THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD:
GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
Utrikespolitiska Institutet (UI)
Rome, 23-24/II/2007

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1. The dynamics of change in the Arab world: globalisation and the re-structuring of state power : general concept paper / Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (13 p.) [vedi Documenti IAI 0622]
2. The changing patterns of political mobilisation and participation in the Arab world : concept paper for the political sector of the research / Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (9 p.) [vedi Documenti IAI 0623]
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UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET

WORKSHOP on

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

Rome, 23-24 February 2007

- IAI Library Room -

PROGRAMME

FRIDAY, 23 FEBRUARY 2007

13.30-14.30 *Welcome Lunch*

14.30-15.30 **I SESSION - *Introduction***

Dynamics of change in the Arab world: a framework for research
by Daniela Pioppi and Laura Guazzone, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

15.30-16.00 *Coffee-break*

16.00-18.00 **II SESSION - *The case of Egypt***

Chair: Daniela Pioppi, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

Discussion of research paper outlines:

- *Changing patterns of political mobilisation and participation*
  Joel Beinin, American University in Cairo, Egypt
- *The changing modalities of wealth accumulation and distribution*
  Ulrich G. Wurzel, University of Applied Sciences of Berlin - FHTW, Germany
- *The re-organisation of internal and external security*
  Philippe Droz-Vincent, Institut d'Etudes Politiques-Paris, France

SATURDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 2007

9.15-11.15 **III SESSION - *The case of Morocco***

Chair: Maria Cristina Paciello, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

Discussion of research paper outlines:

- *Changing patterns of political mobilisation and participation*
  Muhammad Tozy, Hassan II University, Morocco
- *The changing modalities of wealth accumulation and distribution*
  Myriam Catusse, Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, France
- *The re-organisation of internal and external security*
  Issandr El Amrani, Free-lance journalist, Morocco-Egypt

11.15-11.30 *Coffee-break*

11.30-13.30 **IV SESSION - *The case of Lebanon***

Chair: Karin Aggestam, Lund University, Sweden

Discussion of research paper outlines:

- *Changing patterns of political mobilisation and participation*
  Karam Karam, Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Lebanon
- *The changing modalities of wealth accumulation and distribution*
  Charbel Nahas, Economist, Lebanon
- *The re-organisation of internal and external security*
  Elizabeth Picard, Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, France

13.30-14.30 *Lunch*

14.30-16.00 **V SESSION - *The case of Saudi Arabia***

Chair: Helena Lindholm Schulz, Göteborg University, Sweden

Discussion of research paper outlines:

- *Changing patterns of political mobilisation and participation*
  Steffen Hertog, St. Anthony's College, UK

- *The re-organisation of internal and external security*
  Paul Aarts, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

16.00-16.30 *Coffee-break*

16.30-18.00 **VI SESSION - *Research agenda***

Chair: Daniela Pioppi and Laura Guazzone, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

- *Conceptual and methodological framework*: main issues raised during the discussion.
- *Working agenda about*
  - overall trends (transnational change and country specific dynamics);
  - implications for policy oriented analysis.
- *Future activities.*

Workshop secretariat:
Nathalie Champion n.champion@iai.it

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COMPAGNIA di San Paolo

Istituto Affari Internazionali

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Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

GENERAL CONCEPT PAPER

by

Laura Guazzone & Daniela Pioppi*

Project Rationale Recent international events brought Arab politics to the forefront of the world's attention and revealed the failure of current explanatory paradigms to foresee and explain political change in the region, namely those paradigms that identify Islam as the fundamental explanatory variable or that portray globalisation as an unquestionably democratising force. Given the strategic relevance of the Arab countries for global security and peace, a better understanding of developments on the ground and a new conceptualisation of the dynamics of change in the Arab world are strongly needed.

Project Aim The research project aims at elaborating new empirical data and a new conceptualisation of the political, economic and security changes in the Arab countries today as well as their policy implications for domestic and international actors.

1. The background of the research: political change without democratisation in the Arab World

In the last two decades, the study of change in developing countries has been dominated by a framework of analysis and a set of assumptions largely inspired by the theories of transition towards democracy.[1] Although the Arab world is often considered a latecomer and/or an exception with respect to the much more advanced political and economic transitions in other parts of the world, it is still widely analysed in the same perspective.

Recent studies, however, have started to criticise the so-called *democratisation paradigm* for its prescriptive and normative bias. More precisely, they question the idea that political change can be analysed and measured on a rigid and universal path going from authoritarianism to democracy through a set of pre-given sequences, thus determining a sort of teleological search for democracy, even where empirical evidences are very weak to say the least.[2]

Moreover, critics of the democratisation theory pointed out that most democratisation studies do not consider structural variables – such as the structure of the economy, the process of state-formation and so on – as relevant factors in the onset and outcome of the transition process, as if success of transition could simply be granted by applying a universal recipe, independently from the context.[3] As Carothers quite rightly argued: "All that seemed to be necessary for democratisation was a decision by a country's political elites to move toward democracy and an ability on the part of those elites to fend off the contrary actions of remaining antidemocratic forces".[4]

According to the critics of the democratisation 'paradigm', the prescriptive and volontaristic bias of the transition theory had the consequence of granting a primary importance to the institutional and formal aspect of politics, to the disadvantage of the analysis of power relations and variables, both in their national and international dimensions.

As far as the Arab world is concerned, post-colonial regimes had to face in the last two to three decades a number of internal and external challenges (i.e. fiscal crisis, legitimacy crisis, end of the cold war, etc.). Indeed, those challenges were the main drive to a transformation process reaching all aspects of political life: the political discourse used by the regimes and the oppositions changed; the organisation of the economic system changed through structural adjustment policies, privatisation and liberalisation; and, finally, political institutions changed through an ever broader institutional and juridical reform which, at least formally, improved the mechanisms and the guarantees of political participation.

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[1] O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe; Whitehead, Laurence (eds.) (1986), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Perspectives,* Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press; Huntington, Samuel P.(1991), *The Third Wave. Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.

[2] Carothers, Thomas (2002), 'The end of the transition paradigm', *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 1

[3] Rueschmeyer, Dietrich ; Stephens, Evelyne H. ; Stephens, John D. (1992), *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago: Chicago Uviversity Press.

[4] Carothers, op. cit., p. 8.

However, while transitologists believe this process to be leading toward economic and political liberalisation and, eventually, democratisation, their critics have recently pointed to the adaptation capacity of regimes, which successfully implemented tactical opening with no substantial change on their authoritarian nature.[5]

In fact, notwithstanding recent transformations which, as precarious as they may be, seem to converge towards the construction of more liberal political regimes, a significant number of analysts agree that the reforms carried out or under way do not represent a real process of democratisation, nor are they preliminary to it, and that they actually configure and legitimate a restructuring of the power system, both at the national and international level, that does not change the authoritarian and patrimonial nature of the regimes.

Yet, in spite of the growing academic consensus on the *neo-authoritarian* character of the ongoing transition in the Arab world, its inner and international dynamics and consequences are still in many senses obscure. This is probably due to the large space given to the democratisation debate since the eighties: both transitologists and their critics have long been concentrated in either forecasting systemic change or in denying it, thus neglecting the important study of political transformation below the level of systemic transition.

This project aims precisely at filling this void by investigating the internal and international dynamics and the socio-political consequences of the on-going restructuring of the power system in the Arab World and by taking a more open approach that takes into account change below that of transition from one type of regime to another.[6]

In other words, rather than approaching the most debated questions of transition to democracy or, on its opposite, authoritarianism resilience and adaptability, the main object of this research would be *change within authoritarianism* in the Arab world:

- In what ways are current regimes in the Arab World different from their post-independence predecessors in terms of social bases and ruling coalitions, distribution of resources, modes of governing, political discourses?
- How does change in the Arab world interact with structural change at the global level and with specific external actors' policies?
- What are the internal and international consequences of this change?

2. Interpreting change in the Arab World: globalisation and the changing structure of state power

Most analysts of present-day societies would agree on identifying the driving force of change in the contemporary world with that cluster of dynamics commonly referred to as *globalisation.* Ironically, no common definition of globalisation could be found in the literature, although all definitions comprise a number of historical events such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communication technology revolution and, generally speaking, growing global economic interconnectedness in which international financial management and global orthodoxies concerning fiscal practises, openness, loans, and national indebtedness are essential ingredients.

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[5] See, for instance, Albrecht, Holger; Schlumberger, Oliver (2004), "Waiting for Godot: Regime change Without Democratisation in the Middle East", *International Political Science Review*, October; Bicchi, Federica; Guazzone, Laura; Pioppi, Daniela (eds.) (2004), *La questione della democrazia e il mondo arabo. Stati, società, conflitti*, Monza, Polimetrica; Posusney, Marsha Pripstein; Angrist, Michele Penner (eds.) (2005), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, London, Lynne Rienner.

[6] An important step in this direction was the workshop "Dynamics of Stability: Middle Eastern Political Regimes Between Functional Adaptation and Authoritarian Resilience" organised by Oliver Schlumberger and Farid al-Khazen at the 5th Mediterranean Social & Political Research Meeting, Florence & Montecantini Terme, March 2004.

For Arab countries, globalisation has mainly implied growing external interferences in their economic, security and political spheres or - to be more precise - a growing sharing in a subordinate position into a renewed globalised order. In fact, Arab countries have been increasingly exposed to standardisation with the globalization's leading countries and therefore have engaged in "externally" imposed structural adjustment programmes, security arrangements and liberalisation reforms. This is true to the point that the current situation, despite important differences, bears many analogies with the epoch of the so called *first globalisation*, i.e. the period of European colonial expansion in the Middle East (1870-1914). Yesterday as today, the directions of political and economic change – or the process of state formation - are largely determined by the capacity of local actors to adapt or react to external pressures for reform and by the intended and/or unintended effects of these interactions.

Transition theories agree on the fact that growing external pressure is one of the most powerful factors in leading to political change, but then assume that the direction of this change in authoritarian political systems is, at least potentially, towards political liberalisation and, eventually, democratisation. For Arab countries the argument goes that post-Second World War authoritarian regimes relied heavily on the state's almost complete control of the political sphere and of the economy to grant their citizens' political compliance. Once the fiscal crisis and international pressures reduced the ideological and allocative capacities of the state, the basis of support would also decrease and the required political reform and structural adjustment of the economy would encourage the emergence of new political and economic actors, thus fostering the expansion of political and economic participation.

Recent studies on Arab countries, however, have effectively demonstrated that political and economic reforms do not necessarily imply a loosening of the state's control over society and, hence, the emergence of independent actors.[7] In countries like Morocco and Egypt, for example, privatisation processes have represented a chance for ruling elites to reorganise or, better, shift patronage networks towards the private sector without undermining the power of the state as the ultimate source of rent. On the contrary, they have provided it with new sources of wealth and new opportunities for accumulation and distribution. In fact, the emerging private sector in Arab countries remains dependent upon state connections for its own survival and thus easily cooptable by the regime.[8]

At the political level, the introduction of limited or formal institutional reform and multiparty systems allows for, in the best-case scenario, a system of controlled and limited representation of those social groups benefiting from economic reform. At the same time, it eases internal tensions and provides regimes with international legitimacy, while the majority of the population remains excluded from significant political processes, as demonstrated by the lack of social constituencies of most opposition parties and groups.[9]

These empirical fundings question the *state retreat/expanding society approach* that characterises much of the transition literature. In fact, they all indicate that *the state is still the main source of authority and control, albeit by delegating some of its functions to private actors, and using more indirect and sometime informal modes of government.*[10]

The empirical observation of the endurance of state power in the Arab world has produced a large debate on the Arab states' exceptional 'resistance' to global trends.[11] In general, the 'post-democratisation' literature emphasises the successful *survival strategies* of incumbent Arab elites that have

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[7] Hakimian, Hassan; Moshaver, Ziba (eds.) (2001), *The State and Global Change. The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle east and North Africa*, Richmond: Surrey, Curzon

[8] See the concept paper for the economic sector of the research.

[9] Catusse, Myriam; Vairel, Frédéric (2003), "Ni tout à fait le même, ni tout à fait un autre. Métamorphose et continuité du régime marocain", *Monde arabe – Maghreb – Machrek*, 175; Hibou, Béatrice (1996), "Les enjeux de l'ouverture au Maroc. Dissidence économique et contrôle politique", *Les études du CERI*, 15, April; Kienle, Eberhard (2001), *Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt: A Grand Delusion*, London: I.B. Tauris; Kassem, May (2004), *Egyptian politics: the dynamics of authoritarian rule*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. See the concept paper for the political sector of the research.

[10] Hibou, Béatrice (ed.) (2004), *Privatising the State*, London: Hurst & Company.

permitted them to exceptionally maintain state power *despite* externally imposed political and economic reforms.

Yet, the existence of a coherent global trend towards reducing state power to which the Arab world would be 'resistant' is far from being verified. At a closer look, in fact, the state not only does not seem to be globally in question, but also significantly remains the *main internationally recognised framework for political action* and the main *mediation structure between the global and the local.*[12] Local ruling elites in the Arab world derive their power and their patronage network precisely from the fact of controlling a *globally recognised* state, in as much as political and economic elites in core industrialised countries utilise state power to expand and protect their interests.

As Hibou and Bayart quite rightly point out in their thought-provoking works, the idea of a global trend of state 'retreat' and, we add consequently, the opposite but symmetrical thesis of the Arab state's exceptional resilience, are based on a substantialistic and normative definition of the state, artificially separated from the social group detaining power inside it and from society at large.[13] A more useful approach to study the dynamics of political change in the Arab world, as elsewhere, would be instead to consider the state as a *system of power*, which can extend its control well beyond its formal institutions. For instance, the state can 'retreat' from certain functions (e.g. providing social services to the population), but still maintain its control on the economy and on wealth accumulation and distribution through its informal patronage networks. Or the appearance of extra-state actors, apparently in opposition or competition with the state itself, can be interpreted as a *redeployment* of the latter using new strategies that include a growing reliance on private intermediaries (e.g. informal association of state officials with private entrepreneurs in most Arab countries - but also in the US or in Italy -, with smugglers in Morocco or with private providers of social services - including NGOs and Islamists - in Egypt and Morocco).[14]

Hence, what is in question at the global level (and in the Arab world) is not the relevance of the state as a system of power, but the forms and points of state intervention and the nature of the values and norms that the state reproduces. *Globalisation could therefore be exemplified as an on-going process of state restructuring both for industrialised core countries and for peripherical weak-states.* There is nothing particularly new in this process. In fact, the role, functions and formal boundaries of the state are constantly changing categories reflecting internal and external power relations: what pertains to the private sphere and what to the public; what distributional role the state should have; what is the sacred realm of national sovereignty and what is of international competence, depend on the historically and geographically varied results of a struggle between relevant internal and international actors for the management and distribution of political and economic resources. In this perspective, the epoch we live in does not necessarily represent a radical cut with the past, such as a qualitative transformation of the capitalist mode of production or the interruption of that multi-secular connection between capitalism and the formation of a states system, but it definitely corresponds to a significant alteration of the distribution of political and economic resources both within states and between them.

The present phase of global *state re-structuring* begins in the 1980s and 1990s, the decades of economic liberalization and privatisation, during which economic reform and structural adjustment unfolded in free-market West European economies, in centrally controlled markets, such as China and Eastern Europe, and in interventionist regimes of Less Developed Countries (LDCs). As varied as they may be, these reforms bear several common characteristics: they all find approval in the (neo-)liberal discourse, they all make increasing use of private means for governing, they all alter not only the forms of

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[11] Henry, Clement M.; Springborg, Robert (2001), *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

[12] Bayar, Jean-François (2004), *Le gouvernement du monde. Une critique politique de la globalisation*, Paris, Fayard; Hibou, op. cit., 2004.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Hibou, op. cit., 2004

economic regulation but also the forms of political regulation and the forms of sovereignty. In other words, they all displace, relativise and re-draw the borders between the 'public' and the 'private'.

However, the effects, arrangements and responses to this global process of *state restructuring towards an increased use of private and indirect modes of government* vary greatly from context to context, for instance from Western democracies to authoritarian Arab regimes, depending *inter alia* on the local historical configuration of power, so that some global trends (e.g. the change in the distributional role of the state reflecting changes in the power relation between labour and capital in favour of the latter) could determine very different local or national arrangements or responses.

2.1 Working hypotheses of alternative futures for Arab political regimes

The process of state *restructuring* and *redeployment* resulting from the interactions of international and domestic actors could lead to very different regional and national outcomes.

In some cases, it could *consolidate neo-authoritarian political regimes*, in which the state increasingly represents the sum of the private interests of the members of the regime and is less and less accountable to its own citizens (privatisation of the state). This development would be characterised by a fragmentation of the power structure and by an increase in informal modes of government (neo-patrimonialism, corruption), with a parallel political and economic marginalisation of large social sectors.

However, a reduction in budget revenues and corresponding financial difficulties for the public administration; a reduction in expenditure and in the quality of services and, hence, a loss of legitimacy by the state administration and public authorities; a fragmentation of decision-making powers; and the primacy accorded to external rather than internal legitimacy, are all factors that are bound to create their own local dynamics and growing internal opposition. To this should be added the growing articulation of the national political and economic arenas and the effects of the trans-national flow of ideas and information, which could give new room for opposition to and transformation of traditional power.

Yet, only a bottom-up process of mobilisation and politicisation can break the neo-patrimonial mechanisms on which the regimes are based, thus triggering a real *enlargement of political and economic participation and, possibly, democratisation.* For this to happen, an international context favourable to real democratisation is needed.

Growing political instability and opposition to incumbent regimes could also bring about a *return of more populist and nationalist forms of authoritarianism*, especially where a loss of the regimes' legitimacy is coupled with a conflict-ridden and hostile international environment.

3. The research

3.1 The research focus

Following on from what has been discussed in the previous paragraph, the research will analyse the transformations in power relations in the Arab world and, hence, the direction of political change, by examining two general and interrelated dynamics:

(1) *The changing structure of state power.* The internal process of state *restructuring;* i.e. the changing role, functions and formal boundaries of the state resulting from historically and geographically diverse struggles for the management and distribution of political and economic resources;

(2) *The dynamics and consequences of the growing Arab world sharing into a globalised order.* The impact of the Arab world increased exposure to standardisation with globalisation's leading countries (e.g. externally

imposed structural adjustment programmes, security arrangements and liberalisation reforms). The directions of political and economic change – or the continuous process of state formation - are in fact largely determined by the capacity of local actors to adapt or react to external pressures for reform and by the intended and/or unintended effects of these interactions. Interactions between domestic and international actors are complex and can have opposite effects. Outside pressures could either benefit (e.g. by providing new sources of wealth accumulation) or undermine local ruling elites (e.g. by delegitimating the regime) or contribute to creating certain internal political arrangements (e.g. by supporting specific opposition groups and contrasting others). The side effects of these complex interactions (e.g. emerging economic or political actors; new political discourses and forms of mobilisation) could in turn determine unexpected political developments.

3.2 The research sectors

These two general dynamics determining the direction of political change in the Arab world will be investigated in the three inter-related *research sectors* corresponding to the fundamental areas of post-independence state power:

(1) Security and coercion (security sector);

(2) Wealth accumulation and distribution (political economy sector);

(3) Political mobilisation (political sector);

For each sector, the research will focus on a set of *sectorial research areas* with the final aim of giving new insight into the general dynamics of change mentioned previously:

(1) How is the structure of state power changing in that specific sector?

(2) What are the interactions of domestic and international actors and the side effects of their actions in that specific sector?

3.3 The national case studies

The *national case studies* envisaged by the project are the following: Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

The main reason for the selection of the four countries mentioned above is that they constitute a good sample of the Arab world diversity:

(1) Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are representative of different sub-regions within the Arab world (Maghreb, Mashreq, Gulf); while Lebanon is in many ways a 'deviant', yet critical case to include in the analysis.

(2) The four countries selected have *very different processes of 'state formation'* and very different political regimes, thus representing a fairly good sample of the Arab World regimes' variety:

Egypt: prototype of the 'radical' nationalist populist regime in the 50s-60s; policy shift with Sadat and Mubarak, but still 'strong' state (bureaucracy, hegemonic party, military)

Morocco: traditional monarchy (Makhzen-tribes) – indirect system of rule

Lebanon: 'weak' communitarian state – externally vulnerable (civil conflict 1975-1991)

Saudi Arabia: traditional monarchy (kin-ordered), but also prototype of rentier state/oil exporting economy

Moreover, in all the four countries selected, recent national, regional and/or international events have multiplied the effects of the general process of state re-structuring, thus accelerating the pace of change

(e.g. the issue of succession in Morocco and Egypt; Syrian withdrawal in the case of Lebanon; 9/11 and growing internal and regional opposition in the case of Saudi Arabia, etc.).

Time-frame of the research

In terms of research time-frame, it is important to keep a historical comparative perspective to highlight structural change, although the focus of the analysis should be on the last ten years (mid-1990s till today- the exact periodisation depending on the research sector and country).

3.4 Introduction to the three sectors of the research

The following paragraphs offer a brief introduction of the three *sectors* of the research. The sectorial frameworks of the research are fully developed through separate *concept papers*, which discuss the sectorial research areas and provide the research guidelines for the elaboration of the case studies.

The research sector of security and coercion (security sector)

In the last two decades, a number of new factors, international (end of the Cold War and new US Greater Middle East strategy), regional (first and second Iraq war, collapse of Oslo process) and internal (political and economic reform) have modified the Arab states' organisation of internal and external security.

This trend has been accelerated in recent years by the challenge of global terrorism and Western responses to it (e.g. military interventions and increased intelligence control), which have bolstered the use of force as a means of regulating international relations, while limiting weaker states' margin of manoeuvre in security matters and increasing their dependency on external support.

The increasing importance of foreign intervention, foreign bases and stationed troops in Arab states' internal and external security has both a stabilising and de-stabilising effect on the states concerned (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) and on their chances of peaceful political change.

Armies have not become smaller and have maintained substantial budgets, often keeping a 'behind the scenes' political role. The military are traditionally key political actors in Arab regimes. Military personnel and expenditures in most Arab countries represent an important aspect of the 'body and muscle' of the state, while military elites remain crucial – if not pivotal – partners in most ruling coalitions.

As far as the functions of the armed forces are concerned, there has been a progressive 'civilianisation' of cabinets and other political and administrative organisations, combined with an increased emphasis on professionalism within the armed forces and growing efforts aimed at depoliticising the military. An indicator of this might be the expanding 'economic wing' of the army, which in many countries is involved not only in military industries (as was the case in the '50s and '60s), but also in extensive public works and various semi-private economic activities (e.g. Egypt, Algeria). This can be seen as an example of the redeployment of state bureaucracies from public to private sectors.

As far as the management of internal security is concerned, today both regimes and armed oppositions organise their strategies by taking external factors increasingly into consideration, lest they bring on (at least theoretically) foreign intervention or hostile mobilization (e.g. Syria, Lebanon). But due *inter alia* to the effects of the global war on terror, this development does not always translate into a more peaceful approach to the resolution of internal conflicts. For example, the timing of suppression of radical Islamic opposition by military means is often a by-product, however manipulated and/or negotiated, of the regime's obedience to international requirements and foreign pressures. For all the new emphasis on democratisation as the new Western security goal in the Middle East, strategic rent is still received by local pillars of regional or sub-regional stability or, conversely, countries acting as pivots for

externally-driven change, as proved by the enduring flows of military aid, and remains an important asset for many Arab regimes (Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia).

Research areas The consequences of these trends of change in the organisation of the internal and external security of Arab states will be analysed through the following research areas:

(1) The impact of the redefinition by foreign actors of national and regional security architecture (e.g. foreign interventionism and arms proliferation; competition for strategic rent and military aid).

(2) The changing functions of the armed forces and their role in regime transition (e.g. 'civilianisation'; alliance with old/new interest groups);

(3) The changing strategies of national security apparatuses and armed opposition groups (e.g. change in patterns of repression vs. cooptation of dissent or reliance on foreign assets for territorial control; relationship between local and trans-national terrorist networks);

The research sector of wealth accumulation and distribution (political economy sector)

Since the end of the Cold War, the restructuring of the global economy – both in terms of production and finance – has resulted in a growing vulnerability on the part of the Arab states to external pressures for liberalisation and privatisation.

As a consequence, all Arab countries - without exception – have implemented some form of economic liberalisation, with some more advanced cases (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt) and some more problematic ones (e.g. Algeria, Syria, Libya and the oil-producer monarchies).

Yet, in spite of the ambitions of the world's leading countries and international financial institutions to make their economic prescriptions universal, the concrete implementation and effects of economic reform vary greatly from one context to another and depend *inter alia* on the bargaining capacity of local ruling elites, on international actors' local interests and, finally, on pre-existing and historically determined political and economic structures.

Generally speaking, economic reforms in the Arab countries have not produced the predicted results (i.e. economic efficiency, emergence of a competitive and productive private sector, more rational distribution of resources, etc.). Economic liberalisation measures have been used mainly by incumbent elites as a strategic tool for restructuring external relations (e.g. negotiating external rents and re-orienting international trade) and the internal distribution of resources (e.g. coopting new social groups and excluding others). For instance, privatisation policies in Morocco, Egypt or Jordan – just to mention a few – have largely implied a shift in patronage networks from the public to the private sector allowing for the persistence of existing regimes and the formation of crony capitalists, rather than competitive markets. At the same time, the reduction in state budgets and the decline of social services have caused the growing marginalisation of a large part of the population.

These policies should not be seen as necessarily in opposition to outside pressures. On the contrary, they can be reinforced or legitimised by international trends. For example, international businesses or foreign states could very well operate through government channels thus reinforcing the internal government/private sector symbiosis. Moreover, by providing profitable connections at the global scale, internal liberalisation and privatisation processes, as well as international exchange, offer members of the regime and their clients an opportunity for enrichment and a way out of the fiscal crisis, while externally imposed cuts in public administration and welfare push for a new distribution of resources which is more favourable to the upper social echelon.

In general, internationally imposed reforms and their local interpretations contribute by means of their contrasts and alliances to a re-structuring of the state's economic functions, which imply greater reliance on indirect (and informal) modes of government. This process is part of a global trend, but finds a specific expression in each regional and national context.

Research areas The dynamics and consequences of the process of state re-structuring in the economic sector will be analysed through the following research areas:

(1) The modalities of wealth accumulation and redistribution under economic reform

(2) The changing role of the state in the provision of social welfare services

(3) The changing state-labour relations

The research sector of political mobilisation (political sector)

The decline of post-independence state ideologies (Arab socialism, Arab nationalism), the growing trans-national flow of ideas and information coupled with increased outside intervention in domestic politics and international pressures for reform have radically altered the organisation of the forms and contents of political mobilisation in the Arab world.

One of the main transformations has been the introduction under international pressure of participatory mechanisms that are formally more democratic (multi-party systems, reform of the legal framework for non-governmental organisations, etc.), but that take on a different meaning in practice, mainly for two reasons. First, participatory mechanisms have been combined with repressive policies towards political actors that are potentially autonomous or that simply have a grass-roots base (e.g. the Islamists). But above all, they have been accompanied by the depolitisation of political confrontation, that is to say, by a system of settling contrasting political interests that is, paradoxically, managed even less than in the past through the formal system of political representation (e.g. parties, trade unions).

In general it can be said that the ongoing political processes imply a general transition – despite their diversity - from post-colonial *inclusive hegemonic regimes* (i.e. political regimes characterised by large popular mobilisation (populism), strong ideology and nearly absent political competition) to more *competitive oligarchies* (i.e. political regimes characterised by higher intra-elite political competition).

This transition is more evident in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon or Morocco, where recent national events have multiplied its effects (e.g. the debate on the succession of Mubarak in Egypt; the withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon; the death of Hassan II in Morocco), producing more acute intra-elite struggles.

Political theory suggests that increased intra-elite competition could have a positive impact on the political mobilisation of those social strata previously excluded from any active political involvement. In brief, increased conflictuality between elite factions, typical of competitive oligarchies, could drive elite groups to search for the support and, hence, the mobilisation of progressively larger parts of the population.

Yet, when carried out by a top-down process, political mobilisation of larger social strata does not necessarily lead to greater *active political participation* capable of contributing to a real process of political liberalisation and democratisation.

A real enlargement of political participation depends on a number of complex variables, such as the intensity of political pressure for enlargement of participation coming from lower social strata organised in parties, trade unions or similar organisations; the degree of institutionalisation of civil and political rights and freedoms; and the efficacy of the regime's repressive apparatus.

Furthermore, the growing external vulnerability of Arab political systems could have a negative impact on domestic political transitions. In fact, the prevailing international discourse equates democratisation with a liberalisation compatible with the strategic interests of dominant powers. Domestic actors could be supported or opposed by foreign states depending on their propensity to defend and represent those states' interests. Or, domestic actors could find it more useful to seek international legitimacy, rather than support for the mobilisation of their own constituencies. The so-called 'Beirut spring' or the recent Egyptian presidential elections are good examples of this trend.

Research areas

(1) The changing political strategy of regimes in terms of cooptation and mobilisation of different social groups

(2) The changing elites and their impact on the mobilisation and participation of different social groups

(3) The changing channels and forms of political mobilisation from below

RESEARCH OUTLINE

The direction of change in the Arab World will be investigated through the analysis of two general dynamics:

1. The changing structure of state power;

2. The dynamics and consequences of the growing Arab world sharing into a globalised order;

These two general dynamics will be investigated in the three inter-related *research sectors* corresponding to the fundamental areas of post-independence state power:

SECURITY SECTOR	POLITICAL ECONOMY SECTOR	POLITICAL SECTOR
Sectorial research areas: - The impact of foreign actors' redefinition of national and regional security architecture (e.g. foreign interventionism and arms proliferation; competition for strategic rent and military aid). - The changing functions of the armed forces and their role in regime transition (e.g. 'civilianisation'; alliance with old/new interest groups); - The changing strategies of national security apparatuses and armed opposition groups (e.g. change in patterns of repression vs. cooptation of dissent or reliance on foreign assets for territorial control; relationship between local and trans-national terrorist networks);	**Sectorial research areas:** -Modalities of wealth accumulation and redistribution under economic reform -The changing role of the state in the provision of social welfare services -The changing state-labor relations	**Sectorial research areas:** -The changing political strategy of regimes in terms of cooptation and mobilisation of different social groups -The changing elites and their impact on the mobilisation and participation of different social groups -The changing channels and forms of political mobilisation from below
Case studies: MOROCCO, EGYPT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA	**Case studies:** MOROCCO, EGYPT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA	**Case studies:** MOROCCO, EGYPT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA

RESEARCH RESULTS BY SECTOR, BY COUNTRY AND GENERAL

The Project timeline and Activities

The project activities include:

October 2005 – March 2006

(1) The elaboration of one general and three sectorial *concept papers* by the IAI-UI core research group;

April – June 2006

(2) Selection of the national case studies for the project (4 for each sector of the research) and selection of 12 international experts for case studies' elaboration;

September 2006

(3) Final assignment of 12 papers on *national case studies* (4 for each sector of the research) to the selected group of international experts;

February-March 2007

(4) A *mid-term workshop* in Rome with the enlarged group of international experts to discuss the conceptual framework of the research and the case study papers' *outlines*;

June 2007

(5) First draft of national case studies' papers

September – October 2007

(6) Second draft of national case studies' papers and the elaboration of by-sector and general *conclusions* by the IAI-UI research team;

Winter 2007-8

(7) *International conference* to present and discuss research results;

Spring 2008

(8) Research results *dissemination* through publication;

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Istituto Affari Internazionali

UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET

(2)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE POLITICAL SECTOR OF THE RESEARCH

by

Daniela Pioppi** in collaboration with **Laura Guazzone*

« THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB WORLD »

1. Background

The dynamics of change at the global level

In the last two decades a number of dynamics at the global level, such as the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, the crisis of mass-based ideologies and the re-organisation of production (i.e. crisis of fordism-keynesianism, smaller and de-located production units, etc.) have determined a change in the patterns of mass mobilisation and participation both in Western democracies and in authoritarian regimes. The general trend is, above and beyond the different political contexts, towards a gradual dismantling and, in any case, a loss of efficacy of mass-based political organisations (e.g. parties, trade unions) coupled with a marked decline in the political ideologies characterising the Cold-War period, in favour of a 'purely technical' economicistic discourse and/or, apparently in opposition, a revival of religious-ethnic identities.

The decline in the organised collective political participation of the lower and middle classes in its traditional forms is observable also in newly established democracies, such as in Latin America, where growing social inequalities, corruption and political violence go together with a de-legitimation of the democratic system determined mainly by the lack of activism and efficacy of political parties.[1] A similar trend is also visible in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes even if, in this latter case, the decline is more in mass mobilisation from above through corporatist-populist institutions reinforced by the loss of efficacy of non-religiously based political opposition parties.

The dynamics of change in the Arab world

In the Arab World, regional and national events have interacted with international structural transformations, at times reinforcing, at times modifying, at times weakening them. The political appeal of the nationalist and developmentalist ideologies prevailing after independence, was dramatically undermined by the Arab defeat of 1967. The debacle had different effects on the countries involved, but in general demonstrated that Arab nationalism and socialism (epitomised by Nasserism and Ba'athism) had failed to transform Arab societies, thus strengthening the position of those advocating a reconsideration of political and ideological structures in the region.

The 1973 war and the following oil boom contributed to shifting the regional power balance from 'radical' populist states to the conservative oil-exporting monarchies (e.g. Saudi Arabia), while the crisis of post-independence 'radical' state ideology combined with the emergence of political Islam, frequently supported by both governments – in search of a new legitimacy - and private interests linked to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf oil states.

All these events, connected with global changes, have brought about a general re-structuring of politics in the region, although the timing and effects have been different from country to country, depending on the local balance of forces and historical configurations of power.

Political liberalisation in the Arab World

The most evident representation and tool of this process of change and political re-structuring was the introduction in most Arab countries of some forms of *political liberalization* in the 1980s and 1990s, centred on renewed participatory mechanisms that are formally more democratic (multi-party systems,

[1] Dabène, Olivier (2000), "L'état de la démocracie en Amérique Latine", in Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.), *Démocracies d'ailleurs. Démocraties et démocratisations hors d'Occident*, Paris, éditions Karthala.

reform of the legal framework for non-governmental organisations, etc.), accompanied however by the *de-politisation* and *elitisation* of political confrontation.

This process of political liberalization - which combines the enlargement of formal venues for political participation with control (if not command) of the use of the elites' political space and demobilisation of mass participation - is generally based on two basic features:

1. *A system of control of elite political participation* - meant to regulate and fine tune it according to regime convenience - based on repression and cooptation measures that encompass:

- the upholding and sometimes even *reinforcement of repressive policies* (emergency law, military tribunals, torture, use of the army for policing purposes, etc.);
- the use of an extensive set of tools to *manipulate and control the liberalised political institutions* (electoral laws, licensing of political parties and associations, laws regulating freedom of press and speech, etc.).

2. *A system of demobilisation of lower social strata based on:*

- *the de-ideologisation of the regime discourse* coupled, since the late 1980s and 1990s, with the promotion of a globalised discourse on the promotion of democracy and civil society in support of *the de-responsabilisation of the state with respect to its citizens* (e.g. as provider of services or development);
- a general *de-politisation of political confrontation*, in which the opposition also participates insofar as it does not try to represent (with the relative exception of the Islamists) alternative political interests and instead shares in the same globalised discourse as the regime (e.g. no real political programmes, no active grass-roots base, etc.).
- a progressive *dismantling of populist corporatist institutions* (in countries where they played a major role) substituted by more private/informal/neo-traditional forms of clientelism, linking to the regime's various urban or rural 'notables', each with its own constituency built on a 'private' clientelist basis.

2. The research focus

The workings and limits of the 'carrot and stick' system that the 'liberalised' Arab authoritarian regimes have used so far to control the elites' political space have been analysed at length, mostly in terms of authoritarian resilience.[2] Less attention has been given by the literature to the change in power relations that that authoritarian resilience implies, that is to say to the change in the social bases of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and to its interaction with global structural change.

This project intends to explore some of the key dynamics and consequences of the re-structuring of the state's role and functions in the political sphere in the Arab region by looking at the *changes in the patterns of political mobilisation and participation* of different social groups and at the impact of external influences on them, both in terms of global structural change and of specific external actors' policies.

2.1 The changing political strategies of regimes in terms of cooptation and (de)mobilisation of different social groups

The general trend in the last three decades has been a marked decline in mass mobilisation of lower and middle social strata through the dismantling/loss of efficacy/relevance of corporatist-populist

[2] Kienle, Eberhard (1998), *Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt. A Grand Delusion*, London, I.B. Tauris; Albrecht, Holger; Schlumberger, Oliver (2004), "'Waiting for Godot': Regime Change without Democratisation in the Middle East", *International Political Science Review*, 25, 4, 371-392; Bicchi, Federica; Guazzone, Laura; Pioppi, Daniela (eds.) (2004), *La questione della democrazia nel mondo arabo. Stati, società e conflitti*, Monza, Polimetrica.

institutions (state-parties, state trade unions), a decline of state ideology (where it constituted a pillar of the regime legitimacy) and a parallel upholding or, sometimes even reinforcement, of informal (neo-patrimonialism, private-public symbiosis) and communitarian (tribal, ethnic, religious) affiliation-cooptation. This process has different dynamics in the different national contexts and is at the centre of the current recomposition of the modes of governing.

To sum up, besides marked national differences, it can be argued that the region has to some extent witnessed a general transition from *post-colonial inclusive hegemonic regimes (i.e. political regimes characterised by large popular mobilisation (populism), strong ideology and hardly any political competition) to more competitive oligarchies (i.e. political regimes characterised by higher intra-elite political competition and middle-lower class demobilisation).*

This process is more evident in post-populist countries such as Egypt and Algeria, where the political dynamics of the last two decades or so could be set against post-independence 'radical' étatist and welfarist policies, based on the mobilisation of lower and middle social strata. In Egypt, the National Democratic Party (regime's hegemonic party, heir of the Nasserist Arab Socialist Union) is rapidly changing both in its ideology[3] and its organisational form (e.g. the increased role of independent candidates or businessmen and technocrats). While the party is no longer a tool of popular mobilisation, its role as a clientelist, non-ideological party seems to be reinforced.

A similar trend can also be detected in those Arab countries which never had a *populist* period - such as the Kingdom of Morocco and Jordan or the 'communal state' of Lebanon – in which the main forms of oppositional politics in the 1960s and 1970s - i.e. the major vehicles of the middle and lower classes' entrance into politics - were still based on some forms of socialism, Nasserism or Ba'athism. In the last two decades, and even more so in the 1990s, the decline of non-religiously-based opposition parties has permitted a relatively smooth clientelist recomposition of politics in the guise of a de-politicised 'democratic transition'. In Morocco, the elections in 1997 and the formation in 1998 of the first opposition government (appointed by His Majesty) inaugurated a new regime strategy of consensus building and selective opposition cooptation. The strategy aims at picking the '*interlocuteurs du pouvoir*' from those factions and families profiting from the economic reform, while at the same time marginalising other actors, such as trade unions and parts of the Islamist movement.[4] In Lebanon, after the long parenthesis of the civil war and the following Syrian hegemony on the country (1983-2005), the politics of the *zaim* have been re-emerging recently, that is complicated and fragile games of international and national conflicts and alliances meant to allocate different spaces and roles, while corruption and clientelism mounts in the absence of non-communitarian based politics.

These elitist recompositions of the political space under the banner of 'political reform and democratisation' are in tune with and sometimes even encouraged by the prevailing international discourse that has equated democratisation with a liberalisation compatible with the strategic interests of dominant powers, their local clients/allies and with the neo-liberal orthodoxy of development.

2.2 Changing elites and their impact on the mobilisation and participation of different social groups

In the last two decades, elites in the Arab world have at least partially changed in response to new policy priorities, which have, in turn been influenced by the structural transformations mentioned above (e.g. economic reform, bureaucratic institutions' loss of relevance, political liberalisation, etc.). Not only have elites changed, but so have the mechanisms and channels of their recruitment: private-sector business representatives have found their way into the upper echelons of the state; elite members with military or bureaucratic backgrounds have started to run private businesses; a new generation of technocrats has acceded to administrative positions. Notwithstanding the symbiosis of 'new' and old'

[3] Ben Nefissa, Sarah (2004-2005), "Le déblocage du débat démocratique en Egypte, legs nassérien et poids du secteur privé", *Maghreb-Machrek*, 182, 59-78 ; Ben Nefissa, Sarah; Arafat, Ala al-Din (2005), *Vote et démocratie dans l'Egypte contemporaine*, Paris, Karthala.

[4] Catusse, Myriam; Vairel, F. (2003), "'Ni tout à fait le meme, ni tout à fait un autre'. Métamorphe et continuité du régime marocain", *Maghreb-Machrek*, 175, 73-91.

elites and the fact that the lines between 'opposition' and regime elites are blurred, the result of this process is still increased elite 'variety' and increased competition between different elite factions.[5]

Political theory suggests that increased intra-elite competition could have a positive impact on the political mobilisation of those social strata previously excluded from any active political involvement. In brief, increased conflictuality between elite factions, typical of *competitive oligarchies*, could drive elite groups to search for the support and, hence, the mobilisation of progressively larger parts of the population.

Yet, there is nothing inevitable in this process. For instance, when carried out by a top-down process, political mobilisation of larger social strata does not necessarily lead to greater active political participation capable of contributing to a real process of political liberalisation and democratisation. Real enlargement of political participation depends on a number of complex variables (e.g. civil and political rights; the repressive apparatus; the effects of external pressures). But, the most important variable of all is the intensity of political pressure for enlargement of participation coming from lower social strata organised in parties, trade unions or similar organisations: if elites have an interest in building their own constituencies, especially in a privatising clientelist/neo-patrimonial system, they might not have an interest in politicising social conflict in fear of undermining the status quo and loosing their elite status.

This is reflected in the evident lack of popular constituencies and alternative political programmes of the main opposition parties. Political parties, in fact, are more tools for elites' client-seeking than for the channelling and expression of different social interests. Mainly for this reason, the crisis and lack of legitimacy of non-religious *political parties* in the Arab world has become worse in the last few years. The 2005 elections in Egypt demonstrated that the Wafd, the newly created al-Ghad and the small parties of the left are clearly out of the electoral game. Also in Morocco, the consensus-building policy of the King - referred to above – coincided with a loss of the constituencies and political relevance of political organisations (parties and trade unions) that had developed out of the independence struggle and which historically had an important role in the country. The heyday of Lebanese political parties was, by contrast, the period preceding the civil war.[6]

The only political actors with a popular constituency are the Islamists thanks mainly to their efficient network of services (e.g. Justice and Development Party in Morocco; Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan; the Hezbollah in Lebanon): they are for structural and organisational reasons more efficient in building their redistributive and clientelist networks. In many countries of the region, such as Egypt and Jordan, the religious-conservative bourgeoisie – which benefited from the oil boom and economic reform - is using its popular constituencies to bargain a larger role in the ruling coalition.

Apparently to compensate the decline of parties, in the last decade or so, there has been a boom of the Islamic and non-Islamic *associational sector* (NGOs, etc.) in all countries of the region. Many of the opposition reform movements of the last years have been organised and led by associations or platform of associations (e.g. *Kifaya* in Egypt, the movement for the reform of the Mudawana in Morocco, the *Qornet Shehwan Gathering* for the Syrian withdrawal in Lebanon). The associational sector - in line with what is happening in other parts of the world - is portrayed by international donors and Western governments, as well as by national elites, as a more agile channel of political participation with respect to traditional parties. However, associations can hardly replace the political role of parties and trade unions in terms of mass representation and political weight and contribute, in the long run, to the fragmentation of the political landscape (e.g. the occupied territories of Palestine). In the best cases such as the ones mentioned above - they remain elite pulpits for delivering sermons for international

[5] Perthes, Volker (eds.) (2004), *Arab Elites. Negotiating the Politics of Change*, London, Lynne Rienner.
[6] el Khazen, Farid (2003), "Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans", *Middle East Journal*, 57, 4, 605-624.

consumption. In other cases, they are easily controlled and coopted by the regime and sometimes even praised for their social role, which relieves the state of its responsibility vis-à-vis its citizens.[7]

Finally, another factor that can distort national opposition elites' strategies is the support or opposition of foreign governments, depending on the elites' propensity to defend and represent foreign states' interests at any particular time. This was the case in the 1970s and 1980s with conservative Sunni Islamist movements which were supported or at least not opposed by Western powers against the left and the Soviet Union's influence in the region. On the contrary, in the nineties, and even more so after 2001, the alleged danger of an Islamic revolution was used to justify repressive regime policies. Very recently, new contacts seem to be opening between the US and some moderate Islamist parties (PJD in Morocco or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). In the current international context, domestic elite actors could find it more useful to seek international legitimacy than support the mobilisation of their own national constituencies. The carefully planned 'Beirut spring' of last year or the recent Egyptian mobilisation for reform are good examples of this trend. Conversely, political opposition movements can be delegitimised in the eyes of their constituencies by Western support.

2.3 The changing channels and forms of political demands from below

The process of political restructuring outlined in the previous paragraphs is having an impact on the way political demands from below are formed and channelled, making the state less-accountable to its own citizens in the end.

The dismantling of populist corporatist institutions in post-populist states and, in general, the decline of the public sector as the prime garantor of the citizens' living standards has diminished the role of the state as the main channel of popular demands. Although political mobilisation from above was in no case comparable to democratic active participation nor were post-independence nationalist ideologies (such as Nasserism and Ba'athism) class-based, still populism implied a certain responsibility of the state with respect to the organised corporatist interests of those social strata previously excluded from the political arena.[8]

The process of demobilisation and de-politisation of the middle and lower social strata, which has characterised political liberalisation in the Arab world, is not compensated - as mentioned - by renewed activism on the part of parties and trade unions, but rather by the continuation and sometimes even reinforcement of informal patron-client relations, increasingly re-oriented from the state to private actors, such as businessmen, rural notables, community leaders.

In Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia, it is the local 'notable' (businessmen, landowner, etc.) who provides, thanks to his links to the state-regime, services to the population in exchange for labour or votes. This is most evident in the countryside, where the return of extensive landed properties is reinforcing 'feudal' practices (e.g. in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia),[9] but it is also happening in the cities, as attested to by the selling of votes in Egypt and Morocco.[10] Popular demands are thus increasingly channelled apolitically through the traditional 'avenues of (informal) participation'.[11]

Although we cannot rely on free-elections or opinion polls, it can safely be argued that the worsening economic situation, increasing inequalities and the regimes' loss of political legitimation are determining a loss of political consensus, especially in those social strata marginalised by recent policies. However,

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[7] Ferrié, Jean-Noel (2003), "Les limites d'une démocratisation par la société civile en Afrique du Nord", *Maghreb-Machrek*, 175.

[8] Bianchi, Robert (1989), Unruly Corporatism. Associational Life in Twenty-Century Egypt, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press; Posusney, Marsha Pripstein (1997), Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions and Economic Restructuring, New York, Columbia University Press.

[9] Ansari, Hamied (1986), *Egypt, the Stalled Society*, Albany, State University of New York Library; King, Stephen (2003), *Liberalization Against Democracy. The Local Politics of Economic Reform in Tunisia*, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.

[10] Ben Nefissa; Arafat, op. cit., 2005 and Catusse; Vairel, op. cit., 2003

[11] Singerman, Diana (1995), *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

lack of consensus does not automatically create political pressure from below or, at least, not in an organised and effective form – and this not only because of the regimes' repressive and coercive policies.

In this respect it is perhaps worth mentioning that - regardless of the kind of polity - lower class participation is more difficult to organise and develop than elite/individual participation: effective political participation of large numbers of people does not come spontaneously once institutional or coercive obstacles are removed. Instead, it needs to be structured and organised.

As underlined by Pizzorno,[12] the essence of politics is precisely the construction of the political preferences of large number of people through the elaboration of collective identities. Collective identities are then the precondition for the calculation of individual benefits (interests) at the mass level. In this sense, politics is much more focused on constructing and modifying the 'needs of the people', than on satisfying them. Ideologies play an important role in this fundamental process of political socialisation as they contribute to the defining of long-term collective interests to which the enjoyment of short-term individual interests should be subordinated. Therefore, the construction of collective identities is a precondition for effective collective political action. The crisis of post-independence mass-based ideologies and the conservative character of Sunni Islamism are hampering the emergence of collective political action from below.

Other forms of expression of discontent from below are possible and have, indeed, sporadically taken place in the Arab world, but are also easily isolated and repressed. They often take violent and spontaneous forms. This is the case with the most extreme forms of religious protests (e.g. Islamic Republic of 'Ain Baba or jihadist groups in the upper Nile valley in Egypt) and popular riots. In Morocco, the current process of political recomposition started in the wake of a huge wave of protests and general strikes in Fez in 1990. In Egypt, popular riots are a regular happening (1977, 1986) and are also a likely scenario today due to the population's worsening socio-economic conditions.

3. Research areas

Following from the above, the dynamics and consequences of the re-organisation of the state's political functions and the restructuring of politics in the Arab world can best be investigated through analysis of **the changes in the patterns of political mobilisation and participation of different social groups and their interactions with external variables.** In the specific, we suggest three areas of research: *(i) the changing political strategy of regimes in terms of cooptation and mobilisation of different social groups; (ii) the changing elites and their impact on the mobilisation and participation of different social groups; (iii) the changing channels and forms of political demands from below.*

The main general questions that the research project plans to investigate through these research areas are:

- How are the social bases of regimes changing? What impact does this have on the modes of governing?
- What impact does the restructuring of politics have on the political mobilisation and participation of middle and lower social strata?
- How do global structural trends and international/regional actors affect the forms and contents of political mobilisation and participation in the Arab World?

[12] Pizzorno, A. (1966), "Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica", *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 3-4; Pizzorno, A. (1996), "Mutamenti delle istituzioni rappresentative e sviluppo dei partiti politici", in *Storia dell'Europa*, vol. 5: *L'età contemporanea*, Torino, Einaudi, pp. 961-1031. But also Foucault or Gramsci.

(i) *The changing political strategies of regimes in terms of cooptation and (de)mobilisation of different social groups*

This research area aims at assessing how the cooptation/mobilisation strategies of the Arab regimes have changed in the last two decades and what impact this change has on the composition of the ruling coalitions, the modes of governing and the political participation of middle and lower social strata.

The main questions to be asked in each case study are:

- How have the cooptation/mobilisation strategies of the regime changed in the last two decades or so?
- What impact does this change have on the recomposition of the ruling coalition, the modes of governing and the political participation of middle and lower social strata?
- What impact does such change have on regime stability and legitimation?
- What impact do external variables have on regimes strategies?

(ii) *Changing elites and their impact on the mobilisation and participation of different social groups*

This research area aims at assessing how the changes in elite composition and in elite strategies impact on the political mobilisation and participation of larger social groups.

The main research questions to be asked are:

- How do different factions of the elites (the lines between 'organic' participation and opposition are blurred) organise their political influence with respect to the regime?
- What are the incentive structure and the rationale of elite constituency building?
- What impact do changing elites and elite strategies have on the political mobilisation and participation of middle and lower social strata?
- What impact do external variables have on elite political behaviour?

(iii) The changing channels and forms of political demands from below

This research area aims at assessing how the changing political role of the state and the restructuring of politics impact on the channels and forms of political demands and participation from below.

The main research questions to be asked are:

- What forms do popular demands take and how are they organised?
- How is popular discontent manifested?
- How do the strategies of elites and regimes affect the forms of oppositional popular mobilisation?
- How do external variables affectthe forms and organisation of popular demands?

4. Methodology

The research areas outlined above could be analysed by taking into consideration:

The discourse/ideology of mobilisation

Analysis (e.g. subjects, dissemination, recipients) of the political discourse (e.g. speeches, platforms, interviews, political programmes) of major internal and external political actors.

(i) The discourse of the regime (e.g. government, King/President) and of its components (old-new guards, military, technocrats, regional leaders)

(ii) The discourse of the opposition elites and their components (e.g. secular, religious, different ideologies – liberal, socialist, nationalist)

(iii) The international discourse (e.g. Western countries, industrialised countries, Arab countries, international donors/institutions) on the national situation

The organisation and the strategies of mobilisation

Analysis of the organisational forms (e.g. parties, associations, ethnic groups, etc.) and strategies (e.g. cooptation, alliances, use of the means of communication, etc.) of political mobilisation used by major internal and external political actors

(i) regime actors (e.g. liberalisation/de-liberalisation; elite cooptation; international alliances; regime parties);

(ii) opposition actors (e.g. old and new parties; NGOs, movements, alliances, platforms)

(iii) international actors (e.g. forms and beneficiaries of bilateral – ex. USAID - or multilateral – ex. Euro-Med Partnership - international policies – ex. funding, political support, support of specific initiatives NGOs).

An actor-based framework:

The analysis of the research areas outlined above could be organised according to an actor-based framework. In this case, the mutual influences of the various international/regional/domestic actors should be analysed to single out their power relations and how they affect the policy choices of the different actors in connection to a (or a set of) specific issue/s at a given time.

An event/issue-based framework:

The analysis of the research areas outlined above also could be organised according to an event/issue framework. In this case, the various discourses and strategies of major international/regional/domestic actors should be analysed by studying their reactions to:

(1) major national/international events (e.g. National elections or Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, succession in Morocco, etc.).

(2) main national/transnational issues (reform of labour code or family code, regional issues such as Palestine, occupation of Iraq)

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(3)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE ECONOMIC SECTOR OF THE RESEARCH

by

Maria Cristina Paciello*

« THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTION UNDER ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE ARAB WORLD »

1. Background

In the 1960s and 1970s, with rare exceptions, Arab countries pursued import substituting industrialization (ISI) strategies to varying degrees, with different ideological underpinnings, and involving central planning and a large public sector. Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia pursued ISI more resolutely.[1] During the period, the Arab region experienced relatively high growth rates and poverty was reduced. However, by the middle of the 1970s, the problems of ISI, compounded by the problems of the state sector, were becoming increasingly apparent.[2] The infant industries had difficulties growing up and becoming internationally competitive because of their high costs. They were, in general, highly capital-intensive, and even in the best of circumstances, did not provide large numbers of jobs.[3] However, the quadrupling of the international price of oil in 1973 led to a major economic boom in the Arab region, thus postponing the need for structural reforms. Both oil and non-oil countries shared in the massive transfer of rents that characterized the period. For the latter, the benefits of the oil boom were partly redistributed to the population through various channels: migration, remittances, high wages and generous welfare policies.

Following the end of the oil boom, economic growth slowed down in all countries of the Arab region. The end of the Cold War, rising economic difficulties associated with serious foreign debt problems and falling oil prices, forced all Arab countries – without exception – to implement some form of economic liberalisation. Countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria agreed to externally imposed macroeconomic stabilization programs with formal assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in return for international financial flows. In other countries, like Lebanon, Syria and oil producer monarchies, market-oriented reforms were carried out without a formal arrangement with the IMF, but still inspired by the recipes advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, the restructuring of the global economy – both in terms of production and finance – has thus resulted in growing vulnerability on the part of the Arab states to external pressures for liberalisation and privatisation. International actors such as the IMF and WB have become strongly involved in prescribing country policy in the region, by channelling important resources to Arab countries in the form of multilateral and bilateral grants, debt rescheduling and write offs. Other actors like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have also pushed Arab countries to open up their economies. The EU, in particular, has been an important source of multilateral credit, and especially since 1995 has been enticing southern Mediterranean regimes to reduce tariffs with the promise of substantially higher EU credits to offset lost customs revenues.

2. Research focus

There is agreement that the scope and the progress of economic liberalisation reforms in the Arab region have been more limited than in other parts of the world. The implementation of structural reform measures has been gradual and slow, and the public sector still dominates most Arab

[1] Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury (1998). *A Political Economy of the Middle East.* Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

[2] Owen, Roger, and Sevket Pamuk (1998). *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century.* I.B. Tauris, London.

[3] Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury (1998). *A Political Economy of the Middle East.* Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

economies. Despite undertaking reforms to remove protection and increase reliance on market forces, Arab economies, with the exception of Gulf countries, have remained relatively protected. Privatisation of public enterprises has generally been selective, and the financial sector remains under close and centralised governmental control. Much of the literature on economic reforms in the Arab region has thus tended to explain why it lags behind other regions in terms of economic reforms. Moreover, although there is evidence that in the last decade living standards and labour market outcomes in most Arab countries have been negatively affected, analysis of the effects of economic reforms in the Arab region has generally focused on issues of economic efficiency, while neglecting issues of distribution, marginalisation and wealth accumulation. So, little attention has been paid to the fact that economic reforms, albeit marked by caution and gradualism, are contributing to a reorganisation of the state's role and its economic functions, with important implications on the processes of wealth accumulation and distribution. This project intends to explore some of the key dynamics and consequences of the reorganisation of the state's economic functions in the Arab region, by looking at three areas of major change: i) the modalities of wealth accumulation and distribution; ii) the role of the state in the provision of social welfare services; iii) state-labour relations.

2.1 Modalities of wealth accumulation and distribution under economic reforms

One of the main features of the production pattern prevailing in Arab countries is high dependence on the extraction of raw materials, especially oil and natural gas, and reliance upon different types of external rents (location rents, strategic rents, migration rents and political rents coming from the acquisition of foreign aid). Nine Arab countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria) can be categorised as oil dependent economies. Egypt, Syria and Tunisia had substantial revenues at their disposal during the oil boom, although the oil sector is now less important. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Syria also account for about one third of the world's phosphate production, while remittances play an important role in the economies of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. In a rentier mode of production, the economic surplus originates neither from investment nor labour, but is generated as the result of natural and other advantages. Rents do not have to be reinvested in the society's production process and are allocated on purely political terms, namely clientelism, patronage and proximity to the state. As is commonly argued, the rentier mode of production has deeply influenced the dynamics of political and economic development in the Arab region, albeit to different degrees in different countries. From a political point of view, it has contributed to reinforcing authoritarianism and to discouraging political participation.[4] The considerable amount of state revenues accruing to rentier states in the form of oil and external rents has served to reduce the state's need to levy taxes from its citizens, thereby weakening the link between the ruler and the ruled. From an economic point of view, Arab governments have tended to overlook the need for diversifying their economies and implementing long terms structural reforms as they take those revenues for granted. In addition, dependency on rents has encouraged rent seeking and other unproductive activities. Resources are allocated because of personal contacts to political decision makers rather than because of labour, personal capability or merit.

In the 1983-2000 period, oil and other related rents generally declined, although Arab countries continue to be dependent on rents to finance a substantial part of the government budget. In the face of resource shortages, inflows tied to economic reform programs have actually provided a way out of the fiscal crisis and new opportunities for Arab ruling elites' to accumulate wealth, thus reinforcing their ability to maintain control over strategic rents and their allocation. For example, although EU funds to North Africa are designed to bolster private enterprise and support privatisation, only a relatively small percentage of them are destined for private companies, and it is North African governments that determine the actual beneficiaries.[5] Moreover, economic reforms

have been used mainly by ruling elites as a strategic tool for maintaining and reorganising the system of privileges that has served them. Although the pace and methods of privatisation policies have differed

[4] UNDP (2004). Arab Human Development Report 2004. UNDP, New York.
[5] Dillman, Bradford (2001), "Facing the Market in North Africa". *The Middle East Journal* 55 (2): 198-215.

in Arab countries, such reforms have largely implied a shift in patronage networks from the public to the private sector, allowing for the persistence of existing regimes and the formation of crony capitalists rather than competitive markets. In Morocco, for example, "personalisation" of the public sector masquerading as privatisation has directly benefited the royal family and entrepreneurs affiliated with it.[6] In addition, in order to gain the necessary backing for selective economic reforms while maintaining control over economic liberalisation, ruling elites have co-opted new economic actors, with the result that new monopolies and oligopolies have emerged, and crony capitalism has accelerated. As Dillman (2001) notes, through economic reforms "the more they [regimes] 'deregulate', the more they 're-regulate' by determining precisely who can most easily benefit from change and join distributional coalitions to tap profits in the market".[7] In Egypt, Mubarak has diversified the crony capitalism system that he inherited from Sadat to generate the patronage and provide the controls over economic liberalisation required for the regime to retain its support within the state, while appearing to adopt the Washington Consensus. In Morocco, the monarchy has built and strengthened a pro-reform coalition composed of two critical groups of winners in the economic reform process: large Moroccan private sector capitalists and rural notables.[8]

Fiscal policy is also an important instrument through which ruling elites can maintain/re-regulate the political arrangement through the logic of extraction and redistribution. In a context of increasing shortage of rents and external pressures to accelerate trade integration, Arab governments have introduced some changes to their tax system. However, the quickest and politically least disturbing way of reforming the tax system has been through an increase in indirect taxes on consumption, such as value added tax. The increased weight of indirect taxes on massive consumption goods is likely to reduce the real disposable income of the poorest sectors of the population and to have a negative impact on income distribution. At the same time, income and corporate taxes have remained negligible or have been reduced, while tax evasion, especially among influential groups, is on the increase. Lebanon is a case in point: the top marginal tax rate on profits was reduced from 50 percent to 10 percent and the corporation tax rate became a flat 10 percent, while indirect taxes increased continuously in the 1990s.[9] While this regressive tax system was seen as a major cause of the hardships faced by the majority of the population, it provided the ruling elites with the revenues for financing rent-seeking activities. In Egypt, fiscal reform, which was primarily influenced by external pressures, also favoured the continuity of pre-reform privileges by serving the interests of well connected major enterprises and owners of capital.[10]

Finally, despite the conditionality associated with multilateral credits and debt rescheduling, economic reforms have not been able to alter the production structure of Arab countries, which has remained almost as undiversified as it was in the 1970s. Money has continued to be spent on construction and services, the local and private capacity of production remains limited, and the share of manufacturing in export has declined or stagnated. This may suggest that economic reforms have not reduced incentives for rent seeking and other unproductive activities. In this context, how the rise in oil prices in the recent years is likely to affect the economic and political dynamics of changes in the Arab region needs to be investigated.

2.2 The role of the state in the provision of social welfare services

From the 1950s through the 1970s, governments in the Arab region, albeit to different extents, progressively redistributed income from the upper to the lower strata through land reforms, universal

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[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury (1998), *A Political Economy of the Middle East.* Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

[9] Dibeh, Ghassan (2005), *The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon*, July, Research Paper 2005/44, WIDER.

[10] See Kienle, Eberhard (2005), "Reconciling Privilege and Reform: Fiscal Policy in Egypt, 1991-2000", in Heydeman S., *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East, The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited.* Palgrave.

food subsidies and free access to education. The ruling elites used the welfare state as an instrument of power to create national unity and a social base of support among the formal working class and middle class. With structural adjustment programs, Arab governments, with the exception of Algeria, did not cut social spending as drastically as other countries, at least over the period for which data are available. However, there is evidence that the social policies of the past have been challenged by declining rents and by the neo-liberal agenda.[11] Countries are increasingly unable to finance or sustain their previous levels of health, educational and welfare services. For example, in Egypt, while in the 1990s, there was an evident increase in education expenditure, the health budget remained under-funded at a low 1.3 per cent of GDP. In Lebanon, public expenditures increased on both health and education until 1998, but after that, the growth of debt, debt servicing and the state's fiscal crisis caused a diversion of resources away from reconstruction and social expenditures.[12] Moreover, social spending has not been sufficient to prevent deterioration in the quality of health and educational services because too much of it is going to pay the salaries of the large number of public employees. In addition, there is evidence that, although health care and education are still free, private expenditure on those services is on the increase, in particular for the poor. Private tuition, for example, has become even more indispensable to obtain good grades in public examinations for access to higher education, especially in disciplines considered most likely to lead to better professional and career prospects. These disciplines are thus becoming almost exclusively the preserve of the privileged.[13]

In this context, the state is reorganising by increasingly delegating its social welfare functions to private and informal actors. This can be seen by the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Arab countries since the 1990s, many of which are Islamic and deliver social services that the state is no longer able to provide, but also by the return of semi-private charity institutions and the increasing importance of informal networks among the poor as a mechanism for the allocation of resources. It is commonly argued that the appearance of these private actors enhances citizen participation, helps build civil society and fosters democratisation. Yet, country studies have shown that the appearance of these extra-state actors, apparently in opposition or competition with the state itself, does not necessarily challenge state control on wealth accumulation and distribution. While many of the Islamic NGOs have helped to recruit their beneficiaries to Islamist politics, NGOs have been generally co-opted with the aim of either widening the regime's power base or directly controlling society. The Tunisian case may be an example of implementation of social policies to create or maintain national and state security. NGOs and district committees were formed to oversee and provide social services mainly for the purposes of controlling and containing the 'dangerous areas' prone to Islamist recruitment and activity.[14] As for the informal networks, while increasingly competing with state-controlled top-down schemes and with markets, they do not put state authority into question. As Singerman (1995) shows for Egypt, informal networks represent a form of participation that is "tacitly tolerated by the state, unless they become vehicles for opposition and resistance or merely work against the interests of state policy".[15]

The appearance of various private/semi-public institutions established by key political figures to organise aid provided by private sources to the needy can be seen as an example of the ongoing process of state restructuring that implies increasing reliance on indirect/private modes of government, but not necessarily a decline in the capacity of the state, understood as a system of power. In Morocco, the Mohammed V and Hassan II Funds, created respectively in 1998 and 1999, are indeed agencies autonomous from the government, but under the patronage of the King. The ambiguous nature – neither private nor public – of such agencies allows the King to ingratiate himself with the public opinion, while at the same time de-responsibilising the state with respect to citizens' social rights. In Tunisia, the presidential programme called 26-26 National Solidarity Fund designed to benefit low

[11] See, for example, Karshenas, Massoud (2006), *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political and Gender Dynamics*, Palgrave.
[12] Dibeh, Ghassan (2005), *The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon*, July, Research Paper 2005/44, WIDER.
[13] UNDP (2002). *Arab Human Development Report 2002*. UNDP, New York.
[14] Karshenas, Massoud (2006), *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political and Gender Dynamics*, Palgrave.
[15] Singerman, Diane (1995), *Avenues of Participation*, Pricepton: Princepton University Press.

income groups receives money from obligatory "gifts" by citizens and businesses as well as the government budget. Moreover, it does not contribute to the national budget and it is the President who decides how to invest the funds. The programme is thus a tool in the hands of the president for reinforcing his legitimacy in the eyes of the beneficiaries and for maintaining control over businessmen and other influential people.[16] Indeed, the latter risk being excluded from access to economic opportunities if they refuse to contribute to the fund.

Finally, the declining role of the state in the provision of social welfare services has probably caused the growing marginalisation of the initial constituents of the populist state from the processes of wealth distribution. Moreover, while the current social protection system is hardly sufficient to reach all deserving people, the number of weaker social groups is increasing because of significantly increased unemployment, lack of job creation and deterioration of real wage rates. These factors are likely to create their own local dynamics, increasing internal opposition to incumbent regimes and social conflict, as well as reinforcing clientelist social relations and informal networks of solidarity (family, religious etc).

2.3 Changing state labour relations

Most of the studies on Arab labour markets in the 1990s agree that there has been a rise in unemployment, a deterioration of real wage rates and growth in the number of people working in informal labour market. In the light of the above, it becomes important to understand how state labour relations have been changing in the last decade under the pressure of economic reforms and globalisation. Before the end of the oil boom, governments in the Arab countries pursued generous employment policies in the public sector, albeit to different degrees, that helped to provide job opportunities to a growing part of the population in the region. This also meant that a large part of the labour force became eligible for formal modes of social protection. During the first phases of structural adjustment policies largely in response to policies to reduce the size of budget deficits, Arab countries, again to different degrees, gradually started reducing the size of their public sectors. In the mid-1990s, in some countries, the state was still playing a major role as employer, but, efforts at reducing public sector employment, especially in state-owned enterprises, intensified after then. By the end of the 1990s, the role of public sector employment as a tool for promoting more equal distribution and ensuring social mobility had become questionable.

Structural adjustment policies were unable to create sufficient jobs to keep apace with the steady increase in the work force. The obligation to liberalise trade and reduce customs duties as a result of joining the WTO and the EU-Mediterranean partnership agreements also exposed local industries to unequal competition, resulting in increased rates of closure of many industrial units or in further informalisation of the labour market. Moreover, under competitive pressures associated with globalisation, Arab governments started implementing measures to favour capital at the expense of labour. This tendency appears clearly in the Arab countries' attempts at creating free trade zones that provide tax exemptions and other incentives to foreign companies. For example, Jordan started attracting FDI after 1996 with its Investment Promotion Law, including the non-Jordanian Investment Regulation of 1997 as well as the 'Qualifying Industrial Zones' project, launched in 1998 and by granting preferential access to the US market. Most Arab countries also began to revise their labour laws to introduce more labour market flexibility in the second half of the 1990s: in 1996, Algeria amended the labour law it passed in 1990; Tunisia and Jordan approved a new labour code in 1996, while Egypt and Morocco did so in 2003.[17] Yet, in order to minimize social conflict at a time when unemployment and social tensions are on the increase, the states are also re-configuring labour relations, with the result that trade unions are losing ground everywhere in the Arab region. In Morocco, while the state is retreating from the sphere of labour relations, it is actually reinforcing its control over trade unions, by depoliticizing and privatising social conflicts. A new approach based on social dialogue with the unions translated into the signature in 1996 of an agreement between the

[16] Hibou, Beatrice (1999), "Tunisie: le coût d'un 'miracle'" *Critique Internationale*, n° 4 été.
[17] ILO, Natlex database, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home

government, the unions and the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (GCME). In this context, the new labour code calls for the involvement of a new actor - the employer– in the process of social negotiation, which becomes a private affair between him and the worker.[18] Finally, under pressure from the World Bank, some Arab countries have recently started to reform their pension and social insurance systems shifting the responsibility to insure against the increased risks and uncertainties of globalisation from government to individual.

3. Research areas/methodology

Based on the foregoing, **the dynamics and consequences of the reorganisation of the Arab state in the economic sector can be best investigated through the analysis of three areas of research: *i) the modalities of wealth accumulation and redistribution; ii) the role of the state in the provision of social welfare services; iii) state-labour relations.***

The main general questions that the research project plans to investigate are:

- How are ruling coalitions reorganising in the context of economic reforms?
- How is the social basis of Arab regimes changing in that context?
- Who gains and who loses from the process of the state's economic reorganisation?
- How are global structural trends and international/regional actors affecting the process of the state's economic reorganisation in the Arab World?

Periodisation

In terms of time focus, while not neglecting an historical perspective, it would be important to look at what has been happening since the mid-late 1990s. This is because structural reforms have accelerated since then and few studies cover that period. For example, from 2000-03, privatisation activity in the Arab region increased greatly in terms of the value of assets sold, led by the sale of telecommunications systems in Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia and several other large sales (the tobacco monopoly in Morocco; cement companies in a large number of countries) that generated significant sums. Also with regard to trade liberalisation, many Arab countries started committing to further liberalising their trade regime in the second half of the 1990s. Morocco joined the EU Mediterranean Partnership in 1996 and signed the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement in 2004, while Egypt and Lebanon signed Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements respectively in 2001 and 2002.

An actor's based framework

The three research areas can be studied by looking at the interaction between the different actors involved in the process of economic reorganisation of the Arab state, namely between ruling elites and international/regional actors (the IMF, the WB, the EU, etc) as well as between various internal actors (e.g. ruling elites, entrepreneurs, NGOs, exporters, new interest groups benefiting from accelerated structural reforms, workers, trade unions, public employees, importers, etc.).

i) Modalities of wealth accumulation and redistribution under economic reforms

This research area aims at investigating how economic reforms (e.g. fiscal policy, privatisation etc) and global trends (e.g. the rise in oil prices, etc) have affected the process of wealth accumulation and

[18] Catusse Myariam 1998, "De La Lutte des classes au Dialogue social. Réflexions sur les recompositions des relations professionnelles au Maroc", *Monde arabe-Maghreb-Machrek* 162, La Documentation française: 18-38.

redistribution, and in particular, whether or not they have reinforced Arab ruling elites' control over resources as well as the politics/logics of rent seeking.

The main questions to be asked are:

- How have economic reforms and global trends impacted on the way economic surplus is produced, distributed and invested?
- How have economic reforms affected ruling elites' control over wealth accumulation and redistribution as well as the politics of rent-seeking?

ii) The role of the state in the provision of social welfare services

This research area aims at understanding how, under economic reforms, the role of the state is restructuring in the provision of social welfare and what the implications are of such changes on wealth distribution and political dynamics in Arab countries.

The main questions to be addressed:

- How is the role of the state changing in social welfare provision?
- What are the distributive implications of such changes?
- How are social cohesion and ruling elites' legitimacy affected?

iii) *State-labour relations*

This area of research seeks to highlight how state labour relations have been changing under the pressure of economic reforms and globalisation.

The main questions to be addressed are:

- How are state labour relations restructuring under the pressure of economic reforms and globalisation?
- How are changes in state labour relations likely to impact on economic distribution and social cohesion?

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CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR OF THE RESEARCH

by

Karin Aggestam & Helena Lindholm Schulz*

« SECURITY, GLOBALISATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST »

1. Introduction

Globalisation challenges central assumptions of the state as well as international relations, such as the conventional divide between national and international spheres. Globalisation has resulted in a diversification of threats, which on the one hand have created multilateral pressures to cooperate, but on the other hand new modes of fighting and sources of conflict. We may also observe a drastic decline in major interstate wars as well as a general decline in military expenditures while a rise of transnational actors. *Military globalisation* refers to "the process (and patterns) of military connectedness that transcend the world's major regions as reflected in the spatio-temporal and organization features of military relations, networks and interactions."[1] Thus, military globalisation involves the ways in which military networks and alliances expand and the ways in which security affairs of different regions interact and influence one another. This has meant according to some scholars that national security and traditional state-centred approaches have weakened under the impact of powerful global social forces. We are therefore faced with a new and broadened security agenda (including "soft security" issues), which alters the relevance of national military power and increases the importance of multilateralism. Consequently, security is increasingly being sought through regional institutions. The transformation in the security sector includes a shift from traditional Clausewitzian interstate wars to postindustrial warfare and changes the way states organise their security apparatus, that is, from warfighting to crime fighting components and policing apparatus.[2]

Still, others argue that we need to differentiate the effects and changes in the developed world with the third world where the security predicament is still strongly linked to the ongoing processes of state formation and where the phenomenon of weak states persist.[3] A distinction is made between judicial (in theory) and empirical (in practice) sovereignty. In large parts of the third world, the security/insecurity dynamics of vulnerabilities relate both to internal as well as external threats, which may weaken state structures significantly. It means that the security apparatus is defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity from outside threats, but also protecting the regime from internal threats. Thus, it is impossible to separate domestic order from domestic and international security.[4]

The global order is characterised by a blurred picture of local/internal wars, regional security structures and American military hegemony The American response against global terrorism implies a return to a realist paradigm and a strong emphasis on military power, which is of particular relevance for the Middle East. Although 9/11 made it clear that security threats were of a new and amorphous kind, stemming both from "inside" and "outside" state borders, the American reaction has primarily been based on conventional security concerns and unilateral strategies, such as invasions and military attacks against states.

The multitude of internal as well as interstate conflicts and wars in the Middle East means that states and other actors have had to navigate in a political landscape characterised by regional conflict, hostility

[1] Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, 1999, *Global Transformations*, Polity Press: 88

[2] Ripsman, Norrin, M. and Paul, T.V, 2005, "Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis" *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 200-3; Cha, Victor 2000, "Globalization and the Study of International Security", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 391-94.

[3] Ayoob, Mohammed, 1995, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner; Rotberg, Robert I. (ed), 2004, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press.

[4] Maoz, Zeev, 2004, "Domestic politics of Regional Security: Theoretical Perspectives and Middle Eastern Patterns", in Maoz, Zeev, Landau, Emily B., Malz, Tamar, Building Regional Security in the Middle East. International, Regional and Domestic Influences, London: Frank Cass, p. 28.

and internal instability. As a consequence, the dominance of security in the region provides a foundation for a strong security apparatus.[5] As Hinnebusch underlines "[w]ar has profoundly shaped the Middle East regional system".[6] Globalisation constitutes one of the most poignant factors of change when it comes to the security sector of the Arab world, but globalisation processes come uneven, implying both an extensive role for foreign (state and non-state) actors and the redefinition of non-state actors and internal opposition. Globalisation of security concerns means increasing Western pressures to behave in accordance with normatively defined principles (e.g. democracy, adherence to human rights) as well as heavy foreign presence (such as in Iraq) and dependency in the form of arms trade, security cooperation, training etc. Yet it also means increasing assertiveness against internal opposition, which is often linked to transnational networks opposing globalisation. Thus, what is a global threat to Western states is an internal threat to many Arab regimes. As a consequence, globalisation defined as a "threat" to Arab regimes both intensifies internal opposition and Western pressures.

The main research problems in this paper are threefold: (1) How are security policies and the security apparatus shaped by the overarching processes of political transformation? (2) In what ways does the security sector play an active role in these processes? Political change in the Arab world does not imply "democratisation" and yet political transformation is formed by a complicated interplay between "stubborn authoritarianism"[7] and gradual political liberalisation[8]. Change in the direction towards limited political liberalisation is pushed by globalisation as much as it is part of internal and regional political dynamics. States in the Arab world show an impressive capacity to resist change, while at the same time adapt modes of governance to increasing pressures. (3) In what ways are relations between regime and the security sector changing? The changing role and function of the security sector is a neglected area of research even though the high degree of politicisation of the military will undoubtedly affect the outcome of political transformation. In sum, the overall research problem relates to how political change, stemming from global and domestic sources, affects security policies of states as well as the roles and functions of the security apparatus.

2. Interplay between globalisation and regional (in)security

During the latter half of the 20th century, the security dynamics in the Arab world were greatly affected by the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict and by the superpower rivalry, which conducted war by proxy in the region. The Cold War functioned as an "overlay" of regional conflict patterns and alliances but since its end, security relations have increasingly become regionalised.[9] At the same time, this has not led to a regionalisation of security mechanisms and conflict resolution instruments in the Arab world or the Middle East at large. On the contrary, in terms of institutionalisation the Middle East remains a region without much cooperation. The effects of globalisation on security heightened following the Gulf war in 1991 with new security precedence, such as the UN alliance against Iraq and humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq to protect minorities against their own regime. The war in Iraq, which has been transformed from a US-led war of intervention to a prolonged war of attrition between foreign

[5] Eg. Picard, Elizabeth, 1988, 'Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State' in Adeed Dawisha and I. Wiliam Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State,* London: Croom Helm, 1988; Barry Rubin & Thomas Keaney (eds.), 2002, *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, London, New York: Frank Cass; Hinnebusch, Raymond, 2003, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester University Press; Owen, Roger, 2005, *State, Power and Politics in the making of the Modern Middle East*, London, New York: Routledge.

[6] Hinnebusch, *op. cit.*, p. 154

[7] Pripstein Posusney, Marsha, 2005, "The Middle East's Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective" in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[8] Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), 1998, *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, Vol. 1 and 2, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Salamé, Ghassam (ed.), 1996, *Democracy without Democrats: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London, New York I.B Tauris.

[9] Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver, 2003, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press.

(American/British) troops and rebellious groups, loosely organised around jihadist and/or Sunni Arab dissent, will have profound consequences for regional security in the Middle East, and potentially for the role and function of security apparatus.

Bilgin argues that regional security to a large extent derives from actors' different worldviews, which consequently outline threat perceptions and security policies. Hence, there exists a multitude of contending perspectives on regional security, which is determined by the ideas of reference. *Western security conceptions* have for a long time been imposed in the region. The primacy of threats originates in the unrestricted flow of oil at reasonable prices, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and preventing the emergence of any regional hegemony while holding Islamism in check by maintaining friendly regimes sensitive to western security concerns.[10] The new security concerns of the West, such as the global war on terrorism and American involvement in Iraq, has spurred a growing sense in the Arab world that there is an American neo-imperialist project being implemented in the region. The augmented calls by the US and Europe for democratisation and reforms as well as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) are similarly viewed as external imposition in the region. In sum, these threats are largely defined by external powers and by the American urge to control, stabilise and "peacify" the Arab world. Security is achieved by states entering alliances with the West and thus, American and Middle East security is intertwined.

As discussed above, security conceptions also contain non-military dimensions, such as ideational factors. *Pan-Arab security concerns* dominated the region from the 1950s onwards by its emphasis on the Arab Middle East, and the expectation of strengthening the Arab political community. "Arab states were not only sovereign states but also, at a basic level, *Arab* states, deriving their legitimacy from and representatives of the Arab nation; these different social identities contained very different behavioural expectations".[11] For several decades before receding in the 1970s, Pan-Arab security concerns were primarily centred on the threats posed by non-Arab states, such as Iran, Turkey and Israel, and the Palestine conflict, which was rhetorically on top of the Arab security agenda and dominated thinking about regional order.[12]

Another more current and contrasting ideational force is *Islamic security concerns*, which refers to the Muslim Middle East. The ideas of reference are religious identity, the transtate community of the "Ummah", and a redefinition of jihad. Security is framed as achieving greater unity for the Muslim peoples and by lessening the "un-Islamic influences". Threats are often associated with an anti-status quo discourse and directed against the core of the neo-liberal globalisation and western global dominance. Also the military in several Arab states are on collision course with Islamic radicalism since the armed forces historically have been the bastion of secularism. Yet, the Islamic discourse unites various groups more on the basis of what they are against than what they are for.[13] At the same time, jihadists organise in the form of globalised networks and alliances, which turn internal opposition global and thus no longer confined to territorial states. Hence, islamist terror groups act globally as transnational communities, in the form of organisation, networks and the distribution of messages and information. Individual threats stem both from outside and inside state boundaries since globally organised networks maintain a local presence. Thus, territory and geography means less in terms of serving as the prime object of security, with direct consequences for sovereignty.

Since the end of the Cold War and as part of the changing and broadening security agenda, *Mediterranean security concerns* have more frequently been articulated in the context of regional security. Triggered by the Middle East peace process and the multilateral negotiations that took place in the 1990s, several Arab states began redefining security on issues of common concerns, such as economic

[10] Bilgin, Pinar, 2004 "Whose 'Middle East'? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security" *International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 25

[11] Barnett, Michael "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System", *International Organization,* Vol.49, No.3, p. 508

[12] Bilgin, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32

[13] Bilgin, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33

development, refugees, regional security and hydro-political cooperation. Also the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO in 1993 and the following peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 presented the emergence of a new security landscape.

The main ideas of reference is the European Union (EU), which is directed towards creating cooperative schemes with Mediterranean-rim countries to promote domestic and regional stability, cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, economic development and democratisation. This has resulted in an overall Mediterranean Policy of the EU, which includes a Euro-Arab dialogue and a Mediterranean Partnership process containing a number of agreements with sub-regional organisations, such as the GCC and the Arab Maghreb Union. These cooperative schemes are, for example, the only ones that have managed to bring Syria, Israel and a whole range of non-state actors together by its emphasis on people-to-people diplomacy.[14]

3. Interplay between state and regime (in)security

In almost every Middle Eastern state, great importance was attached to the creation of national consensus. However, given the general absence of democratic institutions of such a consensus was more likely to be simply imposed rather than emerging out of general public discussions and debate.[15]

One of the most salient features of Middle East politics is according to Kamrava the intimate nexus between the state and the armed forces.[16] National liberation was often orchestrated by highly ideological officers and as a consequence, national armies were politicised. Regimes also relied heavily on the armies, which enjoyed popular legitimacy in mobilising populations in a new era when colonial institutions were taken over and transformed into state-governing structures.[17] This was frequently related to the absence of a single unifying vision around which to rally and held back the emergence of a corporate unified sense of identity among the officers.[18] Yet, the army remains the utmost symbol as the institution holding the legitimate use of violence, which can secure the state against external threats and guard borders and territories. Armed forces were also instrumental in expanding the very reach of states. The military is therefore a symbol of nation-building in the sense that it might homogenise heterogeneous populations into the same army (an integrative approach) or, on the contrary, it may be used as a repressive force subjugating national minorities to regime rule. Populist nationalism, the overarching nature of the "national task" has rhetorically been emphasised in order to control societies through the use of military machineries[19]. Armies also served the role of a modernising institution in post-colonial states, given its reliance on modern technology and its strict mode of organisation. As armies have had the role of nation building and state construction, "rather than state protection"[20], they view themselves as the core function of the state. Hence, the relationship between regimes and armed forces in the Arab world has been of the praetorian kind. As Kamrava points out, "[a]lmost all of the ideological military-states of the 1950s and the 1960s had by the 1990s been reduced to autocratic

[14] Bilgin. *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35
[15] Owen, *op. cit.*
[16] Kamrava, Mehran, 2000, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No.1.
[17] The classical work on the role of military institutions in nation-building in the Third world remains Janowitz, Morris, 1964, expanded edition in 1977, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, The University of Chicago Press.
[18] Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 77
[19] Waterbury, John 1996, Waterbury, John, 1996, 'Democracy without Democrats: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East', in Ghassam Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London, New York I.B Tauris, p. 26.
[20] Kroonings, Kees & Kruijt, Dirk, 2002 *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London & New York: Zed Books

Mukhaberat (Intelligence) state".[21] "Political armies" of this kind often use turbulence and instability as a reason for political actions. The interlinkage between regimes and armies is also to be explained by the ways that conflict, threat perceptions and enemy images have been exploited in order to promote state interests. The role of political armies may be seen as one of the factors behind the remarkable strength of the Arab state in the era of globalisation. In fact, it appears as though we are today witnessing an "in-between" situation where armies remain large, keeping a special position among state institutions and the missionary legacy in mind, but where political change also imply a more limited role for the army. At the same time, the emergence of new global and domestic threats may well serve to re-strengthen the security sector vis-à-vis other spheres of society. To many Arab regimes, the presence of Islamist opposition groups with links to transnational organisations of informal violence, means a direct security threat. These threats are countered by strengthening the security apparatus and increasing coercive measures against such groups.

3.1 The robustness of authoritarian regimes

The Arab state system is to a large extent characterised by enduring authoritarianism, which according to Pripstein Posusney has to do with the patrimonial norm of the militaries and the capacity of the security apparatus to repress dissent, particularly in times of crisis, such as in Syria 1982, Tunisia 1987, Libya 1993 and, more recently, Algeria 1992, Egypt 1995-97.[22] Typical of political armies are the frequent violent interference in domestic politics.[23] Also Bellin adheres to this view and underlines the exceptional strength and will of the security apparatus, and the limited degree of popular mobilisation for democratic reforms in the Arab world. Low level of popular mobilisation for democratic reforms means low costs of repression, which subsequently increases the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to force to impede reform initiatives.[24]

Another decisive factor is the continued diplomatic support for existing regimes, which include significant foreign military aid and strategic rent. Saudi Arabia, for example, imposes strict limits on civil society, discriminates against women and curb dissent. Yet, "Western governments have contended themselves with purchasing Saudi oil and soliciting Saudi contracts while maintaining a shameful silence toward Saudi abuses." Similarly, "Egypt has secured from the US government massive aid and tacit acceptance of its human rights violation."[25] The dependency on some Arab regimes on technology and assistance from the West has no doubt increased since the first Gulf War. At the same time, Islamist movements are perceived as embracing an anti-western stance and many Arab leaders enjoy relative freedom from external pressure for change and for maintaining authoritarianism and repression as a remedy against Islamist-flavoured opposition. At the same time their legitimate rule is undermined by their extreme subordination and dependence of powerful economic military and political forces.[26]

State and regime (in)security correlates to a great extent to weak/strong dynamics of a state. As Krause underlines, the absence of empirical sovereignty and legitimacy means that the process of state consolidation is lacking. In a weak state, the idea of the state, institutions and territories are not widely accepted by the population, for example in Lebanon. To create domestic order requires a shift in the logic of internal security from military to police, which also means that the police relies less on violence

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[21] Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 81
[22] Pripstein, *op. cit.*, p. 11
[23] Koonings & Kruijt, *op. cit.*,
[24] Bellin, Eva, 2005 "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders" in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 21, 35.
[25] Human Rights Watch, quoted in Brownlee, Jason, 2005, "Political Crisis and Restabilization: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Tunisia" in Pripstein Posusney, Marsha & Penner Angrist, Michele (eds) *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 59.
[26] Krause, Keith, 2004, "State-Making and Region-Building: The Interplay of Domestic and Regional Security in the Middle East", in Maoz, Zeev, Landau, Emily B., Malz, Tamar, Building Regional Security in the Middle East. International, Regional and Domestic Influences, London: Frank Cass,

to impose its will.[27] As mentioned before, the patrimonial linkage between regime and the security apparatus means that democratisation can only be carried out successfully when the state's security apparatus refrain from acting against such a process. However, if the military remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular dissatisfaction and survive significant illegitimacy.[28]

3.2 Strength and willingness of the security apparatus

The security sector in the Arab world may generally be characterised by its enduring strength. Despite economic crises in several countries, military budgets have not been severely affected. For example, Egypt was forced under pressure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make substantial reduction with fourteen percent of subsidiaries for basic goods,. Yet that same year the regime increased the military budget with twenty-two percent. Despite a general temporary reduction in military budgets in the 1990s, the region still has one of the highest defence expenditures in the world. The Middle East is also the biggest spenders in terms of arms purchase and a high percentage of the population is engaged in various branches of security. Yet, it is difficult to get exact figures since most information is controlled and military budgets are surrounded with secrecy. [29]

There are various types of armed forces in the Middle East. Egypt and Syria hold *large armies*, which often exercise a decisive influence in politics and economics. Military courts often try civilians and it is difficult to make a distinction between the police and armed forces since their work is complementary. In Egypt, the military has also expanded its role into non-military areas, such as water management, agriculture and electricity generation.[30] Hence, several countries are characterised by a "merchant/military complex" with the security apparatus having extensive networks of clientelism, patronage and corruption.[31]

Morocco and Jordan have *modern professional armies* that draw on a colonial legacy whereas the Gulf States have *small professional armies coexisting with tribal based* military organisations due to their small populations. This is why they have sought to strengthen the GCC. The increasing threats from Iran and until the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, have also led the Gulf states to become heavily dependent on western military technology and expertise.[32] The threats from Iraq are today of a different kind, with risks of spreading resistance and terror groups with regional fragmentation as a consequence.

Ethnicity or other identity markers are employed by several Arab states in order to control the security sector. In Syria, the Alawi minority, which comprises no more than fifteen percent of the population, controls half of all army divisions and all the security intelligence services. Syria has sometimes been defined a "warfare state", a country "so preoccupied with military preparation that it permits almost all levels of the economy, society and culture".[33] Consequently, peace with Israel would modify all the political and socio-economic structures. In Jordan, tribal background also plays a significant role since the persistent regime vulnerability makes it extremely dependent upon the armed forces. The ruling family handpicks the officer corps primarily from traditional East Bank families, which means that officers with Palestinian origin only counts for ten percent even though they constitute forty percent of the soldiers. Even though the country has a weak economy, it receives substantial rents from Saudi Arabia, the US and other Arab states, which makes it possible for the regime to strengthen its position without having to make new domestic coalition building with groups that might challenge its legitimacy or its security policies. Entering the military also entails a well paid career and after leaving the military to enter business or government.[34]

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[27] Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 112
[28] Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 22
[29] Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 32
[30] Owen *op. cit.*
[31] Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 114
[32] Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 186
[33] Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 179
[34] Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 117

3.3 Institutionalisation vs patrimonialism of the armed forces

The will to repress reform initiatives is related to the degree of military institutionalisation. The more the military is institutionalised the more it is willing to disengage from power. According to Bellin, institutionalisation should not be mixed up with professionalisation and does not refer to the de-politisation of the security establishment and its subordination to civilian control. The emphasis is rather placed on the rule governed and merit-based hierarchy of organising the military, which means a clear delineation between public and private. The security elites have a sense of corporate identity that is separated from the state, a distinct mission and career path, which serves the public good and thus enjoy a high level of popular mobilisation.[35]

However, in the Middle East several armies are organised along patrimonial lines, which is characterised by cronyism, corruption and a lack of a clear distinction between public and private. Discipline is often maintained by balancing tension between different ethnic groups. The Egyptian armed forces have become highly institutionalised whereas in Saudi Arabia and Syria entire branches of the military and security forces are "family affairs". Yet, patrimonialism is not the same thing as professional incompetence. Yet it does indicate a strong linkage between the security sector and the regime it serves. [36] For instance, several armies have gone through a partial professionalisation, triggered by the crushing defeat in the war with Israel in 1967. To counter the loss of legitimacy, there was a drive to professionalise the armed forces by modern military equipment, establish procedures for recruitment, promote and advance training, which increased the military corporate identity and its sense of efficacy. Yet, this has not translated to full civilisation of the armies in the sense of military de-politication and increased subordination to civilian control.[37]Various strategies are used to contain the military and withhold it from exaggerated involvement in politics and governance. Control may be exercised and loyalty ensured by rotating commanders and generals, forming rivalling branches of the security sector and having well-paid career opportunities.[38]

In sum, the military establishment in many Arab states is firmly ingrained into the system with political and economic interests grounded in the status quo. It means a personal identification of the military and security establishment with the regimes longevity and thus induces resistance to political reform."[39]

4. Central research questions

What major alterations of internal and external security policies have taken place in the last decade? What are the main reasons for these changes and their implications on the role and function of the security apparatus? One key area is the definition of "threats" by various regimes. What type of threats are the security apparatus trying to counter? What is the interplay between external and internal threat perceptions? What are the relations between "hard" and "soft" security concerns?

How may civilian-military relations be characterised? What role does the institutions of organised violence play in sustaining the regime? How are different branches used in relation to internal opposition and domestic threats? To what extent is the armed forces institutionalised and civilised? Civil-military relations and the civilisation of Arab armies may be studied through an overview of how the armies have exercised influence on politics. Do government representatives frequently have military background? Are military officers recruited from groups with close alliance to a regime? To what extent is the security apparatus involved in non-military sectors?

To what extent is the regime benefiting from regional and international support in the security sector (military alliance, aid, technology, training etc)?

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[35] Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 29
[36] Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 28, 33
[37] Kamrava, *op. cit.*, p. 68
[38] Baram 1998
[39] Bellin, *op. cit.*, p. 34

Is the security apparatus in fiscal health?

5. Research design

The research project emphasises political change and state transformation in the Arab world, which will be analysed and explained by considering three interrelated areas, namely security, economics and politics. Hence, the research design and selection of cases have been based on these considerations as well as on overarching methodological principles of representation and most different comparison.

First, three countries are selected on the basis of being representatives of their sub-regions: *Morocco* (Maghreb), *Egypt* (Mashrek) and *Saudi Arabia* (the Gulf). These three countries are all part of the wider Middle East regional security complex while at the same time oriented toward different sub-complexes.

Second, the research design includes a comparative approach in which the three cases will be evaluated on the basis of their different characteristics, such as type of army and regime. Egypt is one of the three countries with a large army and security sector. Egypt is also an illustrative case where a military coup meant the introduction of a new political order. Due to its sheer size, Egypt is a critical actor in any regional security structure. Moreover, since the peace treaty with Israel Egypt has sought for the last decades a role in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as in inter-Arab affairs. Yet, the Egyptian security apparatus is to a great extent directed towards internal threats emanating from a large Islamist opposition in Egypt. In contrast, Morocco's domestic security concerns are directed towards the West Saharan conflict implying that the state is positioned against an opposition with demands of national self-determination and liberation. In terms of regime type, the tribally based monarchy has a modern professional army. Finally, the case of Saudi-Arabia highlights the intimate linkage between state and regime security. Saudi Arabia also plays a longstanding ally to the US, being a critical part in the overarching American security strategy in the Middle East. The military combines a tribal force with a small and expensive professional army, which relies to a large extent on foreign assistance and training.

A fourth case, *Lebanon*, is also added as part of the most different comparative design. Lebanon is in many ways a deviant and yet a critical case to include in the analysis of political change in the Arab world. The long civil war and the tradition of paramilitary units have made Lebanon a unique case in the Arab world. The dominance and security concerns of Syria have further underlined Lebanon's peculiarities. At the same time, Lebanon's linkages with the Palestinian–Israeli conflict as well as the dominant role of Syria indicate that Lebanon is a critical actor in any regional security structure.

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THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

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OUTLINE
EGYPT / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

by

Joel Beinin*

« NEO-LIBERAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN EGYPT »

Conceptual Framework

The mid-1970s to the present form a historical conjuncture in the Arab World and the Middle East more broadly in which political community and political culture have been reimagined, modes of collective action and political mobilization have been reorganized, and, with some peripheral exceptions like Morocco, the core states of the Arab world have become more authoritarian. This conjuncture has been informed by a shift in the mode of capital accumulation in the transnational and local political economy, thus linking the histories of global centers of capital and its Middle Eastern peripheries. Egypt is one of the most salient examples of this phenomenon and therefore a good case for examining this argument.

At the global level this conjuncture is defined by: 1) the demise of the Fordist-Keynesian regime of capital accumulation which prevailed from the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 until the delinking of the dollar from gold and the establishment of floating exchange rates in 1971-73. The shift was marked by the global recession of 1973-75, the subsequent decade of stagflation. In the aftermath, a neo-liberal regime of flexible accumulation and stabilization and structural adjustment programs promoted by the U.S. and British governments, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank was inaugurated; 2) the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, the end of the Portuguese African empire and challenges to US dominance in central America; and 3) the withdrawal of British forces from "East of Suez" in 1971. This left the United States with sole responsibility for the security of the oil resources of the Gulf and enhanced the likelihood of armed intervention in the region.

In the Arab World, this conjuncture is informed by four interlocking developments: 1) the historic defeat of secular Arab nationalism and Arab socialism in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967; 2) the retreat from economic nationalism exemplified by Egypt's 1974 "open door" policy and the IMF agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia and Algeria's self-imposition of a similar program during the 1980s and 1990s; 3) the oil boom and bust of 1974-86; and 4) blowback from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan (1979-92).

The particularities of this conjuncture in Egypt are informed by its role as the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, the shift in its foreign policy alignment from the Soviet Union to the United States. Although the primacy of the US commitment was never in doubt, Egypt became major US ally in the Middle East. As a reward for signing the 1979 Camp David accords and the 1982 Egyptian-Israeli treaty, Egypt has received at least $60 billion in US economic and military aid since 1979, the second highest level after Israel.[1] These foreign policy changes have provided easy targets for mobilization of all forces opposing the regime, both secular and Islamist. Such mobilizations have typically had a populist character and indulged in inflated conspiratorial and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Often, they have served as an easy substitute for engagement with domestic policy issues. The level of repression would likely have been much higher had domestic issues been consistently addressed. But, perhaps the political field would be livelier today.

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[1] Highlights of GAO-06-437 "Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals," April 11, 2006 at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d06437high.pdf. *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 9, 2002 reported a figure of $117 billion.

In this conjuncture, Islamist political and social movements have emerged as the most widespread form of resistance to the new global economy and anti-popular, autocratic, and corrupt Middle Eastern regimes. Paradoxically, in the same period, Islam has constituted a form of social capital alleviating the uncertainties and exploiting the opportunities of the new market environment by constituting a network of trust and reciprocity for Muslim-identified businesses, such as Islamic banks, investment companies, construction companies, department stores, etc.

Islamism is, therefore, not an anti-modern phenomenon "over there," it is an integral component of global modernity. It comprises a family of diverse and even internally contradictory social movements that may be systemic or anti-systemic. In the era of neo-liberal economic restructuring they have been both simultaneously.

Most western scholars, journalists, and political figures have treated Islamism as an anti-modern phenomenon "over there." If they attempt to understand it at all, they do so by examining the texts and of salient individuals and organizations, like Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), Abu 'Ala' al-Mawdudi (Pakistan), Sayyid Yasin (Palestine), Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah (Lebanon), or Abdessalam Yassine (Morocco) or the Society of Muslim Brothers, Hamas, or Hizballah. In contrast, an important minority of scholars have analyzed Islamism as urban or regional protest movements or through the lens of network or social movement theory. Social movement theory explains the successes of Islamist movements in mobilizing the core of their activists: the educated, modern middle classes. But the social base of Islamism extends well beyond this sector because, in contradictory ways, it appeals to both the losers and the winners in the new global economy.

Alongside the emergence Islamist movements, most notably the Muslim Brothers, as the largest and best-organized movement of opposition to the Egyptian regime there have been sporadic efforts by workers, primarily in the public sector, to defend the rights and social gains they achieved during the era of Nasserist authoritarian populism. Collective actions including, sit-in strikes, demonstrations, and petitions have typically been led by trade union activists linked to left-wing parties or with no prior political affiliation. They have almost always been opposed by the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions and its component sectoral general unions, which have been, since their establishment in 1957, institutions of the regime.

The Egyptian state under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81) initially sought to mobilize Islamic forces to defeat the Nasserist and Marxist left and enhance its legitimacy. In addition, Sadat authorized a limited political opening to allow opposition forces to express themselves without there being the slightest possibility of a democratic rotation of power. Paradoxically, this also marked the beginning of the demobilization of the party of the state – then the Arab Socialist Union, now the National Democratic Party. Despite its name, the National Democratic Party is not a political party as commonly understood. It has no ideology; it has no local political organization; it does not have a transparent mechanism whereby its candidates for office are selected. It is a machine for distributing patronage and an arm of the state.

As the opposition became more vociferous, the state became more repressive. The repression backfired, resulting in the assassination of al-Sadat and the consolidation of a jihadist movement. One branch focused on Egypt, a second set its horizons on Afghanistan and eventually globally.

The regime of Husni Mubarak (1981-) initially lifted the heavy hand of the repression of the late al-Sadat years. But it too, never contemplated a democratic rotation of power. Oil wealth broadened the political capacities of the Islamist opposition while the fitful implementation of neo-liberal, Washington consensus policies provoked strikes and demonstrations by public sector workers. The emergence of a low-level armed Islamist insurrection provided the pretext for ratcheting up the level of repression, including massive detentions without charges, violations of legal due process, systematic torture, and extra-judicial executions.

The stalemate in Egyptian political life since the military defeat of the armed Islamists in 1997 was broken in December 2004 with the first public demonstration targeting Husni Mubarak personally and opposing the rumored plan to have his son, Gamal, succeed him to the presidency. Since then, the main political contestants have been: 1) so-called "reform" elements within the regime which have promoted constitutional amendments and other "reforms" which in no way change the basic contours of the regime or its grip on state power. In fact, these measures, to the extent that they convince some (a very small number) people that the regime is democratizing, have tended to enhance the power of Gamal Mubarak and his allies such as Minister of Trade and Industry Rashid Muhammad Rashid, Minister of Investment Mahmud Muhyi al-Din, and Minister of Finance Yusuf Butrus Ghali; 2) The Muslim Brothers, especially after their success in the December 2005 parliamentary elections; 3) Kefaya ("Enough") and other forms of extra-parliamentary opposition, which appear to have run out of steam as of this writing due to in-fighting and limited organizational capacity. None of these forces has yet succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of people over a sustained period of time in a way that would pose a fundamental challenge to the regime.

What is perhaps most remarkable about this latest period is the nearly complete collapse of all of the legal secular opposition parties, left, Nasserist, or liberal. While they may have an ideology (which often consists of little more than clichéd slogans), they have little organization or popular support, especially outside Cairo. The only parties to gain any seats in the November-December 2005 parliamentary elections were the European-style liberal New Wafd, the leftist Tagammu' (National Progressive Unionist Party), and al-Ghad (Tomorrow), which split from the New Wafd over personalities with no discernable ideological differences. Altogether, they won 9 out of 454 seats.

Al-Ghad leader Ayman Nur won 7% of the vote in the September 2005 presidential elections. Since then he has languished in jail after being convicted on fabricated charges of falsifying the petition to establish his party. The legal political parties have been unable to mount a united protest to the regime's defiance of even the limited reforms that enabled the first multi-candidate presidential election in Egypt's history.

The Political Economy of Islamism

There is a pre-history to the Islamist upsurge during the oil boom. In the 1960s Saudi Arabia raised the banner of Islam in opposition to Nasserist Arab socialism. The link to Saudi Arabia and the influence of Saudi-based leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood explain why Islamist movements tended to ally with pro-American authoritarian regimes, like Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat, against challenges from secular left opponents. As the oil boom intensified and migrant laborers from Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen found work in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, Islamic movements were often funded by recycling the earnings of these workers through informal exchange networks such as those established by exiled Muslim Brothers. Some of those networks subsequently became major financial institutions such as Egypt's "Islamic investment companies," the Faisal Islamic Bank, etc.

The relationship between oil and Islam during the oil boom has often been treated crudely, suggesting that Saudi petrodollars created a religio-political movement[2]. This instrumentalist view fails to historicize the conjuncture in which specific forms of Islamist mobilization emerged. As the price of oil rose twenty-fold from 1973 to 1981, rentier coalitions based on petroleum revenues dominated several Middle Eastern states. However, they could not establish a stable social structure of capital accumulation or a new political vision. The political, economic, social, and moral crises of these states are the context for the rise of Islamism.

[2] Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York : Basic Books, 1983.

Economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs imposed cutbacks in state budgets and social spending. Consequently, state efficacy became increasingly restricted to urban upper middle class and elite areas. Income distributions polarized. States became unable to provide previously established levels of services or to insure adequate supplies of commodities to all sectors of their territory and population, undermining the terms of the social compact established in the era of authoritarian populism and state-led development. Undermining state capacity provided a windfall to Islamist movements, enabling them to speak in the name of resistance to foreign domination and exploitation of "the people." They established a popular base by offering social services that states could no longer afford to provide. The populist elements in the Islamist discourse linked the corruption and autocracy of state elites with their inability to provide social services and jobs.

The number of university graduates nearly tripled from 1975 to 1985. But because of cuts in the state budget and commodity subsidies imposed by the IMF, public sector employment no longer provided wages adequate to marry and raise a family. Hence, fewer university graduates sought public sector employment, even though they were entitled to a position by law. At the same time, the declining price of oil on the world market after 1982 reduced opportunities for young men to migrate to oil-rich countries and amass savings to buy and furnish an apartment – the prerequisites of a middle-class marriage. The real unemployment rate in the mid-1980s was well over the official rate of 12 percent and was concentrated among first-time job seekers with intermediate and university degrees. This "lumpen intelligentsia," as Carrie Rosefsky Wickham dubs them,[3] was deeply aggrieved that despite their hard work and academic achievements they had few prospects for material success. They became the primary social base of the Islamist movement in the 1980s, and many joined the Society of Muslim Brothers.

At the other end of the Islamist spectrum, by the late 1980s and early 1990s blowback from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan fueled the armed insurrection based in Upper Egypt and the urban peripheries of Cairo and Alexandria.

More details to be filled in later

The Nasser Regime (1952-70)

The Nasser regime can claim important accomplishments – an end to the British occupation, nationalization of the Suez Canal, land reform and land reclamation, heavy industrial projects like the Helwan Iron and Steel Company and the Aswan High Dam, expanding access to education, and raising the living standards of many Egyptians. However, none of these measures were the result of a popular mobilization. Such state-led initiatives must be distinguished from social movements that emerge from civil society and maintain a degree of autonomy from the state in determining their policies and directions.

Using this distinction it can be argued that, despite Nasser's personal popularity and charisma, his regime actually demobilized those sectors of the Egyptian population which had been most active in promoting a nationalist and social reform agenda during post-World War II period that preceded the coup of July 23, 1952. In those years there were three successive waves of mobilization around

[3] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam* (Columbia University Press)

nationalist and social issues involving primarily high school and university students, recent graduates and trade unionists.[4]

While the military regime granted some of the demands of this social movement, it suppressed all forms of popular initiative in the political and social arena, blocking the formation and then dominating the leadership of a national trade union federation until 1957, dissolving the women's political party led by Doria Shafiq, Daughter of the Nile, subjecting all opposition forces – Marxist, Islamic, and liberal – to extended imprisonment and torture. All the social and political organizations promoted by the new regime – a series of single parties supporting the regime culminating with the Arab Socialist Union and its secret Vanguard organization, rural cooperatives for purchasing inputs and marketing crops, trade unions, and institutions of intellectuals, like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and various progressive journals – were subject to supervision by the state.

Even before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Nasser regime began to turn away from economic populism as the import-substitution-industrialization began to falter. This policy change was deepened with the March 30, 1968 Declaration, which adopted a more technocratic approach to the economic difficulties Egypt had been experiencing sine 1965.[5] These measures were balanced by appearing to adopt a more radical orientation with the establishment of the Vanguard Organization, which included many former communists who, after years of jail and torture, had dissolved the two principal parties after they were released from prison in 1963, and the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism.[6]

The Regime of Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81)

The "Liberal" Period of Husni Mubarak (1981–92)

The regime of Husni Mubarak, who came to power after Sadat's assassination in October 1981, can be divided into two. During the first decade, Mubarak lightened the hand of the repressive apparatus on opponents of the regime. He released the 1,300 political prisoners Sadat had arrested a month before his assassination, among them hundreds of Islamist activists. Opposition press and political parties were given more leeway, and an electoral alliance of the Muslim Brothers and the Wafd

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[4] Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile* Princeton University Press 1987) ; Raoul Makarius, *La jeunesse intellectuelle d'Egypte au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale* (Paris 1960)

1) October 8, 1945 (end of martial law) – July 11, 1946 (anti-communist legislation)
General strike, National Committee of Workers and Students Feb. 21, 1946
2) September 1947 – April 1948
June 1947 – DMNL formed
Sept 2–Oct. 4, 1947 – strike at Misr Spinning and Weaving
3) January, 1950 – January 26, 1952 (Cairo fire)
Abrogation of Anglo-Egyptian treaty – Oct. 8, 1951
Labor strikes, etc.
Guerilla warfare on the Suez Canal

[5] Mark N. Cooper, *The Transformation of Egypt* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

[6] Joel Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?* University of California Press 1990) on communists. Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts* on Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism and culture of fear among peasants

was permitted to participate in the 1984 parliamentary elections. A more ideologically compatible Muslim Brothers-Labor Party "Islamic Alliance" contested the 1987 elections.

A few of the most prominent student Islamist leaders of the 1970s became parliamentary representatives of the Wafd-Muslim Brothers alliance of 1984 or the Islamic Alliance of 1987. Muslim Brothers occupied thirty-eight of the sixty seats won by the Islamic Alliance in 1987, sending a strong signal to the government that they had become a powerful force, even within the constraints of Egypt's autocratic political system.

The parliamentary success of 1987 led 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Futuh, head of the Cairo University Student Union from 1974 to 1977, and other young Muslim Brothers leaders to develop a plan to contest the leadership of Egypt's professional associations. Operating under the banner of the "Islamic Trend" or the "Islamic Voice," they and their allies ran for positions on the executive boards of professional associations (syndicates, an Anglicized form of *syndicat*, is a common translation for the Arabic *niqaba*) enrolling some two million engineers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers, commercial employees, agronomists, and others. Most of the associations were in the Islamists' hands by 1992. Having established their dominance in most student unions, Islamists also won control of the boards of most university faculty clubs, beginning with Cairo University in 1984.

The Islamic Trend's message of equity, social justice, moral renewal, and criticism of official corruption and neglect of the common welfare provided a cogent explanation for the social experiences and blocked ambitions of students and recent graduates and was an important factor in their professional association victories. In a different era they would have been leftists. Indeed, the social profile of those arrested as members of illegal communist organizations around this same time resembles that of the Islamist cadres. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham offers this social movement theory explanation for the Islamist successes:

> Graduates became Islamists not because of the intrinsic appeal of the *da'wa* but because the networks of its transmission were deeply embedded in urban, lower-middle-class communities; its social carriers were familiar and respected; and its content resonated with the life experience and belief system of potential recruits.[7]

In a different Turkish class context, Jenny White terms these social and cultural practices "vernacular politics."[8] Because its appeal was familiar and "resonated with the life experience and belief system of potential recruits," this form of Islamism, unlike that of the armed groups, was often not perceived as politics at all. Abu'l-'Ila Madi Abu'l-'Ila was using a rhetorical device when he declared in a 1977 speech, "There is nothing called religion and politics. We only know religion."[9] But it was a plausible claim for much of his audience. Putting things this way did not require people to embrace anything other than the beliefs they had grown up with.

Leftist and independent trade union activists also found somewhat more space to operate. Some fifty to seventy-five actions a year were reported in the Egyptian press during 1984-89, surely not a comprehensive tally. The left was an active and sometimes a leading component in struggles involving major confrontations with the state, such as the massive strike and uprising of textile workers

[7] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*

[8] Jenny White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*

[9] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*

in Kafr al-Dawwar in September-October 1984, the strike at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in February 1985, the railway workers' strike of July 1986, and the two sit-in strikes at the Iron and Steel Company in Helwan in July and August 1989.

The Post-Populist National Security State Perfected (1992-)

During the 1990s, as the jihadi Islamists became more active and especially after they launched a low level armed insurrection based in Upper Egypt and the urban peripheries of Cairo and Alexandria, the regime became more repressive. The legal left Tagammu' entered a tacit alliance with the regime against the Islamists. This ultimately resulted in the loss of a substantial part of its social base and credibility. Political life became ossified. The state pursued a dual strategy. On the one hand, it sought to annihilate its armed opposition by military measures, indefinite detentions without charges, trials in security courts without appeal, torture and extra-judicial executions. On the other hand, it sought to outflank and co-opt the Islamic opposition by promoting a state-sponsored Islam. The result was the entrenchment of anti-democratic and extra-legal procedures as the standard modus operandi, a broad and demonstrative Islamization of public culture, and an amalgam of intimidation and co-optation, which resulted in the fragmentation and corruption of all legal forms of opposition.[10]

Return of the Arab Afghans

The Islamic Group launched a broad armed offensive signaled by the assassination of the secularist journalist, Farag Fuda, in June 1992. The arrest of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman in the United States in 1993 led to intensified armed struggle centered in Upper Egypt. The Islamic Group particularly targeted the tourist industry, culminating in a massacre of fifty-eight foreigners and four Egyptians in Luxor on November 17, 1997. The combination of repression and loss of credibility following this incident ended the viability of the *jihad* option in Egypt.

Rise of the Technocrats

Gamal Mubarak, etc

The Era of Open Criticism of Husni Mubarak

al-Misri al-Yawm (April 2004?) – the first liberal Arabic daily in half a century
Kefaya – from the demonstration of December 2004 to fragmentation
Ayman Nur, al-Ghad, the 2005 presidential election, and the demise of the secular political parties

The Limits of the Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary Opposition

The Muslim Brothers after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

[10] Eberhard Kienle, *A Grand Delusion* (I.B. Tauris)

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(6)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
EGYPT / ECONOMY

by

Ulrich G. Wurzel *

« THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN EGYPT:
MANIPULATED REFORMS, UNINTENDED OUTCOMES AND THE ROLE OF NEW ACTORS »

- "Everything Has to Change So That Everything Can Stay the Same" -

1. Background

The research project "The Political Economy of Authoritarianism in Egypt" is part of the *larger research programme* "The Dynamics of Change in the Arab World: Globalisation and the Re-Structuring of State Power" established by the International Affairs Institute (Instituto Affari Internazionali, IAI), Rome, and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Utrikespolitiska Institutet, UI), Stockholm; supported by La Spienza University of Rome, Department of Oriental Studies, and Riksbanken Jubileumsfond, Stockholm.

Within the larger research project, there are *four national country case studies* (Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia) to be executed, each covered by individual papers on the *three research sectors* security, political economy and political mobilisation and participation.

The author's research on Egypt's political economy will be summarized in a *country research paper* of about 20-25 pages (8.000-10.000 words), with the full draft of the paper to be handed in on June 31st, 2007, and the revised final draft provided on October 31st, 2007.

2. Points of Departure and Focus of the Research Paper

The Objective of Change from Above: Stabilisation of the Egyptian Regime and Restructuring of its Power System

The aim of the larger research programme that the paper is contributing to, is to elaborate new empirical data and a new conceptualisation of *change* in the authoritarian countries of the Arab world, including the related policy implications.[1] This is to be done in order not only to provide a solid foundation for a critique of the so-called *democratisation paradigm*, but – even more important – in order to present an alternative, hopefully more realistic and consistent conceptualisation of the ongoing processes of political and politico-economic change in the Arab world.

In 1990/91, the IMF and the World Bank imposed a Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programme (SSAP) on Egypt. The reforms which have been implemented by the Egyptian government within the broader framework of the SSAP since the early 1990s resulted in a number of changes – some merely of a symbolic or cosmetic nature, others with far-reaching consequences.

The major point of departure for the research on Egypt is that this change, to a larger extent, has been carefully designed and consciously implemented by the rulers primarily *in order to stabilise Egypt's authoritarian regime* in the face of increasing internal and external pressure. According to the saying "Everything has to change so that everything can stay the same"[2], the major objective of the regime concerning the economic reform programme was just to reorganise and consolidate its power system –

[1] See Guazzone, Pioppi, 2006: Project description "The dynamics of change in the Arab world: globalisation and the re-structuring of state power".
[2] A quotation from one of the characters in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's book on 19th century Italy, *Il Gattopardo*, written in 1958.

but, not to lay the foundations necessary to achieve a higher level of international competitiveness in Egypt's national economy. For the Egyptian case it already turned out that "economic reforms do not necessarily imply a loosening of the state's control over society, and, hence, the emergence of independent actors", as Guazzone and Pioppi state in a more general way for the Arab World in the Research Programme description.[3]

As a result, in the Egyptian case there exists a certain interplay of stability and change: On the one hand, one finds a very specific interpretation of the concept of *"stability"* by the Egyptian leaders, meaning first of all the continuation of their own rule. On the other hand, there is *manipulated change*, engineered in order to contribute to the same objective – regime survival and preservation of power.[4] However, in such a context, the dividing line between the concept of stability (with its rather positive connotation) and socio-political as well as socio-economic *stagnation* gets rather blurred.

Re-distribution - The Major Expression of the Dialectics of Stability and Change

This kind of change from above, intended to keep Egypt's power system functioning, and the interplay of stability and change mainly materialize themselves in ongoing *processes of re-distribution*. If one of the primary tasks of contemporary research on change in the Arab world is to identify the most relevant new developments and actors which shape dynamics in the region *below the level of full-fledged system transition*, these processes of re-distribution *are* such highly relevant new developments. Further, the analysis of the respective re-distribution processes also helps to understand the changing positions, roles and relevance of a broader spectrum of political and economic *actors* in that framework.

The ***concept of re-distribution*** as intended to be used in the research paper describes a re-arrangement of Egypt's authoritarian rule (and the underlying resources) facing multiple challenges in terms of actors and issues. Such re-distribution is linked to push-and-pull-factors, with some internal and/or external influences exerting pressure, and others providing incentives:

(1) In the framework of the research on Egypt, "re-distribution" stands first for the redistribution of definition and decision-making power. The re-distribution of *definition power*, among others, concerns the right and ability to formulate broader visions for the development of society and economy at large, to identify relevant problems and to formulate general priorities for action. It further includes to give interpretations of events which are imposed at the rest of the society and to derive consequences for policy-makers in the public discourse (i.e., to prescribe appropriate action in the form of policies, strategies, programmes and measures). Implicitly, all this results in the ability to devalue and delegitimise the perception, world view, problem definitions and demands /claims of other actors in the society which, due to their limited capabilities and leverage, don't have the same definition power.

The re-distribution of *decision-making power*, concerns the ability to propose and push trough decisions on all relevant levels of policy-making – from general decisions on the fundamental features of the system of state and society and basic principles for steering and managing public affairs (including the economy) down to specific policy measures to be implemented in particular circumstances (e.g., the timing, speed and extent of privatisation activities). Other issues are the different actors' influence on

[3] See Weiss, D., Wurzel, U., 1998: The Economics and Politics of Transition to an Open Market Economy. Egypt. Paris: OECD, Wurzel, Ulrich G., 2004: Patterns of Resistance: Economic Actors and Fiscal Policy Reform in Egypt in the 1990s. In: Heydemann, S. (Ed.), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited, New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 101-132, Wurzel, Ulrich G., 2000: Ägyptische Privatisierungspolitik 1990-1998. Geber-Nehmer-Konflikte, ökonomische Strukturreformen, geostrategische Renten und politische Herrschaftssicherung, Hamburg/Münster: Lit-Verlag.

[4] This change for the sake of non-change also seems to contribute to the astonishing harmony which is frequently observable between the representatives of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes – often denying "their" citizens the most basic human rights – and representatives of the West, i.e. European state officials. The latter seem to be more interested in control and "stability" than uncontrolled change, too.

legislation (e.g., tax laws, labour code) and other forms of regulation, on foreign economic relations as well as the concrete framework conditions for the behaviour of microeconomic actors (entrepreneurs, workers) or their representative bodies, etc. The re-distribution of decision-making power will affect the established patterns of communication, co-operation and conflict within the ruling elite and within elite-coalitions and networks, but also the form of relations between the ruling elites and other groups of social actors in the society (e.g., independent entrepreneurs, journalists, intelligentsia, etc.).

A bigger role of particular segments of the society as power base of the authoritarian regime implies the marginalisation of other actors in terms of definition and decision-making power. The respective re-distribution of definition power, of decision-making power and of assets (see below) comes along with the *construction and re-construction* of ideologies, visions, discourse, meaning, concepts and terms by the most influential actors in ways compatible with their interests.

(2) Second, re-distribution is the re-distribution of *assets,* of *means of production,* and of *means of accumulation* – including opportunities to provide employment.
This kind of re-distribution can involve changes in the relative importance of the *public versus the private sector* in the economy or concerning the role of *domestic versus foreign capital.* Further, it can imply changes of the economic weight of the rulers' *business cronies* – trying to preserve the special arrangements benefiting them – *vis-à-vis new, independent entrepreneurs* pushing for a more level playing field, competition in markets and lower barriers for market entry (e.g. in the form of bureaucratic obstacles).
But, such re-distribution of means of accumulation and assets can also be limited to a simple re-arrangement among different factions and networks of state officials and their business cronies, i.e. changes of the balance of power *within* the established politico-economic elite.
In the Egyptian context, the effective *provision of employment* is an important contribution to the ruling *regime's legitimacy.* It is the more important, the more this legitimacy has been eroded during the last two decades as a result of increasing economic hardships for larger segments of the population and the lack of political participation. In the mid- to long-term, those actors which transform the economic privilege (that has been provided by the regime) through job creation into more legitimacy of the rulers, will become increasingly more important for the Palace.

(3) Third, the concept of "re-distribution" includes the re-arrangement of *access to goods and services.* In Egypt, as in many countries of the Arab world, this, again, may address the access to economic *privilege.* But it also includes the access to *public goods and services* in the traditional sense – including the obligations of different groups of economic actors to finance the provision of public goods through their contributions to the budget. Further, the changing patterns of distribution find their expression in the relation of *real income* from wage labour and employment compared to other forms of income (such as capital income, earnings from self-employment, direct and indirect subsidies to private business, etc.), among others linked to changes of tax codes and the like.[5]

Regime-directed Change versus Unintended Outcomes

However, the fact that such re-distribution and re-arrangement is carried out by Egypt's authoritarian rulers in order to secure their power *does not exclude* the possibility that this very process (or some parts of it) may get out of control: Suddenly – in spite of all the top-down manipulation and planning – the regime-directed project of re-distribution and re-arrangement of power may take a turn that was not intended.

[5] In addition, "re-distribution" also means the re-definition of the *politico-economic importance of individual Arab states.* This kind of re-arrangement of roles and importance in the regional and international context, among others, is the result of different economic development paths and development results across the Arab countries – see the different evolution of the GCC countries as compared to countries such as Algeria or Syria for example.

As a matter of fact, even in the seemingly rather stable setting of the authoritarian regimes of the region, there are *always new developments emerging* which are not in line with the original intentions of the rulers. Those situations – when control over a process initiated from above cannot be maintained any longer and when new actors arrive on the scene – are particularly interesting for any research on change in the Arab world. Among others, the proposed paper, therefore, will focus on identifying these newly emerging and unintended processes of change, their outcomes and the related change agents.

3. General Organisation of the Research

Time Period Covered, Main Issues and Research Phases

While the country paper on Egypt's changing patterns of accumulation and distribution will deal with the entire ***time period*** that begins with the proclamation of fundamental economic reforms in the early 1990s up to now, the major effects of the reforms will be analysed primarily for the period from the mid-1990s to about 2005/06.

For the reasons outlined above, ***the paper will mainly deal with two different kinds of politico-economic changes***: On the on hand, there will be a focus on the processes of change which have been *consciously designed and implemented* by the rulers in order to stabilise the existing system and to preserve their power, including the outcomes of these attempts. On the other hand, the research will be interested in those changes which have been resulting from *unintended, emerging new developments* which the government could neither prevent nor fully control. In the overall framework of the collective research programme of IAI and UI, the latter may even be of higher interest than the former.

Therefore, the first sub-area of research in the Political Economy Research Sector – (1) The Modalities of Wealth Accumulation and Redistribution under Economic Reform – will be at the centre of the analytical part of the proposed research paper. The other two sub-areas – (2) The Changing Role of the State in the Provision of Social Welfare Services and (3) The Changing State-labour Relations – will be of less importance to the paper and will be dealt with mainly based on *new empirical data* and the *description* of ongoing processes of re-distribution in the respective areas. From the perspective of the proposed paper, the latter two research areas are sub-issues of the first one.

Phase 1: The main activity of the first research phase will be the *identification and categorisation* of important and/or particularly representative processes of change in wealth accumulation and distribution. This will be an effort that includes both descriptive and analytical elements. It is planned to analyse the respective internal or external reasons and motivations which led to the above-mentioned re-distribution processes (drivers for change) as well as the specific interests of relevant stakeholders (the different categories of actors). Further, the *resulting new developments and tendencies*, which have been kicked-off by the state-directed re-distribution activities (intended and unintended) will be described and evaluated.

Phase 2: Afterwards, the short- to mid-term *consequences* of these changes for Egypt's broader politico-economic setting will be analysed and discussed. The lead questions for this research phase will be:

- How are ruling coalitions reorganising in the context of economic reforms?
- Who gains and who loses from the process of the state's economic reorganisation?
- How is the social basis of the regime changing in that context?
- How are global structural trends and international/regional actors affecting the process of the state's economic reorganisation in Egypt?

Phase 3: Finally, the findings generated so far for the Egyptian case will contribute to providing answers to the major questions of the broader research programme, dealing with

- the differences of today's Arab regimes compared to their predecessors in terms of social bases and ruling coalitions, the distribution of resources, modes of governance and political discourses;

- the interaction of structural change in the Arab world with change at the global level and with specific actors' policies as well as with

- the mid- to long-term internal and international consequences of that change.

Hypotheses

(1) The economic reforms announced by Egypt's government were never intended to provide the framework conditions necessary for the establishment of Egypt's international competitiveness. On the contrary, the whole reform attempt was instrumentalised in order to get access to additional rent income that would sustain the current regime's economic and political power (and the underlying structures) despite its obvious financial crisis. There has been *no substantial change* concerning the authoritarian and patrimonial nature of the system. – However, despite all attempts of the rulers to preserve the established power system, change *within* the authoritarian regime has been occurring during these reforms (and as their result).

(2) With regard to the deliberately designed and consciously implemented re-arrangement of the system of authoritarian rule, the Egyptian regime has been aiming at a number of rather* clear objectives *(intended outcomes). These included, on a more general level, the restructuring of the Egyptian regime's external relations (e.g. negotiating external rents and conditions) and of the internal system of distribution of resources (e.g. co-opting new social groups and excluding /marginalising others).

(3) Political and economic "reforms" in Egypt, such as privatisation, aim at and result in a *shift of patronage networks* toward particular segments of the private sector (including the networks of high-ranking representatives of the state with the private business community) without undermining the power of the state as the ultimate source and distributor of rent.

(4) It is obvious that Egyptian-style political and economic "reforms" so far did not lead to a loss of the state's control over society, or to the emergence of independent actors. However, *unintended outcomes* are always possible – even with regard to the emergence of new politico-economic actors (e.g., private businessmen which try to avoid dependency on the regime and its top figures, sometimes openly distancing themselves from the rulers; independent trade unions challenging the monopoly of the state-controlled unions).

(5) There exist a rather limited number of *scenarios* concerning the most probable outcomes of the processes of re-distribution and re-arrangement within Egypt's authoritarian regime. The three most probable are:

- Scenario #1: The consolidation of "neo-authoritarian political regimes"[6],
- Scenario #2: The return of more populist and nationalist forms of authoritarianism (ibid),
- Scenario #3: Increasing influence of particular segments of the private business community on the state (both domestic and foreign capital), possibly accompanied by a change in the authoritarian nature of the state.[7]

(6) The externally imposed reforms and their local interpretations contributed to a general re-structuring of the state's economic functions. There are *particular patterns* of how the structure of state power in Egypt is changing with regard to the political economy of the country (i.e., a limited number of typical patterns of the internal process of state restructuring), including the specific modalities of wealth accumulation and re-distribution.

(7) With regard to the changing role of the state in the provision of social welfare services, the distributive implications are *negatively affecting* social cohesion and the ruling elites' legitimacy. Among others, state-labour relations change in a way that is likely to impact negatively on equity (in terms of economic distribution). Authoritarian restructuring leads to social conflict, as well as to reinforcing clientelist social relations and informal networks of solidarity (family, religious etc), possibly leading to a *further fragmentation* of the society.

(9) The negative outcomes of authoritarian restructuring for major parts of the population could create their own dynamics of *growing internal opposition.* Under certain circumstances, the new dynamics of such opposition – together with new room for opposition activists resulting from globalisation (information, external support, protection through world-wide media coverage, etc) – may lead to the transformation of traditional power. However, at the moment this option seems to be a rather theoretical one. Further, there are particular necessary and sufficient preconditions for the emergence and "success" of such internal opposition (which have to be explored).

(10) The ongoing *"reforms" reinforce the control of Egypt's elites over resources* as well as the politics/logics of rent seeking. The social basis of the Egyptian regime has been changing in a way that increases the importance of the newly emerging elite being a melange of higher government officials (civilian and military) and outstanding representatives of the possessing classes. These new networks of business cronies, state officials with close business links and leaders of the military-industrial complex increasingly gains importance vis-à-vis the former support base consisting of the rural population, the urban working class and lower to medium ranks of the public sector and civil service.

(11) The most important *actors* which are actively involved in the process of economic reorganisation of the Egyptian state are high-ranking state-officials together with a limited number of business cronies. The privileges of some outstanding businessmen imply restrictions for the majority of small- to medium-scale Egyptian entrepreneurs. The social actors which are increasingly marginalised are the landless labourers in the countryside, small farmers and the lower and medium ranks of the public sector workforce, civil service and intellectuals of various professional backgrounds. (Informal sector suffering from trade liberalisation?). The workforce in the private sector enjoys much less protection than the public sector workers, unionisation levels are low, labour code violations are wide-spread.

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[6] "This is a scenario in which the state increasingly represents the sum of the private interests of the members of the regime and is less and less accountable to its own citizens (privatisation of the state)" accompanied by fragmentation and an "increase in informal modes of government (neo-patrimonalism, corruption), with a parallel political and economic marginalisation of large social sectors" (Guazzone and Pioppi, p. 6).

[7] For the time being, this scenario seems to be a rather theoretical option. It can only come true only if Egypt's capitalists – which are often heavily dependent on the state in terms of protection, privilege, etc. – manage to transform themselves into a self-confident and independent bourgeoisie in the narrow sense (a "class in itself and for itself").

(12) The internal process of *state restructuring is partly related to* (or: a reaction to) the dynamics and consequences of the (albeit very slow) *integration of Egypt into a globalised politico-economic system.* The shape that the ongoing neo-authoritarian transition in Egypt takes is an expression of the adaptation capacity of the regime – its different elements are influenced by internal and external constraints and opportunities (SWOTs). With this regard, global structural trends and international/regional actors have been affecting the process of the state's economic re-organisation in Egypt. However, it seems that external influences have *not* been very important when it comes to the concrete design and implementation of the restructuring of the authoritarian state: Considerations of domestic politics, control and preservation of power seem to have shaped these decisions and restructuring processes much more than external economic events and interventions.

4. The Empirical and Methodological Basis

Desk Top Research

The paper will be based on both desktop and field research. Besides a general review of the recent literature on Egypt's economic and political reforms since the 1990s, desktop research will be concerned mainly with the *collection of economic data and facts* which are relevant with regard to the above-mentioned processes of economic re-distribution and re-arrangement of economic power among the different groups of actors.

Such data include, first of all, *general economic data*, primarily on investment and employment, production and growth, etc – all to be analysed with a focus on the contribution of different economic sectors and groups of actors to Egypt's overall economic activity (e.g., public versus private sector, different sections of the public sector affiliated with particular power centres such as the military versus other parts of the public sector, private sector business cronies of the rulers versus independent entrepreneurs, domestic versus foreign capital, regional distribution of particular economic activities, etc).

Second, available data on the distribution and re-distribution of *income and wealth* will be collected an analysed. Here, the major objectives are (i) to identify relevant *channels or instruments* which are used by the regime for the re-arrangement of the authoritarian state and its economic functions (e.g., the re-distribution of wealth among different groups of actors) as well as (ii) to identify changes which represent the *outcomes and results* of particular re-distribution processes which take place within the overall process of economic state restructuring.

Third, the *structural changes underlying* the newly emerging patterns of wealth creation and distribution, which have been identified in the previous stages of research, will be analysed. This includes to (i) take stock of relevant legal, institutional and other changes (e.g., labour law, tax provisions, court rulings, economic support measures such as granting subsidies or establishing special economic zones, etc) and (ii) to identify their direct and indirect impact on the observed processes of wealth creation and re-distribution.

Fourth, as far as possible, also the dynamic mid- to long-term effects of those changes for capital accumulation, production and distribution shall be addressed, mainly through the analysis of data sets covering longer periods (which, hopefully can be linked to the aforementioned events initiating structural change).

Field Research

The desktop research activities will be complemented by a *four-week field research mission* to Egypt. Field research will be carried out through a number of pre-arranged, explorative interviews with representatives of different groups of relevant actors as well as with researchers working on the economic and political reform processes in Egypt (and other informed observers).
Semi-standardised interviews with government officials, representatives of different factions of the private business community and of different branches of the public sector, with members of professional associations and trade unions as well with representatives of political and civil society organisations are intended to shed light on their particular perception and valuation of the ongoing processes of change (which will be primarily shaped by their own positions, roles and interests).
Interviews with Egyptian academics and researchers at national and private universities, in government-funded as well as independent research institutes and with experts of international and supra-national organisations, foundations, embassies, etc, are scheduled in order to be able to discuss and evaluate the findings from other sources with these rather neutral and well-informed partners.
In addition, the field mission is also intended to provide access to recent, often still unpublished data and documents concerning the major issues of the research project.

Methodological Approach

The findings generated during the desktop research activities and the field mission will be analysed and interpreted both in quantitative as well as qualitative ways. However, the bigger part of the research results is expected to be presented in qualitative terms. Quantitative data (if available in sufficient extent and quality) will mainly be employed in order to prove and support the qualitative statements and to illustrate the general developments and tendencies which have been identified regarding the restructuring of the authoritarian state and its economic role in Egypt.

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(7)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
EGYPT / SECURITY

by

Philippe Droz-Vincent

I will follow in this paper the hypothesis of neo-authoritarianism as presented in the general concept paper. The Arab regimes have faced numerous challenges. They have adapted themselves but without any substantial change on their authoritarian nature. Yet Egypt is not ruled in the twenty-first century as it was ruled in the 1970s. There is a general persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, but there are also transitions of (or within) authoritarianism[1].

Enhancing Egypt's stance in the Middle East as the regime's main external task

What does security mean for Egyptian decision-makers? If by security we mean a right to whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (according to the vague notion of survival), Egypt is located in a Middle Eastern region plagued with threats of all kinds. Threats range from classical "national interests" (the Nile's free flow of water and minor territorial contestations with Sudan), to the maintenance of a balance of power in the "cold peace" with the region's would-be hegemon (e.g. Israel), to threats from the other Arab regimes that may change from being "friend" to becoming "enemy" (the Arab boycott of Egypt only eroded in the 1980s)... to foreign powers' interference (the Middle East remains a very "penetrated" region) or to the "transnational" dimension acquired by identities (Arab solidarities or Islamic attachments) or by specific issues (e.g. the progress in the attainment of Palestinian self-determination, the suffering of the Palestinians or the fate of the Iraqi people under embargo in the 1990's then under American occupation). The saliency of this wide array of threats is reinforced by the fact that the Arab regimes, as a way to seize opportunities or just for fear, have a great propensity to the "securitisation" of many issues (to borrow the expression from Buzan, 1991), i.e. to present them not just as topics that are part of public policies, but as existential threats.

The Middle East is indeed a region with no security system (comparable to Europe for instance) or stable balance of power (Israel has refused any system of dissuasion) and even with no boundaries because ideological influences or transnational mobilisation cross borders from Morocco to Pakistan (the "Greater Middle East" as a reference point, different from its political interpretation as a privileged zone of intervention defined after September 11 by the G W Bush administration). The "peace process" phase of the 1990s that was due to change the whole security structure of the Middle East permanently looks more like a temporary phase. Negotiations failed in the Camp-David II summit, conflict resumed with the second *Intifadha*, hopes dashed and attitudes of extreme hostility have resurfaced (Ross, 2005). The Middle East remains a very volatile security system. Territorial disputes, ideological competitions, status rivalries and ethnic or cultural divisions reinforce each other and place heavy constraints on the foreign policies of the Arab states. For Iran a dispute with any Arab neighbour risks becoming a rift with all its Arab neighbours. Hence the concerns in Egypt's decision-making circles about a "Shiite crescent/arc" emerging in the Arab world and contesting the status quo, as a civil war is mounting in Iraq in 2005-06 and as *Hizballah* is leading Lebanon in a war with Israel in July 2006. The same applies to relations with Israel. The local struggle for territory between Israel and the Palestinians set up and substantiated a much wider hostility between Israel and the wider Arab world that is shadowed by a conflict between Israel and the wider Islamic world. The transnational qualities of Arab nationalism and of Islamic affiliations are amplified by the axial Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hence Egypt can't fully normalise its relations with Israel (and maintains "a cold peace") while Israel drags its feet for establishing a Palestinian state. And the resumed confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians following the failure of the Oslo peace process reinforced the "coldness" of the Israeli-Egyptian peace. The great (Arab-Israeli) wars of the past years are now obsolete but regional security challenges have since proliferated.

[1] Let us just recall that the "transitional" literature had no teleological vision incorporated as its main tenets by its precursors: they were studying "transitions from" (authoritarian classical rule) not "transitions to" (democracy).

After the heightened years of the 1950s and 1960s when the Pan-ideologies had a potential for shaking the region, threats have become much more diffuse and ambiguous but remain vivid. The crosscurrents of Arab nationalism, Islamic solidarity, anti-Israelism (anti-Zionism) and anti-Westernism blur across the internal and regional levels in contradictory ways affecting attitudes and opinion among ruling elites... and in the so-called "Egyptian street". Hence Egyptian leaders are very careful when managing their regional stance (e.g. the replacement of the flamboyant Amr Mussa by the quieter diplomat Ahmad Maher in March 2001) and are very suspicious of the offensive American moves after September 11 to "reshape the Middle East".

At the same time insecure Arab regimes with obsessive concerns about making themselves secure within their state at the helm of their political system (e g securing the regime, not just the state)[2] have found some degree of legitimacy or at least leverage in this threat-inducing environment. The insecurity of most Middle Eastern regimes spills over into regional security policy. Conversely, regimes boasted about their "regional missions" to explain all restrictions in their respective political systems and cloaked the "emasculation" of their respective political scenes behind high ideological discourses. For regimes that can't fully claim to represent democratically a given people (the political rhetoric has always to meet a reality check, to some point), it remains essential to find some basis of legitimacy beyond their borders. Repressive authoritarian regimes have gained ground over Pan-ideologies and transnational mobilisations by using them (and by the way they have kept them afloat). The Egyptian nation-state is a strong nation-state as compared with other Arab states of more recent origin and often considered as artificial envelopes (Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia not to speak about Jordan). But the nature of the regime is leaning Egyptian decision-makers to fulfil a "regional mission". Of course this mission is nowadays quite different from its "Nasserist" version of the 1950s and 1960s. It revolves around the fostering of a strong Egyptian stance in the Middle Eastern region. Here was the source of the strong popularity of Amr Mousa as Foreign Minister (until his replacement in March 2001) when he showed a firm stance vis-à-vis Israel or when he played the drumbeats of Arab nationalism as a way to assert Egyptian authority. Egypt rediscovered Pan-Arab themes in 1994-95 in Cairo's dispute with Washington over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the Egyptians refused to adhere to the treaty so long as the Israelis themselves refrained from signing it (then the Egyptians buckled under American pressure). The Egyptian stance provoked a strong popular chord in the Arab world. But there is a reverse side to this regional projection. Politics is not just about ideas and legitimacy and the regimes have to find resources to sustain their respective political system. This logic applies to Egypt whose economy is its biggest source of weakness (Waterbury, 1983). The three sources of national income (tourism, remittances from Egyptians working abroad especially in the Gulf and taxes from the Suez Canal transit... plus shrinking oil exports) do not allow for a freehand financing of the Egyptian system. This makes a big difference with the oil producers in the Gulf, with Iraq endowed with water and oil or with states that benefit from profligate aid from the Gulf like Syria. The Arab regimes have benefited from stalled situations to negotiate access to rents, arms procurements and international flows of aid[3]. This is also the core of Egypt's special relation with the United States since Egypt's diplomatic shift in Camp-David I (1978-79). The alignment ("bandwagoning") with the United States has earned Egypt one of the largest US economic assistance aid in the world and helped improve the country's strategic situation. It is questionable whether the Egyptian regime would be able to make deals with Israel of the same kinds if Egypt was a democracy.

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[2] On the distinction between the state defined as institutional positions and the regime defined as the "roads" used to fill theses positions (that may be large avenues or more tortuous and blocked trails), see O'Donnel (1973).

[3] There were feelings in the 1990's in Egypt that the advancing peace process would diminish Egyptian role (it doesn't mean that the Egyptians are responsible for its failure). The autonomous path gained by the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Israel-Jordan peace treaty and the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations mechanically diminished Egyptian brokering stance in the Arab world. Other Arab countries complained from the Egyptian contemptuous stance toward them, the Egyptians considering themselves as the ones who opened the way to Arab-Israeli direct negotiations and were unduly punished by an Arab boycott.

The Egyptian regime maintains a two-fold security policy aimed at fulfilling these often-contradictory objectives. Firstly, Egypt's "militarisation" policy, i e the accumulation of capacity for organized violence (even at a time of peace) is to be understood as a way to maintain Egypt's regional stance. Egypt has not been much threatened since it signed Camp David I, but the Egyptian regime has proclaimed the need to maintain a large and competitive military establishment. And the sheer size of the Egyptian army makes the military an influential actor that maintains a high profile. The crucial place of the military sector in Arab polities was defined in a war-prone area and the Middle Eastern security system was born fighting. There is a kind of "path dependence" from this period (the so-called praetorian era) that explains a lot of subsequent developments. Yet from the beginning there was a disparity between the short duration of the fighting itself and the huge consequences of the preparation for war for regime authority and state-society relations (Heydemann, 2000). War preparation served more decisively to entrench regimes than to prepare directly for wars. Things have changed since with the increased "civilianisation" of regimes (see below), but the military sector has remained a key actor in the Egyptian regime and the Middle East plays a key role in arms markets. The military build-up is driven by considerations of prestige and diplomacy and should not be taken at face value as a preparation for war in a threats-plagued region. The most symbolic aim is to maintain Egyptian armed forces commensurate with that of Israel (this is not deterrence, even conventional deterrence, something Israel... and the US would not allow). Egypt's arms industry is the largest in the Arab world producing under licence US Abrams tanks, aircrafts, and helicopters... Military industrialisation is based more on a psychological rationale rather than a functional one (the concerted build-up of a military industrialisation capacity). The Egyptian officers corps where most officers have been influenced in military academies by the generation of old-fashioned Arab nationalists are very sensitive to these dimensions. By the way it is also a convenient way for a regime coming from a military (but that has "autonomised"/"civilianised" itself) to keep strong links with the military establishment. The military is characterised by a strong sense of corporatism (transmitted through the military hierarchy, but also a common identity cultivated in schools, military clubs, traditions or customs), a strong self-image and high societal esteem, which fosters the officers' identification with the success or failure of their country's policies. Egyptian officers constantly lobby for high technology weapon systems. The Egyptian officers corps have witnessed in 1991 the quick defeat of the Iraqi army that was depicted as n°4 in the world and again in 2003 the technological superiority of the American-British military offensive. The Egyptian military aims at building a "capital-intensive" military by the modernization of its armed forces according to the requirements of the "revolution in military affairs". No regime can hope survive with an economically constricted and humiliated officer corps. The regime has been forced in recent years to adapt "militarisation" to the accelerating rate of socio-economic change. The Egyptian regime had to curb military expenditures in the 1990s when its capacity to engage in military spending came to conflict with financial constraints (Sadowski, 1993). The military has loosened some grip on the wealth of the Egyptian state. Yet relative high levels of military expenditures have persisted and the military remains a well-serviced budget-hungry sector. Hence the need for Egyptian military to have unrestricted access to outside aids, arms procurement and the importance of the US-Egyptian military cooperation. US military cooperation has helped Egypt modernise its armed forces and retain a status as a significant military power with the latest jewels (tanks, helicopters, aircrafts...) the military is craving about. US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) helps the Egyptian regime to service the corporate needs of its military ($ 1,3 billion a year). The United States also provides training, military advice and expertise (e g during the biannual large "Bright Star" military exercises)[4]. But the US alliance has a more wide meaning.

Secondly, Egypt cultivates a strong strategic alliance with the United States. Egypt shares with the US numerous strategic objectives: the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the security in

[4] Egypt does not host US permanent bases even if it has a highly supportive role as US partner. Egypt has continued to show sensitivity about any permanent US presence on the US soil (negotiations to use an Egyptian port failed in 1981).

the Gulf, the broader stability in the Middle East, the fight against extremism and the country's economic and political development (Quandt, 19 and 1988). The Egyptian-American alliance has brought concrete gains for Egyptian national interests. It is the context (and the limitation) of the Egyptian strong regional activism. Numerous regional mediations have been conducted by the Egyptian Foreign Minister and by the intelligence chief Omar Suleiman in the first place on the Palestinian-Israeli file. The Egyptian diplomatic activism has served to restore Egypt's prominence as a regional power. Egypt's regional role is one of its main international assets. The Egyptian diplomacy for sure aims at putting Egypt in its right full place at the head of the Arab region. It tries to benefit from the special characteristics of the region as an incomplete security system and to square them with the regime's interests[5]. Yet Egyptian decision-makers have no doubts that they don't have the means of their self-proclaimed ambitions and often place their initiatives under the tutelage of the American patronage. Here enters for Egypt the importance of the US alliance, in pair with Israel. The alignment with Washington has promoted Egypt's vital interests, but Egypt has failed to resist the irrevocable insertion of Israel as a powerful third party in Egyptian-American strategic relations. Egypt has struggled since Camp-David I to stay on an equal footing with Israel in American eyes (and aid allocations). Egypt has tried since the 1990s to mitigate its US alliance by improving ties with Europe because it has found the European policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more balanced than the US stance (Egypt signed a Partnership Agreement with the EU) and has shown a special French tropism (President Mubarak has cultivated close relations with François Mitterand or with Jacques Chirac). But Egypt has never hoped to counterbalance its strategic relationship with the United States. Egypt may develop alternative (and more balanced) visions as compared with the United States: it could convene an Arab summit designed to place the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister in 1996 (Benyamin Netanyahou) before an Arab consensus, it helped maintain contacts between Israel or the United States and Syria and defused many tensions, it withdraw its ambassador from Israel with the beginning of the second *Intifadha*, it urged the United States to intervene when violence began to rage in the Palestinian territories, it urged again the United States to take a clear stance as the United States was in an awkward position to do something to invalidate *al-Qa'ida* "linking"/equating its terrorist attacks with the defence of the Palestinian people (as the American post September 11 internal debate was sidelining those who were advocating for a clear "engagement" in the Palestinian file as opposed to those urging for an Iraq only policy). But Egyptian decision-makers have been cautious to bring their regional interventions in strict line with US objectives and moves. The Palestinian-Israeli has been a prime choice where the Egyptian diplomacy has tried by dint of a pragmatic foreign policy to fill the vacuum left by the "hands off policy" of the Bush administration or generated in 2003-04 by the US engagement in Iraq and the upcoming presidential elections. Egypt took the "road map" in 2003-04 as a workable plan (even if it was strongly biased toward Israel by its insistence on a violence cessation first) and worked with Israel on a plan for its withdrawal from Palestinian territories. Egypt was very much involved in 2004-05 in stopping the smuggling of weapons under the Philadelphia corridor (the border between Gaza and Egypt) or in the training of Palestinian security forces according to the basic tenets of the "security reforms" fostered by the Quartet. It was pivotal in the efforts to organise a cease-fire between various Palestinian fractions when the Palestinian authority began to collapse. The management of the situation in Gaza after the Israeli unilateral withdrawal in Summer 2005 was done with Egyptian help. The Egyptian diplomacy entered in numerous talks with the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon (in February 2005 it conducted the first summit with Ariel Sharon since the Israeli Prime Minister came to power)[6]. Hence, Egypt's strategic relation with the United States has remained the primary context of Egyptian regional

[5] There is behind the Egyptian activism no return to the "Nasserist" policy aiming at dominating the Arab world (and that was decried especially by the Syrians as a kind of "colonization"); it is no tool to project physically Egyptian power but a very symbolic presence through diplomatic activism.

[6] Cairo made numerous symbolic gestures in 2004 especially when the Israeli embassy's spokesman gave an interview on an Egyptian TV program. Yet Egypt's ambassador to Israel had been recalled in Cairo since the beginning of the second *Intifadha*.

policy, although Egypt's dependence has also been a very hotly debated topic especially in Parliament.

Latent tensions, disagreements and mutual scepticism were numerous in the past: the Egyptian government tried to rehabilitate Libya, Sudan or Iraq, considered throughout the 1990s "rogue states" by Washington, while the United States was promoting direct confrontation with them; Israel nuclear arsenal considered as a threat to Egyptian national interests and regional stability was another source of tensions with Washington. Yet the daylight between the positions of Cairo and Washington was never recognized by either of both parties. Strains have deepened in the post September 11 era that acted as a revelatory. Egypt has supported American efforts to fight "global terror" but opposed the American "loose" definition of terrorism (and its use as a deciphering key to the Iraqi or Palestinian situations); the narrow and often Israeli-biased prism through which the United States have looked at the Palestinian situation has created rifts with Egypt; Egypt's formal opposition to the Iraqi war in 2002-03 (Egypt maintained that "regime change" in Iraq was an Iraqi internal matter) and its calls for a diplomatic solution acted as a symbol for a country that in the recent past stood firmly behind the American projects in the Middle East. Finally the American "offensive" interventionism in the Middle East in the name of "democratic dominoes" raised suspicions in Egypt and doubts about its efficiency to effectively solve the many problems of the region. The Iraq war sparked off a lively debate regarding the Egyptian regime's ability to uphold national interests and Egyptian intellectuals of various political taints (Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Tareq al-Bichri) denounced "Egypt's withdrawal from history" i.e. Egypt's marginalisation in the region, its subservience to US interests and its inability to chart an independent course or even a coherent foreign policy[7]. The Egyptian-American relationship has never relied on broad based public support and has always been an elite bargain. Yet after September 11, perceptions have changed and negative feelings have surfaced openly. Finally, Washington new shift of strategy toward reform and democratisation ("a forward strategy of freedom") in the Middle East focusing on Egypt (along with Saudi Arabia; Iraq, Syria, Iran were destined to follow another quite different "regime change" path) and the numerous criticisms (and expressions of contempt) levelled in Washington at the authoritarian, stagnant and corrupt Egyptian regime seriously destabilised in 2002-03 the American-Egyptian relationship[8]. Yet perceptions however important don't ipso facto translate into policy changes. Gradual change and dialogue on reform with the Egyptian regime became in 2004-05 the primary choice for a G W Bush administration that has been engulfed by the intricate Iraqi problems (then bogged down in a complete morass and disaster) and that has set aside aggressive democracy-promotion (except at the rhetorical level). All in all a strong strategic alliance with the United States, however transformed, remains of prime importance for Egypt.

The regime as the guarantor of the state (or change within strong stability)

Although substantial regional threats may continue to loom, the authoritarian primary concern is internal politics. The Egyptian regime's main claim to power/legitimacy has been its ability to maintain "stability" in the country as the guardian of the state. This is the "saviour model" justification. It took the place of the "realisation model" adopted in the 1970s and 1980s by numerous authoritarian military-originating regimes (i.e. the enduring claim that they realised something for their people, that they built roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, factories...). The later model has gradually eroded with economic reforms, the growth of the private sector and under the weight of globalisation: prolonged fiscal crisis and economic reforms/privatisations heavily biased

[7] The American pressures on Egypt and the strongly felt dwindling regional role of Egypt led to questions levelled by Egyptian intellectuals as to whether the weaknesses of Egypt (regime rigidity, economic difficulties, corruption...) may hinder Egypt's role. Conspiracy theories were often invoked answers.

[8] The United States came increasingly to see the authoritarian reform-proof Egyptian regime as a breeding ground for extremism (cf the high number of Egyptians part of the September 11 commando or in the high levels of the *al-Qa'ida* network). The American policy-makers began to attribute the region's problems to the Arab authoritarian regimes and pressed for reforms of all kinds.

toward crony capitalists have "hollowed out" the state apparatus and its hegemonic reach in Egyptian society. But the "statist tradition" remains vivid in Egypt. There is a strong tradition of managerial rule by a state bureaucracy in Egypt and a long history of corporatist political engineering coming from the state (that was "abducted" by the military in 1952 and has been inherited from rulers to rulers until now). This "statist culture", what Tareq al-Bichri analyses as "the consent the Egyptians have expressed to be governed", remains buoyed by a strong coercitive apparatus.

Firstly, the regime as the guardian of the state is said to have saved Egypt in the 1990s from terrorism and Islamist seizure of power. But it has become a police state. The Egyptian state has applied massive repression (massive arrests, generalised torture practices, trials before military courts...) and made great use of the myth of an Egyptian secular state besieged by violent Islamists and resorting to repression in a deadlocked situation. The confrontation began in the 1980s; the 1990s saw an intensification of violent clashes between Islamist groups and the security services in Cairo (Imbaba) and in Upper Egypt. The spiral of violence culminated with the Luxor massacre in 1997. The fighting between the government and *al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya* in the 1990's left 1 300 among civilians or policemen dead and 15 000 to 20 000 (?) Islamists jailed. The regime gave free hand to the security services to combat Islamist groups and implemented amendments to the penal code and to the law on state security courts. Hundreds of civilians were transferred to military courts with fewer legal protections. The Ministry of Interior had the direct command (under the supervision of the presidency that presides over the police) in counter-terrorism operations. During the 1990s, the regime chose to rely primarily upon the security forces to combat Islamists violent groups. But the army stepped in to assist the often badly trained Central Security Forces. And every times the terrorist threats peaked, military top brass commissioned articles in Egyptian (Arabic) newspapers explaining their concern with stability in the country. In 1999-2000 the regime was buoyed by its victory over Islamist violent groups (and by a stable economy). *Al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya* has laid down its arms and renounced violence and *al-Jihad* has been split between those who fled abroad (headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri), those who remain underground and those in prisons who have formally abjured jihad against fellow Muslims. The legacy has been a state apparatus whose brutality has become a routine practice. The prolonged state of emergency has criminalized public life. The 1992 anti-terror law has been used to arrest and prosecute not only those accused of committing violence but also those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The police force has taken a leading role in combating terrorism and has been expanded in numbers (the Central Security Forces) and in prerogatives (from safeguarding "public security" to protecting "public order"). The secret police has also been expanded with the efficient offensive of Islamist groups against the Egyptian state and has gained a prominent role in the political repression. Generalized torture has been a landmark of President Mubarak's regime. The state security courts were abolished in 2004 but the emergency law in force since 1981 (and reinstated every three years) has allowed for "recurrent detention". In this context, the post September 11 American "war on terrorism" has created parallels with the Egyptian regime's war against radial Islamist groups, as the Egyptian officials ironically alluded to (even if its loose American interpretation has created rifts, see above).

Secondly, at the same time the regime has continued to cultivate strong links with the military. On the surface the army performs a less political role in comparison with President Mubarak's predecessors. There is indeed a "civilianisation" of the state in Egypt when compared with the situation in the 1950s and 1960s. Military men are no longer dominating the top positions of the Egyptian state (as ministers, director of public sector companies, high bureaucrats or governors) and the regime has increased its leeway away from the military establishment. The days have gone when a small clique of officers could seize power by mobilising a few military units. Middle Eastern states are now huge Leviathan with large bureaucracies and the military is too weak and ineffective to control the state apparatus (Luciani, 1990). It is rather the presidency that assumes full

control in Egypt with its own network of trusted individuals, crony entrepreneurs and the National Democratic Party (NDP)'s high nomenklatura. Although the Egyptian authoritarian regime suffers from " a crisis of legitimacy" (Hudson, 1977), it has been able to secure more legitimacy (indeed a "weak legitimacy") in the eyes of key social groups than its potential competitors or opponents. The presidency is the centre of power. At the same time the military remains an important component of the Egyptian authoritarian apparatus. Hosni Mubarak is a former military officer who seeks the trust of the military establishment. The difference between the military and civilian channels of influence becomes blurred at the top of the Egyptian states: numerous high decision-makers have a military background (Zakaria Azmi, secretary general of the presidency, Safwat al-Sharif, secretary general of the NDP...). The regime called on the army in numerous situations when it was about to lose control (Islamist uprisings following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, riots started by the Central Security Forces in 1986) or when the police proved inefficient in the 1990s to quell Islamist attacks. The military establishment has always answered positively to the President's requirements. The Egyptian regime ongoing reliance on the armed forces mirrors its lack of accountability and invigorates the weight of the military within the political system. Officers have become part of the authoritarian state as members of the elite. The endeavours of the Egyptian regime were thus not so much geared towards "demilitarisation" or pushing the military "back to the barracks", but rather towards the progressive "institutionalisation" of the military apparatus into the authoritarian state (Bellin 2004)[9]. The trend of the disappearance of uniformed men from high posts does not contradict the thoroughgoing integration of the military into the formal and informal authoritarian decision-making networks. However, this "institutionalisation" is not to be confused with "professionalisation" (in Samuel Huntington's sense), although it has a "professional" element in that cronyism, patrimonialism and political affiliations in the military are increasingly complemented by formal, meritocratic, and professional promotion criteria. Some results of this transformation have been the appointment of more competent officers to high posts, the emergence of corporatism, and greater cohesion within the military.

As a consequence, the security sector has become a strong interest group (of a special kind) inside the Egyptian regime. The army has been at the forefront of these developments. On the one hand, the army with its economic capacity in accordance with its "militarisation" objectives has "organisationally" invaded the civilian economy. The defence industry has converted many production facilities to manufacture civilian goods for the domestic market and the army has developed a wide network of farms, milk processing and bread production facilities, as well as poultry and fish farms. It is involved in the lucrative reclamation of desert land and runs numerous tourist resorts. The army is not a Schumpeterian entrepreneur in the strict sense but is rather a "parasitic actor" knowing better than others how to play by, benefit from the rules of the game in the intricate Egyptian economy under reform[10]. On the other hand, the army's economic activities serve as a life jacket for protecting the living standard of the military personnel from the adverse effects of economic liberalization (*infitah*). Army officers are now a privileged group living in a kind of "military society", i.e. a closed-off social group living secluded from civilians in exclusive suburbs or residential areas, further distinguished by corporate privileges such as access to military-only facilities (schools, hospitals, clubs, leisure facilities, military shops, etc.), cheap housing, transportation facilities, easy access to low-interest credits, access to scarce consumer goods at cheap prices, better medical care, and higher salaries than employees in the civilian public sector (half of an average Egyptian household's budget goes to cover the cost of food, the other that of

[9] Bellin (2004) speaks of the "institutionalisation" of the military... although such a characterisation that has some limits in the Egyptian case when compared with the Turkish case of a strong institutionalisation of the military in the state.

[10] In other words, the military knows how to make use of its comparative advantages like the cheap manpower of its conscripts, its access to technology and highly qualified civilian engineers, its heavy equipment infrastructure, privileges such as disguised subsidies, tax exemptions and absolute financial autonomy, its monopolistic right to produce goods of "strategic interest", and its sheer size which enables it to alter market conditions and circumvent regulations.

housing; public sector employees have lost more than half of their purchase power in recent years with skyrocketing inflation rates). Officers have also access to military networks to find lucrative jobs after their retirement. Once a group with whom the Egyptian middle classes identified, military officers have become a status elite with whom the average Egyptian has little in common and living in a closed "military society". This model of rent-seeking privileged individuals extends beyond the army to the whole security sector. Talks of corruption are numerous. One of the most profitable sectors of corruption is state land and the real estate market. Military and police officers have greatly benefited with Sinai land, villas on the Northern coast west of Alexandria or on the Suez Canal zone. The new security elite is wed to the political status quo. In numerous other cases (especially in Asian countries), governments have empowered themselves by establishing big and hegemonic armies and making the armies fend for themselves through economic activities. In most cases the armies were driven out of business at a surprising speed when governments fostered economic reforms. In Egypt (as in Arab polities), this is less so as the regime remains authoritarian and keeps tight control of the pace of change (a stalled and careful *infitah*).

The regime's newly found stability is explained to an important degree by the restructured security sector. The relationship between the military establishment and the Egyptian regime can't be understood without taking into account the thorough transformation that the regime has imposed on the armed forces. Sadat shook up the officer corps by eliminating a number of powerful and politicised officers, thus achieving, at last, what Nasser had yearned for, i.e. control over the military. Consequently, the Egyptian army is no longer a locus of politicisation where officers can discuss politics as freely as in the 1950s or 1960s. Twenty to thirty years of interaction with the authoritarian regimes have left their mark on the armed forces, which are now characterized by over-centralized authority, hidden lines of command (i.e. the monitoring of military activities behind the scenes), and rivalries between different organizations of military and security/paramilitary services (police, special anti-terrorist branches, *mukhabarat* services...) that counterbalance each other. The presidential or royal palace is the centre of power. Promotions of military personnel are based on loyalty to the regime or at least passivity, rather than on field ability or skills. The top brass of the military are often enticed by material and immaterial benefits and become an integral part of the regime's power network. Officers of lower rank usually maintain a lower profile and are primarily concerned about their personal (sometimes semi-legal) economic interests, while otherwise acting as docile yes-men who lack the will and/or capacity to take initiative, preferring not to be identified as innovators or individuals prone to make the first move and restricting themselves to the roles of quiet modern technocrats and apolitical specialists. All in all, the political quiescence of the military is not the product of the military's "(re)professionalization" or its return to an external mission (the defence of the country) but of its close relationship with their regime and the benefits it gains from it. The military today hardly poses any immediate challenge to the regime, not least because it is among the main beneficiary of the authoritarian status quo. Its new role and activities leave it ample room for self-enrichment, and thus, albeit often indirectly, for continued membership within the inner circles of "politically relevant elites" (Perthes, 2004). Conversely the Ministry of Interior and the increasingly powerful secret services (General Intelligence, State Security Investigations branch of the police) have gained a growing influence, as well as a small special branch of the army, the Presidential Guard (the Defence Minister and the army chief of staff have this background). A new alliance of top military leaders, police commanders and secret police top brass has cemented at the top of the Egyptian state, along with the new capitalist cronies and new technocrats promoted in the NDP by Gamal Mubarak[11].

[11] Gamal Mubarak was appointed in

The "redrawing" of security: security sector as a tool for the survivalist regime

The Egyptian regime has managed to consolidate its hold on the Egyptian polity by strongly integrating the security sector in its authoritarian apparatus. Yet, the robustness of this apparatus is called into question from another point of view, because it gives the impression of strongly governing a debilitated political system (for a different interpretation, Springborg, 198). Politics is not just about who is benefiting from what (the basic question in political science if one follows R Dahl). Politics also entails giving a direction to a political community. Here lies the blame for the Egyptian regime that lost its capacity to imprint a project on the Egyptian polity and only manages competing forces and groups to protect its grip on power[12]. The very nature of the Egyptian authoritarian system weakens any new alliance between the security services and new (businessmen)/old (technocrats) interest groups, because the rigidity of a polity steered by ageing politicians without any sense of national project is its most important and significant feature. Furthermore, the sense of the state is eroding and is threatening the "political contract" at the top of which the security sector in Egypt is lying. The "retreat of the state" is not just physical (privatisation of parts of the state-run economy, relinquishing of basic welfare state functions, retreating from social services left to Islamist organisations...) but is also "conceptual". There is a growing sense of neglect in Egyptian society: the state succeeded in its war against "terrorism" but failed in protecting the lives of its citizens... and hundreds of passengers burnt to death in a burning third class train that nobody stopped in Upper Egypt in February 2002 acted as a metaphor of the Egyptian people governed by an incompetent and corrupt authoritarian regime it could not replace. There is a growing sense of social violence in Egyptian society (tribal vendettas in Upper Egypt, police brutality...) and corruption has reached on a massive scale. The Egyptian social fabric is in a process of gradual disintegration in ugliness, hypocrisy and cynicism, amid growing sectarian tensions (between Copts and Muslims and with a reawakened Coptic question)[13]. The Egyptian polity is increasingly truncated into competing interest groups revolving around the presidency without any cement coalescing them together. The middle classes (a pivotal group in Egyptian history... and the social base of the army and of the police) suffer from the economic reforms: they are deprived of the possibility to buy an apartment, they see their dwindling purchase power reduced by inflation and are witnessing the agonies of the lower classes in the privatised Egyptian economy. The slow rate of change fostered by the Egyptian regime is dangerously weakening the Egyptian social fabric (a case American decision-makers are making against the Egyptian government after September 11 to urge them to shift to "promoting democracy"). The challenge is reinforced by other developments related to regional politics.

At the same time, the regional Egyptian stance has proved a very dangerous trap for the regime. The Egyptian regime has increasingly become caught between a rock and a hard place. 2002-03 proved a hectic period for Egyptian decision-makers. The failure of the Camp David II negotiations and the breaking out of the second *Intifadha* opened the way to a dangerous distancing between the official position of the Egyptian government and the mobilisation of the "Egyptian street", with the return of Israeli violent retaliation moves and Palestinian suicidal attacks broadcasted on live by new Arab satellite media like *al-Jazeera* (that broke state information monopoly in Egypt). Secular leftists, Islamists and even human rights activists began to speak the same language of Arab-Islamic nationalism. Egypt's typically apolitical masses were awakened. The highest wave of popular anti-

[12] Even very narrowly based military regimes in the 1950's and 1960's found ways to create around them a "moment of enthusiasm" (Binder, 1978) and to mobilise their people with a project.

[13] Sectarian tensions surfaced in Upper Egypt in the 1980's with Islamist resurgence. But the clampdown on Islamic groups did not alleviate these tensions. There is also growing international pressure dealing with the Coptic question in Egypt (coming especially from American human rights organizations) and a growing number of Coptic organisations in the diaspora. The Egyptian government took great care to manage this problem and to highlight its concerns in public reports and TV programs (Copts were appointed in the NDP's leadership and the Coptic Christmas was designated as a national holiday).

Americanism in Egypt propagated by opposition political parties, professional unions or committees of solidarity with the Palestinians calling for boycotts has taken place under the Mubarak regime... that let the outpouring of public anger express itself in public to some degree as long as it was manageable. After September 11 anti-Americanism and anti-Israelism (America and Israel being seen as being one) skyrocketed and found new fuel with the American involvement in the Middle East, as the war raged in Afghanistan and as the preparation for the Iraqi war accelerated in Washington. The conundrum increased with the G W Bush administration's unqualified acceptance of the Israeli interpretation of its own situation as a "war against (Palestinian) terror". The Egyptian regime was in complete disarray. The government had hemmed in demonstration held in 2000-01 in solidarity with the second *Intifadha* with an overwhelming security presence. But the regime showed growing tolerance for public demonstrations in January, February and March 2003 (yet angering more openly the United States and Israel)... the NDP staged its own demonstration to stay abreast of public opinion and the regime even coordinated with the Muslim Brothers to canalise the anti-war movement into peaceful demonstrations. The stress was especially felt by the Egyptian regime in 2002-03 when the United States was openly preparing the invasion of Iraq: it declared opposition to war and to regime change by foreign diktats while remaining committed to its strategic relationship with the United States. The Iraq war highlighted the gulf between state and society with an Egyptian government caught between popular demands and external pressures. Mobilisation has receded since then but never abated.

The end-result is a situation of latent mobilisation in Egypt. Firstly, a new generation of activists using e-mail and mobile text messages has grown active in the *Kefaya* movement or in multiple protestations with the slogans "*hadha mesch balad-na*" (this is not our country). They are not deterred by the number of security personnel deployed before each demonstration, by massive arrests and by threats of transfer to emergency state security courts. Protesters are moved by calls for civil disobedience against a repressive, manipulative and personalised state, are trying to recapture back some freedom in a public space that was monopolised by the state (see the foundation document of the *Kefaya* movement written by Tareq al-Bichri) and are publicly indicting the government, in a way that was unimaginable a few years ago. In the recent past, politics was left to a small elite (participation shrank to 10% of the electorate) and political parties whose activities, leadership and fundraising have been maintained at a weak stage to service the NDP's hegemony were submitted to bullying/intimidation (see the closure of *al-Cha'ab* newspaper and the bullying of the Labour Party) or were anaesthetised in largely rigged elections. The last bastion where social activists had taken refuge, in professional unions or in the non-governmental sector, was exposed to legislative restrictions in 1999 and 2002 and social activist were sued before military courts (a 1992 military decree was first promulgated after the 1992 earthquake in Cairo to block foreign support to NGOs and then used to gain control on their activities). In the new Egyptian social movements, activists of past generations, the leftists of the 1970's and the Islamists of the 1980s have joined hands with a hitherto younger generation of students and social activists and have shown a new boldness in breaking the ban on demonstrations and denouncing presidential positions. Demonstrations are also held by popular committees in support of the Palestinians (e.g. after the assassination of the *Hamas*' leader Chaykh Yassine) or in support of the Iraqis (e.g. during the Falluja uprising), but usually spill into direct criticism of the Egyptian government and even of the President (a political taboo in Egypt for a long time... broken with new slogans like "*Mubarak zayy Sharon*").

Secondly, protestations have recovered a new life with a debate on constitutional reforms and on elections monitoring, in a kind of convergence between the new social movements and more institutional actors, the judges. 2005 heralded as "the year of elections in Egypt", with a referendum on May 25 on an amendment to the Constitution, presidential elections on September 7 and legislatives in November and December, has given more salience to the protest movements. 2005 signals the end of the political lethargy of the Egyptian masses in a deadlocked situation whose

beneficiary was the regime. Demands for domestic political and constitutional reforms (the lifting of the state of emergency, safeguards for free and fair elections, the transformation of Egypt from a presidential republic to true a parliamentary republic, a fundamental overhaul of the constitution to allow for multiple presidential candidates[14]...) appeared in October 1999 with the referendum on Mubarak's fourth presidential term. A lively debate occurred in Egypt about the Syrian succession process when Bashar al-Asad inherited his father's presidential post in June 2000 and denounced *tawrith al-sulta* (the inheriting of power) as an illegitimate practice in republics (Sa'ad ed-Din Ibrahim coined the neologism *Gumlukiyya = gumhiriyya+malakiyya* to describe the regime). But protest went further. In July 2000 the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court passed a decision that required judicial supervision of elections (it took ten years to hand down this ruling). The November 2000 legislative elections were conducted for the first time with an enhanced judicial supervision. A kind of liberalisation movement from within the state (the so-called "*Intifadha* of the judges" epitomised by the two well-known personalities of judges Makki and Bastawisi) has materialised, trying to put back some form of rule of law, denouncing the intrumentalisation of justice, with an explicit focus on democratisation at a time when Egypt is in search of international respectability[15]. Hence judges have made use of the potential of legal formalism and have subverted the use of legal procedures by the authoritarian regime (to dress electoral engineering in legal garb).

The overall picture is that of a weakened authoritarian regime. Of course, it retains strong cards. On the one hand, the regional context that has been created by "the American moment in the Middle East" after September 11 has shifted and has worked to the benefits of the regime. The American pressures helped indirectly the Egyptian liberalisation movement's new boldness by weakening an Egyptian regime under close American scrutiny and made cautious when repressing opposition movements[16]. In the summer 2002, President G W Bush threatened in a very symbolic move to block $ 130 million in economic aid to Egypt if the Egyptian-American sociologist Sa'ad ed-Din Ibrahim involved in the 2000 elections monitoring was not released. As "democracy" seemed advancing in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, C Rice cancelled her scheduled visit to Cairo in February 2005 (to welcome the first US grant directly to an Egyptian NGO without the approval of the Egyptian government through USAID/Egypt, another bombshell in Egypt) after the arrest of another opponent, Ayman Nour. The Egyptian regime began to think that the G W Bush administration was sincere in its admonitions. C Rice at the American University in Cairo in June 2005 outlined democratisation goals for the country, with a strong impact in Egypt (or at least in its socially mobilised sectors). Yet a few months later in 2006 the G W Bush administration seems more cautious, after the Muslim Brothers won a historic 88 seats in Egyptian legislative elections (approximately 20%??? of the seats)... and after democracy promotion empowered Islamists in Iraqi parliament, in Saudi Arabia's municipal elections, turned them (*Hizballah*) as a pivotal group in Lebanon and helped *Hamas* to win the Palestinian Authority. The Bush administration gives the impression (in Cairo) that the tepid pressure to democratise and enthusiastic embrace of elections has diminished... conversely the Egyptian government is using the Islamist threat to advance its own agenda. On the other hand, Mubarak's surprise announcement in February 2005 that he would ask parliament to amend article 76 of the constitution to allow multiple presidential candidacies was an astute move. It caught by surprise the unprepared opposition and secured his victory for a fifth

[14] Article 76 of the constitution required candidates to be selected by Parliament with a two-third majority (guaranteed for the NDP). Hence presidential elections took the outlook of a referendum on a single candidate, Hosni Mubarak rather than direct elections with a choice of candidates.

[15] The Egyptian judges are not open opponents but are trying to apply the texts of the law and the provisions of the constitution; hence they are colliding with the regime. They share no quest to transform the Egyptian regime but try to bring life to a hitherto inert political system

[16] The Middle East Partnership Initiative, that is the flagship of American democracy promotion in the Middle East announced by C Powell in December 2002 was denounced as a cultural invasion... in parallel to the denunciations of the Americanisation of Egyptian culture and society in numerous TV talk shows.

term[17]. He perpetuated his rule pre-empting criticism from the US and neutralising the military's reluctance to his son's candidacy (because no candidate was strong enough to oppose the NDP and the military was due to opine)[18]... and the Bush administration seemed to make too much of minor achievements (a multi-candidate presidential election) and too little of major failures (the crackdown on the opposition).

Yet the regime is unable to capitalise on its assets. Its ability to make a proper use of its strong "cards" is questionable. The authoritarian regime has not sought to strengthen institutions. Symptomatically Hosni Mubarak has never appointed a vice-president and chosen between naming a civilian (a challenge to the military pillar of the regime) or an officer (a difficult move when democratisation hence civilianisation are on the international agenda). Instead the Egyptian regime has sought to depolitise the country and impose order from top to down. During the 2000 legislatives the Egyptian regime facing difficulties (the new judicial monitoring) has chosen to revert back to its heavy-handed techniques (physical obstruction to voters, barring opposition supporters from entering the pooling stations...). In November-December 2005 violence and irregularities increased in each of the legislative elections' three successive phases. After the government failed to stop the Muslim Brothers winning a historic 88 seats, crackdowns by Egyptian security forces have resumed as well as arbitrary arrests among the Muslim Brothers. The enduring *al-Qa'ida* threat (supposedly coming from Ben Laden and al-Zawahiri) remains a very helpful justification. After terrorist bombings in Taba in 200???, the town of al-Arish was closed off and mass arrests were reported. The much-despised emergency law that grants security forces wide-ranging powers was reinstated in April 2006 although Hosni Mubarak promised during the presidential campaign he would replace the emergency law (by an anti-terrorist legislation!). And before every demonstration central Cairo is inundated with security forces... Hence the regime's increased dependence on the security sector whereas the latter's proper "institutionalisation" into the regime calls for a careful use of it. Security management as a way to manage all the issues Egypt is confronting clearly shows its limits.

[17] And what had been conceded in principle might be denied through the practice of a nomination process easily influenced and possibly tightly controlled by the NDP (the presidential nominee must be endorsed by a number of those elected in the lower and upper houses of parliament and in municipal councils). Municipal elections were postponed in February 2006.

[18] Some resistance was felt in 1999-2000 in the military against Gamal al-Mubarak taking a political role and when speculations mounted that he might lead a new *Hizb al-Mustaqbal*.

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WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

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OUTLINE
MOROCCO / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

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by

Muhammad Tozy

« RETROSPECTIVE OF AN AUTHORITARIANISM IN PAIN OF LIBERALIZATION »

In Morocco, the struggle for power was not all the time a struggle for democratization and even less for modernization. The straightforward orientation of Morocco toward an assumed pluralism and a struggle for democratization is located in the mid-nineties of the last century. Certainly the progressive desires for modernisation was partly espoused by the political class and even by the Palace itself, but they were inhibited by a struggle for power and incidentally for controlling the economic resources. This was encouraged by a fundamentally conservative society.

Morocco is an old monarchy and French colonization didn't erase its state-controlled tradition. The French had certainly put the monarchy aside, but it didn't try to eliminate the sultanate, an archaic institution where the Sultan had all powers. During the protectorate the Sultan, from whom an absolute docility was expected, had to be content with signing law texts (dahirs) that were submitted to him by the Residence. The outside shapes of the Makhzen (traditional administration) were protected and tidy, but the Sultan has been stripped of all efficient powers. The real power was between the hands of the Resident who was at the top of the French administration.

Following the days of Independence, Morocco found itself with this double inheritance: The traditional Makhzen and the modern state-controlled structure introduced by the Protectorate. The latter will constitute the norm for the construction of the new national State. However, the duality won't disappear, but this time, the real power will change hands and will be on the side of the King who has simultaneously abandoned the denomination "Sultan".

In 1956, the national forces, i.e. the King and the national movement, worked to set up the modern national state. Interdependent during the struggle for the national independence, these political forces are going to diverge on modes of the political regime of the independent Morocco, right from the formation of the first government. From the start, divergences between the King and his allies, on the one hand, and the national movement and its different partisan expressions born after the independence, on the other hand, concentrated on the exercise of power and the detention of its levers. These will crystallize thereafter on the nature of the regime and on the social model while taking the shape of an opposition between two socio-political patterns. The first will be embodied by the King Hassan II and the second is carried by the left wing of the national movement.

The construction of the modern Moroccan state corresponds to three dimensions that find their echo in the contemporary period: the control of the territory and its organization on new foundations, the recast of the administration and the economic resource control.

The colonization of Morocco had materialized in the division of the national territory into three parts under foreign power tutelage: a part under the French Protectorate, a part under the Spanish tutelage and a part under the international authority. March 2, 1956, the treaty of Fès is abrogated and France recognized the independence of Morocco. April 7, 1956, a protocol put an end to the Spanish Protectorate and October 29, a diplomatic conference abrogated the international regime of the city of Tanger. In April 1958, Morocco recovered Tarfaya, June 30, 1969, it recovered Ifni, and November 6, the Green March for the recuperation of the Western Sahara was launched. Land recuperation and the Moroccanisation of enterprises bequeathed by the colonizers had to translate the will to construct a national "economy". In addition, these will encourage the emergence of the social category that the Power tried to develop.

At the time of the independence, Morocco inherited an administration made on the central plan of directions (the Direction of Interior, in charge of all the central and local administration, the Direction

of Services of Public Security, the Direction of the Chérifean Affairs) and of technical services (finance, agriculture, public works...) and on the local plan of townships for cities and circumscriptions and local centers for the countryside. It also inherited a carving of seven regions in the ex French Protectorate zone, divided into territories or Circles, and of five territories in the northern zone of the ex Spanish Protectorate. Since 1956, the chart of the Moroccan provinces follows this carving in order to sit the authority of the state. Since 1960, the country is cut up into 15 provinces in addition to a Prefecture around Casablanca. The same year, the creation of townships is partly going to substitute itself to the chart of tribes and to lead to the first local elections of the independent Morocco.

Devices of sovereignty (the army and the police) constitute another pillar of the new State and since their setting up the monarchy is anxious to control them. Litigation between the Palace and the Istiqlal Party around the holder of the ministry of the interior at the time of the formation of the first government (after the independence) has on the background the stake of the police's control and the seizure on nominations of local authority agents. From the beginning, this ministry is withdrawn from the control of the Istiqlal Party to be confided to the men around the Palace. As for the army, it was created May 14, 1956, but litigation about it will be solved only in 1960. Put under the authority of the heir prince, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) will be formed at the beginning of the Moroccan troop coming from the old colonial armies. As for the National Liberation Army (ALN), created in 1955, it wanted to continue the struggle for the liberating all the national territory. The arbitration of the King Mohammed V brought the two parts together and they accepted a compromise on the basis of the following principle: only a unique King, only a unique State and only a unique army. 5 000 men of the ALN joined the FAR, but 10.000 others fled to the South of Morocco in order to complete the liberation of the rest of the country. In 1960 the ALN is dissolved. Some of its elements integrated the FAR, but some of its leaders were arrested and convicted for "plotting against the Heir Prince ".

The recent Moroccan history can be seen through three periods:

- a first period of a relatively balanced struggle for power; it goes from 1956 to 1965,
- a second period characterized by the predominance of an autocratic power or even by an authoritative drift; it goes from 1965 to 1993, and
- a third period that can be qualified as "political opening", it goes from 1994 on.

Indeed, after a short period of equilibrium between the political forces (1956-1965), we can notice, from 1965, a certain affirmation of the authoritarianism of the regime, with the institution of the exception state (7 June 1965 - 30 July 1970). The direct engagement of the Monarchy on the political stage drives the King Hassan II to break with most nationalistic forces in competition. To the turn of nineties, it is the bootjack of a political transition that conducted to the reopening of the political game with the reinstatement of the nationalistic opposition in the regime, opening the way to its involvement in the management of state affairs after nearly forty years in the opposition

The uncertain struggle for Power

The occupant's departure let face-to-face the King and the Istiqlal party. As a nationalistic party that is both extremely popular and hegemonic immediately after Independence, the Istiqlal also leans on a strong monopolistic trade-union, the Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT), and on a Liberation Army of which an important branch refused to put down weapons before the total completion of the liberation of the national territory (Ifni, Tarfaya, the Sahara, etc.). On its side, the Monarchy that has become stronger after the test with the Protectorate and that wanted to preserve the dominant position left by the occupant's departure could not accept for a long time such a powerful competitor, but whose hegemony is contested not only by the traditional tribal forces, but also by the political partners as the Democratic Party of the independence (PDI), the Independent Liberals (of Rachid Mouline and Réda

Guédira) and independent youssoufistes personalities (MBarek El Bekkay). All these forces are in fierce struggle for power since the first days of Independence.

Of Mohammed V return, Nationalists had made a prerequisite for the country's independence. Interdependent in the struggle, they split, however, on the modes of decolonization, and later, on the management of affairs of the young independent State. Behind the union around the legitimacy of the Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef stood out the division of a movement that mined the political climate of the country since the first days of the national independence. The monarchy, on the other hand, came out greatly reinforced after the test of the deportation of the Sultan and his family. Mohammed V had to face the different pressures on him however, even within the Palace. The Sultan adopted referee's position and preferred to exercise his moral status in front of the political forces in presence while avoiding intervening directly in the march of affairs.

During this period, some paradoxical results were the result of the uncertainty of stakes and the "balanced character of competitors in the political domain. Some decisions can be qualified as revolutionary while others recall the archaic Morocco. By some consideration, one witnessed a slow democratization of the system of which Mohammed V defines the significance and stages.

In 1956, a representative national Council is instituted; in 1957, freedom for trade-unions is recognized and controlled ; in 1958, it is the turn of the freedom of association and meeting and the freedom of the press ; in 1960, the election of town councils to the universal suffrage allows Moroccans to vote for the first time; lastly in 1961, the enactment by Hassan II of a "fundamental Law for the Kingdom of Morocco" prepares the development of a Constitution that will be submitted to the approval of the country and then adopted by referendum December 7, 1962.

But this Constitution, contested by the opposition, strengthens the King's prerogatives and gives him the main role. It forbids the unique party and stipulates that "political parties participate in the organization and the representation of citizens".

The radicalisation of the Left and its growing audience in the public opinion worried the Palace that decided to declare war on it. The discovery of a plot against the King's life provides the pretext for that.

The year 1965 is marked by the exacerbation of tensions around the education question. It will be marked by the toughly repressed riots and the declaration of the exception state. Six months after the March events of that year, Mehdi Ben Barka, the leader of the Left, is kidnapped and murdered in Paris, October 29, 1965.

STATE FUNDATION AND THE AUTHORITATIVE DRIFT (1965-1990).

The March events are at the origin of the royal decision to suspend the Constitution and proclaim the state of exception (7 June 1965-31 July 1970) putting thus an end to the experience opened by the adoption, in December 1962, of the Constitution. The King took directly everything in his hands. It is the beginning of the authoritative drift of the regime.

The 1970 Constitution gave to the absolute monarchy a constitutional setting while assuring to the King a more dominant position than that of the 1962 Constitution. The legislative elections of July 27 and 28, 1970 have been boycotted by the Istiqlal and UNFP parties united in the setting of the National Front (al-Koutla al-wataniyya) created July 27, 1970.

The rupture between the King and the national political parties is total. Henceforth, the Power will put forward a caste of State men and apolitical and docile leaders, technicians and notables to replace the traditional political parties. It is time of high commissioners and technocrats.

The political control of the state is also accompanied by a control of the economy. For that purpose, several enterprises are created and controlled by high commissioners intended to widen the social basis of the regime.

As for the army - modern, homogeneous, disciplined, and assumed to be a docile and devoted instrument at the King's service - it will prove to be also infected by putschist currents like all Third World's armies. At Skhirat, July 10, 1971 and August 16, 1972, soldieries (up to now faithful to the King) tempted to reverse the regime.

The Seventies are staked out of political suits accusing different objectors to the regime. Putschists of Skhirat are brought before a military courthouse that had opened its audiences February 12, 1972 at Kenitra. Some convicted are going to disappear only to reappear several years after in the sad hole of Tazmamart.

The party of the National Union of the Popular Forces (UNFP) was then in the collimator of the Power. In January 1973, two leaders of this party, Omar Benjelloun and Mohammed Lyazghi, received at their home address trapped mail. August 30, the Kenitra military courthouse, sat since June 25, pronounced 16 condemnations to death in the affair of the "March 3rd plot" where many UNFP and UNEM (the National Union of Moroccan Students) controlling and militants were charged, following the bruising of the guerrilla warfare movement led in the Middle and High Atlas (March 1973). September 1st, 1973, the Casablanca regional courthouse pronounced heavy pains of jail against the known to be "leftist" and arrested at the beginning of 1972 for attempting to the safety of the state.

January 24, 1973, the UNEM is dissolved. The trial of the UNEM was the first of another set of suits where almost all accused were among high school students and some young teachers and other engineers freshly starting their professional life.

The national mobilization for the recuperation of the Sahara in 1975, didn't put an end to the political divergences and the social tensions characterizing the evolution of the general situation in the country. It has, on the other hand, given rise to a new political dynamics. "The consecrated Union" around the Sahara question had deep repercussions on the evolution of the political situation. One of its results was the involvement of chiefs of all political parties, notably of the Istiqlal and the USFP, in the ephemeral national union government (of November 30, 1983 to April 11, 1985). The Istiqlal party will also participate in the government presided by Ahmed Osman

The Eighties will essentially be characterized by social tensions notably riots known as "riots of hunger" in 1981, 1984 and 1990 during which were combined strikes, demonstrations and harsh repression. During this period, the process of secularization of the political field that started in the sixties is to be partly suspended to make room for a long process of traditionalisation with the use of religion all azimuths.

After having started the institutional construction of the state immediately after the independence, groups in power see themselves obligated to take into account religion because, in the first place, nationalists had already integrated the religious factor in the nationalistic strategy of mass mobilization and, second, because the construction of a centralized Nation-state requires an effort of mobilization. This leads automatically to a quest of the unanimous conception of the state (wahda) that was not, in this case, conceivable outside the framework of the Islamic values. However, it is necessary to notice, between 1960 and 1970, a transformation in the manner to conceive the role of religion in state

construction. Used first for its identity value that consolidates the adherence of the country to a group (the Moslem world), with the minimum of consequences on the domestic policy, Islam became, through multiple readings, a founding element of the political praxis: it functions like a source of legitimacy of power as well as of de-legitimacy of one's political enemies.

The definition of the royal power proceeds henceforth from a theocratic logic which is a corollary of a will of reinventing a monarchical tradition. Today however, the political conjuncture of the country leads to the fact that this facet of the King's religious power is also a lever of a reformist appropriation of the religious domain and a cut off of the overlapping of the political and religious fields. Indeed, Islamist forces aim at the abolition of borders between the two. As the main actor in the political field, the King, by the principle of being "the commander of the faithful", is also the supreme authority in the religious field. Exclusive to 'ulema-s, the religious field is nevertheless under the authority of the King who embodies the political choices of the country. Once these borders are being thus delimited, it is not superfluous to ask different actors of this field to fill in the function attributed to them in the setting of these choices.

Recourse to religion as a political ideology intervenes in the middle of the sixties in a conjuncture characterized by the exacerbation of power stakes between the Palace and the laic forces of opposition following 1965 events in a deleterious political climate of political suits and repeated coups attempts. From this period, on assists to an islamisation of politics conducted by the state, notably in the domain of education where religion is given a political function in the ideological struggle of the monarchy against its adversaries of the moment, and particularly against Arab nationalists, socialists and Communists in the sixties and seventies, and against the Islamist movement in the eighties and ninety.

One field of this ideological confrontation is that of the youth. The Power had been since the sixties confronted to the imperative of proposing an appealing ideology for this social category with its political activism, notably within high schools and universities. And it was Islam as an alternative to secular ideologies that the King proposed to the youth: "We are anxious to tell Our youth, Our contemporaries or those who are in the secondary or High schools, that Our Prophet, Our Islamic religion or Mohammad's precepts don't need lessons imported from outside; a minimum of reflection would be sufficient to every Moroccan and every Moslem to give lessons to Lenin, Mao Tsé-Toung, or to any political leader and to most famous thinkers [...] " (Speech addressed to the nation January 24, 1974).

As the basis of religious recognition of the monarchy, Islam also became an ideological weapon of struggle of the monarchy against its political enemies, clearly designated then by the monarch himself. In a speech pronounced November 4, 1972 to announce the operation of religious sensitization of minds, the King declares: "[...] we must face our adversaries armed with arguments and answering them stroke for stroke, being strong thank to our faith, especially as our moral value detractors won't be able to pretend to bring the minutest part of what can be our contribution [...]"

The recourse to religion as an ideology of struggle on behalf of the monarchy went together with the process of re-traditionalisation of the regime. The King's stance in this process is the one of the Commander of the faithful whose important part of activities is dedicated henceforth to the religious domain. The religious seminary tradition presided by the King within the Palace, inaugurated by the Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah in the XVIIIème century (more or less followed by Kings in the XIXème and XXèmes) is reinvented by the Hassan II in the middle of sixties. Since this date, the month of Ramadan became the stationary appointment of these religious conferences headed by the King himself in presence of a constellation of 'ulema-s.

The birth of revolutionary Islamist organizations in Morocco at the same time didn't drive the Power to reconsider its religious politics. Instead of reducing the role of religion in the Moroccan political field,

Islamism pushed the Power to accentuate, instead, this role in order to occupy the religious domain. The monopoly of this gap by the King through the maximal capitalization of the paradigm "the Commander of the faithful" was the fundamental aspect of it. At the internal level, the instrumentalisation of this paradigm has served the traditionalisation of the political regime. At the external level, it has been put to the service of the King's leadership in the Islamic world (OCI, ESESCO, al-Qods Committee, etc.

The claiming of a State religious fundamentalism by the monarch was the second fundamental element of this religious politics of Moroccan Authorities, preoccupied, on the one hand, by the development of revolutionary Islamism from within, and challenged, on the other hand, by the triumph of Khomeiny's Islamic revolution in Iran and its echoes in the world from without.

The confrontation with Islamism did have, however, its negative impact on the political opening process started in 1993. It allowed the King to reconsider his old adversaries of the national movement and have them as allies in order to circumscribe a political space that obliges Islamists to accept a soft political game instead of a total recast of the political system.

The political liberalization process (1990-2006)

The 1996-2003 period is thus interesting for more than one reason. It conjugates two unprecedented facts: the access of political opposition to Power and a dynastic succession. The two events are bound together: the first being the prelude to the second. The end of Hassan II reign announced by a chronic illness permitted to anticipate the setting up of a new deal. What is announced as a regression, a re-interpretation, and/or a deviation, is nothing more than an indicator of the complexity of this period that can as well be considered like the inaugural of a new era or like another mode of the Makhzen adaptation to an unprecedented environment.

Between 1993-1999, The King Hassan II who, all along his reign, reinforced the contemporary Makhzen system, founded on the supremacy of allegiance, on the respect of rights, has begin to extol the state of right, and launched reforms in this sense, at the end of his reign,.

Since the beginning of nineties, the reform process started. From this time, appeared a political culture of compromise and negotiation. The relation between the monarchy and the nationalistic political parties of the opposition record a deep mutation in term of its shape as well as in its content. The redefinition by the political opposition of news strategic perspectives that definitely give up the putschist option and that write down their project of reform in the setting of a parliamentary monarchy regime permitted to dissipate some misunderstandings between the King and the opposition.

September 13, 1996 Morocco adopted a new Constitution by way of referendum. It is the fifth Constitution in the history of the independent Morocco (19962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996). Contrary to the previous ones, the 1996 Constitution had collected the adherence of almost the totality of the political class, including the principal socialist and nationalistic opposition parties (USFP, Istiqlal, PPS). Their positive attitude toward the new Constitution had put an end to forty years of antagonism between the Palace and the big parties issued from the national movement. It was the outcome of a long relation process of "décrispation" between the Palace and the opposition parties united in the setting of the democratic Front (The Koutla). At the beginning of nineties, with the resolution of the political prisoner problem and the enactment of a new Constitution in 1992 where the adherence to the universal principles of Human Rights was clearly affirmed, this process was accelerated.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The first liberations of political prisoners started in 1989, then came the royal grace in 1994 to concretize the opening of the political space in Morocco and to give a sense to what is known as the democratic process. The consensual alternation, with the government of coalition in 1998, then the accession of Mohammed VI to the throne gave a new impulse to this process.

During the nineties period, Morocco ratified several international conventions concerning Human Rights: notably, the convention against torture, treaties for the elimination of all shapes of discrimination towards women, conventions for the child's Rights. The creation of the Consultative Council of Human Rights (CCDH), in May 1990, intervenes as well in this setting.

On proposition of this organism, the dahir of 1935, concerning the repression of demonstrations contrary to public order and to the respect of the authority is abrogated July 4, 1994. July 21 of the same year, three hundred fifty-two political prisoners are freed on the basis of a list proposed by the CCDH. At the same time, the right of return for political exiles is proclaimed. Among the most meaningful among them were Abderrahman Youssoufi, in 1992, Faqih Basri, and Abraham Serfaty's return was permitted by the King Mohammed VI after his enthronement in 1999.

Human Rights Organizations are today the real public power interlocutors in this domain. Today, the action of the AMDH (Moroccan Association of Human Rights, created in 1979), of the OMDH (Moroccan Organization of Human Rights, created in 1988) and of the FJV (Forum Justice and Truth, created in 1999) is paramount as far as Human Rights issues in Morocco are concerned.

Even more important is the fact that elites formed in the setting of these movements became the main asset of the Central Power. The old militants and political prisoners occupy positions of power henceforth within the different political and economic processes (CCDH, IER, superior advice of the CDG education....)

WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND REFORMS OF THE MOUDAWWANA (Family Code)

The family's Code is the unique legal domain still governed by the Charîa (Islamic law). Adopted for the first time in 1957, the Moudawwana knew a first retouching in 1993, and then a radical reform in 2004. Behind each of the two reforms is a large feminist movement mobilization in favor of its revision.

The development of the first text of the Moudawwana goes back to the first years of Independence. This text follows closely its orthodox foundation which is extensively discriminatory towards women. A first reform was in 1993, on the initiative the King Hassan II after a large mobilization of the movement for the defence of Women's Rights in favor of the change. The main feminist demands were not satisfied by this reform.

The Plan of integration of Women in the Development had caused reactions of opposition including within the government (the Islamic Affairs minister). It also revealed the weight of traditions and religion on a very delicate on the political plan. After two years and eight months (April 2001 September 2003) of deliberate and contradictory exegeses proceeding from different readings of religious texts, the setting of the legislation of the family Code, propositions of the Commission are finally the object of a royal arbitration for the controversial questions left in suspense. The royal arbitration took the direction wished by the feminist movement. On October 10 during the opening of the Parliament session, the King announces in his speech the big features of the new Mudawwana.

The family's new code has been adopted to the unanimity by the two chambers of the Moroccan Parliament: January 16, 2004 by the Deputies' Chamber, and January 22, 2004 by the Counsellors'

Chamber. This reform of the family code has been greeted in Morocco and abroad as a real revolution led by the young King of Morocco.

CONCLUSION

A reading of Moroccan recent past cannot be content with distributing bad and good points. The Moroccan experience as one wrote it elsewhere, forces us to accept the complexity of the discourse on the state of right, but it also reveals the frequent instrumentalisation of this discourse in countries like Morocco that claims a specific political tradition to the risk of loosing its soul with the same discourse. Also, the frequent need of royal arbitration that stands at the antipodes of the right state informs more appropriately on the inability of its institutions to regulate the tenseness and on arbitrariness and opacity of the working appropriate procedures that get lost between the administrative structures and the authoritative nature of the monarchy.

All along his reign, Hassan II reinforced the contemporary Makhzen system founded on the use of arbitrariness, the secret, the supremacy of allegiance and the respect of the right. But he also extolled, at the end of his reign, the transparency and the state of right, and launched reforms in this sense. Inversely, everybody agrees in praising the predilection for reforms of Mohamed VI, the modernization, the opening and respect of the state of right, and his will of separation between public and private business of the country ; but at the same time, he appears today – maybe wrongly - less interested than his father in concretising reforms.

A historic sociology of recent political change that addresses culture of different institutions as well as the individual itineraries of actors that participate in this process should leave a large room for the unforeseen, the paradoxical sequences. Actors that are apparently the more implied in the setting up of reforms are able as well to pull up the same reforms through other engagements, other allegiances, and other priorities. The most reticent actors to reforms can, in spite of themselves, make them advance. The most "opaque" actors can encourage transparency, whereas the most "transparent" one can contribute to erect procedures fundamentally founded on opacity, ambiguousness and violation of the most elementary rules of the state of right.

Figures of modernity pull their power less from their diplomas and more from their loyalty relation. And they turn into the fiercest defenders of an expertise subtraction to a political government whose power is in principle founded on an election victory. Actors can simultaneously develop some modern and globalize "logics" as well as some archaic and localized "logics".

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THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

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OUTLINE
MOROCCO / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

FR

by

Muhammad Tozy

« LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE MAROCAIN RETROSPECTIVE D'UN AUTORITARISME EN MAL DE LIBERALISATION »

Au Maroc la lutte pour le pouvoir n'a pas été tout le temps une lutte pour la démocratisation et encore moins une lutte pour la modernisation. L'orientation franche du Maroc vers un pluralisme assumé et une vrai lutte pour la démocratisation se situe au milieu quatre-vingt dix . Certes des velléités progressistes et modernisatrices habitaient une partie de la classe politique et même une partie de la cours, mais elles étaient inhibées par une lutte pour le pouvoir et accessoirement une lutte pour le contrôle des ressources économiques. Et encouragé par une société fondamentalement conservatrice.

Le Maroc est une vieille monarchie et la colonisation n'a pas effacé sa tradition étatique. La colonisation française avait certes mis la monarchie en veilleuse, mais elle n'a pas cherché à éliminer le sultanat une institution archaïque ou le Sultan avait tous les pouvoirs. Durant le protectorat le Sultan, dont on attendait une docilité absolue, devait se contenter de signer les textes de lois (dahirs) qui lui étaient soumis par la Résidence. Les formes extérieures du Makhzen (administration traditionnelle) étaient sauvegardées et soignées, mais le Sultan a été dépouillé de tous les pouvoirs effectifs. Le pouvoir réel était entre les mains du Résident placée à la tête de l'administration française.

Au lendemain de l'indépendance, Le Maroc s'est trouvé avec ce double héritage. Le Makhzen traditionnel et la structure étatique moderne introduite par le Protectorat. Cette dernière constituera la norme pour la construction du nouvel Etat national. La dualité ne disparaîtra pas pour autant, mais le pouvoir réel, cette fois changera de main et sera du côté du Roi. Qui a entre temps abandonné la dénomination Sultan.

En 1956, les forces nationales, le Roi et le mouvement national, s'attèlent à la mise en place de l'Etat national moderne. Solidaires dans la lutte pour l'indépendance, ces forces vont cependant diverger, dès la formation des premiers gouvernements, sur les modalités du régime politique du Maroc indépendant. Au départ, les divergences entre le Roi et ses alliés, d'une part, et le mouvement national et ses différentes expressions partisanes nées après l'indépendance, d'autre part, se focalisent sur l'exercice du pouvoir et la détention de ses leviers. Elles se cristalliseront par la suite sur la nature du régime et sur le modèle social en prenant la forme d'une opposition entre deux modèles sociopolitiques. Le premier sera incarné par le Roi Hassan II. Le second est porté par l'aile gauche du mouvement national.

La construction de l'Etat moderne renvoie à trois dimensions qui trouvent leur écho au Maroc dans la période contemporaine : le contrôle du territoire et son organisation sur de nouvelles bases, la refonte de l'administration et le contrôle des ressources économiques.

La colonisation du Maroc s'était concrétisée par la division du territoire national en trois parties sous tutelle de puissances étrangères : une partie sous le Protectorat français, une partie sous la tutelle espagnole et une partie sous l'autorité internationale. Le 2 mars 1956, le traité de Fès est abrogé et la France reconnaît l'indépendance du Maroc. Le 7 avril 1956, un protocole met fin au Protectorat espagnol et le 29 octobre, une conférence diplomatique abroge le régime international de la ville de Tanger. Au mois d'avril 1958, le Maroc récupère Tarfaya, le 30 juin 1969, il récupère Ifni, et le 6 novembre, il lance la Marche Verte pour la récupération du Sahara. La récupération des terres et la marocanisation des entreprises léguées par la colonisation devaient traduire la volonté de construire une économie "nationale". Elles favoriseront, en outre, l'émergence de catégories sociales que le pouvoir cherchait à développer.

Au moment de l'indépendance, le Maroc a hérité d'une administration faite sur le plan central de directions (la Direction de l'Intérieur, en charge de toute l'administration centrale et locale, la

Direction des Services de la Sûreté Publique, la Direction des Affaires Chérifienne) et de services techniques (finance, agriculture, travaux publics…) et sur le plan local de municipalités pour les villes et de circonscriptions et centres locaux pour la campagne. Il hérita aussi d'un découpage de sept régions dans la zone de l'ex Protectorat français, elles mêmes divisées en territoires ou Cercles, et de cinq territoires dans la zone nord de l'ex Protectorat espagnol. Dès 1956, la carte des provinces du Maroc reprend ce découpage afin d'asseoir l'autorité de l'Etat. Dès 1960, le pays est découpé en 15 provinces plus une préfecture autour de Casablanca. La même année, la création des communes va se substituer, en partie, à la carte des tribus et donner lieu aux premières élections locales du Maroc indépendant.

Les appareils de souveraineté (l'armée et la police) constituent un autre pilier du nouvel Etat et la monarchie tient à les contrôler dès leur mise en place. Le litige entre le Palais et le parti de l'Istiqlal autour du titulaire du ministère de l'Intérieur au moment de la formation des premiers gouvernements de l'indépendance a pour toile de font l'enjeu du contrôle de la police et la mainmise sur les nominations des agents de l'autorité locale. Dès le début, ce ministère est retiré au parti de l'Istiqlal pour être confié à des hommes proches du Palais. Quant à l'armée, elle est créée le 14 mai 1956, mais le litige la concernant ne sera résolu qu'en 1960. Mise sous l'autorité du prince héritier, les Forces Armées Royales (FAR) seront formées au départ de troupes marocaines venant des anciennes armées coloniales. L'Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) créée en 1955 quant à elle, veut continuer le combat pour le parachèvement de tout le territoire national. L'arbitrage du Roi Mohammed V amène les deux parties à accepter un compromis sur la base du principe : un seul Roi, un seul Etat et une seule armée. 5000 hommes de l'ALN rejoignent les FAR, mais 10.000 autres rejoignent le Sud du Maroc en vue de parachever la libération du pays. En 1960 l'ALN est dissoute. Certains de ses éléments intègrent les FAR, mais quelques uns de ses dirigeants sont arrêtés et condamnés pour «complot contre le Prince Héritier ».

L' histoire récente peut être appréhendé à travers trois périodes :

une première période de lutte relativement équilibré pour le pouvoir qui va de 1956 à 1965, une deuxième période caractérisée par la prédominance d'un pouvoir autocratique voire une dérive autoritaire qui va de 1965 à 1993 et une troisième période qui va de 1994 à nos jours qu'on peut qualifier d'ouverture politique

En effet on peut noter que après une courte période d'équilibre des forces politiques en présence (1956-1965), on assista, à partir de 1965, avec l'instauration de l'état d'exception (7juin 1965-30 juillet 1970), à l'affirmation de l'autoritarisme du régime. L'engagement direct de la monarchie sur la scène politique conduit le Roi Hassan II à rompre avec la plupart des forces nationalistes concurrentes. Au tournant des années quatre-vingt-dix, c'est l'amorce d'une transition politique qui conduit à la réouverture du jeu politique avec la réintégration de l'opposition nationaliste dans le régime, ouvrant la voie à sa participation à la gestion des affaires après presque quarante années passées dans l'opposition.

La lutte incertaine pour le pouvoir

Le départ de l'occupant laissa face à face le Roi et le parti de l'Istiqlal. Parti nationaliste extrêmement populaire et hégémonique au lendemain de l'indépendance, l'Istiqlal s'appuie aussi sur un syndicat fort et monopolistique, l'Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), et sur une armée de libération dont une importante branche refusait de déposer les armes avant l'achèvement total de la libération du territoire national (Ifni, Tarfaya, le Sahara, etc.). De son côté, la monarchie qui est sortie grandie de l'épreuve du Protectorat et qui tenait à conserver la position dominante que le départ de l'occupant lui a ménagée ne pouvait s'accommoder longtemps sans encombre d'un concurrent aussi puissant, mais dont l'hégémonie est de plus en plus contestée non seulement par les forces tribales traditionnelles, mais aussi par des partenaires politiques comme le Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance (PDI), les Libéraux Indépendants (de Rachid Mouline et Réda Guédira) et les

personnalités youssoufistes indépendantes (M'Barek El Bekkay). Toutes ces forces sont en lutte acharnée pour le pouvoir dès les premiers jours de l'indépendance.

Les nationalistes avaient fait du retour de Mohammed V un préalable pour l'indépendance du pays. Solidaires dans le combat, ils se divisèrent cependant sur les modalités de la décolonisation puis, après, sur la gestion des affaires du jeune Etat national indépendant. Derrière l'union autour de la légitimité du Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef se profilait la division d'un mouvement qui mina le climat politique du pays dès les premiers jours de l'indépendance. La monarchie, en revanche, est sortie grandement renforcée après l'épreuve de la déportation du Sultan et de sa famille. Mohammed V devait cependant faire face aux différentes pressions qui s'exerçaient sur lui, jusque dans l'enceinte du Palais. Le Sultan adopta la position d'arbitre et préféra exercer son magistère moral auprès des forces en présence en évitant d'intervenir directement dans la marche des affaires.

Entre 1955 et 1960, quatre gouvernements se sont succédés traduisant l'instabilité politique du nouvel Etat indépendant : le premier gouvernement de M'Barek EL Bekkay (Le 8 décembre 1955), et le dernier pour cette période est celui, de Abdallah Ibrahim (24 décembre 1958)

A la même période, le Maroc connaît plusieurs troubles déclenchés ça et là, à travers le pays, à l'instigation de forces opposées au Parti de l'Istiqlal : les troubles dans l'Atlas et l'insurrection du Rif notamment.

Les troubles suscités dans certaines régions de l'Atlas (1957) sont le fait d'amis de personnalités au pouvoir, notamment de Lahcen Lyoussi, ministre de l'Intérieur dans le premier gouvernement de M'Barek El Bekkai et membre du Conseil du Trône.

L'insurrection du Rif qui était dirigée à l'origine contre le parti de l'Istiqlal avait pris par la suite une tournure grave menaçant l'intégrité du pays. Déclenchée en octobre 1958, sous le gouvernement Balafrej, elle sera réprimée dans le sang au début de 1959.

Alors que la Gauche est au pouvoir, les amis du Premier ministre, Mohammed Basri et Abderrahman Yousfi (directeur et rédacteur en chef du journal At-Tahrîr) sont arrêtés sous l'accusation d'atteinte par voie de presse à la personne du Roi.

Au même moment, le 9 janvier 1960, la cour d'appel de Rabat prononce l'interdiction du Parti Communiste Marocain (PCM).

Au mois de février de la même année, des militants de l'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (l'UNFP), des résistants et des membres de l'ALN sont arrêtés suite à la découverte d'un « complot contre la vie du Prince Héritier ». Dans le même mois, l'ALN du Sud est dissoute et ses éléments sont intégrés dans les FAR.

Dès cette époque, on assista à une fracture totale entre deux camps : le successeur de Mohammed V et ses amis d'un côté et les progressistes écartés du pouvoir de l'autre. Entre les deux forces, c'est la rupture. Les hostilités sont ouvertes et, fait nouveau, les opposants mettent en cause ouvertement la monarchie.

Durant cette même période, l'incertitude des enjeux et le caractère «équilibré des compétiteurs ont permis des résultats paradoxaux dans le domaine politique. Certaines décisions peuvent être qualifier de révolutionnaire d'autres rappellent le Maroc archaïque . Par certains égard on assista à une lente démocratisation du système dont Mohammed V définit la signification et les étapes dès 1955 au fil d'une série d'allocutions publiques, le 18 novembre et le 7 décembre 1955, le 12 novembre 1956, le 8 mai 1958, le 25 mai 1960.

En 1956, un Conseil national représentatif est institué, en 1957, la Liberté syndicale est reconnue et réglementée , en 1958, c'est le tour de la liberté d'association et de réunion et de la liberté de la presse , en 1960, l'élection de conseils municipaux au suffrage universel permet au Marocains de voter pour la première fois ; en 1961 enfin, la promulgation par Hassan II d'une « Loi fondamentale

pour le Royaume du Maroc » prépare l'élaboration d'une Constitution qui sera soumise à l'approbation du pays puis adoptée par referendum le 7 décembre 1962.

La Constitution sauvegarde les prérogatives du Roi et lui donne le principal rôle. Elle interdit le parti unique et stipule que « les partis politiques participent à l'organisation et à la représentation des citoyens ».

La Gauche ne voit dans cette Constitution qu'un habillage de l'absolutisme.

La radicalisation de la Gauche et son audience grandissante dans l'opinion publique inquiétaient le Palais qui décida de lui déclarer la guerre. La découverte d'un complot contre la vie du Roi lui en fournit le prétexte. En juillet 1963, un procès politique d'envergure est intenté aux conjurés. Mehdi Ben Barka est condamné à mort par contumace le mois de novembre de la même année. Le parti de l'Istiqlal, de son côté, quitte, en janvier 1963, le gouvernement pour se positionner dans l'opposition.

L'année 1965 est marquée par l'exacerbation des tensions autour de la question de l'enseignement. Une circulaire du Ministère de l'Education Nationale (MEN) déclenche les événements du 22, 23 et 24 mars 1965. Le rétablissement de l'ordre fut obtenu au prix d'une répression extrêmement dure. L'événement marqua le début d'une période au cours de laquelle le champ de l'action politique partisane légale s'était considérablement rétréci.

Six mois après les événements de mars, Mehdi Ben Barka, le leader de la Gauche, est enlevé et assassiné à Paris, le 29 octobre, 1965. L'événement marque l'histoire politique contemporaine du Maroc. Son ombre avait également plané sur les relations diplomatiques entre le Maroc et la France. Deux personnalités importantes du régime, le général Oufkir et le colonel Dlimi sont mis en cause et appelés à comparaître devant un tribunal français.

LA CONSOLIDATION DE L'ETAT ET LA DERIVE AUTORITAIRE (1965-1990).

Les événements de mars sont à l'origine de la décision royale de suspendre la Constitution et de proclamer l'Etat d'exception (7 juin 1965-31 juillet 1970) mettant ainsi fin à l'expérience ouverte par l'adoption, en décembre 1962, de la Constitution. Le Roi reprenait directement en mains la conduite des affaires. C'est le début de la dérive autoritaire du régime.

La Constitution de 1970 donna à la monarchie absolue un cadre constitutionnel en assurant au Roi une position plus dominante encore que dans la Constitution de 1962. Les élections législatives des 27 et 28 juillet 1970 ont été boycottées par le Parti de l'Istiqlal et l'UNFP ligués dans le cadre du Front national (al-Koutla al-Wataniyya) créé le 27 juillet 1970.

La rupture entre le Roi et les partis politiques nationaux est désormais consommée. Désormais, le pouvoir s'efforcera de susciter une caste d'hommes d'Etat et de dirigeants apolitiques et dociles, de techniciens et de notables pour remplacer les partis politiques traditionnelles. C'est le temps des hauts fonctionnaires et des technocrates.

Le contrôle politique de l'Etat s'accompagne également d'un contrôle de l'économie. Pour ce faire, plusieurs entreprises sont crées et dirigées par de hauts fonctionnaires destinés à élargir la base sociale du régime .

Quant à l'armée, moderne, homogène et disciplinée, censée être un instrument docile et dévoué au service du Roi, elle s'avérera elle aussi, traversée par des courants putschistes à l'instar des armées du tiers mondes. Le 10 juillet 1971 à Skhirat et le 16 août 1972 des militaires jusque- là fidèles au Roi tentent de renverser le régime.

Les années soixante-dix sont jalonnées de procès politiques mettant en cause différents opposants au régime.

Les putschistes de Skhirat sont traduits devant un tribunal militaire qui avait ouvert ses audiences le 12 février 1972 à Kenitra. Certains condamnés vont disparaître pour réapparaître plusieurs années après dans le triste bagne de Tazmamart.

Le 6 novembre 1972, le général Ahmed Dlimi, en tant que président du tribunal militaire prononçait les onze condamnations à mort des principaux responsables de l'attaque de l'avion royal du 16 août 1972. Le procès avait débuté le 17 octobre 1972 et les condamnés seront exécutés le 13 janvier 1973. Dlimi lui-même disparaîtra, quelques années plus tard, sur la route de Marrakech dans un accident de circulation qui demeure jusqu'à ce jour mal élucidé.

Le parti de l'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) est à cette époque, dans le collimateur du pouvoir. Au mois de janvier 1973, deux dirigeants de ce parti, Omar Benjelloun et Mohammed Lyazghi recevaient à leurs domiciles des lettres piégées. Le 30 août, le tribunal militaire de Kénitra qui siégeait depuis le 25 juin prononça 16 condamnations à mort dans l'affaire du "complot du 3 mars" où de nombreux dirigeants et militants de l'UNFP et de l'UNEM (l'Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc) étaient inculpés suite à l'écrasement du mouvement de guérilla mené dans le Moyen et le Haut Atlas (mars 1973). Au premier septembre 1973, c'était au tour du tribunal régional de Casablanca de prononcer de lourdes peines de prison à l'encontre d'opposants réputés "gauchistes" et arrêtés au début de 1972 pour atteinte à la sûreté de l'État.

Le 24 janvier 1973, l'UNEM est dissoute. Le procès de l'UNEM fut le premier d'une autre série de procès où la quasi totalité des prévenus se recrutait parmi les lycéens, les étudiants et quelques jeunes enseignants et autres ingénieurs fraîchement entrés dans la vie professionnelle.

La mobilisation nationale pour la récupération du Sahara en 1975, n'a pas mis fin aux divergences politiques et aux tensions sociales caractérisant l'évolution de la situation générale dans le pays. Elle a, en revanche, impulsé une nouvelle dynamique politique. "L'union sacrée" autour du Sahara a eu de profondes répercussions sur l'évolution de la situation politique. L'un de ses résultats fut la participation des chefs de tous les partis politiques notamment de l'Istiqlal et de l'USFP à l'éphémère gouvernement d'Union nationale (du 30 novembre 1983 au 11 avril 1985). Le parti de l'Istiqlal participera également au gouvernement présidé par Ahmed Osman et en quittera depuis le gouvernement qu'exceptionnellement.

Les années quatre-vingt se caractériseront essentiellement par des tensions sociales notamment les émeutes dites de la faim en 1981, 1984 et 1990 où se sont conjuguées les grèves, les manifestations et la répression tous azimuts.

C'est durant cette période que le processus de sécularisation entamé durant les années soixante va être en partie suspendu pour le champ politique pour faire la place à un long processus de traditionalisation et d'utilisation de la religion tout azimuts.

Après avoir amorcé la construction institutionnelle de l'Etat au lendemain de l'indépendance, les groupes au pouvoir se voient obligés de tenir compte de la religion d'abord parce que les nationalistes avaient déjà intégré le facteur religieux dans la stratégie nationaliste de mobilisation des masses et d'autre part, parce que la construction d'un Etat-nation centralisé exige un effort de mobilisation et débouche sur une quête de l'unanimisme (wahda) qui n'était dans ce cas concevable que dans le cadre des valeurs islamiques. Il faut toutefois, remarquer qu'entre le début des années 60 et la fin des années 70, on a assisté à une transformation dans la manière de concevoir la place de la religion dans la construction de l'Etat. Utilisé d'abord en fonction de sa valeur identitaire, qui renvoyait à l'appartenance à un groupe (le monde musulman), avec le minimum de conséquences sur la politique intérieure, l'Islam est devenu, à travers de multiples relectures, un élément fondateur de la praxis politique : il fonctionne comme source de légitimité du pouvoir, et de délégitimation de ses adversaires politiques.

La définition du pouvoir royal procède désormais d'une logique théocratique corollaire d'une volonté déterminée de réinvention de la tradition monarchique. La conjoncture politique du pays

aujourd'hui fait, cependant, que cette facette du pouvoir religieux du Roi soit aussi un levier d'une appropriation réformiste du religieux et d'une délimitation du domaine d'imbrication du politique et du religieux , au moment où les forces islamistes visent l'abolition des frontières entre les deux domaines. Acteur principal dans le champ politique, le Roi est aussi l'autorité suprême dans le champ religieux de par le principe de la commanderie des croyants. Exclusif aux oulémas, le champ religieux est néanmoins sous l'autorité du Roi qui incarne les choix politiques du pays. Les frontières étant ainsi délimitées, il n'est pas superflu de demander aux acteurs de ce champ de remplir la fonction qui leurs est dévolue dans le cadre de ces choix.

Le recours à la religion en tant qu'idéologie politique intervient au milieu des années soixante dans une conjoncture caractérisée par l'exacerbation des enjeux du pouvoir entre le palais et les forces d'opposition laïques suite aux événements de 1965 dans un climat politique délétère de procès politiques et de tentatives répétées de coups d'Etat. On assiste, à partir de ce moment, à la conduite par l'Etat d'une politique d'islamisation notamment dans le domaine de l'enseignement donnant à la religion une fonction politique dans la lutte idéologique de la monarchie contre ses adversaires du moment, en l'occurrence, dans les années soixante et soixante-dix, les nationalistes arabes, les socialistes et les communistes, et, dans les années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix, le mouvement islamiste.

L'un des terrains de cette confrontation idéologique est celui de la jeunesse. Le pouvoir s'était trouvé depuis le début des années soixante confronté à l'impératif de proposer une idéologie attirante pour cette catégorie sociale dont l'activisme politique, notamment au sein des lycées et des universités, mettait en péril les desseins politiques du régime. Et ce fut l'islam que le Roi proposa à la jeunesse comme alternative aux idéologies laïques : "Nous tenons à dire à Notre jeunesse, à Nos contemporains ou à ceux qui sont dans les écoles secondaires ou supérieures, que notre Prophète, notre religion musulmane ou les préceptes de Mohamed n'ont pas besoin de leçon importée de l'extérieur, il suffirait d'un minimum de réflexion à chaque Marocain et à chaque Musulman pour donner des leçons à Lénine, à Mao Tsé-Toung, à n'importe quel leader politique et aux penseurs les plus illustres, qu'il s'agisse du fond ou de la méthode[...] » (Discours adressé à la nation le 24 janvier 1974).

Base de légitimation religieuse de la monarchie, l'Islam est devenu aussi une arme idéologique de combat de la monarchie contre ses opposants politiques, clairement désignés par le monarque de l'époque. Dans un discours prononcé le 4 novembre 1972 pour annoncer l'opération de sensibilisation religieuse des esprits, le Roi déclare : « [...] nous devons faire face à nos adversaires armés d'arguments et répondant coup pour coup, forts de notre foi, surtout que les détracteurs des valeurs morales ne pourront prétendre apporter la plus infime partie de ce que peut être notre apport [...]

Le recours à la religion en tant qu'idéologie de combat de la part de la monarchie allait de pair avec le processus de retraditionalisation du régime. La posture du Roi dans ce processus est celle du Commandeur des croyants dont une partie importante des activités est désormais consacrée au domaine religieux. La tradition des séminaires religieux présidés par le Roi au sein du Palais, inaugurée par le Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah au XVIIIème siècle (plus au moins suivie par les Rois du XIXème et XXème) est réinventée par le Roi Hassan II au milieu des années soixante. Depuis cette date, le mois de ramadan est devenu le rendez-vous fixe de ces conférences religieuses présidées par le Roi lui-même en présence du gotha des oulémas.

La naissance des organisations islamistes contestataires au Maroc à la même époque n'a pas conduit le pouvoir à la révision de cette politique religieuse. Bien, au contraire, au lieu d'œuvrer pour une réduction du poids de la religion dans le champ politique marocain, le développement de l'islamisme a conduit le pouvoir à l'accentuation de ce poids dans le souci d'occuper ce terrain. Le monopole de ce créneau par le Roi à travers la capitalisation maximale du paradigme de la commanderie des croyants en a été l'aspect fondamental. Sur le plan interne, l'instrumentalisation de ce paradigme a servit le dessein de la traditionalisation du régime politique. Sur le plan externe, il a été mis au service du leadership du Roi dans le monde islamique (OCI, ESESCO, Comité al-Qods...etc.).

La revendication d'un fondamentalisme religieux d'Etat par le monarque a été le deuxième élément fondamental de cette politique religieuse du pouvoir marocain préoccupé, d'une part, par le

développement de l'islamisme contestataire interne, et interpellé par le triomphe de la révolution islamique de Khomeiny en Iran et ses échos dans le monde, d'autre part.

Dans un entretien accordé par Hassan II à la Revue des deux mondes publié dans le numéro du mois d'avril 1986, le Roi déclare : « L'intégrisme est une chose, le fondamentalisme en est une autre. Chez nous, lorsque l'on dit de quelqu'un : C'est un fondamentaliste, cela signifie que c'est un homme érudit, connaissant très bien la religion musulmane. Etre intégriste, cela ne veut pas dire autre chose qu'être un intolérant, un fanatique (...) Il est facile dans notre religion d'être intégriste ou fondamentaliste, parce que la laïcité n'existe pas. ...Fondamentaliste, je le suis, parce que je n'abandonne pas les piliers fondamentaux, qui constituent les fondations de notre religion. En revanche, je ne suis pas un fanatique ».

La confrontation à la montée de l'Islamisme n'a aps manqué de géner le processus d'ouverture politique amorcée dés 1993. Elle a permis au Roi de s »'allier aux anciens adversaires du mouvement nationale pour circonscrire un espace politique qui oblige les islamistes à accepter un jeu politique pacifié à défaut d'une refonte totale du système politique.

Le processus de libéralisation politique (1990-2006)

La période 1996-2003 est ainsi intéressante à plus d'un titre. Elle conjugue deux faits inédits : l'accès de l'opposition au pouvoir et une succession dynastique. Les deux éventements sont très liés : le premier étant le prélude au second. La fin du règne de Hassan II annoncée par une maladie chronique a permis d'anticiper la mise en place d'un new deal. L'histoire ponctuée au rythme des vacarmes des médias qui inscrivent leur analyse dans une temporalité propre reconductible sans effet d'accumulation donne l'impression d'une remise en cause. Or ce qui est annoncé comme régressions, réinterprétations, déviation, n'est qu'un indicateur de la complexité de cette période qu'on peut aussi bien considérer comme inaugurale d'une nouvelle ère ou comme une autre modalité d'adaptation du Makhzen à un environnement inédit.

Entre 1993-1999 Le Roi Hassan II qui a conforté tout au long de son règne le système makhzénien contemporain, fondé sur la suprématie de l'allégeance, sur le respect du droit, a commencer à prôner, à la fin de son règne l'État de droit, et a lancé des réformes en ce sens.

L'amorce du processus de réforme débute dès le début des années quatre-vingt-dix. A partir de cette époque, on observe l'apparition d'une culture politique du compromis et de la négociation. La relation entre la monarchie et les partis politiques nationalistes de l'Opposition enregistre une mutation profonde aussi bien dans sa forme que dans son contenu. La redéfinition par l'Opposition de nouvelles perspectives stratégiques qui renoncent définitivement à l'option putschiste et qui inscrivent leur projet de réforme dans le cadre d'un régime de monarchie parlementaire a permis de dissiper certains malentendus entre le Roi et l'Opposition..

Les mémorandums présentés par les partis de l'Opposition ont constitué le support principal de communication avec le Palais : le premier est présenté par les partis de l'Istiqlal et l'Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) le 9 octobre 1991. Le second est présenté par la Koutla démocratique, une alliance regroupant en plus de l'Istiqlal et de l'USFP, le Parti du Progrès et du socialisme (PPS) et l'Organisation de l'Action Démocratique et Populaire (OADP), le 19 juin 1992. Le troisième est présenté par la même Koutla en avril 1996. La participation de l'Opposition au gouvernement et la réforme constitutionnelle sont les principaux sujets des ces mémorandums et des tractations entre le Palais et les partis de la Koutla.

La révision de la Constitution, en 1992 puis en 1996, n'était pas un acte isolé. D'autres réformes sont introduites à travers la mise en place de nouvelles structures notamment : la création du Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme (avril 1990), la création des tribunaux administratifs (septembre 1993), la création du ministère chargé des Droits de l'Homme (1993), la création du Conseil Constitutionnel (février 1994), la création du Conseil Consultatif pour le suivi du dialogue social (novembre 1994).

Le 13 septembre 1996 le Maroc adopta une nouvelle Constitution par voie référendaire. C'est la cinquième Constitution dans l'histoire du Maroc indépendant (19962, 1970, 1972, 1992, 1996). Contrairement aux précédentes Constitutions, celle de 1996 avait recueilli l'adhésion du quasi totalité de la classe politique y compris des principaux partis de l'Opposition socialiste et nationaliste (USFP, Istiqlal, PPS). L'attitude positive de ces derniers à l'égard de la nouvelle Constitution avait mis fin à quarante années d'antagonisme entre le Palais et les grands partis issus du mouvement national. Ce fut l'aboutissement d'un long processus de décrispation des relations entre le Palais et les partis de l'Opposition ligués dans le cadre du Front démocratique (La Koutla) dont l'amorce s'est accélérée au début des années quatre-vingt-dix avec la résolution du problème des prisonniers politiques et la promulgation d'une nouvelle Constitution en 1992 où l'adhésion aux principes universels des Droits de l'Homme était clairement affirmée.

La Constitution de 1996 est venue se substituer à celle de 1992 qui n'avait pas recueilli l'adhésion de la majorité des partis de la Koutla (USFP, Istiqlal, OADP) dont les suggestions n'étaient que partiellement retenues dans le nouveau texte. Quoique la réforme constitutionnelle de 1996 n'avait pas satisfait toutes les propositions de la Koutla, les partis de l'Opposition du Front démocratique, à l'exception de l'OADP, avaient appelé à un vote favorable ouvrant ainsi la voie à l'alternance consensuelle et à la formation du gouvernement de mars 1998, présidé par le socialiste Abderrahman Youssoufi, avec la participation des partis de la Koutla, à l'exception de l'OADP, dans une coalition de sept formations politiques incluant également certains partis de l'ancienne majorité.

LES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Les premières libérations de prisonniers politiques, à partir de 1989, puis la grâce royale, en 1994, sont venues concrétiser l'ouverture de l'espace politique au Maroc et donner un sens à ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le processus démocratique. L'alternance consensuelle, avec le gouvernement de coalition en 1998, puis l'accession au trône de Mohammed VI ont donné une nouvelle impulsion à ce processus.

Au cours de cette période des années quatre-vingt-dix, le Maroc a ratifié plusieurs conventions internationales relatives aux Droits de l'Homme notamment : La convention contre la torture, les traités pour l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard de la femme, les conventions pour les Droits de l'Enfant.

La création du Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme (CCDH), en mai 1990, intervient aussi dans ce cadre.

Sur proposition de cet organisme, le dahir de 1935, relatif à la répression des manifestations contraires à l'ordre public et des atteintes au respect de l'autorité, est abrogé le 4 juillet 1994. Le 21 juillet de la même année, trois cent cinquante-deux prisonniers politiques sont libérés sur la base d'une liste proposée par le CCDH. Dans le même temps, le droit au retour des exilés politiques est proclamé. Parmi les retours les plus significatifs, celui de Abderrahman Youssoufi, en 1992, celui de fquih Basri, et celui d'Abraham Serfaty, retour autorisé par le Roi Mohammed VI dès son intronisation en 1999.

Un ministre délégué auprès du Premier ministre chargé des Droits de l'Homme a été également désigné le 11 novembre 1993.

Ce cadre général national conjugué aux données relatives à la conjoncture internationale a permis un essor rapide du mouvement des Droits de l'Homme dans les dernières années au Maroc.

La mise en valeur du principe des Droits de l'Homme et l'engagement pour la défense de ces droits au niveau mondial a largement profité au développement du mouvement des Droits de l'Homme au Maroc. Le respect de ce principe devient à partir des années quatre-vingt un élément important dans les relations Est/Ouest et Nord/Sud. Depuis le début des années 1990, les Droits de l'Homme ont joué un rôle prédominant dans les relations internationales notamment dans le domaine de la coopération au développement. Les conférences mondiales organisées sous l'égide des Nations

Unies, de Rio en 1992, à Rome en 1996, ont toutes réaffirmé les liens directs entre les trois objectifs fondamentaux de la Charte des Nations Unies : La paix, le développement et les Droits de l'Homme.

Les organisations des Droits de l'Homme sont aujourd'hui les véritables interlocuteurs des pouvoirs publics dans ce domaine. L'action de l'AMDH (l'Association Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme, créée en 1979), de l'OMDH (lOrganisation Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme, créée en 1988) et du FJV (forum Justice et Vérité créé en 1999) est aujourd'hui déterminante sur le terrain des Droits de l'Homme au Maroc

LES DROITS DES FEMMES ET LA REFORME DE LA MOUDAWWANA

Le Code de la famille est l'unique domaine juridique encore régi par la Charîa. Adoptée pour la première fois en 1957, la Moudawwana a connu une première retouche en 1993, puis une réforme radicale en 2004. Derrière chacune des deux réformes se trouve une large mobilisation des mouvements féministes en faveur de la révision de la Moudawwana.

L'élaboration du premier texte de la Moudawwana remonte aux premières années de l'Indépendance. Ce texte ne s'éloigne pas de son fondement orthodoxe largement discriminatoire à l'égard de la femme. Il connaîtra une première réforme en 1993, à l'initiative du Roi Hassan II après une large mobilisation du mouvement de défense des Droits de la Femme en faveur du changement. Les principales revendications féministes ne furent pas satisfaites par ce texte. La déception des femmes auteurs de la mobilisation pour la réforme de la Moudawwana fut grande, mais leur volonté de combat resta intacte et trouva dans la défense du Plan d'Action pour l'Intégration de la femme au Développement (PANIFD) présenté pour le gouvernement d'Alternance, en 1999, une nouvelle occasion pour revenir à la charge et remettre à nouveau la demande de la réforme de la Moudawwana à l'ordre du jour.

Le Plan d'Intégration de la Femme au Développement avait suscité des réactions d'opposition y compris au sein du gouvernement (le ministre des affaires islamiques). Il a aussi révélé le poids des traditions et de la religion au sujet d'une question très sensible sur le plan religieux et très délicate sur le plan politique. Après deux ans et huit mois (avril 2001-septembre 2003) de délibérerions et d'exégèses contradictoires procédant de lectures différentes du référent religieux, cadre de la législation du Code de la famille, les propositions de la Commission sont rendues et font l'objet d'un arbitrage royal pour les questions controversées laissées en suspens. L'arbitrage royal est rendu dans le sens souhaité par le mouvement féminin et le 10 octobre, à l'occasion de l'ouverture des travaux du Parlement, le Roi annonce dans son discours les grands traits de la nouvelle Mudawwana.

Le nouveau code de la famille a été adopté à l'unanimité par les deux chambres du Parlement marocain, le 16 janvier 2004 par la Chambre des Députés, et le 22 janvier 2004 par la Chambre des Conseillers. Cette réforme du code de la famille a été saluée au Maroc comme à l'étranger comme une véritable révolution menée par le jeune Roi du Maroc.

La mort du Roi Hassan II est l'événement politique le plus important de l'histoire contemporaine du pays. Elle est intervenue le 23 juillet 1999, après 38 ans de règne sans partage. (du Roi Hassan II). La succession de Mohammed VI s'était déroulée dans la sérénité et elle a été marquée par un bel unanimisme autour de la monarchie. Deuxième cérémonie du genre dans le Maroc indépendant, la bay'a (l'allégeance) à Mohammed VI a attesté de la stabilité du régime et du consensus autour de la monarchie. Membres du gouvernement d'alternance, deux femmes au titre de ministres avaient apposé leurs signatures au bas du texte de la bay'a au Roi Mohammed VI. C'est un signe de changement et d'une certaine évolution de la culture politique du pouvoir puisqu'il s'agit de la participation de la femme à l'investiture du Roi, pour la première fois dans l'histoire du Maroc.

Néanmoins, une lecture du passé récent ne peut pas se contenter de distribuer les mauvais et bons points. L'expérience marocaine comme on l'a écrit ailleurs, oblige à complexifier le discours sur l'État

de droit, mais elle en révèle aussi l'instrumentalisation fréquente dans des pays comme le Maroc qui revendique une tradition politique spécifique au risque d'y perdre leur âme. Aussi, le besoin fréquent d'arbitrage royal qui est aux antipodes de l'État de droit renseigne plus sur l'incapacité des institutions à réguler convenablement les tension et sur l'arbitraire et l'opacité des procédures de mise en œuvre qui se perdent entre des structures administratives que sur la nature autoritaire de la monarchie.

Hassan II a conforté tout au long de son règne le système makhzénien contemporain, fondé sur l'usage de l'arbitraire, le secret, et la suprématie de l'allégeance sur le respect du droit,. Mais il a aussi prôné, à la fin de son règne, la transparence et l'État de droit, et a lancé des réformes en ce sens. Inversement, tout le monde s'accorde à vanter la prédilection de Mohamed VI pour les réformes, la modernisation, l'ouverture et le respect de l'État de droit, et sa volonté de séparation entre affaires publiques du pays et affaires privées; mais en même temps apparaît peut- être à tort, aujourd'hui moins intéressé que son père à faire entrer dans les faits les réformes

Une sociologie historique des changements politiques récents qui interroge autant la culture des différentes institutions que les itinéraires individuels des acteurs qui participent à ce processus devrait laisser une large place à l'imprévu, aux enchaînements paradoxaux. Les acteurs qui apparemment sont les plus impliqués dans la mise en place des réformes peuvent aussi bien les freiner par d'autres engagements, d'autres allégeances, d'autres priorités. Les acteurs les plus réticents aux réformes peuvent, à leur insu ou du moins malgré eux, les faire avancer. Les acteurs les plus « opaques » peuvent favoriser les avancées de la transparence, alors que les plus « transparents » peuvent contribuer à mettre sur pied des procédures foncièrement fondées sur l'opacité, l'ambiguïté et la violation des règles les plus élémentaires de l'État de droit. Les figures de la modernité tirent beaucoup moins leur pouvoir de leurs diplômes que de leur rapport de loyauté Et elles se transforment en défenseurs les plus acharnés d'une soustraction de compétences à un gouvernement politique dont le pouvoir est en principe fondé sur une victoire aux élections. Les acteurs peuvent simultanément développer des logiques « modernes » et globalisées et des logiques « archaïques » et localisées.

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WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

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Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
MOROCCO / ECONOMY

by

Myriam Catusse

Introduction:

This paper will investigate the ongoing change in the Moroccan regime, focusing on the restructuring of its economic policies. Morocco presents indeed an interesting case for observation of the reshaping of State power on economic regulations, in the context of globalization. In terms of political economy, parallel to its historical and institutional peculiarity, it can be considered as a "paradigmatic" case, in the MENA: exemplary for the manner, pace and effects of privatization and liberalization of economic policies, and sometimes observed as a laboratory for the implementation of new tools of political economy.

My point of departure is the political quest for new kinds of socioeconomic regulation: the Developmentalist and Fordist (and Post-Fordist) compromise failed and was abandoned and the shortcomings of neo-liberal regulation are becoming more and more obvious, in economic but also social and political arena. After the debt crisis, a structural adjustment programme was implemented 20 years ago (1983). But neither the "Developmentalist State", nor the "Market corrector State" or "incentive State" seems today to be relevant paradigms to help in understanding the concrete dominant mode of regulations: change of economic institutions, rules and norm, spatial dynamics, political dimensions of economic policy. On the contrary, as a political economy issue, the "stability" of the Moroccan regime can be analysed as an instable balance between several kinds of economic regulation.

I will not propose a normative analysis of the expected or perverse outcomes of the reform; nor an analysis of who won and who lost. There is a larger literature on political economy which provided models to explain how the politics could (or would according to some authors) shape economic liberalization programs. There is also a criticism of this first generation literature that put emphasis on why liberalization caused or reinforced cronyism, rent seeking and patronage instead of engendering transparency, accountability and democratization. More recently, some scholars have paid attention to the pre-reform coalitions and path dependence to explain the various outcomes of neo-liberal reforms, for instance in terms of banking institutions, structure of elites, etc. Others have focused on "networks of privileges" to analyse the economic reforms as historical and social process.

In the framework of this program on "The dynamics of Change in the Arab World : Globalisation and the restructuring of State power", I suggest to investigate more deeply not only the arena of politics and elite coalitions or dissension, but also the arena of policies. The study of recent economic policy reforms in Morocco (including social policy) lets us presume some key elements of public action conversion.

- First, the rentier (or post-rentier) paradigm (cf. "Concept paper for the economic sector of the research") is not very relevant here: the Moroccan State is a productive State, based on a fiscal system and it did not redistribute very much: neither through high wages nor generous welfare policies.

- Second, one could examine the reshaping of public economic institutions to explain the change – and the stability – of the State power without questioning a priori the "democratic" outcomes of the economic liberalization, or of the "authoritarian" dimension of the reform.

• This leads us to try first of all to open the "black box" of the State (Signoles, 2006) and to observe the complexity of economic "public action": the various actors and interests at stake, not always teleological or coherent strategies inside the administration, interaction with domestic lobbying and advocacy coalitions and adjustment with international agendas, adaptation and sophistication of the range of available instruments, spatial and territorial aspects of policy, professionalization, etc.].

• This allows us also to abandon the equivocal and elusive dialectic between "return" or "withdrawal" of the State because in theoretical terms, this is not very relevant. Historians and comparative politics have proven that liberalization often implies an upstream State initiative and call for the State to provide help and compensation (cf. Polanyi; Camau (1990) on political change in Maghreb). This is because, in more empirical terms, in Morocco, public authorities still remain a major economic regulator, even if their direct resources have diminished. Their arenas of intervention are changing and fragmenting. And the State reference makes sense for social and economic actors in the context of the destabilisation of previous conventions and compromises: for instance, 20 years after the structural adjustment, the « un-employed graduate » (diplomés chômeurs) movement still turns to the State to claim for State employment payments (sit-ins are often organized in front of the Parliament in Rabat).

• Therefore, I propose to study the reshaping of (economic) policy through 4 main assumptions. It is still an outline. I will point out the linkage between them. They do not resemble each others, they are not relevant in all sectors. But they are complementary key elements to understanding how State economic power is restructuring in Morocco – and certainly, to various extent, in the other case studies of the program; how are State institutions reshaping and how is political economic regulation changing (kinds of coordination, of exchange, places of regulation, space constraints or opportunities, innovative tools, etc.).

(1) Privatization : privatization not only of the means of production and of utilities, but also of help, welfare, assistance and protection against various social risks. Here « privatization » is to be understand in the sense developed by B. Hibou (1999): less a (relative) withdrawal of public power than a new kind of interventionism, which Hibou calls a « discharge » onto private actors (a reference to the weberian process): erosion of direct public resources, fragmentation of powers, indirect private government, but also concentration of decision power.

In the case of Morocco, this is a particularly interesting assumption in that the privatization program launched in 1990 was ambitious and has been reinforced by the de facto privatization of a lot of public services / utilities in the last decade.

(2) Devolution and decentralization of investment and social issue: Recent economic policy in Morocco outlines new territories for economic regulation. These spatial dimensions of economics involve new cleavages and conflicts and contribute to the reshaping of local politics.

• In Morocco, like in a lot of other Arab countries, the substantial decentralization reform in the 2000s is ambiguous. It does not really give more power to local citizens. It is very supervised by the central authorities, who have devolved economic policy to local domestic administrations (gouverneurs (prefect), wali (regional prefect), etc.) in the name of economic development priorities.

• In the face of international delocalization (off shoring, etc.) and national decentralization of economic policy, one can question the national model of economic management (is it justified to situate analysis at a State-nation level?). There is a "Moroccan-style" political economy, but I presume that one can isolate local peculiar regulations, linked to social, historical, geographical or institutional specificities. They are contributing to the stabilization or the destabilization of the regime.

(3) Trends to depoliticize economic policy: Here depoliticization means the desire to express and manage economic choice outside of the political arena. This is first a common/banal process, arising from development and sophistication of public policies (calling in experts or technocrats for economic policy). But this can also be explained as a "politics of anti-politics". The anti-politics is to some extent a feature of populist and anti-democratic governance. It is also advocated by some liberal economists (cf. Schumpter, etc.): the argument to marginalize the role of politics (political parties, elected local or

national authorities, parliament), to the advantage of "experts" is that only an "end to politics" (with its conflicts, instability, or even division, demagogy etc.) can provide the basis for economic development. In Morocco two elements can illustrate these two dimensions of the trends to depoliticize economic policy :

- When the USFP (Union socialist des forces populaires) came to government in the 1998 so-called « gouvernement d'alternance », a lot of economist academics were appointed in the administration or at the head of major ministries. The same who had mobilized against privatization in the 80's converted to liberalism. Here, the sophistication of public action found "appropriate" experts in this generation of academic militants.

- It is quite different in another case. In the same period, industrialists or senior managers of public or private firms were appointed to major responsibilities. Like the new minister of the Interior, Driss Jettou (industrialist, an establishment figure, close to the palace but also to the CGEM (???) during the 90's, previous treasury minister) appointed minister of Interior (2001) then Prime minister (2002) , they embody a new generation of political men, close to the Palace, promoting a certain 'technocratisation' of policies and politics). In the field of economic policy, the recent decentralization has exacerbated this process : the Royal Letter to the Prime Minister on Investment Management Devolution (2002) gave "wali" (regional prefects) important and new functions: they are in charge of "the decentralised management of investment and of economic and social development." In 2001, seven of nine Walis appointed were indeed, for the first time, from outside the services of the Ministry of the Interior. These were graduates of the best French schools, engineers and often heads of important public or private offices in the Kingdom, some of whom had participated in the privatisation program. The press called them "technowalis". Keeping in mind the social elitist origins of most of them, they cannot rightly be considered outsiders. Cabinet minister's sons, some of them, they grew up in a political atmosphere. Nevertheless, they contribute to a "politics of anti-politics" and are strong rivals for elected local authorities in terms of means and legitimacy of economic policies.

(4) title ???: Maybe we could (very) carefully question the relevance of a "third way" in the political quest for new economic regulation? The reference to Gidden's (1998) paradigm for a social democracy is definitely not valid here. But the reshaping of economic public action in Morocco, and the instable balance between several kinds of regulation, shape a compromise in which individuals have to organize themselves (especially against social risk) and in which the State has to guarantee quality of services, evaluate them, regulate them (see the huge reform of economic Laws in Morocco, the desire to found a social and economic council, the implementation of Trade courts, etc.):

- New paradigms and tools for policy? contractualization vs institutionalization ; generalization vs individualization/merchandization ; assistance vs insurance ; sectorization vs de-sectorization, etc.

- What kind of arena for policy? For instance, in terms of Labour relations, social partners in Morocco tend to become norm producers (see the adoption of the new labour law) ; in terms of redistribution and social policies, is an assistance right at stake ?

The framework of my paper will follow the main entries proposed in the "concept paper for the economic sector of the research".

1- MODALITIES OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTION UNDER ECONOMIC REFORM

In Morocco, the last two decades witnessed many reforms of economic policies. Three processes characterized these restructurings:

- First, the "Structural adjustment", implemented with the help of loans and expertise from the IMF and WB (and to a lesser extent the EU). As elsewhere, the « orthodox » plan aimed to « stabilized » the macro equilibrium of the economy, to restructure State expenses and public funds, and to reform the economic tools of State intervention

- Second, a privatization program voted by the Parliament in 1989 and launched in 1991
- Third, a liberalization process,

• One the one hand, an opening to world trade: decreasing customs tax and trade agreements: in 1996, with European Union, in the vein of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and more recently (2004) with the US, as the first for Arab country (with the exception of Jordan in 2001).

• On the other hand, the implementation of a new legal framework for economic activities [even if the law is not well enforced, and even if breach of the law is arbitrarily punished, as was the case during the famous and controversial "purification campaign" in 1996 – ended, incidentally with a fiscal amnesty, "updating amnesty"]: bank and tax system reform; competition law (loi sur la concurrence), limited (SA) company law; implementation of commercial courts, etc.

1.1- Structural adjustment and « mise à niveau » : reformist plans and slogans.

- End of the myth/the promise of public employment
- Reduction of customs protection of local production.
- Fall of subsidy consumption.

• In terms of macro economic goals, structural adjustment reaches its goal or tends to.
• Its social impact is negative (in terms of employment, education or health system access).
• The measures of the structural program seem to have, paradoxically, paved the way for stronger state interference in the economic arena, on the one hand, and for a closer rapprochement between some leading entrepreneurs of the national economy and the state, on the other, to keep the balance between economic reform success and social stability. This can be illustrated with privatization policy.

1.2- Privatization:

Morocco offers a unique perspective on liberal reform in the region considering both the specificity of its privatization program and its level of achievement. In the beginning of the 1990s, R. Springborg (1993), among others, anticipated a great social transformation, in the wave of liberalization and privatization ("the way thus has been clearly ideologically and politically for a resurgence of the bourgeoisie. The new orthodoxy of development, which calls for exported growth under private sector auspices, champions bourgeois entrepreneurialism"). But contrary to what was predicted (and announced by public authorities in Morocco), the important cession and sales of public enterprises to Moroccan or foreign investors did not give rise to a "new middle class" or a "new entrepreneurship".

1.2.1- Privatization list voted in Parliament in 1989 concerned the most important economic sectors of the country (hotel or firms in difficulty but also the main firms in the sectors of finance, banking and insurance, mining and cement, transportations, etc. not to mention the transfer of telecoms, water and electricity supply, etc.) The pace and extent of their sale to private interests were sustained during the 90s, even if they slowed down for a while with the appointment of the so-called "gouvernement d'alternance" led by several socialist and nationalist leaders in 1998.

Parallel to this formal privatization process without precedent in the MENA region , a lot of utilities, such as water supply, transportation, telecommunication, etc., were "sold" in the contractual form of "gestion déléguée" (delegated management).

1.2.2- Only few Moroccan privileged groups have benefited from the program, and mainly ONA (Omnium Nord Africain), owned by the royal family. In other terms, public firms have been bought either by a few people and groups heading the major State-owned and private holdings in the country, or by their previous "general directors" (when they were Sate-owned), or by foreign groups.

1.2.3- This concentration of capital with the help of privatization has multiple causes:
- Arbitrary, discretionary, corrupt and clientelistic practices in the process
- More mechanical effects generated by the credit and financial structures (the bank system – and the possibilities of securing a bank loan -- is in the hands of the main holdings and firms of the Realm).

1.2.4- But these direct sales and the privatization of utilities had major consequences on economic policies – and the citizen/State relationships:

- On the one hand, State enterprises can no longer employ as many people as they previously could. Added to the restructuring of the State administration, this led to a strong reduction of a major kind of redistribution and regulation: the public employment. Between 1985 and 1994, the rate of recruitment in the public service and sector dropped by 80%.

- On the other, these operations tend to "transform" citizens into clients, not without opposition and protest: L. Zaki (2005) shows for instance how the electrification of bidonvilles/shantytowns in Casablanca, after privatization, generated "poaching" practices, local contention and negotiations with local authorities and private company representatives).

- This reshapes the hypothetical social contract and the exercise of economic citizenship:

• In terms of path dependence and attempts of citizens, this can be illustrated by the exceptional and exemplary mobilisation of "diplomés chômeurs" (unemployed graduates) who organized in the 1990's in national (ANDCM), regional, specialized or sector-based associations (see the dissertation of M. Empador (2005)).

• In terms of concrete power of citizen in the making of policies, this can also be underlined in the case of the privatization of utilities: the previous jurisdictions of local governments, and mainly municipalities, concerning community and public services were heavily shaken these last few years. The generalisation of the concession of public utilities to private firms partly stripped them of their functions.

1.3- Conclusion :

1.3-1. At the end of the 70's Morocco figured among the 15most heavily indebted countries.

- After the 1983-1993 Structural adjustment program and the macro stabilization of the economy, the external debt (solde du compte courant) was reduced from 12,3% of the GDP in 1983 to 0,9% in 1987 and 0,7% in 2003. Thanks to devaluation of the dirham (from 1983 to 1985), exports increased and imports diminished in the 80's. The growing tourism earnings on the one hand, and the increase in capital transfers from Moroccans living abroad helped, with debt relief (allègement de la dette) to restore external equilibrium.

- In spite of the exceptional incomes provided by privatization, the budget deficit remains, but according to official sources, is "under control".

- Public resources diminished noticeably during the two last decades.

1.3-2. Despite the mode of Privatization, the combination of a new export-oriented trade regime and rising international manufacturing opportunities initiated important changes in the composition of the private sector. In the textile sector, for instance, M. Camett (2004, 246-247) shows that "small-scale producers from modest background emerge alongside traditional protectionist elites". Not directly visible through a statistical approach, this has induced conflicts and change in entrenched business-public powers linkages (in politics and policies linkages).

1.3-3. Decentralization of economic policies: in a global context of "delocalization" (off shoring mainly), the restructuring of economic policies in Morocco tends to encourage the delocalization of investment inside the country, thanks to a decentralization program. The "Royal Letter to the Prime Minister on Investment Management Devolution" (2001) initiated the process. It ordained under the supervision of regional wali, the creation of Regional Investment Centres (RIC), that centralise the services for economic operators, Moroccan or foreign, interested in local investment.

1.3-4. To sum up, from a macro level point of view, we can follow the study by B. Dilmann (2001, p. 198) on the recent political economy in the Maghreb: « Regimes have been quite adept at maintaining patronage coalitions and determining the mechanisms by which public and external resources are divvied up. The most they "deregulate" the most they "re-regulate" by determining precisely who can most easily benefit from change and join distributional coalition to tap profits in the market". Direct State resources have weakened but public authorities, and the Palace at the head, have proven to be the main initiator and operator of economic policies. The liberalization still remains an « affair of State ». But this is not enough to understand how State power is evolving because the channel and modes of its intervention are reshaping. Thus, analyses should be deepened to show the complexity of the process of « regulation by less State » very supervised by public authorities. This can be made clearer by examining what is at stake in social welfare provision and the labour arenas.

2- THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE

The equation is the following: contrary to what was expected in the 60's and 70's (or to what we can observe in Tunisia), Moroccan society remains weakly "salarised" (salarisée): wage earners are few while the social welfare system launched in the first years of independence was precisely based on the Fordist assumption (productivity growth, taylorist division of Labour and extension – and stabilization – of wage earning) would insure the path towards modernization, thanks to State subsidies, social law, the welfare State and national economic management). The pressure exercised by direct foreign investment encouraged social dumping and low wage policies. And the social impact of structural adjustment aggravated the rate of poverty, including poor workers (according to official sources, 33% of the population is poor).

During the last decade, official social indicators improved in Morocco. This was due mainly to an increase in public social expenditures and the Government's increasing focus on rural areas (e.g., rural electrification, rural roads, and potable water). Yet, both absolute poverty and "economic vulnerability" increased: according to official statistics, Poverty in Morocco affects over 23% of the rural population. 700 000 households are affected by social exclusion and 4 million people live in sub-standard housing or slums. Furthermore, 2% of the urban population lives in extremely vulnerable conditions. The health and educational expenses have remained stable (in percentage of GNP) but have fallen in comparison to the demographic increase.

In the context of social movements – and mainly after the bomb attacks in Casablanca 2003 – and pressed by the EU to hinder immigration, Morocco is waking up politically to the exacerbation of social risks and their possible political consequences. Within a short time, a series of social laws have been

adopted, first and foremost a new labour law which, in 2003, replaced an older and outdated law inherited from the colonial period. At the same time, various semi-public agencies, and in 2005 a National initiative for Human Development (INDH) have been established to organize aid provided by private sources and volunteer associations to the "needy". This acceleration of social reform is based on the perception that integration through formal participation in the labour market has failed. It is part of the transformation of the role of the Moroccan state and other actors and institutions involved in the formulation of social policies, with a tend to depoliticization.

2.1- Moroccan State has never been a Welfare State (unlike for instance, close neighbours like Tunisia and Algeria)

In the case of Morocco, the role of the State in the provision of social welfare service is not declining, on the contrary. But it is reshaping.

2.1-1. A very low place in the HDI ranking.
In 1985, had the UNDP's HDI existed, Morocco would have ranked among the "underdeveloped countries" (with low human development) (CERED, haut Commissariat au Plan, 2006). Now, mainly due to growth recovery, the country ranks among countries with medium human development. Nevertheless, its social policies are characterized by mediocre performances. In terms of IDH, it is classified with the 4 weaker Arab countries.

This is mainly due to the failure of the health system and the educational system: Morocco has the lowest adult literacy rate in North Africa (around 50%).

2.1-2. A pyramidal system of welfare, based on the non-achieved goal of extension of wage earners.
- At the head of the pyramid, some members of the State administration and public sector.
- Of 7.3 millions private sector employees (89% of the working population), only 1.2 millions are affiliated to the Caisse Nationale de la Sécurité Sociale.
- While only a part of the population is covered, their needs are also in fact only marginally covered.
- Those who can insure themselves with private insurance firms, others ask for assistance, local, familial, communitarian, private or public. This is exacerbated by the increase in unemployment and the development of flexibility on labour market. (???)

2.1-3. An embryonic assistance system.
Until the latest reforms, no social policy was really implemented. The main program , called "l'Entraide nationale", launched in 1957, claims today to provide help to 100 000 poor people in Morocco, since 5 million people are registered as poor people (and the part of "vulnerable people" is further more important).

- In the case of Morocco, the State has never been a welfare State, except through the plethoric state employment. Thus, what is at stake now is the implementation of social policies strongly combined with the reshaping of labour policies.

2.2- A dual set of reforms which reshape the "social citizenship"
We can observe a double process, involving some reshaping of State intervention: On the one hand, a legislative process aiming directly at improving social protection of the already somewhat privileged salaried workforce;
On the other hand, the less institutionalised and sometimes volatile disbursement of aid funds by governmental agencies and international organizations.

2.2-1. An ambitious reform of Welfare concerns a small part of population.

- Reform of the labour Code (2003): more flexibility but institutionalization of unemployment benefits and recognition of labour representatives inside firms.
- Institutionalization of an obligatory health insurance (AMO. 2006). Trends to generalization of health system (but for the moment, the need covered by the new AMO concerns very few medicines and the reimbursement represents only 1% of the expense).
- Reform of the pension: towards private insurance (see the WB model)?

• Protected population are few (15% of Moroccan people have health insurance and access to hospitals or clinics are difficult in rural areas)
• Needs covered are few.
• The Law is not enforced. Especially in firms, employers do not consider registration of their employees with the CNSS as obligatory (only 27% of employees are affiliated to CNSS).

2.2-2. Le « Chantier de règne » : l'Initiative pour le développement humain (2003). The announcement by Mohammed V, in May 2005, two years after the bomb attack, of the implementation of the INDH (National initiative for human development) breathed new life into the reshaping of policies targeted at poor and vulnerable people.
Beside the media coverage of the event (presented as a "chantier de règne" for the so-called "King of the poor"), the dynamics around the INDH underline some redeployment of the power of the Moroccan State. It places emphasis on the role devoted to those "private semi-public institutions established by key figures to organise aid provided by private sources to the needy" (cf. "concept paper for the economic sector of the research"). But in some aspects, it goes further: mainly because it establishes public institutions to coordinate private aid; because it also tends to decentralize social policies.

- A Royal Initiative. Charity and neo-patrimonialism reinvention and modernization.
• The INDH is along the same lines as the two « flagship » monarchic institutions: Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity (created in 1998) and Hassan II Funds for economic and social development (created in 2000). Leaded by King Councillors, bank leaders, etc., these hybrid institutions are financed by exceptional public funds or national and international private sponsorship: for instance a part of the privatization of GSM (???) in the case of the Hassan II Funds. But their expenses are not controlled by Government or Parliament. Since 2001, Hassan II Funds have the status of State-owned Companies.
- This is based on a "new" kind of social intervention: micro credit support to encourage "income generating activities" and to promote access to basic infrastructures and social services.
- They enter into partnership contracts with local or international NGOs.
- If they have Moroccan monarchic support, they are very similar to other kinds of institutions such as the 26/26 Funds in Tunisia. They are modernizing neo-patrimonialist and clientelist charities.

• INDH, supported by the World Bank, goes further: it claims to "reinforce" social policies controlled by national and local authorities, managing private funds for poverty reduction. It is designed as "community driven development" (but until to now it is mainly lead by local representatives of the Interior Ministry) ; it is supposed to rely on a "participatory approach". It targets some rural and urban neighbourhoods diagnosed as priority communities.

• The target population is not a « residual » one but on the contrary represenst a huge part of the Moroccan population.
• The activities supported are "private", "decentralized" and tend to be "de-politicized". It is never debated in the Parliament but depends on Royal initiatives. Locally, the municipalities are stripped of any decision-making or implementation, to the advantage of some NGOs and the Interior administration.

• It is not a question of transforming the social and political rights of Moroccan people, but of changing the conditions, prerequisites and framework of insurance and solidarity. Nevertheless we can question the assumption of the beginnings of a kind of "right to assistance" in the context of the implementation of INDH.

2.3- Conclusion

In the case of Morocco, the embryonic issue of protection against social risk shows that the State is on the tightrope but has not withdrawn from service provision. The current reforms of social policies can be observed as a laboratory of social policy making in a context of economic liberalization and strong public expenses reduction. This retructuring shows not only trends toward innovation but also structural and conjectural limits of the reshaping of State power in these domains.

The State lays down (allocates ???) some heavy loans (to private sectors and NGOs), but seems to retain the control of economic management and social regulation. Maybe here it is that it would be interesting to investigate the issue of social cohesion and the quest for a « third way ».

• Resorting to private national or international partnerships to raise funds but also to implement policies.
• Delocalization (offshoring?) of social policies: while welfare, protection and assistance are expressed in universal terms, the concrete policies are implemented in very localized places. The territories of this "welfare system" do not correspond to the territory of the National State.
• Welfare is not a right but a favour to the needy, or a service to customers or to insured people.

3- CHANGING STATE LABOUR RELATIONS.

The landscape of labour relations in Morocco evolved through Structural adjustment and privatisations. The State is no longer the main employer in the Kingdom and the violent State-labour relations are opening up to a third partner: private employers. While some new institutions seem to be inspired by a « neo-corporatist » formula (such as the « Social dialogue » cycle), the process is quite different:

- Because none of the « social partners » can claim to monopolise representation.
- Labour unions are divided; they have found competitors in ad hoc new organizations and associations and are not very present inside firms.
- CGEM remains a fragile organisation in terms of representation.
- Because public power still remains very interventionist, even if social partners tend to become norms producers.

3.1- Employers become « social partners » : Institutionalization of a professional association :
3.1-1. A voice :

- During liberalization a new narrative appeared that combines the others.
- A narrative about entrepreneurship
- A narrative from entrepreneurs: some people speak in the name of the entrepreneurs' interests.

3.1-2. An association : The "Confédération générale des entreprises du Maroc" (CGEM)
Created in the 1940's, CGEM became a real and apparently powerful corporatist organization in the 1990's:

- In 1994, a new "unexpected" team took the chair -- not without contention.
- The team started a double process :

- Reform of the association, especially in terms of representation (increasing the number of its federation including the federation of small and medium-sized enterprises ; creation of regional offices ; work of media coverage of the association's activities and positions).

3.1-2. A social partner:

For the first time in Morocco, employers (as it happens CGEM) are represented in social negotiations and the signing of agreements with Labour unions (social agreements in 1996, 2000, 2003).
- This (fragile) triangularization of negotiations broke the history of face-to-face violent government - labour confrontation.
- Development of the association consolidated and strengthened the existence of « entrepreneurs » whose new and atypical leaders claimed to be « spokesmen ».
- In spite of the work of the leading team and the election of a new president in 2000 (and another new one in 2006), the power of the confederation still remains fragile because of its contested representational ability and because its decisions and positions or not always followed by the employers.

• Three consequences:
- In a context of social trouble and rapid transformation of the labour market, the social conflict is transferred from the public and political arena to private firms.
- After long years of bargaining, a new labour code was adopted in 2003 (just after the attacks in Casablanca and the national elections in 2002 in which the PJD demonstrated its strength).
- Employers and labour unions are put in a position to establish norms. They have gained a certain autonomy in negotiations (cf. the negotiations on the new labour code in 2003)

3.2- In spite of (and because of) growing flexibility on the labour market and the worsening of unemployment rates and social risks, Labour unions have lost ground and are weakened by a growing lack of political and economic resources.

3.2-1. Unemployment rates are increasing (rem.: officially, in 2006, 9,8% but the figure is very contested.), and the ratio of workers in small enterprises without staff representatives or of undeclared workers is very high. In this context, relationships between workers and trade unions are rare.

3.2-2. Labour unions have to deal with their own close but sometimes antagonistic relationships with the various political parties they were linked to. Especially when USFP and Istiqlal came into government affairs in 1996, unions had to revise their previous oppostional position. In the case of CDT (Confederation generale des travailleurs) and USFP, this led to a split and the foundation of a new political party in 2003 (the Ittihadi Congress led by the leaders of CDT).

3.2-3. Because of the strong tension on the Labour market, and the weak power of the law, the exercise of union activities in Firms is very risky and costly.

• Consequences :
- Individualization and personalization of labour relationships, which tend to take place and be organized more inside the company than in an institutionalized arena.
- Sectorization and delocalization of labour regulation: the comeback of collective agreements in State enterprises; implementation of a temporary sector-based SMIC (index-linked guaranteed minimum wage) in the case of the powerful textile sector, etc.
- The law (and the State of law) is not the main tool of regulation.
- The State remains « instituteur » (in the same time teacher and tutor) of this reshaping of social partner relationships. Public powers and especially the Prime Minister D. Jettou claims to play the role of referee and arbitrator.

CONCLUSION: RESTRUCTURING ECONOMIC STATE POWER IN MOROCCO

1. The resources of Economic State power in Morocco have changed :

- The driving force of the State's economic power does not rest on the public sector which has privatized a large part of its main firms (except the Office Chérifien des Phosphates).
- The Moroccan State is not now the main employer in the Country.
- It is dependent upon international division of Labour but, the Moroccan State, dependent as it is on the European economy is trying to diversify its partnership and to play a leading role in the reshaping of MENA political economy (First MENA Conference in 1994 in Casablanca : building a regional market in the "wake" of the Oslo Agreement ; Free trade agreement with the USA in 2004 ; Agadir Agreement (for the implementation of a "free trade Arab area" supported by the European Union) in 2004, with Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt).

2. Morocco: an atypical or exemplary case study? How to outline a comparison?

If the Moroccan case suits the "tracks" suggested in the "concept paper for the economic sector of the research", it also offers some peculiarities:

- the weakness of the rentier paradigm to explain what is at stake in Morocco.
- the welfare State is more developed than it is in Lebanon, but we can not assert that the State is withdrawing from social policies. In some aspects, it is the contrary.

• Interest to compare inside "Arab world" in terms of political economy. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Morocco present common processes but also huge historical and institutional peculiarities in terms of production, distribution and wealth accumulation.

• Can we notice the same king of re-regulation in the other case?

3. Bringing the State back in… what's about the paradigm of "less-State regulation" (réguler par le moins d'Etat ?). As Dillman underlines (cf. "concept paper for the economic sector of the research"), the more the regime de-regulates, the more it re-regulates. The Moroccan case allow us to add that this re-regulation cannot amount to determining who will be the losers and who the winners of the reform :

- Contrary to what Richards and Waterbury claimed in 1998 (cf. "Concept paper for the economic sector of the research"), it is not so easy in the case of Morocco – and maybe elsewhere – to identify a "stable" pro-reform coalition, composed of a large Moroccan private sector and rural notables. If we analyse the making of "networks of privileges" capturing a disproportional share of the benefits of the reforms (Heydeman, 2004) – cf. global statement on the privatization process –, there are complex social and economic processes intervening in the restructuring of economic State power. While pre-reform coalitions remains powerful, they interact with other kinds of collective actions and bargaining, expressing the complexity of the interests at stake and the difficulty in assigning a stable, distinct and coherent identity to the various actors of political economy. This can be illustrated by the many conflicts inside the CGEM, the huge disputes led by the textile association (AMITH) against the recent agreement signed by the CGEM, the controversial election of a new president for the Confederation in 2006. It would be a "pity" (???) to minimize the various divisions in the "private sector": it appears all but homogeneous and shows difficulty in expressing a common interest (do the "entrepreneurs" exist in Morocco as a social group?).

- The modes of re-regulation are many and contribute to redefining political and social identities; new linkages between politics and policies; the expression of new kinds of cleavages. Crony capitalism is not the only mode of regulation. The analysis of privatization, social policies and labour relationships helps us to identify some of them, in the arena of policies (and not only politics or elites structure): "discharge" (see before); decentralization and delocalization (with the outline of new territories for policies); de-politicization ; compromise (and conflicts) on new social pacts, founded more on contract and individuals to the detriment of collective actors and general rights.

- In terms of restructuring of State power, I should come back more to the scenario proposed by our general outline

- the "consolidation of neo-authoritarian regime";

- the "populist" scenario

but my ideas are not very clear on that yet…

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(10)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
MOROCCO / SECURITY

by

Issandr El Amrani*

The aim of this research paper is to present a narrative for the relationship of the security sector (broadly defined) with Morocco's ongoing political transformation.

Many Arab states have evolved in the post-colonial period into security states -- that is, states where the primacy of the security sector, notably in maintaining regime stability, trumps the role played by political actors such as parties, elected officials, or appointed technocrats and senior civil servants. Morocco largely fits this model, with senior officials and royal advisers widely recognized as influential political players have often spent a career in the security services.

From military strongmen such as General Mohammed Oufkir in the early 1970s, General Ahmed Dlimi from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s and General Hosni Benslimane since the early 1980s, to security sector civil servants hailing from the Ministry of Interior such as former Prime Minister Driss Basri or current Prime Minister Driss Jettou, personnel from the security sector has and continues to play a pivotal political role in Morocco.

Despite an official narrative that pits King Muhammad VI has a reformist in contrast to the late Hassan II, eight years into his rule there has been little change to the practice of statecraft, which remains in the hands of a few persons loyal to the monarch. Non-security sector political actors, while they have gained new importance since Hassan II began to implement limited political reform in the 1990s, remain largely constrained by "red lines" imposed by the security sector and in practice must negotiate with it. Political groups that wish to operate outside of this framework, such as the Islamist movement al-Adl wal Ihsan, face severe limitations on their field of action and periodic security crackdowns.

As elsewhere in the region, post-9/11 global concerns about terrorism have also played a major role in redefining the Moroccan security sector's outlook. Morocco has been fingered as a major origin country for al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist terrorists, most notably in the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004, but also generally among the "Afghan Arabs." One reason for this is the Moroccan security sector's support (within the scope of wider US and Saudi backing for Afghan *mujahideen*) for anti-Soviet Islamist groups during the Cold War.

In the aftermath of the 16 May 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Moroccan security services reversed what had appeared like a retreat from the public sphere and launched a wide-ranging crackdown on Islamist groups, arresting hundreds of alleged terrorists and earning the rebuke of local and international human rights groups that believed many of the arrests were unwarranted. The Casablanca attacks also changed the public discourse about the role of the security sector, with many observers noting what was dubbed a "Tunisian tendency" among the security services -- a reference to the zero-tolerance policy towards dissidents (notably Islamists) adopted by the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia.

Close collaboration between the Moroccan security services and Western ones -- notably those of France, Spain and the United States -- has also introduced a new problematic. Under the administration of US President George W. Bush, Morocco has frequently been singled out as an example of an Arab country that was engaging in positive political reform. On the other hand, the same administration has collaborated closely with Morocco, making it a key country in the "rendition" program to extradite and interrogate (often through the use of torture) suspected members of al-Qaeda.

Of particular interest in Morocco's case is that the revival of a critical role for the security sector in the aftermath of the Casablanca bombings coincided with the first attempt to address past human right abuses by the security sector in any Arab country: the *Instance d'Equite et de Reconciliation* (IER). The IER, headed by former leftist dissident Driss Benzekri (who spent 17 years in prison under Hassan II) was tasked with accounting incidents of kidnappings, torture and other human rights abuses by the security services under the reign of Hassan II, most notably the period known as *les années de plomb* (the year of lead). Although the IER represented a major step towards ending impunity for the illegal actions of the

security sector, many observers have noted that it was a flawed process that did not sufficiently address the issue of key security sector personnel taking responsibility for past incidents.

Several important aspects of Morocco's security sector will be excluded from examination in this research paper. The question of Morocco's tense relationship with Algeria, with the Polisario and the Western Sahara's future status will not be broached in depth, although recent attempts by the Moroccan government to depict Sahrawi irredentists as Islamist radicals will be touched upon. These were excluded for both reasons of brevity and because of the difficulty obtaining reliable primary material from military sources.

This research paper will will draw in interview with primary sources including government officials, human rights activists, political actors, members of the IER as well as as media, NGO and academic sources.

Part of the reason for looking at at the relationship between security sector and the issue of political transition is because of the contradictory pressures countries such as Morocco have been exposed to (as explained in part two of the IAI/UI security sector concept paper): there has been increased pressure to pursue democratization since the end of the Cold War and, at least between 2003 and 2005, due to the Bush administration's "Forward Strategy of Freedom." But initial efforts focusing on electoral reform and monitoring have proved disappointing: electoral autocracies have been largely able to satisfy demands for elections while continuing to restrict prospects for meaningful political reform. In its conclusion, the paper will examine the potential for security sector-focused reform efforts.

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OUTLINE
SAUDI ARABIA / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

by

Steffen Hertog

« SAUDI ARABIA: CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION »

Introduction:
This paper will pull together various strands of research on Saudi history and politics which I have been pursuing during the last four years, putting them into comparative perspective in the context of our project. Due to my historical-institutionalist take on Saudi politics, the paper's proposed structure is largely historical, focusing on the formation of political institutions in Saudi Arabia since the 1950s and how these institutions have shaped the responses of various political actors to crisis events since the 1990/91 Gulf war.

The main point I will make is that there has been much less change in the conduct of politics and state-society relations than in the republics under study. This does not mean that there has not been a certain convergence of systems in the Arab world – but this mostly is because the republics have shed their populist mobilizational structures, which Saudi Arabia never had. Recent moves to create ostensibly representative, formal-corporatist institutions in Saudi Arabia have not resulted in substantial change in the paternal, clientelist political strategies of the regime, which still define the essence of Saudi politics. The new corporatist institutions largely remain state-dependent and have little popular outreach – which makes them surprisingly similar to the formerly influential, but now largely disemboweled parties, unions and syndicates of other Arab states. One point in which Saudi Arabia paradoxically differs from both Morocco and the formerly populist republics is that it has been more successful in keeping up its distributional, inclusive socio-economic agenda – which has never been tied to political mobilization, however.

Sources and method:
The sources for my paper consist of press and government material, interviews with "civil society" and regime representatives in Saudi Arabia as well as oppositional documents. I will also draw on the growing theoretically informed secondary literature on political change in Saudi Arabia, which is much more substantial now than only five years ago. In its historical part, the paper will draw on archival material from the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh, the Public Record Office in Kew/London, US State Department documents, as well as the Mulligan Papers collection at Georgetown University and a number of other private paper collections.

My method is historical sociology, broadly speaking. I use the documentary record to trace the formation and change of social institutions, both formal and informal, which define Saudi politics. My main concern in the context of out project is with how these deeply rooted institutions delimit and shape current political change. The paper is not wedded to a specific analytical mode of political economy, class analysis, political anthropology or "statist" analysis. I rather use the toolkit of political sociology liberally as it is applicable to the Saudi case.

The paper will start with a substantial historical section that maps out how the paternal clientelism of the Saudi polity was constructed and expanded between the 1950s and the 1980s, and how non-state social actors were fragmented or co-opted, leaving royalty and bureaucracy as main active constituents of the polity. I will then discuss a number of challenges to the regime, including non-state Islamist mobilization, and how these were dealt with through established structures of repression and, more importantly, co-optation. The empirical section of the paper will conclude with a discussion of recent corporatist initiatives by the regime, explaining how thus far they represent a modernization of the regime's political paternalism at best, but no substantial political change. The final section will put the

Saudi case in comparative perspective, also briefly discussing other cases in the Gulf which are not addresses by out project in detail.

Saudi history as history of the Saudi state

The history of modern Saudi politics is to a large extent the history of the modern Saudi state and its elites. It was a small elite which created the early Saudi state through conquest and alliances with local notables in the 1920s and 1930s. Before the new state could become an arena for truly national politics, oil income skewed power relations between regime and society, allowing state elites to build quickly growing bureaucratic and distributive institutions without having to engage in negotiations with larger social groups.

Non-state actors grew increasingly dependent on state and regime patronage and became (or remained) politically fragmented. Never in modern Saudi history did social forces form or act independently of the state on a national level. Tribes were settled and co-opted, with the tribal leadership remaining relevant only on the local level. Those urban notables who were willing to cooperate with the regime preserved their local status, but usually became clients of the royal family, their range of action typically geographically circumscribed to their region of origin. Business was allowed to thrive, but in the shadow of the state, dependent on various forms of handouts and fragmented regionally. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, it was the regime and its distributional networks which largely defined Saudi politics.

Patterns and games of patronage: personalized

The system has been held together through patronage of two kinds: personalized and institutionalized. Personalized patronage can be captured through concepts of patron-client relations as developed in the anthropological literature – princes as patrons, smaller princes, bureaucrats or businessmen as clients; bureaucrats as patrons, aid recipients, small-scale shop owners or "paper pushers" as clients etc.

It is important is to remember that patronage is multi-layered in various ways and should not be reduced to simple dyadic relationships. Even if understood as complex phenomenon within larger institutional contexts, however, it remains defined by inequality of resources and power, its small-scale nature and its capacity to undermine coalitions of equals. Tokens of exchange from the patrons' side can be jobs, bureaucratic protection and access, money, contracts and other state services. Clients reciprocate by spreading the good word about their patrons, representing their interests in lower reaches of the system, and gathering information for them. A larger clientage imparts social and political prestige.

In the absence of other political institutions or groupings, structures of personal patronage have often been the defining feature in the politics of the Saudi elite. Similarly, it has been important in bringing ever larger numbers of Saudis into the fold of the state as clients of growing numbers of princes, bureaucrats and other figures with access to state resources. It has also been important in defusing political crises, as the regime has tended to prefer co-optation of opposition over outright repression – although this was less so the case under rather harsh King Faisal than under his successors, who allowed former oppositionists back into the fold in the 1970s and 1980s, co-opting many a bright young Arab nationalist into the growing Saudi state apparatus.

Patterns of patronage: institutional

Institutional patronage has become increasingly important with this expansion of the Saudi state and its "swallowing" of large swathes of Saudi society in the boom decade of the 1970s. The term as used here denotes the formal structures of distribution, broadly defined, with which the increasingly complex Saudi state has been reaching out to various larger constituencies in society on a large scale and through formal means. It is an unequal exchange involving delimited groups of actors which, like personalized patronage, undermines the formation of autonomous horizontal groups. It usually involves jobs,

subsidies and public services of various kinds. It can be intertwined with personal patronage on a small scale, but cannot be reduced to it.

The most important means of institutional patronage has been bureaucratic employment, which has contributed to the "statizing" of social groups and to the creation of new, fragmented social formations dependent on the state[1] – most notably the so-called "new middle class", which is not really a class at all, but an incoherent melange of various professional groups which are dependent on various state institutions. State employment has also helped to control and fragment tribes through employment in the National Guard. Similarly, Saudi ulama have been bureaucratized, not least by "granting" them a control over a variety of state institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, the moral police and significant parts of the education system – which gives them local institutional power, but also makes them subservient to state leaders.

One might object that subjects in many other political systems are playing comparable roles in state apparatuses and are benefiting from public services on a similar scale. What is more important, however, is the historical *proportion* of state and societal resources: Saudi societal resources have been much smaller than those of the state for a long time; for exactly the decades during which the rules of Saudi politics were written and a national framework was established. Considering the very low development level of pre-oil Saudi society, relative dependence on the state has been much more pronounced than in any non-rentier state (and so has, incidentally, the clientelist entitlement thinking that goes along with sustained existence of direct and indirect state support).

The corollary of omnipresent, state-centred patronage in Saudi Arabia is the absence of large-scale social movements with any serious claim to autonomy from the regime. With distribution as the prevalent mode of economic interaction, conventional class formation was stymied.[2] Distributional states allow structures of kinship and primordial identities to flourish, often to the detriment of programmatic politics.

Leftist and nationalist parties in the 1950s and 1960s were weak and fragmented in social and regional terms. An incipient labour movement only existed in the Eastern Province, where US-owned oil company Aramco was the only entity to employ a sufficient number of workers in one place to enable unionization attempts. As these attempts had little national resonance, they were successfully crushed.[3] While a labour class never developed, the business classes of the various Saudi regions quickly grew dependent on state and royal patronage, as the size of state contracts outstripped any private profit opportunities. With old social actors losing their coherence and new groups growing up as creatures of the state, Saudi society in general remained fragmented and politically unmobilized. Independent organization of political interests was seldom demanded and never condoned. As far as the Saudi regime experienced crises in the 1950s and 1960s, these resulted from conflicts within the royal family rather than bottom-up pressures from society.

Different from all other socio-economic groups, business has developed some coherence as a class in recent decades, as sustained rent recycling has increased its autonomous resources and gradual managerial maturation has made it capable of catering to private demand and competing regionally.[4] It remains, however, a class without politics, as its limited demands are channeled through corporatist institutions such as chambers of commerce or economic policy commissions, keeping it separate from

[1] What Michael Ross calls the "group formation effect" of rentier states; Ross, Michael. 'Does oil hinder democracy?', *World Politics*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (April 2001), pp. 325-361.
[2] Cf. Vandewalle, Dirk. *Libya since independence: oil and state building* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998).
[3] Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: mythmaking on the Saudi oil frontier* (Stanford University Press 2006).
[4] Giacomo Luciani, 'Saudi Arabian business: from private sector to national bourgeoisie', in Paul Aarts, Gerd Nonneman (eds.), *Saudi Arabia in the balance: political economy, society, foreign affairs* (London: Hurst 2005), pp. 144-181

politics at large[5] – a feat that is easy to achieve considering the underdeveloped state of other forms of political mobilization.

Mobilizing against the paternal order

This is not to deny that Saudi Arabia has seen phases of salient oppositional mobilization. The fate of these movements however illustrates the resilience and flexibility of Saudi political paternalism more than the potential for broad oppositional coalitions.

The fully developed Saudi state saw its first political crises unfolding in late 1979: The uprising of Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province and the occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. Both, although they shook the ruling elites, were delimited problems which did not lead to political activation of the bulk of Saudi society. Many Sunni Saudis have little sympathy for Shiite claims for recognition. The absence of non-identitarian political ideologies in Saudi Arabia to which the Shiites could have attached their demands allows the regime to play divide-and-rule. The problem could be neatly quarantined in the Eastern Province, and – in classical Al Saud fashion – alleviated through increased expenditure on regional development, increasing institutional patronage.

The Juhayman revolt in Mecca delivered a deeper psychological blow to the rulers, but its very extremeness also underlined the isolation of Juhayman's group in Saudi society. The retrograde and millenarian nature of his movement might also be interpreted as the unwitting success of Saudi state-builders in suppressing broader-based, realistic oppositional ideologies – at least for the time being. Although the Mecca events made a dent in the Al Saud's credibility, they had no problems crushing the movement itself.

The 1980s, although a decade of economic crisis, were pretty calm in political terms. Political debate, as far as it occurred, tended to focus on cultural and moral issues, as a new generation of educated young Saudis questioned the relatively liberal attitudes of the socially mobile generation of the 1960s and 1970s. The locations for these debates were literary clubs and Islamic charities, not political organizations. These venues all were licensed and controlled by the state.

Despite this, the Islamically inclined intelligentsia (the "sahwa") did have a rather large leeway to organize in various cultural, educational and charitable institutions. Having no clearly defined socio-economic base, it still is the closest approximation to a "new middle class" movement Saudi Arabia has thus far seen – consisting of students, educated professionals and lower-rank Islamic scholars.

It was after the Gulf war of 1990/91 that a considerable component of the Islamic networks of the 1980s became politicized, openly demanding an Islamization of the public sphere and an Islamic foreign policy from the regime, as well as an end to the Al Saud state's corruption and favoritism. The emergence of the politicized sahwa from within formally state-controlled institutions (universities, charities etc.) revealed the ambiguity of the Saudi state's ubiquity: While its patronage reaches virtually all parts of Saudi society, it has in itself, in parts, become so amorphous and fragmented that the leadership cannot always control what happens in all of its sectors – specifically those sectors given some internal autonomy due to their specific role of reproducing the state's Islamic ideology, which requires minimal credibility and therefore freedom from too overt regime interference.

In Saudi Arabia more than perhaps anywhere else, politics often happens *within* the state. Positions within the fragmented state can give resources and opportunities to actors, which explains the sahwa's relative organizational successes. However, actors within the state also tend to have more to lose. This puts constraints on them which groups outside of the state would not be subject to. It can force them to engage in unusual trade-offs – most saliently, they might decide to pursue their aims by having themselves co-opted; a process that tends to appear at best peculiar and at worst duplicitous to outside

[5] Steffen Hertog, 'Modernizing without democratizing? The introduction of formal politics in Saudi Arabia', *International Politics and Society*, 3/2006.

observers, but which can be entirely rational and socially acceptable in the Saudi context. Oppositional bargaining with the regime in Saudi Arabia can be intricate and functions according to rules that are different from both democratic-pluralist systems and the harsher autocracies in the rest of the Arab world.

Such bargaining arguably helps to explain why the sahwist oppositional movement which reached its apogee in 1994 fizzled out subsequently and has not been revived since. To be sure, the Saudi state deployed a measure of coercion to stop sahwist demonstrations, and the two most prominent sahwist leaders (Salman Al-Awdah and Safar Al-Hawali) were imprisoned for five years. At the same time, however, subtler means of pressure were used – such as threats to the public careers of activists – and incentives for cooperation were given. Remarkably, both leaders now have been more or less co-opted by the regime, taking part in regime-sponsored intellectual events and abstaining from anti-government rhetoric. Many other sahwist preachers now are firmly in the government camp, some of them enjoying considerable prestige and resources as regime-sponsored intellectuals. Once again, the Saudi leaders' paternal willingness to admit unruly subjects back into the flock has defused and divided opposition activism; as had happened several times before, be it with leftists or with errant princes. The Saudi state easily had enough resources to cope with an opposition that only had a vague program and a relatively thin socio-economic basis in the intelligentsia.

The corporatist reaction

King Fahd's regime also reacted with a number of institutional reforms in 1992/93: the promulgation of a "basic law", a new law on regional governance, and the creation of the appointed quasi-parliament, the Majlis Al-Shura. The basic law more or less institutionalized authoritarian rules of governance which had long since been in force informally, and the regional reform has had little impact on actual governorate structures. The Majlis was a more innovative reform step, although one that had been pondered at various occasions for more than 30 years. It also was a first significant step towards the institutionalization of public debate which has further progressed under Crown Prince and later King Abdallah.

As I have argued elsewhere, this institutionalization is best captured with the concept of state corporatism:[6] the state-led creation of various "interest groups" which are granted a representational monopoly by the state and are organized along non-competing, functional lines to take care of the various components of society, while ultimate control of politics remains in the hands of the regime, which alone has the license to bring the various interests together.

Saudi Arabia has not yet seen another phase of oppositional mobilization as in the early 1990s. It has however seen a number of political crises since 2001: the soul-searching induced by 9/11 and the domestic political violence since 2003 have emboldened Saudi intellectuals of various hues to once again ask for political reform. Again, Islamists (often with a sahwist background) have been the best-organized and persistent in their petitioning, although there have also been several petitions in which liberal and Islamist intellectuals joined hands to ask for a political opening.[7]

Corporatism has been the regime's main response. With Abdallah at the helm, the willingness to allow for controlled public debate has become much greater. At the same time, Abdallah's regime has worked towards channeling debate into state-controlled institutions, in line with his generally stronger reliance on formal mechanisms of governance (possibly a strategy to delimit the informal powers of other senior princes). Abdallah might also recognize that as Saudi society has grown larger, more complex,

[6] Steffen Hertog, 'The new corporatism in Saudi Arabia: limits of formal politics', in: Abdulhadi Khalaf, Giacomo Luciani (eds.), *Constitutional reform and political participation in the Gulf* (Dubai: Gulf Research Center 2006), pp. 241-276

[7] Stéphane Lacroix, 'Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia's New Islamo-Liberal Reformist Trend', *Middle East Journal* vol. 58, no. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 345-65.

and more educated, it has become increasingly harder to accommodate all social interests through princely or bureaucratic clientelism.

Abdallah's regime has created various fora for various social interests: a "National Dialogue", which meets roughly twice a year to debate specific social and cultural problems, and has invited representatives of groups such as intellectuals, women, and national youth; one at a time. The state has also created a journalists' association, a human rights association, and a pensioners' association in the Eastern Province, while student and teacher associations have reportedly been mooted. Moreover, under Abdallah, the Majlis Al-Shura has been further extended. As it is explicitly recruited from various strata of functional elites (academics, businessmen, former bureaucrats, military, and some ulama), this body has a much stronger corporatist component than a conventional parliament.

With the exception of the Majlis, which has become a real forum for technocrats to debate policy issues in specific areas delimited by the regime, the above-mentioned exercises have aroused remarkably little interest in Saudi society. The state hand in orchestrating the new organizations might have been too visible, but at the same time, it also appears that large parts of Saudi society have little interest in formal, functional interest representation – the new bodies are not even seen as a chance to get a process of representation started. In the absence of a formal organizational tradition, the vast majority of Saudis seem to prefer pursuing their interests through established informal (and often polyfunctional) channels. Active identification as member of specific functional strata still seems alien to most Saudis. Needless to say, desultory attempts by dissident intellectuals to set up independent organizations have been suppressed by the regime.

The one area in which the new corporatism really reaches out beyond a small number of regime-sponsored client actors is in economic policy-making, where the regime has created several new channels for business interest representation. But although this finds considerable resonance in business circles – Chambers of Commerce by far the oldest corporatist institutions with the largest outreach – it happens in a separate realm which is rather unconnected to the political and cultural debates that happen in the rest of society. The one political consequence this seems to have is to prevent the politicization of business. More generally, the within-case comparison of business with other corporatist initiatives shows that without an organizational tradition, top-down institutionalization of political debate is unlikely to have much resonance in a fragmented society used to operating in a clientelist fashion.

Summary and discussion

With the exception of business inclusion and the Majlis, recent corporatist initiatives have been a rather inconsequential exercise. At the same time, however, Saudi Arabia has not witnessed successful oppositional mobilization. Saudi dissidents are adrift, having no broad social base and independent national organizational structures to call upon. As the economy has been doing well for several years, not even the ritual, unspecific denouncements of regime corruption has much resonance for the time being.[8] Through the liberalization of national debate on cultural and social issues, the regime has managed to deflect public attention away from politics proper. Moreover, due to the polarization of Saudi Arabia between a broad conservative base and a smaller group of elite liberals (often with technocratic background), "culture wars"-type debates can be continued endlessly without having political consequences for the regime.

[8] According to some strands of rentier state theory, an anti-corruption agenda is the only economic item which oppositions in rentier states can easily agree upon, as this agenda does not require specific class interests; cf. Luciani, Giacomo. "Allocation vs. production states: A theoretical framework", in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *The Arab state* (London: Routledge 1990), pp. 65-84

Comparative remarks for our project

Saudi Arabia has seen less substantial change in its political institutions than one would think looking at the impressive formal record of reform initiatives. With visible corporatist reform, but little change in actual participation and mobilization, it might represent the inverse of what is has happened in other Arab states: there, older corporatist institutions have seen substantial change – they have been undermined – but this has happened in a stealthy fashion.

Different from other Arab states, there has been no demise of "mass-based political organizations" in Saudi Arabia – the kingdom never had any. Conversely, Saudi Arabia's cautious political liberalization was not accompanied by "de-politisation and elitisation of political confrontation". Politics has always been an elite affair, although elites through their clientelist networks have always made great efforts to get a paternal sense of demands in society.

It is also difficult to discern a "higher level of intra-elite competition" in Saudi Arabia. The elite has of course grown in size, but the plural nature of princely fiefdoms is nothing new. Princes do compete for enlarged clienteles – also among the lower classes – but this kind of paternalism is as old as the Saudi state. Similarly, the growth of business resources and its influence on economic policy-making does not denote a new center of political power; at least not one that is in open rivalry to other political institutions. If anything, it has become harder to carve out new niches in the Saudi elite since the early 1980s, as due to slower state growth, socio-economic mobility has decreased considerably.

With some delay, Saudi Arabia has gone through a measure of political liberalization like other Arab states, culminating in municipal elections in 2005. In this, however, it has been able to sell very modest steps as progress, as its point of departure in formal-institutional terms was that of an absolutist monarchy. It hence has had the advantage of being able to give tokens of liberalization which other regimes have already given long time ago. At the same time, the Saudi regime has not had to resort to repressive policies on the scale seen in Egypt or Syria in the 1980s and 1990s. It has maintained a paternal and co-optative political tradition which is rooted in the historical conservatism and gradualism of the Al Saud and has been enabled by oil income.

The clientelism which many decry as politically regressive in other Arab states has always been the dominant mode of politics in Saudi Arabia and has been widely accepted. In this sense, the kingdom has a comparative historical advantage in the way it conducts its politics, which it possibly has in common with other monarchies, which never promised mass-based, mobilizational politics.

Paradoxically, the distributional commitment of the Saudi regime is more resilient and serious than that in Arab republics. Wide-reaching distribution is of course made possible by oil income, but it has remained a very serious consideration even under strong economic pressures. Subsidy cuts tended to hit business and higher income brackets rather than lower strata, and as far as the latter were concerned, austerity measures were often repealed.

Although public employment guarantees are not given anymore, public services remain strongly subsidized, and social expenditure has recently increased more rapidly than any other type of expenditure. The lower and middle classes were always meant to be included, but never to be mobilized, and the regime still holds true to that. Different from other Arab states, intermediation through non-state elites has not increased in importance – intermediation of state resources through princes or notables is significant, but not new.

As it has not re-engineered its socio-economic basis, the regime also did not have to de-ideologised its discourse very much: it can by and large stick to its Islamic-conservative guns, which continue to befit the paternal monarchy. The recent opening away from rigid Wahabi discourse is a limited phenomenon

and one that is rooted in Saudi Arabia's specific security problems and Abdallah's attempts to obtain reformist credentials.

One development that other Arab states and Saudi Arabia have in common is that only Islamists have come to constitute a serious opposition. The socio-economic base of the broader networks of Saudi Islamists engaged in petitioning and peaceful protest is comparable to that of the Muslim Brotherhood in other states: students, academics and middle-class, educated professionals are strongly represented. What Saudi Islamists lack, however, is backing by a strong Islamist bourgeoisie – which might help to explain their lack of oppositional perseverance. Moreover, they do not garner legitimacy from the provision of social services to the lower classes; certainly not on the scale witnessed in poorer countries such as Egypt, Palestine, Morocco etc. The Saudi state has not failed sufficiently to provide space for this.

This paper does not argue that state-society relations in Saudi Arabia are completely different from those in other Arab states. The point is slightly more complicated: The way politics is nowadays being conducted in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world – in a authoritarian-clientelistic fashion, with formal-corporatist institutions little more than embellishment – is pretty similar. What differs are the trajectories through which the different states arrived at this set-up. The different histories in turn explain why the Saudi regime appears more comfortable with this style of politics: It did not have to go through a crisis of legitimacy and the painful dismantlement of formal-inclusive institutions to reach it, but had adopted it as the natural form of politics of a rentier monarchy. Therefore its new corporatism is not suffering from a full-blown legitimacy crisis, but rather from a (delimited) crisis of irrelevance.

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WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
LEBANON / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

(ENG)

by

Karam Karam

« THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN LEBANON »

The "Independence Uprising" demonstrations that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Harriri on the 14th of February 2005, as well as the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian army by the end of April 2005, reinforced the belief that the Lebanese political system is effectively undergoing transformation; all the favorable conditions required to engage the political system in a "democratic transition" process seem to have come together.

If the shadow of emerging disillusion began to emerge, it is clear that the Lebanese political scene in 2007 is obviously very different compared to the one of in the post-war period, when the Syrian Baathist regime assumed control over Lebanon with the consent of the international community in the context of the post cold-war era, with the liberation of Kuwait and the launch of the Peace Process in the region. It is equally important to note that the current situation is different from that of September 2004, when the Syrian President Bachar al-Assad unconstitutionally imposed the prolongation of Emile Lahoud's presidential mandate.

The hypothetical indicators for "democratic transition" in Lebanon, may include for instance, the end of the civil war in 1990, the dynamics of "reconciliation" and "reconstruction" of the country and its public institutions (launched in 1992), as well as the organization of several elections (presidential, legislatives and municipal elections, after a long period of interruption or boycotting), and the withdrawal of foreign troops (The Israeli Army in 2000 form south Lebanon and the Syrian Army in 2005). These indicators however do not imply in any sense a reform of the Lebanese political system (nor its potential for democratization) and certainly do not solve the system's endemic crises.

Within the framework of this paper, I shall concentrate on three mobilization cycles that I will differentiate according to their dominant hypothesis, the way in which they participate in the formation of political identities, and the way they intervene in the definition of groups-related social forms of dominations and "counter-actors".

Moreover, instead of political, economic and social liberalization, in which some countries in the MENA region could be engaged, it seems that, in the scope of the last fifteen years, in particular since 1995, Lebanon was engaged in different cycles of mobilization or dynamic "protestation" that contributed to the restructuring of State power.

Without overstating the atypical aspect of the Lebanese political process compared to those existing in the MENA countries – particularly in terms of "State Resilience", the monopoly of the means of coercion and/or the personification of the regime –, this paper will propose a new dimension for both understanding and analyzing "political change without democratization". This will be based on three main factors: (1) the analysis of regimes strategies (and the way in which they are redefined), (2) elite change and (3) their methods of participation and mobilization "from below".

This paper will address these dynamics, at the same time avoiding Manichaean (i.e. civil society vs. political society) or linear (i.e. oscillating among different strategies in the political arenas) overtures. It will also highlight the position of political actors and their objectives in order to draw attention to the difficulty of assigning them fixed positions (Who has power? Who and what is the "opposition"?).

The first cycle of mobilization can be described as civil mobilization. Between 1995 and 2001, several organizations, initiatives, or social movements emerging from below - or from the margins of society -

shared common characteristics. In a society where political elites tend to neutralize any kind of opposition emanating from within the system, these channels tend to reinforce citizen action by giving participation in public life a politico-judiciary feeling and re-conciliating citizens to political action, which was previously compromised by the violence of the war and the behavior of the political elite after the war.

Three categories of actors can more or less clearly be identified during this period, and thus gives us the opportunity to reflect deeply on changes in the Lebanese political elite structure, as well as the way in which they are described: ruling elites, "opposition" elites and "civil actors".

The semblance of cohesion and homogeneity amongst the ruling elite during this period prevailed primarily because of the hegemony of the dominant political actor Syria over the political system. Despite their differences, they managed to abide by the rules of the game which were imposed on the entire political elite, thus neutralizing political space in various ways, such as: recourse to repression or exclusion (for example, the imprisonment of Samir Geagea, the exile of Michel Aoun, the violent repression of Hizbollah demonstrations, etc.); restricting entry into the political system by controlling the electoral system and the electoral process which was revived during that period, or even the logic of cooptation and distribution which prevailed and spread in what was at the time a large reconstruction site.

During this period, notions of political opposition were complex and tightly linked to the rules and conditions of political participation. First of all, in a consociational system, the notion of power-sharing among the various representative factions makes the idea of opposition ambiguous. On the one hand, the opposition can express itself by exercising its right to veto, a right afforded to every group in Lebanon's consensual political system. On the other hand, it can express itself through competition for representation of each group, or even within the government itself among the representatives of each group. Opposition against the government, however, was costly.

Secondly, that period was also typified by a group of outcast political leaders who became de facto opponents of the regime. For these outcast actors or groups, opposition arenas were numerous but not situated within the main representative institutions. If they were absent from government, or partially represented in parliament or not at all, they challenged the government and the regime either on the local level or through boycotting elections (mainly in 1992 and 1996), or in 'virtual' arenas (from abroad, or through outspoken press statements, etc). However, their absence from governmental institutions did not have the same impact in terms of actual power, which depended on their relation with the dominant actor, the Syrian regime. This meant radical opposition for some and "alliances of convenience" for others (mainly Hezbollah).

In reaction to these restrictions on the political scene, civil actors began to organize themselves within associations in order to oppose government policies, and not the government itself. They called for civil rights, freedom of expression and participation, and the reform of certain laws and policies (such as the Electoral Law, Associations Law, Civil Status Law, dealing with the issue of missing people during the war, environmental policies, etc.).

The second cycle of mobilization emerged at the beginning of the current decade and was characterized by a patriotic and pro-sovereignty stance. One can roughly pinpoint 2000-2001 as the period where agitation for this cause began. It reached its climax with massive demonstrations during the spring of 2005. Above all, the 2000 parliamentary elections signified a break from the past when compared to previous elections, especially vis-à-vis the ruling elites. Competing alliances amongst the heavyweights of the political system (particularly amongst the three leaders of the so-called Troika – the Prime Minister, the President and the Speaker of Parliament) replaced the previous unified consensual lists imposed by the Syrian regime. The death of Hafez el-Assad, the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from South Lebanon in 2000, and subsequently the reshuffling of Near East policy on the part of

international powers after the events of September 11th 2001, contributed to the transformation of internal dynamics in Lebanon and the balance of power amongst Lebanese elites. This cycle is termed 'patriotic' and was characterized by diverse movements whose common aim was the 'liberation' of public and national space from Syrian power and interference from the various Lebanese and Syrian security and intelligence apparatuses.

Frictions and divisions within the ruling elites intensified as was reflected in electoral competition, whereas considerable changes which were operating on the national, regional and international levels, blurred their previous standpoints. Certain leaders in the opposition or the loyalist camps changed their strategy to take advantage of emerging opportunities. Gradually, a large opposition movement emerged against the dominant actor Syria, which brought about a reshuffle in political alliances. In particular, the principal actors of earlier 'civil' movements merged some of their demands for the reform of the Lebanese political system with those of the new 'patriotic' movement. Consequently, the nature and the image of the opposition have changed. During this period, groups such as Qornet Shehwan, the Bristol Gathering rose to prominence and eventually culminated in the Independence Uprising, which spread to large segments of society.

In terms of mobilization, alongside the strategies of the elites, this period was also defined by the development of the arena of protest which reached a crescendo during the cycle of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations during the spring of 2005 (it should be noted that the starting point of these demonstrations was discernible since 2001). A misunderstanding arose between, on one hand, elites who adjusted their allegiances according to complex strategies in the name of national liberation and a Lebanese population, which openly demonstrated its politicization and its capacity to react and to mobilize around these challenges by going to the streets. In other words, the redrawing of the political space of the elites, and the rules and norms by which they abided did not necessarily coincide with the transformation of a society which was growing poorer, and whose demands went beyond conflicts of power.

The third cycle of mobilization began in the summer of 2005. It became a partisan (i.e. party-based) mobilization, in which different political factions clashed amidst some brushes with violence. This partisan mobilization resumed the earlier political boundaries. It confirmed, or reinforced, the political and sectarian cleavages in Lebanese society and political power. In contrast to the previous mobilizations, sections of certain confessions displaced a sort of acquiescence to their sectarian leaders. In fact, this cycle of mobilization is notable for inter-communal alliances (Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement against the government coalition). However, what emerged was a competition between the leaders or groups for representation of the political community. Patronal and clan mentality proved to be a determining factor. In other words, each political leader sought to rally community support in the name of partisan demands. Their aim was to strengthen their position and to maximize their gains on the political chessboard in a turbulent period for Lebanon, while waiting for the creation of a new order, more specifically, a new redistribution or restructuring of power by foreign actors.

This pattern saw the emergence of a more 'classic' form of opposition; i.e. an opposition characterized by the departure from the government of the Shiite representatives, which expressed itself through institutional and non-institutional arenas, and subsequently resorted to street demonstrations and sit-ins. The political scene also went down the path of violence.

In this tense atmosphere, civil society actors tried to distance themselves from these narrow-minded disputes and communal cleavages in order to propose trans-communal activities to unite around either a common project or certain principles of common living.

Thus, this paper aims to examine the restructuring of public space and of the Lebanese political scene during these three periods. More precisely, I intend to examine the interactions during each cycle of

mobilization, the rationale of government elites and the opposition groups, while paying particular attention to the role of regional and international actors and their impact on internal dynamics. All this has several implications which I will try to develop within the framework of this paper.

The interactions between these actors in the different political arenas are complex and fragmented. Analyzing them allows us to understand the debates, dynamics and tensions, which characterize the Lebanese political scene. This perspective will permit me to suggest "plural political spaces. [where] politics play out through diverse scenes, where the arena for possible protest could no longer be reduced from now on to only state and para-state spheres" (Geisser, Karam et Vairel 2006, 194) .

The relative singularity of Lebanon in the Arab region with its consociational political formula is interesting in terms of dealing with the question of the restructuring of power in Lebanon. To what extent is the singularity of the Lebanese process truly atypical?

The nature of the founding political pact, the National Pact of 1943, and the Taëf Accord of 1989, established a confessional political system, which divided power and high official offices of state among confessional elites. By default, no single group could assume hegemony over the others. Moreover, the idea of 'national' and 'individual' citizenship was sacrificed for the sake of maintaining peace among the confessional groups . In the notable "grey zone" (Carothers 2002, 10) , the "feckless pluralism" syndromes of the Lebanese political system are stated and transformed into the three cycles of mobilization.

On one hand, because of the rules of the political game, political elites of the main political factions or parties were perceived by the majority of citizens to be corrupt, selfish and incompetent. For some, they had neglected their responsibilities to the public. However, this did not prevent some elites from showing a strong capacity for mass mobilization in their client and confessional bases. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that these patron-client relations vary from case to case where other types of ties between leaders and followers are defined (as with Hezbollah).

On the other hand, despite the pluralist consociational formula, the Lebanese political system is not protected from authoritarian logics specifically from dominant-power politics: Syrian power played a direct dominant role in political decision-making, from the end of the civil war in 1990 until 2005. Herein, the dominant actor was imposed outside the national political arena while partly determining the terms of conjunction between the elements of the civil society and the structures of the political one.

Finally, with regard to the three recent cycles of mobilization and recent developments on the Lebanese political scene another hypothesis is formulated: are we witnessing, after the withdrawal of the Syrian army, current confrontations between the actors who are competing to dominate the political system, which was structured specifically to prevent the hegemony of one group or person? Could this perhaps open the way for new domination outside the national arena?

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OUTLINE
LEBANON / POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

FR

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Karam Karam

« THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN LEBANON »

Les manifestations du « soulèvement de l'indépendance »[1], qui ont suivi l'assassinat de l'ancien Premier ministre Rafic Hariri, le 14 février 2005 et accompagné le retrait de l'armée syrienne, fin avril 2005, avaient ancré la conviction que le système politique se transforme effectivement au Liban voire que le pays réunit les conditions favorables pour s'engager dans un processus de « transition démocratique ».

Si les désillusions se font déjà entendre, il n'en demeure pas moins que la scène politique libanaise en 2007 est sensiblement différente de celle de l'après-guerre quand le régime baathiste syrien a pris le contrôle du Liban, avec l'assentiment de la communauté internationale, dans le contexte de l'après-guerre froide, de la libération du Koweït et du lancement de processus de paix. Différente également de la configuration politique de septembre 2004, quand le Président syrien Bachar al-Assad a imposé la prolongation du mandat de président de la République libanaise Emile Lahoud de façon anticonstitutionnelle.

Les indices hypothétiques de « transition démocratique » au Liban, que pourraient représenter par exemple la fin de la guerre en 1990, les dynamiques de « réconciliation » et « reconstruction » du pays et des institutions étatiques, lancées à partir de 1992, l'organisation et la tenue de plusieurs élections présidentielles, législatives et municipales après une longue période d'interruption du processus ou de boycott, le retrait des troupes étrangères (israéliennes en 2000 pour le Sud Liban, syriennes en 2005), tous ces indices ne préjugent en rien en réalité d'une réforme du système politique libanais (et plus encore de son potentiel de démocratisation) et ne résolvent en rien les crises endémiques du régime.

Dans le cadre de cet article, je travaillerai sur trois cycles de mobilisations que je propose de distinguer en fonction de leur problématique dominante, de la façon dont ils participent à la formation d'identités politiques et de la façon dont ils interviennent sur la définition d'acteurs et de groupes dominants (groups-related social forms of dominations) et de « contre-acteurs » (counter-actors). En effet, plutôt qu'un processus de libéralisation économique, sociale et politique, dans laquelle certains pays de la région MENA seraient engagés, il semblerait, à l'observation de ces 15 dernières années, et plus précisément depuis 1995, que le Liban s'est engagé dans différents cycles de mobilisations ou de dynamiques protestataires qui restructurent le pouvoir de l'Etat (restructuring State power). Sans préjuger de l'exemplarité ou de l'atypisme de la trajectoire politique libanaise dans la région – en particulier en termes de « résilience de l'Etat », de monopole de la violence légitime et/ou de personnalisation du régime –, l'analyse des stratégies du régime (et de l'évolution de ses contours), des transformations des élites et de leurs modes de participation et des mobilisations « par en bas » dans ces trois moments permet de suggérer des pistes sur les logiques du « changement politique sans démocratisation ». J'analyserai dans ce papier ces dynamiques et logiques en tenant d'être ni manichéenne (la société civile contre la société politique) ni linéaire (en observant des valses-hésitations, des avancées et des reculements, des différentes stratégies et des aller-retour entre ces espaces, etc.), et en mettant l'accent sur les enjeux contenus dans le positionnement des acteurs qui rendent d'ailleurs leur description difficile (qui est « au pouvoir » ? Qu'est-ce que « l'opposition » ? etc.).

- Le premier cycle de mobilisation peut être qualifié de **mobilisation civile**. Entre 1995 et 2001, plusieurs organisations, initiatives, ou mouvements sociaux émanant d'en « bas » – ou de « marges » – présentent des caractéristiques communes. Dans un contexte où les élites

[1] Cette appellation a été donnée aux manifestations par les différentes oppositions libanaises regroupées dans le cadre de « Rassemblement de Bristol », tandis qu'une partie de la presse européenne les désigne par « le printemps de Beyrouth » et « la révolution du cèdre » c'était le mot d'ordre de l'administration américaine.

gouvernantes tendent à neutraliser toute sorte d'opposition émanant de l'intérieur du système, ces prises de paroles cherchent à requalifier l'action citoyenne : à donner un sens politico-juridique et constitutionnel à la participation à la chose publique et à réconcilier les citoyens avec l'action politique, désavouée par la violence de la guerre et par les pratiques de la classe politique à la sortie du conflit.

Trois catégories d'acteurs et de protagonistes se distinguent de façon relativement claire durant cette période. Elles permettent d'engager une réflexion sur les transformations des élites politiques libanaises et de la façon dont on peut les décrire : les élites gouvernantes, les élites dans l' « opposition » et les acteurs « civils ».

Le semblant de cohésion et d'homogénéité dont font preuve les élites gouvernantes durant cette période tenait avant tout à l'hégémonie imposée sur elles par l'acteur dominant la société politique : en l'occurrence le pouvoir syrien. Ainsi, malgré leurs divisions, elles ont réussi à maintenir les règles du jeu et à les imposer sur l'ensemble des élites politiques, en neutralisant l'espace politique par plusieurs biais combinés : le recours à la répression ou à l'exclusion (par exemple l'emprisonnement de S. Geagea, l'exil de M. Aoun, la répression sanglante de manifestations de Hezbollah, etc.), le verrouillage du système politique par le contrôle du système électoral et de son processus qui reprend au cours de cette période, ou encore les logiques de cooptation et de distribution dans un contexte de grands chantiers et de reconstruction.

Durant cette période, les enjeux d'une opposition politique sont complexes et sont intimement liés aux règles et conditions de la participation au jeu politique. D'une part, dans un système consociatif, le principe du partage du pouvoir entre les différents segments représentatifs rend le principe d'opposition ambigu. Soit elle s'exprime par l'usage du droit de veto dont dispose chaque groupe ; soit elle s'exprime entre des prétendants concurrents à la représentation de chaque groupe ou au sein même du gouvernement entre les représentants de chaque groupe. En revanche, l'opposition au gouvernement s'avère plus couteuse. D'autre part, cette période se caractérise par une mise au ban de leaders politiques qui sont alors de facto des opposants au régime. Pour ces acteurs ou groupes exclus ou mal intégrés, les arènes de l'opposition sont plurielles mais ne se situent pas dans les institutions centrales de la représentation et du pluralisme. S'ils sont absents du gouvernement, peu ou pas présents au Parlement, ils « s'opposent » au gouvernement et au régime soit au niveau local, soit en boycottant les élections (notamment en 1992 et 1996), soit dans des arènes « virtuelles » (de l'étranger, par communiqués interposés, etc.). Cette absence de représentation dans les institutions gouvernementales ne se traduit pas de la même façon en termes de pouvoir effectif. Ce dernier se joue notamment dans les relations à l'acteur dominant, le régime syrien : opposition radicale pour certains, et alliances objectives pour d'autres (notamment le Hezbollah).

En réaction à cette clôture du champ politique, des acteurs civils s'organisent, « faute de mieux » pour certains, dans l'espace associatif en particulier pour s'opposer aux politiques du gouvernement. Ils revendiquent plus de libertés publiques, d'expression et de participation et la réforme de certaines lois et politiques publiques (loi électorale, loi sur les associations, question du statut civil / ou loi sur le statut personnel, question des disparus de la guerre, politiques environnementales, etc.).

- Un second cycle de mobilisation se dessine au début de cette décennie. Il s'agit d'une **mobilisation nationale**, souverainiste. On peut grosso modo situer ses éléments déclencheurs ou incitateurs en 2000-2001. Elle atteint son paroxysme avec les grands mouvements du printemps 2005. D'abord, les élections législatives de 2000 ont indiqué une rupture par rapport aux précédentes, notamment en ce qui concerne les élites au pouvoir : des listes concurrentielles

entre les grands ténors du système (et en particulier entre les trois présidents de la Troïka (président du conseil, président de la république et président de l'assemblée) remplacent les listes uniques et consensuelles précédentes, imposées par le régime syrien. Le décès de Hafez El-Assad, le retrait de l'armée israélienne du Liban Sud (2000), puis les réorientations de la politique proche-orientales des grandes puissances internationales après septembre 2001, vont transformer les enjeux internes et les rapports de forces entre les élites libanaises. Ce cycle est « nationaliste » : diverses mobilisations s'organisent en effet autour de l'objectif principal de « libération » de l'espace public et de l'espace national de la domination du pouvoir syrien et des interventions des différents services de sécurité et de renseignement libanais et syriens.

Les tensions et les divisions au sein des élites gouvernantes s'intensifient comme l'indiquent les divisions électoralistes, alors que les changements considérables qui s'opèrent au niveau national, régional et international troublent les positionnements antérieurs. Certains leaders, dans « l'opposition » ou au « gouvernement » changent de stratégie pour tirer bénéfice des opportunités qui s'ouvrent. Progressivement, une opposition majeure s'organise et se polarise autour d'une résistance à l'acteur dominant, la Syrie, ce qui entraine une reformulation des alliances politiques. En particulier, les principaux acteurs des précédents mouvements « civiques » s'allient aux élites politiques qui défendent ce mot d'ordre « nationaliste » en assimilant une partie de leurs revendications, relative aux libertés publiques et à la non-violence, à celles de « l'opposition politique ». Ils laissent en revanche en suspend la partie de leurs mobilisations relative à la réforme du système politique libanais. La définition et les fronts de l'opposition changent alors. C'est au cours de cette période que se constituent d'abords des pôles tels que « Qornet Chehwan », le groupe de Bristol pour finalement culminer avec le soulèvement de l'indépendance qui s'étend à de larges franges de la société.

A côté de ces stratégies des élites, en termes de mobilisation, cette période se caractérise par une évolution des arènes de la protestation. Le point d'orgue se situe évidement lors du cycle de manifestation et de contre-manifestation du printemps 2005 (à noter que ces logiques de manifestations et contre manifestations sont perceptibles dès 2001 et contribuent à polariser le jeu politique). Un malentendu s'instaure entre d'une part, ces élites qui transforment leurs alliances et positionnement par des stratégies complexes, au nom de la libération nationale et une société libanaise qui montre sa politisation, sa capacité de réaction et de mobilisation autour de ces problématiques en descendant en masse dans les rues. Autrement dit, les recompositions de l'espace politique des élites, les règles et les normes sur lesquelles elles s'appuient ne coïncident pas nécessairement avec les transformations d'une société qui s'appauvrie et dont les attentes vont au-delà du partage des pouvoir

- Un troisième cycle de mobilisation s'ouvre depuis l'été 2005. Il s'agit d'une **mobilisation partisane (ou patronale)**, dans laquelle s'opposent différentes forces politiques qui frôlent l'affrontement violent. Cette mobilisation partisane reprend des contours antérieurs. Elle confirme, voire renforce, les clivages politiques et segmentaires de la société libanaise et de ses pouvoirs publics. A la différence des mobilisations précédentes, on constate dans celle-ci une sorte de connivence, dans les segments communautaires. En effet, ce cycle de mobilisation se caractérise par des alliances intracommunautaires (le pôle Hezbollah, CPL vs la coalition gouvernementale). Cependant, ce qui se joue c'est la concurrence entre des leaders ou des groupes pour la représentation de la communauté politique. Les logiques patronales et claniques s'avèrent déterminantes: En d'autres termes, chaque patron politique cherche à mobiliser au nom d'une revendication partisane le ralliement d'une communauté. Leur objectif est de renforcer leur position et de maximiser leurs gains sur l'échiquier politique dans cette période tumultueuse que connaît la scène libanaise, en attendant l'imposition d'un nouvel ordre, voire une nouvelle redistribution ou re-structuration du pouvoir, par des acteurs extérieurs.

Cette configuration voit l'émergence d'une forme plus « classique » d'opposition : une opposition au gouvernement que quittent les représentants chiites, qui peut s'exprimer dans les arènes institutionnelles et non institutionnelles puisqu'elle fait recours aux manifestations, à la rue, aux sit-in, etc. Le jeu politique reprend également les voies de la violence.

Dans ce contexte tendu, des acteurs de la société civile essayent de se détacher de ces querelles de clochers ou clivages communautaires et de proposer des actions transversales, pour se rencontrer soit autour d'un projet commun soit autour de certains principe du vivre ensemble.

Tout en m'inscrivant dans la problématique générale de ce programme de recherche sur les dynamiques du changement dans le monde arabe, je propose donc d'étudier la re-structuration de l'espace public et de la scène politique libanaise durant ces trois périodes. Il s'agit plus précisément d'examiner les interactions, durant chaque cycle de mobilisations, les logiques des élites gouvernantes et les formes de l'opposition, en prêtant une attention particulière aux rôles des acteurs régionaux et internationaux et leur impact dans les dynamiques internes. Ceci a plusieurs implications que j'essaierai de développer dans le cadre de mon papier :

- Les interactions entre ces acteurs dans ces différents espaces du politique, sont complexes et loin d'être univoques. Leur analyse nous permet de comprendre les débats et les dynamiques et tensions qui traversaient, et traversent toujours, la scène politique libanaise. Cette perspective me permet de suggérer de traiter « d'*espaces politiques au pluriel.* [où] L'action politique se joue sur une multiplicité de scènes, où le champ des possibles protestataires ne se réduit plus désormais à la seule sphère étatique ou para-étatique » (Geisser, Karam et Vairel 2006, 194)[2].

- On le sait, l'atypisme relatif du Liban dans la région tient à sa formule politique consociative qui nous engage à nous intéresser aux restructurations des pouvoirs publics et plus largement à la question du pouvoir au Liban. Dans quelle mesure « l'exception » ou la trajectoire libanaise est-elle vraiment atypique ?

  La nature du pacte politique « fondateur », celui du Pacte national en 1943 et de l'accord de Taëf en 1989, qui instituent un système de confessionnalisme politique partage le pouvoir et les grandes fonctions de l'Etat entre élites confessionnelles. Dans ce système a priori aucun groupe hégémonique ne pouvait acquérir une position exclusiviste. En contre partie, l'idée de citoyenneté « nationale » et « individuelle » est quelque peu sacrifiée au nom du maintien de la paix entre les groupes[3]. Or, dans la fameuse « zone grise » (Carothers (2002, 10) [4] les syndromes du « pluralisme limité » (feckless pluralism)[5] de la société politique libanaise s'expriment et se transforment dans ces trois cycles de mobilisation.

  D'une part, du fait de ces règles du jeu, les élites politiques des principaux groupes ou partis restent perçues par la majorité des citoyens comme corrompues, égoïstes et inefficace. Pour certains, elles auraient désaffecté leurs responsabilités publiques. Mais ceci n'empêche pas ces mêmes élites de montrer une forte capacité à mobiliser en masse, sur des bases patronales et

[2] Gesseir Vincent, Karam Karam, Vairel Frédéric, 2006, "Espaces du politique. Mobilisations et protestations dans le monde arabe", in Picard Elizabeth, *La politique dans monde arabe*, Paris, Armand Colin, p. 193-213.
[3] Ghassan Salamé, 1994, "La démocratie comme instrument de paix civile", dans Salamé Ghassan (dir.), 1994, *Démocraties sans démocrates*, Fayard, Paris, p. 129-162
[4] Thomas Carothers, 2002, "The end of the Transition Paradigm", Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, n° 1, p. 5-21.
[5] Juan Linz, 1975, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", dans Greenstein Fred I., Polsby Nelson W., 1975, The Handbook of Political Science. Macropolitical Theory, vol. 3, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley Publications, p. 175-412.

confessionnelles. A souligner néanmoins que ces relations de leadership varient au cas par cas et que se dessinent d'autres types de lien entre leaders et followers (par exemple dans le cas de Hezbollah).

D'autre part, malgré la formule consociative pluraliste, la société politique libanaise n'a pas été protégée de logiques autoritaires[6] et notamment de la « politique hégémonique » (dominant-power politics) : le pouvoir syrien a joué depuis la fin de la guerre en 1990 et jusqu'à 2005, pour le moins directement, un rôle prépondérant dans la décision politique. Dans ce cas précis, l'acteur dominant s'imposait hors de l'espace politique national en déterminant en partie les termes de l'articulation entre les éléments de la société civile et les structures de la société politique.

Finalement, au regard de ces trois cycles récents de mobilisation, et des développements actuels sur la scène politique libanaise, une dernière hypothèse pourrait être la suivante : après le retrait du régime Syrien, est-ce que ce qui est en jeu aujourd'hui n'est pas justement de fortes concurrences pour être l'acteur dominant dans ce système politique organisé pour empêcher la domination d'un groupe ou d'une personne ? Ce qui d'ailleurs pourrait ouvrir la voie à une nouvelle domination hors champs.

[6] Farid El-Khazen, 2003, "The Postwar Political Process: Authoritarianism by Diffusion", dans Hanf Theodor, Salam Nawaf (eds.), 2003, Lebanon in Limbo. Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 53-74.

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(12)

WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
LEBANON / ECONOMY

by

Charbel Nahas

METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

Analytical approach of politics or synthetic approach through economics?

What are the central stakes to shed light on, why and for whom?
The "Arab world" and, especially, Lebanon, captivated and captured by the external look
What conditions for a refocusing?
What channels to integrate the great changes of the world?

Correspondence between the adopted and the proposed outlines

CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE « SYSTEM »

Economic, financial; political and social assessments
Slow and hindered growth
Steady attraction of capital inflows, exceptional indebtedness and surprising financial resilience
Chronic political unstability
Social fragmentation and persistent emigration

Primary rules of operation of the model

Main equilibriums

Table of resources and uses
External equilibriums
Financial equilibriums
Prices and sectors

Structure of production

Low rates of activity
Low rates of investment
Weak intersectoral and spatial connection

Labour relations

Predomination of fragile family-type and micro businesses
Limited share of wage-labour in the workforce and in the earnings
Extensive recourse to immigrant workers
Massive emigration

Income distribution and sources

Strong inequalities
Predominance of financial and external revenues
Inequalities that have a strong spatial and sociological dimensions and inequalities that have not

EFFECTS AND ADJUSTMENTS

Reallocation of factors
Allocation of capital
Allocation of labour
Use of natural resources

Public services
Extent of coverage
Costs
Redistributive effects through the delivery of services and through the increase in the costs of their provision
Subsidiary character of the public services
Effects on the legitimacy of the state

Fiscal system (taxes and expenditure)
Amplitude and affectation (evolution in time)
Effects of taxes and subsidies on income
Induced effects of taxes and subsidies on production

Financial flows and wealth
Amplitude of flows
Remuneration and risks
The game of musical chairs

PRINCIPLES OF REGULATION

Economic
Sectoral and regional disequilibria
Instruments of cyclical policies
Mechanisms of subsidy
Fiscal< margins of action and effects
Allocation of gains and losses

Financial
Attractiveness on capital flows (remuneration, liquidity, risks, channels)
Effects on stocks and flows
Solvency and liquidity

Political
"Balanced development"
Legitimate, legal and illegal circuits
Bargaining, forcing and solidarities

RESULTING SOCIO POLITICAL CONFIGURATION

References
Threat and survival
Inclusion-exclusion

Drifts toward adventurism and toward conservatism

Functional nodes of management and power
Control over financial inflows
Control over redistribution

Readily available and/or easily produceable sociological and ideological framings
The place and function of the communities
Capture and manufacture of slogans
Reciprocal manipulations interior-exterior (the theme of "reforms")

Alliances, resistances and domination
Forms of resistance and domination
Natural and opportunistic alliances
Logics of minorities and logics of dominance

CONDITIONS OF EMERGENCE AND PERPETUATION

Preconditions and constituent limits
End-of-war effects
The regional setup of the early 90's
The necessity of internal arbitrage and external support

Factors due to learning and to wearing down
Individual and collective memory
Effects and modalities of the management of time

Adaptation to cycles, absorption of shocks, management of crises
A paradoxical globalization
Regional evolutions (peace, war, oil, …)
Paris conferences

Legitimacy and functionality of power
Margins towards inside, towards outside and cross margins
Winners and losers: imaginary, effective and pending
Outcomes and alternatives

PARTICULARITIES AND SPECIFICITIES OF THE "LEBANESE CASE"

Regional dimension
General dimension

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OUTLINE
LEBANON / SECURITY

by

Elizabeth Picard

Lebanon is characterized in the introductory paper as a « deviant » case in comparison to other cases of restructuring of state power in Arab countries in a time of globalization. Concerning the security sector, the main transformation of national security in the Middle East can be summarized as follow:

- The diversification of armed forces
- Externalisation of security missions to either foreign, international, private or para-statal agencies
- The securitization of state-society relations, *in relation* to the extension of the power of the police state and the judiciarisation of politics
- But also the search for accommodation of armed forces by political powers either in a democratisation move (Huntington) or through an authoritarian pact (Stepan)

I will argue that Lebanon is deviant not so much because of the peculiarities of its social fabric and political institutions but due to the singular temporality of its change process. In Lebanon, change in institutions as well as in practices, of the kind that took place during several decades (since WW2) in other Arab countries, is taking place in a limited time span. As a result of this acceleration, diverging and eventually antagonist processes could be observed simultaneously.
During the fifteen years following the end of civil war (1990), change in Lebanon's defence and security sector took simultaneously two opposite directions: on one hand, the military and security forces were being reconstructed according to the already obsolete model of the national Arab army, and security strategy was tightly submissive to Syrian priorities. But, on the other hand, change was happening in the post-bipolar era and in a fluid political environment marked by looming regional insecurity and growing Western intervention. Such a hazardous environment contributed to a "post-modern" renewal of security priorities and military options playing against the state's military doctrine as inspired by its Syrian patrons.
The effect of the combination between these two opposite trends was an ideological and power struggle between pro-Western actors on one hand and pro-Syrian and/or pro-Iranian actors on the other hand within various state constituencies. As of today, the outcome of this confrontation remains open. Still, it is rich of lessons for those interested in the various implications of globalisation and the redefinition of the balance of power for local state restructuring in the Arab Eastern regions.

This communication is organised along two major issues:

1 Firstly, it questions the reform process observed in the Lebanese security sector since 1991 by confronting its actual institutionalisation (particularly through adoption of general conscription) with the looming fragmentation of the state's security missions under the pressure of re-communalisation of politics.
2 Secondly, it examines changes in the definition of the objectives, functions and modus operandi in the security sector, and uses them as indicators of the waning of the Lebanese state's sovereignty in spite of its recent autonomisation from Syrian tutelage.

I Under what conditions can a reformed security sector hold together a fragmenting polity?

A *Institutional reconstruction*
During the civil war, the Lebanese army did not escape the division of the country and national security functions were progressively taken over by non state actors. In the framework of the Taef agreement (1989) which put an end to the war, the reunification and consolidation of armed forces were meant to be the main vehicle for the restoration of the state. Armed and security forces were intended to become the backbone of the nation state.
The project was not really new for Lebanon: namely, it was inspired by Fuad Shihab's presidential experience (1958-1964). President Shihab, who had previously been C-in-C of the Lebanese army, had in mind the "neutral army" *(jaysh muhayid)* model which might help him challenge the traditional rule of

communal notables. In Shihab's view, the army should be an independent center of power and project to the public the image of an institution with political and social stances distinct from those of civilian actors. The model was briefly re-activated under Amin Gemayel's presidency in 1983, with intensive US support, but to no avail. And when Emile Lahoud became the first post civil war C-in-C in October 1989, immediately after the Syrian army had expelled Michel Aoun, he was in many respects inspired by the Shihabist doctrine of a strong army for a unified state.

Therefore, the new Lebanese armed forces were anachronistically rebuilt according to the classical model of the Arab military (Sayigh; Picard) altogether from a developmentalist perspective and in the prospect of involving these forces in the political struggle for power (Owen, 1992).
The real novelty resided in the fact that Western countries traditionally supporting Lebanon (France and the U-S), became reluctant to help rebuild the Lebanese security sector as long as the state remained under Syrian control. The new Lebanese security sector remained therefore tightly interconnected to the powerful Syrian forces stationed on the country's territory (30 000 men in 1990, still 20 000 in 2001), at least until Syrian military retreat in April 2005.

1. Institutional reform

- Concerning armed and security forces, an important change on state level consisted in the implementation of Law 102 (1983) creating the Supreme Council of Defence headed by the president. The C-o-D was composed of the ministers of Interior and Defence, the PM and vice PM, the C-in-C, the head of Internal Security Forces (police), the head of General security and the head of State security. Clearly the composition of the C-o-D reflected the priority of domestic security over defence as well as of the minInt over the minDef. It also outlined a very centralised and hierarchical chain of command in the security sector in relation to close Syrian monitoring. Moreover, a National Security Council was established in 1991 in order to centralise previously competing information networks as well as to coordinate the operations of the military and civilian security services inside Lebanon. The army intelligence services and the directorate of the Sûreté générale (Internal security) were reformed respectively in 1990 and 1998, and successively entrusted to the same pro-Syrian officer. To complete the move, the judiciary, one of the most damaged sectors of the state during the civil war, was reorganised in close submission to the executive.

- During the civil war, armed forces and police had been trimmed down to a mere 12,000 men. They were untrained and fragmented. From the early 1990s on, they went through a deep and rapid reconstruction process: selective recruitment aiming at re-establishing their communal balance through the enlisting of 59% of Muslims between 1991 and 2001, then through an effort to attract young Christians; training of some 3,000 officers (half Christian half Muslim); re-organisation of the army into brigades subsequently reshuffled to make them more multi-confessional; rapid promotions, and strengthening of discipline.

On the whole, military and security reform was being conducted in a very "classical" manner, according to the nation-state paradigm.

2. The new armed forces, a melting-pot for Lebanese citizenship?

The Shihabist tone of the Taef agreement was especially illustrated by two initiatives in relation with the reconstruction of armed and security forces, seen as the backbone of the future Lebanese nation-state. The first one was DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration) of the war confessional militia (1991); the second was the adoption and implementation in 1993 of universal conscription in order to support national integration. However, twelve years later both initiatives appear to have missed their point:

- Only around 4,000 ex-militiamen (of whom 85% Muslim) and only a few dozen officers joined the regular armed forces while the main current of the Christian *Lebanese Forces* was excluded and more importantly, Hizbollah's Islamic resistance remained exempted from demob.

- As for the military service it brought yearly 10,000 and at its peak (in 2000) 20,000 recruits – three quarters of them Muslims. The operation was costly and raised growing protest among all sectors of the society especially among Christians. Young conscripts were trained only three months and often remained unoccupied during a full year. Conscription was suspended in 2005.

These anachronistic and failed initiatives are worth analysing in comparative perspective within and also outside the Arab region.

3. The new Lebanese army as a typical « Arab army ».

Although rebuilt after the bipolar era, the new Lebanese armed forces bore several traditional characteristics.

- Men in arms in the public service (either army or security) saw a fourfold increase between 1991 and 2001, thus representing a high percentage of the country's population. Security and defence budget culminated at 23% of government's budget in 1994 and remained higher than 10% during the all period. This was exorbitant with regard to state budget deficit (interviews mDef Kh. Hrawi 28 Feb 01 & economist K. Mehanna 8 June 02). Add that, except for a few special units there was little technical military modernisation. The growth of armed forces was a mere window dressing process and possibly a covert way of fighting unemployment. A deep discrepancy could be noticed between central and peripheral parts of the country with regard to modernisation of the infrastructures and equipment of armed forces.

- Military and security officers were granted various social and economic privileges. The move helped enhance recruitment of quality candidates but also gave rise to new corporatism, separating armed forces from the political elite and the communal society at large. Rather than sharing an ethic of « nation in arms », officers regrouped in a kind of « military party » (Rouquié). In a context of aggravated budget deficit, they tended to stand up collectively for their corporate interests (attack of the minFinances in 1999 when Siniora tried to cut the army budget).

- The new Lebanese armed forces were rebuilt under tight Syrian political control. The Syrian Special forces and various intelligence services spread over the country used a mix of corruption and threat to keep the Lebanese army and police under their order. They had direct access to the Lebanese military hierarchy at every level up to the Supreme Council of Defence.

On the whole, the relationship between the security and the political sector in post-war Lebanon bore several characteristics inherited from the Arab nationalist authoritarian state of the 1960s and 1970s.

B. *Armed and security forces as reflecting the social and political communal mosaic*

1. An unfinished de-confessionalisation process

Political de-confessionalisation was on the agenda of the Taef agreement but remained on the shelves. After a decade of *troika* rule (a Christian president under Syrian tutelage, a Shiite speaker of parliament allied with the Syrian regime, and a Sunni pm struggling for governmental autonomy) came a phase of re-confessionalisation of politics as observed in the Legislative elections of 2000 and 2005, through

deeper Syrian intervention and also due to growing inter-communal competition within state constituencies.

2. The subsequent fragmentation of security institutions

Each security agency and many army officers became tightly linked to communal and/or private interests through clientelist and primordial *('asabiyât)* networks. What was at stake was the control of specific state institutions, with the various status and financial advantages attached. What was at work beyond alleged secularism within army and police was the selective recruitment of agents according to specific communal identities (e.g. in the Presidential guard or in the Government guard).

- The result was a dangerous unbalance between and within security forces in comparison with national demography as well as a looming privatisation of security functions. A good illustration is the case of the rehabilitation, reshuffling and expanding of ISF as revealed by general Rifi when he took them over after Syrian departure in 2005. ISF were suspected of communal preference toward the Sunnis (see their management of the February 2006 Islamist demonstration at Tabaris); corruption in their daily control of local populations; and involvement in trans-national mafia networks (as exposed in the Mehlis-Brammertz inquiry and the Bank al-Madina scandal also involving Syrian military top-brass in Lebanon.

- A side effect of the communalisation of state security was the re-activation of illegal communal and private militia groups as illustrated by the case of the *Lebanese Forces* which had been forced to go underground in 1994 and were being trained and equipped anew since 2001, possibly with Western (US) support. Hence the risk of resumption of civil war which might be ignited by multiple local communal military encroachments.

- However my hypothesis is that the military themselves have been able to escape the doom because they had the means to shield themselves from politics. The reasons are to be found less in the nature of their mission (we will see in part II that they mainly fulfil police tasks) and rather in their pre-1975 heritage (the model of the neutral army; a generation of committed officers recruited before the civil war had become the commandants and generals of today); in the post-war exclusion of top-brass previously involved in militia activities; and possibly in the counter-productive effect of officers' attendance of Syrian training schools (80% of all non-commissioned officers and 40% of all officers having followed a training session abroad) - strangely enough the Syrian authoritarian rule had the effect of de-politicising them; not to forget their corporatist interests mentioned previously.

- A confirmation of this hypothesis can be found in the management by the army of the large popular demonstrations in 2005 and 2006: sectarian tension within the army barracks was cleverly defused and responsible efficient officers sent on the ground while Western allies pressed the army command to avoid civilian massacres (Douard). Today the situation remains open as long as civilian leaders refrain from advising their partisans to leave their army assignment (Jaber).

In this respect, the Lebanese case is worth comparing to other Arab countries also characterised by ethnic and religious pluralism. In the absence, or deficiency, of democracy, each minority or peripheral group tends to privatise its collective defence, either covertly (within homogeneous state military units) or directly (by forming a militia). While in other countries the majority rule does not guarantee equal security for every citizen, the Lebanese armed forces remain prone to fragmentation and dissent in order to guarantee the security of each communal and local group. In this respect, the privatisation of security is as much the effect of globalisation and the waging of new wars (Kaldor) as of specific path dependence.

II Security and the recovering of state sovereignty

This part of the presentation deals with the various functions fulfilled by military and security agencies with regard to the recovery of the Lebanese state's sovereignty. Its main assumption is that there is a paradoxical contradiction between the official (Lebanese and international) pledges for state sovereignty based on Westphalian criteria (the world being organised into independent and equal statal units) and Weberian criteria (the state as unique legitimate user of physical force) on one hand, and the current exercise of power in today's Middle East. Under American hegemony, the world, especially the Arab Middle East, tends to be organised along unequal hierarchised units, and criss-crossed by a network of trans-national actors.

Examining change in the definition of the objectives, functions and modus operandi of various security sector agencies since the end of the civil war, offers an opportunity to re-assess the sovereignty of Lebanon.

A *Externalisation of defence. Blurring of army and police tasks*

1 The Lebanese army has been deprived of its defence main function altogether by domestic and foreign political decision.

- There is no consensus among state elites concerning the definition of national threat and main enemy. The result is political paralysis and the lack of strategy.
- Moreover, the Syrian power forbids any autonomous political or military Lebanese initiative on the Israeli frontline. Even after the Israeli withdrawal of 2000 and the Syrian withdrawal of 2005, Damascus keeps using pendent Israeli-Lebanese border encroachments (Shebaa, Ghajar) to promote its Golan Heights' strategy.
- Western powers deny the Lebanese army offensive and lethal armaments because they might threaten the IDF military superiority. The Lebanese army only intervened marginally in the South beside the Islamic resistance (Hizbollah) during the 1993, 1996 and 2006 invasions, and in the Ansarieh battle of 1997.

2 The Taef agreement itself, then several political decisions taken during the 1990s made the military a support and even a substitute for failing police forces. The army, submissive to Syrian command and president Lahoud, their past commander-in-chief, not only assisted the police but took the lead in execution: road blocks, curfews, identity controls, repression of social movements, stopping demonstrations, breaking strikes, tapping telephone lines, extra-judiciary arrests, abductions, extra-judiciary imprisonments at army headquarters.

- E. g. : against Hezbollah demonstration, 13 September 1993 ; arrest of Lebanese Forces leaders, 1994 ; policing in the Druze Shuf, 1994 ; arrest of Sunni militants after the assassination of sheikh Halabi, 1996 ; curfew against workers union (CGTL) demonstrations, 1997 ; crushing Tufayli's insurrection in Baalbeck, 1998 ; arrest of sovereignist militants in Christians areas in 2000 and 200

Although Lebanon remained far from the Arab *mukhâbarât* states whose society was caught between fear of, and complacency toward the regime, and where the public sphere was silenced, the post-Taef state has become much more coercive than the consensus state of the 1960s and 1970s. The political class and some segments of the society felt threatened by the new security priorities and methods that used to be blamed on brotherly Arab regimes. A new political cleavage appeared between those supporting the intervention of armed forces on the domestic scene (who more than often happened to be Syrian proxies) and deputies and leaders of various denominations who stood up together for the independence of the country and respect of the rule of law. Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir complained about security forces' abuses and illegal arrests. Prime minister Rafic Hariri denounced anti-

constitutional measures while Druze leader Walid Jumblatt claimed that since president Lahoud's election, Lebanon was "living under a military regime".

3 All in all Lebanon was being rebuilt Lebanon as a weak state with a limited margin of manoeuvre in security matters, altogether submissive to Syrian rule and to new global (Western) security priorities. It was rebuilt as a minorised local force contributing under external authority in the struggle against (Islamist) terrorism, illegal migration and unlawful traffics.
Military operations against Islamist radicals and Jihadists illustrated the new trend:
A large security operation was undertaken by the military against a Sunni Islamist group of 200-300 guerillas on the eve of the year 2000. The group had taken refuge in Dinniyeh, a mountainous northern region. While presented as a domestic security operation, the attack had been decided in compliance with "regional" (Syrian) interests. It took place under the supervision of Damascus and with the support of the Syrian army. The army command appeared strongly committed to fight scattered Sunni groups who represented the only potential challenger to the 'secularist' regime in Syria. At the same time, the suppression of Islamist militants had been insistently demanded by the US in search of al-Qaida militants. The Dinniyeh campaign was followed by multiple skirmishes between army units and Salafi groups, and a series of crackdowns. Hundreds of Islamic militants were rounded up while thousands of police files were scrutinized by Lebanese intelligence in cooperation with Syrian and U.S. security services.
Various operations against Sunni militants showed that Lebanese security agents from the "B2" (the army intelligence services) or from the minInt had now gained capacity to implement tasks like interrogations and searches that had been the preserve of the Syrians and their local proxies (such as SSNP and local Ba'thist militants) since the end of the civil war. And it was hardly paradoxical that such capacity had been acquired through training and advice from Western powers such as France and Germany, making Lebanon a junior partner in the "global war against terror".
At this stage, a conclusion might be that the reconstruction of the Lebanese armed forces made Lebanon resemble more the Arab "police state"; however a new kind of "police state", submissive to the new world order of hierarchised states.

B *Toward a redefinition of state sovereignty*
Since 2004, the US strategy of « democratisation » in the broader Middle East combined with the French fall out with Bashar al-Asad's regime has made the full recovery of state sovereignty a Lebanese priority. However, the new Western injunctions as illustrated by UNSC 1559 (Sept 04) and 1701 (Aug 06), and the redefinition of national defence under the influence of external actors put the contradictions within the Lebanese state in full light: (1) the absence of internal consensus on the notion of national defence; (2) the substitution of a communal militia for paralysed state armed forces; and (3) the submission of the Lebanese army to an international force enforcing its own view of local and regional security.

1 Historically and even more since Rafic Hariri's assassination and the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces, there was no national consensus on the designation of the country's main threat (Syria or Israel). For that reason, the army remained nearly absent from the Israeli frontline since 1949 (although their motto was "to the South, walk and persist"). After the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, the army and ISF sent a joint limited force of lightly armed 1,000 men south of the Litani.
The rift between the present pro-Western ruling coalition (Siniora, the 14-March leaders) and its contenders (Hezbollah, Aoun) who welcome the support of Syria and Iran deepened after the Israeli war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, in relation to the sectarian distribution of power. Each political-sectarian party defines national defence according to what they consider the dominant sensibility of their constituency, thus shattering the national identity of the state. National security is also a venue for foreign sectarian oriented intervention (US and France equipping, training and assisting the ISF; Iran doing the same for Hezbollah).

2 Hezbollah, a surrogate for state defence forces.

Since 1985, Hezbollah has become *the* military actor confronting Israel in Lebanon. It was acknowledged as the main national resistance group and Shiite representative in the Damascus agreement of 1988, and exempted from DDR in 1991.

- Hezbollah is a paragon of new warfare and military structures born from with the "revolution in military affairs".
  As seen in its recruitment and the blurring of the military, the party, and the Shiite society. Its recruits are drawn through family and communal connections. Horizontal solidarity networks crisscross a strict top-down authoritarian hierarchy.
  As observed in its operational means (well-equipped, small, mobile units, with intelligence capability) and strategy (around 10,000 combatants with light high-tech arms available on the international market, even the use of suicide militants). It is organised for a new kind of warfare where high technology is coupled with improvisation. + The role of media and information technologies, and its capacity for trans-national mobilisation and funding.

- Hezbollah has the capacity to mobilise by religion, history and identity, to modify the structure, norms and ethics not only of the Shiite society but of the Lebanese entity, and to promote a kind of state formation different from the communal state which was a legacy of Ottoman and colonial rule.

- Although they seem competitors at first sight, there has been covert and open strategic cooperation between Hezbollah and the military under Syrian tutelage, especially since Emile Lahoud presidency (1998-). Hezbollah leadership refers to a "conceptual continuity" between them as illustrated by the April 1996 arrangement ending the Israeli operation "Grape of Wrath", the prisoners' exchange with Israel in 1998 and 2004, and various public stances after Israeli withdrawal in 2000. The understanding between Hezbollah and Aoun's Patriotic Current in 2005 is to be read in the same context. While this remains a subject of contention among army officers and feeds inter-sectarian cleavages (between Sunnis and Shiites) and intra-sectarian cleavages (between Christians), it is also leading to a redefinition of the boundaries of state authority and state legitimacy.

3 Since 2004, the reconstruction of the Lebanese armed forces and the redefinition of their missions by external actors illustrate the "neo-trusteeship over a weak state" model (Fearon & Laitin). It is worth comparing with the relationship of the PA on the one hand, and the GCC states on the other hand, with the US.

- Western powers (especially EU countries, the UK acting as a substitute for the US) are now willing to reform and train the military and the police, *but only* in relation to their regional strategic priorities as attested in recent meetings on security sector reform held in Geneva, Beirut and Amman. Their understanding of Lebanese security comes along their own understanding of the identity of the Lebanese state, of its relation to specific communal groups, and of Lebanese national interest. They are subsequently contributing to enforce a redeployment of the Lebanese state.

- External defence of Lebanon has been pre-empted by UNIFIL + since September 2006. In spite of official declarations and the sending of several thousands troops, the Lebanese do not have the military lead in the southern area between the Litani and the Israeli border, neither in the control of the Syrian border, nor in their territorial waters. At best they can put forward their dissension with the UN rule (e. g. Siniora's seven point plan in August 2006). But rather than expressing state sovereignty, this dissension sheds light on the current crisis over Lebanese national identity.

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WORKSHOP

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: GLOBALISATION AND THE RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

ROME, 23-24 FEBRUARY 2007

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via Angelo Brunetti, 9

OUTLINE
SAUDI ARABIA / SECURITY

by

Paul Aarts

« THE RE-ORGANISATION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY »

Today, in most GCC countries the paramount issue is security. Democratisation is much less on the agenda, the more so since external presure has weakened and the US administration in particular seems to have given up its 'liberty doctrine'. These developments in the real world closely correspond to academic fashion which these days looks to be in transition, i.e. from crafting democratic theory to 'authoritarian theory'.[1] It is indeed high time to get rid of normative orientations in studying political processes and all the flaws that go with it.[2] Generally speaking, studying the security sector is obviously much less coloured by normative inclinations than the political and the political economy sector tend to be, so in that sense it is 'easier' to do.

The Globalisation Factor: To What Extent?

But, taking the 'Concept Paper for the Security Sector of the Research'[3] as a starting point for this specific contribution, I was struck by the fact that it is less easy than presumed. There are a few reasons for that. First, 'big words' like 'military globalisation' do not relate very much to the situation that contemporary Saudi Arabia is facing. I sincerely do not see how we can speak of a "Transformation in the security sector [that] includes a shift from traditional Clausewitzian interstate wars to postindustrial warfare and changes the way states organise their security apparatus, that is, from warfighting to crime fighting components and policing apparatus" (p. 1). To the best of my knowledge, the Saudi armed forces – though the largest in the Gulf region – have never been really military powerful, hence dependent on an outside (i.e. American) umbrella and, equally, they hardly have been able/willing to fight a "traditional Clausewitzian interstate war".[4] This is a constant factor, till this very day, notwithstanding changes in the 'special relationship' between the US and Saudi Arabia.[5]

Second, I would challenge the notion that Saudi Arabia *lacks* empirical (or positive) sovereignty as compared to judicial (or negative) sovereignty (p. 1 and p. 6), though it is true that (part of the) security apparatus (the National Guard in the first place) is mainly there to protect the regime from internal threats.[6] The legitimacy (or empirical- sovereignty question for that matter) is more complicated than often assumed.[7]

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[1] Oliver Schlumberger, 'Arab Authoritarianism: Debating the Dynamics and Durability of Non-Democratic Regimes', first (draft) chapter in Schlumberger (ed.), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism*, Stanford University Press, 2007 (forthcoming), p. 22. Same perspective in the conveners' project proposal ('The dynamics of change in the Arab world: Globalisation and re-structuring of state power', pp. 1-3.

[2] Most of Schlumberger's recent work strongly emphasises this point. Actually he does so since his Winter 2000 article in *Democratization* ('The Arab Middle East and the Question of Democratization: Some Critical Remarks'), so two years before Thomas Carothers attracted attention with his 'The End of the Transition Paradigm' in the *Journal of Democracy*. An interesting recent addition to the debate comes from Benjamin Smith, 'Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999', *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2), April 2004, pp. 232-246.

[3] Authored by Karin Aggestam and Helena Lindholm Schulz.

[4] In the 1960s, during the civil war in Yemen there were no Saudi troops being sent by King Faysal. Saudi aid was confined to providing subsidies and weapons to the royalist forces. During the second Gulf War (in February 1991), a symbolic contingent of Saudi troops was sent into Kuwait.

[5] See Paul Aarts, 'Events versus Trends: The Role of Energy and Security in Sustaining the US-Saudi Relationship', cf. Rachel Bronson, 'Understanding US-Saudi Relations', both in Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), *Saudi Arabia in the Balance. Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, Hurst, NYUP, 2005/2006, pp. 399-429, resp. 372-398. Also Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia, *Power, Legitimacy and Survival*, Routledge 2006, pp. 143-170. Interestingly enough, Niblock presumes that "By the time the United States, in March 2003, launched its attacks on Iraq, therefore the close military coordination between the two sides *had come to an end*" (p. 167, emphasis added PA). Cf. Aarts, 'Events versus Trends', pp. 406-408.

[6] This touches on the question how 'relative' the notion of sovereignty can be.

[7] On that, see the useful remarks made by Niblock, *Power...*, pp.17.

Third, as already refered to, there is less – and not "increasing" – Western pressure these days "to behave in accordance with normatively defined principles (e.g. democracy, adherence to human rights", p. 2), though indeed the factors of "heavy foreign presence (such as in Iraq) and dependency in the form of arms trade, security cooperation, training, etc." (p. 2) weigh considerably.

Fourth, and different in kind from the previous points, is the fact that there is lack of variation in written material on the subject. Apart from some of J.E. Peterson's contributions, the field is almost 'monopolised' by Anthony Cordesman and his co-authors.[8] I was glad to visit the country recently and do some interviews on the subject, hopefuly giving enough substance for a decent contribution to this workshop.

Taking these remarks into account, in particular the first one, I might argue [I am not sure about this] that there is much less a qualitative than a quantitative change in Saudi Arabia's security policies. Though Saudi Arabia's key aims in foreign policy always have been (1) domestic security and (2) external security, the way in which the second is pursued is to a large degree determined by the first.[9] For sure, there have been occasional external threats in the past (Yemen, Iraq) and in the present (Iran), and the regional environment has often been perceived as insecure, but the internal threat factor seems to be predominant. This becomes clear when having a look at the twelve-pages long "chronology of terrorism and counter terrorism" (starting in 1970 till early 2005) as documented by Cordesman and Obaid.[10] After the May 12, 2003 terrorist attack on several housing compounds in Riyadh it hase become even more evident that the primary threat comes from internal Islamic extremists.

Interplay between State and Regime (In)security

It is a truism that there is an "intimate nexus between state state and the armed forces" in Middle East politics (p. 5 of the concept paper). More interesting is the question (1) how this nexus looks like in the case of Saudi Arabia and, more importantly, where it might be different from most of the other Middle Eastern states; and (2) whether there are any indications of qualitative and/or quantitative changes in this relationship.

On the first point, the 'classical' picture of politicised national armies – 'symbol of institution building', 'modernising institution', etc. – does not fully apply to the Saudi case.[11] The Saudi military's role in politics has not moved from 'revolutionary plot to authoritarian state'[12], simply because of the fact that it never functioned as a revolutionary actor.[13] In most Arab states in the Gulf region control over the military is asserted by rulers through their families and tribes with which they are allied. The House of Saud has developed this method of familial/tribal control most fully. Hundreds of princes are in the Saudi army, navy, and air force. This does not mean that civil-military relations have always been cordial as wished by the ruling strata within the Al Saud. That is why the National Guard has been set

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[8] Cordesman's books often read like "*The Military Balance* on steroids", as John Peterson rightly remarks in his recent review essay 'The Kingdom of Enigma', *Survival,* vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 152. On the earlier period, see of course Nadav Safran's *Saudi Arabia. The Ceaseless Quest for Security,* Cornell University Press,1985/1988.

[9] Gerd Nonneman, 'Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy', in Aarts/Nonneman, *Saudi Arabia...*, pp. 315-351.

[10] Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, *Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts: The Changing Paramilitary and Domestic Security Apparatus*, CSIS, 2 February 2005, working draft, pp. 9-20.

[11] As Waterbury remarked, in many Arab states "...praetorians have dominated the political scene to a degree and with a technological impregnability that 'tin-pot'African dictators or Latin American caudillos could seldom boast." See John Waterbury, 'Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World,* IB Tauris, 1994, p. 26. In the Saudi case, we have a special variety of a 'mission-oriented state', not focused on anti-imperialism, liberation or socialism, but on 'Islamic justice'. That is also why the Saudi monarchs, at least since King Fahd, preferably label themselves as 'Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques'.

[12] This refers to Elisabeth Picard's 'Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State', in Adeed Dawisha & I. Willam Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion. The Durability of the Arab State*, Instituto Affari Internazionali/Croom Helm, 1988, pp. 116-146.

[13] It should be noted, however, that there have been some attempted coups in the past decades. See Nazih Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East*, IB Tauris, 1995, p. 282.

up, separate from and as a counterweight to the regular armed forces. So what we have here is a 'military-tribal complex' *par excellence* and fully conforms to the much-discussed notion of patrimonialism (versus institutionalisation).[14]

On the second point, what does apply is the notion that, in recent years, the security sector has been re-strengthened vis-à-vis other spheres of society (as is noted on p. 5 of the concept paper). Strikingly, it took quite a while before the Saudi authorities realised the seriousness of the threats to internal security. The reaction against direct and indirect attacks by Islamic extremists were relatively limited until the events of September 11,[15] And even then some Saudi officials reacted by going into a state of denial.[16] It was in May 2003 that Saudi Arabia experienced its 'own 9/11' when terrorism truly came home, this time on a different scale and in a different global atmosphere than in the decades before.[17]

Developments in the Security Sector

Saudi security forces comprise a mix of regular military forces (divided into four major branches: the army, the navy, the air force and the air defense force), a separate National Guard, and various internal security and intelligence services. There is full civilian control over the security apparatus, be it through family and tribal bonds. Prins Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation (since 1962), is the actual decision-maker on everything related to the regular armed forces, while King Abdullah controls the National Guard (since 1963). Most of intelligence and internal security services are overseen by Prince Nayef, Minister of Interior (since 1975). He is bossing a wide range of institutes, more than anyone else.[18] Finally, there is a specific number of intelligence services, each controlled by one of the leading princes and the king himself: the Military Intelligence by Prince Sultan; the National Guard Intelligence Directorate by King Abdullah; and the General Security Service (GSS) or 'Mahabith' (the domestic intelligence service) by Prins Nayef. To top it all off, there is the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), controlled by Prince Turki al-Faisal until he was replaced by Prince Nawaf bin Abd al-Aziz on September 1, 2001.It focuses on external affairs.

As the role of the regular armed forces is rather marginal in counter-terrorism activities, we will concentrate in the following on the intelligence and security services.[19] It is clear that the Ministry of Defense's GSS – controlled by Prince Nayef himself and seconded by Prince Ahmed bin Abd al-Aziz and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef – has gained importance and strength to the detriment of the General Intelligence Presidency, which was much more successful in dealing with both internal and external threats in the period up to 2001. Since the departure of Prince Turki al-Faisal, the GIP has

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[14] As Ghassan Salamé once aptly remarked, "In short, no ministerial post related to national security is outside the hands of the sons of Ibn Saud, and it has always been this way." Salamé', 'Polittical Power and the Saudi State,' *Merip Reports* 91 (October 1980), pp. 9-10. The concept paper also aptly speaks of "family affairs" (p. 8). More in general, see Eva Bellin, 'Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders', in Marsha Pripstein Posusney & Michele Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance*, Lynne Rienner, 2005, pp. 21-41.

[15] For a catalogue of "failures to see the problems", see Cordesman & Obaid, *Saudi Counter Terrorism...*, pp. 3-5.

[16] Here again, Cordesman & Obaid provide a list of intelligence and security shortcomings. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. Both an interesting and controversial explanation for this rather lacklustre attitude is given by Thomas Hegghammer: "The failure of the Saudi authorities to detect and prevent the rise of QAP [al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula] in 2002 had much to do with the fact that Saudi Arabia lacked the culture of confrontational policing required to confront and preempt terrorist threats. [...] One might argue that in its modern form, the Saudi state has relied more on religious conservatism than physical power for social and political control"; see Hegghammer, 'Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia', *Middle East Policy*, vol. XIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, p. 54.

[17] An excellent survey of terrorist violence (and regime strategies trying to cope with it) is provided by Roel Meijer, 'The "Cycle of Contention" and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia', in Aarts & Nonneman, *Saudi Arabia...*, pp. 271-311.

[18] See Figure 2, 'The Saudi Intelligence and Security Community', in Cordesman & Obaid, *Saudi Counter Terrorism Efforts*, p. 26.

[19] For a recent, critical appraisal of the regular armed forces, see Anthony H. Cordesman & Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, *The Gulf Military Forces in a Era of Asymmetric War. Saudi Arabia*, CSIS, 28 June 2006, working draft, pp. 19-64. [I have to look for figures which illustrate the – possible – shift in budget allocations from regular to intelligence forces after May 2003].

played an almost negligible role in the global war on terrorism, and the GSS has increasingly come to the fore.[20]

On the Asymmetrical Front

Almost 150 Saudi nationals and foreign residents and 120 militants have been killed since the May 12, 2003, attack in Riyadh.[21] Between this event and December 29, 2004, a series of violent clashes took place but since then it has remained relatively quiet. Some pundits, and Saudi officials in the first place, like to see the lull in insurgent activity as evidence that the government has a firm handle on matters.[22] Others think that the relative peace may not last and even see the quiet as the calm before the storm.[23] The latter designated the attempted attack on the Abqaiq oil facilities in the Eastern Province in February 2006 – the first major terrorist assault in the Kingdom since December 2004 – as a significant turning point. (So far they have been proven wrong).

It goes without saying that developments in Iraq – positive or negative – will have an influence on Saudi Arabia's security situation. At the moment of writing, it looks extremely unlikely that things will turn favourably in Iraq, but even if that would happen Saudi Arabia would be adversely affected (apart from obvious beneficial outcomes). Most probably it would mean that jihadis – Saudis and others – would leave Iraqi territory and look for safe havens elsewhere in the region, Saudi Arabia included. In the negative case, and this is what is generally expected, this 'jihadi effect' would be multiplied. In the worst-case scenario (a disintegration of Iraq into mini-states, the Americans being pushed out), the jihadis would claim victory, feel emboldened ('after Afghanistan now Iraq!') and turn their eyes and energy to the US supported monarchies and emirates in the Gulf region.

In the concrete case of Saudi Arabia, this latter scenario (not highly improbable) might have damaging spill-over effects.[24] Though nobody knows exactly how many foreign fighters, including from Saudi Arabia, are now in Iraq – and the guestimates vary widely – all countries in the region hold their breath for things to come. Their is a deep concern about the 'home coming' of these volunteers, well-trained and battle-hardened.[25] As Thomas Hegghammer recently commented: "...The Iraq experience

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[20] Cordesman & Obaid, *Saudi Counter Terrorism Effort*, pp. 28-31.

[21] Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, *The Gulf Military Forces...*, p. 84.

[22] Cordesman and Obaid certainly belong to the category of these 'optimists', though they remain surprisingly critical vis-à-vis the regime, pushing for a reform agenda: "It cannot be stressed too firmly that Saudi security is best preserved by broad progress and reform, and not by reforming the Saudi military or intelligence services. [...] True internal security is based upon popular support", Anthony H. Cordesman & Nawaf Obaid, *Saudi Military Forces and Development: Changes & Reforms*, CSIS, working draft, 30 May 2004, p. 36; and Cordesman, 'Saudi Arabia and the Struggle Agianst Terrorism', 11 April 2005, https://www1.columbia.edu/sec/bboard/gulf2000/gulf2000-9/msg03694.html. The optimist view was also expressed in several interviews I had in Riyadh, in particular with Abd al-Aziz al-Fahad (15 December 2006): "Jihadism is manageable".

[23] Shades of opinion here, varying from cautious pessimism (like *The Economist* , 19 October 2006; and Richard Russell, 'Insurgency in Waiting', *Foreign Policy*, November 2005) to outright warnings that the worst still has to come (like Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph and John C.K. Daly, 'Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy', The Jamestown Foundation, May 2006). Some of the interviews in Riyadh and Jeddah (December 2006) confirm the pessimist view.

[24] Though it should stressed that opinions differ on that. Some interviewees clearly are more confident that Saudi intelligence and security forces can handle an increase of terrorism within its borders.

[25] Much is written on that subject, sometimes not more than informed speculation. See Nawaf E. Obaid, *Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security*, Saudi National Security Assessment Project, 15 March 2006; International Crisis Group, *The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia*, Middle East Report no. 45, 19 September 2005; John R. Bradley, 'Al Qaeda and the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows?, *The Washington Quarterly*, 28:4, Autumn 2005, pp. 139-152; Daniel Byman & Kenneth Pollack, 'Explosive Affinities. Cross-Border Consequences of Civil Strife', *Number Thirteen*, Fall 2006, pp. 26-29; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Iraq: The Regional Fallout*, Middle East Programme, Briefing Paper no. 2, February 2003; Chatham House, *Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst?*, Middle East Programme, Briefing Paper 04/02; Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, *The Gulf Military...*, pp. 91-99; James A. Russell, 'Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma', *Middle East Policy*, vol. XII, no. 3, Fall 2005; Russell, 'Insurgency...'; International Crisis Group,

has changed the jihadist's notion of the enemy and placed the Gulf countries and Europe [*sic*] more clearly in the spotlight."[26] Some Saudi reformist hold the rather rosy view that this kind of worst-case scenario might be a blessing in disguise: the regime feels threatened by the home-coming jihadis and only by installing serious political reform can they be isolated from the masses. Others label this view as wrong or flatly naive.[27]

For some, special concern goes out to the possibility that Saudi Sunni jihadists, when returning to their home country, will take the sectarian conflict into Saudi Arabia and start targeting the Shi'a enemy on a new battlefield. According to some observers, there is an increased support for the anti-Shi'a and anti-occupation violence in Iraq, as many Saudis see the US forces and the Shi'a ascendancy as one and the same.[28] As a sign of the growing fear among Shi'ites in the Eastern Province, some have already started taking security measures. In some al-Ahsa village mosques have set up cement barricades in front of their entrances to prevent cars carrying bombs to make fatal attacks on the mosques when people gather for prayer.[29]

Since the escalation of violence in Iraq in early 2006, there have been reports about Saudis going "to kill Shi'as".[30] There is no consensus on the question of 'official' support being given to Sunni brethren in Iraq – or the prospect of that if the sectarian conlict in Iraq deepens and Sunnis run the risk of being killed in huge numbers. Some would favour this kind of support, others abhor the possibility of "falling into the trap of sectarianism".[31]

The External Front

Relations with Yemen, one of Saudi Arabia's southern neighbours, have in the past been worse than they are these days. The Yemeni threat – as perceived from Riyadh – seems to have changed from the possible use of direct military force to terrorist infiltration along the porous border.[32] It should be noted that Yemen suffers intermitten upheaval, acting as a reservoir and refuge for radical Islamist opponents of both regimes.

Iran, on the other hand, is considered to be Saudi Arabia's only significant external threat. There are less worries now than there have been about Tehran's 'long arm' among the Shi'ites in the Eastern Province and tensions seem to have diminished (though this may change if one of the above-sketched scenarios turns into reality). Obviously, most worries are reserved for Iran's nuclear program. The basic questions are summed up by Cordesman and Obaid: "...The country can a) live with a nuclear Iran by doing nothing; b) build an anti-missile defense system; or c) acquire its own nuclear weapons.[33] None of these choices is easy, but given that Iraq, as a military power, is gone for at least the next 10-15 years, with the US occupation, the only viable rival to Iran is Saudi Arabia. Doing nothing is not an option. [...] Although very unlikely, Iran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail the Kingdom over its Shi'ite population, over its support of Bahrain, or over its control over the holy

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After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq?, Middle East Report no. 60, 19 December 2006, pp. 26-29; Toby Jones, 'The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia', *Middle East Report* 237, Winter 2005, pp. 20-25.

[26] Thomas Hegghammer, 'Global Jihadism After the Iraq War', *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 2006, vol. 60, no. 1, p. 31.

[27] Interviews with reformists Matruq al-Faleh, Abdullah al-Hamid, and Khaled al-Dakhil. The more 'realist' view was given by Awadh al-Badi, Mohsen al-Awaji, Abd al-Aziz al-Fahad, Muhammad Salahuddin, and Eissam Basrawi (interviews in Riyadh and Jeddah, December 2006).

[28] Jones, 'The Iraq Effect...'.

[29] Private conversation (in Riyadh, December 2006) with a reseacher on the Saudi Ja'fari Shi'ites, who conducted several interviews in the Eastern Province.

[30] ICG, *The Shiite Question...*, p. 11.

[31] Interviews in Riyadh and Jeddah (December 2006). Strikingly enough, some of the interviewees with a (Sunni) Islamist background would strongly disagree with lending official support, while some more secular-oriented interlocutors tended to take the oppostie position.

[32] More on this, see Nicole Stracke, 'Counter Terrorism and Weapon Smuggling: Success and Failure of Yemeni-Saudi Collaboration', *Security & Terrorism. Regional Security in the Gulf*, no. 4, November 2006, pp. 8-14.

[33] On the nuclear option, see Russell, 'Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century...'.

places, Mecca and Medina. Conventional weapons by themselves are not the answer. The question, however, remains, will the Saudis trust that the US will be there for their protection? Is this enough to deter Iran from blackmailing the Kingdom? Do they have to look somewhere else for their protection? [34] Do they try to acquire their own deterrence?"[35]

Saudi worries about Iran's nuclear ambitions are widespread and are not limited to government circles. This was clearly exemplified during interviews in Riyadh with scholars and political activists. Most recently, it was shown during the annual conference of the Gulf Research Center,[36] where some Arab scholars (from the Gulf region) held a diatribe against the Islamic Republic of Iran. What also was noticed during this gathering – not for the first time – was the much-discussed lack of any effective military and security coordination among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Although the GCC has made some advances in military and security cooperation, it remains largely a hollow shell. Despite an apparent unity, GCC members have developed different, at times contradictory, defense doctrines. Taking a look at the wider Middle East region, one might even descry an emerging new regional security structure which seems to be managed almost totally by non-Arab regional hegemons: Iran, Turkey, Israel, and a toned-down or over-the-horizon US. "Any Arabs who play a role will mainly be surrogates, subcontracted militias, or outsourced intelligence agencies to these front-line powers. Arab military systems that cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build will be relegated to being little more than local gendarmeries."[37]

It seems that some Saudi (and other Gulf states') officials see efforts to expand the role of NATO in the Gulf region as a way of "...both reducing de facto Saudi dependence on the US, and of using NATO as a more politically acceptable cover for Saudi military ties to the US... [At the same time] however, [the Saudis] are all too aware of the real political limits on European power projection capabilities, and as to the limits of the power projection forces NATO and the EU are trying to build."[38] So, again, don't expect anything from NATO.

Probably not all (sub)-themes that were paid attention to in both Guazzone/Pioppi and Aggestam/Lindholm Schulz have been treated sufficiently in the above exposé. Some may even not have been treated at all, such as the notion of an expanding 'economic wing' of the military. In this particular case, there is a good reason for that omission [though I must admit that my knowledge on this particular aspect is still weak]: Saudi Arabia has been extremely slow in developing its indigenous defense industry and there is nothing like a 'military-industrial complex'.[39]

More themes may be absent (or underrated). Comments are welcome.

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[34] More on this in Paul Aarts & Machteld van Rijsingen, 'Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region. The Near and the Distant Future', paper for the Eighth Mediterranean Research Meeting of the European University Institute, Florence, Italy (21-25 March 2007).

[35] Cordesman & Obaid, *Saudi Counter Terrorism...*, pp. 21-22.

[36] 'Consequences of US Policy for the Gulf Region' (Dubai, 11-12 January 2007).

[37] Rami G. Khoury, 'The Arab States Drift into Irrelevance', *The Daily Star*, 6 January 2007.

[38] Cordesman & Obaid, *Saudi Military Forces...*, p. 1. Also see Amir Taheri's devastating critique, 'NATO Has Little to Offer the GCC States', *Arab News*, 16 December 2006.

[39] The only analysis I have seen is Yezid Sayegh's 'Arab Military Industrialization: Security Incentives and Economic Impact', in: Bahgat Korany *et al.* (eds.), *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, Macmillan, 1993, pp. 214-238.