2004; Elowson, C., *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, March 2009, p. 25.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sudan Liberation Movement, quoted in Burr and Collins, *Darfur: Long Road to Disaster*, Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 2006, p. 292.

[19] See UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2005/11, February 2005.

[20] Powell, C., quoted in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. (Eds.), *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in Sudan*, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. xiii.

In April 2004, the AU brokered the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the belligerents to end hostilities, release prisoners, and open up humanitarian access to the civilian population. While this agreement produced a temporary lull in fighting, further attempts at extending the truce did not materialize. In May 2006, the AU presided over the signing of another peace deal in the form of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This time around, the agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan and only one of the rebel groups, the Mini Minnawi faction of the SLM/A. The congenital difficulties that typified the DPA meant its impact would correspondingly be slight.

Consequently, AU peacekeeping in Darfur become the inevitable option. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was subsequently deployed in 2004 to monitor the compliance of the combatants to the N'djamena ceasefire agreement (and later, the DPA), and to help protect the civilian population from attacks. Nonetheless, given the AU's capacity weaknesses, in terms of finance and logistics, resort to the EU became the only attractive option.

From 2004 to 2007, the EU and its member states joined the AU to execute the AMIS through the provision of wide range of support to the AU. In April 2005, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, in his capacity of President of the AU Commission, addressed a letter to the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) of the EU highlighting the seriousness of the situation in Darfur and hoped to be able to count on the EU to enhance the capacity of the AMIS.[21] Responding to this request, the EU pledged to lend all possible support to the AMIS.[22]

While the EU did not engage in intense crisis management operations in Darfur, the organization, together with its member states, contributed some EUR 500 million (EUR 300 million from the APF, and EUR 200 million from individual EU member states) to the AMIS, from its commencement in 2004, until the mission was transferred to the UNAMID in 2007.[23] These funds made it possible to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, ration and medical costs, communication equipment, political support to the Darfur peace talks (leading to the DPA) and the Ceasefire Commission. EU support to the AMIS also came in the form of planning and technical assistance to AMIS levels of command, provision of additional military observers, training of African troops, provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and support for the civil police (CIPOL) component of AMIS.[24]

Capacity Building Support for the APSA and the RECs

Aside from its operational collaborations with the AU, the EU is also committed to helping build the long-term capacities of both the APSA and the RECs. The RECs are expected to contribute the relevant brigades toward the formation and launch of the African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. As a result, the effectiveness of the ASF, the

[21] See EU Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, 18 July 2005, at para 11.
[22] Ibid. at para. 12.
[23] EU Council Secretariat Fact sheet, *EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS*, (AMIS II/07), December 2007.
[24] Ibid.; EU Council Secretariat Fact sheet, *Darfur – Consolidated EU package in support of AMIS II*, (AMIS II/02), October 2005; *EU Council Secretariat Fact sheet, European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis*, July 2006.

operational arm of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), is contingent upon the viability of the RECs. Between 2004 and 2007, the AU provided EURO 35 million for capacity building activities of the APSA and the RECs.[25] Specifically, the grant was to be directed toward the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the creation of liaison between the AU and the RECs, the facilitation of communication links across Africa and the enhancement of RECs initiatives.[26] The EU contribution in the area of capacity building is ultimately aimed at supporting the AU and the RECs develop proactive and comprehensive approaches to peace through operational prevention as well as structural prevention.

EU Direct Military Engagement

Operation Artemis

Although the EU's peace support collaboration with the AU is clearly guided by the principle of African ownership and African-led PSOs with consistent resource backing from the EU and its member states, the EU has not always operated within this frame. While the 2003 EU peacekeeping mission in the DRC, codenamed Operation Artemis, represented one of the EU's best peacekeeping endeavours, this mission failed to include the AU.

In May 2003, factional fighting reignited between Hema and Lendu-based militia groups for control over Bunia, a town in the Ituri province of the DRC after the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Following escalating violence and atrocities, the Secretary-General of the UN requested 'the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped multinational force... for a limited period until a considerably reinforced United Nations presence could be deployed'.[27] France agreed to take up the challenge, and on 30 May 2003 the UN authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) until 1 September 2003, when a more enhanced UN mission in the form of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed. The mandate of the mission was 'to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situations in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camp in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town'[28]

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union decided to deploy Operation Artemis, the EU's first peacekeeping mission in Africa, with France as the Framework Nation. What was most intriguing about the mission, however, was the total absence of AU input. As a result, even though the mission was a significant success in terms of accomplishing its mandate and highlighting the possibility and necessity of partnerships between the UN and regional organizations, it also represented a missed opportunity for EU-AU peace support partnership.

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[25] Elowson, C., *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, March 2009, p. 26.
[26] Ademola, A., 'EU Crisis Management in Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects', in Blockmans, S. (ed.), *The European Union and Crisis Management*, The Hague,T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008, pp. 328-343.
[27] UN Doc. S/2003/574, 28 May 2003.
[28] UN Doc, S/RES/1484, 30 May 2003.

Lessons Learned and Future Scenario

There is no doubt that EU-AU peace support partnership represents an indispensable instrument within a rather limited toolbox of possible remedies to Africa's peace and security challenges. While Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the contribution of regional organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security, it subordinates them to the pacific settlement of disputes. Regrettably, this tool has, since the end of the Cold War, proved woefully inadequate for addressing Africa's complex emergencies. Although the primacy of the UN in maintaining global peace and security can hardly be questioned, Africans have since the 1994 Rwandan genocide come to realize the imprudence of depending entirely on the UN for the continent's peace and security needs.

With the support of the EU, Africa is positioning itself in a manner that allows for rapid and comprehensive response to conflict situations. In this sense, AU-EU partnership, through the APF, has been critical both in terms of enhancing the long-term capacity of the AU for conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as meeting current peacekeeping needs. The critical nature of AU-EU partnership particularly lies in its ability to launch rapid interventions, as in the case of AMIS, prior to UN deployments. The significance of prompt responses to crises situations become obvious when one considers the fact that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda could be executed in a matter of some hundred days.

Yet the non-involvement of the AU and the RECs in Operation Artemis, even if a militarily expedient, completely undermined the EU's concept of African ownership and African-led PSOs. Indeed, Operation Artemis was a good opportunity for engaging the AU as an 'equal' partner in peacekeeping, particularly when the operation was taking place on African soil. Also, the operation could have been used to enhance the capacity of the AU for managing small to medium scale conflicts.

This notwithstanding, the EU is generally committed to helping the AU create the necessary conditions for stable peace and security in Africa, which is in turn acknowledged by the EU as necessary for the security of Europe. It is significant, however, to note that the EU sometime experience difficulties in coordinating its member states when it comes to the AU-EU peace partnership. This problem seems to result from the lack of awareness about the potential gains that can be derived from the partnership. [29]

While it is imperative to unravel the necessity of the AU-EU peace and security partnership, it is equally important to stress the need for well coordinated, ordered and predictable interaction between AU, the EU and the UN in the domain of peace and security. With the increase in the interfaces and synergies between the UN and regional organizations, particularly the AU and the EU, there appears to be recognition that the role played by these organizations as components of multilateralism is desirable, feasible and necessary. Not only are the AU, the EU and the UN united by a common objective (promoting peace and security), they are also connected by mutual bond in terms of

[29] [29] Elowson, C., (March 2009) *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*, FOI, p. 8.

resource-dependency, legitimacy and sharing of emerging common values. Closer and deeper interaction between them is therefore needed in order to exploit the comparative advantages of each body, while at the same time enhancing the complementarity of roles.

Conclusion

While the AU has clearly demonstrated it commitment towards improving the human security architecture of the continent, the organizations still lack the necessary capacity for effective structural and operation conflict preventions in Africa. Against this background, the AU-EU peace support partnership, through the APF, has been a prudent and desirable option for addressing Africa's peace and security challenges. However, the diversity of experiences and capabilities that characterize the UN and regional organizations mean that closer and deeper collaboration between the AU, the EU and the UN represent a superior strategy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa and beyond.

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PAPER ON

G8 AND EU SUPPORT OF AFRICAN EFFORTS IN PEACE AND SECURITY

BY

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Introduction

In Pittsburgh in September 2009, leaders of the Group of 20 nations reached agreement to make the G20 the main international forum for crafting international economic policy – a move that represents a major change in the global financial architecture. This decision ushers in a new economic order that gives re-emerging and emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea more say in steering the global economy. This means the G20 will assume the role long played by the smaller club of wealthy countries, made up of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. The transition from G8 to G20 will take place formally in June 2010 in Canada – where Canada next year's G8 host will now host two consecutive summits – co-hosting a G20 summit with South Korea.

Africa remains marginalized in the G20, only South Africa is a member and the African Union remains an invitee at the discretion for the chair (unlike the European Union which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank). The African Union had lobbied for more of its members to be included in addition to the African Union Commission. At the London G20 in April 2009 summit Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi represented the AU as co-chair with Jean Ping of the AU Commission at the invitation of Prime Minister Gordon Brown. He also attended the Pittsburgh summit in this capacity at the invitation of President Barrack Obama.

The immediate concern is that low-income countries like those in Africa will not have much of a say. South African President Jacob Zuma lobbied for G20 leaders on the needs of low income countries. The UN Secretary-General also called on G20 leaders to deliver the $1.1 trillion promised in London last April, especially the $50 billion for poorest countries and honour the Gleneagles G8 pledges of 2005 to increase official development assistance (ODA) - with $65 billion for Africa. The G20's final communiqué did make a couple of commitments that impact Africa:

- Agriculture – It called on the World Bank to develop a new trust fund, as a way to implement the G8's food security initiative announced at the L'Aquila Summit in Italy in July.
- African Development Bank – It also reaffirmed the commitment to make sure the multilateral development banks have enough finance, especially the World soft loan arm, the International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

As an economic body, there was no reference to climate change or African efforts toward peace and security. Indeed, at the G8 summit at L'Aquila in 2009, the Italian presidency invited most of the G20 to attend in addition to a number of African countries - Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Senegal, Egypt and the AU Commission for a discussion of the global economic crisis on the continent. It may be that the main result of this was bilateral meetings, such as the Presidents of India and South Korea with the Angola President José Eduardo dos Santos.

It is early days for the G20, and time will tell how the shift toward the G20 works out. Up to the summit South Africa itself was split on whether a G13 (the G8 with the Outreach Five – China, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa) might provide them more a

greater voice than the full twenty, which includes Australia, Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey, most which have marginal interest in Africa.

But then, when it comes to African peace and security it should be said that for the G8 the prime driver has been an extension of humanitarian concerns, rather than national interest, although migration and counter-terrorism have featured. In many ways the "responsibility to protect" has found its purest form in G8 engagement with Africa. This position is particularly prevalent amongst EU members of the G8. For the time being the G8, despite its downgrading, will play a role to yearly review progress on key global themes, such as the development of African efforts in peace and security and the support that EU members of the G8, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom play.

Mapping G8 Commitments toward African Peace and Security

Kananaskis and Evian summits

At the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada in June 2002, participating nations established an ambitious Africa Action Plan. Stating that Africa had been "undermined or destroyed by conflict and insecurity", G8 nations pledged that they were "determined to make conflict prevention and resolution a top priority". This summit built on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and committed G8 members to support goals with NEPAD, both as individual and collective actions, and through their international membership in international institutions.

The Kananaskis pledges included resolving the principal armed conflicts in Africa at the time; providing technical and financial assistance to enable African countries and regional/sub-regional efforts to better prevent and resolve conflicts and provide more effective peace-building support to societies emerging from or seeking to prevent armed conflicts. The commitments also covered other aspects of conflict such as better regulation of arms brokers and traffickers, the elimination and removal of anti-personnel mines, addressing the link between armed conflict and natural resources exploitation and the protection and assistance of war-affected populations.

The following year at Evian, peace operations drew even more emphasis with the follow-up "Implementation Report" to leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan. This report added recommendations calling for African Union consultation and links with the UN, and support for the AU and regional organizations to learn more about Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) as a model for the African Standby Force (ASF).

Sea Island summit

The following year at Sea Island, G8 leaders "committed to an Action Plan to expand global capability for peace support operations that is available for any international peace support operation or mission on a timely basis. "We commit, consistent with our national laws, to:

- Train and, where appropriate, equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010, in line with commitments undertaken at Kananaskis and Evian;

- Coordinate with African partners, the UN, the EU and others to enhance African peace support operations capabilities and set up donor contact groups in African capitals (as foreseen in the Evian plan);

- Work with interested parties to develop a transportation and logistics support arrangement, which will help provide countries with transportation to deploy to peace support operations and logistics support to sustain units in the field;

- Increase the training of carabinieri/gendarme-like forces both by continuing to support existing centers dedicated to that purpose, notably those in France and Italy, and those in Africa, and by supporting new initiatives in that respect. In particular, we will support the Italian initiative to establish, on a multinational basis, an international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The center will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces to develop carabinieri/gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations."

Gleneagles summit

At the 2005 meeting in Scotland, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was high on the agenda. G8 nations agreed to enhance support for the development of Africa's capacity to resolve conflicts and keep the peace, consistent with our national laws, by:

- Providing co-ordinated technical assistance to the ASF and helping to establish planning elements at the African Union HQ and its regional brigades;
- Supporting the AU in developing its ability to deploy unarmed military observer missions, civilian policing operations and gendarmerie/carabinieri-like forces as part of stabilisation and peace support operations;
- Providing support, including flexible funding, for African peace support operations including transport, logistics and financial management capacity;
- Countering terrorism in Africa, including through co-operation with the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers;
- Supporting efforts from regional and international organisations to reinforce African capacity to promote peace and stability.

Furthermore it was agreed by the G8 that they would also help Africa prevent conflict and ensure that previous conflicts do not re-emerge, by:

- Working in partnership with the AU and sub-regional organisations, including by providing resources to develop their planned Continental Early Warning System and implement the AU Panel of the Wise to address and mediate conflicts before they erupt into violence;
- Enhancing the capabilities of the AU and African sub-organisations, building on the existing G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, as well as commitments from the Evian and Kananaskis Summits. To support this, we will work to promote within our respective governments mechanisms for more effective and flexible crisis response and

promote faster, more comprehensive and coordinated partner responses engaging ourselves, the UN, key regional organisations and other partners;

- Maximising the contribution of local and multinational companies to peace and stability including through working with the UN Global Compact and developing OECD guidance for companies working in zones of weak governance;
- Working to implement UN sanctions regimes more effectively by improved co-ordination of existing monitoring mechanisms and more efficient use of independent expertise;
- Acting effectively in the UN and in other fora to combat the role played by 'conflict resources' such as oil, diamonds and timber, and other scarce natural resources, in starting and fuelling conflicts;
- Improving the effectiveness of transfer controls over small arms and light weapons, including at inter alia the review conference of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons in 2006, and taking effective action in Africa to collect and destroy illicit small arms. Development of international standards in arms transfers, including a common understanding of governments' responsibilities, would be an important step towards tackling the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms. We agree on the need for further work to build a consensus for action to tackle the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms;
- Working in support of the UN Secretary General's proposed new Peace Building Commission.

St. Petersburg summit

At the Russia meeting in 2006 an Action Plan to expand global capability for peace support operations that is available for any international peace support operation or mission on a timely basis was outlined.

It was agreed that any nation receiving training and assistance would make its own sovereign decision on whether to deploy its units to a particular peace support operation, and that all peace support operations and other related activities undertaken by G8 members under this initiative would be in accordance with the UN Charter. Moreover, given the fact that most of the peace support operations around the world, particularly those in Africa, are operating under the aegis of the UN and with a UN Security Council mandate, all actions undertaken by the G8 to expand global capability for peace support operations should be implemented in close cooperation with the UN, in accordance with its technical standards, and take into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. In Africa, these actions should also be implemented in close cooperation with the African Union and sub-regional organizations, in line with the African ownership principle.

It was also agreed to maintain specific commitments made at Sea Island, such as to equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010 and coordinate with African partners, the UN, the EU and others.

Heiligendamm summit

The G8 in Germany agreed to continue to support APSA and to identify lasting solutions to sustainable financing and operational support such as assisting African regional organisations and other institutions (AU, SADC, IGAD, ICGLR, MDRP) in crisis prevention and management (including the development of early warning systems both at the continental level and at IGAD headquarters); the control of small arms (and illegal trade in such, through cooperation with SADC and EAC); the strengthening of African peace-building and peacekeeping structures (continuing support for peacekeeping training institutions, including the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, the École de Maintien de la Paix in Bamako, and the Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi); as well as the development of a civil component of the ASF.

The G8 also supported the creation of the ASF and focused on defining strategies and guidelines for the ASF in areas such as logistics, communication and the civilian components of peace support operations. G8 members also made pledges to the UN Peace Building Fund launched in October 2006 and the G8 also supported efforts by several African countries to toughen their laws with regard to the illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Hokkaido summit

Security and peace-keeping in Africa has received much less attention in Japan but there were some commitments relevant to African peace and security. At the Hokkaido Summit Leaders Declaration, the G8 committed to "promote peace and security through supporting the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in enhancing Africa's peacekeeping capabilities in particular the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force (ASF)." They also committed "to fulfil or exceed our Sea Island and subsequent commitments."

L'Aquila summit

At the 2009 G8 summit in Italy, security and peace in Africa received little attention, but participants reaffirmed their commitment to promote peace and security. They stressed the importance of and discussed progress in establishing a credible system of regional security, in particular through APSA and the elimination of all factors of instability, including the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this framework, they agreed on continuing collaborative efforts in fighting more effectively all forms of criminality and organised crime, including piracy off the coast of Eastern Africa, drug trafficking in Western Africa, money laundering and terrorism in all kind of ramifications.

Impact of G8 initiatives on APSA

Next year, 2010 is a landmark for the G8 for a number of goals set by its leaders, including for African peace and security. At Sea Island, a headline goal of training 75,000 peacekeeping troops worldwide by 2010 was set. On this, G8 countries appear to be on track. The US, via its Global Peace Operations Initiative Program (GPOI), has trained more than 69,000 military personnel from 73 countries since 2005, over 48,000 of whom have deployed to 20 operations around the world. In Africa, G8 countries have provided support, with the UK, for instance, having trained 12,000 peacekeepers since 2004-05 via support for centers in 13 countries, and France having prepared 3000 trainees, mostly at

African training centers, and 6800 troops from 27 countries, including 9 peacekeeping battalions in 2008 alone.

G8 countries have also been involved in police training. In Africa, Canada provides financial and technical assistance through its Pearson Peacekeeping Center to the police services of 15 countries, while the UK, by funding centres in West and East Africa, has supported the training of numerous police peacekeepers, including pre-deployment training to participate in UNAMID. The Italian Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), with US support, has trained nearly 2000 trainer graduates from 29 countries, with over 900 graduates from Africa. Germany also provides training for deployment in Africa, including via funding and trainers for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana. France has supported the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) in Cameroon.

As noted by the G8, peace support operations are often hindered by a lack of transportation and logistical support on the part of regional or UN troop contributors. To fill this gap, G8 countries have supported the AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition, G8 countries and the EU have provided direct bilateral support to UN and AU missions, including provision of military and police experts to AMIS, aircraft and armoured personnel carriers to AMIS and UNAMID, equipment and strategic airlift to the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC) and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI), and transportation and other support to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Looking ahead

There remains an urgent need for improved coordination to avoid duplication of international efforts toward APSA and ensure the best application of resources; a need for improvements to the mandate and mission planning process; a need for interoperability and hence for doctrine, particularly for police peacekeepers; a need for greater equipping and logistics support, and a need to balance quality and quantity.

Expanded partnerships with the AU and with the RECs to reinforce local capacities in all sectors remain important for enhancing long-term capacity building and finding the appropriate modalities for mission-specific support. The UN Security Council's recent call for the establishment of a Trust Fund for AMISOM is one such example. The African Union-United Nations Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations is an interesting step forward for an AU-UN relationship and in seeking to secure sustainable, flexible and predictable funding for AU-led peace-support operations.

Limitations of the G8

As discussed above the G8 is yesterdays' international architecture and on economic issues there has been a shift to the G20. 2010 is now not only an important year for reflection of past G8 commitments but it marks under its Canadian presidency a moment for clear thinking on roles and responsibilities for both bodies. Ultimately the G8 was always transient and dependent on national or regional implementation of its decisions. The G8 do not possess a secretariat or any other institutional body to perform administrative functions let alone implementation, monitoring, or evaluation functions. While the G8 can generate the political will, the actual ground-work has to be done by national bodies such as the various ministries and agencies, and regional bodies, such as

the EU and its various units. Because of these limitations the G8's approach to peace and security in Africa goes hand in hand with multilateralism.

Even the heavy-weights amongst the G8 are limited in the amounts of resources they can put towards peace-keeping initiatives and support to APSA. Multilateral integration not only has the potential to better focus resource allocation but is also a necessary pre-condition for coordination and harmonization of efforts. As the summaries on G8 engagement on African peace and security show, it becomes thinner and thinner from Gleneagles to L'Aquila. This does not mean that the issue is going out of fashion, rather, the theme and the actual implementation has been handed to a multilateral entity to manage – in this case the EU (see below).

An issue is also that some of the G8 countries do have strategic foreign policy interests in Africa (and even more so many G20 members). These countries are likely to remain outside multilateral efforts but may contribute on an *ad hoc* basis. The G8's smaller size and clearer focus can still be helpful in addition to allowing key issues of strategic African relevance to be discussed. The G20 is likely in the near future not to prioritize Africa, not helped by the lack of strong African advocacy or clear pan-African vision. For all its flaws, NEPAD provided a common African platform to which G8 nations could respond through their own African Action Plan drawn up in Kananaskis, Canada in June 2002.

EU Co-ordination in support of African Peace and Security

A joint Africa–European Union Strategy was adopted by Heads of States and Governments in December 2007 in Lisbon. The partnership on peace and security is one of eight adopted, and aims to ensure adequate, coherent and sustainable support for the establishment and functioning of the APSA. It also aims to promote long-term capacity building (including civilian and military crisis management), and coherent and coordinated support for the ASF. The key pillars of cooperation within this partnership are political dialogue, support of APSA, and provision of predictable funding for Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

The EU is the most important partner of the African Union when it comes to peace and security on the African continent. The AU structures mirror those of the EU and full-time representatives have been exchanged. The peace and security chapter of the partnership between EU and AU is being implemented and there is continuous political dialogue between the Political and Security Committee in Brussels and the AU Peace and Security Council. An important element of EU support is also to maintain and strengthen the link to the UN and brief them regularly on the peace and security chapter of the EU-AU partnership strategy. This is essential for easing the transfer of operational command from the AU to the UN or vice versa.

The European Commission (EC) funds the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), as well as capacity building for communications, intelligence gathering and information analysis. The AU Situation Room is an example of this. The EU is also engaged in conflict prevention and supports the Panel of the Wise - part of the African security structure.

Individual EU member states are also engaged in strengthening the APSA and AU. The Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy has developed software that has been used in

intelligence assessments and communications and forms the basis for many projects such as a German initiative to map all the early warning systems on the continent. In addition there is a joint French and British proposal to organise cooperation between EU and AU crisis centres (MIVAC – Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism), as well as a Finnish initiative to train African mediators.

In the funding of peace-keeping operations, the EU is already providing funds through the African Peace Facility, and Romano Prodi has been instructed by the UN to investigate under what conditions AU-led operations may be financed and supported. It is envisioned that the G8 also improve its coordination with the United Nations, and that the United Nations in turn continue to build partnerships with regional organizations, and contributing countries. The framework of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management serves as a useful precedent here.

Another structure that originally was a French initiative is the EURORECAMP exercise which links together various regional training and operation centres. EURORECAMP aims to make know-how available to the AU in order to verify the ability to implement peace-keeping operations. A European team including UK, Belgian, Finnish, and Italian citizens headquartered in Paris heads the EURORECAMP from the EU side. EU member states as well as other G8 members will be asked to contribute to the cost of the exercise.

Indications are that Japan, Russia, Canada and the USA will contribute to the EURORECAMP exercise at various stages. NATO is also expected to take part in assessing the ASF after the end of the Amani Africa exercise – at the request of the AU. EURORECAMP has a history of G8 and other involvement. Over its 10-year history this initiative has managed to bring together over forty EU, AU and non-EU partners. EURORECAMP is an ESDP instrument for Africa, and is under the control of the Political and Security Committee, which recently designated France as Framework Nation for implementation of the first cycle. It also comes within the framework of the Africa Clearing House (G8++), a general coordinating body for the partners' activities for Africa.

Aside from financing and technical support EU troops will continue to play a role in short-term missions, preparing the ground for UN or AU missions to follow, and in providing technical assistance to African missions. This includes the provision of military hardware by individual EU countries on a bilateral basis to African countries engaged in AU peace-keeping missions.

The drivers behind EU support for APSA

The member states that are most active in the peace and security partnership are France, the UK and Italy. France and Italy together lead APSA issues. Apart from EURORECAMP, France is in charge of military crisis management in general, while Italy specifically takes the lead for civilian crisis management and the police aspect. The UK heads the financing work in collaboration with the Commission.

A point of departure for the Italian engagement in the Peace Support Implementation Team is ex-Prime Minister Prodi's emphasis to carry out initiatives through the EU, which is still felt in Italy. Despite Italy's multilateral emphasis, Italy also pursues bilateral

efforts in the Horn of Africa, due to historical and strategic reasons. There is a specific interest in directing extra security efforts to this African region, and Italy is also chair of 'Friends of IGAD'.

The UK is by some seen as more active in New York than in Brussels with regard to peace and security issues. It is often argued that the UK feels a stronger affiliation with the UN than the EU, thus rather seeing a development of the DPKO than the peace and security initiatives of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

Lately, President Sarkozy has attempted to transfer some of France's foreign policy for Africa into EU channels. The europeanisation of the RECAMP is an example of this initiative. For France, it is perceived as necessary to have the support of other member states in their undertakings, to obtain more legitimacy and also to reduce costs that have been high for this ambitious military collaboration initiative.

The future prospects for EU support of African efforts in peace and security

The EU is the best placed regional body to lead on the international effort to support African efforts in peace and security. The EU possesses the administrative and technical capacity as well as the political clout and reputation necessary for the task. In practice the EU has already taken the leading role through the Lisbon Treaty, which includes the EU-AU partnership on peace and security. The EU has in effect taken over the baton from the G8 to implement and coordinate the G8's initiative. Nevertheless, challenges remain.

One key challenge is the ability of the AU to distribute funds within its own structures. Part of the problem is under- and over-funding of particular programmes by international partners. This is a result of a lack of coordination, and the EU, if accepted as the main interlocutor and the administrative centre for fund disbursement, could make a real difference to ensure the strategic and prudent use of financial support.

The major challenge for the EU is coordination and harmonization of engagement with the AU and the AU structures. This starts with streamlining and standardization of accounting and reporting requirements amongst donors, which also assists transparency. This may in part be achieved by enabling civil society organisations to be part of a more coherent, coordinated and effective process.

The EU can play a stronger coordinating role for G8 support of the AU and the AU peace and security institutions, bodies, and centres. This can help strengthen APSA as well as coordinating other, non-military preventative security policy initiatives such as sustainable development, inclusive governance and poverty reduction throughout Africa.

The aim should be to mainstream African peace and security issues into the day-to day work of European and member state development agencies. Care should however be taken to avoid development becoming militarized or that military operations become development orientated. The focus should be on policy coherence and on thinking around where and how the military and developmental dimensions overlap. This should be based on consensus and would for instance include analyses of the causes of conflict and instability as well as impacts.

Apart from the major task of coordinating and targeting engagements and optimising the use of resources, the biggest challenge in the EU taking the lead is to create the buy-in of other countries to take part in an EU led effort – particularly some G8 (and now G20) members but also other EU members. When it comes to the peace and security partnership, there may be a perception that engaging on a bilateral basis is more flexible and efficient. Adapting systems to the EU guidelines and project management system, as well as moving over bilateral projects to the Peace Support Partnership Framework, is perceived to be too complicated and bureaucratic. The same goes for the AU – it may be perceived to be a sluggish, inefficient and difficult recipient. This major problem can only be tackled by convincing members with results. The EU must prove that EU initiatives in peace and security with the AU as a partner can be implemented and monitored in an efficient and coordinated manner.

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7-8-9 October 2009

ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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ROME

PAPER ON

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE G8: EU COORDINATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL DONORS TO SUPPORT AFRICAN EFFORTS IN PEACE AND SECURITY

BY

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Ambassador Giorgis is Consultant, Revival Africa Initiative

DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a distinct pleasure for me to participate in this timely conference on **Implementing a New EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security in Africa** here in the *Eternal City of Rome.* The significance of this conference lies in the crucial importance of peace and security for Africa's political stability, economic growth and sustainable development.

I must add that it is only fitting that this important conference on implementing a new EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security is organised under the current Italian Presidency of the G8, as it was also under an Italian Presidency that the G8 Genoa Plan for Africa was first launched at the Genoa Summit in 2001. This demonstrates Italy's abiding interest in and strong commitment to strengthening EU-Africa partnership to promote peace and security in Africa.

At the outset, I wish to thank the organisers for inviting me to speak in this ***Session*** on **In the Aftermath of the G8: EU Coordination with other International Donors to Support African Efforts in Peace and Security.**

I will begin with I) brief remarks on the prevailing situation of peace and security in Africa by way of introduction; I will then II) present a general overview of Africa's efforts to achieve peace and security in the continent; III) profile the evolution of G8 support for peace and security in Africa; IV) highlight the EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security; V) appraise EU coordination with international donors in support of African peace and security efforts and VI) proffer some concluding remarks.

I. The Current Peace and Security Situation in Africa

Africa today is beset by multiple wars and violent conflicts. Some of these wars and conflicts are seemingly intractable and remain quite frozen. Afflicted by the scourge of scores of active or simmering conflicts of varying intensity, Africa stands out as the most war-torn, conflict-ravaged and crisis-ridden continent. Most of these wars and conflicts are intrastate while a few are interstate. Many conflicts are localized, unfolding within the confines of given national boundaries while some have become integral parts of regional conflict systems.

For instance, each specific conflict situation in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic triangle has its own autonomous internal dynamics and a concomitant regional dimension. To succeed, efforts to achieve *peace* and promote *security* in Africa must thus seek to address this significant feature of the internal and regional dynamics of the prevailing conflicts and conflict systems in the continent.

I think we can all agree that wars and conflicts cause considerable loss of life, produce immense destruction of property and entail huge lost opportunity for development. It cannot be denied that wars and conflicts and their cumulative ramifications have operated to perpetrate general underdevelopment, aggravate poverty and downgrade the human condition in many parts of Africa. Furthermore, they have, in no small measure, contributed to Africa's overall economic, political and strategic marginalisation in world affairs.
To address this challenge and help reverse the continent's fortunes, the African Union (AU) has

undertaken an effort to develop a continental capability for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. Although the AU, like its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), adheres to the principle of *non-interference* in the internal affairs of member states, it has embraced a policy of *non-indifference* in situations of grave mass atrocity, namely, '*war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity*'[1].

In a radical departure from the OAU's policy and practice, the African Union, certain African Regional Economic Communities, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and several African countries have deployed peacekeepers and contributed contingents to international peacekeeping operations and observer missions in a number of AU member states under AU leadership or UN mandate.

II. Africa's Efforts to Achieve Peace and Security in the Continent

The AU is the premier Pan-African organisation working to promote peace, security and stability in the continent. It aspires, *inter alia*, to promote democratic principles and institutions, good governance, human rights, sustainable socio-economic development and economic integration as the foundations for sustainable peace and security in Africa.[2] Plagued by constant wars and violent conflicts and faced by the prospect of an increasing number of failed and/or failing states, the African Union has created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as a vehicle for conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

The adoption of APSA[3] in 2002 caps four decades of previous efforts to promote peace, security and stability as a precondition for Africa's unity and development. The effort was given a boost by the AU's embrace of the principle of 'non-indifference' to situations of grave mass atrocity and desire to work out *African solutions to African problems.* In establishing an African mechanism, the AU seeks to avoid unilateral external intervention in African affairs and engage outside countries and organizations on the continent only on the basis of invitation and agreement to cooperate within an AU framework. The notion of *African solutions to African problems* should not, however, be construed or, in any way, used as a cover for inaction in situations where action is required.

The African Peace and Security Architecture and all aspects of peace and security policy fall under the general auspices of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. It has three key operational components: the *African Standby Force* (ASF), the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS) and the *Panel of the Wise* (POW). The Panel of the Wise operates at the AU level while the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System are attached to Africa's five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). A special Peace Fund, financed from the AU's regular budget and voluntary member state contributions, has been set up to fund peace support operations. A Military Staff Committee, made up of representatives of the fifteen AU Peace and Security Council member states, provides military and security advice to the PSC.

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[1] Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU-Constitutive_Act.htm

[2] Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/doc/PSC%20protocol.pdf

[3] Ibid.

The African Standby Force is expected to become fully operational by next year (2010), a target whose achievement now seems increasingly unlikely. Once operational, however, the African Standby Force is intended to serve as a Rapid Reaction Force capable of deployment at short notice on missions of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance anywhere in the continent. It would be deployed under AU mandate and placed under AU/UN operational control, as applicable. The five African Standby Force brigades[4], presently at varying degrees of formation, comprise multidimensional contingents with civilian, military and police components located in the countries of origin.

The Continental Early Warning System, based in the situation room at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, is designed to anticipate and prevent conflicts. Its reports, compiled from open sources and information fed from the regional early warning systems, aim to identify and flag potential crisis flashpoints and dangers, help inform the decisions of the Peace and Security Council and guide the deployment of the African Standby Force.

The Panel of the Wise, made up of five eminent persons[5] or individuals of high stature representing the five regions, is designed to work as an advisory and mediation body in conflict prevention. It provides support and advice to the Peace and Security Council, either on its own initiative or under instructions from the PSC and/or the Chairperson of the AU Commission, on issues of peace and security, mediate between warring and/or opposing groups, or discretely raise politically sensitive issues with the Peace and Security Council.

In outlining this brief overview, I wish to underscore that the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture demonstrates the African Union's commitment to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. I must admit, however, that the record to date is quite mixed. African Union intervention in several flashpoints has served to avert further escalation of violence and as a bridge for subsequent deployment of UN missions. At the same time, there is no denying that the African Peace and Security Architecture remains work in progress and that its construction faces a number of key challenges, compounded by festering interstate conflicts and rivalries as well as divergent interests of key international players.

The first key test is **viability**. The African Peace and Security Architecture appears fine on paper. But, its practical dependence on external funding is neither desirable nor sustainable. Over the long-term, ensuring viability, functional autonomy and independence of policy and decision would require self-financing from the AU budget and dedicated member state contributions.

The second major challenge is **political**. Beyond formal declarations of agreement, summit resolutions and fine oratory, there is no continental consensus on the underlying principles or the overriding objectives. The lack of real political will and readiness of African leaders to intervene, in practice, in the internal affairs of African states hampers the full formation and consolidation of the African Standby Force, and the missed operationalisation of its mandate is a key constraint

[4] These are 1) EASBRIG, the East African Brigade, 2) SADCBRIG, the Southern African Brigade, 3) ECOBRIG or WESBRIG, the West African Brigade, 4) the Central African Brigade and 5) the North African Brigade.

[5] The present members of the panel are Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary General of the OAU (East Africa); Brigalia Bam, President of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (Southern Africa); Miguel Trovoada, former president of Sao Tome and Principe (Central Africa); Elizabeth Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin (West Africa); and Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria (North Africa). Available at: http://www.panapress.com/freenews.asp?code=eng015268&dte=16/03/2007

hampering rapid progress in the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The third obstacle is **structural**. Overlapping membership of several states in different Regional Economic Communities and dual affiliation in regional brigades[6], a structure that very much resembles the configuration of a *spaghetti bowl*, is a major obstacle that undermines coherence and hinders close coordination within the five regions in developing the African Peace and Security Architecture and operationalising the African Standby Force.

Fourth: the **uneven development** of the five regional components of the African Standby Force in terms of formation, command and control, capacity, structure and coherence poses a serious challenge to the smooth integration of the regional brigades, the effective operationalisation of the ASF and the implementation of the peace and security mandate of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

A fifth challenge is **overall continental capacity**. The African Union lacks the required financial resources and critical mass of competence and technical expertise to fully develop and effectively operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture, develop the Continental Early Warning System and establish, train, equip, and deploy the African Standby Force.

These constraints are often aggravated by divergent interests and incoherent responses of Africa's international partners. Let me cite three examples to illustrate the debilitating and often disastrous impact of these constraints:

First, lacking the necessary manpower, logistics and material, the AU peacekeeping operations in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) proved unable to stop the violence and protect civilians in Darfur and Somalia. Prior to UNAMID's deployment, AMIS had to repeatedly watch helplessly as Government troops, militias and rebels violated ceasefire agreements, killed civilians and attacked its own units with impunity.

Second, the Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD), with its member states working in concert and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) providing coherent international support, was able to broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan. On the contrary, with its member states at loggerheads with each other and key global actors pursuing divergent objectives, IGAD has been too paralyzed and the international community too disjointed to tackle the Somali crisis, with devastating consequences for Somalia and the region.

Third, despite the deployment of MONUC and UNAMID, violence continues to rage with mounting atrocities against civilians in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

These constraints hamstring the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and undermine the implementation of its mandate. G8, EU, UN and other international assistance

[6] Only five of Africa's eight RECs are affiliated with the ASF. Some countries belong to two regional brigades. For instance, Madagascar and Seychelles are in both EASBRIG and SADCBRIG while Angola and the DRC are in both SADCBRIG and the Central African Brigade. See: MoU on the Establishment of EASBRIG (Addis Ababa, April 2005); MoU Amongst the SADC Member States on the Establishment of SADCBRIG (Lusaka, August 2007); and ECCAS – Peace and Security Architecture, available at: http://aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/Economic_Community_of_Central_African_States_(ECCAS)_%E2%80%93_Peace_and_Security_Architecture

in support of African peace and security efforts must thus, first and foremost, endeavour to tackle these key challenges. No doubt, the amount of financial assistance and quality of technical support forthcoming from Africa's international partners would be of critical importance to the continent's efforts to tackle these challenges. External assistance by itself, however, would not suffice. Addressing these constraints to achieve Africa's peace and security objectives would require a new paradigm of African self-reliance and more effective coordination of EU, G8 and other international support to the continent's home grown agenda.

III. G8 Support for Peace and Security in Africa

For nearly a decade now, the world's eight major industrial countries, the G8, have provided support for the promotion of peace and security in Africa. Successive G8 summits have underpinned the crucial importance of peace and security as essential conditions for economic growth and sustainable development to enable Africa integrate into the global economy. The G8 support to Africa's efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts has come mainly through funding, training and logistics for the peace efforts and security structures of the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and certain African states.

As mentioned in my introductory remarks, the G8 first launched the Genoa Plan for Africa in 2001[7] in response to the initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) presented at the Summit by three African heads of state[8]. The Genoa Summit set up an Africa Group to draw up a proposal for an Africa action plan. The 2002 Kananaskis Summit in Canada adopted the G8 Africa Action Plan to promote peace and security and agreed, among other things, to support the development of an African military intervention force, set a timeline to build an African conflict prevention capability and laid out a plan for responding to hotspots.

The Africa Action Plan committed the G8 to, *inter alia*, make conflict prevention and resolution a top priority and support African efforts to resolve the continent's major military conflicts; extend technical and financial assistance to enable the African Union and the RECs to effectively engage in conflict prevention and resolution and undertake peace support operations; support African and UN efforts to remove antipersonnel mines and eliminate illegal arms flows to and within the continent; work with African governments and civil society to address the linkage between armed conflict and illegal exploitation of natural resources; enhance African capacities to protect and assist war affected populations; and provide effective peace building and reconstruction support to post conflict societies.[9]

The 2003 Evian Summit in France came up with the Joint Africa-G8 Plan to Enhance African Capacities to Undertake Peace Support Operations.[10] The Joint Plan marked a shift in emphasis from conflict prevention through development to peace and security through military responses to conflict. This shift in emphasis was followed by a corresponding shift in the allocation of the bulk of aid resources and support efforts from long-term conflict prevention programmes to short-term

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[7] Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO), Vol.3, No.3, Nov-Dec 2007, available at: http://peaceops.com/web/.

[8] The three heads of state were Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, see: Journal of International Peace Operations.

[9] G8 Africa Action Plan, Kananaskis (Canada) Summit 2002, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/G8AfrikaAktionsplan2002.pdf.

[10] Journal of International Peace Operations.

training of peacekeepers and capacity building for the deployment of African-led peace operations.

The 2004 Sea Island Summit in the United States drew up the Peace Building Initiative[11], pledged increased funding to manage conflicts, create peacekeepers and develop capacity for peace building operations. The Peace Building Initiative committed G8 member states to train and equip African peacekeeping forces, develop African regional peace support capabilities for deployment in crisis spots, provide transport and logistics support to peace operations and regulate illegal arms trafficking.[12]

Africa's peace and security challenge has remained a constant item at or near the top of the G8 agenda in the subsequent summits in Gleneagles 2005 (UK), Saint Petersburg 2006 (Russian Federation), Heiligendamm 2007 (Germany), Toyako 2008 (Japan) and L'Aquila 2009 (Italy). G8 Member countries have committed increasing financial assistance and technical support to help build the peacekeeping capabilities of the AU and the RECs, construct the African Peace and Security Architecture and develop the African Standby Force.

The bulk of G8 support is provided by each member state through bilateral channels at the AU, REC and selected country levels. The aim is to help build the military and civilian capabilities of APSA, the ASF and their auxiliary bodies. According to the Final Chair's Summary of the G8 L'Aquila Summit 2009, G8 commitments to Africa's peace and security agenda include training peacekeepers and police; developing civilian capacity; deployment, transport and logistical support; and peacebuilding strategy and financing.[13]

The report states that "G8 countries have provided fundamental support to peacekeeping preparedness" in Africa with: the UK training "12,000 peacekeepers since 2004-05" through funding centres in West and East Africa to help train "police peacekeepers, including pre-deployment training"; France "preparing 3000 trainees, mostly at African training centres and 6800 troops from 27 countries, including 9 peacekeeping battalions in 2008", and supporting the "creation of the *International School of Security Forces*" in Cameroon to enhance civilian security forces; Canada providing "financial and technical assistance...to the police services of 15 countries"; Italy, "with US support", training "nearly 2000 trainer graduates from 29 countries, with over 900 graduates from Africa"; Germany "providing training for deployment in Africa, including via funding and trainers" in Ghana; and Russia preparing "significant components for deployment in Africa".[14]

The G8 has worked to enhance international coordination for African peace support operations among its members and with key international and regional contributors. It has developed the G8++ Africa Clearinghouse as the main international coordination mechanism[15] and provides substantial funding to the UN Peacebuilding Commission as a coordination body to assist countries in transition from conflict to peace. It has, however, yet to devise an integrated military/civil

[11] Ibid.
[12] Focus Issue 11: Peace and Security, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/13/42338420.pdf.
[13] G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding, Final Chair's Summary, G8 L'Aquila Summit, 10 July 2009, available at: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2009/peacekeeping-maintien_de_la_paix.aspx.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Forty countries and international organizations have participated in this event and reached broad agreement on the five key Peace Support Operations capacity gaps identified, namely leadership, partnerships, doctrine, resources and sustainability. Ibid.

programme and a coherent coordination mechanism to help build APSA and create an operational African Standby Force by or beyond 2010.

Certain member countries, like Germany, for instance, direct their bilateral support mainly to the development of the civilian component of the African Peace and Security Architecture.[16] Supporting peace missions, enhancing police work and upgrading strategic management capacity to enable better integration of the AU's planning, political decision-making and operational responses are, of course, very important dimensions of APSA. But, the development of APSA and the operationalisation of the ASF within the specified timeframe would seem to require a more coordinated, holistic and integrated military and civilian construction project than the present arrangements would seem to suggest.

IV. EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security

With the adoption of the *EU Strategy for Africa* in 2005[17] and the *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership* in 2007[18], EU-Africa cooperation received a new impetus. At the core of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership lies the *Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security,* which formally commits the strategic partners to work together to build the African Peace and Security Architecture and fully operationalise its mandate. The EU has since boosted its overall support for peace and security operations in Africa. This support is comprehensive, embracing military, police and civilian dimensions.

Based on mutual strategic interests, common objectives and shared values, the *Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security* aims to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security and promote close cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

EU support for African peace and security efforts is undertaken in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[19] The *African Peace Facility* (*APF*)[20], financed from the European Development Fund (EDF), has made a significant contribution to AU-led peace support operations and provided substantial funding to the crisis management efforts of Africa's Regional Economic Communities. To date, the EU has provided the lion's share of the financial support for the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the deployment of AU peace operations, both at the continental and regional levels.

The EU and several member states have been actively present in UN and AU-UN peace missions in Africa as policy and decision makers, funders, trainers and troop contributors. The EU has also deployed short-term bridging, stabilisation and civilian protection missions, such as *Artemis* in Bunia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and *EUFOR* in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic; advisory and assistance missions for Security Sector Reform in the DRC and Guinea-Bissau; and most recently, *Operation Atalanta*, the naval and air anti-piracy operation off the

[16] http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/G8FriedenSicherheit/Uebersicht-G8AfrikaProgramm.html

[17] http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12540_en.htm

[18] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/97496.pdf

[19] http://www.diplomatie.be/en/policy/policynotedetail.asp?TEXTID=14275

[20] The APF was established in 2003 with an initial financial envelope of €250 m drawn from the 9th EDF. It was replenishment by €50 m to a total of €300 m covering the period up to 2010.

coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

V. EU International Coordination in Support of African Peace and Security Efforts

The advent of the 21st century has witnessed an apparent outpouring of international good will and pledges to support Africa to develop a viable peace and security architecture to enable it focus on its development agenda and catch up with the rest of the world. Today, there exists an overlapping international presence in support of African peace and security efforts both at the multinational and bilateral levels. The G8, the EU, the UN, key member states and China are active players on the African peace and security scene. They are all busy trying to contribute to the operationalisation of APSA. Moreover, the EU has deployed several peace support operations while the UN maintains about a dozen peacekeeping missions and runs a ten-year capacity building programme to upgrade and standardise AU planning and peace operations.

G8 countries currently coordinate their efforts via the Africa Clearinghouse and work closely with the AU, UN, EU and other international donors to help develop the African Peace and Security Architecture and operationalise the African Standby Force, Continental Early Warning System and Panel of the Wise. In addition, "individual countries, together with the EU via its Africa Peace facility, are developing the EURO-RECAMP/AMANI"[21] as a tool to help the ASF become operational by 2010.

Nevertheless, EU support to APSA remains fragmented. Several EU member states, notably France, Germany, Italy and the UK, maintain bilateral technical, military, police and civilian cooperation with key elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture at the AU, REC and selected country levels. This is a reflection of different historical relations and divergent national interests and policies. Given that half of the G8 members are EU member states, it seems that their support would be more effective if it could be coordinated with that of the EU at the exit point at the EU level and at the entry point at the AU level. A more prominent EU coordination role in international peace and security support efforts in Africa would, however, have to await the emergence of a more coherent EU and AU common foreign and security policies, respectively.

The multiplicity of actors, the magnitude of resources involved and the enormity of the challenges at stake posit the paramount need to enhance coordination. All the key players recognise this imperative. Establishing seamless coordination among these multiple actors would, however, prove a Herculean task. Yet, serious consideration must be given to setting up a single entry point for channeling G8, EU, UN and other international assistance in support of Africa's peace and security efforts at AU, REC and national levels.

This would facilitate coherence of policy, convergence of interests and effective coordination of donor support. Furthermore, it would serve to minimise or avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and resources and ensure synergy in operationalising APSA to fulfill its mandate. Given its historical links and strategic partnership with Africa, its active engagement in the major global and regional forums, the pull of its economic and soft power and comparative institutional capacity, the EU seems best suited to play this role of global coordinator with the blessing of the UN. This can build upon the existing framework of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management.

[21] G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding, Final Chair's Summary, G8 L'Aquila Summit, 10 July 2009.

VI. Concluding Remarks

Dialogue: There is a need to enhance the level and quality of dialogue, as G8 support for African peace and security efforts often seems paternalistic or donor driven without adequate consultation with the AU or its member states.

Focus on Prevention: There is a need to reverse the recent shift in focus in EU and G8 support for peace and security efforts in Africa from prevention to response. Primary focus on improving short-term military responses to conflict ignores the need to build capacity for long-term conflict prevention. It would seem more prudent to prioritise conflict prevention, since the prevention to response cost ratio is barely 1 to 4[22] and the very high human, humanitarian and developmental cost of violent conflict impedes sustainable development and feeds conflict and insecurity.

Overcome Fragmentation of Aid: There is a need to overcome the fragmentation of European and G8 financial, logistical and military support to APSA by achieving greater coordination at the EU level. Closer coordination of AU, G8, EU, UN and Chinese cooperation would avail APSA adequate, sustainable, predictable and flexible financial and technical support to enable ASF and CEWS address Africa's pressing peace and security challenges. A more integrated, coherent and autonomous EU Africa policy, one that enables it to punch on par with its collective weight, more effectively use the leverage of its development cooperation and act less deferentially to US policy, would make a greater contribution to conflict resolution and peacemaking, as could have been the case in Somalia in 2006 had the Commission's stance been sustained.

Delegation: It seems likely that future AU, G8, EU, UN and Chinese cooperation in African peace and security efforts will shift towards more delegation, as it would be relatively cheaper, faster and more pragmatic to deploy African peacekeepers. Meanwhile, support to AU peace operations and APSA would remain vital to build the resource capability needed to achieve the AU objective of a secure and stable continent at peace with itself. Closer EU coordination could lend the process more efficiency and greater synergy.

Policy Coherence: There is a need for greater AU-G8-EU-UN policy coherence, as lack of political support has undermined the expeditious implementation of certain peace accords, such as the CPA between North and South Sudan and the Algiers Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Policy coherence and closer cooperation in the area of peace and security continues to lag behind expectations. This feeds festering political tensions, conflicts and zones of insecurity.

Work in Progress: I wish to underscore that APSA and the international coordination mechanism for its support are work in progress. Strengthening APSA's institutional foundations will be slow and incremental. So will be the evolution of an effective international coordination mechanism. But there is no better option. APSA provides African states with a unique opportunity to address, in an efficient, holistic and comprehensive manner, security challenges, which often transcend national boundaries.

Ownership and Autonomy: International support is necessary to develop APSA. African

[22] Hickson, Claire, "Evidence and Analysis: Overview Paper on Strengthening Conflict Prevention", paper prepared for the Commission on Africa, London, 2004. Available at: http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/background/hickson_background.pdf

ownership and autonomy of decision are indispensable to sustain it. APSA avails the diverse countries of Africa the means to achieve a greater degree of political, economic and military self-sufficiency. To reap these benefits, however, African states will have to embrace democratic governance and diminishing sovereignty, muster the necessary political will and resolve to establish reciprocal trust and confidence, invest in collective security and promote Pan-African solidarity. APSA, the RECs and Standby Brigades have the potential to become the building blocks in the construction of a continental security organ, the Union of African States and the African Economic Community.

7

Intervento del Ministro Frattini: "Ensuring peace and security in Africa" (Sala Aldo Moro, 7 ottobre 2009)

Roma 07 Ottobre 2009

Negli ultimi anni abbiamo imparato che esiste anche un'Africa diversa da quella rappresentata soltanto come terrà di povertà, malattie e conflitti endemici. **Un'Africa cui guardare in modo più articolato, per coglierne anche i lati positivi e le opportunità.** Un continente giovane, in crescita economica, con un enorme potenziale di capitale umano, che oltre ad essere un grande fornitore di materie prime è un mercato di 900 milioni di consumatori con spazi promettenti per investimenti esteri e cooperazioni internazionali.

Sul piano politico, l'Africa è poi diventata **un interlocutore chiave su problematiche strategiche** come la sicurezza energetica – Angola e Nigeria sono tra i dieci produttori di petrolio più rilevanti al mondo – ed **un partner ormai indispensabile nelle sfide globali**: dal cambiamento climatico alla lotta contro il terrorismo. **L'esigenza inoltre di includere i Paesi africani nel sistema di "governance mondiale" come attori a tutti gli effetti sta ricevendo le prime, positive risposte.** Lo ha dimostrato il Vertice G8 de L'Aquila del luglio scorso quando l'Italia ha invitato un numero di Paesi africani – Egitto, Paesi fondatori Nepad, Sud Africa, Presidenza Unione Africana e Angola – a partecipare all'evento come attori politici a pieno titolo.

Naturalmente tutto questo non significa che i gravi problemi e le tante contraddizioni che affliggono l'Africa siano ormai in via di soluzione. Tutt'altro. **Gli ostacoli da superare per raggiungere stabilità e benessere rimangono molti.** Tra il 2008 e il 2009 lo sviluppo del continente ha poi subito una secca battuta di arresto per effetto delle crisi economico-finanziaria ed alimentare che lo hanno colpito.

Nonostante le tante difficoltà da affrontare siamo comunque oggi di fronte ad una nuova fase di attenzione verso l'Africa. Agli sforzi dello stesso continente africano per provare a progredire e modernizzarsi, corrisponde una rinnovata volontà politica internazionale di aiutare l'Africa ad aiutare se stessa. Esistono cioè oggi le condizioni per **un nuovo "Patto per l'Africa"** tra Paesi di quel continente, da un lato, e Paesi industrializzati, dall'altro. Un Patto che si basi su una logica di partenariato per definire il quale l'Europa ha una responsabilità primaria, anche morale, da esercitare. **Europa ed Africa hanno bisogno di un'alleanza globale e di un autentico partenariato strategico.** La prossimità geografica tra i due continenti, le vicende che ne hanno intrecciato la storia, le interdipendenze economiche, sociali ed umane che si sono create, i legami culturali intensi che esistono, sono tutti elementi che spingono verso un futuro insieme, un destino comune.

L'adozione - in occasione del Vertice di Lisbona dell'8-9 dicembre 2007 - di una Strategia Congiunta UE-Africa ha posto le premesse per il rilancio di questo rapporto sulla base di una visione unitaria del continente africano. **L'idea è che tocchi ormai anzitutto all'Africa stessa plasmare il proprio destino**. Spetta anzitutto alle autorità africane esercitare le proprie responsabilità nelle scelte politiche che le riguardano.

Di qui **la necessità di superare la logica donatore-ricevente e di sviluppare un dialogo politico tra eguali**. Di qui la consapevolezza che il Partenariato UE-Africa possa rappresentare lo strumento giusto per facilitare il raggiungimento di due obiettivi: la creazione di **un'architettura africana di pace e sicurezza;** e **l'integrazione economica del continente africano.** Due prospettive per la cui concretizzazione l'esperienza dell'Unione Europea può senza dubbio rappresentare – sia pur in un contesto molto diverso - un punto di riferimento importante per l'Africa.

Muovendo da queste premesse, sono principalmente 4 le direttrici da seguire per sviluppare il partenariato Europa-Africa: **(1)** sicurezza e peace-keeping; **(2)** crisi regionali e conflitti dimenticati; **(3)** diritti e democrazia; **(4)** un nuovo modo di "fare" sviluppo.

(1) Sicurezza e peace-keeping – Sicurezza africana e sicurezza europea sono strettamente correlate. L'instabilità del continente africano produce effetti che si ripercuotono sul vecchio continente: **immigrazione illegale, traffico di armi e droga, terrorismo, criminalità organizzata, pirateria**. Allo steso tempo, l'Africa rappresenta la regione dove più spesso sono previsti interventi internazionali di peace-keeping: le relative operazioni ONU attualmente dispiegate in Africa impegnano circa il 70% dei caschi blu operativi.

Il fattore oggi nuovo e positivo della sicurezza africana è però la crescente responsabilizzazione del continente nella gestione delle crisi che lo affliggono e nella ricerca di una loro soluzione. L'Unione Africana e le organizzazioni sub-regionali africane svolgono un ruolo crescente a favore della pace nel continente. L'UA è ormai diventata un interlocutore chiave dell'Unione Europea e delle Nazioni Unite. Essa ha saputo svolgere, per conto dell'intera comunità internazionale, una funzione politica ed operativa di fondamentale importanza, tramite iniziative di mediazione o l'invio di forze di mantenimento della pace

Come indicato anche nel **Rapporto del Panel ONU, guidato dal Presidente Prodi**, occorre però stabilire una relazione strategica più efficace tra Nazioni Unite e Unione Africana, ad esempio sul modello della cooperazione UE-ONU. Bisogna inoltre assicurare la sostenibilità finanziaria delle operazioni di pace UA e prestare particolare attenzione alla formazione del personale coinvolto nelle operazioni di pace. L'Italia è tra i principali sostenitori dell'impegno dell'Unione Africana, in particolare attraverso lo strumento finanziario della **Italian Africa Peace Facility**, un fondo ad hoc costituito nel 2008 e con una dotazione iniziale di 40 milioni di Euro.

Nel settore del peacekeeping in Africa, anche il G8 ha assunto impegni importanti in occasione del Vertice de L'Aquila. I Leaders hanno concordato in particolare sulla necessità di rafforzare il sostegno ai centri di formazione regionali africani, le cui attività vanno sempre più raccordate con quelle dei centri di eccellenza situati nei Paesi G8. Tra questi, per quanto concerne l'Italia vorrei citare **il COESPU di Vicenza**, specializzato nella formazione di peace-keepers e di unità di polizia, che ha addestrato sinora più di 2100 ufficiali e sottoufficiali, circa la metà provenienti da Paesi africani; e **la Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa** che opera in stretto raccordo con l'Unione Europea e quella Africana.

(2) Crisi regionali e conflitti dimenticati – L'impegno a sterilizzare crisi e conflitti aperti o a "bassa intensità" è un altro ambito cruciale per la collaborazione tra Europa ed Africa. Tra i vari conflitti a lungo dimenticati in Africa vorrei citare in particolare quello in Somalia che può e **deve diventare un banco di prova della collaborazione tra Unione Africana ed Unione Europea**. Quasi venti anni di guerra civile hanno fatto di questo Paese una sorta di zona di libero scambio illegale, dove l'unica fonte di reddito, insieme con gli aiuti umanitari, peraltro sempre più difficili da distribuire a causa della situazione sul terreno, è data da quella che è stata definita **l'"industria dell'insicurezza":** un insieme di attività legate a traffici illeciti, di cui la pirateria è solo una delle manifestazioni più visibili e più preoccupanti.

L'impegno del Governo italiano è in primo luogo quello di **farsi portavoce della crisi somala e dell'esigenza di darle risposte concrete nei fora dei quali l'Italia fa parte**: Unione Europea, Nazioni Unite, G8. Lo abbiamo fatto su sollecitazione di numerosi Paesi amici africani e della Lega Araba, con la consapevolezza che una crisi della quale non si parla è una crisi che, di fatto, non esiste. Noi vogliamo invece che venga affrontata con decisione. Vogliamo dare una speranza alla Somalia.

Ci siamo quindi fatti promotori di alcune iniziative, come la riunione dell'International Contact Group (ICC) di Roma del giugno scorso e di una riunione straordinaria sempre **dell'ICG, a New York, a margine dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, lo scorso 23 settembre.** Abbiamo convocato quest'ultima d'intesa con un grande Paese amico come il Kenya, sempre più esposto alla crisi somala. In tale occasione abbiamo presentato un "position paper" che riassume quello che l'Italia ritiene si debba fare, d'intesa con i partner dell'Unione Europea e soprattutto con l'Unione Africana per avviare a soluzione la crisi somala. In questo senso, in ambito UE ci stiamo adoperando affinché venga adottata una strategia di maggiore impegno a sostegno del governo somalo e della sua politica di riconciliazione, **con nuove iniziative volte a rafforzarne le capacità nel settore della sicurezza e più in generale della ricostruzione istituzionale.**

(3) Diritti e democrazia – La presenza di istituzioni democratiche consolidate, di una società civile vivace, di operatori economici privati intraprendenti e attivi, di una stampa libera, di amministratori e di giudici onesti, sono il presupposto di un'Africa pacifica e avviata verso condizioni di vita migliori per tutti i propri cittadini. **Il numero dei Paesi africani che ha intrapreso questa strada è in crescita**. Parimenti, è più frequente oggi trovare una classe politica africana giovane, nuova, preparata, e consapevole degli obiettivi che deve perseguire. Dobbiamo pertanto continuare ad investire nelle istituzioni democratiche africane per favorire il "buon governo" e combattere la cattiva amministrazione e la corruzione, fenomeni che minano alla base ogni prospettiva di sviluppo e benessere del continente.

Al contempo dobbiamo impegnarci affinché anche ai cittadini africani vengano **sempre più riconosciuti i propri diritti inalienabili**. Anche in questo campo la responsabilità primaria è comunque delle classi dirigenti africane, che in certi casi hanno fatto marcare significativi passi in avanti. Ma l'obiettivo di fondo non è facilmente raggiungibile poiché esiste una stretta relazione tra sottosviluppo e negazione dell'esercizio dei diritti fondamentali. Là dove prevalgono fame e povertà è anche più difficile difendere e promuovere quei diritti.

Su quest'ultimo aspetto anche la comunità internazionale ha una precisa responsabilità morale cui adempiere. Dal canto suo, l'Italia è in prima fila in questa battaglia, in particolare per quanto concerne **i diritti dell'infanzia**, con particolare riferimento alla protezione dei bambini vittime dei conflitti (120.000 solo in Africa); **e quelli delle donne**, ad esempio per quanto concerne la violenza sessuale nelle situazioni di conflitto armato o le mutilazioni genitali femminili. Su quest'ultimo tema ho lanciato di recente – insieme a vari Paesi africani e nel rispetto delle loro sensibilità culturali – un'iniziativa in ambito ONU per abolire una pratica che viola i diritti umani delle bambine e mette a rischio la loro salute.

(4) Un nuovo modo di "fare" sviluppo – L'aiuto allo sviluppo internazionale di tipo paternalistico ha fatto il suo tempo. Bisogna cambiare approccio e finalizzare l'assistenza alla crescita strutturale e allo sviluppo sostenibile delle società africane. **Deve cambiare dunque la qualità dei nostri aiuti, senza peraltro ridurre la loro quantità.** L'Italia si sta muovendo in questa direzione sia sul piano "bilaterale" che "multilaterale".

Quanto alla prima dimensione, **l'Africa rimane al centro delle nostre priorità di cooperazione**, come dimostra l'impegno già preso di destinare a quel continente, nel triennio 2009-2011, non meno del 50% delle risorse di aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo. Quei fondi verranno destinati a Paesi prioritari in settori strategici per lo sviluppo sostenibile: agricoltura, sicurezza alimentare, ambiente, salute, istruzione, governance, sostegno alle piccole e medie imprese, ma anche riconoscimento del ruolo della donna e protezione dei soggetti più vulnerabili come i bambini. **L'obiettivo che ci anima è quello di riportare l'uomo al centro dello sviluppo, massimizzando l'impatto dei nostri interventi.**

Come presidenza del G8, l'Italia si è inoltre impegnata molto affinché l'Africa restasse al centro dell'agenda internazionale in occasione del Vertice de L'Aquila. Nonostante la crisi che ha colpito anche i Paesi donatori, i Leaders del G8 hanno infatti confermato gli impegni in termini di **Aiuto Pubblico allo Sviluppo (APS)** assunti a Gleneagles nel 2005; hanno rilanciato l'**Agenda di Doha del WTO** come traino della crescita nei Paesi in via di Sviluppo; hanno varato un'iniziativa per il dimezzamento dei costi medi di transazione per **le rimesse dei migranti**; hanno espresso sostegno a strumenti innovativi di **finanziamento per la salute globale**.

E' stato poi proposto, su impulso italiano, **un nuovo approccio allo Sviluppo**, definito "whole of country", in grado cioè di attivare tutti gli attori e gli strumenti essenziali per innescare processi di sviluppo; non solo quelli legati all'impiego degli aiuti pubblici ma anche investimenti, partenariati pubblico-privati, iniziative delle ONG, rimesse degli emigrati, commercio internazionale e interventi della società civile. A L'Aquila sono state infine adottate, per la prima volta nella storia del G8, **due dichiarazioni congiunte con i Paesi africani: una sulla sicurezza alimentare** (con un impegno di 20 miliardi di dollari in favore dello sviluppo agricolo sostenibile) **e una sulle risorse idriche**.

Conclusione: il tema dell'immigrazione - Lasciatemi concludere soffermandomi su un tema che tocca trasversalmente tutti e 4 i settori citati: sicurezza, conflitti, diritti e sviluppo. Mi riferisco al tema dell'immigrazione. **I flussi migratori che dalle coste africane raggiungono – attraverso il Mediterraneo – l'Europa, sono infatti una delle questioni contemporanee più complesse, urgenti e drammatiche che dobbiamo affrontare**. Una sfida che richiede un approccio moderno che tenga conto del profilo multidimensionale del fenomeno immigrazione e che comporti un'assunzione di responsabilità da parte di tutti i soggetti coinvolti: Paesi di origine, di transito e di destinazione, in una logica ancora una volta di partenariato tra Europa e Paesi africani.

Per quanto concerne in particolare l'immigrazione clandestina proveniente dalle coste africane, è fondamentale che tale questione venga affrontata come un problema europeo, dell'UE nel suo complesso e non solo dei Paesi, come l'Italia, che si affacciano sul Mediterraneo. A questo proposito, alcuni importanti progressi sono stati registrati negli ultimi mesi. Ma l'Unione Europea deve fare di più su questo fronte. **Lo reclamiamo ad alta voce non perché vogliamo scaricare su Bruxelles un problema nostro. Ma perché la UE può effettivamente fare di più.** E' necessaria un'autentica solidarietà tra gli Stati membri. Il Consiglio Europeo del giugno scorso ha fatto registrare alcuni progressi in questa direzione, riconoscendo – in particolare - la dimensione comunitaria del fenomeno ed invitando la Commissione a presentare ulteriori proposte in occasione del Consiglio europeo di ottobre. Attendiamo ora di vedere i fatti. Nell'interesse dell'Europa e degli stessi Paesi africani.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

COMUNICATO STAMPA

TRE LINEE GUIDA PER GARANTIRE PACE E SICUREZZA IN AFRICA

Il convegno di Roma lancia un progetto internazionale di studio guidato dall'Istituto Affari Internazionali

Coinvolgere la società civile africana nella ricerca della sicurezza e nella ricostruzione ed evitare sovrapposizioni nelle cooperazioni euro-africana e fra Paesi africani: sono le direttrici del progetto di studio internazionale per la pace in Africa che prende l'avvio da un convegno svoltosi per tre giorni alla Farnesina ed appena conclusosi.

La ricerca, guidata dallo IAI, l'Istituto Affari Internazionali di Roma, durerà un anno: obiettivo è capire come rendere concrete la volontà d'azione per la sicurezza e la ricostruzione dell'Unione africana (Ua), e l'assunzione di responsabilità dell'Unione europea (Ue), nella consapevolezza che le difficoltà dell'impresa - logistiche, militari, finanziarie, sociali, politiche - richiedono un forte coordinamento e soprattutto una volontà di realizzazione degli impegni assunti dagli organismi internazionali, Onu, G8 e Ue.

Al termine dei lavori, il vice-presidente vicario dello IAI, Gianni Bonvicini, organizzatore del convegno, ha indicato che la ricerca si articolerà lungo tre temi e si svilupperà in seminari a Parigi e a Londra, mentre le conclusioni saranno affidate a una conferenza in Africa.

Le direttrici della ricerca guidata dallo IAI, così come delineate da Bonvicini, sono le seguenti:

1) Fare in modo che le diverse regioni economiche dell'Unione africana riducano ed evitino sovrapposizioni di competenze e competizioni, che potrebbero contrastare le prospettive di integrazione, specie sul fronte della sicurezza: la razionalizzazione è importante per fare decollare l'Ua;

2) Rendere più efficace il partenariato strategico fra Ue e Ua: le spese e l'azione per l'Africa dell'Unione europea sono note, mentre gli stanziamenti e gli interventi dei singoli Stati, pur sovente utili, sono meno noti. Anche qui si tratta di evitare sovrapposizioni e, soprattutto, di stornare il sospetto di un perseguimento degli interessi nazionali;

3) Organizzare e fare partecipare la società civile africana ai progetti di sicurezza e ricostruzione, perché le azioni non rispondano solo a priorità dei governi ma anche dei cittadini: senza sicurezza, anche gli aiuti allo sviluppo rischiano di finire in un buco nero di sprechi e corruzione.

"Si tratta – sintetizza Bonvicini - di spiegare agli africani che cosa abbiamo fatto di buono nell'Unione europea e di renderli partecipi, facendo loro capire che la sicurezza può essere, anche in Africa, un motore dell'integrazione, come lo è stata in Europa".

Il convegno di Roma, organizzato dal Ministero degli Esteri italiano e dallo IAI, con la Commissione europea e l'Unione africana, era centrato sul tema "garantire la pace e la sicurezza in Africa" e mirava proprio a iniziare un approfondimento su come attuare la nuova partnership tra Europa e Africa e su come sviluppare in particolare la cooperazione nei settori dello sminamento e del disarmo.

Al simposio hanno collaborato la Compagnia di San Paolo, l'Istituto dell'Ue per gli studi sulla sicurezza (EU Iss), Chatham House e il Centro di ricerca e di formazione sullo Stato in Africa (Crea). Nella sessione d'apertura, mercoledì, il ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini aveva insistito sulla necessità di "un nuovo patto" tra Europa e Africa "per la sicurezza e la stabilità". E Romano Prodi, presidente del comitato Onu/Ua sulle azioni di peacekeeping, aveva sottolineato l'esigenza di passare, nei rapporti con l'Africa, dalla fase del bilateralismo a quella del multilateralismo.

Dopo il dibattito d'apertura sul dialogo politico e la cooperazione inter-istituzionale tra l'Ue e l'Ua, con Frattini, Prodi e rappresentanti di alto rango delle istituzioni Ue e Ua, i lavori sono proseguiti con sessioni e tavole rotonde su temi specifici, fino alle conclusioni odierne, affidate a Bonvicini.

Sono ormai anni che l'Africa è al centro dell'attenzione della comunità internazionale: Onu, Ue, G8, agenzie specializzate come la Banca Mondiale e l'Fmi. E il convegno di Roma s'è svolto mentre in Vaticano è in corso il secondo Sinodo Africano, che Papa Benedetto XVI ha voluto centrato sul tema 'La Chiesa in Africa al servizio della riconciliazione, della giustizia e della pace'.

L'Italia ha dedicato sforzi e iniziative per sostenere un sempre maggiore ruolo dell'Unione europea in Africa, un impegno che è stato ribadito al G8 dell'Aquila e che vede il nostro paese capofila nelle azioni di training del personale africano sul modello dei nostri carabinieri

Per aiutare l'Unione africana ad affrontare e risolvere i conflitti che continuano a svilupparsi (Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Darfur, ex Zaire, nonché il terrorismo e la pirateria marittima), l'Unione europea e l'organizzazione africana hanno varato nel 2007 a Lisbona un partenariato congiunto euro-africano: l'Ue dà un forte sostegno finanziario, di supporto logistico e di training alle forze di polizia e militari africane, affinché possano concretamente attuare il principio delle "soluzioni africane ai problemi africani". E con l'entrata in vigore imminente del nuovo Trattato, l'Ue sarà meglio attrezzata per fare fronte a queste sue responsabilità.

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