


POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE'S FOUR SEA BASINS

EU4SEAS International Seminar

Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)

Rome, 3-4/IV/2009

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International seminar

Political and Security Cooperation in Europe's Four Sea Basins

April 3-4, 2009

Palazzo Rondinini, Via del Corso 518 - Rome, Italy

PROGRAMME

FRIDAY, 3rd APRIL 2009

09:00 Registration

09:30 Welcome and Introduction to the Seminar

Ettore Greco, Director, *LAI*, Rome

Jordi Vaquer i Fanés, Director, *CIDOB*, Barcelona and EU4SEAS Coordinator

10:00 SESSION 1: Defining Security Agendas in Europe's Four Sea Basins

Chair: **Ettore Greco**, Director, *LAI*, Rome

- Security Agenda in the Mediterranean basin
Fulvio Attinà, Jean Monnet Professor, Department of Political Studies,
University of Catania
- Security Agenda in the Baltic basin
Silja B. Omarsdottir, Director, Institute of International Affairs, *University of Iceland*, Reykjavik
- Security Agenda in the Black Sea basin
Dana Depo, Senior Fellow, *ICPS*, Kiev
- Security Agenda in the Caspian basin
Leila Alieva, President, *CNIS*, Baku

11:45 Coffee-Break

12:00 SESSION 2: Sub-regional Cooperation on Conflict Resolution and beyond

Chair: **Nathalie Tocci**, Senior Fellow, *LAI*, Rome

- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Stabilization in the Mediterranean basin:
Eduard Soler i Lecha, Senior Fellow, *CIDOB*, Barcelona
- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Stabilization in the Baltic Sea basin
Tiago Marques, Research Associate, *Estonian Foreign Policy Institute*, Tallinn

- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Stabilization in the Black Sea basin:
Nadia Arbatova, Head of the Department on European Political Studies, *IMEMO*, Moscow
- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Stabilization in the Caspian Sea basin:
Oktay F. Tanrisever, Associate Professor, *METU*, Ankara

13:45 Lunch

15:00 SESSION 3: Sub-regional Perspectives on the Transformation of Political System: Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights in Europe's Four Sea Basins

Chair: **Gianni Bonvicini**, Executive Vice-President, *LAI*, Rome

- The Role of Sub-Regional Organisations in Promoting Democracy in the Mediterranean Basin
Amr Hamzawy, Senior Associate, Middle East Center, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Beirut
- The Role of Sub-Regional Organisations in Promoting Democracy in the Black Sea and Caspian Basin
George Tarkhan-Mouravi, President, *International Centre for Geopolitical and Regional Studies*, Tbilisi
- The Role of the EU in Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance in Europe's Four Sea Basins
Elena Baracani, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, *CIRES*, *University of Florence*
- The Role of other International Organizations in Promoting Democracy in Europe's Four Sea Basins
Neil Winn, Senior Lecturer in European Studies, Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law, *University of Leeds*, UK

16:45 Coffee-Break

17:00 SESSION 4: The Impact of EU and NATO Enlargement and Neighbourhood Strategies on Sub-regional Security

Chair: **Michele Comelli**, Senior Fellow, *LAI*, Rome

- The Impact on the Mediterranean Sea Basin
Roberto Aliboni, Vice-President, *LAI*, Rome
- The Impact on the Baltic Sea Basin
Riina Kaljurand, Deputy Director, *JCDS*, Tallinn
- The Impact on the Black Sea Basin
Olga Shumylo, Director, *ICPS*, Kiev
- Beyond Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies: The EU's Central Asia Strategy
Nargis Kassenova, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, *KIMEP*, Almaty

19:00 End of Session

20:00 Dinner

SATURDAY, 4TH APRIL 2009

10:00 ROUNDTABLE: Strategies for promoting Security in EU Four Sea Basins

Moderator: **Ettore Greco**, Director, *LAI*, Rome

- **Arslan Chikhaoui**, Chairman & CEO, Nord-Sud Ventures, *Strategy and Lobbying Consultancy*, Algiers
- **Pauli Järvenpää**, Director General, Defence Policy, *Finnish Ministry of Defence*, Helsinki
- **Grygorii Perepelytsia**, Director, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, Kiev
- **Alfredo Conte**, Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, *Council of the European Union*, Brussels
- **Alberto Bin**, Head of Regional Affairs Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, *NATO*, Brussels
- **James Henry Bergeron**, Political Advisor, *US Navy*, Striking Force NATO, Naples
- **Igor Sevastiyanov**, Senior Counsellor, *Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Communities*, Brussels

12:00 Wrap up Session
Michele Comelli, Senior Fellow, *LAI*, Rome

12:15 Closure
Stefano Silvestri, President, *LAI*, Rome
Jordi Vaquer i Fanés, Director, *CIDOB*, Barcelona and EU4SEAS Coordinator

12:30 Lunch

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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JAMES HENRY BERGERON	Political Advisor, US Navy, Striking Force NATO, Naples, Italy
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EDUARD SOLER I LECHA	Coordinator of the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, Centro de Investigaciones de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona, Spain
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GEORGE TARKHAN-MOURAVI	Co-Director, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Tbilisi, Georgia
NATHALIE TOCCI	Senior Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy
CIGDEM USTUN	Research-Fellow, Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
JORDI VAQUER I FANÉS	Director, Centro de Investigaciones de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona and EU4SEAS Coordinator, Barcelona, Spain
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Speakers' bios

ROBERTO ALIBONI

Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

He is Head of the Institute's programme on the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

He taught International Economics at the Universities of Naples and Perugia from 1972 to 1979 and held research positions in different Institutes. In 1994, he conceived of and successfully established the Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo), the network of Mediterranean Institutes dealing with international and security affairs (transformed in the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission-EuroMeSCo in 1996). Presently he is Co-President of EuroMeSCo's assembly and member of the Scientific Council of the Tampere Peace Research Institute-TAPRI. He published numerous articles and books.

LEILA ALIEVA

Director, Centre for National and International Studies, Baku, Azerbaijan

Dr Leila Alieva is the director for the Center for National and International Studies (CNIS). She directed an independent Center for Strategic and International Studies in Baku (1995-1997), and founded CNIS (2004), held fellowships at Harvard University (1993-1994), UC Berkeley (2000), Woodrow Wilson Center -Kennan Institute- (1995) SAIS -Johns Hopkins University- (2001), NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, Italy and most recently at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC. She advised the President of EBRD, as well as leading oil companies, such as BP, UNOCAL, STATOIL, AIOC, served on the board of the Open Society Institute in Baku in 1998 and was a National Coordinator of the Human Development Report for UNDP (1997). She has published extensively on the issues of security, conflicts and politics in the region.

FRANCISCO ANDRES PEREZ

EU4SEAS Project Manager, CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona, Spain

Dr. Francisco Andrés Pérez is currently the EU4SEAS manager, financed by European Commission 7th Framework Programme. He has a master in International Relations at Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI). He is Member of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy, at the University Institute for European Studies, Autonomous University of Barcelona. His main areas of academic interest are: the EU's energy policy and the coordination of sub-regional cooperation processes with European Foreign Policy (enlargement, neighbourhood and multilateralism). Among his recent publications, "*España en la genesis de una nueva política europea*" (European Foreign Policy Observer, n.4, February, 2008); "*A Southern Perspective on Diversifying Natural Gas Supply. The Case of Spain*" (forthcoming in a refereed journal, 2009). He has also a PhD in Mathematics, University of Salamanca and Bachelor in Journalism, Carlos III University, Madrid.

NADIA ARBATOVA

Head of the Department on European Political Studies Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Federation

Visiting Professor at Department for Strategic Studies, the Swedish National Defense College 1998-1999; visiting Professor at ELIAMEP (Greece) 2003; Director of Policy Studies and Editor at the Committee "Russia in a United Europe" 2001-2007; Member of Council on Foreign and Defence Policy professional interests: European Integration, European Security, Russian foreign policy, terrorism and conflict prevention. Author of numerous publications including four individual monographs and brochures on international relations and Russia's foreign policy, including the recent ones: Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova "Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area in the Context of EU-Russia Relations", ICBSS 2008; Nadezhda Arbatova, "Russia-EU Beyond 2007: Russian Domestic Debates in Russia.Nei.Visions, 2008 Nadezhda Arbatova, The Russia-EU Common Space of External Security: Imperatives and Obstacles in Security Index No3 (86) 2008, (in Russian and English); Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, "Troubled strategic partnership: The Black Sea Dimension Of the Russia-West relations" in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhardt Mangott (ed.), The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century, Washington, 2008

FULVIO ATTINA'

Professor of Political Science, University of Catania, Italy

In this University, he has been the Director of the Department of Political Studies (1991-97) and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence "EuroMed" (since 1998). President of SISP (the Italian Association of Political Science) in 2005-07, he has served in the governing bodies of professional associations like SISP from 1998, AUSE (Italian University Association for European Studies) from 1988-1996, ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) from 2000-2006, and ISA (International Studies Association) from 1999-2001. As visiting professor, he taught at foreign universities like the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Columbia University and the New York University, the University of Tampere, the ITAM of Ciudad de Mexico, the National University of the Urals at Ekaterinburg, the University of Karachi, the Shandong University at Jinan, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences of Beijing. His research interests covered areas like international conflict, foreign policy, and the EU political system with emphasis on political parties in the European Parliament. His current research interests are in the following areas: multilateralism, peacekeeping, and security cooperation; global politics and institutions; EU policy-making institutions.

ELENA BARACANI

EFSPS Post Doc Researcher, Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, Florence & Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, CIRES, University of Florence, Italy

She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of Florence in April 2006, and she is currently Post Doc Researcher at the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane in Florence, as winner of a research grant in the framework of the 'European Foreign and Security Policy Studies' programme funded by the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, and VolkswagenStiftung. She is working at a research project entitled European Union as Democratic Anchor. An Instrument of Conflict Resolution in its Periphery? She is also Deputy Director of a Research Centre on European Studies at the University of Florence, and teaches 'EU Politics' at the University for Foreigners of Perugia and at California State University in Florence, 'Contemporary European Politics' at Rutgers University in Florence, and 'World Politics' at Kent State University in Florence.

JAMES HENRY BERGERON

Political Advisor to Commander Striking Force NATO, Naples, Italy

A former submariner and university law professor with extensive experience of EU and international affairs, Mr. Bergeron joined the US government service in 2000. He is considered to be one of NATO's most experienced POLADs in the fields of joint expeditionary and maritime operations, having supported NATO exercises and operations for a number of NATO headquarters, including the Steadfast Jaguar LIVEX in Cape Verde and the NATO Riga Summit. In a national capacity he was POLAD to the US European Command's JTF Lebanon in August 2006. Mr. Bergeron has published numerous articles on legal, political and international security topics and is the editor, with Peter Fitzpatrick, of *Europe's Other: European Law between Modernity and Postmodernity* (Ashgate 1998). He holds a BA from Regent's College of New York, MA in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship at Syracuse University, Juris Doctor from Syracuse University College of Law and Master of Laws from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

ALBERTO BIN

Head, Regional Affairs Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO, Brussels, Belgium

In this capacity, he is responsible for NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for the broader Middle East, as well as for NATO's relations with all the countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Korea. Prior to joining NATO, Dr. Bin was Deputy Director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta, where he held the Chair of international history. He lectured at a number of universities and other academic institutions in Europe, North America, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Prior to that, he spent several years working in the private sector including in the Gulf region. Dr. Bin's undergraduate education was in history at the "La Sapienza" University in Rome, Italy. He received a Masters degree and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He has published books and articles on – inter alia – Mediterranean and Middle East security.

GIANNI BONVICINI

Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Scholar in European affairs and foreign policy, he is Chairman of the International Advisory Board of *The International Spectator*, the English-language quarterly journal of the IAI, and foreign policy commentator.

He is also a member of several research and study associations in Italy and abroad. He was Visiting Professor in International Relations (course on "The Politics of West European Integration") at the Department of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center (1981-2000) and Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (1987-2008). He was also President of the Istituto Trentino di Cultura (ITC) in Trento (1999 to 2004).

ARSLAN CHIKHAOUI

Chairman and CEO, Consultancy Centre "Nord-Sud Ventures", Algiers, Algeria

He is graduated in International Relations, and in Economics (Berkeley University). He then further specialized in Strategy, and Public Affairs (FSI). Since 1994 up today he has specialized in strategy, Business Intelligence and lobbying. From 1991 to 1994, he was Senior Advisor-Analyst to the Algerian Institute for Global Strategy Studies, dealing with Defence and Security Policy issues. From 1982 to 1990, he was Senior Administrator and Coordinator of the Development Aid and Cooperation

Programs for Algeria. He is expert and visiting lecturer to the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), the Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI), the Japanese Institute for Middle East Studies, UCLA for MENA Development, the Algerian Army Forces High Command, and the Algerian Military Academy. He is Advisor to Defence and Security Forum, and Member of the World Economic Forum. He is also involved in training high-ranking Algerian Army Officers in Public Affairs and Consultant to Algerian Government Bodies. He has been involved in the work of the Euromed Barcelona Process, the "Europe, Middle East and North Africa: Dialogue and Cooperation" project, the NEPAD Initiative, the Good Governance for Development in the Arab Countries Initiative. His essays include: Political and economic transformation in Algeria; Security and Stability in the Mediterranean Sea; The impact of the Western Sahara conflict on the relationships between North African States; Integration Challenges facing the North Africa Region; Islamism between violence and democracy.

MICHELE COMELLI

Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Michele Comelli is a Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, where he deals with the institutional reform of the European Union and European foreign and security policy, in particular towards the neighbours of the EU. He is also a member of the steering committee of the IAI-Compagnia di San Paolo Convention. He has published peer-reviewed articles, papers and chapters of books on these subjects and is currently working on a book on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). He has spent research periods at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin and at the Swedish Institut of International Affairs (SIIA) in Stockholm to carry out a research project on the European Neighbourhood Policy in the framework of the "European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme". Michele holds a PhD in EU Law at the University of Udine, an MA in European Political Studies at the College of Europe of Bruges (Belgium) and an MA in International and Diplomatic Studies from the University of Trieste-Gorizia. Michele is a Marshall Memorial Fellow of the German Marshall Fund. He is member of the steering committee of the project EU4SEAS and leader of work package 2 "Politics and Security".

ALFREDO CONTE

Senior Advisor to the Director of Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, Brussels, Belgium

Assignments include policy planning issues; covers, among others, situation in Georgia and its implications on EU-Russia relations.

2004-2008: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet of the Minister. Assignments include speech-writing for successive Foreign Ministers (Franco Frattini, Gianfranco Fini, Massimo D'Alema). 2001-2004: First Secretary, then Counselor, at the Embassy of Italy in Berlin. Private Secretary to the Ambassador. Assignments include German foreign and domestic politics, cultural affairs. 1996-2001: Consul at the Consulate General of Italy in Hong Kong. Assignments include economics, trade, public affairs, culture and press.

DANA DEPO

Research Fellow for European Programme, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev, Ukraine

Ms. Depo is working in projects on European integration and EU-Ukraine relations. She is currently involved with a project on preparation of Ukraine for the implementation of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. MA in International Law from the Kiev Institute of International Relations Taras Shevchenko National University, was on internship at the European Parliament, and continues cooperation with the MEPs. Ms. Depo is ICPS project coordinator and Junior expert in the EU4SEAS Project.

ETTORE GRECO

Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

He is also editor of the institute's journal *The International Spectator* and heads the transatlantic program of the IAI. He worked as visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution from January 2006 to July 2007. He taught at the universities of Parma and Bologna. From 2000 to 2006 he worked as correspondent for the Economist Intelligence Unit. From 1993 to 2000 he directed the IAI's program on Central and Eastern Europe. He was also Deputy Director of the IAI from 1997 to 2008.

He is the author of a number of publications on the EU's institutions and foreign policy, transatlantic relations and the Balkans. He has been a free-lance journalist since 1988.

AMR HAMZAWY

Senior Associate, Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beirut, Lebanon

Amr Hamzawy is a distinguished Egyptian political scientist who previously taught at Cairo University and the Free University of Berlin. Hamzawy has a deep knowledge of Middle East politics and specific expertise on the reform process in the region. His research interests include the changing dynamics of political participation in the Arab world and the role of Islamist movements in Arab politics. His most recent book, *Human Rights in the Arab World: Independent Voices*, coedited with Anthony Chase, was published in 2006. Hamzawy regularly contributes articles in Arabic to various academic journals. He also writes a bi-monthly op-ed for the leading pan-Arab daily *al-Hayat*, a monthly commentary for the Egyptian *al-Shourouk* and a weekly column for Jordanian *al-Ghad*. Selected Publications: *The New Middle East*, with Marina Ottaway, Nathan Brown, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem (Carnegie Report, 2008); *The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?*, with Nathan Brown (Carnegie Paper, 2008); "The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections: Results and Implications" (Web Commentary, 2007); *Egypt—Don't Give Up on Democracy Promotion*, with Michele Dunne and Nathan Brown (Carnegie Policy Brief, 2007); *Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World*, with Marina Ottaway (Carnegie Paper, 2007); *Human Rights in the Arab World: Independent Voices*, coedited with Anthony Chase, (University of Pennsylvania, 2006); *Zeitgenössisches Arabisches Denken: Kontinuität und Wandel*, (Verlag des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 2005).

PAULI JÄRVENPÄÄ

Director General, Department of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence in Helsinki, Finland

Dr. Pauli Järvenpää is responsible for both national and international defence policy, including the European Security and Defence Policy issues, NATO cooperation, Russia, the United States, Nordic cooperation, Baltic assistance, and arms control questions. He assumed his current position on March 1, 2002. Previous appointments: Defence Counsellor, Mission of Finland to NATO, Brussels (1999-2002), Deputy Director General, Department of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Helsinki (1994-1999), Minister-Counsellor for Politico-Military Affairs, Embassy of Finland, Washington, D.C. (1991-1994), National Security Advisor, Ministry of Defence, Helsinki (1983-1991), Senior Researcher, Institute of Military Science, Helsinki (1980-1983), Research Associate, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1979-1980). Dr. Järvenpää has published over 100 articles in books, journals and newspapers in Finnish, Swedish and English. His military rank is Major (in national reserves).

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Riina Kaljurand is the Deputy Director of the International Centre for Defence Studies and her main research interest lies in the Security Sector Reform and the Nordic-Baltic co-operation in this area. She has only recently started to research on the topic of the Baltic Sea Security. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Stockholm. She has worked at the Estonian Ministry of Defence as an Assistant to the Secretary General and Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including tours in the Embassies in Oslo and Stockholm. She also worked in Kyiv within the framework of the "Public Administration Reform" project run by SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency).

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Nargis received her MA and PhD in Political Science from Nagoya University (Japan). In her dissertation she explored the conceptual and operational aspects of Kazakhstan's national security since independence. In 2004 she returned home and worked on a number of projects including a EU-funded study of the policy and law making in Kazakhstan and a World Bank project on legal and judicial reforms in Central Asia. Since 2007 she has been teaching at KIMEP. Her current research focuses on the policies of various Eurasian actors in Central Asia (EU, Russia, China, Japan) and the implications of their engagement for Kazakhstan and the rest of the region.

TIAGO MARQUES

Researcher and Lecturer in International Relations, University of Tallinn, Estonia

He teaches a Jean Monnet course on European Security Governance and a Research Associate at the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute. He holds a MA in History from the University of St. Andrews and a MA in International Conflict Studies from Uppsala University. Previously, he worked as a researcher in the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Lisbon and was a research assistant at the office of the Director at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

NONA MIKHELIDZE

Junior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

Nona Mikhelidze is a Junior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. She holds a M.A. in Regionalism: Central Asia and Caucasian Studies from the Humboldt University Berlin (HU) and was awarded with the Volkswagen Foundation Scholarship as a Research Fellow at HU. She holds also M.A. and B.A. degrees in International Relations from the Tbilisi State University. Currently she is participating in Commission 6th and 7th Framework projects MICROCON and EU4SEAS. Her research interests include the ENP and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, the Wider Black Sea and regional cooperation, Turkey and Caspian Region, and Russian foreign policy in the ex-Soviet space. Among her most recent publications are: "After the 2008 Russia-Georgia war: implications for the wider Caucasus and prospects for western involvement in conflict resolution," Background paper of the conference on "The Caucasus and Black Sea region: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and beyond," Rome, 6-7 February 2009; Mikhelidze, Nona and Pirozzi, Nicoletta, "Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Abkhazia, Israel-Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Western Sahara," Brighton, MICROCON - Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, (MICROCON Policy working papers, 3), November 2008, 84 p.; Tocci, Nathalie and Mikhelidze, Nona, "How to engage with political Islam? Lessons from Europe," *The International Spectator*, Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 67-83.; Mikhelidze, Nona, "Georgien als Transitland in den Interessen des Westens,"

SILJA BARA OMARSDOTTIR

Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland, Reykjavik

She teaches international relations theory and international negotiations. Her current research is focused on the development of Icelandic security policy in the context of Nordic, European, and transatlantic organizations. Ms. Ómarsdóttir is currently on leave as the director of the Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small State Studies at the University of Iceland. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Southern California and holds an MA degree from the same university. She previously completed a BA with honors in international affairs from Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon. Previous work experience includes the Icelandic Centre for Gender Equality, where she was in charge of international cooperation, serving on various Nordic and European committees. She has been active in a number of organizations, including Icelandic Political Science Association, The Icelandic Women's Rights Association, and the UNIFEM National Committee in Iceland.

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HERRANZ, Anna (eds), *Política Exterior y Parlamento Europeo: hacia el equilibrio entre eficacia y democracia*. Barcelona: IUEE/ Oficina del Parlamento Europeo en Barcelona, pp. 89-101, 2007)

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JORDI VAQUER I FANÉS


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SECURITY AGENDA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

DRAFT

Abstract

In the first part of the chapter, existing knowledge in the field of security studies is taken into account to assess data on the political, social, cultural, environmental, and economic factors that affect state security, and to give hints on setting the security agenda of the Mediterranean region. In the second part, attention is drawn to problems of security cooperation on the assumption that setting the region agenda implies generalized consent and shared practices of problem co-management. On knowledge of the indecisive negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace, the security culture divide is pointed out as very important cause of missing agreement on security co-management in the Mediterranean region. On the premise of the analysis of the two parts of the chapter, a two-track security agenda is proposed in the concluding section.

Setting the security agenda of the Mediterranean region requires answering to questions on the existing risks on, and threats to, the values of the Mediterranean countries, and on how to overcome them. What political, social, cultural, environmental, and economic values of the countries of the Mediterranean region are either at risk or under threat today? Are risks, i.e. structural and involuntary insecurity conditions, more dangerous than threats, i.e. direct and intentional menaces against a state by another state and by non-state actors like terrorist organizations? Are risks and threats generally of internal origin or are they brought in by actors external to the region? Can the Mediterranean countries contend with, and prevail over, these risk/threat conditions by rehearsing the indecisive security dialogue of the time of the Barcelona Process? These are but a few questions to answer to in order to carry out the hard task of setting a viable agenda of the actions and measures to improve the security conditions of the Mediterranean region in the years ahead. To make the task simpler, two aspects of the problem are shortly discussed here. First, since security can be defined as the condition of the actor (person, group, organization) whose values (material and immaterial objects of vital importance to him) are safe from the hostile action of other actors (security from threat), and from the negative effects of natural and social processes (security from risk), it is here acknowledged that the Mediterranean countries play against many conditions that make their values unsafe. Some conditions are the concern of a few single states; others are perceived by many states; and others are shared by all of the Mediterranean states. On this premise, the present chapter deals with security agenda as a set of answers aimed at moderating and, hopefully, taking under control the most important problems of security that are common to all, and not to some of, the Mediterranean countries. The second aspect concerns the group of the Mediterranean countries, and in particular issues like the appropriate definition of the Mediterranean region, the criteria of inclusion and exclusion of region countries, and the criteria for the eventual division of the region in sub-regions. To make the discourse short and workable, this analysis skips off such matters. In particular, it focuses on the countries that lie on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and analyzes data of seventeen nations, i.e. Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. However, the spectrum of the analysis in the second part of the chapter encompasses a wider set of issues and processes, and takes into account all the countries concerned with the problem of building cooperative security in the region.

The chapter structure is as follows. In the first part, attention is drawn to the data of the *hard factors* that affect the security of the Mediterranean region as an international system. Existing knowledge in the field of security studies is taken into account in this part. The hard factor data of the states of the Mediterranean region are examined according to this knowledge. In the second part of the chapter, attention is drawn to problems of security cooperation in the Mediterranean on the

assumption that setting the region agenda implies generalized consent and shared practices of security problems co-management. In this part of the chapter, the indecisive and ineffective negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace is recalled, and attention is called on the security culture divide as one of the most important causes of the past failure of security co-management in the Mediterranean region. In the concluding remarks, the major results of this study are recorded in order to set the items of the Mediterranean security agenda. Briefly, this task results in the building of a two-track security agenda. Track one concerns the systemic factors. Track two concerns the co-management strategy for building lasting security conditions.

Hard factors affecting security

In the community of the security studies specialists, state security is linked to systemic/relational factors, in particular to economic, military, environmental, and cultural factors, and to the political status/regime of the state. For the sake of concision, the existing knowledge on the security conditions of regional groups of countries, like the Mediterranean ones, is summed up here by presenting five basic assertions on the relation between security and hard factors.

Assertion 1: Economic wealth and state security are associated to one other because economically satisfied countries value international stability as essential to their economic growth, and consequently refrain, as much as possible, from violating the security of other countries and the conditions of growth of their economy.

Assertion 2: Arms race and military build-ups destabilize the security conditions of all the countries of a region.

Assertion 3: Environment pollution and contamination feed up mutual distrust, and international tension. Therefore, they endanger the security conditions of a region.

Assertion 4: Cultural homogeneity is requisite to mutual understanding and security. In case of conflict among states, it makes negotiation easier. In non conflict circumstances, cultural homogeneity facilitates the construction of common institutions, and, therefore, enhances the security of concerned countries.

Assertion 5: As demonstrated, although not in clear-cut terms, by the scientific research of the Democratic peace school, the domestic political status and aggressive behaviour of the states are associated to one another. In general, democracies are prone less than non-democracies to violate the security conditions of other states by armed force.

These assertions are not rigid rules, but proposals on the *regular* occurrence of the relation existing between each factor and aggressive state behaviour. In other terms, these assertions are overall positively tested hypotheses on the *normal* association existing between each observed systemic factor

and the behaviour of the states of the contemporary international system. On this premise, leaving apart the complex issue of the cumulative effects of these factors, it is worth fixing here existing knowledge on the present status of each factor in the Mediterranean region. On this knowledge base, one can better assess the status of security in the region, and consequently advise on building the security agenda of the Mediterranean countries in the years to come.

Assertion 1: Economic wealth and state security are associated to one other because economically satisfied countries value international stability as essential to their economic growth, and consequently refrain as much as possible from violating the security of other countries and the condition of growth of their economy.

Economic wealth is multifaceted factor. GDP (gross domestic product) is commonly considered as both a good measure of economic wealth, and a reliable indicator of the economic satisfaction of a nation. To our present interest, GDP growth rate suits better to assess the economic satisfaction of the ruling class and population of a nation, and the consequent national inclination to retain stability and security. In very simple terms, the argument here sounds as it follows. The faster the national economy grows, the more the government is expected to avoid being responsible for hostile actions against neighbouring countries for the sake of shielding the conditions of economic growth (see, as example of the literature on this assertion, O'Neal and Tir, 2006; Rosecrance, 1986; and Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch, 2003).

Recent studies of economic trends have demonstrated that, in past years, the less wealthy economies of the North-Africa and Middle East countries have been developing faster than the wealthy economies of the European ones. The GDP of the former group of countries has been growing, at few exceptions, at striking but irregular rate (see Table no.1 for the year 2005-2007). Countries like Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Israel, i.e. two on three North-Africa and Middle East countries here taken into account, have growth rates higher than the European ones.

Table no. 1: GDP, GDP growth, Population growth

	GDP (current US\$) (billions)			GDP growth (annual %)			Population growth (annual %)		
	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007
Cyprus	17,00	18,37	21,28	3,9	4,0	4,4	2,4	1,9	1,8
France	2.136,45	2.248,09	2.562,29	1,7	2,0	2,2	0,6	0,8	0,6
Greece	283,74	308,45	360,03	3,7	4,3	4,0	0,4	0,4	0,4
Italy	1.769,74	1.850,96	2.107,48	0,1	1,9	1,5	0,7	0,6	0,7
Malta	5,91	6,38	..	3,3	3,4	..	0,5	0,6	0,8

Portugal	185,21	194,73	220,24	0,5	1,3	1,9	0,5	0,3	0,2
Spain	1.126,05	1.224,68	1.429,23	3,5	3,9	3,8	1,6	1,6	1,7
Algeria	102,34	116,46	135,29	5,1	1,8	3,1	1,5	1,5	1,5
Egypt	89,69	107,48	128,10	4,4	6,8	7,1	1,8	1,8	1,7
Israel	131,23	142,07	161,82	6,5	5,2	5,3	1,7	1,8	1,7
Jordan	12,61	14,10	15,83	7,1	6,3	6,0	2,3	2,3	3,2
Lebanon	21,56	22,76	24,00	1,1	0,0	2,0	1,1	1,1	1,0
Morocco	58,96	65,40	73,28	2,4	8,0	2,3	1,0	1,2	1,2
Palestinian
Syria	28,20	33,41	38,08	4,5	5,1	6,6	2,7	2,7	2,5
Tunisia	28,97	30,96	35,02	4,0	5,7	6,3	1,0	1,0	1,2
Turkey	484,0	529,9	657,1	8,4	6,9	4,5	1,3	1,3	1,2

Source: World Bank, www.worldbank.org (access: February 27, 2009)

However, it is better to be cautious on making projections from these data for at least three reasons. First, the time length is too much short to speak of a decisive economic trend. Second, the current crisis of the world economy can hit economic growth dramatically as in the Mediterranean region as everywhere. Lastly, attention is called here on the continuing fast growth of the population of the countries of North-Africa and the Middle East (see Table no. 1). Actually, demography is important to assess the strength of the GDP trend in the years ahead. At the same time, irrespective of economic growth and crisis, the demographic gap negatively affects relations between the two groups of Mediterranean countries. Migration flows have negative influence on the security conditions of the Mediterranean region in as much as immigrants are considered as a social and economic risk factor by the Europeans.

Assertion 2: Arms race and military build-ups destabilize the security conditions of the countries of a region.

Arms race is both the symptom of conflict relations, and the cause of tension, conflict, and insecurity. Conflict and military analysts make use of various kinds of data on armaments and military build-ups in order to study change in international conflicts. All these data are useful indicators of either increasing or decreasing tension between countries in conflict relations because they make known whether, and how much, mutual hostility is either increasing or decreasing. On the other hand, when no conflict of interest exists, unilateral military build-up reveals the change of the foreign and security policy of the arming state. This policy change is normally perceived by other countries as the

demonstration of the aggressive orientation of the arming state. Therefore, usually neighbouring states decide to react, and adopt what they call a containment policy, i.e. they counteract with arms race too (see, for example, Kinnella, 2002; and Richardson, 1960). However, analysts recognize that, in some cases, increasing the size of the armed forces is not a foreign policy driven act, but a political choice geared to solve domestic problems. Governments may decide to strengthen their position against the real or perceived threat of internal opposition groups, and consequently increase the size of the army rather than come to terms with the opposition demands. At the same time, it is to bear in mind that military strength can be diverted from internal to external goals. Overall, any increase in military spending must be considered carefully in assessing the state of security in a region, and in constructing the region security agenda.

Taking in due consideration this knowledge on armament and military build-up policies, the annual increase of the military expenditures of the Mediterranean countries is accounted here. Military expenditures as percentage of the national GDP reveal that, in past years, from 2002-2006, military build-up has been higher in the Mediterranean countries of North-Africa and the Middle East, at the exception of Tunisia, than in the Mediterranean countries of Europe, at the exception of Greece (see Table no.2).

Table no. 2: Military expenditures as percentage of gross domestic product

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Cyprus	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,4
France	2,5	2,6	2,6	2,5	2,4
Greece	4,2	3,4	3,6	3,8	3,8
Italy	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,9	1,8
Malta	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7
Portugal	2,0	2,0	2,1	2,0	1,9
Spain	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,0	1,2
Algeria	3,7	3,2	3,3	2,9	2,7
Egypt	3,4	3,3	3,0	2,9	2,7
Israel	9,5	8,8	7,9	7,9	8,0
Jordan	5,4	6,0	5,1	4,8	5,0
Lebanon	4,8	4,7	4,4	4,5	4,6
Morocco	4,1	4,2	3,9	3,9	3,7
Palestinian					
Syria	4,7	5,5	6,0	5,3	5,1
Tunisia	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,4

Turkey	4,4	3,8	3,1	2,8	2,9
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Source: SIPRI <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4> (Access: February 27, 2009)

Assertion 3: Environment pollution and contamination feed up mutual distrust, international tension, and, therefore, endanger the security conditions of a region.

The countries on the shores of the Mediterranean basin, like those of all mediterranean areas, are very much concerned with environmental problems for apparent reasons. As a result, the governments of the region have been always aware of the need for regional coordination of national anti-pollution measures, and for the adoption of apposite measures at the region level. Actually, many agreements have been signed; a remarkable number of environmental programmes have been approved and are operational today in the Mediterranean basin [References here]. On the whole, environmental risks in the Mediterranean region are under the careful consideration of the governments and concerned experts. Hence, despite the seriousness of the problem, environment has not been in the past, and will not be in the years ahead, an insurgent matter of security to the countries the region.

Assertion 4: Cultural homogeneity is requisite to mutual understanding. In case of conflict between states, cultural homogeneity makes negotiation easier. In normal circumstances, it facilitates the construction of common institutions; and, therefore, enhances the security conditions of cultural homogeneous countries.

Cultural diversity is a major feature of the Mediterranean region. At the same time, communication and dialogue between the different cultures are the concern of state and civil society actors of European and Arab countries. However, the distance between the two major cultures, the Arab-Islamic and European-Christian one, is quite large. For this reason, in addition to other differences and conflict motives, political dialogue for building common institutions for the joint management of shared problems is hard task to diplomats and practitioners. The fifteen years long experience of the so-called *light* institutional structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is clear demonstration of the problem of creating a set of institutions that can effectively select and implement common political projects. Furthermore, the unsuccessful negotiation on the First Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration and the project of the Mediterranean Peace and Stability Charter discouraged aspiration to run new talks on this objective. For this reason, the subsequent project of the Union for the Mediterranean has avoided to create any formal institution, and has not taken into consideration any project on security matters.

The Middle East conflict and other controversial issues aside, the point here is the security culture gap existing between the two major groups of Mediterranean countries. The European group,

thanks to the experience of the Helsinki Process and the armaments control talks of the Cold War times, is familiar with the concept of cooperative and comprehensive security. The Arab group, instead, has not been influenced by any important multilateral security experience in the past. Therefore, in the past, the efforts of diplomats and practitioners to form a security agenda in the Mediterranean region achieved no substantive results. This aspect is further discussed in the second part of this chapter.

Assertion 5: Domestic political status and aggressive behaviour are associated to one another. Though not in absolute terms, the scientific research of the Democratic peace school has demonstrated that democracies are prone less than non-democracies to violating the security conditions of other states.

This chapter is not the right case for assessing strengths and weaknesses of the empirical analyses that tested the hypothesis of the Democratic Peace theory (Russett, 1993; Barkawi and Laffey, 2001). The argument here is that democratic governments are influenced more than non democratic ones by public opinion in matters concerning the use of armed force against other countries. The difference can be explained as it follows. In democratic countries, political rights and civil liberties, along with political mechanisms and practices like party competition, free elections, and parliamentary debates, have the effect of relenting decision-making in tense situations and international conflicts. Consequently, the time for negotiation becomes longer, the search of peaceful conflict resolution more efficacious, and the chance for security short of violence improves. Since these mechanisms and practices are missing in non-democratic states, at least to the extent they are in democratic ones, the rulers of non-democratic states are relatively free to divert internal resources towards external aims, and can decide even instantly the use armed force against other states.

Measures of the political status of contemporary states, like the Freedom House indexes of political rights and civil liberties, can substantiate knowledge on the state of these factors in the two groups of Mediterranean countries. Difference in both political rights and civil liberties of the countries of Europe and North-Africa/Middle East is apparent in the last seven years here presented (see Table no.3). Therefore, the growth of democratic control on foreign policy and armed forces is a true matter of concern in building the Mediterranean security agenda.

Table no. 3: Political rights, and Civil liberties

	Political rights							Civil liberties						
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Cyprus	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0
France	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	2,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0

Greece	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0
Italy	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	2,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0
Malta	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0
Portugal	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0
Spain	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	2,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0
Israel	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	2,0
Algeria	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0
Egypt	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0
Jordan	5,0	6,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0
Lebanon	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	4,0
Morocco	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0
Palestinian	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	4,0	5,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	5,0	6,0	6,0
Syria	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	7,0	6,0	6,0
Tunisia	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	7,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,0
Turkey	4,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0

Source: Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org (Access February 27, 2009).

Rating range 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level.

In conclusion, taking account of this brief examination of the five hard factors of security in the Mediterranean international system, the following statements are advanced:

- The GDP growth of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East can raise optimism on the foreign policy behaviour of these countries, but this is tempered, and eventually reversed, on consideration of the negative effects of the current world economic crisis, the continuing demographic pressure on domestic economy development, and the consequent migration problem. Therefore, the security agenda of the Mediterranean region must urgently address the problem of revitalizing economic growth in the Southern Mediterranean countries, and further search for coordinating national efforts on demographic and migration issues.
- The growth of military spending weakens the security conditions of the region. It feeds mutual distrust and international tension, and worsens any conflict situation. Therefore, containment of military build-up, arms trade, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must remain high on the Mediterranean security agenda. Existing programmes and agreements (like the Registry ---) must be carefully implemented.

- The natural environment must be constantly monitored. In the security agenda of the Mediterranean region, these conditions of the regional environmental policies must be clearly stated and forwarded. Protectionist policies must be upgraded employing appropriate resources and advanced technologies
- The dialogue of cultures is the only instrument to advance peaceful coexistence, and make diversity no obstacle to building common institutions in culturally heterogeneous areas. In the contemporary world, institutions are essential to the effective management of any region-wide problem. The Mediterranean security agenda has to point out a feasible strategy for building the minimum base of cultural values needed to construct multilateral institutions.
- Liberalization and the gradual introduction of political rights in all the Mediterranean countries will strengthen the domestic conditions that enhance security also at the region level. The Mediterranean security agenda must address the problem of inducing all the countries of the region to adopt the domestic reforms that help create the conditions of effective international negotiation in opposition to the existing practice of relying on national armed force to solve international conflicts.

The co-management of security problems


In abstract terms, security in a region can be the result of arrangements as different as dyadic military pacts and alliance politics, on one side, and universally agreed co-management measures, on the other. The goal of setting the security agenda of a region assumes that the countries of the region normally act as responsible members of an the local international system that they want organize co-operatively. In addition, governments must share views of common management of security problems. In fact, the agenda will achieve expected results only on condition that co-management of security is really pursued by the states of the region even though conflict divides some of them, and systemic factors impinge negatively on the agenda items.

Research on co-operative security regionalism has been growing in the past years. Barry Buzan forwarded the analytical scheme of regional security problems, that centres on the concept of security *complex*, and inspired many studies of security regionalism. However, Buzan's model falls short of recognizing the existence of any cooperative pattern and trend at the region level in contemporary world politics (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Other researchers have proposed to record regions as either zones of peace or zones of war accounting on the importance of factors like the level of conflict and security (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993; Kakowicz, 1998), the existence of conflict, integration and democracy (Gleditsch, 2002), and the presence of regional trade agreements (Powers,

2004). Adler and Barnett (1998) revisited the Karl W. Deutsch's concept and model of *security community* in order to explain the formation of the European security system after the Helsinki Process. They believe that the constructivist reinterpretation of Deutsch's approach to political communities is fruitful to understand the security-building processes that take place at the region level in contemporary world system. On this account, Adler and associates investigated building co-operation in the Mediterranean region as a case of political community construction (Adler, Bicchi, Crawford, and Del Sarto, 2006). Another security culture school relies on constructivism and critical analysis to study regional security cooperation in Asia and Europe (see Krause, 1993). Constructivism (Bilgin, 2005) and traditional analysis (Maoz, Landau, Malz, 2004) have been applied also to study the embryonic stage of security cooperation in the Middle East at the time of the Oslo agreement. Close to the security community school, the concept and model of regional security partnership has been proposed as better suited to explain current regional cooperation processes like those in contemporary Europe, Asia, and Africa (Attinà 2006 and 2007).

Summing up the existing knowledge on security regionalism and co-operation, the main forms of regional arrangement are presented here below as distinct points on a line spanning from the lowest to highest level of coordination (Figure no. 1).

Figure no.1



On the extreme left-hand side of the line, the states refuse to create stable security arrangements by explicit agreements, and prefer to count on national military power to ensure security to each region member. In *opposite alliance system*, governments do not agree on any region-wide coordination but trust on the equilibrium of military power groups. In the *collective security* arrangement, the region governments keep armed force under national control but agree on coordinating their military power in case of aggression to one of them. *Security communities*, as initially theorized by Karl Deutsch, are groups of people/states so integrated to one another as to believe that war is an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is brought into existence by converging factors, namely (a) large flows of transactions, trade, and communication, that bind together people and states; (b) the consequent perception of being members of the same community; and (c) the formation of common institutions responsible for the peaceful resolution of interest conflicts. Deutsch made a distinction between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. The former are constituted by states that abandon sovereignty and merge into a single state. The latter are formed by states that retain legal independence but create common institutions. As Adler and Barnett remark (1998), even pluralistic communities can be separated in two forms of community, the loosely and tightly coupled one. In the former, the member states support the persistent separation of state sovereignty; in the latter, they opt for government centralization. Amalgamated security communities coincide with federal states, like Germany. The group of the Scandinavian countries, the Canada and United States compound, and the Euro-Atlantic community, i.e. the states of the Atlantic Alliance, are examples of the loosely coupled form of pluralistic security community. Lastly, the European Union is good example of the tightly coupled form of security community. *Security partnership* is the arrangement created by all (or almost all) the states of a region, and also extra-regional powers, who act as partners in upholding a plurality of means and instruments of regional security. In addition to the traditional instruments of collective security, this arrangement consists of new cooperative measures like the exchange of information on state military policies and structures, and comprehensive, i.e. military and non-military, international and internal, measures. Contrary to security communities, the cultures of the partner countries can be distant from one another, but this difference does not prevent the formation of cooperative practices of management of security problems. For political reasons like the need of controlling the domestic effects of international interdependence, and practical reasons like the benefit of reducing transaction costs, these countries prefer coordinating themselves as partners and, consequently, reduce the risk of violent confrontation. As partners, they contribute to create and maintain various instruments and mechanisms of security co-management like formal security treaties, international organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue, peace and stability pacts, confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and also measures for supporting the domestic

stability of the partners at risk of internal violence and collapse. A regional security partnership is formed through a long process that starts ordinarily with negotiating some fundamental documents and operative agreements. In the fundamental agreement(s), shared principles of peaceful relations are declared; commitment to avoid power confrontation is given by all the partner governments; and the common view on the local sources of conflict, tension and instability is stated publicly. With the operative agreements, the partner governments create the mechanisms and institutions for controlling and solving common security problems.

As explained elsewhere (Attinà 2006 and 2007), the regional security partnership model has been constructed on the knowledge of the experience of the European security arrangement of the 1990s. On the aftermath of the Soviet bloc dismemberment, the European governments decided to overcome the uncertainties of the region by strengthening the positive elements of security cooperation that had been developed by themselves during the Helsinki Process, i.e. the principles of cooperative, comprehensive, and progressive security. However, the regional security partnership model has been positively applied also to the analysis of other regions. In fact, processes in East Asia on the initiative of the ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in Central Asia on the initiative of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and in Africa on the initiative of the African Union (the Peace and Security Council of the AU), are further cases of regional security co-operation that correspond to the traits of the security partnership model. On account of the fitness of the regional security partnership model to the main current security cooperation processes at the region level, the model is applied here below to the uncertain security-building process of the Mediterranean region.

Building co-management security in the Mediterranean region

In the late 1990s, the Mediterranean countries started talks aimed at writing the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability. But, this resolve, declared in the official documents of the Barcelona Process, failed to produce any result. Actually, the Chapter on Politics and Security Affairs of the Barcelona Declaration is the early official text of cooperative security building in the Mediterranean region, a sort of fundamental agreement of the regional security partnership. The Charter was expected to be the main operative agreement, and to spell out the mechanisms, instruments and measures available to security co-management. Agreement on starting negotiation on the Charter at the level of Senior Officials and experts was reached on 1997, but very soon it was understood that the Mediterranean governments had divergent perceptions of the existing threats and challenges to political stability and security. In a short time, the negotiation process vanished because negotiation was confronted to many obstacles like the Middle East conflict, the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies of the Western governments, the Iraq and post-Iraqi war problems, and, lastly, the adoption of the European

Neighbourhood Policy that fostered the new perspective of the European Union on relations with the countries on the Europe's borders. Actually, these events slowed down the partnership building process and, finally, made the Charter negotiation disappear, but here attention is drawn also to the systemic obstacle to security negotiation in the Mediterranean region, the security culture divide (Attinà and Zhu, 2001).

The security policies of the states are intrinsically influenced by past experiences in security problems, and by beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that shape the country's security culture. More precisely, this culture shapes the preference of national governments for security instruments, i.e. makes them inclined towards national military power rather than either alliance politics or one of the cooperative forms of regional security arrangement earlier discussed here above. However, since culture is never static, factors like learning from recent and current experiences, interacting with the security culture of other states and regions, and the influence of new ideas and values, can give place to culture change. On this belief, dialogues between the different security cultures of the Mediterranean countries is still worth practising, and must be an important item on the region security agenda. This is a crucial aspect because the security cultures of the Mediterranean countries are very distant from one another.

The current security culture of the European countries is shaped by three recent experiences: (1) the arms control negotiations of the Cold War and détente times; (2) the Helsinki Process with the three-decade long elaboration of new security ideas and values, and the formation of comprehensive and cooperative security mechanisms; and (3) the establishment of new defence policies in the early years of the current decade that are aimed at reacting to unexpected crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to state and non-state actors of the region. Briefly, the present European security culture combines the concepts of co-operative and comprehensive security with the discourse of the new threats and dangers. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect from the European countries lack of interest in any security agenda that overlooks the problem of arms control in the region as well as the problem of controlling the non-state actors that make unconventional use of violence and armed force.

The security culture of the contemporary Arab countries is also a composite one. First, Arab governments, generally speaking, are attached to the traditional view of strategic secrecy, and national military power short of alliance coordination. As a matter of fact, the Arab countries never practiced co-operative security mechanisms as the European countries have been doing since the Helsinki Process. The same comprehensive security concept is something like smoke in the eyes of the Arab political elite and policy-makers. This situation can be progressively changed as far as the Arab countries participate in the Africa Union's security partnership. As remarked by Franck (2008), this partnership is structured in many sub-regional arrangements, but this is not the case of Mediterranean

Africa. Second, in past years, lack of experience in cooperative security regionalism went along with cultural beliefs which were/are favourable to cooperation but only with Arab Islamic countries. Believes in the existence of the Arab nation as a trans-state community, and in the society of Arab states, continue to be strong drives to suspicion towards talks on security cooperation across cultural divisions. Third, in recent times, the importance of the culture divide as an obstacle to security cooperation has been growing because the Arab Islamic identity is invoked by the reformist and radical movements that ask for important changes in the Arab countries. Some movements use violence; others non-violent means. All of them criticize the state for failing to meet both the socio-economic needs of the society and the aspiration of the people to turn down external influence and interference.

Briefly, since the present trends of the European and Arab security cultures are different from one another, in past years, the Euro-Mediterranean partners have been able to achieve only broad consensus on security cooperation, and great difficulties blocked the walk on the road to work out the operative instruments of the security partnership..

Concluding remarks

Territorial controversies, national aspirations, communal clashes, and secessionist projects have been cause of conflict, in some cases violent conflict in the Mediterranean region but a spontaneous, non-negotiated, and unstructured security system has been overall holding thus far. At the exception of the Middle East, recourse to violence by parties in conflict did neither spread to the entire region nor to sub-region areas thanks to different reasons. However, the existing causes of conflict can activate spirals of tension and actual conflict, and put stability and people/state security in jeopardy. Moreover, the status of hard, systemic security factors is boost to existing causes of conflict, and would propel escalation in case of clash. On this knowledge, given for granted that, in the different conflict theatres of the region, separated agendas are to set and carry out by diplomats, rulers, and community leaders, a two-track security agenda has been proposed here as the region-wide agenda. Actually, this agenda is deemed to set up, better, to initiate a process for setting up a number of actions aimed at keeping under control and short of violence the existing conflicts as well as for preventing future conflicts of interest to escalate to violence.

On this premise, in the first part of this chapter, track-one actions have been proposed to prevent hard, systemic factors impinge on the security of the region by aggravating crises, escalating tension, and exacerbating latent and low-profile conflicts. These actions can be listed in the following priority/urgency order.

1. Existing agreements and treaties of disarmament, armaments control, and non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must be carefully implemented because

military build-up weakens the security conditions of the region. In addition to world-wide treaties, region-wide ones should be signed, and honoured even by accepting, on occasion, inspection mechanisms.

2. The dialogue of cultures, essential to peaceful coexistence, must be pursued, and should aim at fixing the minimum base of cross-culture values that is needed to construct common political institutions. Accomplishing this objective is condition to build effective and lasting security.
3. Measures to contain the negative effects of the current economic crisis on the region economies are urgent, and must be tailored on the long-term goal of the Mediterranean free-trade zone, and integration of the national economies in a single market.
4. The status of civil liberties and political rights of all the Mediterranean countries must be improved, and no obstacle put on civil society organisations, including trans-national civil society networks, on condition that they comply with security standards and regulations.
5. Environment protection must be constantly upgraded by providing appropriate resources and technologies.

Track-two security agenda measures are intended to create lasting conditions for region security. On assumption that, at the present time, the Mediterranean region lacks the attributes for the instauration of a security community, the goal of the track-two agenda is the formation of a regional security partnership. Past experience notwithstanding, in order to accomplish track-two security measures it is necessary to restart negotiations on writing the treaties and creating the multilateral offices and international organizations that can make operational the Barcelona Declaration that framed the agreement of the Mediterranean states on their interdependence and will to work together for stability and peace. Devising cooperative measures and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention, at the international and internal level, and thinking up also rules and practices for associating non-regional actors (states and international organisations, the United Nations included) will be the task of the diplomats, practitioners and experts concerned with this agenda issue.

Last, but not least, to say here is that the rationale of the two-track security agenda is the cross-fertilization effect of the two tracks as far as they are simultaneously implemented. In this case, implementing track-one measures is already creating the conditions for the region security partnership, namely generalized consent and shared practices of peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, the negative effects of the hard factors of in-security are contained and progressively removed as long as the security partnership measures are constructed.

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
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Political and Security Cooperation in Europe's Four Sea Basins

Session 1:

Defining Security Agendas in the Four Sea Basins: The Baltic Sea

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Introduction

Multilateral security cooperation in the Baltic has a very limited history, as the sub-region has been marked by its littoral states' diffuse organizational memberships. The Nordic states have a long-standing tradition of cooperation in many fields, but have very carefully excluded security policy from their partnership. The Baltic countries have, since the end of the Cold War, been invited to participate extensively in a number of cooperative fora with their Nordic neighbors but that invitation has generally not reached into the security realm – which of course is not surprising given that the Nordics have had a very complex relationship when it comes to their security policy. The Baltic states' membership in the EU and NATO also has shaped their emphases when it comes to security, adding their membership complexities to that of the Nordic countries, with three of the five Nordics being members of both NATO and the EU, but only one, Denmark, being member of both organizations. The additional littoral states are of course Germany and Poland, which during the Cold War were separated by the Iron Curtain, but now are both members of both NATO and the EU. In the background looms Russia, whose presence has manifold implications for the security agenda of both the Nordic and Eastern European countries. NATO and the EU are important actors as well, particularly in recent years.

The security agenda in the Baltic Sea is more and more shaped by environmental concerns, as reflected for example in the Northern Dimension program of the EU. Military concerns, however, are important, especially as regards the relationship between Russia on the one hand and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on the other hand. In this paper, the main focus is on the question of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the one hand, and the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, on the other (although Iceland's role is mostly peripheral here, but it is included as it is part of the Council of Baltic Sea States).

Is there a Nordic/Baltic Security Community?

Nordic cooperation has traditionally centered on cultural and political issues, with the 1962 Helsinki Treaty stating the governments' shared desire to “promote and strengthen the close ties existing between Nordic peoples in matters of culture, and of legal and social philosophy, and to extend the scale of cooperation between the Nordic countries”.¹ Military cooperation is carefully not mentioned in the Helsinki Treaty, and continually avoided in its numerous updates, as the five countries persisted in building their approach to security and defense on decisions made in 1948-1949 with Denmark, Iceland and Norway choosing to become founding members of NATO, with Sweden and Finland remaining neutral and non-allied throughout the Cold War.² Browning and Joenniemi, in fact, state that security and defense were deliberately “excluded from intra-Nordic cooperation, primarily because of Soviet warnings that such cooperation would be viewed as forging an anti-Soviet alliance.”³ In addition to the complexity added to security arrangements in the region, an additional level is added by the fact that three of the five countries are members of the

¹ Nordic Council: “Helsinki Treaty”, http://www.norden.org/avtal/helsingfors/uk/helsinki_agreement.pdf.

² Bailes, Alyson J.K.: “Introduction: The European Defence Challenge for the Nordic Region”, pp. 1-28 in Bailes, Alyson J.K., Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius, eds.: *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, SIPRI and Oxford University Press (Solna and Oxford, 2006), p. 3.

³ Browning, Christopher S., and Pertti Joenniemi: “Regionality Beyond Security: The Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement,” in *Cooperation and Conflict*, v. 39:3, p. 297.

EU, two are not. Only one is a member of both organizations. But as more geo-political emphasis is placed on the Arctic, stronger voices are being heard, asking for Nordic security cooperation. The military chiefs of Norway, Sweden, and Finland issued a statement in early 2008,⁴ saying they wanted their governments to consider shared defenses. On June 16, 2008, the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs entrusted Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Minister for Foreign Affairs in Norway, with the preparation of a report proposing closer foreign and security cooperation between the Nordic countries.⁵ Stoltenberg found that there was a great deal of interest in closer cooperation in all the Nordic states, and that the Nordics feel that the increasing strategic and geo-political importance of the Arctic makes this a worthy task for the countries to address. While Stoltenberg's recommendations certainly do address some state-centric/military security concerns, they also address a more traditional Nordic and liberal-institutionalist approach to international affairs, as evidenced by the proposals suggesting monitoring of maritime areas and the establishment of a Nordic Task Force which would work with and through the UN, rather than the EU or NATO. Stoltenberg's report does not address the interests of the other Baltic Sea states, thus ignoring the potential for closer cooperation between, for example, the Nordic and Baltic states. Other options, which might include the other countries around the Baltic Sea are also not addressed.

In light of the above, it is quite easy to maintain that the Nordics coexist in a security community, and in fact Mouritzen maintains that it is undisputable that they did form a security community during most of the 20th century, as a 'we feeling' "had developed at the popular level, making war unthinkable between the Nordic states. It is also possible to count a series of 'non-wars' during the 20th century, where conflicting interests between pairs of states could easily have led to war but where peaceful solutions were found."⁶ As early as 1994, Wallenstein and associates came to the conclusion that despite an increased communality of values of the Baltic Sea states, their "individual routes to military security ... developments in the Russian Federation and weakly developed institutions were seen as obstacles to security community-building."⁷ Möller, however, maintains that the three Baltic states are not given enough credit for

introducing round tables as a key instrument during the negotiated revolutions in Eastern Europe or for their achievements relating to peaceful conflict resolutions. Curiously enough, not even Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are considered a security community, although the fact ... that 'they have never been engaged in mutual war' points in the opposite direction.⁸

While it is commonly accepted that a security community exists among the Nordic states, not everyone agrees that it is actually based on security cooperation. Browning and Joenniemi, for instance, state that "security has *not* been an important argument in driving Nordic cooperation."⁹ Further Nordic integration is not needed to avoid a war between the Nordics, and in fact "has never been greatly institutionalized, while those institutions that do exist are not conceptualized as

⁴ Diesen, Sverre, Håkan Syrén, and Juhani Kaskela: „Et nytt nordisk forsvar“, in *Aftenposten*, June 18. 2008, p. 5

⁵ Stoltenberg, p. 5

⁶ Mouritzen, Hans: "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined", in *Security Dialogue*, v. 32:3, p. 298.

⁷ Cited in Möller, Frank: "Capitalizing on Difference: A Security Community or/as a Western Project", in *Security Dialogue*, v. 34:3, 2003, p. 319.

⁸ Möller, p. 320.

⁹ Browning and Joenniemi, p.240.

performing a security function ensuring peace in the region.”¹⁰ Trends in cooperation between the Nordic states and the three Baltic States may indicate that these countries are moving closer to a community based not on security – or abnormal politics – but on a security – or upon the pursuit of normal politics.¹¹ Their accession to NATO and the EU furthermore suggests that they can no longer employ military threats as an incentive for the EU or NATO to take action to protect them.

Key Actors and Convergence of Issues

The key actors in the region should be considered the four Nordic littoral states, the Baltic states, along with Germany, Poland and Russia. The EU also should be taken into account here. The emphases placed on the region by the various actors are very different, depending on the importance of the sub-region to their security concerns. Thus, regional security is extremely important to the Baltic countries, whose main security concern is the presence of Russia in the region. Furthermore, NATO has considerable interest in the region, as indicated by its assumption of air-policing in the Baltic States upon their accession to the alliance. In fact, the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO and the EU can be considered to have added a couple of twists to the security picture in Northern Europe. As Archer notes, their membership in these organizations “may seem likely to lessen their reliance on and involvement with the Nordic countries in the defence and security field.”¹² They may, however, be encouraged to think (sub-) regionally and focus their cooperative efforts on Northern neighbors, namely around the Baltic Sea.

Impact of EU/NATO accession of Baltic States and Poland on political cooperation and security dynamics in the region.

Threats and Conflict Dynamics

Securitization was effectively used by the three Baltic states in the 1990s, when they were able to frame the threat from Russia in military terms and leverage that threat to ensure European and American involvement, finally culminating in their accession and integration to both the EU and NATO. The success they have enjoyed, however, has resulted in these countries being even more closely knit into the European structures than are their Nordic friends. Threats have also become less militarized, with a far more significant focus on soft security, such as environmental concerns, possible epidemics, and migration.

Kaliningrad: Future prospects for security cooperation in the Baltic in light of the recent debates on missile defense in the area? Separatist pressures possible if economic development continues to place Kaliningrad behind neighbors, but this would be very sensitive for Russia and might cause a severe problem in diplomatic relations.¹³ A further problem with Kaliningrad is the possibility of the Russian Federation setting up missiles in the enclave.¹⁴ The Baltic states have been successful at integrating themselves into the Western security structures, using “a discourse of ‘returning to Europe’ in constructing their post-Cold War identities, [a discourse which] only makes sense to the

¹⁰ Browning and Joenniemi, p.240.

¹¹ Browning and Joenniemi, p.241.

¹² Archer, Clive: “Still Nordic After All These Years: Nordic Security in the Post-Cold War Period”, in *Security Dialogue*, v. 36:3 (2005), p. 399.

¹³ Larrabee, F. Stephen: „NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era“, RAND Project Air Force, available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1744.sum.pdf.

¹⁴ <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4AC3CP20081113>

extent that the 'West' is constructed in opposition to a negatively depicted 'Russian East,' which they are leaving behind."¹⁵

Integration into Western structures: The Baltic security agenda has changed significantly in the Post-Prague era. The key challenge for the Euro-Atlantic institutions in the decade following the end of the Cold War was to integrate the Baltic countries. Some have even maintained that the Baltic states need to "find a new way – a new strategic agenda – to keep the United States engaged at a time when U.S. attention and resources are increasingly focused on issues outside of Europe."¹⁶

Soft Security: Environment, democracy, public health, economic performance, etc. Building on Nordic example of these countries exporting comprehensive, civic and cooperative security to the Baltic States and Russia.¹⁷ Important to note here that referent object moves from state to people, including people in other countries. Military logic, in particular the othering of Russia doesn't work here. A way to overcome discord/otherness in the region.

Conclusion

A significant change has occurred in the Baltic in the last fifteen years. This has touched upon political and security cooperation as much as culture, environment and other issues. Many former Soviet and Communist bloc countries have been successfully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and this integration has perhaps nowhere been as successful as in the case of the Baltic countries. Enlargement was largely carried out for political reasons, but the military aspect remains important. While the US has been prominent in providing for the security of the Central European countries, the EU and the Nordic countries have been particularly active in the case of the Baltic countries. This may reflect the presence of political ties, and even indicate that a security community either exists or at the very least is fledgling. A more successful approach in the Baltic, however, may be the application of the Nordic model of "asecurity discourse," that is building a regional communality based on issues other than security.

¹⁵ Browning and Joenniemi, p.237.

¹⁶ Larrabee.

¹⁷ Browning and Joenniemi, p.239.

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Security Agenda in the BLACK SEA

**Seminar on “Political and Security Cooperation
in Europe’s Four Sea Basins” held in frames of EU4SEAS Project**
Rome, 3-4 of April
Dana Depo International Centre for Policy Studies


Black Sea Region

Black Sea Littoral States

- 6 maritime countries
- 3 of them NATO members
- 3 NATO partner-countries

Black Sea Region also includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece which are not littoral states, but history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional actors.

Wider Black Sea Region:
BSEC area, including SE Europe, littoral states of the Black Sea and Caucasus.



Security challenges in the Black Sea region

Energy supplies

Environment and pollution

Local government corruption

Illegal trafficking

Terrorism

Separatist nationalism

Religion

“Frozen” Conflicts

- Transnistria
- Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- Nagorno-Karabakh
- Chechnya




Transnistria

Unilaterally proclamation (1990) as a Soviet Republic separate from Moldova.

Peacekeeping mission consist of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan; troops is deployed, tasked with monitoring of the demilitarized security zone between Moldova and Transnistria.

A political process for negotiations, known as the "five-sided format" (consists out of Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, OSCE and Ukraine as mediators; the EU and the U.S. observers).

Currently: EUBAM ensuring effective border control and surveillance between Moldova and Ukraine



Nagorno-Karabakh



- Self-style autonomous region
- Approx. 1/7 of the territory of Azerbaijan is under occupation by Armenian forces

- 4 resolutions of the UN Security Council during 1993
- "The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference", Rec 16/90/2005 of CoE
- OSCE Minsk Group since in 1992:
 - "troika" - isolated ownership of the process by chairing countries;
 - Basic principals (Madrid document) as "ten commandments"

Current situation: both leaders express status quo

Chechnya


- OSCE observer mission 1995-2002 (mission's mandate not continued due to failure of the OSCE and Russia to agree)
- Russia refused any international involvements towards a peaceful resolution claiming that it would constitute a breach of Russia's territorial integrity

Current situation: according to the Russian Federation since 2002 the war is over and the process is normalized.



Abkhazia and South Ossetia

- Official support of the secessionist movements by Russia;
- 2006 – demand of Georgia to withdraw Russian peacekeepers left unanswered;
- Intensified attempts of Georgia to internationalize the negotiations and peacekeeping format;
- South Ossetia, the tripartite force is supervised by a Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of Russia, Moldova and Transnistria, with the OSCE and Ukraine as observers
- War in Georgia monitoring:
 - EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
 - OSCE
 - UNOMIG
- **Current situation:** CIS collective arm forces have terminated their 14-year mission; Russian remained deployed on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the zone of conflict. Georgian and Abkhaz forces, including heavy weapons, were deployed on their respective sides of the ceasefire line facing each other.



Conclusions from the Georgian-Russian War

- Increased activities coming from outside of the Black Sea region disturb Russia and have bad consequences for its neighbours;
- Message sent by Russia as to its major role in the region is learnt by other Black Sea actors;
- Ownership of the situation in the region belongs to the regional actors, and not to EU, NATO, etc;
- The ethnic card is a very powerful tool which can be played in other countries of the region, ex. Ukraine in Crimea peninsula.

The Role of the key security actors in the area

- Russia
- EU
- NATO
- Sub-Regional Organizations
 - BSEC
 - GUAM
 - CIS

Russia

- is not active in institutional cooperation, organized or planned events in the region;
- is indirectly involved in all activities/conflicts/tensions held within the region, ex. by means of supporting of the separatist group;
- plays a major role in the Black Sea region due to its energy supplies and potential of one of the strongest naval forces in the Black Sea.

EU

- Dominance of the bilateral approach through the ENP, Strategic Partnership, and Accession Partnership;
- Active participation in the local initiatives and organizations (CEI, BSEC);
- Since 2007 pays more attention to multilateral cooperation:
 - Black Sea Synergy – an initiative to reinforce cooperation and interaction between 10 Black Sea countries;
 - EaP – proposes measures addressing the imbalances;
 - Union of the Black Sea – as future initiatives proposed in the Resolution on the EU Commission's 2007 Strategy Paper;

NATO

- Does not have any co-operation programs or a strategy focusing on the Black Sea region;
- Is considered by Russia as a potential threat;
- Does not have any formal relations with the regional cooperation initiatives, but has individual approach to each country;

Naval Cooperation

- BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, est in 2001) with littoral member-states;
- Operation Black Sea Harmony – naval cooperation, similar to the NATO-led Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean;
- Black Sea Confidence and Security Measures – politically binding document which enhances regional security and stability of the littoral states.

BSEC

NB: BSEC is a unique as it has 12 member-states (10 of the Black Sea region plus Serbia and Albania) and 13 observer-states; originally established aiming to enhance economic cooperation and integration of the new independent states; recently “security component” was added to its activities.

BSEC did not prove its effectiveness because:

- Difficulties in reaching total consensus on the side of its members when they all have so different expectations from the organization;
- Little tradition of fruitful cooperation between member-states;
- Deceleration of the initiatives and progress by its founders, Russia and Turkey;
- Difficulties in implementation of different project ideas due to not effective decision-making process and instruments of implementation.

Sub-Regional Organizations in the Region:

- **GUAM** – opposition to attempts of Russia to retail political and minlitary control in the region and reaffirmation of close cooperation with UN, OSCE, and NATO.
- **CIS** – brainchild of Russia is not effective as Russia has never showed an interst in solving the security issues in the region;
- **Community of Democratic Choice (CDC)** – recently established “community of nations” aiming to unite countries of the Baltic, Black, and Caspean Seas.

Initiatives

- **“Platform of security and stability in Caucasus”** a new initiative of Ankara (Sept 2008). It will consist out of Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Armenia. Turkey’s goal in establishing the platform is the prompt solution of the territorial conflicts in Caucasus between Armenia and Turkey, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- **Baku Initiative** policy dialogue on energy cooperation between the European Union and the littoral states of the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and their neighbours, undertaken as part of the INOGATE programme.
- Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, Black Sea Euroregion, Border Defense Initiative, South East European Cooperation Process, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

= to many initiatives and two little effective actions.

Conclusions

- Settling frozen conflicts and reaffirmation of the inviolability of borders is a precondition of the security in the region;
- A few initiatives which do not have a significant impact on the sustainable security;
- Not effective sub-regional organization due to little engagement of the states;
- Need of external support of young countries on their way to democracy and stability in the region;
- Lack of common policy of the sub-regional organization as to the region.

Thank you for attention!

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Sub-Regional Cooperation and Stabilization in the Mediterranean basin

Dr. Eduard Soler i Lecha

Rome, IAI, 3rd April 2009



GOAL OF THE PAPER

- Understand the linkages between regional and subregional cooperation and conflictivity in the Mediterranean
- Demonstrate that sub-regional cooperation has in some circumstances been hampered by regional tensions and in other circumstances been promoted because of these tensions.



SUMMARY

- Mapping the impact of regional conflicts in developing regional cooperation in the Mediterranean (the Barcelona Process and the UpM)
- Conflictivity as an obstacle for sub-regional cooperation
- Subregional cooperation as a mean to bypass regional conflictivity
- Subregional cooperation as an attempt to build sub-regional and regional security
- Case study 1: the Maghreb
- Case study 2: The Mashreq & The Middle East
- Concluding remarks




Euro-Mediterranean relations and conflict resolution

- The EMP is the result of a context of optimism regarding the MEPP but of a serious instability in Algeria and the Balkans
- The Barcelona Declaration clearly stated that its goal was to build an area of peace and stability but it also affirmed that it did not wanted to interfere with the MEPP:

“The Euro Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace other initiatives undertaken in the interests of peace, stability and development of the region but they will contribute to their success”



- Is dialogue, cooperation and integration possible without previously solving regional conflicts?
- The EMP and the UfM believes that through socialisation and by emphasising common interests, they create conditions for negotiations and reconciliation



The impact of the arab-israel conflict

- The Barcelona Process has often suffered from the deterioration of the arab-israeli conflict(s):
 - 1997 Malta Conference.
 - 2000 failure to approve the Charter for Peace and Stability.
 - 2005 absence of first-rang leaders in the Barcelona summit.
- The Union for the Mediterranean is suffering from the same problems (e.g. Launch of the UfM Secretariat)



The impact of Algeria-Morocco relations and the Western Sahara

- It has never hampered the political dialogue in the framework of the EMP
- But it is an element that impedes further progress in south-south trade liberalisation (Agadir agreement)



The impact of the Greek-Turkish conflicts and Cyprus

- While it is a crucial issue in the evolution of the EU and NATO it has never affected the Barcelona Process or the EMP



The impact of the Balkan conflicts

- Despite the presence of Yugoslavia in the inception of Mediterranean cooperation (Barcelona convention 1975, Global Mediterranean Policy) the Balkan countries were not among the founding members of the Barcelona Process
- Albania joined in 2007 the EMP and Bosnia, Montenegro and Croatia joined the UfM in 2008



Conflictity as an obstacle for sub-regional cooperation

- No-subregional cooperation has been launched in the Mashreq
- Maghreb integration attempts have suffered from the intra-maghrebian conflicts



Sub-regional cooperation as a mean to bypass conflictivity

- The idea of giving priority to cooperation in Western Mediterranean (5+5) results from the blockages of regional cooperation frameworks



Subregional cooperation as an attempt to build regional and subregional security

- Sub-regional cooperation initiatives like the 5+5 offer a unique opportunity to officials of different countries to meet, get to know each other and develop practical cooperation projects
- Likewise the Barcelona Process, these initiatives do not seek to solve regional conflicts but they attempt at creating conditions for peace and reconciliation




CASE STUDY 1: The Maghreb

- Two main sub-regional cooperation
 - UAM: Maghrebian integration
 - 5 + 5: Western Mediterranean Dialogue (sub-biregional dialogue)
- Both initiatives were created in a similar context
- Different evolution mainly due, among others, to institutional factors.



Union of the Arab Maghreb






- The UAM is the result of a process of Maghrebian detente following the Algiers summit of 1988 and the Maghrebian summit of Zeralda (1988)
- The UAM was created in 1989 through the Marrakech Treaty which establishes a quite sophisticated institutional architecture (Presidential Council, Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Follow-up Committee, General Secretariat, Judicial units...)
- Since 1994, the UAM enters into a big crisis (closing of the Morocco-Algerian border, Mauritanian-Lybian crisis)
- Despite its potentials, maghrebian integrations suffers from the deteriorated Morocco-Algerian relations, partly but not only caused by the Western Sahara crisis)



5+5 Dialogue in Western Mediterranean





- This project was initiated in 1989 with a strong leadership of Italy, Spain and France
- Since the early nineties it was soon paralysed by a deterioration of Morocco-Algeria relations, by the conflictual situation in Algeria and it also suffered from Libyan ostracism
- Since 2000 this process has been reactivated and has incorporated new dimensions (among them Defence)
- Among the keys of its success: real equality among members, weak institutionalisation and low visibility
- On the one hand, allows some euro-mediterranean countries to cooperate despite the blockages resulting from the arab-israeli process
- On the other hand, it is a confidence-building mechanisms among maghrebian countries and between them and its European neighbours.



CASE STUDY 2:


The Mashreq / Middle East

- The Arab-Israeli conflict impedes any attempt to create in the Mashreq something similar to the UAM or the 5+5
- Only in the Gulf Region there exist such attempt: the GCC
- A new phenomenon which is loosing its subregional dimension: Iraq Neighbours conference
- In both cases, conflictivity has speed up those processes



Iraq neighbours


- Iraq Neighbours Conference was proposed in April 2003
- The Iraq Neighbours Conferences are held every 6 months.
- Specialist forums have been held between conferences to discuss specific matters, including: energy cooperation; border security; Iraqi refugees and displaced persons.
- It is losing its sub-regional character, becoming a global initiative





Gulf Cooperation Council

- The most successful case and the most distant from the Mediterranean
- Both Iraq and Iran have acted as external federators (threats posed by these two countries have favoured the GCC to cooperate and merge forces)





Concluding remarks

- Regional and subregional integration attempt to create peaceful and stable relations among their members but they also suffer from conflict escalades among these members
- In the Mediterranean the Maghreb presents a slightly better balance sheet than the Mashreq
- The 5+5 dialogue is particularly interesting as the best example of how sub-regional dialogue can serve to bypass blockages of a larger regional dialogue and also because it has been able to progress despite the maintenance of deteriorated relations between Algeria and Morocco.
- This is why some actors ask to concentrate efforts in Western Mediterranean and some have ask to enlarge the 5+5 to include Egypt and Greece... We should try to evaluate the risks and opportunities of this option.




Thanks!

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Political and Security Cooperation in the Black Sea region after the Caucasus crisis

Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova

Its scale cannot compare the recent crisis over South Ossetia with other armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space or former Yugoslavia, not to mention the conflicts of the Cold war period. However, by its political consequences the Caucasus crisis has gone far beyond the local level and exceeded all turning points and crises that happened after the collapse of the USSR including NATO's military operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 and 9/11 2001. It has already had and will continue to have a strong impact on European and regional security.

The Dialectic of Regional and European Security

The Wider Black sea region is a region of regions. Being part of Wider Europe it includes the Caucasus, Caspian region, Balkans, which, in turn are bridging the Black Sea with Central Asia and Middle East. Heterogeneity of the Black Sea region in terms of security arrangements and membership in different international organizations (OSCE, EU, NATO, CIS and GUAM), presence of the regional and external players with conflicting interests and troubled relations, presence of the so-called frozen conflicts and the growing importance of the Black Sea-Caspian region as the energy transport route mean that instability in this area can have significant ramifications not only for domestic and regional security, but for European and international security as well. Most of the problems which exist nowadays in the Black Sea region are not so much regional problems but rather regional projection of more fundamental differences which exist in Russia's relations with its major Western partners – EU, NATO and US. These differences have a strong impact on the regional situation including Russia's troubled relations with the GUAM countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and the growing rivalry over energy pipelines.¹ **Therefore, the trends in the Black Sea region cannot be separated from the trends in the Russia-West relationship at large. The Caucasus crisis is the most telling evidence to this reality. Being triggered by the regional developments, in its substance it is the outcome of a clash of interests between Russia and the West on the security issues and it should be viewed as the embodiment of the major controversies between Russia and the US/NATO.**

Heterogeneity of the Black Sea region in terms of security arrangements and presence of competing institutions means that the individual approach of the regional actors towards security prevails over the common security agenda. Virtually every member of the so-called "civilized international community" recognizes that security threats are linked above all to continuing ethno-religious and territorial conflicts, extremism, energy security, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But the shared perceptions of post-bipolar threats provide just the skeleton of a framework for international interaction, a general categorization of states into "holy" and "unholy" ones. But the devil of any approach or agreement is in detail. A common Black Sea security agenda should include **several criteria**:

- (1) Having the idea of what constitutes a common security space both geographically and functionally;
- (2) A shared perception of not only common external threats, but also of their origins and concrete adversaries;
- (3) Identification of a common course of action, with a significant military component in its basis (training and use of the armed forces), rather than just cooperation in addressing international problems;
- (4) Establishment of administrative and structural echelons for security cooperation.

¹ See, Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, "Troubled strategic partnership: The Black Sea Dimension Of the Russia-West relations" in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhardt Mangott (ed.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century*, Washington, 2008

Common security space

There is no such notion as a common security space in the Black Sea region, which is being torn apart between different institutions and regional players. The EU and NATO share a common security space in the region. Russia regards the CIS space in the Black Sea region as an area of its security interests. The GUAM space in the region can be viewed as a contested security area since Russia, NATO and EU is competing for dominance there. Turkey has emerged as a regional superpower with a special interest in the Black Sea-Caucasus area. "The West is facing powerful competition from Russia both in the fields of energy and the military security. Turkey's importance will increase through the Black Sea to Central Asia and Ankara will use this to its advantage in this new era".² The Black Sea Economic Council, or BSEC, is the only regional organisation embracing all the countries of the Black Sea region, building the regional identity and bridging different parts of the region. But it has limited capabilities to mitigate tensions between its members, which are regional projection of more fundamental differences that exist in Russia's relations with its major Western partners – EU, NATO and the United States.

The Caucasus crisis has resulted in new splits in the region. Russia's military action didn't lead to NATO's consolidation but on the contrary resulted in a split between NATO and EU on how to deal with Russia after this crisis. In a certain sense this split was stronger than that on Iraq because it was inspired by the NATO enlargement strategy to the CIS, which was strongly backed by the Bush administration. But unlike the case of Iraq it didn't bring Russia closer to EU. For the first time Russia found itself in solitude inside CIS and CSTO since none of its allies in CSTO, SCO or EuroAsEc clearly and unequivocally supported Kremlin in the South Ossetia conflict. GUAM as a regional "political, economic and strategic alliance founded in 1996 to strengthen the independence and sovereignty" of its members, has not passed the first real test for the organization since its founding. While Georgia and Ukraine took firm stands against the Russian invasion, Azerbaijan and Moldova did not rush to support its Caucasian ally, which means that "the anti-Russian rhetoric and direction of the organization were not enough to cement the weak military, economic, and political ties between countries".³ The future of GUAM as a regional organization seems to be bleaker than ever.

Frozen conflicts

The key players in the region look at the origins of the conflicts through distinct lenses. The existing frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area have been commonly perceived in the West as part of Russia's CIS policy directed at retaining its control over this space. The real picture is more complex and the frozen conflicts have at least three dimensions – internal, the Russia/CIS and international. The so-called frozen conflicts in the CIS space are not just regional conflicts though they heavily affect the regional stability. The internal dimension of the frozen conflicts is closely related to their origins of the conflicts. It would be impossible for external players to drive a wedge between the parties involved in the conflicts if there were no ground for a split between them. With the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, ethnic violence has escalated in those former Soviet Republics where ethnic-religious and territorial problems existed even before the Soviet era. So, the unresolved or frozen conflicts are the product of historic grievances, the Soviet legacy and uneven collapse of the USSR as well as the ill-conceived policies and mistakes of Russia and other external actors – USA, NATO and EU. The Caucasus crisis has had a strong impact on these dimensions and resulted in controversial consequences which heavily affect conflict resolution process.

² www.armtown.com/news/en/pan/20090206/28529/ - 31k -

³ Anar Valiyev, AZERBAIJAN AFTER THE RUSSIA-GEORGIAN WAR PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 52, at ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/63493.html - 25k -

The Caucasus crisis and Internal Dimension

With the Caucasus crisis Gamsahurdia's dream "Georgia for Georgians" has come true but it has not made Georgia happier. The crisis has shown that in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution of a conflict, status quo is not the worst option. It has shown also that there is no alternative to a well-thought integrationist strategy. At the same time the crisis has become a catalyst for secessionist movements elsewhere. Even if there is no direct linkage between the recognition of independence of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia and other secessionist movements, the three cases have created a precedent for separatists from UK to Spain who draw courage from them.

The Caucasus crisis and the Russia/CIS dimension

Russia's CIS policy has passed through several stages - the Yeltsin policy directed at reassembling the CIS space under Russia's leadership, Putin's pragmatic course and entered a period of uncertainty after the Caucasus crisis. It would be worthwhile to ask what impact Russia's policy on the Caucasus crisis will have on Russia itself and on Russia's relations with the CIS states.

Many experts and political analysts in Russia and the West believe that Russia's recognition of the statehood of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may have a boomerang effect on Russia, first and foremost in the North Caucasus. The Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia-Abkhazian and Georgia-South Ossetian conflicts have always had a severe destabilizing influence in the North Caucasus region. With the rise of ethnic nationalism and the revival of Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ethnic minorities of the Caucasus region have begun to demand redress of their territorial claims and compensation for their repression. In addition, ordinary citizens of the North Caucasus republics now blame Moscow for turning a blind eye to their woes while investing massive financial, military, and diplomatic resources in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As Aleksei Malashenko, a Caucasus expert at the Carnegie Center in Moscow, has pointed out, "Literally one day after the recognition of South Ossetia's independence, people in the Caucasus were already asking why the problems of one people were being solved in a matter of days, when the problems of others have been going on for almost 20 years."⁴ The emergence of independent Abkhazia can become a catalyst for disintegration the North Caucasian part of the Russian Federation and reintegration of the region into a Confederation of the Mountain Peoples. It is all the more so, since the Islamic militants are fighting for a "Caucasian emirate," which they hope will one day extend from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Put simply, the outcome of the Caucasus crisis could encourage secessionist movements and trigger a chain of conflicts in the area.

The Caucasus crisis has become also a catalyst to centrifugal trends that existed before the conflict, including the more and more obvious inefficiency of the CIS in economy, regional security and even political fields. Russia's inability (or disregard?) to build collective positions within the CIS during the Caucasus crisis increased dissatisfaction of the CIS partners at Moscow and reinforced their fears about Russia's unpredictability. Moldova, Azerbaijan and even Byelorussia and Armenia, Russia's closest allies, abstained from openly siding up with Russia. No doubt, this fact will have long-term consequences for CIS at large as well as for Russia's relations with the CIS states. Russia's closest neighbors are confronted today with a difficult dilemma how to ensure their security – through external security guarantees, first and foremost the US/NATO guarantees, or through a new model of relationship with Russia.

After the Caucasus crisis, with Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS, with the growing tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations, which are central for the very existence of the CIS, it won't

⁴ Claire Bigg, Red Flags Hint At Brewing Civil War In Ingushetia, at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-180-14.cfm - 34k -

be an exaggeration to say that the Commonwealth is undergoing the deepest crisis in its history, "Georgia has initiated the procedure of withdrawal from the CIS; although Ukraine has not done this but it does not hide its sympathies (at least at official level) for the actions of Georgian authorities; declarations on the need to leave the Community as soon as possible are more and more frequently in Moldova (among the opposition).⁵ As a result of these considerations, Moscow has been confronted with a necessity to resort to a fence-mending diplomacy with regard to the CIS partners, first and foremost to Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia, involved in the frozen conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. On the morrow of the Caucasus crisis President Medvedev confirmed its reassurances that Moscow was still committed to finding a peaceful solution to the frozen conflicts and tried to persuade its counterparts that South Ossetia and Abkhazia cases should not be regarded as a model for other frozen conflicts. He also seized an opportunity for Russia to mediate between the parties to the conflicts and reinvigorate the negotiation process.

In other words, Russia wants to retain its position as a key-player in the conflict resolution processes. With regard to the Transnistria problem Russia has a major role to play and if it continues its search for post-conflict settlement, Transnistria can be integrated with Moldova. The fact that Moldova's European choice is to be within the framework of neutrality, and Moldova has signed its individual plan of cooperation with NATO as a state committed to preserving neutrality creates much more favorable environment between Moscow and Chisinau. After the 2+1 negotiations held on the 18th of March 2009 the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin said, "Dmitry Medvedev confirmed Russia's readiness to promote invigoration of the 5+2 talks, and that was reflected in the Joint Declaration, signed in Moscow, concerning Transnistria problem settlement". He also stressed the Declaration reflected "the expediency of transforming the peacekeeping operation in Transnistria into a peace-guaranteeing operation under the OSCE aegis". Voronin also said that, according to the document, the parties have agreed on creating conditions for a soonest-possible resumption of work in this format possibly in the first half of 2009".⁶ The Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov has a different reading of the achieved agreements. Commenting on the agreements, reached at the tripartite meeting in Moscow, Smirnov stressed that the transformation of the peacekeeping operation in the Dniester Republic into a peace guaranteeing operation under the OSCE aegis did not mean the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping troops from the area. "The transformation of the operation will take place only after a final settlement of the relations between Moldova and the Dniester Republic. As long as the solution is not found, there will be nothing new in the format of the peacekeeping operation."⁷ This means that Russia's role in the conflict resolution process remains central and its substance will be dependent on a broader format of the Russia – West relations after the Caucasus crisis.

As for Nagorno-Karabakh, which is the least frozen conflict, Moscow does seek normalization of Azerbaijani and Turkish relations with Armenia. This would provide Moscow with a transport link to Armenia through Azerbaijan and help Armenia fare better economically. At the same time Baku fears that such negotiations are being conducted without taking Azerbaijani interests into consideration. If the Turkish-Armenian border were re-opened, Azerbaijan would lose one of the strongest levers in talks with Armenia on Karabakh"⁸. It is very telling that Azerbaijan met the Turkish plan on the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform with little enthusiasm since, in the eyes of Baku the absence of the United States in the Platform raises questions about the plan's viability. The United States is seen by Baku as one of the major players in the OSCE Minsk Group. And Armenians have high expectations for the new US administration. The Armenian government will seek help from the United States if it is pressured to give up Azerbaijani territories without obtaining guarantees that the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians will be able to hold a

⁵ Igor Volnitchi, Moldova - the "Midwife" of the new CIS?, 24 November 2008 at www.azi.md/en/comment/264 - 17k

⁶ www.azi.md/en/story/1835 - 14k

⁷ ITAR-TASS at www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13703272&PageNum=0 - 63k -

⁸ Ibid.

referendum on their future status.⁹ As a result of these considerations, it is clear that for both Azerbaijan and Armenia the US is indispensable in the conflict resolution process, which objectively puts constraints on Russia's mediator role. One cannot entirely exclude that at the end of the day will see a new version of the Goble plan.

The Caucasus crisis and the international dimension

The Caucasus crisis is the outcome of a clash of interests between Russia and the West on the security issues and it should be viewed as the embodiment of the major controversies between Russia and the US/NATO, first and foremost their competition in the CIS space. The West, once the problem with the Soviet nuclear legacy was solved, perceived the disintegration trends on the territory of the CIS as a key condition of democratization of these countries and a guarantee that the USSR would never be brought back to life, in whatever form, in the post-Soviet space. That approach was as erroneous as the "reassembling" of the CIS by Russia in the 90s without clearly formulated interests and goals in each concrete case. Beyond this, there was a kind of dichotomy in the West position on Russia's role in the conflict resolution processes. On the one hand, Russia's participation has been essential for the process of conflict resolution, although it is often seen not as much as part of the solution but rather as part of the problem. On the other hand, the West has been fearful that Russia's contribution to the resolution of the frozen problems would reinforce its positions in the CIS. The crisis has brought about new dividing lines and splits not only in the CIS but also inside Euro-Atlantic community.

One of the main conclusions (or may be the main one) that can be drawn from the Caucasus experience is that stability in Wider Europe cannot be achieved against Russia's interests. NATO has already reached the safe limits of its eastward expansion. Any further move toward Georgia or Ukraine against Russia's position would be dangerous.

Energy

The energy security sector is the most controversial issue in the European and regional cooperation. The partisans of a conspiracy theory are prone to see Russia's energy interests as a main driving force of the Caucasus conflict. The energy interdependence has already taken the form of "pipeline arms race" making other regional states that have their own stakes in this game take sides in this competition. This process started with the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which destroyed Moscow's monopoly on West Caspian oil. Russia's opposition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a US-backed project intended to avoid traversing Iranian or Russian territory, has been seen as a vital aspect in the recent conflict. However, the role of the pipeline is sometimes overplayed. The capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is roughly half that of the existing pipelines from Iraq to Iskenderun. Russia has learnt to accept the BTC, which started pumping oil in 2005, and it would be incorrect to assume that Russia's attacks in Georgia have been 'all about oil'.¹⁰ Russia does not see these pipelines as a threat to either of its positions of energy or political dominance in the region. Nonetheless the Caucasus crisis has already had a strong impact on the notion of energy security in the region. Analysts say the latest Caucasus crisis has made the countries in the surrounding area think twice before deciding to implement big energy projects.

Many Western experts believe that the Caucasus as a realistic alternative for Europe's energy security should be re-considered. The Nabucco pipeline project has envisaged laying of gas

⁹ Harry Tamrazian, Karabakh Peace Agreement Impossible Without U.S. Involvement, at www.rferl.org/content/Karabakh_Peace_Agreement_Impossible...US.../1338083.html - 48k -

¹⁰ Copperman, Aharon-David, Behind the Crisis in the Caucasus: Russian Isolation or Inclusion in the International Arena? INSS Insight No. 72, September 19, 2008

pipeline to Austria from the Caspian Sea avoiding Russia. It will be continuation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline laid to Turkey. But nowadays this project faces an uncertain future. With Georgia still in turmoil and Russia's recognition of the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, investors and creditors of the \$11.8 billion project would be even more wary of putting their money into a project already running behind schedule.¹¹ In addition, the Russia-Georgia conflict has raised fears that oil and gas producers from the Caspian region, including Azerbaijan, could turn their backs on Georgia as a route for exporting to the West.

As Andrew Monaghan has rightly pointed out, the risk of conflict affecting the pipeline network in the region is high: BP temporarily closed the Baku-Supsa pipeline during the conflict and the BTC is temporarily out of action due to a fire on the pipeline in Turkey (the PKK claimed responsibility for attacking it). The war in the region has become just new evidence to the fact that the gas pipelines will turn into burial fires, should hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia break down. Furthermore, Russia's recent actions show that it retains – and seeks to enhance – considerable influence over the pipeline and at least two of the key states in the BTC/BTE. At best, these pipelines reflect supplementary energy security solutions – by no means do they represent significant diversification away from Russia.¹²

Generally speaking all regional pipelines projects, and first and foremost Nabucco, are highly politicized and all regional and external actors are playing their own game. Although the Nabucco pipeline project is presented as not anti-Russian, it is characterized as a scheme aimed at reducing Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas supplies, which excludes any direct Russian participation. Russia says it doesn't consider Nabucco a rival but Russian energy giant Gazprom [RTS: GAZP] is prepared to buy Azerbaijani natural gas (allocated for Nabucco) at European market prices minus transport expenses. And in addition, Russia's plans to build the North and South Stream pipelines are viewed as threatening to the viability of the Nabucco project.

For Azerbaijan its participation in Nabucco project is a bargaining chip in its relations both with Russia and the West. As Anar Valiyev, political analyst from Baku, has confessed, “what Azerbaijan does need is strategic integration with the EU—otherwise, it could just as well sell its gas to Russia at a negotiated price ...As in the case of GUAM or NATO membership, the Nabucco project is another important tool of leverage for Azerbaijan in its relations with Russia. Nabucco does not provide any added value to Azerbaijan in terms of political importance or economic benefits. The project is mostly beneficial for Eastern Europe. If Russia were to agree with Azerbaijan on a solution to the Karabakh conflict, Baku could sacrifice the Nabucco project to Russian ambitions”.¹³ Armenia is welcoming rapprochement between Iran and Turkey since the strengthening of their relations in the sphere of energetic will definitely make a new gas deal realizable. Armenia is backing a new Nabucco project, which will be oriented on the gas supply from Iran and not from the Caspian region, “because there are much more political problems connected with the gas supply from Kazakhstan and from other countries of the Caspian region”.¹⁴ This argument does not hold water because Iran itself presents a big political problem. The underlying reason of Yerevan's support is to strengthen positions of Armenia's natural ally Iran in the region and weaken its rival Azerbaijan.

¹¹ Judy Dempsey, Georgia crisis could thwart EU project to bypass Russia for natural gas, at www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/28/business/pipe.php - 63k -

¹² Andrew Monaghan, The Russo-Georgian Conflict, Immediate Report, August 2008, NATO Defense College, p.6.

¹³ Anar Valiyev, AZERBAIJAN AFTER THE RUSSIA-GEORGIAN WAR PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 52, at ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/63493.html - 25k

¹⁴ Sevak Sarukhanyan, Collaboration between Iran and Turkey will rehabilitate NABUCCO and weaken the role of Azerbaijan, at www.noravank.am/en/?page=news&nid=1609 - 20k

The EU newly born "Eastern Partnership", which envisages regional cooperation of the European Union with Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and under certain conditions Belarus, also includes the close cooperation and the coordination of the energy policy of the EU and the six former Soviet republics. In particular, the EU is going to sign the memoranda of understanding in the energy security sphere with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. In addition, Brussels plans to discuss the European Commission-Belarus energy declaration concerning the hydrocarbons transit and the energy reform in Belarus. Russia's exclusion from this project cannot but fuel suspicions of Russia about the EU attempt to expand its "sphere of influence" in the quest for hydrocarbons.

The pipeline war" has become a critical issue in a complex interplay between Russia, the West and the regional countries and it will be involving new actors outside the Black Sea rim – Iran and Iraq extending the energy competition and allowing these new actors to use the Russia-West conflicting interests to their advantage. The energy security differences between producers and consumers, above all between Russia and the West, will never be solved only through purely legal and commercial means, but by a larger political partnership, which would introduce clear rules of behavior in this sphere.

Regional strategies

Regional strategies of the key players in the region are guided by opposite goals, which cannot be easily reduced to a common denominator and therefore they cannot but undermine the Black sea sub-regional cooperation.

NATO's enlargement strategy to the Black Sea region, including the CIS space, remains the main apple of discord between Moscow and Brussels which undermines the international cooperation on the post-Cold War threats to European and regional security, and which has a very bad impact on Russia's domestic evolution, fueling anti-Western sentiments. Anticipating Russia's reaction, George F. Kennan, the principle conceptualist of America's post-World War II containment strategy, by the end of his brilliant career as a political philosopher described the decision to undertake eastward expansion of NATO as the "most fateful error of American policy in the entire post Cold War era."¹⁵ The eastward enlargement of NATO can be seen as the embodiment of fundamental security differences between Russia and the leading Western countries in the Euro-Atlantic space, as well as a final victory of traditional approaches to European security, in spite of all the warm words about the indivisibility of European security after the end of bipolarity. It can also be seen as an expression of the West's disbelief in Russia's democratic future, although publicly NATO's leadership has never recognised the anti-Russian bias of this process. After 9/11 the negative reaction of the new central and east European members of NATO (in particular the Czech Republic) to Russia's admittance to the decision-making process in NATO has become the best evidence of the anti-Russian bias of NATO's enlargement.¹⁶

Officially NATO's enlargement to the east has been presented as a strategy directed at projecting security and stability to the crises prone areas. But given the fact that in the past, the Black Sea region was the political borderland between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, **traditional security perceptions** still cast a long shadow over the region in the absence of a clear-cut NATO/US strategy vis-à-vis Russia. NATO, notwithstanding its transformation, is still a military alliance. As Ian Lesser has rightly pointed out, 'there can be little question that much of the strategic significance accorded to the region in the post-Soviet era derives from a very traditional

¹⁵ George F. Kennan, "NATO, A Fateful Error," *The New York Times* (February 5, 1997).

¹⁶ See Nadia Arbatova, 'NATO's Enlargement: How to Bypass Russia?' in *Nuclear Control*, Moscow, PIR-Centre (Centre for Political Studies in Russia), Dec. 2001 (in Russian).

stake in power projection. For Russia the stakes are clearly different.”¹⁷ A more competitive relationship with Russia could also mean a different kind of American and NATO engagement across the region. Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey could face new pressures regarding security cooperation, base access and over-flight rights.¹⁸

From the Russian perspective, NATO’s enlargement strategy, which includes increasingly active policy in promoting the control of air and sea space around the Black Sea region, is at odds with Russia’s security interests – (1) to prevent new dividing lines in the region and the expansion of military coalitions which excludes Russia as a full member; and (2) to ensure uninterrupted and secure energy, trade, civil and military communications within and throughout the Black Sea and the Straits. Being just a symbolic partner of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions but a member of none, Russia will be suspicious about NATO’s intentions; it will be looking for its own strategic and ad hoc allies.

The question of NATO’s enlargement to the GUAM countries is seen by Moscow as a radical change in this status quo, which is fraught with new security challenges to its interests. On the one hand, GUAM, a “political, economic and strategic alliance founded in 1996 to strengthen the independence and sovereignty” of its members, has been a net product of Russia’s troubled relations with Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova who lost their last hope to resolve their territorial problems with the help of Moscow. On the other hand, the crack in the CIS has been used by the US and NATO. They started supporting GUAM countries to make drift farther away from Russia. “In this sense the countries in question are objective (and, maybe, unconscious) conduits of the West’s interests aimed openly and officially at preventing Russian prevalence in the former Soviet Union.”¹⁹ GUAM Member States have established structured relations with NATO through relevant partnership and cooperative programs such as Intensified Dialogue (Georgia, Ukraine) and IPAP (Azerbaijan, Moldova). The latest waves of enlargement led to strengthening of links between NATO and GUAM countries as well as the whole region of GUAM. Georgia and Azerbaijan are regarded by Russia as “the leaders in militarization of the region, with militarization going on concurrently with the beefing up of the US and NATO military infrastructure in the two countries (mobile task forces, stopover air bases etc.).”²⁰ This situation reminds a vicious circle where the situation evolves in line with a self-fulfilling prophecy scenario. One cannot but agree with Ian Lesser who has written that in “an even more negative case, friction with Russia could spur a remilitarisation of the Black Sea region, in the sense of higher defence spending, a greater emphasis on capabilities beyond territorial defence, and a revival of Russian naval activity in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.”²¹

Russia really drew «a red line”, having proved that its opposition to NATO’s enlargement to the CIS space was not just words and should be taken by the West into account. However, one of the most depressing consequences of the Caucasus crisis for Russian liberals is that Western partners take seriously only use of force, not words. The main lesson learned by certain fractions in Russian political elite is that Russia should no more waste time sending messages about its security concerns to the West like the famous Munich speech of president Putin but protect its interests by all means.

Through its *Neighborhood policy* the EU seeks to forge closer ties within its eastern border and to stabilize its immediate neighborhood without taking new commitments to its enlargement policy. It is natural that the EU is interested in good relations with all its neighbors, the post-Soviet states included. At the same time this common wisdom does not mean that the neighboring

¹⁷ Ian O.Lesser, Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea. Xenophon paper No. 4, ICBSS, November 2007, p. 6.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 13.

¹⁹ Alexey Arbatov, Round Table at Military-Political Problems Research Foundation, “Military Diplomat”, International magazine, N4, 2007, p. 42.

²⁰ Andrey Areshev, Round Table at Military-Political Problems Research Foundation, “Military Diplomat”, International magazine, N4, 2007, p. 52.

²¹ Ian O.Lesser, Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea. Xenophon paper No. 4, ICBSS, November 2007, p 14.

countries are equally important to the EU. It is quite possible – and the ENP is the best evidence to this fact – to bring together EU's policies vis-a-vis its neighbors in one strategy but to make this strategy workable is a different story. "In reality, the strategic priorities that shape EU relations with its Mediterranean neighbours on one hand, and its eastern neighbours on the other, are significantly different. Because of its generalised formulation, the Neighbourhood Policy courts the danger of being unable to provide an effective strategy toward either region's problems that serves the EU's interests".²² In this context, the Balkans and the Black Sea region have represented the key strategic gaps in the vision of Europe. In order to bridge these gaps the EU has developed a programme, "**Black Sea Synergy**", specifically aimed at stimulating democratic and economic reforms; supporting stability and promote development; focusing on practical projects in areas of common concern; responding to opportunities and challenges through coordinated action in a regional framework; developing a climate more conducive to the solution of conflicts in the region.

The growing rivalry between Russia and the West in the CIS space and in particular the Caucasus crisis have made EU to present a new regional strategy **Eastern partnership** aimed at enhancing its relationship with: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (the latter depending on the development of its relations with the EU). "This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement, gradual integration in the EU economy and allow for easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalization, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration. The Partnership would also promote democracy and good governance; strengthen energy security; promote sector reform and environment protection; encourage people to people contacts; support economic and social development; offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability".²³ The Eastern Partnership which excludes Russia as well as Turkey under the pretext that their relations are to be developed on a separate track has been criticized by Moscow. "We are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence, including to Belarus," the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said at the Brussels Forum on 21 March.²⁴ Though the gas crisis has shown how important the normalization of EU relations with Ukraine and Belarus is, Russia has to be included in this policy, so that no geo-political competition starts to develop. Had Russia been included in these negotiations from the very beginning, a critical position would never have developed. The EU politicians demand also an improvement in the collaboration within the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, as an integral part of the future Eastern Partnership of the EU, first and foremost on energy issues.

"Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform"

This regional initiative as a result of the Caucasus crisis has been proposed by **Turkey** who has been trying to play the driving force role in the sub-regional cooperation. What is Turkey trying to do now by giving a green light to the Caucasus Stability Pact (CSP) which it disapproved of in 2000? Moreover, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE), which is advertised as a model for the Caucasus Stability Pact, was terminated in 2008 on the grounds that it was a clumsy and dysfunctional organization. Apparently, Turkey has made up its mind on the name, choosing "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" in order to make a fresh proposal by securing the involvement of the Russian Federation.²⁵

Russia has praised Turkey's diplomatic initiatives in the region. Medvedev particularly emphasized his satisfaction with Turkey's actions during the Russian-Georgian war last summer and Turkey's subsequent proposal for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Medvedev said the August crisis had demonstrated not only the need for

²² Iris Kempe, Kurt Klotzle, The Balkans and the Black Sea region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy Options., CAP, Policy Analysis No 2, April 2006, p.6.

²³ ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm - 30k

²⁴ Pop Valentina, "EU expanding its 'sphere of influence,' Russia says", at euobserver.com/9/27827 - 25k

²⁵ www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=150578 - 65k

coordination among regional countries to address local challenges, but also their ability to deal with such problems on their own without the involvement of outside powers.²⁶ Medvedev was clearly referring to the exclusion of the United States from attempts to solve regional problems. Indeed, the ease with which Turkey went ahead with the CSCP, bypassing Washington and not seeking transatlantic consensus on Russia, prompted international and Turkish observers to question Turkey's place in the West. Since then, attention has been focused on Turkey's determination to follow an independent foreign policy. Taking advantage of the cool relations between Turkey and Washington as well as the refusal of the European Union to seriously consider Turkey's bid to join the EU, Moscow is trying to counter the continuing NATO encirclement policy of Washington and to reduce Western influence in the CIS space. This policy is similar to the Russia-China cooperation in Central Asia.

Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili said the Turkish-proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform has acquired no "clear shape" yet and consultations were on their "very early stage". He added that "we should not create any mechanism that would exclude European Union or other major actors in the region."²⁷ The same can be said about **Azerbaijan's** and **Armenia's** approach to the new initiative. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian has given a cautious support to Turkey's proposal: "We've welcomed the idea of the Turkish initiative, as we are in favor of building confidence, stability, security and cooperation in the region which are in the basis of this proposal. But we have questions to clarify the mechanism of its implementation, its format, as well as other aspects. Till now, we haven't had detailed and serious discussions on this."²⁸

Generally speaking, the idea of the platform - to bring together the three South Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia, and enable them to mediate and solve their conflicts among themselves - sounds attractive. But one can hardly believe that it will go far. Such pacts can work only if all members are willing to prioritize stability and good relations over their other interests. Yet if there is one thing we know, it is that there is no consensus for stability in the Caucasus.²⁹

BSEC can be seen as a potential positive influence in regional cooperation though it rarely gets a high profile, unlike more political-security organizations such as NATO or the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. The BSEC-led sub-regional cooperation has been restricted to mainly economic issues, placing 'hard' security matters out of its scope of activities. All Working Groups (WGs) have economics-related objectives: WG on Finance and Development, WG on Agriculture, WG on Transport etc. The only exception is the Working Group on Combating Crime. Put simply, the architects of BSEC have perceived economic development as the main pillar of regional security.

After the Caucasus crisis the BSEC secretary general, Ambassador Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, emphasized that if the BSEC was to continue progressing, it was vital that bilateral tensions or crises of the region be kept outside of the organization, which he emphasized was an economic organization. He also mentioned that the economic infrastructure projects must not be negatively affected by such crises.³⁰ But the fact is that economic projects, including large energy projects, which cost tens of millions of dollars and cross national boundaries, are extremely political issues, which cannot be resolved on the sub-regional level.

Conclusion

As indicated above, sub-regional cooperation as well as stability and security in the Black Sea region cannot be achieved without radical changes in the very foundation of the strategic

²⁶ www.cnnturk.com, February 13

²⁷ www.armtown.com/news/en/pan/20090323/29724/ - 37k

²⁸ www.turkeydailynews.com/news/117/ARTICLE/1428/2008-11-24.html - 37k

²⁹ Reynolds Michael, **TURKEY'S TROUBLES IN THE CAUCASUS**, at rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=736&Itemid=40 - 31k -

³⁰

relations between Russia and the West. Therefore, the EU-US/NATO-Russia efforts should be directed at resolving the most urgent fundamental problems. As a result of the Caucasus crisis that has shown all risks of a new confrontation between Russia and the West, the world economic and financial crisis that has put both Russia and the West in one boat, and the US presidential election, which opens a new window of opportunity, one can expect a certain improvement in the Russia-West relations. However, this improvement by its nature and substance will be completely different from the expectations of the early 90s or the euphoria period after 9/11. It will be much closer to the past East-West peaceful coexistence, and there should be no illusion that this stage will be smooth and easy.

The recent Russia-West crisis over Georgia should not shade fundamental problems resulted from the end of bipolarity. One of the main conclusions (or may be the main one) that can be drawn from the Caucasus experience is that stability in Wider Europe cannot be achieved against Russia's interests. NATO's enlargement to the CIS space, namely to Ukraine and Georgia, is a recipe for disaster in the absence of normal partnership relations between Russia and NATO. EU, not NATO, integration is the best way to keep Ukraine free and whole. NATO has already reached the safe limits of its eastward expansion. Any further move toward Georgia or Ukraine against Russia's position would be dangerous.

Addressing the future of the EU-Russia relations it would be very important for Brussels to understand that in the absence of real political capitalization of these relations, Russia has nothing to lose and it can do anything it likes. EU should not expect that Russia's foreign policy would be consistent and coherent. The East-West confrontation has been erased in the international relations with the end of the Cold war but it has acquired a national dimension. The East-West confrontation taking different forms and scale nowadays is going on inside the individual member-states of Euro-Atlantic community. This confrontation is particularly strong in NIS, which are still in the process of transition from Communism to democracy. Russia's domestic and foreign policy evolution is heavily influenced by a fierce ideological fighting between liberals and nationalists. So, the EU itself should clearly define its policy vis-à-vis Russia saying what the EU wants from Russia, what the EU is ready to concede Russia for cooperation and what the EU "red line" is. No doubt, the EU does not want Russia's domination in the CIS space but Russia does not want either any foreign dominance in its immediate neighborhood. The EU leadership should understand that the space of European Union is the most stable part of the world because any external political forces do not dominate it. And under the best scenario the EU-Russia multifaceted cooperation, particularly in the context of a new post-PCA treaty based on a new strategic footing, will remove Moscow's fears with regard to the CIS space, and the EU concerns about Russia's neo-imperial ambitions.

The post Cold-war experience shows that every decade in the Russia-West relations has started with a short period of euphoria – early 90s and post- 9/11 rapprochement, and ended with a serious conflict –the NATO/Yugoslav conflict of 1999 and the Caucasus crisis of 2008. Now we are entering a new period of détente, which should be used for preventing a new conflict and building a genuine post-bipolar order for the sake of stability and security in Wider Europe.

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BIBLIOTECA

NAGORNO-KARABAGH CONFLICT AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE CASPIAN BASIN

Oktay F. TANRISEVER*

This paper seeks to explore the attempts at promoting regional in/stability the Caspian basin by focusing on the regional dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. In this paper, the Caspian basin refers not only to the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan, but also to Georgia and Armenia as two other Caucasian states whose policies directly influence and are influenced by the policies of the littoral states of the Caspian Sea.

The geopolitical significance of this region stems from its role in linking Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf. The region is located at the juncture of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, thus occupies a central position on the traditional 'Silk Road' from China to Europe. Due to this geopolitical position, the regional security complex in the Caspian region has been more volatile as compared to most of other regions in the world. Besides, the region is very diverse in terms of its ethnic and cultural make-up adding internal dimension to the already very unstable external dimension of regional stability in the Caspian basin.

The paper assumes that the network of relations among the post-Soviet states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia as well as Iran constitute the regional security complex in the Caspian basin. The paper argues that the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict has played a critical role not in Azerbaijan's relations with Armenia, but also in the evolution of the regional security complex in the Caspian basin due to its role in linking the geopolitical and energy dimensions of the regional security complex together very closely.

The paper will also demonstrate that the regional stability in the Caspian basin has been undermined by Moscow's use of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict as a frozen one. In addition, the paper describes the political and economic challenges facing the regional leaders and their responses to these challenges in detail. Moreover, the paper evaluates the performance of Russia in controlling the regional states between 2001 and 2009.

This paper starts with the examination of how regional politics in the Caspian basin has evolved in the post-Soviet historical context. Next, the paper will discuss the current characteristics of the regional security complex in the Caspian basin. Afterwards, the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict will be examined in terms of its role in the regional security complex of the Caspian Sea basin. The concluding part will evaluate the prospects for regional stability in the future.

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Evolution of the Regional Political System in the Caspian Basin

Regional political system in the Caspian basin reached its current level of dis/equilibrium in the aftermath of the initially chaotic post-Soviet disorder in this region. In this context, the regional security complex in the Caspian states has been shaped by Russia's 'near abroad' policy. The policy which was adopted at the end of 1992, was defined in the "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation". This document specified the following objectives among Russia's main goals in the near abroad countries, including the Turkic republics: (1) deepening political, economic, and military cooperation with the NIS within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as on a bilateral basis; (2) broadening and strengthening the CIS infrastructure; (3) conclusion of agreements on protection of rights of Russian citizens with each of the Newly Independent States; (4) collective protection of the CIS borders; and (5) formation of the CIS peace-keeping forces.¹

The Russian influence in the Caspian basin has been strengthened with the creation of a CIS system of collective security. The desire to receive military support from Russia made Kazakhstan and Armenia to sign the Collective Security Treaty, which was actually concluded on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent.² The Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) played a crucial role in the evolution of the regional security complex in the Caspian Sea basin.

Not surprisingly, Russia's hegemonic behaviour has attracted an apparent reaction from Azerbaijan and more subtle ones from almost all other states in the Caspian basin. The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also contributed to improving tense relations between the members of its military wing and its non-members, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. Besides, political opposition groups in the Caspian Sea basin states have been systematically suppressed leading to the rise of authoritarianism because this form of sub-regional cooperation was based on the idea of maintaining the *status quo*. The existing sub-regional cooperation has been functional in preventing open conflicts and keeping them frozen.

Characteristics of the Regional Security Complex in the Caspian Basin

The Russian led- sub-regional cooperation namely the CIS has not yet contributed significantly to the intra and interstate conflict resolution processes yet. On the contrary, it seems that the very existence of the Russian led- sub-regional cooperation networks makes it very difficult to find alternative and more sustainable solutions to the existing frozen conflicts due to Moscow's insistence in keeping the influence of other international actors especially, the European Union, the United States and NATO at the

¹ Irina Zvigelskaia, *The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

² V. I. Slipchenko, 'Russia's Political and Military Problems in Central Asia', *European Security*, vol. 6, no.1, 1997, pp. 122-123.

minimum level. Consequently, the existing sub-regional cooperation frameworks are ineffective in identifying, containing and eliminating transborder sources of instability.

An alternative regional cooperation framework to the Russia-led CIS is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) with its capacity to engage the European Union and the United States to the Caspian basin closely. It is also important to discuss the promotion of regional economic cooperation in the Black Sea region and its implications for the frozen conflicts in the region. Regional integration in the Black Sea region has been determined basically by an economic interdependence approach to international relations since the end of the Cold War. There has been a consensus among the foreign policy-making elites in the region that the creation of economic interdependencies in the Black Sea region would lead to greater cooperation and regional integration in this region.

The BSEC members include the Black Sea littoral states—Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia; the non-littoral Balkan states—Albania, Greece, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro; and the non-littoral Caucasian states—Azerbaijan and Armenia. The membership profile of this organization shows that the BSEC has the potential of linking the Balkans and the Caspian Sea basin, two quite unstable regions in Europe, and to make these regions more stable by using its economic instruments for the promotion of regional integration in the Black Sea region.

Cooperation between the European Union and the BSEC becomes an important topic in recent years since further cooperation between the European Union and the BSEC could contribute to the development of a regional perspective in the EU's Eastern Partnership (EP). This cooperation could also make the Eastern Partnership (EP) more effective in the Black Sea region and the Caspian basin.

Regional Actors and the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict

The lack of any significant level of regional cooperation in the Caspian basin explains why there has not been any regional contribution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution process and why the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)'s Minsk Process is the only available framework where the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution process make some progress.

It is important to note that Kazakhstan is not involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution process at all. However, its position vis-à-vis Russia in this regard differs slightly. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan views the settlement of this conflict very positively. It seeks to engage both Azerbaijan and Armenia together closely in the regional networks of cooperation mainly in the field of energy.

Iran is the other low-profile Caspian player, which seeks to accommodate Azerbaijan and Armenia together. However, its policies tilt toward those of Russia as both of these two countries seek to manipulate the regional ethno-territorial conflicts such as the Nagorno-

Karabagh conflict to its own advantage and to prevent the European access to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin.


In principle, there would not be any significant objection from the littoral Caspian countries with the exception of Azerbaijan to the idea that Armenia should be integrated into the regional pipeline projects in order to facilitate the conflict resolution process.

Prospects for Future

In the foreseeable future, it is getting more and more difficult to prevent the frozen conflicts, including the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, from being transformed into boiling conflicts or to reach a working solution to such ethno-territorial conflicts. Besides, as conflict settlement has become extremely difficult to achieve, finding new ways of regulating these conflicts has become an important priority for the parties involved.

For the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it is important that the parties should be more innovative and creative in formulating their positions. If the parties are unable to come up with such positions, external and regional actors could help them in this respect. Besides, an impartial external approach to the conflict is essential for the effectiveness of potential peaceful settlement plans to the conflict.

All in all, it is possible to argue that international actors are very likely to intensify their efforts at finding an enduring solution to the frozen ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus. In this context, Turkey could play a vital role in the realization of Euro-Atlantic strategy of conflict settlement by creating a conducive environment for conflict regulation in the region through its multifaceted relations with the relevant parties. Turkey seeks to play a mediating role in the currently frozen ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus, especially in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict as exemplified in its proposal to create 'Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform'. The positive contributions of Turkey to the regulation of such ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus could also enhance the positions of Euro-Atlantic security structures in the Caspian Sea basin.



DRAFT**POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE'S FOUR SEA BASINS**

IAI, Rome, Italy: 3-4 April 2009

**SESSION 3: Sub-regional Perspectives on Transformation of political System:
Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights in Europe's Four Sea basins*****The Role of Sub-Regional Context, Actors and Organisations
in Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance
in the Black Sea and Caspian Basins***

G. Tarkhan-Mouravi

The Black Sea – Caspian region plays an increasingly important role in global politics, and it is more and more frequently mentioned in geopolitical discourse. Although there is no single opinion as to where the borders to this region pass, speaking about I will refer to the littoral states around these two seas (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan) along with two small land-locked countries totally encircled by these littoral state (Armenia and Moldova). The core area of the region is actually one between the two seas, i.e. the three states of the South Caucasus, and the Russian North Caucasus.

While defining of this region in purely geographic terms, located along the dividing line between Europe and Asia (Russia due to its extensive size is of course an exception here), is not too difficult, one should realise what a great diversity the states of the region present, whether in terms of size, cultural tradition, political system, economic wealth, or geopolitical orientation. At the same time, this region of Eurasia still has certain unifying elements from European perspective, as it is associated with such issues of concern or interest as political instability and conflicts, geostrategic importance (e.g. from the viewpoint of land access to Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia's nuclear status or Iran's Nuclear ambitions), and access to huge energy resources.

Countries of the region: an attempt of classification

One way to understand the complex nature and the essential diversity of the Black Sea – Caspian region is to try to categorise or group the countries on the basis of various markers or criteria.

Even in our post-Huntington era we can see that there is certain correlation between the civilisational type and the geopolitical position, though there is no simple coupling with confession or cultural tradition. Rather, one may observe stronger correlation with geography – the states of the Black Sea basin tend to demonstrate more pro-Western orientation and more political pluralism, while those located around the Caspian Sea tend towards more authoritarianism. To some extent this is related to another factor - the “oil curse” – i.e. more energy resources in a country positively correlate with more centralised and concentrated power system.

Not only geographic location mentioned at the beginning, but the pure size of the countries under consideration plays a very important role in determining the political trajectories of these states. Some of these states are really big. Russia is a giant among these, being the biggest country in the world. Kazakhstan is 9 times bigger than Italy, and Iran roughly equals that of the aggregated areas of United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany. Turkey and Ukraine too are among the biggest countries of Europe, either from the viewpoint of territory or the population, and even Turkmenistan with its miniscule 5 million of population is significantly bigger than Italy or

Germany. At the other end, after the medium sized Romania and Bulgaria, lie the tiny former soviet republics – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia.

Table 1¹

State	Russia	Kaza- khstan	Iran	Turkey	Ukraine	Turkmen istan	Romania	Bul- garia	Azerbai- jan	Geor- gia	Mol- dova	Arm- enia
Area (mln km ²)	17,045	2.725	1,648	0.784	0.604	0.488	0.238	0.111	0.087	0.697	0034	0,030
Popu- lation (mln)	142.0	16.5	70.5	71,5	46,2	5,1	21.5	7.6	8.2	4.7	4.1	3.2

Closely correlated with size is the economic power of our states (with the exception of small but oil-rich Azerbaijan), and this is one more interesting way of grouping the states - in accordance with their economic profile, and in particular the role of energy resources in their economy:

- All the littoral states of the Caspian Sea (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) are extremely rich in oil and gas, controlling among these four a huge portion of the world energy resources, gas in particular².
- On the other hand all other states of the region are strongly dependent on the energy imports and in some cases on the transit of energy resources (Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine).
- Landlocked Moldova and Armenia do not possess any significant amount of natural resources, but also do not play any role as energy transit countries.

Size and economy are important characteristics, but still there are several other ways to group the countries. One of such categorisations is based on confessional and cultural tradition.

- Romania, Bulgaria, Russia (though Northern Caucasus is mostly Sunni Muslims, with only a majority of Ossetians and Slavic inhabitants such as Cossacks, Russians and Ukrainians being Orthodox Christians), Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are all predominantly Eastern Orthodox, and all have experience of belonging to socialist world, all but Romania and Bulgaria – the former republics of USSR.
- Turkey, as well as former Soviet republics - Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are mainly Sunni Muslims (though formally secular states), while in Iran and Azerbaijan Shiya Islam is the dominant confession (though about one third of the Azerbaijan's population is reportedly Sunni, and Azerbaijan since Soviet times is also basically a secular state)

Another interesting dimension is the geopolitical orientation of the countries in the region:

- Obviously EU and NATO members – Bulgaria and Romania, but also NATO member Turkey, as well Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine try their best to further integrate into the West. It is interesting to note that all these are countries with limited energy resources.
- Russia, in its turn, has an ambition to play its own game, and return its status of a global power, in the world which it would like to see as 'multi-polar' – i.e. no more dominated by the USA. On this route it often cooperates with China, whose rapid rise as a regional and global political and economic power has significant implications for the Black Sea - Caspian region, and particularly to its Eastern periphery – Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
- Iran, on its part, has an ambition to become the leader of the Islamic world, and at the same time the regional superpower, a feasible option after the weakening of its arch-rival, Iraq. Notwithstanding religious ideological being the backbone of its political system, in external affairs Iran reveals calculated pragmatism. So, e.g. Iran would rather support Christian Armenia but not Muslim Azerbaijan, as the latter poses a certain threat to its integrity, due to great

proportion of Turkic speaking Azerbaijanis in Iran itself who may be inspired by irredentist passion. Equally, Iran would closely cooperate with much disliked Russia, on which it depends for arms and nuclear technologies, and keep silence against abuse of its Muslim brethren in Chechnya.

- Armenia, landlocked and sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Turkey, is formally Russia's strategic partner, depends on the latter for its security, and houses a Russian military base in Gyumri. While strongly dependent on Russia in addition to great extent controlling its economy, and the hostage to the victory in the Karabagh conflict with Azerbaijan, Yerevan tries to develop its relations with the EU and US, but with Turkey.
- The three remaining states - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, are all trying to pursue a complex policy of balancing the influence of Russia, the West, and in the case of the latter two – China.

Why such categorization is important? All the above factors seem to influence the political profiles of the states, and in particular such issues as political stability, democracy vs. authoritarianism situation, and ethno-territorial conflicts in which they are involved.

It is amazing to observe that all the states of the region rich in energy resources (*resource curse*) tend to enjoy authoritarian regimes, with Iran governed by Islamic autocracy, others being more secular states; In contrast, those states with limited natural resources tend to be moderately democratic, if located to the West, and with shorter or no experience of Communist rule – Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, or demonstrate hybrid regimes with soft authoritarianism mixed with non-consolidated democracy - Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia.

These latter countries (apart of Ukraine, which was able to cope to date with its regional tensions, but with very important addition of Russia) also demonstrate heavy involvement in ethno-territorial conflicts, the absolute majority of which is located exactly between the Black and the Caspian seas – in the Caucasus (Karabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Ossetia-Ingushetia). This area is characterised among other things by extreme diversity of ethnic composition.

Events

As it would be difficult to list all the important events that have formed the current overall political and security related situation in the region, let us consider just a few most important current trends and recent events that may play decisive role in influencing further developments within the region.

It is interesting to observe that the change of millennium has indeed been a watershed, marking the beginning of what could be characterised of post-post-cold war era, but also post-post-Communist transition for many of the regional states, but also in equally metaphorical way could be called the end of the end of history. The most important event of global significance that has to great extent modified the post cold war reality is obviously the terrorist act of 9/11.

However, for the region there were also other events that played important roles. Russia in 1999 started coming out of its deep economic crisis, and started the second Chechen war. "Botanical" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated another interesting trend, when soft authoritarian regimes can be replaced as a result of peaceful mass protests. However, farther to the East the changes were more modest and even more peculiar – the death president Heydar Aliiev and the establishment of hereditary rule in Azerbaijan (October 2003), the death of Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) in 2006 and the slight humanisation of the authoritarian regime in Turkmenistan, and the withdrawal of the 'reformist' wing in Iran as president. Ahmedinejad chose a more confrontational mode in Iran's relations with the West.

Nuclear programme in Iran became one of the most controversial development in the region, and along with EU/NATO expansion and Russian resurgence became one of the most important developments in the region.

Quite important was the emergence in Turkey of moderately Islamist Justice and Development party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, striving to integrate into the West. After several years of phenomenal reforms in Turkey, they pace significantly slowed down, and along with deteriorated relations with US, there is certain convergence of interests with previous arch-rival in the Caucasus – Russia, and even with Iran.

In its turn, Kazakhstan remains to some extent the same post-Communist state where Nursultan Nazarbayev – the former First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist party in 1989-1991, still rules as a president of this vast and rich state, and there are rumours he may use the Azerbaijan experience and try to bring to power his daughter as a hereditary ruler.

However, the last year has seen new developments that may have great impact on the future of the region. One of these is the global economic crisis that tends to modify political and economic behaviour of many states of the region, but especially of the exporters of fossil energy resources (Russia) or metallurgy (Ukraine).

Another most important recent event appears to be the Georgian Russian war of August 2008. This was the first case since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when the Russian soldiers fought abroad. While there are numerous explanations why Russia fought this war, and went even further in neglecting international code of behaviour by unilaterally recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia, one thing is clear – while the immediate aftershock has somehow been mitigated, this has had very serious influence on the future of the region, the security situation here and geopolitical disposition. Creation of the Russian military bases in these two secessionist territories, and particularly creation of a naval base in Ochamchire, will further shift the geostrategic balance in the Black Sea basin and may lead to unpredictable developments.

Actors

Russia is not the only big player in the region. A number of other external actors get increasingly involved here for a number of reasons, mainly having to do with energy and security, but also for certain ideological or value-based considerations.

The region, as was mentioned above, is strategically located, and simultaneously belongs, at least partially, to a number of other geopolitical areas, such as Greater Middle East, European Neighbourhood, or the Wider Black Sea region. At the same time a significant number of international organisations would involve at least some of the countries of the region: OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova (GUAM); Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and some others.

However, the sheer number of organisations involved would rather suggest that none of them play any crucial role here. Indeed, the most influential external actors seem to be the US and EU.

EU seems to be the most predictable big player in the region, ready to allocate certain financial resources to assist the countries in the region both economically, but also in their democratic state-building. However, apart of the two member states – Romania and Bulgaria, the political influence of EU and that also means ability to promote democracy, human rights and good governance is rather limited. Stalled accession negotiations with Turkey is just one issue illustrating the difficulties on the way forward. As EU continuously stresses is unwillingness to expand further to the East (though admits such a possibility, unlike the case of the Southern Partnership³), its main

incentive for effective cooperation – prospect of accession – is lacking. European “soft power” is slow power, and in the situation of rapid changes and the lack of ability of the local political to think and plan strategically, in longer term perspective, to great extent many of the EU goals in the region remain difficult to achieve. The fact that on average every year EU would propose new approaches for dealing with its Eastern Neighbourhood (ENP; ENPI; Sectoral agreements and ENP Plus; Black Sea Synergy; EaP) is in itself a sign of certain weakness of both planning and implementation of respective policies.

However, the EaP seems to be a radical step forward, essentially enhancing the EU involvement in the Eastern Partnership countries, through association agreements and other instruments.

Another area where EU has demonstrated a new, much more active approach was the August war in Georgia when President Sarkozy was never too slow in negotiating a peace agreement to stop the bloodshed. Opinions have been expressed that this success was exactly due the speed with which Sarkozy acted, so that there was no time for long debates and different opinions to take place, but member countries appeared to encounter a *fait accompli*. Nevertheless, EU actions are a sign of much more consolidated action than previously. Arranging and sending hundreds of unarmed observers to Georgia in just a couple of weeks, while avoiding any confrontational situation that may seriously irritate Russia, may be another successful motion demonstrated by EU. Still, currently, it appears that much of the Western Europe has accepted the new disposition of forces in the Caucasus. As an observer described the EU-Russia summit in Nice on 14th November 2008: “Georgia was relegated to the status of a largely ritual sideshow at the summit. Sarkozy reiterated the EU’s condemnation of Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. Medvedev for his part said Moscow will not reverse its decision, and that it recognizes Georgia’s territorial integrity without Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are now ‘subjects of international law.’”⁴

Divergent interests of EU member states vis-à-vis Russia, and in addressing energy security issues make EU policies in the region often inconsistent, while decision making slow and inefficient. In particular, this is revealed by controversies with regard to a number of gas pipeline projects (Northern Stream, Southern Stream, White Stream, Nabucco). However, as again a new and positive sign, the recent EU-Ukraine joint declaration on gas transportation system in Ukraine demonstrates more decisiveness in actions.

However, in many other cases European influence (or rather, commitment) appears insufficient for overcoming difficulties in such areas as conflict resolution, most probably due to Russia’s counteraction. Even in the case of Transdnistrie, which seems to be relatively easy to solve, Russia uses its proxies (Smirnov, in this case) to squeeze out EU involvement in negotiations and hinder progress.

Another important regional player is of course the United States. August events appeared to be a serious blow to its policies in the region, and to its image a reliable defender of its political allies. While it is yet unclear what will be the position of the new US leadership in the face of the challenges posed by Russia both globally and in the Caucasus, there are a few hints to the possible developments. While the US are seeking Russian cooperation in a few areas such as Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea, at the same time they do not seem to accept the changing status quo and the geostrategic balance in the region. With regards to Georgia, US will definitely help the country to reconstruct its heavily bruised economy and military potential. Still, this will hardly make Russia withdraw from the occupied parts of the Georgian territory, or agree to civilised terms of conflict resolution in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Nor will this in short term prevent Russia to use any artificial pretext to further hurt Georgia. However, the only logical, though to some extent risky move that may change the current deadlock will be the permanent deployment of US or/and NATO bases in Georgia and the Black Sea. Notably, already in the beginning of March 2007, an official representative of the US Department of Defence declared the intention of the US to consider the possibility of deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) radar in the Caucasus region, in the framework of development of the ABM defence system in Eastern Europe. In the light of current

events, a radar and anti-missile capacity based in the Caucasus as a part of the broader system involving Poland and Czech Republic seems to be an option considered by military planners, and may be indeed an only way to avoid further frustration in the South Caucasus. The recent demand by Kyrgyz government to withdraw the US air base in Manas serving as a transportation hub on the route to Afghanistan, obviously happening under Russian pressure, may be another reason to look for alternative air bases in the region, and prompt considering Caucasian airfields as a worthy alternative.

However, the main two problems for the US policies in the Black Sea – Caspian region to less extent relate to Russian actions in the Caucasus, but to main headaches – nuclear ambitions of Iran, and the much more urgent need to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also successfully withdraw from Iraq. In all of these issues, US on one hand seeks the cooperation of Russia, on the other – Turkey, Caucasian and Central Asian states. Against such background and extremely complex geopolitical objectives, it seems that US will appear more tolerant toward failures in the areas of good governance and human rights protection.

Future

Current situation in the Black Sea – Caspian region is characterised by high volatility and the unprecedented level of unpredictability. One of the main factors of such unpredictability is of course the global economic crisis, which pushes the world to undertake some radical changes in how global and national economies are run. At the same time, the crisis has moderated some ambitions among richer and bigger states, once again having demonstrated the interdependence of the national economies and the need to calculate carefully policies and actions.

Another important event - the Russian-Georgian war was a relatively small-scale event on the global geo-strategic scene that has hardly changed the actual balance of power. However, its symbolic importance is significant. The events have indicated toward the emerging dynamics in the geo-strategic configuration, and the limited capacity of Western powers to stop Russia from abusing the norms of international law. At the same time, the ability of Russia to amass support to its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was circumscribed by its lack of sufficient leverage, and the fears even among its immediate CIS clientele. At the same time, the gas crisis of January 2009 became one more illustration of the dangers of too much dependency of Europe on Russian energy supplies, and the limited ability of EU states to act decisively and in concert in crisis.

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On the other hand, the war has revealed not only the fragility of Georgia's statehood, but also the essential unpredictability of even softer authoritarian regimes such as in Georgia, to say nothing of Russia. Indeed, unpredictability is the key word to describe the situation in and around Georgia in the short and medium term.

One important aspect of volatility of Georgia's future stems from the weakening legitimacy and eroding popularity of its incumbent government. Georgia still needs to experience a peaceful and normal change of leadership, a challenge also for some other post-Soviet states. The bitterness of military defeat, the full loss of control over the secessionist entities, economic hardship and disillusionment with social policies of the government and its authoritarian qualities, which seemed acceptable against the background of previous optimism, stability and economic growth, - all these may lead to a social explosion involving impatient masses that have been more than once successful

in ousting leaders who have lost popularity. Under such condition, the government may either further strengthen repressive and authoritarian tendencies in an attempt to suppress dissent, therefore losing western support, or moving toward more democracy and pluralism – in both cases putting under serious threat its grip on power as well as political stability within the country.

Equally unpredictable is the geopolitical environment in which Georgia finds itself. Russia may for whatever reason (e.g. in order to divert public attention from economic difficulties, or in order to appease military elite, or maybe just as a part of a power game in Kremlin) find it useful to further destabilise the situation in Georgia, notwithstanding longer term risks for stability along its southern borders and spoiled relations with the West. Russia retains a very dangerous weapon in its hands – an ability to restart military action in Georgia any time it finds it convenient. The threshold for such action has much lowered with August events, but also current disposition along the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia allows easy provocation. Russia seems to love any action that may cause irritation in Washington, and would against all odds try to at least symbolically stress its global significance and military rise.

One more issue of concern in this regard is the decision by the Russian leadership to establish a naval base for its Black Sea fleet (Ochamchire port), an air base (Gudauta, Bombora airfield), and one more base in South Ossetia (Java). This in addition to generally changing the balance of military power in the Black Sea region (if previously NATO was moving closer to Russian borders, now this has reversed) may prompt certain strategic response from other players (including Turkey - which on the one hand finds common interest with Russia, apart of existing energy dependence, not to allow external powers into the Black Sea, on the other – is extremely worried by Russia's military expansion to the South).

Not only South Caucasus demonstrates high level of volatility. In Russia's Northern Caucasus events are developing along extremely dangerous lines, particularly in Ingushetia and Daghestan. According to the latest UNHCR figures, there are 20,500 asylum seekers in 2008, in the third place after Somali (40,000) and Iraq (22,000)⁵. The majority of these people originate from the Northern Caucasus, indicating to the seriousness of the situation there.

Another key element of unpredictability in the region originates from Iran's nuclear and political ambitions. While it seems there is little possibility that Iran develops nuclear weapons in the nearest future, the issue would not get away, prompting nuclear arms race in the broader region, elevated insecurity, and unpredictable response from such actors as US and Israel. In their turn, US policies vis-à-vis Iran and Russia are not yet clearly formulated, adding to overall unpredictability of the situation.

Under such conditions, EU has a special responsibility to act prudently, but decisively, in order to diffuse tensions. While reducing its energy through looking for alternative routes for transporting fossil fuel bypassing Russia, but also by restructuring its reliance on such fuel through radically turning toward alternative and renewable energy sources, EU could use its huge economic power for mitigating tensions, prompting Russia to be more cooperative in crucial areas related to security. At the same time, coordinated efforts, not only within the EU, but also with the US, is a key to positively influencing conflict resolution and democracy promotion in the region under consideration. EaP may appear a very useful instrument for such a process, but it should be strengthened by clearer prospects accession as well as by combining soft power with more of the hard power.

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
¹ Source: author's compilation

² "World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates", 2009.

³ The initiative on Eastern Partnership marks a decision to separate two approaches for countries of South and East Europe. However, the key elements and governance of the Eastern Partnership are modeled on the Barcelona Process and in particular on the Mediterranean Union launched in July 2008. This points to an aim to make the EU relationship with the Southern and Eastern members more symmetrical.

⁴ Ahto Lobjakas, RFE/RL, November 14, 2008

⁵ "Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2008."



The role of the EU in Promoting Democracy in Europe's 4 Sea Basins:

One Size Fits All or Different Strategies of Democracy Promotion?

Elena Baracani

Second draft

Introduction

The European Union (EU) activity of democracy promotion is part of the 'international dimension' of democratization, which refers to all those external factors that can have an influence on democratic changes of domestic political regimes, such as transnational phenomena, regional aspects, NGOs, states and other international actors. Initially, democratization studies gave no importance to external factors in explaining the causes of the democratic transitions which occurred in Southern Europe and Latin America between 1974 and 1989¹. It was only with the fall of the Berlin wall, the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the end of the cold war that international actors, as states, international organizations, NGOs, and independent foundations engaged more actively and systematically in activities of democracy promotion. As a consequence, democracy promotion has become 'a norm of practice within the international system',² and several authors have started to affirm that the international dimension, together with domestic variables, should be taken into consideration to explain democratization processes, as an intervening factor.³ In this new international context, there is no doubt that democracy promotion is at the centre of EU foreign policy, at least rhetorically.

This essay explains, first all, what are the key features of the EU activity of democracy promotion in Europe's four sea basins, trying to evaluate whether the EU adopts or not a 'one size fits all' approach (Boerzel and Risse 2004). In addition, it answers the following questions: 1) what is the relationship between the EU's activities of democracy promotion and its objective of maintaining stability and security; and 2) what is the relationship between the EU's activities of democracy promotion policy and its activities for conflict settlement?

The first two sections of this work show that the EU has become a democracy promoter only in recent decades after the end of the Cold War, and explain what is a strategy of democracy promotion that can be adopted by an external actor. The third section analyses what are the main strategies of democracy promotion adopted by the EU in the four sea basins, and evaluates what is the relationship between the EU's activities of democracy promotion and its objective of maintaining stability and security.

¹ O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986); Linz and Stepan (1986); Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989); Morlino (1998, p. 166).

² Gershman and Allen (2006, p. 36).

³ Schmitter (1996, pp. 27-28); Whitehead (1996, p. 23); Pridham (1997, p. 7); Huntington (2001).

1. EU and Democracy Promotion: an Historical Perspective

In the original founding treaties of the EU there was no mention of 'democracy'.⁴ It was only in January 1962, when the European Parliament approved the Birkelbach report, that the necessary political conditions were established, for the first time, for membership and also association status of the European Economic Community (EEC). In particular, it stated that '[o]nly states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of the Community'.⁵ On this basis, the February 1962 application by Franco's Spain for association status with the EEC was dropped for political reasons and only a commercial agreement was reached in 1970.⁶ Then, after the 1967 Colonels' coup, which established a military dictatorship in Greece, the EEC decided to freeze its association with Greece.⁷ The last years of the 1970s and the first part of the 1980s were characterized by the accession processes of Greece, Spain and Portugal and by the Declaration on Democracy at the Copenhagen summit in April 1978, which stated that respect for and maintenance of parliamentary democracy and human rights in all member states are 'essential elements of their membership in the EC [European Community]'.⁸ On the whole, the literature has shown that the role played by the European Community in the democratic consolidation of Greece, Spain and Portugal during the 1980s was only an indirect one,⁹ as its strategy of democracy promotion 'was marked by a distinct lack of procedure and its operation by ad hoc approaches and a continuing tendency to react to events rather than trying to determine their outcome'.¹⁰

In the 1990s, with the creation of the EU at Maastricht in 1992, the 'development and consolidation of democracy' became one of the objectives of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the EU started to play a direct role in the democratization process of accession candidate countries from central and eastern Europe that joined the Union in 2004. The main turning points in the EU relationship with central and eastern European applicants are the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, and the 1997 Luxemburg European Council. In 1993 the heads of state and government of the EU agreed that those associated countries of central and eastern Europe desiring membership could become members of the EU, even though, for the first time, the promise of membership was accompanied by a statement of formal membership conditions, among which was 'democracy'. Then, in 1997, the Luxemburg European Council launched the enhanced pre-accession strategy to be applied to all central and eastern European applicants, which made it possible for the EU to implement its political conditionality, and move from indirect influence to direct leverage. This was first of all because the Copenhagen political conditions started to be translated by the EU into the demand for specific political reforms from each candidate. Moreover, the progress of each

⁴ Indeed, the 1951 Treaty of Paris was more concerned with preventing the reoccurrence of war. However, the Rome Treaty of 1957 noted in the preamble that member states 'resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join their efforts', see Pridham (2005, p. 29).

⁵ Quoted in Pridham (2005, p. 30).

⁶ See Crespo (2000).

⁷ See Koufoudakis (1977).

⁸ Quoted in Pridham 2005, note 27, p. 33.

⁹ See Whitehead (1996, p. 261); Morlino (1998, p. 166); and Kubicek (2003, p. 9).

¹⁰ Pridham (2005, p. 35).

candidate in complying with these demands began to be monitored annually by the European Commission in specific reports. Finally, the EU started to reward, in terms of institutional links (such as the start of accession negotiations) and economic assistance, those candidates that complied with its requests.¹¹

At the beginning of the 21st century, the EU is seeking to replicate this successful strategy of 'democracy promotion through integration',¹² not only with the current candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), and with the remaining potential candidate countries of the western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo), but also with those countries of eastern Europe, the south Mediterranean and the south Caucasus that fall under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2003, and that do not have the perspective of membership of the Union. Indeed, according to the European Security Strategy, '[o]ur task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean'.¹³ However, it can be stated that democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, rather than being an objective in itself of EU foreign policy, is an instrument to achieve the Union's primary foreign policy goals, which are its security and economic prosperity. For instance, according to the same document '[t]he best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states'.¹⁴ Therefore, it can be expected that in the case of conflict between democracy promotion and national security interests in the neighbourhood, the EU will give priority to the defence of its security interests, even if it means tolerating or even supporting authoritarian regimes.

2. Strategies of Democracy Promotion: external leverage and models of democracy promotion

Strategies of external democracy promotion, defined as approaches that donors take to promoting democracy,¹⁵ can vary on two main dimensions: the 'degree of leverage' or the model of democracy promotion, and the model of democracy that is promoted.¹⁶ By 'leverage' I mean external pressure for democratization, and not 'governments' vulnerability to external pressure'.¹⁷ Thus, my definition of leverage is very close to what Larry Diamond calls 'peaceful forms of pressure ... to advance human rights and democracy'.¹⁸ The second dimension of variation of strategies of democracy promotion – the model of democracy promoted – refers to the fact that different external actors can promote different models of democracy, as formal or substantial democracy, or as electoral or liberal democracy.

¹¹ See Baracani (2009).

¹² On this concept see Pridham and Dimitrova (2004).

¹³ European Council (2003).

¹⁴ European Council (2003).

¹⁵ Carothers (1997, p. 111).

¹⁶ Another relevant dimension of variation may be the time span, which refers to the fact that external actors' activities to promote democracy can be short-term, as in the case of election monitoring missions, or long-term when the activity of democracy promotion lasts several years, as is usual in the case of state building missions.

¹⁷ See Levitsky and Way (2005, p. 21 and 2006, p. 382).

¹⁸ (2008, p. 111).

2.1 The degree of leverage or the model of democracy promotion

External leverage for democratization may be viewed as a *continuum* that describes different degrees of leverage depending on the strategies adopted by the international actors (see Figure 1). This *continuum* has two extreme poles. One in which there is no active external leverage, but what has been called 'diffusion',¹⁹ 'contagion',²⁰ or 'example',²¹ to describe a situation in which ideas and models of democratic change come from outside, but without any direct activity by external actors. The other extreme pole represents the end of peaceful forms of pressure, 'democratization by force',²² 'military intervention',²³ or what has been called 'control',²⁴ to describe a situation in which an external actor promotes democracy through the use or threat of force.

Between these extreme poles there are different modalities of democracy promotion that involve different degrees of external leverage on democratization. The most important of these modalities are: (1) political dialogue, (2) democracy assistance, (3) positive conditionality, and (4) negative conditionality or sanctions. Of course, there may be overlap between these modalities of democracy promotion.

'Political dialogue' refers to all bilateral political contacts between the external actor and a third country, and varies according to the frequency and intensity of these contacts. Political dialogue can become more structured through the establishment of specific institutions to conduct this dialogue.²⁵ Democracy assistance comprises 'all aid for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient country'.²⁶ It is both economic and technical: '[t]he provision of advice and instruction, training programmes, equipment and other forms of material support to institutional capacity building are typical examples, as are financial subventions to pro-democracy bodies and subsidies to cover the costs of certain democratizing processes'.²⁷

'Positive conditionality' refers to the fact that the target country has to satisfy the democratic conditions required by the external actor in order to be granted additional benefits or 'carrots',²⁸ as additional economic assistance or closer bilateral relations. Negative conditionality or sanctions, means that an international actor may penalize or sanction a country that does not respect the required democratic conditions by suspending, for example, economic assistance,²⁹ or 'freezing' their bilateral relations.

¹⁹ See, for example, Starr (1991); Kopstein and Reilly (2001); and Diamond (2008, p. 107).

²⁰ See Whitehead (1996, pp. 5-8); and Kubicek (2003, pp. 4-7).

²¹ See Nau (2000, p. 147); and Morlino and Magen (2008).

²² See Diamond (2008, p. 133).

²³ See Carothers (2000, p. 186).

²⁴ See Whitehead (1996, p. 8); Kubicek (2003, pp. 4-7); and Morlino and Magen (2008).

²⁵ In the case of the EU examples of institutions created to make political dialogue become more structured are the Councils of Association (established in the framework of Association Agreements), Association Councils and Association Committees (established by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements), and Cooperation Councils, Cooperation Committees, and Parliamentary Cooperation Committees (established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements).


²⁶ Carothers (2000, pp. 187-188).

²⁷ Burnell (2000, p. 9).

²⁸ Carothers (2000, p. 187).

²⁹ Carothers calls this democracy policy tool 'economic pressure' (2000, p. 186).

Figure 1: Degrees of External Leverage for Democratization




The EU has made an active use of all the methods indicated in Figure 1 to promote democracy, with the only exception of coercion. But what is the model of democracy promotion that has characterized the EU activities in that area? Democratization 'through integration' seems to be the characteristic or preferred model of democracy promotion of the EU.³⁰ However, it can only be applied to a specific category of third countries, that of accession candidate country. This means that it is not the most common model used by the Union to promote democracy. Indeed, the EU can only offer integration only to the accession candidate countries – in exchange for the respect of its democratic principles – in addition to its economic assistance. This means that the most commonly used model of democracy promotion for the EU is democracy assistance. Formally, this assistance is usually positively or negatively conditioned to the achievement of some democratic objectives, however the decision to implement this conditionality is a political one, which is very rarely taken.

OECD statistics on development shows an overall perspective of all official development assistance (ODA) for government and civil society provided by the European Commission (it means multilateral aid and not also bilateral aid from the member states) to all recipients (197 countries) between 1990 and 2006 (see Figure 2). First of all, it can be observed that European Commission government and civil society ODA steadily increased: from \$19 million (at 2005 prices) in 1990 to \$2213 million (at 2005 prices) in 2006.

³⁰ See Pridham and Dimitrova (2004).

Figure 2: US and European Commission ODA for Government and Civil Society



Source: data come from OECD Aid activity (author's calculations).

However, in spite of this increase in government and civil society ODA, it remained a small percentage of the total ODA provided by the EC between 1990 and 2006: 9.71% for the EC (see Table 2). In addition, data presented in Table 2 show that ODA for 'Support to NGOs', in the same period, was 0.03% of total ODA.


Table 1: Sectors of European Commission ODA to all recipients in the period 1990-2006
(Commitments - million constant USD 2005 - and percentage of total ODA)

Education	Health	Population Programmes	Water Supply & Sanitation	Government and civil society	Conflict, Peace and Security
5715 (5.17%)	4295 (3.88%)	1106 (1%)	4202 (3.8%)	10735 (9.71%)	867 (0.78%)
Economic Infrastructure	Production Sectors	Multisector	Commodity Aid / General Prog. Assistance	Action Relating to Debt	Emergency Assistance & Reconstruction
17178 (15.54%)	11094 (10.03%)	11773 (10.65%)	20830 (18.84%)	197 (0.18%)	15186 (13.73%)
Support to NGO's	Refugees in Donor Countries	Unallocated/ Unspecified	Other Social Infrastructure & Services	Administrative costs of donors	
29 (0.03%)	9 (0.01%)	823 (0.74%)	3921 (3.55%)	2611 (2.36%)	

Source: data come from OECD Aid activity (author's calculations).

Figures 3 shows the regional distribution of government and civil society ODA for the European Commission in the period 1990-2006. The region that received the largest amount of government and civil society ODA, in the period under study, was the South of Sahara (with 30%), followed by Europe (with 22%), and Central Asia (7%).

Figure 3: Government and Civil Society European Commission ODA to all recipients by region in the period 1990-2006
(Commitments in millions of constant USD 2005, and percentage of total ODA)



Source: data come from OECD Aid activity (author's calculations).

2.2. The model of democracy promoted

The model of democracy promoted by the EU is the western liberal democratic one, which has the following basic features: (1) regular, free and fair elections, (2) a constitution that enshrines democracy and a full set of human rights, (3) a governmental system based on the separation of powers with an accountable executive, a representative legislature, and an independent judiciary, (4) local government structures, and (5) political parties that aggregate citizens' interests. In addition, in the last two decades, the EU has moved from the promotion of a formal democracy model (with a liberal-democratic constitution, and free elections) to the promotion of a more substantive model of democracy.³¹ In the case of the EU, this substantive model of democracy, has been developed by the European Commission during the accession process of the central and eastern European countries that joined the Union in 2004, and include the strengthening of institutional and administrative capacity, judicial independence and efficiency, the fight against corruption, civil control of the military, and a vast array of human and minority rights, not only civil and political rights but also social, economic and cultural.³² But is this model of democracy promoted also towards those third countries that won't join the Union?

³¹ See also Pridham (2005, p. 25).

³² See Dimitrova and Pridham (2004, p. 97); and also Baracani (2009, p. 70).

3. EU and Democracy Promotion in Europe's 4 Sea Basins

Countries in Europe's four sea basins could be divided into two main categories: southern and eastern countries, with Turkey in between these two categories. However, in order to assess what are EU's activities of democracy promotion, it's useful to divide these countries according to their relationship with the EU. According to this criteria, table 2 shows that there are five categories of countries: 1) an accession candidate country (Turkey), 2) southern and eastern partners of the ENP, 3) Russia, 4) Iran, and 5) two former soviet republics that are not partners of the ENP (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

Table 2: What categories of third countries?

	MEDITERRANEAN	BALTIC	BLACK	CASPIAN
ENLARGEMENT			Turkey	
ENP	North African and Middle East countries		Ukraine, Georgia	Azerbaijan
EU- Russia relationship		Russia	Russia	Russia
EU- Iran relationship				Iran
EU- Former Soviet Republics relationship				Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

3.1. Turkey: what EU's strategy of democracy promotion?

Model of democracy promotion:

- Political dialogue (high level of intensity in the framework of the pre-accession policy)
- Democracy assistance: EU economic assistance for the political criteria was very low in 2002 (about 2 million euros), but it increased in 2003 and 2004, and in 2005 reached the peak of about 48 million euros.
- Both negative and positive conditionality are present, and have been used (strong conditionality). Example of negative conditionality: Turkey has been sanctioned in terms of institutional links, with the decision not to open accession negotiations on some specific chapters with Turkey in December 2006, because of the lack of implementation by Ankara of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara

Agreement. Example of positive conditionality: Turkey's progress in satisfying the requested conditions was rewarded in 1999 with the decision to grant the country candidate status and also in October 2005 with the decision to open accession negotiations. Moreover, the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey was accompanied by the decision to allocate this country 500 million euros of economic assistance for 2006 (the same assistance allocated for 2005 had been 300 million euros).

- Not democracy promotion through integration: it is true that until now the final objective of the process of enlargement has been membership, but Turkey might turn into an exception.

Model of democracy promoted:

- a substantial model of democracy

3.2. ENP partners: what EU's strategy of democracy promotion?

Model of democracy promotion:

- Political dialogue (in the framework of the institutions created by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements)
- Democracy assistance (in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, ENPI)
- Positive conditionality has been added to negative conditionality, so both are present, but have been used rarely: it is a weaker conditionality (because the carrot of membership is not offered) that can work only when the neighbor is really interested in developing a closer relationship with the Union
- Not democracy promotion through integration

Model of democracy promoted:

- it depends on the neighbor, and in particular on its will to democratize or not (see the differences for instance in the ENP Action Plans for Morocco and Ukraine)
- and it depends on the EU as whereas democratization might threaten stability of the country and region, the Union prefers the status quo – the maintenance of an authoritarian or hybrid regime – rather than promoting a genuine democratization.

3.3. Russia: what EU's strategy of democracy promotion?

Model of democracy promotion:

- Political dialogue
- Democracy assistance: very low level
- Conditionality
- Stable political and economic relations are more important for the EU rather than promoting democracy

Model of democracy promoted:

- Formal:

3.4. Iran: what EU's strategy of democracy promotion?

Model of democracy promotion

Model of democracy promoted

3.5. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: what EU's strategy of democracy promotion?

Model of democracy promotion

Model of democracy promoted

Table 3: EU and Democracy Promotion in Europe's 4 Sea Basins

	MODEL of DEMOCRACY PROMOTION				MODEL OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTED	
	PD	DA	+C	-C	FORMAL	SUBSTANTIAL
TURKEY	x	x	x	x		x
ENP PARTNERS	x	x	x	x	x	x
RUSSIA					x	
IRAN					x	
KAZAKHSTAN and TURKMENISTAN					x	

Conclusion: One Size Fits All or Different Strategies of Democracy Promotion?

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The Impact of EU and NATO Enlargement and Neighbourhood Strategies on Mediterranean Inter-Regional Security

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Enlargement’s impact

After the end of the Cold War, the two most important Western Alliances have expanded to Central-eastern Europe and Eastern Balkans. While NATO will continue to include members in Europe, EU has drawn a line across Europe and the Mediterranean between countries having still a chance to become EU members and countries enjoying a special relationship with the EU in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy-ENP, yet having no chances to become members.

So, NATO and the EU have two different neighbourhood strategies, that of NATO being, at least in principle, more inclusive than EU strategy.

The impact of NATO enlargement, and its open perspective to further enlargements in Europe, has no significant impact on non-EU Mediterranean countries and sub-regional relations between the latter and Western Alliances. EU enlargement, in contrast, has had and continues to have an impact on sub-regional relations across the Mediterranean Sea, first, because the enlargement, by including more European countries, changed the balance of EU external relations and related Mediterranean perceptions, and, second, because the Mediterranean countries were included in the ENP, along the European countries excluded from the enlargement, thus becoming stakeholder in the new EU policy stemming from enlargement.

In general, the impact of enlargement and related neighbourhood strategies is less significant for the Mediterranean countries than for European countries. This is due to a number of political reasons. Most European countries included in the ENP and most of those having the status of Partners countries in NATO would like to become full members in both organisations. On the other hand, this trend creates problems for the Russian Federation. In the Mediterranean, no countries – except for some voices in Israel – are wishing to become members of the EU and NATO. Furthermore, in the Mediterranean area there is no counterpart to such an actor like Russia with its “near abroad.

In the Mediterranean sub-region, the impact which is worth considering is on current frameworks of cooperation: the ENP, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP and the Union for the Mediterranean-UFM, which has just replaced the EMP, as well as NATO Mediterranean Dialogue-MD: are enlargement and neighbourhood improving or worsening these frameworks of cooperation? As said, this question is less significant for NATO MD than EU-initiated policies.

For the non-EU Mediterranean countries that were included so far in the cooperation framework initiated by the EU and NATO, in particular the Arab countries, the EU enlargement has been perceived as a sidelining factor on both political and economic-financial ground. It was not perceived, though, as a factor impacting on national security; more in general, it was seen as a factor rather neutral with regard to other regional and strategic security dimensions. This may be less true for the Maghreb countries, which may have been concerned because of the greater political and economic significance EU is representing for them with respect to Near East countries. At the outset, there were concerns for the ENP, mostly from the economic point of view. However, once the new policy began to work and by the time they understood its working, the ENP has been generally welcome because of the differentiation it allows. Relations tailored on willingness and

ability are definitely preferred over the regional homogeneity prescribed by the former EMP. For the countries now looking for an advanced status within the ENP, as Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, the new EU framework is proving better than the previous one.

There are negative political aspects, such as the reinforcement the ENP has fostered in EU relations with Israel. On the other hand, the Arab EU partners are relieved by the loosening of their relations with Israel permitted by ENP bilateral pattern. All in all, as already said, political aspects are marginal.

The ENP coupled with the unchanged NATO' strategy for Mediterranean neighbourhood is, maybe, a quasi-optimal policy framework of relations for the Arab countries and Israel. There is little regret for the EMP, while NATO's support to Southern Mediterranean countries' armed forces is strongly appreciated. The replacement of the EMP by the UFM has been willingly accepted. On this point an evaluation is premature. However, some reflections are devoted to the UFM future later on [in the final paper]. Whether this evolution is also meeting NATO's and, most of all, EU's requirements and expectations remains to be seen, though. This point is evaluated by the paper in the fourth section.

In the following, the paper considers these points: the institutional architecture of sub-regional policy frameworks as of today; the evolution of security perceptions until today; an evaluation of the post-enlargement situation in the Mediterranean from the point of view of EU and NATO security objectives (related to the main question posed by the EU4Seas project) [to be completed].

Architecture: bilateral and multilateral relations in the Euro-Med area

Both EU and NATO are distinctively present in the Mediterranean and operate across the basin by means of significant and complex policy frameworks of cooperation.

NATO initiated its Mediterranean Dialogue-MD in 1994. Its architecture is relatively simple: the MD consists of a web of bilateral relations between NATO and each partner country plus several common activities and gatherings that constitute a kind of multilateral dimension inside the MD policy framework. After September 11, there were attempts at upgrading this multilateral dimension without any significant result, though.

EU's model is by far more ancient and complex; furthermore, it went across a not negligible number of alterations. The EU initiated in 1972 by running a policy framework based on a uniform format of bilateral policies towards part of the coastal Mediterranean countries. This policy was dubbed "Politique Méditerranéenne Globale". This denomination was alluding to the comprehensive character of the policy, in the sense that it was intended to addressing the whole region as well as including different dimensions in the same policy format - a political-institutional dimension beside an economic and financial one. This format was bound to last until the beginning of the 1990s, when it was reshaped by the inclusion of a human-social dimension in keeping with the experience of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).

The subsequent step was the Barcelona Declaration with its three pillars (the political, economic, and social-human pillars) which set in motion the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP.

EU Mediterranean policy frameworks had always included elements of regional multilateralism, essentially in the form of support and incentives to economic cooperation and integration among its Mediterranean partners. In the EMP, while bilateral relations kept on holding their significance thanks to the setting up of bilateral Association Agreements with each separate partner (agreements that were the heirs of previous EU Mediterranean policy), existing elements of multilateralism resulted upgraded and expanded to the political realm, thanks respectively to the introduction of the objective of a free trade area at 2010 and the institution of a political dialogue.

In 2004, the EMP has been partly replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy-ENP as a consequence of EU enlargement to Central-eastern European countries. With this development, the EU came to run two distinct tiers of policy frameworks: one for the whole neighbourhood, i.e. the arc stretching from its north-eastern to its south-western boundaries, that is the ENP, and another one for single inter-regional contexts encompassed by neighbourhood, namely the EMP and the Synergy in the Black Sea region.

As a result, when it comes to EU inter-regional relations with neighbouring areas, we have a rather complex architecture. This architecture consists of a set of distinct institutional inter-regional frameworks (in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) with the ENP getting across all of them.

In 2008, the EMP has been replaced by the Union for the Mediterranean-UFM. This has upgraded both EU and non-EU governments' role in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. At the same time, it has altered the balance between EU governments and the European Commission-EC. The role of the latter, historically dominant in EU Mediterranean policy is somehow downgraded as a deeper separation has been made between communitarian roles in the area – which are owned essentially by the EU and the EC – and inter-governmental ones – owned to EU member states.

In today's Euro-Mediterranean relations the ENP represents the realm of the EU, whereas the UFM that of governments. By the same token, the ENP is essentially managed by the EC and reflects EU competences and what we can call a model of community-like relations, whereas the UFM is essentially run by governments and reflect a conventional model of international relations.

It must be pointed out that, in fact, much of the EMP has been left out of the UFM without belonging to the UFM, for instance the Euro-Med free trade area as well as conflict prevention policies such as elections 'watch, and so on. These relevant policy fragments resulting from the big bang in the EMP galaxy are waiting for being now arranged as a multilateral dimension in the Mediterranean sector of the EMP. This endeavour is parallel to the more advanced one being carried out in the framework of the Eastern European sector of the ENP, that is the so called "Eastern Partnership". Therefore, a "Mediterranean Partnership"-MP will have to be structured.

To summarize, the architecture of Euro-Mediterranean relations is shaped, as of today, by an overall EU bilateral policy regarding the whole neighbourhood. This bilateral policy includes, though, two distinct multilateral dimensions for each one of the two sub-inter-regional sectors of the ENP (the Black Sea and the Mediterranean). Both the ENP and its sub-inter-regional dimension are run by the EC and the EU according to a model of community-like relations. On the other hand, the two sub-inter-regional dimensions are framed by inter-governmental multilateral organisations, respectively the UFM and the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) that act according to a conventional model of international relations.

Security perceptions in the Mediterranean

Perceptions related to security are very different on the two sides of the Mediterranean. So are responses and objectives. Furthermore, the two sides are far from being or acting as monolithic blocs and, as a consequence, there are differences within the two halves of the Mediterranean basin which constitute the Euro-Mediterranean framework. So, Turkey is broadly close to the EU, but has – more and more – its nuances and differences. On the other hand, security perceptions towards the Mediterranean area are different in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe. There is a long standing difference between Southern and Northern Europe. These difference has been attenuated over time by many factors, to the point that one German author could speak of Germany as a Mediterranean country [Volker Perthes in EuroMeSCo Papers]. There is as of today a considerable difference between Western and Eastern parts of the EU, though. The same is true for the Southern part of the basin, where, beyond obvious differences between Israel and the Arab countries, the latter have substantive different views in the Maghreb and the Near East. The inclusion of Western Balkan

countries in the UFM is definitely bound to bring about other differences and multiply possible alignments in the area.

Having pointed out differences, in this paper we consider the northern and southern part of the basin in broad terms. In these terms, one cannot doubt about security perceptions being different, if not at odds, and linked to quite different factors of threat. Furthermore, we consider first, basic perceptions and, then, changes occurred in basic perceptions as a result of September 11 events and their consequences.

In the South, security concerns use to focus on regimes' stability and, therefore, on opposition to regimes, in particular the strong and effective opposition stemming from religious political movements (other opposition's wings being either too weak, as the liberals, or under the hegemony of islamists, as the nationalists. Obviously, security concerns regard most of all the violent wing of Islamism, which employs terrorism and violence, but political Islam – whether violent or not – is a concern anyway. Israel is regarded as a direct military threat to national security by much of Lebanon, the Palestinians and Syria. For Egypt and Jordan, having a peace treaty with Israel, and for Maghreb nations any military threat from Israel is not excluded, yet such threat looks as an objectively distant development. All Arab countries, though, see Israel and its unwillingness or inability to come to terms with the Palestinian problem as a factor of internal threat. For the lack of solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict strengthens domestic opposition, in particular the Islamists, and weakens and discredits the regimes instead.

In the EU, security perceptions did not contemplate any military threat but a large set of spill over effects, stemming first of all from migration, regional conflict, economic stagnation, environmental degradation and terrorism and other domestic political conflict in Southern nations. More in general, at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU realised that instabilities stemming from the end of the Cold War could threaten democratic order and welfare societies reigning in its territory. To counter these threat the EU initiated a programme of inclusion for the Central-eastern European countries contingent to the implementation on their part of deep political and economic reforms. The Southern Mediterranean countries were not offered inclusion but a form of strict association, again contingent on political reforms and economic integration, though.

When EMP partners began negotiate on security, very soon they discovered that their security agendas were at odds. From the southern point of view, the EMP was not really regarding the most important threat to their security, i.e. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, it asked for domestic political reforms that, in regimes' eyes, would only multiply problems with Islamist opposition and eventually bring about their ousting. In this perspective, the EMP partners negotiated for four years a Chart intended to establish the principles of their indivisible security and the platform for their security and political cooperation. These negotiations were doomed. In fact, they failed at the Marseille conference of 2000.

September 11, 2001 has less altered the basic structure of both sides' security perceptions than added new dimensions to them. This has had an impact on policies, though. What happened with September 11 was that an unusual terrorist attack inspired by a civilisational and culturalist approach got a response based, unfortunately, on the same approach, thus giving way to a clash-of-civilisations self-fulfilling vicious circle. Since then relations between the West and the Middle East, rightly or wrongly, have been permeated by stronger tensions in a clash-of-civilizations mood. Until September 11, perceptions in Euro-Mediterranean relations reflected heterogeneous concerns rather than reciprocal threats. Significant cooperation in both the political and security realms resulted prevented from heterogeneity rather than opposition and mutual fears. The clash-of – civilization mood that came to dominate relations between Western and Middle Eastern countries after September 11 has introduced, in contrast a sense of reciprocal threat which just did not existed before. In the North, fears of spill-over effects from the South have turned into fears of more direct threats and generated policy responses in terms of securitisation of terrorism and migration. In the

South, regimes have become more intransigent and assertive and whatever European intentions to have a reformist dialogue with them in the framework of a community-like framework of relations is definitely gone. Their rationale to resist reforms continues to stem from concerns for their own durability and stability. After September 11, however, resistance to reform is construed as a national-cultural platform against Western gross interference and coercion, which provides them more legitimacy in front of domestic opposition (reforms have to come only from inside and be based on “our” culture and “our” religion).

Is the emerging sub-regional cooperation in tune with EU and NATO objectives

In the first section we have illustrated the web of policy frameworks that shape inter-regional relations across the Mediterranean Sea. The question now is how this web of policy frameworks meet problems deriving from the security dynamics pointed out in previous section. To respond to this question we have to look into the security dimension of NATO and Euro-Med policy frameworks.

These policy frameworks and their security dimension have a cooperative rationale. They are based on a set of security concepts that emerged with the end of the East-West confrontation. Military threats to Western Alliances having ceased to exist, security is affected by an array of political, economic, environmental and social risks with no or low military components. To counter or contain such risks, the Alliances have to shape the environment by introducing an effective multilateralism in international relations and political reforms domestically. All this has to be done by means of cooperative instruments and frameworks whereby security is attained by cooperation, i.e. by instruments and frameworks based on cooperative security concepts.


Both the MD and the EU frameworks for inter-regional cooperation in its neighbourhood are cooperative security frameworks intended first of all to establish internationally normative relations among their members. The frameworks are also regarded as channels to promote political reform domestically. The MD has the prominent task of promoting security governance and the democratisation of armed forces. The former EMP and the ENP aim at fostering political and social reform in more general terms. In this sense, one could say that the EU and NATO pursue security by pursuing “milieu goals” [Wolfers].

The EU has pointed out very clearly its aims, and the instruments to achieve them, in its 2003 European Security Strategy. In this Strategy, effective multilateralism and economic reforms (economic cooperation and integration in the Washington consensus conceptual framework) are seen as world-wide objectives; political reform is mostly related to neighbourhood (in which EU policies are supposed to promote a ring of friendly and well-governed countries).

In inter-regional Mediterranean relations, the success of the frameworks of cooperative security initiated by the Western Alliances has been uneven and, in broad terms, not very satisfactory. The frameworks failed to affect and change security perceptions in the South of the Mediterranean. Most of all, it emerged clearly that security perceptions are heterogeneous: Arab security perceptions regard the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – where the EMP proved impotent – whereas EU security perceptions regard the lack of reforms, whose introduction is, in turn, perceived by regimes as a threat to their stability. The framework failed to start a dynamics of horizontal political and economic integration and cooperation among Southern partners.

All this has prevented the frameworks to evolve towards effective multilateralism. Bilateral relations have developed quite favourably both in the MD – which for true has never attempted at really going multilateral – and in the EMP. The latter, while hesitated to develop its multilateral dimensions, namely the political dialogue among the Senior Officials, has quite well developed bilaterally the Association Agreements. In 2004, the bilateral dimension has been subsumed, expanded and strengthen by the ENP. All in all the hub-and-spokes model of relations which was

supposed to be only transitional in the EMP, has gained the upper hand with respect to multilateralism. Furthermore, attempts at transposing EU models failed as well, so that the EMP rather than a community-like model of inter-regional relations is today patterned on a conventional model of international relations. The UFM has confirmed this trend by establishing an inter-governmental organisation to deal with political inter-regional relations and a set of inter-regional economic and social projects, leaving the EU and the EC with the problematic task of reconstructing a multilateral dimension in the UFM-ENP international-bilateral framework which has in fact emerged where community-like and multilateral framework was expected.



Beyond Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies: EU's Central Asia Strategy

Nargis Kassenova

The New EU Strategy for Central Asia

Until recently Central Asia did not attract European attention, being too remote and unfamiliar. For most of its modern history the region was hidden in the obscurity of the vast Russian and then Soviet empires. Once the USSR collapsed, five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) appeared on the political map of the world. Like other post-Soviet states they benefited from the EU assistance programme TACIS and could join the OSCE, formally becoming part of the European security space. However, their status was peripheral compared to the western ex-Soviet republics, including those of the Caucasus.

Around 2000, this situation started to change. The 9/11 events triggered the beginning of a military campaign in Afghanistan. Central Asian states found themselves amidst the "war on terror". Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed to host US/NATO military bases, and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gave overflight rights to the coalition planes. As a result, the region has been increasingly seen from the southern angle, as part of the "stan" area.¹ The attention commanded by Afghanistan spilled over to Central Asia.

The EU enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007 brought the region closer to European borders. Central Asian states became "neighbours of neighbours", and therefore, increasingly within the scope of the growing geopolitical ambitions and influence of the EU around its perimeter. Finally, the 2006 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine and the subsequent search for alternative to Russia suppliers of gas to Europe threw light on Central Asia as a potential source.

These developments fed the perception among European policy makers that there is a need for a new approach to Central Asia. The effort was spearheaded by Germany during its presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007. In June 2007, "The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership" was adopted. It was announced as the first political strategy developed for Central Asia.

High on symbolic value, the Strategy contains ideas, guidelines and policies with a good potential to make the European engagement in the region more coherent and effective. Among the most important are: intensification of political ties through regular dialogues at the top political level; indication of a number of areas for focused assistance (such as good governance, education, environment, etc.), supported by the doubling of the assistance budget (from 350 million euro for 2001-6 to 750 million euro for 2007-13); and the new emphasis on the bilateral approach that acknowledges diversification among Central Asian states and slow pace of regional integration.²

The adoption of the Strategy is a very significant development, marking a breakthrough in the relations between European and Central Asian states. However, it cannot be considered a full-

¹ The US State Department moved Central Asian states from its European Bureau to the newly created Central and South Asia Bureau.

² It was decided to maintain regional approach for issues that need regional solutions (organized crime, drugs trafficking, water management, etc.) and to develop more tailored policies and cooperation programmes to deal with issues better solved on a bilateral basis, taking into account different needs and conditions in Central Asian states.

fledged political strategy. It departs from the level of an assistance programme but does not achieve that of a document with clear political goals.

The Strategy contains some elements of a strategy. It draws the links between European and Central Asian security indicating the common threats and challenges. The EU approach is that of comprehensive security upheld by the OSCE. It will continue to provide direct assistance to the military-political security sector: helping to combat human, drugs and arms trafficking, proliferation, organized crime, and international terrorism.

The EU will also help to address the causes of instability, such as poor governance, lack of rule of law, poverty, and violation of human rights, through various aid programmes. The Strategy envisions special Rule of Law initiative, European education initiative, and a regular dialogue on human rights. It is hoped that these efforts will contribute to the creation of “a peaceful, democratic and economically prosperous Central Asia”, which would make the region a better neighbour and partner for Europe.

The Strategy makes another link between European and Central Asian security – in the energy sphere. European countries would like to have access to Central Asia oil and gas resources to provide for the security of supply, and the resource-rich states of the region are interested in the security of demand and geopolitical benefits that can be provided by the diversification of oil and gas export routes. The parties are trying to reduce their dependence on Russian supplies and pipelines.

The interest in transition and reforms in Central Asia is more abstract and long-term, while the interest in hydrocarbons, particularly gas, is tangible and short-term. They create a dilemma and grounds for accusations that the EU is using “double standards” and chooses interests over values. It is clear that governments of resource-rich states would be criticized with less enthusiasm.

Although it is noted in the Strategy that “the intensity of cooperation will reflect the commitment to transition and reform in each country”, it is unlikely that the EU would cut assistance in cases of “lack of commitment to transition and reform” in the country, relying more on the soft power of ideas and examples rather than the “carrots and sticks” mechanism. Central Asia is perceived to be a difficult terrain for democratisation, therefore there is an understanding that engagement is valuable in itself. This serves as a counter-argument to the “double standards” accusations. It is a very valuable argument. Nevertheless, the dilemma remains, and it would be necessary to develop some clarity as to what can be achieved in the sphere of political transformation and what are the best ways to achieve this.

The Missing Geopolitical Context

The intensified dialogues and more focused assistance are good steps. However, it is impossible to be an effective actor in Central Asia without taking into consideration the complex geopolitical context of the region. The Strategy does not dwell on it. The only element that has a geopolitical meaning is the reference to building the energy corridor Caspian Sea-Black Sea-EU energy transport corridor, which implies bringing Caspian oil and gas to Europe bypassing Russia.

The lack of geopolitical context is understandable. The Strategy is a document that has to be agreed by all 27 member-states who have different interests and relations with the key actors in Central Asia: Russia and the US. There is no consensus on what should be done in the relationship with China – another competitor for Central Asian resources and political

influence. The European approach at the moment is soft and cooperative, which is simultaneously a source of strength (for it allows to avoid unnecessary antagonism and rivalry), but at the same time a source of weakness (for it does not allow an effective common foreign policy, coveted by the promoters of European integration).

With regard to Russia in Central Asia, the important questions to answer would be in what areas cooperation and partnership between Russia and the EU/European countries are possible, and in what areas a certain rivalry is unavoidable. At present, both parties are competing for the resources of the region and, in a less obvious manner, for political influence over it. Russia is traditionally entrenched in Central Asia and has a myriad of connections with it, but it does not have enough resources and inspirational power to serve as the ultimate magnet for the countries of the region. The EU is a remote and not so familiar actor, but it is increasing its presence and has the reputation of a successful political community the citizens of which enjoy the highest standards of living.

With regard to China, the issues to consider would be the implications of China's growing influence for the region and European interests in it; what forms of cooperation and in what institutional formats are possible and could yield the best results (for example, would it be beneficial for the EU to develop ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?).

As for the traditional ally of the EU – the United States, the objective would be to define European interests against American ones in the region and find out the areas of compatibility or lack of such. One issue to consider would be what are the implications of the ongoing development of transport infrastructure between Central Asia and Afghanistan, what are the potential benefits, costs and risks.

It would be natural for the EU to carry out policies in the region that are driven by European interests. The key challenge is to formulate these interests. In this sense, Central Asia puts the EU and its ability to carry out a CFSP to the test.

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