TOWARDS A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP:
NATO'S TRANSFORMATION AND ESDP

Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
Centro militare di studi strategici (CeMiSS)
Rome, 21/XI/2005

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International Conference

Istituto Affari Internazionali

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Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership: NATO's Transformation and ESDP

MONDAY, 21 NOVEMBER 2005

Kindly hosted by

Centro Alti Studi Difesa (CASD)
Palazzo Salviati, Piazza della Rovere 83
Rome, Italy

PROGRAM

Monday, 21 November

8:30-8:45 **Welcome Address**

Vincenzo Camporini, President, Centro Alti Studi Difesa (CASD), Rome

8:45-9:00 **Introduction**

Giovanni Gasparini, Co-Director, IAI Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Rome

Lucio Martino, Senior Analyst, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome

9:00-10:45 **First Session**

International Terrorism, Non Proliferation and Crisis Management: How Does the Transatlantic Partnership Work?

Chair: **Luciano Callini**, Director, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome

Introduction: **Yves Boyer,** Assistant Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Paris

Robert Hunter, Senior Advisor, RAND, Washington DC

Discussants: **Tomas Valasek**, Director, Center for Defense Information (CDI), Brussels

Knut Kirste, Information Officer, Public Diplomacy Division, International Staff, NATO, Brussels

10:45-11:00 *Coffee-Break*

11:00-12:45 **Second Session**

The Challenges of European Integration and their Impact on NATO-EU Relations

Chair: **Ettore Greco**, Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Introduction: **Simon Serfaty**, Senior Adviser, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC

Christophe Cornu, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, International Staff, NATO, Brussels

Discussants: **Wolfgang Krieger**, Professor, Department of Modern History, University of Marburg

Rob de Wijk, Director, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands

12:45-13:45 *Lunch-Buffet*

13:45-15:30 **Third Session**

NATO-EU Crisis Management Cooperation: Lessons Learned and Prospects

Chair: **Giovanni Gasparini**, Co-Director, IAI Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Rome

Introduction: **Ludwig Decamps**, Policy Planning Unit, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO, Brussels

John Sandrock, Director of the Program on International Security, Atlantic Council of the US, Washington DC

Discussants: **Klaus Becher**, Associate Director, Wilton Park, Steyning (UK)

Jean-Yves Haine, Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London

15:30-15:45 *Coffee-Break*

15:45-17:45 **Fourth Session**

Roadmap for a Renewed Transatlantic Security Partnership

Chair: **Stefano Silvestri**, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Introduction: **Karsten D. Voigt**, Coordinator of German-American Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Jonathan R.Cohen, Counsellor for Political and Military Affairs, Embassy of the United States, Rome

Discussants: **Marcin Zaborowski**, Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Paris

Giacomo Sanfelice, Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

17:45-18:30 **Conclusion**

Chair: **Vincenzo Camporini**, President, Centro Alti Studi Difesa (CASD), Rome

Panelists: **Luigi Ramponi**, Chairman, Defence Committee, Italian Chamber of Deputies, Rome

Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Riccardo Alcaro	Research Assistant, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Luca Bader	Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Klaus Becher	Associate Director, Wilton Park, Steyning (UK)
Marco Beia	Marketing Director, Aerea Spa, Milan
Marzia Benini	Cultural Affairs Assistant, Embassy of the United States, Rome
Annalisa Biondi	Head of International Affairs Area, Confindustria, Rome
Gianni Bonvicini	Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Yves Boyer	Assistant Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
Fabrizio Braghini	Head of Associations Relations, Institutional Relations Department, Finmeccanica, Rome
Werner Brandner	Military Attaché, Austrian Embassy, Rome
Michael Braun	Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Rome
Luciano Callini	Director, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Vincenzo Camporini	President, Centro Alti Studi Difesa (CASD), Rome
Federica Ciacagli	Research Fellow, Italianieuropei, Rome
Jonathan Cohen	Counsellor for Political and Military Affairs, Embassy of the United States, Rome
Michele Comelli	Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Christophe Cornu	Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, International Staff, NATO, Brussels
Giuseppe Cucchi	Former Italian Representative, NATO, EU- WEU, Military Committee, Rome
Serafino D'Angelantonio	Head Office, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), Rome
Ludwig Decamps	Policy Planning Unit, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO, Brussels
Federica Di Camillo	Junior Researcher, Isituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Sibilla Di Renzo	Journalist, *Finanza Mercati*, Rome
Anselmo Donnari	Head of International Relations Area, Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Raffaele Esposito	President, Selenia Communications, Rome
Giuseppe Fabbrocino	Chief, Technical Coordination General Office, Teledife, Rome

Ezio Ferrante	Head of International Law Area, Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Carlo Finizio	Senior Researcher, NATO Defense College and Former Director of Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Gianmaria Gambacorta	Chief Business Development Executive, Fincantieri, Genoa
Giovanni Gasparini	Senior Fellow & Co-Director, IAI Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Rome
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Ettore Greco	Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Jean-Yves Haine	Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London
Robert Hunter	Senior Advisor, RAND, Washington DC
Carlo Jean	President, Sogin, Rome
Knut Kirste	Information Officer, Public Diplomacy Division, International Staff, NATO, Brussels
Wolfgang Krieger	Professor, Department of Modern History, University of Marburg, Germany
Alessandra Lanza	Head of International Relations and Studies, SACE, Rome
Arrigo Levi	External Relations Advisor, Office of the President of the Italian Republic, Rome
Fabrizio Luciolli	Secretary General, Comitato Atlantico Italiano, Rome
Daniela Manca	Program Assistant, The German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Center, Brussels
Angelo Mariani	Secretary, Supreme Defence Council, Office of the President of the Italian Republic
Lucio Martino	Senior Analyst, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Raffaello Matarazzo	Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Andrea Meloni	Plenipotentiary Minister, Head of Policy Planning Unit, Secretariat General, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Cesare Merlini	Executive Vice President, Council for the United States and Italy, Rome

Laura Mirachian	Plenipotentiary Minister, Secretariat General, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
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Egon Paulin	Vice President Bid Management, Selenia Communications, Rome
Lavinio Perotti	Secretary General, Elettronica Spa, Rome
Alfredo Pigiani	Head of External Relations, Oto Melara, Rome
Simona Poidomani	Journalist, *Adnkronos*, Rome
Alessandro Politi	Independent Strategic and OSINT [Open Source Intelligence] Analyst, Rome
Alessandro Quaroni	Ambassador, Sovereign Military Order of Malta, Rome
Luigi Ramponi	Chairman, Defence Committee, Italian Chamber of Deputies, Rome
Generoso Roca	International Relations Office, Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome
Ferdinando Salleo	Former Italian Ambassador to the United States, Rome
Stefania Salveta	Assistant, Institutional Relations Office, MBDA Italia, Rome
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Tomas Valasek	Director, Center for Defense Information (CDI), Brussels

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Rob de Wijk	Director, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands
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International Conference

Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership: NATO's Transformation and ESDP

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International Terrorism, Non Proliferation and Crisis Management: How Does the Transatlantic Partnership Work?

by

Yves Boyer

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

As principles are concerned, transatlantic cooperation for combating terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and crisis management activities is exemplary. A wide consensus exists throughout the Atlantic alliance and within the EU to maintain and strengthen the various regimes prohibiting the spread of WMD. Combating terrorism is equally unanimously understood as a priority for western government albeit, with some nuance about the nature and the intensity of the struggle. The US is embarked in a Global War on Terror when terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are mentioned in the European Union's Security Strategy paper as "preoccupying factors" [1].

The intrinsic nature of terrorism and the complex stake surrounding non-proliferation makes difficult to systematically link both issues in a unique framework defining a global transatlantic partnership. Each issue requires specific policies and a huge variety of means and networks of cooperation that exceed, by far, what NATO can deliver as a traditional alliance. Indeed, the world scene is rapidly changing. Instruments against proliferation appear already somewhat outdated, leading some analysts to assume that in the near future "*the sensible campaign to combat further proliferation must fail. If we are fortunate it will fail slowly*"[2]. Fighting terrorism is largely a matter of police and intelligence which imperatives go far beyond what the transatlantic partnership can offer in a globalized world.

Indeed, globalization is bringing the biggest challenge to transatlantic relations. Without the cement of a common enemy, WMD and terrorism cannot make up for that fortunate loss. Between Washington and few, or all, West Europeans capitals, frictions resulting from political, societal, economic, trade or monetary divergences are more frequent than it used to be in the past decade. Indeed, at a time when temptation arouse in the US to use Nato as a "multipurpose kind of tool" whose missions should now encompass a growing number of many different tasks from fighting terrorism to promote stability "out of area", one runs the risk of overloading the boat precisely because different political perspectives among member states have spill-over altering the strength of the Alliance. If the phenomenon is not new, now its consequences produce direct effects on the fabric of the partnership.

Transformations of the international scene

[1] « A secure Europe in a Better World », June 2003.
[2] "Future Warfare. Or the Triumph of History", Colin Gray, RUSI Journal, October 2005.

It is convenient if not comfortable to continue envisaging the world which is coming as the world which is already past. It is, thus, reassuring to postulate, without the slightest doubt, that already "*NATO has responded effectively to twenty-first security challenges*" [3]. Instruments that were inspired and defined in the framework of a given political and strategical context, forty years ago, are expected to live indefinitely[4]. How relevant if, not outdated, would they be in the next decades? A multipolar world is appearing where new "actors" are transforming the scene and the parameters of the play. In that perspective, one cannot underestimate the fact that Western values and interests underpinning globalization and its correlative imperative of stability will certainly be dramatically challenged. Indeed, the benefit of globalization is the privilege of around only one billon of people when four are at the margin of the market economy and one other billion is totally out of the game. Already, half of the world population lives in only six Asian countries with high demographic growth. Three have now nuclear arsenal. Two of them having superbly ignored the NPT from which they are still not part - giving them a strange status since they are not considered as nuclear states according to the NPT - , a third one has been a late signatory of the treaty.

In such transformed world, one of the crucial difficulties that have to be transcended between America and the EU is related to diverse if not divergent cultural influences that now shape their respective vision of the world: if values are shared, norms are no longer systematically coinciding. As such those differences if they are not yet bearing upon the political as well as the bureaucratic *raison d'être* of the transatlantic partnership, they however growingly contribute to lessen its ability to generate common political actions. Common grids of lecture are increasingly lacking between the two sides of the Atlantic for analyzing rapid and complex international transformations, either to understand their origin or to envisage their potential political and strategical consequences as well as their possible solutions. It is particularly significant, by example, in the relation with the Arab Muslim world.

Most Arab-Muslim countries are under severe strain. Demographic pressures, economic underdevelopment, exclusion from world economic exchanges, dramatic unemployment rate could be actively exploited by Islamic fundamentalists. There is indeed a very dangerous explosive cocktail that may lead to unbridled rise of radical Islam with dramatic political consequences on the stability of that region and on Western security. The Western world has thus now to cope with the revival of Islam. Either, an increased uneasiness from Arab Muslim population may impact on European security or, because, in its extreme form, adepts of a radical Islam pursue goals which are uncompromisingly at odds with Western values. If the transatlantic partnership remains useful to

[3] "Collective Defence in the 21st century", General Richard Myers, *RUSI Journal*, October 2005.
[4] It has been the case of the NPT which was indefinitely prolonged as in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension conference.

meet such challenges it does not appear to be able to fit the tasks in finding constructive and positive answers.

To prevent worst case scenarios the European Union is trying to exert a stabilizing effect on the Arab Muslim world in order to buy time in the hope that the present chaotic situation may be sooner than later been improved. In its Mediterranean policy the EU is having expressed an implicit reluctance to see an excessive American involvement. The current messy situation in Iraq is reinforcing that feeling as stated by French defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie: "*we have a different sensibility vis-à-vis the Arab-Muslim world, whereas the Americans are intent on resolutely facing the new challenges to security, especially after 9/11... we should be listening more to the Arab-Muslim world: the sense of injustice and humiliation is really very widespread. It is being used by terrorist networks. So it's up to us to show consideration for its civilization which is very old; understanding for its problems which are very real; determination to resolve collectively the Israel-Arab conflict; and resolve to help the Arab world enter modernity. We must help moderate Muslims counter the rise in a radical Islam which has come about through the bankruptcy of many states and the exploitation that's been made of this by power-hungry fanatics. That is our common responsibility to meet together, but each with our own cards as this is a complex and sensitive problem*"[5]. It would be too easy and a mistake to attribute such attitude to any kind of anti-Americanism. It is related to historical experience of the Europeans about the real complexities in dealing with what general de Gaulle used to called "*l'Orient compliqué*" (the intricate Eastern).

In the early 90's the European Union redefined its Mediterranean policy around three goals: political stability and security; financial and economic developments; social, cultural and human collaboration. This led to the Barcelona process between the EU and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean basin. The difficult walk toward modernity in the Maghreb and the Mashrak (i.e the North African littoral from Morocco to Egypt) has turned this area in a high risk zone. Current stability is very fragile and largely dependent upon the existence of authoritarian regime implicitly backed by western powers despite their commitment in favour of human rights. To choose the lesser of two evils is indeed derogatory to principles. The other alternative is running the risk of letting Islamic fundamentalism regime becoming a political reality and spreading from Morocco to Egypt with the associated danger of dramatic turbulence in the whole Mediterranean basin.

In a way, as already mentioned, European powers are buying time, notably through developing comprehensive programs of cooperation and development such as the common EU strategy in the Mediterranean. This is done in the hope that financial efforts, cooperation will stabilized socially and then politically the countries of the south of the Mediterranean basin. The road towards that

[5] Michèle Alliot-Marie, "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership", speech at the CSIS, Washington, January 16, 2004

goal is paved with many uncertainties. Widespread corruption, growing pauperization, demographic watershed, illiteracy, in the Maghreb-Mashrak "help" Islamic movements which find there a very favourable ground for prospering. They brought refuge for those who felt excluded and impoverished by what is perceived as consequences of Western move towards globalization. They found, in Islam a sense of dignity a sense to their life. The greatest paradoxes of that situation is that, if on one hand Europe's search for stability is translated into backing authoritarian regime, the White House's "Greater Middle-East Initiative" is actively promoting democracy in that region. Democracy is growingly perceived as being corresponding to Western values and intrinsically not compatible with the precepts of Islam. Speaking after a recent Middle East summit in Bahrain when a "democratic manifesto" initiated by Washington was rejected, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Affairs declared that: *"It would be a disaster if this region thought democracy was an American idea"*[6]. Such sentence is reminiscent of what was said, few years ago at the Wehrkünde meeting in Munich by Wolfgang Ischinger, then the German ambassador to Washington: *"unfortunately, the standing of the United States has not improved worldwide, it has deteriorated...there are people who would even go as far as to suggest that the poor standing of the US could be a burden in effort to solve regional problems"*[7].

If the organization of delicate relations with the Arab Muslim world does not call for making the transatlantic partnership the key actor, the rapid transformation in the overall balance of power will also affect the efficiency of that partnership. In the next ten to twenty years, a rapid demographic decline in most EU's countries will reduce the overall reach of the European powers at a time when a relative decrease of US capabilities will diminish in due proportion its leadership role on world affairs. Such new settings may accelerate the relative irrelevance of large part of present international mechanism of regulation largely initiated by Western powers such as those prohibiting the spread of WMD. Arms control regime used to constrain the spread of weapons or technologies considered as threatening regional equilibrium are increasingly unable to product effects when at the same time there are temptations by Western countries (however the greatest proliferators of WMD) to transform the arms control process into a political instrument of power. Non proliferation is becoming as much an end as a mean to coerce, a mean to influence a given political situation as witnessed with the disastrous developments occurring during the Iraqi crisis in 2002/2003. As such it is running the risk of being seen with growing suspicion by new world or regional powers challenging the present status quo established in favour of the Western powers.

In the mean time, if the transatlantic partnership can undoubtedly continue to play a useful, although potentially reduced role one should neither overestimate its relevance nor its capacity to

[6] « Bush's vision fails to win over Middle East », Simon Tisdall, *The Guardian*, November 15, 2005.

overcome internal contradictions when global issues are at stake. When terrorism took a world-wide proportion with the 9/11 attacks against New York and Washington, the transatlantic solidarity worked very well and as the French newspaper *Le Monde* published, the day after the attack, at its front page "*Nous sommes tous américains*". The partnership however stop functioning, as expected, when the US government did not call for activating article 5 of the Washington treaty leaving European allies making bilateral arrangements with Washington in order to participate to the on-going fight in Afghanistan aimed at wiping out the Taliban who provided a safe heaven to Al Qaeda[8]. Different strategic perspectives are indeed plunging the Western world into a delicate situation which may create profound dividing line between its different parts. The current difficulties in the transatlantic relationship are precisely illustrating diverse if not divergent cultural influence that create different visions of the world between the US and Europe. In that perspective, the many debates surrounding the Doha round within the framework of the WTO are reflecting deep different strategic perspectives. It is significant that some EU's countries having their economy largely founded on international trade follow a certain path regarding their security requirements when others, more preoccupied with maintaining a certain social model less open to unbridled economic liberalism have chosen different strategic perspective.

Fighting terrorism

Fighting terrorism is a tricky issue and remains largely marked by secrecy making analysis an almost impossible task to grapple with. This is a matter of high confidentiality in a scene where shadows matter as much as light. People involved in that business will certainly not expose to the open the nature, the purpose, the scope, the channels and the depth of their cooperation. To such opacity, one has to add the very nature of what is at stake. It is about using the means offered by international cooperation for exchanging very sensitive information and acting in order to identify, deter, prevent and act against terrorism. The new nature of the threat has had many consequences to begin with blurring traditional patterns of cooperation organized in concentric circles.

The first one is the national level. At that level, a huge diversity of situations exists. National organisation varies according to historical experience, administrative structure and political architecture. Organisations range from centralized structure to more decentralised which gives local power (*Länder*, States, regions etc.) a certain capacity to mobilise police resources against terrorists activities. Despite these differences, a common set of problems have to be internally solved to make

[7] "Don't mention the war", Peter Spiegel, *Financial Times*, February 9, 2004.
[8] France was one of the first European country to participate to Operation Enduring Freedom with a carrier battle group (operation Héraclès).

efficient and mutually fruitful intelligence cooperation at the international level. Besides traditional national inter-service rivalries, one key issue is about giving coherence of the intelligence processes at the national level. Traditional police forces, *gendarmerie* (in certain countries) and customs agents interact with many other agencies such as the counter-intelligence apparatus (the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the US; DST, *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* and *Renseignements Généraux* in France; MI5 in Britain, and the BND *Bundesnachirendienst* etc.). There are obvious difficulties to synchronize and pool efficiently intelligence products among those many different services which have their own history, code and behaviour. In order to enhance the whole effectiveness the need arouse to create new bodies with the tasks of coordinating the many effort done at the national level in fighting terrorism. In France by exemple, the Cilat (*Comité interministériel de lutte antiterroriste*), an inter-ministerial structure, chaired by the Interior minister is coordinating the works of other ministries regarding protection against terrorists activities ; the UCLAT (*unité de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste*) has been created in 1984 to coordinate and spread intelligence information among specialised services. UCLAT has liaison officers in Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Holland and the USA. In Britain, a structure is in charge of synthesizing intelligence materials about terrorist activities for political leaders does also exist, the JTAC (Joint Terrorism Analysis Center); at the Home office level, terror activities are coordinated by the Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Directorate (CTID). Under the leadership of the Director General of the MI5, the JTAC comprises representatives from eleven government departments and agencies.

The second level of cooperation against terrorism is the European and the allies level and certainly not the transatlantic partnership as such. At the level of the EU the recognition of the need to deepen cooperation to fight terrorism has been the result of the trans-borders activities of terrorist cells. As early as in 1975, the European Council decided to organise an internal security group called Trevi (Terrorism Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, and Internationalism). The TREVI group was set up, at that time, among the 9 EEC members to deepen police cooperation notably in relation with extremism, radicalism and terrorism at that time identified with the *Rote armee fraction* in the FRG, Red brigades in Italy and *Action Directe* in France. 9/11 has considerably modified the EU perspective in fighting terrorism with the adoption on September 21, 2001, of a Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism encompassing legislative measures, the strengthening of operational cooperation among security services, police and customs, the improvement of the effectiveness of information systems with new functions added to the Schengen Information System (SIS).

- *Europol* has thus seen its anti-terrorist activities significantly increased with the establishment of a Counter-terrorist task force

- A European Arrest Warrant has been agreed even though only 17 out of the 25 members had included this European Arrest Warrant in their national law by June 2004.
- A new structure, Eurojust has been created in order to develop judiciary co-operation within the EU.
- Cooperation agreements have been signed with the US such as by example in April 2004 the agreement to strengthen maritime container security.
- The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is able to use the Situation Center (SitCent) to provide synthesis of intelligence materials (provided by the member states) to the EU presidency and to the various member states. Although the role of SitCent should not be over estimated. It receives rough analysis from other sources of intelligence. As example, Europol is not allowed to give personal related data but only broad strategic analysis[9]. In the same perspective exchange of sensitive information are still made on a bilateral basis within the EU member states and only between key actors in Germany, France, the UK and few others countries members of the Union.
- This arsenal of measures was improved after the Madrid bomb attack in March of this year. At the EU council of last June a "EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism" has been endorsed in accordance with UNSC resolution 1372 of 2001 which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, made up of all 15 members of the Security Council.
- Surveillance of ground borders of the Union (6 000 km) or its maritime borders (85 000 km), a European Borders Agency was set up in January 2005.
- The position of a Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gert de Vries, has been established to co-ordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism.

Among allies the transatlantic partnership is not directly involved in the direct fight against terrorism. Outside an EU or a Nato framework, one has to mention the elusive role of the so-called "Alliance Base"[10]. A network of intelligence services working together on matters related to terrorism and having their "secretariat" located in Paris. The members of "Alliance Base" are similar to those participating to the MIC, Multinational Interoperability Council. The MIC is a kind of a "reinforced cooperation" in military affairs established between the US, France, Britain, Germany, Australia, Canada and Italy, since 2005.

The third level in the fight against terrorism is a world-wide cooperation. This type of cooperation is made more and more on an ad hoc basis and essentially bi-lateral. Even countries with political divergences may be led to exchange pertinent intelligence information and develop cooperation. For

[9] Interview of Max-Peter, Europol Director, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 2005.

example, during its visit to London in the fall of 2005, Vladimir Putin was accompanied by Anatoli Safonov, special envoy of the Russian president for international co-operation against terrorism. The Russians discussed intensively anti-terrorism with their British counterparts and a working group on that matter between the two governments will be developed. More generally one is witnessing the multiplication of bilateral or multilateral contacts among security and intelligence services throughout the world. This sort of gathering now encompasses meeting between many different internal security services. By example in October 2005, the head of the Japanese Public Service Investigation Agency (KOANCHO), Takashi Oizumi visited his French counterpart at the DST. Discussions now encompass not only terrorism but also organized crime which represent a growing challenge for many states, its is costing around £14 billons to the UK economy[11]. International meeting are also places where countries at odds on many topic still gathered to talk about international terrorism. Such meetings occurred, at least openly, twice in 2005. In February in Saudi Arabia, among many participants, were the head of the Pakistan's intelligence service (SIS), Britain's MI5 head Dame Eliza Manningham, the head of French's UCLAT, president Putin'special envoy on terrorism Anatoli Savonov and president George Bush advisor on homeland security, Frances Townsend. Few weeks later in Novosibirsk such gathering also happened in March where many heads or representative of services committed to fight terrorism from the EU, Nato, G8, the CIS, etc gathered once more time.

The global fight against terrorism thus call for new ad hoc cooperation sometimes far away from the traditional channels inherited from the cold war.

[10] « La CIA et la DGSE auraient établi une structure secrète antiterroriste », *Le Monde*, July 4, 2005 ; « Help From France Key In Covert Operations. Paris's 'Alliance Base' Targets Terrorists », Dana Priest, *Washington Post* July 3, 2005.

[11] « Warning over 'mafias' gangs infiltrating British banks », Patrick Hosking et Stewart Tendler, *The Times*, November 16, 2005.

International Conference

Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership: NATO's Transformation and ESDP

ROME, 21 NOVEMBER 2005

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International Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Crisis Management: How Does the Transatlantic Partnership Work?

by

Robert E. Hunter
RAND Corporation, Washington DC

Two and a half years after the Iraq War – which initiated what was arguably the lowest point in transatlantic relations since the 1956 Suez Crisis – enough time has passed for the gradual reemergence of shared efforts to reassess both the requirements and the opportunities of relations between the United States and European allies with which it has been at odds, as well as to reassess the roles of NATO and the European Union and relations between them.

Rebuilding the Political Relationship

In February 2005, President George Bush broke the ice by visiting NATO and also paying the first visit of a US president to the European Council at its Brussels headquarters. Rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic has improved and so has reason, to a considerable degree. Disagreements among various allies do continue over the proper course to pursue in Iraq; but these no longer have the poisonous quality of the earlier period. All 26 NATO allies have been working together in Afghanistan, through the International Security Assistance Force – marked, in terms of intra-allied cooperation, by the fact that for several months the ISAF commander was a French officer, operating under NATO authority. Iran, along with its possible ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons, remains a major point of contention between the US and a number of allies, but the European "big three" – Britain, France, and Germany – have been engaged in tripartite diplomacy with Iran that largely has Washington's blessing. Cooperation among allies – bilaterally and as between the US and the European Union, in particular – has continued apace on critical activities in countering terrorism, which focus largely on non-military actions.

On the two sides of the Atlantic, there has been emerging a new *modus vivendi,* if not the stuff of a solid set of Alliance understandings: the Americans accept, to a degree far beyond the attitude that prevailed in President Bush's first term, that the US needs allies and is willing to pay some price in terms of consultation and moderation of ambitions in order to secure their support; meanwhile, Europeans, in general, now accept the broad outlines of the overall US agenda, 1) focusing on the need to counter international terrorism, even far afield from the traditional locus of allied cooperation, and 2) assigning a high priority to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. What began in December 2003 as a European Union good faith effort, with reservations, to mimic the headings of the US global agenda – in the European Security Strategy ("A Secure Europe in a Better World.") -- has gained a more durable basis of shared

understanding.[1] To be sure, there remain serious fault lines: thus many European governments are less than enthusiastic about the US commitment to democratize the states of the Middle East in the near term (a commitment also less evident in US government declarations in recent months); and the United States does not accord the same degree of importance as virtually all European governments to pressing forward with Arab-Israeli (especially Palestinian-Israeli) diplomacy.

As 2005 nears its close, therefore, it is fair to say that the "glass" of transatlantic relations on the most important strategic and security issues of the day is "half full" and not "half empty": the positive is in (reasonable) ascendancy, even though there is still a good distance to go to turn cooperation that is often "convenient" into that of genuine conviction.

Thus how to proceed? Debate over the directions to be taken in goals by transatlantic allies and partners will need to continue; as well as will debate over the best means to employ to gain even those ends that are agreed. Even though the United States now accepts more than before that dealing with those factors that help terrorists gain new recruits (including not just bad governance but also poverty and hopelessness); and even though European governments now accept, in general, that military power does have an important role to play in promoting security beyond Europe, a good deal of effort, sustained over time, will be needed to enable transatlantic partners to work effectively together to achieve the agreed ends.

Institutions Matter

At the same time, institutions and processes matter. At the outset, it is important to add another "home truth" to those that have been advanced above: that it is time for all parties, on both sides of the Atlantic, whether concerned more with NATO or with the European Union, to put behind them the squabbles over the roles of those two institutions that have proved so debilitating at times in the past. It does matter that NATO has primacy in critical security cooperation where "heavy lifting" – the employment of major military forces – could be required, especially since all European allies and partners do want to ensure that the United States remains committed to promoting a "European continent" security agenda and will continue to exercise leadership elsewhere in the world, in common cause, where there is unlikely to be any European substitute. At the same time, it does not

[1] Brussels, 12 December 2003, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. This document listed five main challenges to European security, which largely paralleled those advanced by the United States: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

really matter whether the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) develops its own governing bodies and discusses how and where it could operate independently of NATO (and the US), even drawing upon NATO "assets," if need be, without undue NATO oversight and interference. This is provided, of course, that what ESDP does is transparent and does not cause any truly serious impediment to NATO's capacity to act – which does not seem very likely, however much some European rhetoric at times points in the opposite direction.

The basic facts are that there is one only set of European military capabilities – perhaps at times to be used by ESDP but at other times (likely to be more prevalent) to be used by NATO; that the United States and the European members of the EU have basic strategic interests, whether or note these might require the use of military force, that are highly similar and in major aspects are congruent; that no one in Europe, however much there might be transatlantic bad blood at times or unease about US leadership organized though NATO, wants "Yankee [to] go home;" and that none of the key security challenges now facing Europeans and Americans face one or the other in such a different kind or degree that they can afford to go their separate ways, either in policy or in institutional relationships. Furthermore, building a successful ESDP (along with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) retains importance for many European states, perhaps all the more so with the defeat by referenda in France and the Netherlands of the European Constitutional Treaty. And however much some Americans bridle at the prospect of a European Union that will become stronger economically if not politically, the failure of the "European project," or even its diminishing in its positive development, cannot be in the US interest now any more than it was during the last half century and more. So, concerning the debate over the role of ESDP as opposed to that of NATO: "Let the dead past bury its dead." That was an indulgence in institution-competition that could be indulged in the 1990s; today such a debate, beyond development of tactical arrangements for cooperation between the two institutions, works against the interests of all parties.

Countering Terrorism

That need for cooperation now clearly exists. And the first "truth" is that the NATO institution and the EU institutions need to work together to achieve the common ends that are by-and-large agreed, at least to the point of making up a rough agenda. This "working together," of course, is a supplement or complement to effective bilateral relationships and efforts by other institutions. For example, the practical work of countering international terrorism falls to a wide variety of bodies and relationships, including those dealing with intelligence and police work, the former of which is

managed almost exclusively country-to-country and the latter of which is undertaken effectively outside the framework of NATO and where the EU does not have primacy in Europe In general, for cooperation across the Atlantic in dealing with terrorism, far and away the most important relationship is that between the US and the European Union, not a role for NATO. And the European Union began its vigorous role in cooperation with the US and others immediately after September 11, 2001, and that cooperation has continued at a level reminiscent of the closest transatlantic cooperation in the Cold War years.[2]

Non-Proliferation

NATO and the EU do not play the most important roles in non-proliferation, at least regarding nuclear weapons: NATO almost not at all. Yet it is remarkable that one of the most important tasks in preventing the spread of the most dangerous of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) involves ensuring positive control over already-existing sources of fissionable material, especially those in the Russian Federation. Efforts to secure these sources are almost entirely bilateral between the US and Russia, with little role for European countries and even less for NATO and the EU: an error in collective priorities.

In the near term, the most important issue, relating to non-proliferation, that faces partners and allies across the Atlantic – other than preparing to deal with potential regime-stability problems in Pakistan, perhaps the most dangerous challenge to security in today's world – is dealing with Iran. At the most obvious level, this is about Iran's possible ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons; but at a deeper level, it is about the nature of security throughout the Persian Gulf region, both in the short and long terms. The two levels are related, and here there is still no true meeting of the minds as between the US (with Britain) and most European countries. For the latter, preventing Iran's acquiring nuclear weapons is the highest priority, along with seeking some way for Iran to emerge, in time, as a positive sources of security in the Persian Gulf community; for the former, there is a mixture of desires, which also include overturning the clerical regime, limiting Iran's role in the Persian Gulf unless it clearly accepts US leadership and primacy, and halting Iranian support for terrorism and opposition to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Further, the US resists either taking part in negotiations with Iran (as it does with North Korea) or allowing the British, French, and Germans to put on the table for negotiations security assurances in exchange for Iran's

[2] See: *Counter-Terrorism: The European Union's Actions*, http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/2001EURespUSTerror.htm.

permitting unfettered inspections and other steps to provide ironclad reassurances that it is not developing nuclear weapons – security assurances that the US has already given to North Korea.

The Iranian issue, which may not come to a head as rapidly as seemed possible only a few months ago, if only because of limits on America's post-Iraq War political and military capacities, is only one aspect of what needs to be a broader, cooperative US-European strategy and set of policies to deal with the Middle East: with implications for the war on terrorism, proliferation (in various forms of weaponry) and the need for long-term strategic and political "success" in the region. To this end, one area that needs to be explored is that of beginning to fashion a regional security system, of some nature, that could in time reduce the need of the United States (with allies) to continue accepting virtually full and open-ended responsibility for regional security. Such a system is still only in fledgling form, with efforts like the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (NATO - 2004) and the Barcelona Process (EU -1995) – the two of which, and other efforts, need to be worked together and in common.

Crisis Management and Cooperation

In dealing with international terrorism and non-proliferation, there is important work for different institutions; but cooperation between NATO and the EU is not high on the list of priorities – or possibilities, given the mandates of the two institutions and completing demands on their respective competencies. The reference is true with regard to crisis management, including – in the case of terrorism – in what is called "consequence management." Indeed, even in the Cold War NATO had a component body, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) that would have had responsibilities following the onset of hostilities; and which already is acquiring duties in the event of non-combat-related civil emergencies.

The apposite relationship in crisis management is not one between NATO and ESDP, as such, but rather between NATO and EU bodies, more generally, including CFSP. In fact, for purposes of crisis management, for the EU these two sets of relationships and activities (CFSP and ESDP) are interdependent and extensions one of the other; and for NATO, it is important to work with both of the EU bodies. So far, the NATO relationship with ESDP is developing; but there is very little NATO interaction with non-ESDP bodies or processes in the EU; nor has either acquired the habits of mind or inclination to work effectively with the other. Thus, in the last two NATO annual crisis management exercises (CMX-04 and CMX-05), scenarios for "play" naturally led to overlap

between areas of responsibility for NATO and the EU, but the NATO "players" (senior NATO officials) gave virtually no thought to potential roles for the European Union.

A relationship between NATO and the EU is hardly more than a decade old; and it continues to proceed by fits and starts. The focus, however, should not be primarily on how NATO and ESDP should relate to one another, but rather on how NATO and the EU can best cooperate in undertaking crisis management activities, whether in Europe (e.g., related to terrorist attacks) or elsewhere. Here there is genuine complementarity and a significant potential for bringing to bear different skills and talents; here, as well, is where there is high likelihood of challenges that will require shared and coordinated responses. Thus, whereas NATO does have greater capacities to use military force in virtually any circumstance more demanding than tasks like extracting nationals at risk, humanitarian efforts, and some elements of "nation building," in crisis management, from start to finish, the EU, at least on paper, has some natural advantages. NATO comes into play almost always after it is asked to respond by political authorities that have, separately, been trying to achieve ends through non-military means. By contrast, the EU can be engaged in all aspects of a crisis, from the first moments of concern (CFSP) through the use of military force, if need be (ESDP). This is, at least on paper, a seamless process.

The immediate requirement is for NATO and the EU to create both processes and some formal institutional structure for managing crises, together. The techniques are straightforward; the politics are not. But if either institution is to be effective in meeting tomorrow's demands, this is a requirement for shared success. This should begin with creation of a joint staffs on intelligence sharing (within the limits imposed by national intelligence agencies), political coordination, and response – in all areas, civilian and military, pertinent to crisis management and action. Allied Command Transformation should increase the role for non-military staff and non-military considerations at its Norfolk headquarters, as well as at Joint Headquarters Lisbon, which should be used as a critical link to continental Europe and the EU, and it should offer its full range of services to the European Union and include EU personnel directly in its work. For its part, the EU should include NATO liaison officers at every appropriate level of its own crisis management structures.

Coordination and cooperation in crisis management, then, is the area where NATO and the EU most need to be creative in the period immediately ahead. This can be far more productive than the sterile debates in recent years about the relative merits and competencies of NATO and ESDP; it can contribute to dealing with common threats that have emerged in recent years, including international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and a congeries of other threats;

and, perhaps most important, it can create the kind of partnership that these two institutions need to have if either – and either's membership countries – are to succeed in meeting the challenges and opportunities of this new era.

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Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership: NATO's Transformation and ESDP

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A challenged and challenging Europe Impact on NATO-EU-US relations

by

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After the Cold War and ahead of the events of September 11, 2001, a new Europe, deeper and wider, and a transformed NATO, larger and increasingly global, transformed the Atlantic Alliance into a genuine partnership that global developments since 9/11 have challenged but not ruptured. Such progress should not be an invitation to complacency, however. This is a delicate moment for both the United States and the states of Europe, and failure to seize that moment would be costly. In coming years, past the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties in March 2007 and on our way to the 60th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 2009, the European Union (EU) and its members, NATO and the Alliance it serves, and the Transatlantic Partnership between the United States, the EU, and NATO will become either much more cohesive and stronger or much more divided and accordingly weaker.

Shaping this moment are several broad transitions that point to an idea of Europe that is being challenged from within the EU, even as its institutions might be poised to challenge the United States within NATO.

DE QUOI S'AGIT-IL? A CHALLENGED EUROPE

The first of these transitions is about the condition of Europe – and the final outcome of an integrative process that has already transformed much of the Old World from a mosaic of nation-states into a union of member-states. Historians will view this transformation as the most significant geopolitical development of the latter half of the 20th century. It has been truly awesome, and a New Europe today stands as a continent that is more peaceful, more democratic, more affluent, and more stable than at any time in the past.

That, of course, should be cause for satisfaction in the United States. That it would often be cause for some concern and even a source of EU-phobia that goes beyond past bursts of EU-bashing is, therefore, astonishing. If anything is to be learned from US-European relations in the 20th century, it is that the main cause for US concern should be a Europe that fails – a Europe, that is, which proves unable to end what it starts: whether a war, a revolution, a currency, or a union.

Yet, to respond to the challenges it now faces – which are questions of *modalités* rather than questions of *finalité*, as Joshka Fischer called them – the EU will need, in addition to sustained and credible US support:

Robust, steady, and evenly shared economic growth,

Stable and confident national leadership able to resist pressures from either extreme of the political spectrum,

Regional stability, including in the East but also, and now especially, in the South in the Greater Middle East, and

An effective locomotive previously consisting of at least two major EU members – France and Germany – but now demanding more and broader groupings of capable and relevant EU members.

These features are lacking, and in and beyond 2005 the EU may be more at risk than at any time in 20 to 30 years.

- Economic growth has been below potential for some time, and prospects for recovery in the euro-zone are below the levels expected elsewhere. The EU agenda for specific and credible reforms to complete the single market and respond to the competitive challenges of globalization is stalled. The 2000 Lisbon Agenda was still born, and prospects of a re-launch are limited. Demographic conditions are dire, and the consequences of a Europe whose population is turning smaller, older, and darker are potentially catastrophic. In short, the next round of economic reform is likely to be the responsibility of each nation-state rather than that of the Union's institutions.
- After years of government choices justified by institutional decisions over which local constituencies had little influence, citizens now view "Europe" as an obstacle to their right to be represented by their democratically elected representatives. Frustrated by the alleged neglect of their interests and priorities, voters have been turning against incumbent majorities. Over the past two years, strong governments became weak and weak governments even weaker. Such volatility opens the door to expedient populist appeals: whether aimed at Europe proper, or protective of Europe at the expense of America, or attentive to neither because of a growing sense of feeling abroad at home, these appeals are significant for both Europe's future and the future of its role in the world, with or in spite of the United States.
- Neither Germany nor France shows a capacity for the co-management of Europe, not only because of the internal conditions faced by each country but also because of growing differences in their respective visions of Europe's future. Indeed, there is no precedent of both countries simultaneously faced with such political disarray – one in the aftermath of inconclusive elections and the other while awaiting its next election. Changing Gerhard Schroeder with a coalition government that neither of Germany's two main political parties truly wants is unlikely to help much while Chirac stays in place does not help; in mid-2007, changing Chirac while Angela Merkel's coalition implodes will not help much either, irrespective of Chirac's replacement. In any case, other EU members have grown more hostile to such limiting bilateral control of their

institutions. But with the constitutional treaty stillborn, and the 2000 Nice Treaty ineffective, rules of governance that would help re-launch Europe are lacking.

- Europe's new insecurity grows out of its vulnerability to acts of terror, because of its geographic proximity, economic dependence, and political sensitivity to countries south of the Mediterranean where these acts might originate or from which they might be inspired. A wave of terrorism anywhere in Europe will quickly affect the national and institutional agendas everywhere else; so will an unarmed (but not passive) resistance movement – a European version of an urban *intifada* – that would emerge in opposition to the inequities and injustice that shape the lives of 20-odd million Muslim citizens in most EU countries. With many of the mythical "Arab streets" now in the national capitals of Old Europe, the political consequences of disruptions imported from, or attributed to, or initiated by "foreign" communities reinforce the adverse economic, political, and societal conditions suggested above.

In sum, the current EU crisis is fundamentally different from the recurring European crises of the past as it not:

- Personal – that is, attributable to the weakness or miscalculations of any single head of state or government in a leading EU member,
- Bilateral – that is, limited to a clash of ideas or interests between France or Britain, or any other bi- or multi-lateral grouping of significant EU member, or
- Circumstantial, that is defined by the most salient issue of the moment, like the Constitutional treaty or any part of enlargement, including the most recent decision to open negotiations with Turkey.

Now instead, the crisis is a structural crisis of perceived relevance:

- A structural crisis, because under prolonged conditions of sustained economic rigor and increasing political volatility the EU institutions can no longer accommodate their own enlargement, let alone more of it, unless they engage into significant reforms about which the 25 EU members do not seem to agree. But also
- A crisis of relevance, because for the past 15 years the Commission has promised more than it could deliver, while the heads of state and government have delivered, through the Council, more than their respective constituencies were willing to accept. For a European aged 30 years or less, in most but not all EU countries, the idea of Europe has produced a tale of unfulfilled promises over

their three main concerns for work and prosperity, security and safety, and even identity and a sense of community.

As a result, a mere change of leadership in one or more of the major national capitals, an improved economic conjecture in one or more of the key EU economies, a tedious top-down compromise over a single issue, or even a sense of urgency nurtured by a crisis abroad will not suffice to overcome the current stalemate. For the past 15 years, there has been too much stress on the institutions, too many crises within and between their members, and too many painful demands on their citizens. Indeed, however indispensable and even urgent a *relance* of the institutions might be, it would not be enough: it is the idea of Europe, too, that needs to be renewed by and within the member states to convince their citizens that whatever their problems may be these problems would be worse without the ever-closer Union which they are questioning. As stated by President Jose Manuel Barroso last June 2 – "Europe needs a big idea, a new consensus. We have to make the case for Europe." Absent such a case, the case against the case against Europe will be difficult to argue not only in Europe but also in the United States.

DE QUI S'AGIT-IL? A CHALLENGING EUROPE?

Thus challenged, Europe and its members may be tempted to turn inward, economically as well as politically. The paradox, however, is that even as Europe becomes a house without windows, it is increasingly penetrated by a world that the events of 9/11 have made more dangerous, more intrusive, more unpredictable, and all the more demanding of Europe's attention as America's capacity for leadership is widely questioned. As a result, a challenged Europe may also be a challenging Europe because even as an unfinished Union it is nonetheless a power in the world whose far-reaching influence responds to its global interests and relies on the transformative potential of its non-military capabilities.

In this context, the recent transatlantic debate over Europe's role in the world presented two extreme theses that distorted the respective conditions of both America and Europe on grounds of theory as well as on grounds of history. Robert Kagan's divide between power (meaning American power) and weakness (meaning Europe's weakness) not only misrepresented the nature of power as primarily if not exclusively military, but also overlooked the transformation of Europe as a significant pole of influence in the world. By the same token, Charles Kupchan's vision of Europe's rise as an adversarial counterweight of the United States exaggerated its interest in, and its

commitment to, building a counter-hegemonic coalition at the expense of its senior partner across the Atlantic.

The evidence does not warrant either of these theses. As a power in the world, the EU has moved its Common Foreign Policy beyond enlargement with an innovative European Neighborhood Policy designed to provide for a stability zone beyond its current Eastern borders and across the Mediterranean without taxing further the absorbing capacity of its institutions. In Iran and other parts of the Greater Middle East, the EU exerts its influence to avoid new conflicts and instabilities to which it is sensitive politically and economically as well as geographically. In an emerging multipolar world, the EU suffers from fewer "alliance handicaps" than any other likely pole, and as a result can engage ascending powers like China, or residual powers like Russia, that might otherwise achieve or protect their great power status under conditions of isolation or even alienation. Faced with the new security normalcy inaugurated by the acts of terror of September 11 in New York, and closer to Europe those of 3/11 in Madrid or 7/7 in London, the EU outlines a Common European Security Strategy and discusses ways to build up relevant organizational, material, and intelligence capabilities to assess, combat, prevent, or event preempt a threat that is acknowledged to be indivisible

There is nothing for the United States to fear in any of these areas, except the fear that changes might be sought in such absence of Euro-Atlantic cooperation as to create duplication rather than complementarity. The idea of complementarity describes a structure of power and weaknesses that now condition the global role that can be played by both America and Europe in an increasingly integrated Euro-Atlantic area – a role that speaks of cooperative counterparts rather than adversarial counterweights. It also conveys the sense of a transatlantic partnership that can remain "vital" even when it proves to be "partial" – meaning, several gradations of cohesion and follower-ship ranging from piqued silence to separate actions to willing cooperation in the pursuit of goals that are common to all the partners even when they are not evenly shared. Thus, the alliance need not impose on its members to pursue every mission together, but it does expect that all together its members will complete all missions. Denied permissible differences among its members, an alliance is permanently at the mercy of the next crisis when some of its members will be "troubled" by their partners' unwillingness to join a decision that remained short of a consensus because no amount of consultation could suffice to modify that decision to everyone's satisfaction.

The US renewed need for a united and strong Europe was acknowledged by President Bush upon his re-election in November 2004 after the limits of US military power had been shown in Iraq

while the fallacies of Europe's alleged weakness were revealed with an impressive display of EU influence in Ukraine and elsewhere. It is ironic, therefore, that the EU might now seem to be less prepared than the United States to respond to America's calls for institutional complementarity, not for lack of EU capabilities but for lack of coherence within the EU. During the Atlantic crisis over Iraq, US bilateral relations with some EU countries within NATO were closer than bilateral relations among EU countries, not only because the Bush administration wished for such a condition but because EU heads of state and government themselves sought it. So long as the EU and its members cannot speak with one reliable voice they will find it difficult to offer a credible alternative to the United States and NATO. The Constitutional treaty was designed to permit that single voice, and that is not the least of the items that should be salvaged from the treaty to re-launch the institutions and renew the idea of Europe.

Thus challenged by America to contribute to the transformation of the Alliance with a stronger and ever closer Union, Europe faces questions over which its members remain divided and which, therefore, they usually avoid: questions over Europe's relations with the United States and the "finality" of Euro-Atlantic relations; questions over Europe's role in the world, and the most effective ways to play that role; and even questions over the impact of the world on Europe, including that part of the world it used to rule, and the extent to which Europe should accommodate or deny that impact. These questions are "deeper" than the question of ESDP, and they are "broader" than the question of EU relations with NATO. They raise at least four sets of overlapping issues that help clarify a multiple use of the collective "we" and are themselves complementary:

- Clearer transparency within both the EU and NATO. For the Union, reforms mean, for example, the agonizing reappraisal of its rules of governance, including voting rules and budget rules, as well as a reappraisal of its core structures and related priorities. This is not the place to assess the failed constitutional debate or discuss the modalities of an intra-European deal over the next seven-year EU budget. Suffice it to say, however, that lacking institutional reforms and denied the resources required to satisfy its commitments and obligations an enlarged EU will be unlikely to do as much as needed but is likely to do far less than is wanted. In any case, assuming the best about the EU debate, a comparable debate is also needed within NATO. In the midst of NATO's unending enlargement, now centered on two upcoming summits in late 2006 and 2008, the traditional consensus needed before sending NATO into battle has become too large to be effective, but the ritual foursome known as the Quad, around which that consensus used to build, may well have become too small to be legitimate. Enlarging the quad to an additional two to three large

members (Italy, Spain, and Poland) under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General may be politically difficult but it is institutionally desirable. At a later date, the EU could also be invited to attend.

Closer intimacy in US-EU relations, reflective of America's special status as a non-member member state of the EU, but also of the EU's special role as a vital pole of power and influence in the world. For example, a new deal in US-EU relations might take the form of a broad Compact or Charter, first called by Chirac in February 1996, or it might aim at the completion of a transatlantic marketplace by a date certain – say, 2014. With most world economic powers less sensitive to US unilateral pressures for policy changes than in the past, a global monetary order will be best achieved with a closer cooperation between the United States and the EU over monetary policy, fiscal policy and exchange rates. US-EU relations with third countries also need to be coordinated further, with additional groups designed for consultation before decisions are made. Such groups would be especially helpful for developing complementary policies toward institutional orphans in Europe – meaning, European countries like Ukraine and Georgia that do not belong yet to either NATO or the EU. More broadly, and to instill energy from the top down, the EU and EU-US summits are venues that require transformation as well: U.S. participation to the opening dinner of one yearly EU summit would confirm the EU perception of a privileged relationship with the United States; it would also complement usefully the annual US-EU summits between the US president, the President of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission.

Better coordination between NATO and the EU, as two institutions whose parallel contributions to the war on global terror are indispensable if those wars are going to be both won and ended. However, because of known limits in NATO resources and culture – to deploy police forces pending the training of local forces, to promote the development of civil society, to stimulate economic development, and much more – NATO cannot suffice for stability-building missions. That being the case, the EU is a partner of choice for such missions, in a United Nations context whenever possible and outside that context whenever necessary. The principle ought to be convincing: Ask not what the EU can do for NATO, or NATO for the EU – but ask what NATO can do with the EU, and the EU with NATO: Whether this degree of postwar cooperation can be achieved with some efficacy in the future has already been tested in Kosovo and Afghanistan with some measure of success, but even as it is reinforced in those places it needs to be extended further and elsewhere, beginning, arguably, with Iraq.

More integrated EU-US-NATO relations – meaning, the development of institutional venues that regroup the 32 EU and NATO members into a Euro-Atlantic community of like-minded states that

are privileged partners even when they do not belong to both of the institutions that define that community. The need for complementarity of action between the United States and the states of Europe in both the EU and NATO is based on a new multipolarity that has been emerging faster than its proponents had predicted, and which is already affecting America's and Europe's respective roles in the world. In such a multipolar environment, Europe is a pole with few alliance handicaps, but lacking political unity and military capabilities, Europe will still need a like-minded partner of choice that compensates for its weaknesses – meaning the United States.

A CHALLENGED AND CHALLENGING ALLIANCE

The transatlantic partnership remains a complex imbalance of states and institutions – an alliance that endures even as it is troubled, unhinged, and even fading. No more than before can this be the long-announced end of the alliance, but it is surely the end of an era. At issue is the legitimacy of the two ideas that have defined this remarkable relationship for half-a-century: the legitimacy of U.S. leadership, exercised with, and on behalf of, an ever-larger Atlantic community represented most visibly by a powerful Atlantic Alliance and its Organization, as well as the legitimacy of the allies' integration into an ever-closer Union, represented most convincingly by the EU institutions.

That both America and Europe have the will to re-launch their partnership was shown convincingly in early 2005. But for the launch to reach the high point of renewal will need convincing demonstrations of efficacy over a range of issues that the United States and its allies can neither neglect for long nor pursue alone with meaningful success. First things first, second things first, third things first, and small things first – there is some urgency for a wide range of issues that threaten to unveil a new global anarchy with inescapable consequence on both sides of the Atlantic. How well those urgencies are not only acknowledged but also, and more significantly addressed – and assuming they are, how well and by whom is no less dependent on Europe's decisions over its own future and the role its members wish to assume collectively than on America's own decisions as a preponderant power that gives its like-minded partners of choice a right of first refusal even if it is not always prepared to abstain in their absence.

For the transatlantic partnership to be renewed Europe needs to re-launched; for the transatlantic partnership to be re-launched Europe needs to be renewed. To achieve their shared interests in order, America needs to soften its hard power, and Europe needs to harden its soft power. That America's military preponderance is beyond the immediate reach of any friend, rival or adversary, is not in question. But as shown in the unipolar context of the war in Iraq, and as confirmed within

the multipolar environment that is now being tested in Iran, even a power without peers cannot remain for long without allies. Whether the countries of Europe will respond to the US call as a Union rather than one capital at a time will depend on how they respond to their current institutional crisis: if not in the EU, where; if not with NATO, how; if not with America, with whom?

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NATO-EU Crisis Management Cooperation: Lessons learned and Prospects

by

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"[T]he scope and reach of our [EU] crisis management activities has expanded enormously. ..... Let me be clear: what we are doing is not about replacing NATO. Nor is it about militarizing the Union. It is about effective crisis management. About increasing the role of the European Union as a promoter of stability and security."[1]

I. Introduction and Overview

Without going very deeply into how we got to where we are today and how the promise of the end of the Cold War has not materialized, it is clear to all of us that we live in a difficult world that poses many challenges. The most serious of these are generally accepted to be terrorism, the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and what most have come to refer to as failed or failing states. The worst combination is, of course, all three in the same package. A failed or failing state that supports terrorism while, at the same, it pursues a WMD capability that it may transfer to terrorists.

In 1989 and perhaps even as late as the early 1990's we briefly thought that we would live in a peaceful, happy world in which we could turn our attention to solving the most fundamental problems of humanity to include poverty, disease, and hunger. That "dream", if we can call it thus, has not and will not materialize probably for quite a long time (if ever).

We live in a very difficult world in which the trans-Atlantic community has no choice but to respond to the threat of local and regional conflict, the terrorist threat, the threat inherent in the proliferation of WMD, while also coping with the problems that result from failed or failing states.

It is not for the first time, that the partners of Europe and North America have to rise to a serious challenge and, most likely, it will not be the last time, but if we do not tackle these problems together, there will be no lasting solution. On the very gloomy side, some so-called experts on both sides of the Atlantic (though for different reasons) have asserted that the time for NATO has passed. They contend that the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have removed NATO's raison d'être. Others claim that more than at any time in the past 50 years, the partnership is under stress precisely at a time when it must act in unison and that urgent repairs to the Alliance are required. Many blame the U.S. involvement in Iraq since 2003for the problems in the transatlantic relationship, but in my opinion this is a short-sighted and largely incorrect perception and glosses over the endemic problems in the Alliance that have existed since the early 1990's.

[1] Javier Solana, "Europe's International Role," a speech delivered in Bratislava on 9 November 2005, p.4.

On the other hand, there are many who remain firmly tied to the conviction that NATO is not only as necessary as it has always been, but must have an ever-more important role in confronting the security challenges of the 21st Century not only in and near Europe but in a much wider region perhaps even world-wide. I am, of course, on the side of those who contend that NATO has a critical mission that it alone can accomplish but that it must continue to transform to meet new and evolving threats. And, it must fulfill this role in full partnership with the EU and other international organizations.

II. NATO and the EU as Twin Pillars of Security

We all know and understand that the twin pillars of NATO and the EU are really not entirely separate entities at all since there is a major overlap in membership and, most importantly, a profound commonality of interests that must transcend the problems and differences that exist as a result of the coalition action in Iraq and other strains on the transatlantic relationship. There can be no questions that, in the final analysis, the fundamental aims, objectives, and goals of both NATO and the EU are quite similar. What's really puzzling to many of us (I believe on both sides of the Atlantic) is why they cannot work together in a much more coordinated and coherent fashion.

As Dr. Patrick Hardouin, NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy said not too long ago:

> "Today, no organization, neither NATO, nor the EU, nor the UN, (and you could add the OSCE to this list) is on its own able to provide for the security needs of its members *across the full security spectrum* (conflict prevention, peace enforcement and peacekeeping/peace building). But when they work together, they have greater chances to successfully tackle the challenges for the new century.
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> The key international elements of such an international security network are already in place: the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations. Individually, each of these institutions reflects a distinct approach to security. Together, they offer a chance to establish a new quality of security."[2]

The bases for the necessary coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU are in place. Here I will review only a couple of brief highlights:

[2] Remarks by Dr. Patrick Hardouin, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy – paper presented during a conference in Bonn, Germany.

- On 10 December 1991, the Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance was signed. Essentially, the signatories agreed to "develop a genuine European Security and Defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters." It was clear that this goal would be reached in phases and that the WEU "will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance." The agreement recognized NATO "as the defence component of the European Union" and saw its own new efforts "as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."
- The 1999 Helsinki decision in support of its Common Foreign and Security policy established that the European Union should have an autonomous capability to take crisis response decisions where NATO is not or would not be engaged. While this decision may have caused a bit of concern in some quarters, the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy established a basis for close cooperation in the areas of crisis management, terrorism, WMD proliferation and the development of plans to assure access to NATO's planning capability and stressed basic principles of strategic partnership with NATO.
- Then in March 2003, there was the "Berlin Plus" agreement that today forms the basis for practical work in crisis management between the two organizations and permits the Alliance to support EU-led military operations in case the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.
- May 2003 saw the establishment of the NATO-EU Capability Group what has become a forum for planning of capabilities, development, and mutual reinforcement between NATO's Prague Commitment and the EU's European Capabilities Action Plan.

The question is whether or not the above measures and agreements and other declarations of common interest and objective are, in fact, the basis for the close cooperation that is required to cope with today's challenges. Or, perhaps the better question is: If they are the basis for good cooperation and mutual understanding, are they efficiently and effectively utilized, and does the required and promised close coordination actually exist?

There has been cooperation on some major operations notably in Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which were facilitated especially as a result of the Berlin Plus agreement. But, the major feature of these operations has been that the EU took over some of the responsibilities that NATO had handled up until the time of the take-over. There was close coordination between the EU and NATO leading up to and after the agreement on the hand-over of

responsibility, a shift of some resources, and there has also been agreement that NATO would continue to provide support under Berlin Plus.

- With specific reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU began preparations in January 2003 to activate its first large mission "Operation Althea", which became fully operational in December 2004.

- In the meantime, the EU also activated Operation Concordia which took over from NATO's Operation Allied Harmony on March 31 2003. Operation Concordia was itself terminated on December 15, 2003 and replaced by Operation Proxima.

Overall, the official EU and NATO position is that all is well and that the coordination mechanisms have worked. Indeed, a review of how NATO and the EU view each other based on what is published on their respective web sites and in a whole host of official documents and pronouncements, leaves one with the general impression that relations and coordination between NATO and the EU on security related matters are quite close. But, is this really the case?

Several recent reports including one to NATO's Parliamentary Assembly note that despite the present climate of improving transatlantic relations, the NATO-EU dialogue has reached an impasse and that the agenda of joint EU-NATO meetings is limited to the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreements and largely theoretical discussion of capabilities in NATO-EU Capability Group. What appears to be lacking is a genuine effort to coordinate and cooperate in the event of a future crisis.

Moreover, and from a personal perspective, during several meetings I have recently attended it is clear that official contact between the EU and NATO staffs is highly scripted and not at all conducive to effective and smooth coordination. Apparently most, if not all joint meetings concentrate on mundane and uncomplicated issues deferring a meaningful discussion on a whole host of important issues. On the other hand, these same NATO and EU officers told me that informal discussions based on personal contacts and conducted mostly on the margins of official meetings have been quite successful in discussing problem areas and in promoting mutual understanding. If this is indeed as it appears, then NATO and the EU have much work to do in order to realize the potential of a smooth and effective working relationship. The losers are not only the citizens of the 19 nations who hold a common membership in both organizations but rather all those who may one day have to rely on the assistance of the transatlantic community in a time of desperate crisis or conflict. All in this room and far beyond know full well that effective

cooperation and close coordination must be planned, practiced, trained, exercised, and nurtured. It is almost impossible to respond adequately to an emergency unless the mechanisms to do so are in place well ahead of time – their absence can and most likely will compound any disaster.

III. Transformation and Co-operation in Stabilization and Reconstruction

Military transformation has become the cause celebre of the first decade of the 21st Century. In fact, for NATO transformation began after the fall of the Soviet Union but even then it was not new. NATO has never been a status quo Alliance and has been transforming since its creation. The same thing may be said for the EU which has been evolving and transforming itself since it was known as the Common Market. But, for the sake of this discussion, it is best to recognize the considerable efforts that have accelerated the transformation process especially since 9/11. To meet the threats of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and failed of failing states, NATO and the EU have no choice but to transform. More must be done with less than at any time in our modern history.

From a strictly military perspective there has been increasing recognition in European capitals that gradual reform will not meet today's security challenges. Military formations recruited, trained, and equipped to fight a major land war in Europe have limited utility to meet today's security requirements. Light, deployable, highly mobile, multi-tasked and multi-capable forces are required. Most, if not all, have recognized the need for what I would term "whole force transformation" that includes not only the military but in a larger context, the full panoply of security capabilities.

Limited budgets necessitate difficult choices. Available resources must be expended wisely and should concentrate on the selection of appropriate capabilities that may be shared with partners. Few EU or NATO nations can field the broad spectrum of military capabilities that may be required to respond to today's contingencies. Specialization and sharing of some critical capabilities are key – and this must be a two-way street. No nation can rely totally on its own resources and an equitable relationship in the sale and acquisition of modern weapons and support systems is essential. This applies to all. Inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication will no longer be acceptable.

For the moment, I will avoid the debate of what I see as a requirement to integrate in a seamless continuum security and military forces who must respond to current threats and especially the threat of major terrorism, which is likely, and the threat of WMD use which must be considered far less likely. But I will say that we must all continue to consider and, if possible plan to activate a full

response capability that is able to mitigate the effects of attacks ranging from small terrorist acts resulting in few casualties to a mass-casualty attack.

I would, however, like to address very briefly a special interest and concern. With considerable direct, on-the-ground direct experience in observing and dealing with the consequences of conflict and military intervention, I have long been aware that the aftermath of conflict has far too often been left to those who are least equipped to deal with the death and destruction modern war leaves in its wake – the civilian population. Although the international community has now come to recognize that post-conflict stabilization and recovery is essential, far too often, aid to rebuild has been slow or absent.

- Viet Nam 1968-71, Afghanistan 1978-79, the Iran-Iraq War 1980-88, India-Pakistan crisis in 1999, Tajikistan Civil War 1995-96, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-97, Albania, 1997, Croatia (Eastern Slavonia) 1997-98, Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003

I was a first-hand participant and/or on scene observer in each of these conflicts or crisis situations. None benefited from an effective (or even ineffective) post-conflict or post-military involvement Stabilization and Reconstruction effort in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Yes, international assistance would reach some after a considerable time had elapsed and after the depravations and suffering of the population had increased and aggravated an often desperate situation but the international community absolutely must do better in the future. I will discuss this topic extemporaneously as time permits.

In closing, I am reminded of two of my favored sayings attributed to one of America's founding fathers who said:
We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.
and
All mankind is divided into three classes: those that are immovable, those that are movable, and those that move.

We, in the transatlantic community must move to make ours better more peaceful world. We have not choice but to do our best to meet today's challenges or we will suffer the consequences.

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International Conference

Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership: NATO's Transformation and ESDP

ROME, 21 NOVEMBER 2005

Centro Alti Studi Difesa (CASD)
Palazzo Salviati, Piazza della Rovere, 83
Rome, Italy

Roadmap for a Renewed Security Partnership

by

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

I see it as my role to discuss not only the positive aspects but also the critical points in the transatlantic partnership, more precisely what binds us together and what could cause us to drift apart. A reorientation in transatlantic relations is not unusual. However, the stage we have reached is particularly striking. November 9, 1989 and September 11, 2001 and possibly the natural desasters in 2004/2005 changed Germany, Europe, the US, transatlantic relations and, ultimately, the world as a whole.

The peaceful revolution of 1989 transformed Europe and reunited Germany. The second key date is September 11, 2001. The acts of terrorism committed that day accelerated and changed international developments. New threats were recognized. The experience of September 11 led to a new view of the world, first in the US and then in Europe as well. The altered awareness in the US following September 11 was underestimated by many Europeans at first. On the other hand, it is not generally known in the US why the majority of Europeans, and Germans in particular, felt disconcerted and alienated by the Bush administration's rhetoric and policy after 9/11. Finally, the recent natural desasters in Southeast Asia, in the US and in Kashmir should provide the global actors with a trigger to speed up the process of addressing the non-military global security challenges, be it natural and humanitarian disasters, climate change, infectious and endemic diseases, the fight against poverty or the protection of natural resources. In a rational pursuit of our national interests, it is key to focus on our joint vision and policy of one world.

Since 9/11, well-known categories seem to be free-floating, the system of reference is gone. Power, security and the way to achieve them must be redefined. After the Cold War, Europe was forced to realize that neither US involvement in Europe nor an automatic convergence of interests on both sides of the Atlantic could be taken for granted. Europe finds itself in a constant balancing act trying to complete European integration while at the same time maintaining close transatlantic ties. We Germans, due to our historic ties with the US, feel especially challenged by this: without the US or without Europe we would not be what we are now. There is a specific double bind that we cannot and will not neglect when shaping and pursuing our interests.

We all are aware of the fact that with the end of the Cold War the transatlantic relationship and Europe's geostrategic setting after 1989 have given rise to unavoidable changes. I would ask everyone not to regard changes as negative from the outset. Despite these geostrategic changes, if we were to cling to the modes of conduct and ideas which reflected Western Europe's geostrategic

situation during the Cold War, we would undermine rather than strengthen the partnership across the Atlantic. I would therefore like to see a new Atlanticism emerge through a reform of transatlantic policies and institutions, especially within NATO, through deepening the relationship between NATO and the EU and the relationship between the US and the EU. That President Bush met with NATO and EU leaders on the same day during his visit to Europe was an excellent signal in this regard.

What has changed strategically?

In the US consciousness the main sources of conflicts have shifted to other problems and, in geographical terms, to the Middle East and to certain parts of Asia. In a stable European order of peace, the centuries-old German question has been resolved by united Germany's membership in the EU and NATO. Both sides of the Atlantic can and should rejoice that Germany is no longer a cause or at the center of a crisis. We perceived this conflict as a European or – we Germans – even as a local German crisis. in the past, Europe had strategic importance for the US as an importer of security because it was at the heart of a global conflict and was therefore totally dependent on the US guaranteeing its security. Europe's main relevance today is due to its willingness and ability to help resolve problems in other crisis regions, i. e. as an exporter of stability and security. European politicians must now examine whether they want to reorient either in order to be relevant to the US or because they, just like the US, believe that their security and interests are at stake. Mind you, this is about the strategic orientation of the US away from a global conflict with Europe at its epicenter towards other regions (for example, the Middle East) and towards other issues (for example, the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). At the same time, we must seek a new consensus in security policy on whether, where and under what conditions, we are prepared to use military means to protect our security, interests and values.

There is another factor. In contrast to the situation during the Cold War in Europe, in regional conflicts such as the one in Iraq, the US is no longer dependent on its European allies in order to prevail in purely military terms. In the final analysis, the military victory in Iraq was not won because of the support of other European partners. This decrease in military dependency in wars has not only military but also political consequences. A country which believes it is no longer dependent on military support but seeks support for political reasons will begin to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of partnerships. That will influence the extent to which a country is prepared to show consideration for the interests and viewpoints of potential partners.

During the Cold War, certain political and military decisions in the US would not have been made against the express wishes of key European partners in NATO. Although the European members of NATO were completely dependent on the US for their security at that time, they nonetheless welded much influence. Prior to the Iraq war, there was a debate in Washington on whether, on political grounds, the US should still show consideration to those who doubted not only the tactics but also the goals and strategy of US policy. Or whether for the sake of protecting the autonomy of US military action and the clarity of its own objective, it would not be better, if need be, for the US to pursue its course alone and do without critical and excessively self-confident partners. After all, there were always partners who, although they did not support every tactical detail of Washington's decisions, did support its strategic orientation.

This change in thinking in some Washington circles was no longer based on the premise that solidarity among all NATO partners was the key prerequisite for military action. It was therefore no coincidence that, following 9/11, the NATO offer to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty was not taken up in Washington. If the US were to carry out an emergency unilateral action (which a priori the US does not want but has not ruled out either) or if a Coalition of the Willing were to replace action by NATO as a whole, this would have serious consequences for NATO.

One result of the difficult situation in post-war Iraq is that those in Washington who are in favor of partners and alliances have again gained ground. While it still is doubtful for some politicians in Washington whether European partners are needed to win a war militarily, it has become obvious that they are needed to win the peace. Beyond this, the concept of the transformation of the Greater Middle East requires not only the cooperation of local partners in the region but also a functioning partnership of the community of transatlantic democracies. Therefore, it is only logical that, during the last year, President Bush and several of his key advisors have emphasized their support for a strong Europe. In view of this changed debate in Washington, we Europeans should seize the occasion and, jointly with our American partners, develop concepts and strategies to renew and intensify transatlantic relations.

Both clarity about our own interests and detailed knowledge of the other side are essential as a starting point for developing common ground in the future. In order to reach a new transatlantic perspective, common ground and differences between American and European interests and security cultures must be considered rationally. In my view there might be differences in the hierarchy of our interests and values. But we agree on the fundamentals. Therefore, it is perfectly justified to talk of a transatlantic community of interests and values. This differing hierarchization

of interests and values is not new, however. In the past, it contributed to the ambivalent image which Europeans and Americans had of each other.

Many in the US have ambivalent if not negative feelings concerning an ever solidifying EU not only competing in global economic markets but also organizing its military capabilities via ESDP and even recently, after long negotiations, solving its headquarters question. In the past, the recurrent European leitmotiv of ESDP being a strong European pillar of NATO and not a contender in the wings did not find many believers in the US. Sometimes it seemed that, with certain US critics, the only acceptable reason for the existence of ESDP would be that it might help Europeans spend more money on defence. In addition, an uneasiness has been existing in the US over EU members of NATO forming a European caucus and coming to the Atlantic table with a prefixed non-negotiable European position.

During the Cold War, the US was in favour of a strong European pillar of NATO. That European pillar was desirable to the US on the assumption that it would help counterbalance the Soviet threat, relieve the US of the danger of being drawn into regional armed conflicts and would not represent a competing entity. In view of the development which Europe has undergone in the last few years and decades, it is understandable that there was growing concern, particularly in the US, that this stronger Europe is transforming itself into a second rival pole in the West. In the final analysis, I do not believe there is any real danger that Europe will endeavor to define itself in opposition to the US. Nor is there a majority for this following the enlargement of the European Union.

The reason is: Defining Europe in opposition to the US would definitely not be in Europe's or Germany's interests. However, I would also like to contradict those in the US who believe that an increased European strength in the sphere of foreign and security policy would be a negative development. The opposite is true! Europe's lack of effectiveness is one of the central problems in transatlantic relations. A Europe incapable of taking effective action has little global influence. The US would quickly lose interest in a weaker Europe. A weak Europe would also weaken transatlantic ties. A Europe which, as a result of its weakness, sees no hope of exerting influence on the US would, out of a sense of frustration, turn either away from or even against the US. Europe should have weight in the US but should not define itself as a counterweight to the US.

It is because we want to strengthen the basis for a joint transatlantic future that Europeans are in favor of making Europe more effective.

I agree as well with those who exhort Europeans to modernize and enlarge their military capabilities. But leaving aside the question of military capabilities - most of us Europeans, even more so us Germans, strongly believe that the soft approach pays off in the long run. The fact that for a long time only within a NATO framework there was sufficient European military clout is part but not all of the backdrop to this characteristic. As Kagan puts it, the EU has become a "gigantic political and economic magnet", its most attractive tool being enlargement or what Robert Cooper calls "the lure of membership". That means the EU is gradually enlarging the zone of peace, stability and prosperity along its expanding border. The EU's "soft" approach of cooperation and its political attractiveness has proved to be very effective in Europe.

The handling of the Ukrainian change of power was an excellent example of how the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy acted in a smooth and concerted way. The EU made sensible use of its new member Poland, the excellent personal relations between Chancellor Schröder and President Putin and the good offices of High Representative Solana. The initiative was backed by the EU presidency and member states, without locking the US out. I am convinced that such fine examples of smart multilateralism will become more and more numerous.

We alone cannot shape the ideal world that corresponds to our interests, values and dreams. One thing is certain however, the EU needs the US, and vice versa, be it in the war on terrorism, the fight against weapons of mass destruction or any of the crisis areas mentioned or still lurking. What we most ardently need is the common insight that the EU and the US, NATO and ESDP have complementary approaches and powers. No problem in the world can be solved faster and better when the transatlantic partners choose to approach it without the other. Why not follow the recent proposal of a "double-track initiative" fighting against terrorism and engaging the Islamic world? It should include credible law enforcement, military containment and more of the tools of the politics of power, while at the same time leading an active dialogue with Muslim cultures and societies.

I would like to respond to the growing number of people in recent times who take a skeptical view of transatlantic relations - and they are to be found on both sides of the Atlantic - with the following argument: I believe that transatlantic relations are just as important now as they were in the past. The US rightly regards itself as an "indispensable nation" but Europe should, with the same right, see itself as an "indispensable partner". Incidentally, that goes not only for military and economic issues but, ultimately, also for issues related to our democratic culture and even for environmental protection. If Europe and the US were to oppose each other, this would jeopardize the chance of achieving security and democracy in many parts of the world.