


THE FUTURE OF GULF SECURITY: GCC, US AND EUROPEAN VIEWS

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA)

The Stanley Foundation

Dubai, 28-30/V/2005

- a. Workshop agenda
- b. List of participants
1. The challenge of our age: avoiding "forever war" / Michael Ryan Kraig (9 p.)
2. What the US does right and wrong in dealing with Tehran? Suggested changes in US policy for a more secure Gulf / Yaccoub Hyatti (4 p.)
3. Strategy, security, and war in Iraq: the United States and the Gulf in the 21st century / James A. Russell (18 p.) [pubbl. in Cambridge review of international affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2005, p. 281 - 299, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/biolinks/russell/CCAM%2018-2%20Russell.pdf>]
4. Realistic solutions for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis / Michael Ryan Kraig (7 p.) [pubbl. come The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, April 2005, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/GSI05pab.pdf>]
5. Political & Security Brief, April 2005 / Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (8 p.) [<http://www.inegma.com/politicalsecuritybriefApr05.html>]
6. The United States and the Muslim World: Critical Issues and Opportunities for Change / The Stanley Foundation (6 p.) [pubbl. come The Stanley Foundation Policy Bulletin, January 15, 2005 : [<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/USMwa05pb.pdf>]
7. Strategic issues in the Northern Gulf: scenarios & policy options for the GCC and the coalition / Sami M. Al-Faraj (13 p.)
8. Terrorism / Sami M. Al-Faraj (5 p.)
9. Consortium of research institutes project on Regional co-operation and security in the Middle East and North Africa (2 p.)
10. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (3 p.)





Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (FZ - LLC)

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The Future of Gulf Security: GCC, US, and European Views

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in association with INEGMA

May 28-30, 2005

JW Marriott Hotel, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

May 27, 2005


Dear Sir/Mme,

Welcome to the workshop on "Future of Gulf Security." Hope you find discussions in the next couple of days fruitful and productive. On behalf of the Stanley Foundation and INEGMA, I would like to thank you for accepting our invitation to this workshop, which we hope it would be to the benefit of all concerned parties. You will find along with this letter all the information that you need concerning the workshop - like the agenda and list of participants.

We hope you find your stay at the JW Marriott a pleasant experience. The organizers will cover the expenses for your accommodation and meals at the restaurants designated in the workshop's agenda (schedule). Organizers will not cover meals at other restaurants not included in the official program. Participants must have all their meals at the Marketplace restaurant in the hotel throughout their stay, with the exception of dinners on May 28, 29 and 30 and lunch on May 29 (see workshop schedule). Participants will be responsible for all other extra and personal expenses - like mini bar, laundry, telephone calls, alcoholic drinks and room service. Participants' spouses can benefit from free accommodation and breakfast throughout their stay as well as formal dinners on May 28, 29 and 30. Those who wish to stay extra days after the workshop and benefit from the special rate given by the hotel must contact the organizers or hotel staff ahead of time.

Wish you a pleasant stay in Dubai. If you need any assistance during your stay please contact INEGMA Events' Coordinator Rasha Kayyal on 0504650692. Alternatively you can talk to Riad Kahwaji and Michael Kraig at the workshop.

Best Regards
Riad Kahwaji



The Future of Gulf Security: GCC, US, and European Views

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in association with INEGMA

May 28-30, 2005

JW Marriott Hotel, Abu Baker Al Siddique Road
Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Workshop Agenda

Saturday, May 28, 2005

05:00 p.m. Room check-in

07:00 p.m. Reception

08:00 p.m. Dinner/Keynote speaker *HE Bader Bin Hamad Al Bousaeidi*
(Salon A, Deira Ballroom)

Sunday, May 29, 2005 (Salon A, Deira Ballroom)

08:00 a.m. Buffet breakfast at Marketplace Restaurant

09:00-11:00 Session I: The Ambitions of External Powers and Mixed Regional Perceptions

- US and global pressures for democratization and liberalization
- US goals vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq
- The US and European stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict
- The differences between European and US goals: Perceptions from the region
- Likely changes in the second Bush administration: A return to pragmatism?

Moderator: **Chas W. Freeman**, Middle East Policy Council

Presenter: Chas Freeman – “Areas of Common Agreement Among all US Factions on National Security Goals in the Middle East and Gulf.”

Presenter: Stefano Silvestri – “Areas of Common Agreement Among Most European Officials and Analysts on Europe’s Role in the Region.”

11:00-11:15 Coffee Break

11:15-13:00 **Session I Resumes.**

Presenter: Dr. Abdul Kareem Dakhael – “Areas of GCC Common Agreement on Security, Foreign Policy, and Development Goals and Methods”.

13:00-15:00 Lunch Break at Zabeel Room

15:00-16:30 Session II: Transnational, Intra-National, and Developmental Aspects of Regional Security

- Border security, smuggling, proliferation, and terrorism:
 - What types of terrorism and illicit trade now exist and fed by which groups?
 - Is transnational-based proliferation more of a threat than state-led nuclear proliferation in the region?
- Ethnic and religious trends: What future schisms may escalate international as well as transnational and intra-national conflict in the region?
- Assessment of overall effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Gulf security and stability, including attempts to stabilize Iraq
- Strategic Economic Issues: Oil vs. Economic Diversification for the Long Term
- Political and Social Developments: Human Resource Issues and the Status of Women and Expatriates.

Moderator: **Chas W. Freeman**, Middle East Policy Council

Presenter: Abdel Nabi Ikry – “Steps Toward a Unified Approach to Human Resource and Economic/Political Development Issues.”

16:30-16:45 Coffee Break

16:45-18:15 Session II Resumes.

Presenter: Sami Faraj – “Steps that outside powers could take to stabilize Iraq in a way that respects GCC Interests and Concerns.”

18:15 End of Session II

19:15 Gather in Lobby for dinner

19:30 Bus Leaves to Dinner at Al-Hallab Lebanese Restaurant.

22:30 Bus returns to Hotel.

Monday, May 30, 2005

08:00-09:00 Buffet breakfast at Marketplace restaurant

09:00-11:00 Session III: The Future of Iran and Its Relations With GCC States and External Powers

- Iran’s conventional and nuclear ambitions: GCC Perceptions of the Threat
- Iran’s current and evolving relations with individual GCC states
- Iran’s economic relations: opportunities for advancement?

Moderator: Michael Yaffe, National Defense University

Presenter: Yaccoub Hyatti – “What the US Does Right and Wrong in Dealing With Tehran:

Suggested Changes in US Policy for a More Secure Gulf.”

Presenter: Michael Kraig: “A New US-European-Arab Joint Strategy for Dealing with Iran: Crafting a Mutually Beneficial Security Environment.”

11:00-11:15 Coffee Break

11:15-13:00 **Session IV: The Future of Gulf Security as a Whole: What is the “Ideal Gulf Security Environment” From a GCC Standpoint?**

- Ideal US security and foreign policies
- Ideal Iranian development and Iraqi developments
- Ideal evolution of liberalization and development agendas

Moderator: **Riad Kahwaji**, INEGMA

Presenter: Dr. Ahmad Abdel Malak – “Impact of bilateral agreements between US/EU and Arab Gulf States on GCC unity and future.”

Presenter: Saif Bin Hashel AL Maskary – “New forms of multilateral engagement in the Gulf, including the issue of Iran's relations with GCC states.”

13:00-15:00 Lunch Break at Marketplace Restaurant

15:00-16:00 **Session moderators prepare summary of discussion and recommendations.**

16:00-16:15 Coffee Break

16:15-18:00 **Final Wrap-Up Session to discuss recommendations and future plans.**

19:15 Gather in Lobby for dinner

19:30 Bus Leaves to Dinner at Shabestan Restaurant- Intercontinental Hotel

22:30 Bus returns to Hotel.

Tuesday May 31

8:00 Breakfast at Marketplace restaurant

12:00 p.m. All must check out of hotel by noon.

7.55

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Car at 6:00
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List of Participants

The Future of Gulf Security: GCC, US, and European Views

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in association with INEGMA

May 28-30, 2005

JW Marriott Hotel, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Organizers:

Mr. Riad **Kahwaji**, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, The Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) in Dubai, Lebanon. X

Dr. Michael **Kraig**, Middle East & Gulf Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation, USA. X

Participants:

1. **HE Bader Bin Hamad Al Bousaeidi**, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oman
2. Dr. Badr **Al-Hinai**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oman. *American Bureau*
3. Mr. Saif bin Hashil **Al-Maskery**, Head of Center for Research and Consultancy, Modern College of Business and Science; Member State Council & Member GCC Consultative Council, Oman. *only anti*
4. Mr. Ibrahim **Al-Abed**, Director of Emirates News Agency, United Arab Emirates.
5. Mr. Youssef **Ibrahim**, Managing Director, Strategic Energy Investment Group (SEIG), United Arab Emirates
6. Dr. Ahmad **Al-Banna**, Dubai Chamber of Commerce, United Arab Emirates
7. Dr. Ebtesam Kitbi, Professor at U.A.E. University, United Arab Emirates. X
8. Mr. Ahmad Thani Obeid **Al-Muheiri**, Ministry of Defense, United Arab Emirates.
9. Ms. Isabelle **Martin**, Political Officer, Embassy of Canada in UAE, Canada.
10. Mr. Abdel Nabi **Ikry**, Researcher, Bahrain Center for Studies and Research, Kingdom of Bahrain.
11. Ambassador Dr. Dhafer **Alumran**, Director of Bilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Bahrain — *anti*
12. **Sheikha Aisha Bint ahmed Al Khalifa**, Political Researcher, Bahrain Center for Studies and Research, Kingdom of Bahrain.

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X

13. Dr. Ahmad **Abdel Malak**, Political Analyst at the Authority of Radio and TV, Lecturer at Qatar University, Qatar.
14. Dr. Sami **Faraj**, President of the Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies, Kuwait. *Dr. Faraj Faraj*
15. Dr. Yaccoub **Hyatti**, Member of GCC Consultative Council, Kuwait. —
16. Dr. Othman **Al-Rawaf**, Academic, Saudi Writer, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. *Boh*
17. Mr. Abdel Karim **Dakhael**, Chairman of Political Science Department, King Saud University, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
18. Dr. Katja **Niethamme**, Middle East Research Group, SWP, Germany.
19. Prof Stefano **Silvestri**, President of Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, Italy.
20. Dr. Alberto **Bin**, NATO, Head Regional Affairs and Mediterranean Dialogue Section, Brussels.
21. Dr. John Duke **Anthony**, President and Chief Executive Officer, The National Council on US-Arab Relations, USA.
22. Captain John **Wood**, USN, PhD, Director of Political-Military Affairs, US Naval Central Command in Bahrain, USA.
23. Ambassador Chas W. **Freeman**, President, Middle East Policy Council, USA.
24. Mr. Alan **Eyre**, Iran Issues, Consulate General of the United States of America in Dubai, USA.
25. Mr. Michael J. **Carver**, Economic Officer, Consulate General of the United States of America in Dubai, USA.
26. Mr. Ashish **Katkar**, Embassy of the United States of America in Abu Dhabi, USA.
27. Mr. James A. **Russell**, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Contemporary Conflict, USA.
28. Dr. Eric **Thompson**, Director of Middle East Programs, Center for Strategic Studies, The Center for Naval Analysis Corporation, USA.
29. Dr. Michael **Yaffe**, Academic Dean and Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, USA.

Dr. John Duke Anthony is the founding President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and is a founder, board member, and Secretary of the U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee. He is also the founding president of the Middle East Educational Trust, a founder of the Commission on Israeli-Palestinian Peace, and he founding president of the Society for Gulf Arab Studies. For the past 32 years, Dr. Anthony has been a consultant and regular lecturer on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf for the Departments of Defense and State. For nearly a decade, he taught courses on the Middle East at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

Dr. Anthony holds a B.A. in History from the Virginia Military Institute, a Master of Science in Foreign Service (With Distinction) from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he was a University Scholar, and a Ph.D. in International Relations and Middle East Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Dr. Alberto Bin is the Head of the Regional Affairs & Mediterranean Dialogue Section in the Political Affairs & Security Policy Division of the International Staff at NATO HQ in Brussels. He joined NATO in 1998, where he is currently responsible for supporting the Alliance's work on relations and cooperation between the Atlantic Alliance and the countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area, including NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for the broader Middle East.

Prior to that, he was Deputy Director and Chair Holder at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta (1993-1998), and Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Studies, University of Catania (Italy). Dr. Bin holds a PhD in International Relations from the Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, a degree in History from the University of Rome, and a diploma in Computer Sciences.

Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1993-94. He served as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). Ambassador Freeman earned a certificate in Latin American studies from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, certificates in both the national and Taiwan dialects of Chinese from the former Foreign Service Institute field school in Taiwan, a BA from Yale University and a JD from the Harvard Law School.

Ambassador Freeman is Chairman of the Board of Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based business development firm that specializes in arranging international joint ventures, acquisitions, and other business operations for its American and foreign clients. He also serves as Co-Chair of the United States-China Policy Foundation and Vice Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is a member of the boards of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the regional security centers of the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Washington World Affairs Council.

Riad Kahwaji, INEGMA's Founder & General Manager, is also the Middle East Bureau Chief for Defense News, The largest selling international defense publication. He worked for Jane's Defense Weekly as Middle East Correspondent from 1999 to 2001. He also contributed on regular basis to various Jane's publications like Jane's Intelligence Review and Jane's Sentinel and Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst. He published many defense analysis articles in Al-Hayat newspaper and professional periodicals. He has been working as a professional journalist covering the Middle East since 1988.

Riad has an MA degree in War Studies from King's College, the University of London, and a BA in Mass Communication from Phillips University, Oklahoma, USA.

Dr. Ebtesam Bin Howaiden Al-Kitbi is an Assistant Professor of political science, UAE University. She also is Director of Women in GCC program, Gulf Research Center and Head of Committee of Civic Education curriculum in the UAE Ministry of Education. She has published numerous journal articles focused on the GCC region in academic and professional periodicals. Her research interests include political and social developments and the democratization process in the GCC countries and women's issues in the GCC.

Dr. Ebtesam Bin Howaiden Al-Kitbi earned a PhD in Economics and Political Science from Cairo University, Egypt.

Dr. Michael Kraig is a program officer in Policy Analysis and Dialogue. He is currently managing several Foundation initiatives on Persian Gulf regional security strategies, US national security strategies, US-Iran and US-Syria relations, and weapons proliferation. These on-going projects aim to widen the policy debate in the United States and abroad by discussing multilateral, cooperative policy options that could make both the United States and the world more prosperous and secure.

Dr. Kraig has a Ph.D. in political science from the University at Buffalo, New York, with a concentration on international relations and US foreign policy. He has presented talks on US national security strategy, WMD proliferation, and US nuclear policies at policy institutes in Germany and Italy and at the United Nations 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York. Kraig has also interned with the US General Accounting Office on nuclear weapons issues. His current work on Gulf security strategies involves extensive travel and outreach in the greater Middle East.

Isabelle Martin is the Arabian Peninsula Senior Regional Officer in the Global Security Reporting Programme for the Embassy of Canada in the United Arab Emirates. Prior to her Abu Dhabi posting she served as Policy Advisor on Conflict Prevention in Ottawa and Political, Economic and Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy of Canada in Cairo. Ms. Martin has also worked as a Foreign Service Political Officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Isabelle Martin earned Baccalauréat en science politique (B.A.) and Maîtrise en relations internationales (M.A.) degrees from Université Laval in Québec.

Katja Niethammer is a Thyssen Scholar at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Research Unit Middle East and Africa in Berlin where she has been engaged since 2004. From 2001 to 2004, Ms. Niethammer worked as a researcher at the Free University of Berlin, Institute for Islamic Studies, and also as Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Center "Social and Cultural History of the Middle East".

She earned a Masters degree in Islamic Studies and Communication from Free University of Berlin and also studied Arabic and Social Sciences at Birzeit University, Palestinian Autonomous Territories during 1995-96.

Dr. Othman Al-Rawaf serves as a member of the Shura council and is the Assistant Secretary General of the Center for Andalusia studies and civilization dialogue at King Saud University. He is currently working on a book in English on US-Arab relations and conducting research concerning the war on terrorism. Dr. Al-Rawaf has actively participated in conferences spanning the globe in North America, Europe, and the Middle East.

Dr. Al-Rawaf earned his bachelors degree in economics and political science from King Saud University. He holds a masters degree and PhD in political science from Duke University. Dr. Al-Rawaf is a member of the International Political Science Association, British Society for Middle East Studies, Middle Eastern Studies Association for North America, and the Arab Society for Political Science.

James A. Russell is a senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he is teaching courses on Middle East security affairs, terrorism, and national security strategy. He also performs sponsored research for a variety of U.S. government organizations. His articles have appeared in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *Comparative Strategy*, *Middle East Policy*, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Naval War College Review*, the *Nonproliferation Review* and *Contemporary Security Policy*.

From 1988-2001, Mr. Russell held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense. He received Masters Degree in Public and International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh in 1983.

Stefano Silvestri is the President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali – IAI, Rome, and is responsible for Defence and Security studies and is also the commentator of Foreign Policy and Security matters for the Italian newspaper *Il Sole 24 Ore*. He is the Scientific Advisor to the Italian Center of Higher Defence Studies (CASD) and to the Military Center of Strategic Studies (CeMiSS), of the Italian Defence Ministry. Mr Silvestri is a member of the Board of the Italian Association of Aerospace and Defence Industries (AIAD) and of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) of the European Commission.

Mr. Silvestri has been Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (European Policies), 1974-76. Consultant to the President of the Council of Ministers (1979-80, 1981-83, 1986-88, 1993-1994), the Minister of Internal Affairs (1979), the Minister of Industry and Trade (1989-1993), the Minister of Defence (1980, 1984-85, 1993 and present). He served as Deputy Secretary of Defence of the Italian Government from January 1995 to May 1996.

Ambassador Dr. Dhafer Al-Umran is the Director of Bilateral Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bahrain. Dr Al-Umran has served in various capacities in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance and National Economy. He was also the head of the Bahrain Negotiation delegation within GCC-EU Negotiations, GCC-Japan Negotiation, and GCC-U.S.A. Negotiations (1987-1994). Dr. Al-Umran is Secretary of the National Strategic Committee as a Think Tank Group to evaluate and assess the economic performance in Bahrain.

Dr. Al-Umran earned a bachelors degree in economics from The American University of Beirut. He holds a master of science in public administration and a Ph.D. in economic development from the University of Southern California. He has been awarded the Sheikh Isa Bin Salman Al- Khalifa Order award.

Eric V. Thompson is the director of the International Affairs Group at the CNA Corporation's Center for Strategic Studies. Eric is a Middle East political/military affairs specialist and has worked closely with U.S. and regional civilian and military leaders. His most recent work has addressed Iraq and Afghanistan, military cooperation with member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, military-to-military relations with Egypt, interoperability with Turkish and Algerian maritime forces, and coalition building for military operations in the region. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, he deployed to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain to provide on site analysis.

Prior to joining CNA, he was an adjunct professor of international relations and history at the Virginia Military Institute, where he taught courses in Middle East history, Middle Eastern politics, and served as the director of the Model Arab League program. Eric V. Thompson holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, and a B.A. in political science from Vassar College.

Captain John Randolph Wood, USN, is an F-14 pilot with 4,500 total flight hours. Currently CAPT Wood is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, Exercises, and Political-Military Affairs, US Naval Forces Central Command. CAPT Wood was selected as an Arthur S. Moreau scholar and attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. CAPT Wood's fields of study were political theory, international security studies, and conflict resolution.

In April 2004 he successfully defended his dissertation "Mitigating Proliferation: An Assessment of Nonproliferation Institutions, International Law, and Preemptive Counterproliferation Intervention." CAPT Wood holds a BS from the US Naval Academy, MA from the University of San Diego, diploma from the US Naval War College, and PhD from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. CAPT Wood was honored to serve as a 1996-97 White House Fellow.

Dr. Michael D. Yaffe is the Academic Dean and Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the NESAC Center, Dr. Yaffe was a career Foreign Affairs Officer in the U.S. Department of State where he focused on Middle East security and weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation. As an expert on nonproliferation and arms control, he also served as the senior advisor and lead U.S. negotiator on Middle East issues to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committees and the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the annual General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Dr. Yaffe's undergraduate education was in economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He received a Masters degree in international relations from the London School of Economics, and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has published articles on Middle East security, arms control, diplomatic history, and strategic studies.

The Challenge of Our Age: Avoiding “Forever War”

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With another four years of Bush Administration foreign policy, it is a useful exercise to examine the fundamental roots of current US actions – as well as the long-term dangers inherent in the global war on terrorism as presently defined. And a first step is to get past the semantics of today’s superficial media debates.

One initial stumbling block is the popular rhetoric adopted by the Bush Administration, which obscures rather than illuminates the issues at stake. As expressed by ex-Reagan Administration official Lawrence Korb, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense: “Terrorism is a tactic, like Germany’s military tactic of blitzkrieg during World War II. You can’t declare war on a tactic. Who ever heard of a ‘war on blitzkrieg?’”

Semantics aside, the Bush Administration and its avid supporters would be the first to admit that they are not actually fighting the tactic of terrorism. The “war on terror” is simply a catch-all phrase that broadly refers to a little-known strategy developed very deliberately over the course of the 1990s by so-called “neo-con” think-tanks such as the Project for a New American Century. In essence, this strategy can be thought of as a roadmap to achieve global primacy based on US military transformation internally and social, political, and economic transformation of the Developing World externally.

First, “global strategic primacy” means being so incredibly powerful in every aspect that other nations are “dissuaded” from even thinking of attempting to match the US in traditional strategic capabilities such as air forces, ground forces, heavy weapons, and even outer space vehicles. It translates into a world of one lone superpower amid several “middle-weight” Great Powers from Europe to Asia, from Germany to China to Japan, all of whom essentially follow the political, social, and economic lead of the United States and concede the military high ground to US armed forces.

This indefinite strategic primacy will presumably allow the United States to prevent not only traditional challenges by other countries, but also attacks by non-state, transnational terror groups. But if these groups are truly non-state in character – largely independent of countries such as Iran, Syria, or North Korea, as most regional experts and terrorism experts argue – how would strategic primacy deter or dissuade them from attacking the US? After all, Al-Qaeda does not have a “return address” for a retaliatory strike from US conventional or nuclear forces. Transnational terrorist groups are the ultimate “distributed network,” to borrow a phrase from the world of information technology, and as such, are not especially vulnerable to the sophisticated heavy weapons of the US arsenal.

The answer, put simply, is long-term transformation of the Developing World.

Within the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, it is clear that the Bush Administration believes that the United States and its Cold War allies (against the background of historical evolution) have together found the answer to global peace and stability. As argued in the opening paragraphs of the Bush NSS, the Cold War ended with “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise....these values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society....Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side....” This notion is again reiterated at the start of the second section of the NSS, stating bluntly that Western conceptions of freedom, democracy, and free enterprise “are right and true for all people everywhere.” Further on in the document, the Bush Administration states unequivocally that “The lessons of history are clear: market economies...are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies – industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing world.”

In short, the NSS clearly believes that there is a universal moral, political, and economic code, or common moral imperative. As stated at the beginning of the second section of the NSS, “No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them... America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” Or as President Bush stated in an earlier, oft-cited address at West Point Military Academy on June 1, 2002, “Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities.”

Based on these revealing and honest comments, it would seem that the United States will fight and “win” the war on terror only by eliminating or transforming those value systems that compete with US liberal-democratic values socially, economically, politically, and militarily around the world. The Bush Administration and its primary supporting intellectuals hope to make the world safe for the United States by making it democratic – by making other societies look and act much as if they were the United States themselves. Their answer is not allying with other nations of all creeds and faiths to defend against attacks from radical fringe groups such as Al-Qaeda, but rather altering and eliminating (over time) the ideological and social sources of such attacks.

It is, in short, a civilizational mission, a mission of global transformation. It is a mission that has been decried and opposed by almost all parts of the traditional Washington policy community, from former officials of all political persuasions, to defense experts, to scholars of regions such as the Middle East and Asia. In true populist tradition, Bush and his primary advisors have skipped over all objections from these myriad groups of bipartisan wise men (and wise women) who have staffed the State Department and the military Services throughout the Cold War, and who together have traditionally acted as a sounding board for both Democratic and Republican Administrations as they propose new policy directions. The Bush Administration has instead based its foreign and security policies upon the fundamental values of the America populace itself. In the name of both US national security and global peace and prosperity, the Bush Administration has essentially adopted America’s core founding principles for the rest of the world. It is this

presumed universality of US liberal-democratic values which under-girds all the actions of the Bush Administration.

And it is this actual Bush strategy – not a war on terrorism, but a war of global transformation that ultimately aims to change other societies – that threatens to undermine the security and prosperity of both Americans and other citizens around the world.

While the major challenge of the Cold War was to avoid global nuclear apocalypse, the challenge of today's global system is to prevent the evolution of an indefinite conflict over values with Islamic societies which could take any number of nasty forms: transnational terrorism against Western societies (perhaps using a weapon of mass destruction); regular military strikes on sovereign states' territory in the Developing World by US Special Forces without consultations involving the governments in question; US diplomacy based increasingly on implicit or explicit threats and coercion; the development of ever more lethal and precise killing technologies, which could go well beyond nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to include new breakthroughs in nano-technology; the spread of such technologies and materials to purely non-state, unaccountable insurgent groups who may have nothing to do with so-called "rogue states" (despite attempts by US analysts and politicians to find solid links between them); traditional conventional wars between competing nations; and last but not least, endless Western military occupations of states in the Developing World that are falling apart due to internal strife, health epidemics, failing economies, corruption, and drug-running. The Judeo-Christian-Islamic divide threatens to unite all these ugly 21st century global trends into one all-encompassing, black-and-white conflict in which the stakes are infinitely high.

Although the US military has not been preparing for this broad war per se, it has been trying since the fall of the Berlin Wall to achieve "Full Spectrum Dominance," a catch-all term that describes an ideal world where the US military and political leaders know exactly what is happening anywhere on the globe, at any time, and are able to use precision force against any individual, group, or nation to preempt foreign attacks against either the US homeland or its multitudinous economic interests abroad. Full Spectrum Dominance includes "information superiority" (basically, an earthly form of omniscience in which the United States military sees and knows everything) as well as "total control of the battlespace" in all mediums – earth, air, land, sea, or space. This much-touted "Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA, now involves research and creation of new space surveillance systems, potential space-based weapons, global missile defense, hypersonic cruise missiles, "augmented" super-soldiers (using advanced bio-tech and nano-technology) for covert and legally dubious missions in developing countries, and unmanned strike craft with global reach.

While these weapons are very sleek and sexy, their basic logic is one of coercion, threats, and (if used) destruction. The RMA and the war on terror, as presently defined and implemented, therefore promise not a world of mutual prosperity and peaceful co-existence between differing value systems and national traditions, but rather a world of endless conflict between the First World and Developing World, between the Global North and Global South, between Christianity and Islam. It is a war without conclusion, without clear goals, without practical solutions, and without any realistic economic foundation.

It is time for Americans to recognize that the United States is the world's most powerful, wealthy country today not because of purely national efforts, but because of the inherently interdependent, integrated global economy that was created from the top-down by the so-called "Wise Men" advising Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower after the devastation of WW II. Based on advice from realistic and pragmatic personalities such as Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, and George Kennan – all of whom considered themselves fundamentally non-partisan – the United States sought to create a world in which different societies and economies would be progressively more banded together by a thick web of international and transnational economic dealings. Mutual prosperity was to be the fundamental basis of global stability and (inter)national security.

It is precisely this world of untold plenty that a war of civilizations could dismantle and destroy. The final outcome would be a global economy a fraction of its current size and a US national economy that is more isolated, and hence, much smaller. The United States might achieve the absolute security that its citizens seem to increasingly desire, but at a tremendous cost to the average American and to the world.

So what is the solution?

Ronald Reagan once said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." It was this sentiment that led to both the "Star Wars" missile-defense program and the historically unprecedented Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe Treaty with Gorbachev's Soviet Union in 1987, which called for the cooperative and complete destruction of an entire class of nuclear-armed missiles. This landmark agreement then provided the political and conceptual foundation for further cuts in both arsenals once the Cold War ended.

Thanks in part to Reagan's far-sighted effort to emphasize bilateral compromises based upon mutually-agreed verification measures and mutual security for both sides – alongside traditional, threat-based nuclear deterrence – the world today is much safer from the threat of missile strikes involving thousands of megaton warheads. Nuclear threats still exist, to be sure, but the probability of a spasmodic, massive nuclear exchange is so low as to be negligible – because Reagan understood a fundamental truth, expressed in 11 short words, that he later acted on in his dealings with the enemy.

It was a truth neither grasped nor embraced by the most hard-line advisors in Reagan's two Administrations at the time, many of whom are now influential players in the Bush Administration. These Cold Warriors from the 1980s disdained the idea of cooperative actions, preferring absolute advantage for the side that was "right" rather than mutual advantage between competing value systems – even if it meant preparing to fight and "win" an offensive nuclear war. Ignoring these extreme voices in his second term, Reagan kept his eye on the ultimate goal of security for the average US citizen and eventually called for engagement rather than division, and for a modicum of respect between competing value systems rather than relations based completely on contempt and fear.

So what is today's equivalent of Reagan and Gorbachev's INF Treaty? The solution, unfortunately, is not a straightforward legal agreement signed by two different governments. Rather, it involves reorienting the strategic vision and foreign policy

philosophy of the world's lone superpower, especially toward those regions falling outside the familiar "Western" circle of nations. In effect, it requires a more humble United States that takes into account its own foibles and imperfections as it tries to nudge the world toward a more liberal-democratic ideal. It requires an America that ultimately relies more on various forms of engagement toward societies with different goals and values – engagement based on reciprocal, mutually-beneficial economic and security obligations rather than threats.

First, the United States should finally recognize that it is not an inherently secular country advocating the spread of an objective, neutral, and globally applicable version of liberal democracy for all peoples. Instead, it is a country that is still itself going through very painful, long-term developmental pains, in the form of intense value disagreements between orthodox Christianity, moderate and left religious practices of various faiths, and secular humanism, as well as between economic laissez-faire practices and ideals of equality and social justice. It is a country of opposites that encompasses atheism, agnosticism, mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, New Age spirituality, and Baptist Evangelism. It is a polity that embraces preservation of the environment alongside traditional beliefs in the absolute dominion of humankind over nature, as well as radical emphasis (as seen by the rest of the world) on unregulated, market-driven economies alongside repeated calls for social justice for the common person in an increasingly corporate world. It is a country still riven by latent racism even as there is an astonishing diversity of race, religion, and culture in the major metropolitan areas. It is a country equally urban and rural, cosmopolitan and parochial. It is a democratic experiment still in its infant stages of development, trying in its nascent thrashings to project onto the rest of the world a confusing array of religious, secular, and economic ideals under one liberal-democratic umbrella. Everyone else is well acquainted with this turbulent reality, but Americans themselves remain blithely unaware of how their internal conflicts frustrate, confuse, and frighten other nations on the receiving end of US foreign policies.

Once the US has explicitly recognized the unfinished nature of its internal domestic experiment, it needs to take seriously the frequent calls by states such as Iran to engage in a "dialogue of civilizations," based on the logic of mutual respect. This message is also inherent in China's desire to be viewed as a "strategic partner" rather than "strategic competitor" by the United States in regard to both global and Asian security. These soundings from the developing world are concerted attempts to understand the cultural divides, clashing geopolitical interests and common ideals that animate today's global system. It is an attempt to get beyond the tired clichés and angry denunciations seen daily on cable news networks and radio programs, and to explore how different religions and national cultures can provide value to each other rather than simply representing threats to each other's existence. Ultimately, it is an attempt to tell the US that not all national differences are of the magnitude of Hitler, Stalin, or Bin Laden, and that attacks on US territory by a radical fringe group should not be the sole energizing force behind US policy toward the rest of the world.

This points to the third requirement for finding a new solution, which is to recognize that the war on terror has been largely mischaracterized by popular media and by some leading figures in the Bush Administration. The United States is not under attack for its very values and freedoms, for how Americans live their lives on their own home soil. Although the US does indeed have a huge popularity gap throughout the Islamic world, this does not

translate into a collective wish of all Muslims to assault US society, enslave its citizens, teach Arabic and the Koran, dismantle McDonalds, baseball, and other cultural icons, and remake political institutions in Washington, DC. The threat of catastrophic terrorism on the order of 9/11 does not come from all of Islamic civilization, but rather from radical fringe elements who have perceived defensive goals toward the US based on a militant reading of Islamic texts and hatred and fear of the incremental extension of US culture abroad through globalization and through forward US military basing policies. In sum: these radical transnational groups do not really care what Americans may do in Fargo, North Dakota or Memphis, Tennessee, but they care a great deal about US cultural and military influence half-way around the globe and are willing to commit terrorist acts to lessen that foreign influence over their own societies.

Yet to hear some of the statements out of the White House and popular press, 9/11 does represent an attack on America's very cultural identity and values, at home as well as abroad. And the US government seems to be going down the path of fighting a global war based on this understanding of the threat – on the belief that all authoritarian leaders of Islamic societies, and all non-state Islamic terrorist groups, are working together somehow and in some way to bring down the entire West. If the US acts upon this crude and grossly inaccurate definition of the terror threat, it will be in grave danger of creating exactly the kind of civilizational war that the current fringe Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda desire. It will, in short, play straight into the hands of the most radical minority elements in the Islamic world, empowering them and giving them legitimacy where none existed prior to US interventions – as has already happened in the case of Iraq. Or as expressed in a recent *Christian Science Monitor* article on the burgeoning social and political appeal of the Al-Qaeda insurgency to Muslims around the world, primarily via targeted internet and TV messages: "[One tape by Bin Laden] is a 75 minute diatribe echoing bin Laden's claims that *Islam is under attack by the West* – occupying lands and exporting corrupt values. It says that continuous jihad is the only solution....[R]ecruiting is much closer to missionary work....Above all, the purpose of this screed is to enlist people in the greater cause of jihad" (emphasis added).

To prevent these highly worrying trends from going any further, an alternative model is desperately needed for US relations with the Islamic world, and with the larger Developing World in general. And one alternative model that is still firmly based on Western values would be the European approach, which holds out liberal-democratic goalposts for Developing nations but which recognizes the complex, contradictory, and inherently long-term nature of social and political reform among disparate societies. In particular, Europeans know full well that comprehensive, immediate liberalization of everything from judicial institutions to business circles to gender issues would clash with most of the world's standing cultural mores and practices, and as such, would represent a kind of "shock therapy" that would simply make the globe more unstable without leading to enduring changes in the domestic situations of other countries. Liberal political elites and institutional practices – and cultural predispositions in this direction – cannot be immediately manufactured through any clever mix of foreign financial aid packages, trade incentives, security agreements, or (more negatively) punitive sanctions and military force options. Instead, better domestic governance in regions such as the Middle East and Asia will take decades, if not centuries, to build up – and in the meantime, there is a short-term battle against ruthless non-state terrorist groups that urgently requires cooperation with existing sovereign elites and institutions throughout the Developing World.

Moreover, Europeans understand their own limitations in ways that the US does not. Their colonial experiences may have made them what they are today, but one thing colonial history does not demonstrate is an innate ability of Western nations to overcome their own prejudices and cultural boundaries to successfully bring prosperity and law and order to nations with markedly different regional histories. Europeans suffered and caused massive suffering during their centuries of imperial dominance, and ultimately, they were unceremoniously booted out of every country they tried to “civilize” – often after fighting endless, ruthless, and fruitless counter-insurgency wars that contradicted Europeans’ own claims to moral superiority and which ate away at their appetite for leadership in international affairs. It is this humbled and humiliated Europe that now watches in stupefaction as a boisterous US tries to secure itself through a strategy of global transformation that looks very much like old imperial adventures.

To paraphrase Reagan: “A war of civilizations cannot be won and must never be fought” – whatever ambitious scenarios are spun by a Rumsfeldian Pentagon enamored of the RMA and military transformation. The road to US national security is not paved with programs for immediate, radical reshaping of other states and societies along lines reflecting US values and institutions. Nor will it be guaranteed by maintaining global military primacy. Instead, the United States will only be secure by steadily and reliably engaging countries of all faiths and creeds in the Developing World in the fight against radical, non-state terrorist groups – whether the country in question is a rogue like Iran or a rising Great Power like China.

In short, the United States will only be secure if it uses adroit diplomacy to purposely create a **“balance of interests and values”** between all nations, in all regions – insofar as this balance does not undermine one state’s rights and interests in favor of another. A peaceful world is one in which large regional powers such as Russia, Iran, Brazil, India, and China coexist with all their smaller neighbors in a mutually beneficial set of relationships, based on prosperity and respect rather than domination and fear. Only the United States has the diplomatic and military capital to seek and create this balance of national interests and balance of value systems throughout the world. And this “balance” would also ideally allow for concerted multilateral cooperation in stamping out radical, non-state terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda who threaten the global order with their dubious notions of religious utopia.

Although this may sound revolutionary and impossible at first glance, it should not be too foreign of an idea, since this is exactly the situation created by the United States and its allies in Western Europe over the past 60 years, in the form of the European Union. Germany, France, and Britain (and increasingly Russia as well) now live in a regional environment defined by mutual respect, mutual prosperity, and a constantly negotiated balance of national interests, national values, and national obligations via bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, common institutions, and legal norms. It could be argued that China’s relations with its Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors are already proceeding quickly in this direction, and barring an armed conflict over Taiwan, will actually be a defining reality of Asia by the half-century mark.

So what does a balance of interests and values mean in practice? Practical policy steps in this direction would include the *largely unconditional* admittance of Iran to the World

Trade Organization, with all its corresponding legal, bureaucratic, and economic duties, constraints, and responsibilities; public disavowal of “regime change” and interventionist policy options toward other states – except in grave instances of massive human catastrophe, such as the attempted genocide that took place in Rwanda or Bosnia in the 1990s; and a concerted attempt to understand and compromise on the security needs of other states, without telling other powers what their national interests “should” be in regard to highly charged, sovereignty-based issues. Simply put, US national security and interests will be much better served if the US dons the mantle of “regional power broker” or “honest broker” and puts its considerable economic, military, and cultural “soft power” toward this end – as opposed to donning the indefinite mantle of global hegemon and regional transformer.

Take for instance the complex and frustrating example of the Middle East (and sub-regions such as the Arabian-Persian Gulf). George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued persuasively that the answer to the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation, domestic instabilities in Arab states, and Israeli security fears can only come through a comprehensive attempt to balance the interests and value systems of Iran, the Palestinians, Israel, and Iran’s Arab neighbors (the GCC states) under one large regional security vision:

....When asked to pressure Iran, many Muslim states focus on the double standard that they perceive in Washington’s acquiescence in Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and its violation of international resolutions regarding treatment of the Palestinians....Washington’s capacity to mobilize Arab governments will be limited by this perceived double standard of U.S. policy toward the Israeli government. Daniel Yankelovich has concluded from his research into public opinion that the United States needs to “present a new vision of America to the Muslim world by positioning United States foreign policy on the side of justice, because the present perception is that the United States is always found on the side of injustice.” Yankelovich adds, “There’s just no way that we can skip over” the need to pay “much more attention to legitimate Palestinian grievances.”

U.S. and Israeli leaders do not truly comprehend how the aggressive expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has made Muslims everywhere feel that the world is stacked against them....Israel’s continued disregard of its own commitments and international resolutions and legal judgments against the expansion and walling in of settlements makes Muslim populations feel it is unfair to do the United States and Israel “favors” by combating terrorism and proliferation in the Middle East.

For their part, Israelis justly feel threatened by terrorism and by Iran’s and Syria’s refusal to recognize Israel’s existence. Many hope that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s initiative to withdraw from Gaza and four West Bank settlements, paired with the election of new Palestinian leadership, can revive the near-dead peace process....But Sharon may not be able to prevail over the militant settler movement, and he may be unwilling to negotiate acceptable terms on the transfer of West Bank territory and the final status of Jerusalem. The United States can regain some of its lost legitimacy as a champion of international justice by demanding more of Israel and by making sure Sharon follows through.

In recent months, officers of an elite Israeli Air Force unit protested that operations in Gaza, particularly the destruction of roughly 1,500 Palestinian residences, violated any standard of justice. Other veterans have mounted similar protests. The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled against the course of the security barrier the government is building on occupied territory,

including in East Jerusalem. Legal protests are being mounted against a policy the Sharon government adopted secretly last year to seize untended Palestinian property in East Jerusalem: The Palestinian owners cannot tend their property because the security barrier blocks their access to it, and Israeli authorities will not permit them to travel around it. Instead of joining Israelis who demand greater justice of their own government, Americans—Democrats and Republicans alike—have tripped over themselves to pander to the Sharon government, which, until recently, pursued settlement policies that a majority of Israelis do not support. The United States should support Prime Minister Sharon in opposing the militant settler movement that answers only to God-given law and refuses to support the rule of democratically made law.

Israel can further directly help the cause of nonproliferation by offering to cease production of plutonium when Iran permanently halts its fuel-cycle-related activities. Such a step would establish a new baseline of no plutonium or highly enriched uranium production anywhere in the region.¹

The notion of the US playing an “honest broker” can also be applied in other strategically important but unstable regions. In the Far East, while the United States would not acquiesce to unprovoked Chinese aggression against Taiwan under this strategy – a precedent that would auger badly for future Chinese use of force against other neighbors in the future – the US also would not try to tell China what its own sovereignty-related interests should be in the Taiwan dispute, and the United States definitely would not ally formally with Taiwan or give Taipei the weaponry needed to allow full Taiwanese declarations of independence from the Mainland. Instead, the United States would support *both* Taiwanese democracy *and* Chinese regional interests by deterring unilateral actions by either side against the interests of the other (i.e., military attacks by China and/or sudden declarations of independence by Taiwan), mediating economic, military, and diplomacy relations between both sides (when possible), and ultimately acting as formal arbiter of the bilateral dispute as the political chances for a true agreement increase, with the ultimate long-term goal of bringing about a mutually-agreed, negotiated solution to this seemingly insolvable conflict.

If, instead of seeking a balance of interests and values, the US instead attempts to make itself absolutely invulnerable through attempts to transform sovereign states politically, socially, and economically – in addition to taking more direct actions against Al-Qaeda – it will only succeed in creating lasting violence, instability, and (eventually) a break with the entire Developing World as a whole. And such a breakdown in relations would truly represent the onset of “Forever War,” a condition coined by award-winning author and Vietnam Veteran Joe Haldeman to describe a 21st century status quo of chronic violence and repeated bouts of destruction. Any US strategy that fails to recognize the futility of Forever War will leave Americans unable to mend either their own internal divisions or the growing gap between the West and the Islamic World. We must remember that the only true alternative to chronic insecurity is peace, and peace is almost always a two-way street involving respect between acknowledged equals rather than a total victory of one side’s values over the other.

¹ “Iran is not an island: A strategy to mobilize the neighbors,” George Perkovich, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief #34*, pp. 1-8, February 2005, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB34.perkovich.final.web1.pdf>.

“What the US Does Right and Wrong in Dealing With Tehran? Suggested Changes in US Policy for a More Secure Gulf.”

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Introduction

To begin with , it may subjectively be said that no practice may be described as absolutely ‘right’ or absolutely ‘wrong’, for any practice is always attributed the trait of relativity and is therefore relatively right or relatively wrong when consideration is made of all its surrounding circumstances: in recording, collecting, analyzing and evaluating scientifically. No policy of any state is an exception, even if it were the US, in its practices which carry a relative probability of right and wrong, quite remote from absolutism. This is due to the fact that practices are committed by politicians who are fallible humans, and may be therefore right or wrong , while only God Almighty never errs and is forever right. This elementary conclusion is sensed, and leaves no need for evidence or proof, admitted by American politicians themselves before others , in their declarations as decision makers or as executives of those decisions, or in their memoirs at a later stage.

On the other hand, the special relationship between America and Iran was such that prior to the fall of Shah Mohammad Rida Bahlawi, America was literally an ally, to the extent that the relationship was described as ‘Political Romance’ for various reasons. Following the fall of the Shah, and the instatement of the Islamic Republic Regime, the relationship transformed into a ‘Political Hostility’, again for various reasons which will not be dealt with here.

Proposed changes in American policy towards achieving a more stable security in the Gulf.

First: America’s right and wrong practices in dealing with Iran..

Generally speaking, it is widely acknowledged that following the drastic fall of the Soviet Union as an almost equivalent power to America in this globe, the whole world and America itself rightly and realistically consider America to be the sponsor of international law and its resolutions, as well as representing the related executing power by force , which secures that all

countries abide by the decisions and resolutions of the UN in normal conditions , through practices of the different American institutions , on top of which lie the practices of the different American Administrations, internally and externally.

Hence, following the Second World War, Humanity reached a general consensus that beneath the umbrella of international legitimacy as embraced by the UN Charter , as a global law which control world peace and security among all peoples of the world, that the right practices of any state were those that abide by international legitimacy and its resolutions, the UN Charter, and participate in establishing world peace and security , implement decisions of the Security Council and diverse treaties, accords, or matters of Human Rights , as well as those treaties, accords, and legislations put forth and implemented according to regulations and procedures.

Inversely, the wrong practices of any state are embodied in the lack of respect of international legitimacy and its resolutions, violation of the UN Charter , as well as representing a threat to world peace and security, enhancing the outbreak of wars , demolition, violation of Human Rights , and the renunciation of the resolutions of international law, and maneuvering against it.

Therefore, to be true to the content of the Third Topic, the practices of America would be considered right when in accordance with international legitimacy and its resolutions versus a state that does not abide by international legitimacy . This is a matter of extreme caution for America, and one that it defends thoroughly. On the other hand, its practices would be erroneous and wrong when it trespasses international legitimacy and its resolutions against another state that respects this legitimacy& its resolutions, since this commitment to international legitimacy and its resolutions , together with the supremacy of international law, are the accurate and disciplined standards in this respect.

Especially if America were to respect international legitimacy & its resolutions in its dealings with Iran, then its practices would be considered as right, and Iran would be considered as faulty for having abandoned international legitimacy & its resolutions, and international law. While if America were to disregard international legitimacy and its resolutions, and international law, then America would be in fault , whereas iran this time would be right for abiding by international legitimacy & its resolutions, and

international law. As previously mentioned, the standard is the extent to which any state abides by international legitimacy & its resolutions, and international law, whether it be America or Iran ,or any other state for that matter.

In view of past history and the contemporary reality we are now living, it should be kept in mind that the example of Iran, classified by America as the core of evil, and with Iran viewing America as the major satan, is not similar to the case of Iraq within the grasp of a dictator , Saddam Hussein, who was treated by America as a criminal outlawed by standards of international legitimacy and its resolutions, and according to America's interpretation of international legitimacy and its the resolutions, bearing in mind the special regard of those who back her up, in line with America's interests in higher strategic national supremacy, supported by the law of the compulsory power that tackles unilaterally the destiny of the world, and in some exceptionally rare instances may weaken certain traditionally theoretical justifications on the basis that the law was perceived by some as the will of the powerful self-imposed by force according to circumstances and American interests. Hence the American administration takes great care in its dealings with Iran via international legitimacy and its resolutions, and at other times, through conspicuous or hidden mediators . However, circumstances may take a different course in the near or average or distant future.

Second: Proposed Changes in the American policy towards achieving a more stable security in the Gulf.

It is thanks to Anerica's contribution to history, together with friends from the allied international forces, that Kuwait and the people of Iraq were set free , and the dangers of terror were faced in the Gulf Region and other parts of the world.

World peace and security constitute part of the peace and security in the Gulf Region , since peace and security are interlaced mutually exclusive , and influenced by surrounding changes.

So as to achieve a more stable Gulf security, we suggest that American policy consider the following matters , of which we are assured that America is quite aware of , due to their nature and lucidity:

1-Complete and continued cooperation of America with international legitimacy and its resolutions issued regarding Iran, its cases and files, including the nuclear file, by maintaining contact with the GCC states or the

EU through a mediated dialogue between the two Unions, or by direct dialogue between them.

2- Solving the problem of the Middle East, with the Palestinian problem at its core, as soon as possible, by providing a just and comprehensive defense of the rights of the Palestinian people, and by implementing the related resolutions of international legitimacy.

3- Inhibiting Israel from direct or indirect intervention in matters that concern the states of the Gulf Region including Iran, either through mediators or through direct dialogue.

4- Activation of the role of civil social institutions in the Gulf Region including Iran, as well as maintaining exchange visits among those institutions and corresponding American institutions on all fronts and levels , with the aim of exchanging expertise and legitimate benefits, as well as popular visits and encouraging rapprochement between the peoples of the Arabian Gulf Region, including the Iranian people on the one hand, and the American people on the other.

5- Holding meetings between the American side and that of the Gulf States including Iran to discuss matters pertaining to the price of oil-the maximum price, the fair price, and its limits.

Conclusion

Man has suffered in the Gulf Region from insane wars , and costly devastation which have brought development to a standstill. It is now high time to remember the renown American author Ernest Hemingway with his wonderful book: "A farewell to Arms"!!

When are we going to say "Farewell to Arms" and war not only in the Gulf Region but also all over the world??

We pray that peace and virtue will prevail all over the world and that it be bestowed upon all humans everywhere. May God Almighty grant us our wish.

Strategy, Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century

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Abstract *Over the course of events taking place in and around the Persian Gulf over the last three years, the United States has used force to replace a despotic dictator who once served Western interests, placed considerable distance between itself and its erstwhile regional partner Saudi Arabia, and reduced its role as arbiter in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Operation Iraqi Freedom would seem to reveal that the United States has chosen a broader vision for the role that force could play as part of a more aggressive security strategy. The Gulf littoral's forward-deployed footprint, set into place during the first Gulf War, enabled effects-based capabilities to be tested in Iraq that have come online since the 1990s, enabling the US military to begin to operationalise what was initially dubbed the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and now is called 'Transformation'. As such, the Gulf infrastructure provides the US with a model to emulate around the world as it seeks to realign its forces to better address new threats in the global theatre. The Gulf facilities will become central hubs in the network of bases stretching throughout Central and South Asia and the Horn of Africa which will perform missions associated with the global war on terror. Operation Iraqi Freedom represents only the beginning of this phenomenon in an emerging new global defense strategy that may see forward-deployed forces around the world used with increased frequency to manage an uncertain security environment.*

Analysts, scholars, and policy professionals can be forgiven if they seem somewhat confused over the course of events in and around the Middle East and the Persian Gulf over the last three years. During this period, the United States used force to replace a despotic dictator who had once served Western interests, placed considerable distance between itself and its erstwhile regional partner Saudi Arabia, and reduced considerably its role as arbiter in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Each of these three elements had at one time or another served as an important pillar in US regional security strategy during the last twenty years.

The abandonment of the peace process and the new distance between the United States and the Saudis, while interesting, are partially explainable by circumstance and domestic politics. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks placed inordinate pressure on an already frayed US-Saudi political partnership and followed a decade of drift in what was once a strategic relationship. As for the peace process, the Bush administration came into office in 2001 openly stating its belief that the United States had become too involved in trying to broker a deal

*The views in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the views or positions of the Department of Defense.

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between Israel and the Palestinians. Making good on its campaign rhetoric, the Bush administration only half-heartedly engaged with the parties and eventually all but abandoned the so-called 'peace process' by refusing to forcefully pressure both parties to implement the Road Map and watched in curiously detached isolation as the parties continued to brutalise one another in a seemingly never-ending spiral of violence.

But the decision to use force against Iraq is more difficult to explain and to place within a broader framework that makes sense in the context of US regional strategy and policy. While it is true that a recalcitrant Saddam and his dormant programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction represented a potential threat to the region, it is also true that Saddam served a useful role in preserving the regional status quo—providing the less populated but oil-rich Sunni Gulf states with a bulwark against the Shiite state of Iran. President Reagan initiated a re-examination of the US-Iraqi relationship in the early 1980s due to concern on the National Security Council (NSC) about the prospect of an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War, and Rumsfeld was appointed special envoy to Baghdad, where he met with Saddam in December 1983. This important and often missed nuance of US policy towards Iraq and the Gulf during the 1990s was based on the implicit assumption that the US wanted Saddam weak, but not too weak, which formed the underlying framework to the oft-cited position by various senior officials to 'preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq'—a position that was frequently repeated even after 1997 when the United States publicly endorsed the idea of 'regime change' in Baghdad.

The decision to use force to topple Saddam hence suggests a fundamental departure from assumptions that drove US strategy and policy in the Gulf throughout the post-1945 era. The absence of domestic political pressure to invade Iraq and the outright opposition of many of the United States' alliance partners make the decision to use force that much more interesting. While it is true that the aftermath of the September 11 attacks created a new decision-making environment to address emergent threats, the case that Iraq (in particular its nuclear programme) represented an imminent danger to the United States requiring the use of force was always a weak argument.

A New Cost-Benefit Matrix?

A rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of the decision to use force against Iraq reveals some interesting calculations. The use of force in Iraq came with considerable domestic political risk to the Bush administration and the wider risks to US international credibility were (and remain) substantial; the financial costs have only begun to be counted; and, last, but not least, the United States is paying with the blood of its servicemen and -women—not to mention the uncoun- ted thousands of Iraqis (Russell 2004). These are a few of the obvious costs. The principal benefit of using force is that Saddam is gone, with a secondary but more far-reaching benefit being the potential establishment of a new domestic political equilibrium that may be more acceptable to the United States. An incontrovertible result of using force to achieve regime change in Baghdad is that a new government eventually will emerge that must inevitably feature a prominent (if not a dominant) role of Sunni and Shia Islamist parties. If the new government in

Iraq remotely reflects proportionate representation, Shiite political parties will exercise significant influence over the levers of governmental power in Iraq.

Even this rudimentary cost-benefit analysis reveals another fundamental change in US strategic calculations. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, a critical and underlying objective of United States regional security strategy has been to prevent the emergence and spread of overtly Islamist-style regimes. Today, the United States has apparently reversed course by 180 degrees, intended or otherwise. While it is clear that the United States did not use force with the specific intent of promoting the spread of Islamist-style governance, this outcome must be considered as an irrefutable result of using force in Iraq.

Over the last 25 years, the United States invested considerable time and effort to bring about a settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute and in parallel constructed an elaborate security architecture in and around the Persian Gulf that was in part designed to preserve the status quo and prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution onto the Arabian Peninsula. The two objectives successfully complemented each other during the 1990s. The Gulf security system, which gathered steam with the launching of Operation Earnest Will in March 1987, featured an inherently defensive posture that reflected the strategy of containment adopted after World War II to control the spread of Soviet influence around the world. Containment—and this was true in the Gulf—consisted of a series of isolating concentric rings around the opponent(s). These rings consisted of military and political relationships, forward-deployed forces, and a coordinated diplomatic strategy to maintain international support for the isolation of, in this case, Iran and Iraq.

In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) it seems clear that the United States has abandoned a regional approach that primarily relied on deterrence that, during the 1990s, was backed by the periodic use of force justified by the United States as enforcement actions related to the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. While the use of force certainly became more commonplace in the no-fly zones in Iraq in the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, the United States still couched the application of force in terms of essentially defensive objectives, such as protecting pilots and continuing to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions (Weller 2000). In contrast, in OIF, the United States applied force in pursuit of objectives unrelated to a broader defensive strategy of containment and instead used force to fundamentally alter the status quo. One of the outcomes of using force in Iraq may be to provide momentum to the emergence of the kind of Islamist politics that the United States spent the last 25 years trying to contain. How did we come to this situation? Understanding the answer to this question can allow analysts and professionals to undertake the task of drawing wider inferences from the situation. Focusing on the wider inferences is the task of this paper.

Back to Basics

The German strategist Carl von Clausewitz believed that force should always serve as an instrument of policy and not represent an end in itself. Furthermore, clear-headed strategic thinking and well-formulated strategic objectives should in turn drive that policy. Clausewitz's maxim is as worth considering today as it was

when he formulated it. In today's context in the Persian Gulf, the use of force in Gulf War II should be considered within a broader context of political and military objectives in support of what in modern parlance could be described as a 'strategic vision'. History is replete with examples where victory on the battlefield failed to deliver on the promise of peace and security due to the lack of such a vision (Murray 1986).

The Bush administration articulated a number of objectives for Gulf War II—some of which were complementary and some of which were not: (1) forestall the possibility of reconstituted capabilities associated with Iraq's programme to develop weapons of mass destruction that could threaten the United States and its allies; (2) forestall the possibility that these capabilities could be provided to transnational terrorist organisations targeting the US and its allies; (3) remove a despotic dictator as part of a broader plan to create a regional environment more conducive to stable democracies and open societies. The first two objectives remain politically charged and, while useful for domestic political purposes, somehow seem wanting in terms of Clausewitzian logic. Iraq's nuclear programme was believed to have been largely dismantled during the 1990s. The gaps between Iraq's declarations and the UN's attempts at verification were quite limited in Iraq's missile programme. It is true that significant gaps remained in Iraq's chemical and biological programmes, but using force over disputed amounts of growth media and chemical precursors do not seem to measure up to Clausewitzian logic, particularly since there was no consensus in the intelligence community about the significance of these gaps and whether they constituted a grave and impending threat to the United States.

However, the last objective seems particularly apt in the context of Clausewitz's cited maxim. The idea of using force to effect a wide-reaching transformation of regional politics makes more sense in the calculated end/means tradeoffs that states must make in deciding to go to war. Given that Saddam had shown remarkable outward resilience through 13 years of sanctions and international isolation and that it seemed unlikely he would leave of his own free will, regional political transformation represented a principal and compelling objective that could only be achieved through the use of force. Some suggest that a paper titled 'A Clean Break: A Strategy for Securing the Realm' by Richard Perle and others provided the Bush administration with a blueprint of sorts that articulated an objective of fundamentally altering the internal politics of Arab states throughout the region.¹ The paper, written in 1996 for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, called, among other things, for regime change in Baghdad as part of a plan to spread democracy around the region and isolate those states resistant to fundamental political change—Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt. Spreading democracy, it was argued, would create a new set of actors throughout the region that would be more amenable to reaching a peace treaty with Israel. The paper reflected much of the thinking attributed to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who is generally credited with penning the first draft of the Bush administration's approach to national security strategy in the early 1990s (Lemann 2002).

¹Text of the paper can be accessed online at <<http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm>>.

If the 'Clean Break' paper represented potential blueprint for a new approach in the Middle East, the broader vision for the role that force could play as part of a more aggressive American security strategy was clearly spelled out in a September 2000 report released by the conservative organisation called the Project for New American Century. Many of the senior members of the organisation would assume prominent positions in the Bush administration. The report, titled 'Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century',² called for the United States to assume its mantle of global leadership and take concrete steps to preserve and extend America's position of global predominance. In a passage that could be regarded as the articulation of the Bush administration's new strategic direction—even before the September 11 attacks—the report's authors declared in its introduction that 'The United States is the world's only superpower, combining preeminent military power, global technological leadership, and the world's largest economy. Moreover, America stands at the head of a system of alliances, which includes the world's other leading democratic powers. At present, the United States faces no global rival. America's grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible' (ibid., i). The role of the military within this grand strategy, according to the report, was to 'secure and expand the "zones of democratic peace"; to deter the rise of a new great-power competitor; defend key regions of Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve American preeminence through the coming transformation of war made possible by new technologies' (ibid., 4).

If using force to expand the so-called 'zones of democracy' as part of a strategy of political transformation represented a central objective of using force against Iraq, it stands to reason that this objective applies throughout the region. The decision to use force in pursuit of Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of a broader strategic vision of political transformation that is linked to battling terrorism seems clear in President Bush's soaring rhetoric linking the toppling of Saddam with a plan to defeat terrorism and spread democracy in the Middle East:

We are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power. In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly—yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security. The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism. The terrorists thrive on the support of tyrants and the resentments of oppressed peoples. When tyrants fall, and resentment gives way to hope, men and women in every culture reject the ideologies of terror, and turn to the pursuits of peace. (Bush 2003)

This rhetoric, to be sure, only mirrors the verbiage in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy Report, which unequivocally establishes the goal of expanding the zone of democracy around the world as a primary strategic

²The report can be accessed at <<http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>> .

objective. Presumably, expanding the zone of democracy will, in turn, make those states within the zone less prone to support terrorist groups and religious extremists. As noted in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 'Ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate for their own advantage' (White House 2003, 23).

The Bush administration's strategy documents make clear that force will be an instrument not just to pre-empt emergent threats but also to expand the zone, forcibly if necessary. In the report's foreword, President Bush emphatically states, 'In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action' (White House 2002). Using force to effect regime change in Iraq indisputably represented such a path.

If we accept political transformation as a newly articulated strategic objective for the United States in the region, a logical next issue for analysis is whether and/or how such an objective fits within the historical framework of US regional security strategy. Stated differently, does the objective of using force to effect political transformation represent a 'fork in the road' for US security strategy? If so, what role will the use of force play in supporting political transformation in other regional states? And last, what role will forward-deployed forces play in this process and how will the infrastructure established in the Gulf serve this broader purpose? The remainder of this paper will examine these questions in an attempt to better define US regional security strategy and to determine if the security framework in the Gulf represents a precursor to an emerging global defence strategy that will unfold in the years ahead.

An Historical Baseline

To judge whether the United States has established a new and pre-eminent strategic objective in the Middle East requires a brief review of history. United States security strategy in the Gulf and the Middle East remained remarkably consistent throughout most of the post-1945 era. The region was seen as a critical front-line area during the global confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the Azerbaijan crisis of May 1946 is regarded by many as the opening act in the Cold War. Some have argued that the Eisenhower administration's decision to finally embrace the British plan to topple the Mossadegh government in Iran was made not so much in response to the nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian oil company as in the belief that that Iranian communists serving as a front for the Soviet Union could assume a dominant role in Iranian politics (Gasiorowski and Byrne 2004, 225; Palmer 1992, 68-69). To the south of Iran, the gradual integration of Saudi Arabia under the US security umbrella during the 1940s and 1950s flowed from the realisation of the growing strategic importance of Saudi oil to the West as US production declined. In planning documents during the 1950s, the United States examined the possibility of using nuclear weapons as part of an 'oil denial' strategy to prevent the Soviet Union from seizing control over Saudi oil fields. Distracted by Vietnam during the 1960s, the US nonetheless still signalled its

continuing commitment to Saudi Arabia in July 1963 when it deployed aircraft to the kingdom in response to the Saudi-Egyptian conflict in Yemen (Hart 1998).

Following the British withdrawal east of Suez in 1971, the United States sought to fill the vacuum by building up security relationships with Tehran and Riyadh. The infrastructure within Saudi Arabia was built out during this period, while Iran was sold many advanced weapons. The so-called 'twin-pillar' system unravelled following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Tehran, and the United States became drawn into an increasingly active and direct role during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Saddam's Iraq became a part of the new system during the 1980s as the United States reluctantly agreed with the assessment of the Gulf States that Iranian victory on the battlefield would be disastrous for regional security and stability. As a result, the Reagan administration gradually re-established a political relationship with Iraq during the 1980s, removing that country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982 and re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984. Both steps paved the way for support to Iraq during the war in the form of intelligence and other non-lethal defence equipment. The actions by the United States represented a *de facto* acceptance of the view that a strong Iraq served as a useful counter to the political and military threat from Tehran (Borer 2003).

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the United States spearheaded the coalition to restore order and finally moved completely into the vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal some twenty years earlier. After the war, the United States and the Gulf States reached a series of tacit understandings as part of the expansion of the security umbrella in the 1990s: the Gulf states provided access to facilities and publicly (if unenthusiastically) supported containment; in exchange, the United States guaranteed their security and adopted a policy of non-interference in their internal affairs (Indyk 2002; Russell 2003). In some ways, this represented a return to the 19th-century arrangements made between the British and the Trucial sheikdoms practised up until the British departure in 1971.

During the 1990s—the period of containment—the logistical infrastructure for the forward-deployed presence took shape as part of a strategy to preserve stability, deter Iran and Iraq, and, if necessary, use force on a short-notice basis to defend US regional interests. Consistent with this approach, the United States negotiated a series of defence cooperation agreements with the Gulf States that (1) reached agreement in principle to pre-position military equipment; (2) granted access to host-nation military facilities; (3) established a framework for military-to-military interaction; and (4) ensured that US military personnel deployed in these countries would be protected under US law. The United States pre-positioned three heavy brigade sets of equipment in the region as part of the plan to build forces quickly in the event of a crisis: one in Kuwait, one in Qatar, and one afloat. These forces were complemented by a continuously present carrier battle group and assets in theatre to enforce the no-fly zones and the trade embargo against Iraq.

In 1995, the Department of Defense identified a number of critical strategic interests in the Middle East—assured access to Gulf oil, protecting freedom of navigation along the sea lines of control, a durable Arab-Israeli peace, and security of key regional partners as priorities for the United States (Office of International Security Affairs 1995, 5-10). The system for preserving security established during

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the 1990s supported these objectives, essentially representing a defensive strategy designed to preserve the status quo. While the United States sought to undermine Saddam's regime through covert means and from 1997 onward adopted a policy of rhetorically embracing regime change, the Clinton administration shied away from the idea of invading Iraq to achieve regime change in Baghdad.

Isn't it Still About Oil?

Most discussion of US strategy and its vital interests in the Gulf invariably leads to one overriding issue: oil. Despite the curious lack of emphasis of this issue in recent US strategy documents and official government pronouncements, there is no way to get around an inescapable fact: the long-term health of the world's economy depends on the Gulf's ability to continue delivering a predictable, steadily increasing supply of oil to the international community at reasonable prices. In 2003, the Gulf states produced about 22.9 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for 27% of the world's total. Approximately 15-15.5 million barrels of oil per day transits out of the Gulf through the 34-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, making the waterway an important pressure point in the world's economy.³ The region contains an estimated 715 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, representing 57% of the world's totals and most of the world's excess production capacity. Nearly 40% of the world's natural gas reserves also reside in the region. The world promises to become even more dependent on Gulf state oil producers over the next 25 years. By 2025, the Energy Information Administration estimates that the Persian Gulf producers will be exporting 36.4 million barrels of oil per day, more than doubling their current exports of nearly 17 million barrels per day (Energy Information Administration 2004). Developing economies of Asia will become particularly dependent on Gulf oil to sustain their economic expansion over the next two decades.

While various commentators argue forcefully that 'it's still about the oil' in discussing US interests in the Gulf,⁴ the salience of the issue of consumption access seems greatly reduced in the Bush administration's primary strategy documents, and today seems replaced by the need to control international oil pricing. Oil access issues played little if any role in the decision to use force against Iraq, which was not the case in 1990-91.⁵ While US troops moved quickly to secure

³ Figures drawn from 'Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet', Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, September 2004, <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html>>.

⁴ See Kenneth Pollack's discussion of this issue, as one example (2003). An even more forceful case arguing for the transcendent importance of oil in US strategy in the Persian Gulf is made by Andrew Bacevich (2005). Bacevich argues that the so-called war on terror and the pursuit of democracy are subsumed by the overriding strategic requirement that the American way of life requires unlimited and unfettered access to imported oil. He states that from 1980 to the present, 'Regardless of who happened to be occupying the Oval Office, universal values did not figure prominently in the formulation and articulation of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. Geopolitics routinely trumped values in the war. Everyone knew that the dominant issue was oil, with Saudi Arabia understood to be the crown jewel' (58-59). Another variant on this argument can be found in Telhami (2002). Telhami places the US approach in the Gulf within a strategy of denying access to Gulf oil to hostile powers.

⁵ See Woodward (2004). As revealed in Woodward's highly credible reporting on the Bush administration's internal deliberations leading up to the Iraq war, access to Gulf oil seemed to have little if any role in the decision to use force.

Iraq's oil fields and protect Baghdad's Oil Ministry from looters at the outset of OIF, control over Iraq's 110 billion barrel oil reserves seemed to play little role in the Bush administration's war objectives. In the context of regional strategy, the objective of generally preserving the free flow of oil to international markets receives scant attention in the National Security Strategy, while greater emphasis is placed on preserving more stable sources of oil access (the best being neighbourly Canada and Mexico), and expanding domestic energy resources: 'We will strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and the Caspian region' (White House 2004, 19-20). Vice President Cheney's report on national energy policy also places little particular emphasis on the Gulf (White House 2001). With the world's major oil-producing region barely mentioned in this context, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Bush administration seems to have recast as a strategic priority US access to Gulf oil. Instead of emphasising control over the region's resources as a geopolitical tool, the Bush administration instead emphasises the Gulf's importance for price stability in world oil markets.

Going on the Offence: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Gulf Reconsidered

While the merits of the various justifications for using force in OIF can be debated, there can be no doubt that the decision-making environment surrounding the decision to topple Saddam took place against the backdrop of the September 11 attacks (Wirtz and Russell 2003). After the attacks, the Bush administration promulgated a series of strategy documents stating that the United States would use force in a widening number of circumstances. Confronted by a seemingly new and more dangerous security environment, the Bush administration summarily rejected the idea of waiting to be attacked by an adversary as the pre-eminent circumstance under which the country would respond with force. Instead, the Bush administration promised to act as threats emerged and to eliminate them using force before the threats matured. As noted in the National Security Strategy report, 'The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively' (White House, 15).

Q1 United States will, if necessary, act preemptively' (White House, 15).

At the same time the Bush administration articulated the idea of using force to pre-empt emerging threats and attack hostile terrorist groups on a global basis, a parallel development was gathering steam in American military institutions. Initially dubbed the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and now called 'Transformation', new concepts of conducting warfare were taking shape as the nation's military institutions started to integrate technological advances in data processing and delivery that swept through society in the 1990s. An important subset of military transformation is called 'network-centric warfare', in which US forces are increasingly tied together in encrypted command and control networks, greatly increasing situational awareness, combat capability, and efficiency. In short,

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network-centric operations offer more destructive power, more quickly, and with less manpower. During the second half of the 1990s, the strategic backbone for network-centric operations took shape. The military integrated the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) into the force structure, which provided the ability to link data feeds from a variety of different sensors into a fused common operational picture. The enhanced situational awareness available to US forces at the strategic and operational levels is in the process of being made accessible at the small unit level. The Defense Department is in the process of developing a system to feed this situational awareness down to a unit-level
 02 intranet with something called the Global Information Grid (GIG) (Weiner 2004)

At the end of the 1990s in concert with the integration of GCCS was the fielding of a new generation of precision-guided standoff munitions that enabled the physical destruction of targets with minimal risks to delivery platforms and US troops. Enhanced situational awareness, networked forces, and standoff strikes against differentiated target sets were dubbed by the press 'shock and awe' during OIF. The military refers to the operational concept as 'effects-based operations'. The Joint Forces Command defines the concept as 'A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels'.⁶ Applying force using the principles of effects-based operations entailed an entirely new scheme of targeting a potential enemy. Instead of an attrition, campaign-style of military operations with large numbers of forces built up over time, effects-based operations offered the promise of destroying an enemy's will to fight through the synergistic effects of coordinated targeting, information operations, and special forces.

Some believe the air campaign in Gulf War I represented the first use of effects-
 03 based operations (Worden 1995). Most analysts agree OIF was deliberately planned and executed using concepts associated with effects-based operations. The infrastructure and forward base of operations established in the Gulf during the 1990s proved to be instrumental in executing the stunning conventional phase of OIF—albeit against an incompetent foe. Coordination of the build-up in the Gulf would have been much more difficult without the forward command elements in place in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Execution of invasion itself was commanded largely out of the facilities in Qatar (Camp As Sayliya and Al Udeid), which also coordinated air operations using ground- and sea-based strike aircraft. Though it was largely hidden from public view, the Saudis as usual provided access to their airspace and their facilities for a variety of US forces involved in OIF.

The forward-deployed footprint proved instrumental in using force against Iraq, and represents a powerful and continuous reminder to other regional states of US conventional military strength. Consistent with the objectives of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy, these forces thus serve the dual purposes of assuring friendly states of the US security commitment (Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, for example) while deterring overtly aggressive behaviour on the part of less friendly regional actors such as Syria and Iran. In some respects the forward-deployed footprint also

⁶ Joint Forces Command Glossary, <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>> .

serves as a powerful tool for compulsion that is designed not just to deter aggressions but also to change the behaviour of regional states. The sword of compulsion cuts both ways, it should be noted.

There can be little doubt that the presence of 170,000 military personnel and their equipment in the Gulf is intended to send a threatening message as part of a
Q5 broader coercive/deterrent/compellant bargaining framework to countries like Iran and Syria, while sending what have to be regarded as more benign but also somewhat ambiguous messages to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Depending on whether the states in question are 'with or against the United States' the Gulf infrastructure has come to represent an important element in a broader framework to indirectly support and encourage the spread of rules-based governance and global interaction, while at the same
Q4 time serving as a tool to continue in its more 'traditional' role of preserving the status quo.

It can be no accident that the Gulf states that have welcomed the US military presence with open arms—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—are in some respects leading the way in the region towards limited democracy and transparency. While it is unrealistic to expect these states to embrace Western-style secular political systems, these states are embracing other aspects of global rules-based governance that connote a certain 'stability' to the international community. All these states seem determined to position themselves as important operational hubs not just for the US military but as networked centres for the globalised world, moving content, people, and money through their geographic and virtual spaces. Dubai, for example, has positioned itself as a primary resort, financial centre, and trade facility in the global economy. Provided with US security guarantees, all the smaller Gulf states seem to be developing rules-based societies more in accord with the globalising world than the rest of their Middle Eastern cousins (Russell 2004). Saudi Arabia constitutes the primary and most important exception to this phenomenon, though there seems to be little doubt that Crown Prince Abdullah seeks to move the Kingdom towards political, economic, and social reform (Russell 2003).

While US military forces and host-nation military facilities may provide a welcome umbrella to the Gulf states that can indirectly encourage the kind of political transformation the United States more actively seeks in Iraq, they also provide a powerful coercive influence over Syria and Iran—states that, according to the Bush administration, constitute a primary threat to security and stability in the international system. The presence of US forces, supported by a newly reconfigured strategic deterrent, provides a seamless web of military capabilities that can be brought to bear in a deterrent, compellant, and direct role on both actors. The redundancy, geographic dispersion, and denial and deception prowess shown by Iran in its nuclear programme shows, if nothing else, an appreciation for US and Israeli military capabilities. The skills shown by the Iranians in hardening and hiding their nuclear footprint also makes a conventional and/or nuclear counterforce scheme of operations that much more difficult for targeteers at Al Udeid, Omaha, and Tel Aviv.

The Arc of Crisis—Global Strike and the Gulf as Epicentre

While the Gulf infrastructure is also intended to encourage political transformation and deal with military contingencies within the theatre like Iraq, it is also clear that these facilities are intended to provide power projection capabilities into distant areas. The role of the Gulf infrastructure in using force in Iraq may be a harbinger of things to come, assuming that using force OIF in pursuit of political transformation was not an anomaly. It seems clear that the basic outlines of the US military footprint in the Gulf may be replicated elsewhere around the world. Various strategy documents highlight the growing importance of forward-deployed forces to US global security strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review states, 'Over time, U.S. forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcements, and were necessary, assured access for follow-on forces' (The Pentagon 2001, 20). A further goal for US forces is to 'increase the capability of its forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect and possibly allowing for reallocation for forces now dedicated to reinforcement to other missions' (ibid.). The National Military Strategy further reinforces this point, noting that 'Our primary line of defense remains well forward. Forces operating in key regions are essential to the defense of the United States and to the protection of allies and US interests' (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 9).

The Gulf infrastructure provides the US with a model to emulate around the world as it seeks to realign its forces around the globe to better address new threats. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, has noted, 'Key premises underlying our forward posture have changed fundamentally: We no longer expect our forces to fight in place, rather, their purpose to project power in to theaters that may be distant from their bases.'⁷ The Gulf provides the United States the ideal platform upon which to project power not just from the United States but from centre of the so-called 'arc of crisis' that is regarded by Pentagon strategists as the primary problem for US security in the 21st century. Force can be projected both within the immediate environs of the arc but also outside the arc from Gulf bases, complementing the emerging global strike assets that are based in the United States.

The Pentagon has been working on the global realignment of the US military is intended to address threats from the zone of crisis, which starts in Central and South America and spreads through North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. There is discussion of drawing down the presence in Europe and the Korean Peninsula and redeploying these forces to areas in the so-called arc. Noted strategist Tom Barnett has characterised this area of the world as the 'gap'—constituting that part of the world that has not developed and/or signed onto the rule sets that characterise interstate interactions in the 'core' countries, which consist of North America, Europe, Russia, and developing Asia. Barnett suggests that the presence of US forces in the Gulf is to 'export security' in parts of the gap still prone to violence and instability. Events in Iraq suggest that the United States will need to 'export security' in this part of the world for the foreseeable future (Barnett 2004). The notion of exporting security is not necessarily a new concept, but is simply

⁷ Remarks by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 'Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture', at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 3 December 2003.

another way of linking security and conflict with social and economic development—a linkage that has become particularly pronounced in the post-Cold-War era (Duffield 2001).

A new scheme of supporting forward operations throughout the arc of instability is spelled out in the Bush administration's *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Department of Defense 2005). Released in March 2005, the report calls for a new global posture that features main operating bases, or MOBs, forward operating sites, or FOSs, and a 'diverse array of more austere cooperative security locations', or CSLs. These facilities are intended to be linked and mutually supportive. Principal operating bases—like the facility at Al Udeid, for example, are well developed with sufficient infrastructure to support large numbers of forces and to receive even larger numbers in times of crisis. Forward operating sites are 'scalable, "warm" facilities intended for rotational use by operational forces. They often house prepositioned equipment and a modest permanent support presents. FOSs are able to support a range of military activities on short notice' (Department of Defense 2005, 19-20). The new, networked scheme of forward operating areas can be expected to spread out into the arc of instability from the main operating areas in the Gulf.

Consistent with the requirements spelled out in the Bush administration's strategy documents, a new and diverse array of military facilities are appearing in the Gulf and Central Asia. The developing military footprint inside Iraq will only further complement other facilities in theatre that are already available for use in a variety of contingencies. One commentator has identified as many as six permanent bases in Iraq, with three currently under construction at Baghdad International Airport, Tallil air base near Nasariyah, and Bashur air field in northern Iraq (Johnson 2004). In October 2004, as part of supplemental appropriations to fund ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress earmarked US\$63 million in military construction funds for improvements at the Al Dhafra airfield in the United Emirates, which accommodated a United States Air Force aerial refuelling detachment during the 1990s. The same bill contained US\$60 million to fund additional enhancements to the Al Udeid airfield in Qatar. In Afghanistan, the United States recently announced plans to spend US\$83 million to upgrade its two main bases at Bagram air base (north of Kabul) and Kandahar airfield to the south.⁸ The funding will be used to expand runways and other improvements to provide new billeting facilities for US military personnel. The expansion of the facilities infrastructure in Afghanistan has been mirrored by the development of facilities and solidified politico-military partnerships in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Berman 2004-5). Completing the development of facilities in and around the Gulf, in 2002 the United States established the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), in Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA is working with regional states to coordinate training and direct action against terrorist groups in the region (West 2005).

The Gulf and the Global War on Terrorism

The facilities infrastructure throughout the arc of instability, which will be supported through the main operating areas in the Gulf, will feature a different

⁸ See Associated Press, 'U.S. Invests in Upgrades of Afghanistan Bases', 28 March 2005.

regional footprint and a different kind of force structure from those that populated the Gulf bases during the era of containment during the 1990s. Those forces conducted continuous operations against Iraq and more indirectly against Iran, exercising pre-positioned military equipment and performing training exercises with host-nation militaries (Office of International Security Affairs 1995). In the future, the structure of forces deployed in the Gulf and to the facilities being established in other parts of the arc will be driven less by requirement to conduct major combat operations than by those associated with the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The footprint of these forces is likely to feature a more prominent role for special forces and strike assets that can be brought to bear on targets with compressed warning time and reduced planning requirements.

At the strategic level, these forward-deployed forces will perform what various Defense Department briefing slides refer to as the 'disrupt' function that will serve to disrupt terrorist networks and complicate terrorist command-and-control cells that are seeking to carry out operations against US forces in theatre and against civilian targets in the continental US. One of the central tenets of the plan to conduct operations against the global Islamist insurgency is to fight forward, conducting military operations throughout the arc of instability. Other missions to be performed by these forces:

- Deny sanctuary to terrorist groups afforded by state sponsors and geographic areas outside the control of central governments. Gulf-based forces can be expected to support operations in the Horn of Africa, the Central Asian republics, and the tribal border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also means maintaining a series of active and ongoing military activities in support of a political coercive and compellant framework designed to prevent states from supporting terrorist groups.
- Identify, track, and destroy terrorist groups before those groups can mount attacks on the US homeland. This mission will be accomplished by forward-deployed surveillance assets, allowing quick targeting and destruction of identified targets—preferably at standoff ranges using the new family of precision-guided munitions, and, if necessary, force-on-force engagements using special operations forces or forward-deployed conventional forces.
- Work with coalition partners in forward operating areas to defeat terrorist groups, with particular emphasis on those countries being threatened by insurgents.
- Engage in psychological and information operations that will discredit Islamist ideologies that are at the core of the insurgent ideology.
- Help create conditions in which terrorist groups lose their legitimacy and base of support within the broader population. Forward-based forces will have to be configured to perform civic action, law enforcement, and other so-called 'stability' operations.
- Retain the flexibility to engage in a variety of forms of warfare, ranging from conventional military operations to 'irregular' or counter-insurgency operations.
- Collect intelligence that in all the targets in forward operating areas.⁹

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⁹ These missions are derived from White House (2003); 'Joint Operating Concept for Defeating Terrorist Organizations' (Pre-coordination Draft), United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 14 November 2003; and Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004).

The Gulf facilities will become central hubs in the network of bases stretching throughout Central and South Asia and the Horn of Africa which will perform missions associated with GWOT. These bases will all be networked together in secure command-and-control links to share intelligence and coordinate operations throughout that part of the arc surrounding the Gulf. Operations commanded out of the Gulf and performed by forward-deployed forces throughout the theatre will serve as a test bed for emerging concepts of conducting operations against geographically dispersed adversaries. The Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation is undertaking an initiative called the Wolf PAC Distributed Operations Experiment which will 'explore command and control (C2) of geographically dispersed, networked, autonomous and semi-autonomous assets'.¹⁰ These operational concepts feature distributed operations in which small numbers of networked forces would be clandestinely inserted into hostile zones supported by unmanned aerial vehicles and other sensors to target hostile terrorist groups and/or disrupt ongoing terrorist operations.

Transformation and Effects-Based Operations: The Mixed Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan

While the United States is moving forward to implement new concepts of applying force which will increasingly feature a predominant role for forward-deployed forces, the lessons from the two ongoing military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan provide very different lessons for planners contemplating the use of force in those parts of the arc of instability in and around the Gulf. In Iraq, the United States executed an extremely successful conventional military operation against an incompetent foe, integrating air, ground, and sea-based assets in a coordinated campaign that effectively brought down Saddam Hussein in several days. But it would be wrong to conclude that the campaign represented a 'triumph' for military transformation and effects-based operations. While the innovative targeting scheme executed by sensors and long-range standoff munitions worked largely as advertised during the assault on Baghdad, much of the US military's modern hardware and sophisticated operational concepts have been less effective in Iraq's urban counter-insurgency environment (Baum 2005). Lacking language skills and overall familiarity with Iraqi society and culture, US ground troops face the difficult task of applying their technological superiority and operational prowess against a societally embedded foe—at least in Iraq's Sunni heartland. Without a clear political decision to raise the level of national commitment, it seems clear that the United States cannot militarily 'defeat' the insurgency and must instead rely on indigenously generated Iraqi forces to root out the insurgents. In short, effects-based operations and the capabilities envisioned in military transformation do not by themselves offer the prospect of 'victory'. As is being relearned by a new generation of troops in Iraq, there is no

Q15 ¹⁰ See 'Wolf PAC Distributed Operations Experiment', *Transformation Trends*, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, 7 December 2004, <http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/trends_375_Transformation_Trends_7_December_2004_Issue.pdf>. Also see 'OFT Launches Initiative to Help Cultivate "Distributed Ops" Concept', *Inside the Pentagon*, 17 February 2005.

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substitute for language skills, cultural awareness, and tactical intelligence in the fight against the insurgents.

In Afghanistan, the 'military' lessons for the United States are different from those in Iraq, but the implications of the experience there are similar. Like Iraq, Afghanistan represented an astounding success in which relatively small numbers of US forces (numbering several hundred special operations forces) brought down a regime in a relatively short amount of time at little direct cost. Since bringing down the Taliban, US special forces in concert with the International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) led by NATO helped establish security that was critical for the successful national elections of October 2004. These special forces along with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) working alongside Afghan nationals are providing security and helping execute reconstruction and stabilisation missions throughout the country. While elements of the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain active on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the country is not being subjected to the kind of instability and violence regularly plaguing sections of Iraq. Overall, Afghanistan nation-building is moving forward but at a pace slower than anticipated and it is still too soon to classify Afghanistan as a success—or a failure, for that matter. While the presidential elections of 2004 represent a success, the follow-on parliamentary elections have now been delayed until September 2005. It remains to be seen whether the latest schedule for elections can be met. Despite pronouncements of success by various senior US officials,¹¹ other reporting paints a more nuanced picture. In its weekly report covering the period from 24 to 30 March 2005, the European Union's Afghanistan Non-Governmental Organisation Safety Office (ANSO) reported uncertain local security conditions in 26 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.¹² In the conventional phase of combat operations, force was applied in an imaginative and ad hoc way that demonstrated flexibility and innovation. Particular characteristics of the regional environment provided importing supporting elements to the use of force and have also helped in the post-conflict environment. Aided by a coherent opposition that is being moulded into a national-level force, US special forces are working diligently to build indigenous capabilities while simultaneously retaining the means to launch direct action teams against al-Qaeda and the Taliban if necessary to supplement the local defence forces.

But it is easy to overdraw the lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan cases (which are still being assessed) and hence still more difficult to draw out wider implications from these cases for the new security strategy being implemented in the region by the United States. If there is an overriding lesson for planners of these two cases it is this: history, situation, and context matter in planning and executing military operations. In Afghanistan, the United States had at its disposal an extant and indigenous resistance force—the Northern Alliance—the members

¹¹ In the press conference announcing the nomination of Zalmay Khalilzad as US ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad stated, 'In partnership with the Afghan people, particularly President Karzai, we have made great strides. Success in Afghanistan will lead to the political, economic, commercial and ultimately the geopolitical transformation of Central Asia and South Asia.' Remarks posted online, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44285.htm>>.

¹² The ANSO Security Situation Summary advises non-governmental organisations to exercise 'caution' or 'extreme caution' in these areas, and generally advises against travel outside urban areas throughout most of the country after dark due to concerns about security.

of which had been involved in the internal Afghan conflict for much of the past 25 years. The Northern Alliance had a relatively coherent command structure and faced a foe with symmetrical military capabilities. In Iraq, an indigenous underground resistance to Saddam existed in the Shiite south which was almost totally opaque to US planners and, as a result, was of no real use in prosecuting the conventional military phase of the invasion.¹³ The lack of knowledge of the Shiite infrastructure, however, simply flowed from a broader ignorance of Iraqi society, which had been devastated by nearly thirty years of Saddam's totalitarian rule. In Iraq, a new generation of military personnel encountered an environment that had not been seen by the United States as a military occupying force since Vietnam. Thus it is not surprising that the United States has struggled to bring its formidable military capabilities to bear in an extremely difficult counter-insurgency environment tailor-made for an opponent with asymmetric capabilities.

Conclusion

Events over the last three years in the Middle East indicate that the United States is in the midst of redefining its strategic objectives in the region. It is no longer satisfied with the status quo and preserving historical relationships based primarily on access to energy and stability in world oil markets. The US–Saudi partnership is in the process of redefining itself, while the US relationships with the Gulf states have assumed an ascendant role in terms of their contributions to US military objectives. Unlike the problematic use of Saudi military facilities during the 1990s, the no-strings-attached platforms for military operations in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates will only become more useful to the United States as it seeks to address emerging threats in and around the arc of crisis. The facilities in the Gulf are now being complemented by additional bases being built in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa.

Using force to achieve political transformation in the Middle East and elsewhere, however, means accepting the unexpected, and accepting limits to the control that can be exercised over the very transformation that has been embraced. An Islamist Shiite style of government could emerge in Iraq, one that may well 'request' that the United States depart from their country. Embracing the idea of using force to spur political transformation also means accepting the idea that 'stability' per se is not necessarily a pre-eminent strategic objective. Iraq is a primary example, replete with certain historical quirks that make a less than ideal platform for the test bed of political transformation. The historical legacy of a state characterised by coercion, authoritarian, and centralised state control of political and economic activity in combination with pronounced sectarian and ethnic fissures poses profound challenges for the process of political transformation.

While it is true that the 9/11 attacks redefined global security environment for the United States, that redefinition had other important contributing

¹³ The coherence of internal Shia groups came as a complete surprise to the United States—another aspect of the so-called 'intelligence failure' that has focused primarily on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Since the Shia infrastructure was largely unrecognised by the United States, the latter could not take advantage of it in either the conventional phase of operations or the immediate post-conflict environment. See Jabar (2003, 272–73).

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elements that helped shape the decision to use force against Iraq. The United States arrived at the strategic objective of regional political transformation as a result of a confluence of many different factors. Military transformation, effects-based operations, and the presence of the developed infrastructure played an indirect and supporting role in the political decision to use force in Iraq. All these factors combined to help build a case that force could be used in pursuit of political objectives without the accompanying political, economic and social costs that have traditionally been associated with using force. Using fewer numbers of an all-volunteer force in a lightning-style campaign that promised few casualties presented an alluring chimera to decision makers—a chimera that has been largely blown apart by the explosion of the insurgency inside Iraq.

But there can be little doubt that the new American way of war characterised by effects-based operations, long-range conventional and nuclear targeting, and enhanced situational awareness will play a role in future decisions to use force as an instrument of strategy and policy. Operation Iraqi Freedom represents only the beginning of this phenomenon in an emerging new global defence strategy that may see forward-deployed forces around the world used with increased frequency to manage an uncertain security environment. It seems clear that the Gulf infrastructure will continue as an enduring feature—maybe even the centrepiece—of the emerging global infrastructure that will see US forces redeployed around the globe to meet the requirements of expanding the zone of democracy and exporting security to stabilise trouble spots around the world.

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8	Clarify 'The Pentagon has been working on the global realignment of the US military is intended to address threats from the zone of crisis'.
9	Clarify 'outside the control over central governments'.
10	'It also means maintaining' – To what does 'It' refer?
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12	Define PAC?
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Policy Analysis Brief

April
2005

Realistic Solutions for Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

Summary

International policy options for the Iranian nuclear crisis do not exist in a vacuum. Desired US national security goals and global nonproliferation goals will be impossible to fulfill if the interests, perceptions, fears, and ambitions of the "target state," Iran, are not duly considered and incorporated into US decision making. The first section of this brief outlines three Iranian perceptions and domestic realities with potentially decisive impacts on the success or failure of Western policy strategies, followed by five concrete policy recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies.

This policy brief is based on personal research by the author and is informed by numerous Track 1-1/2 dialogues with both reformist and conservative Iranian officials/analysts from 1999 through May 2004. The viewpoints expressed in this brief cannot be attributed to any one individual Iranian, European, or American involved in Stanley Foundation-sponsored dialogues. The author is solely responsible for all policy conclusions.

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Iranian Threat Perceptions and Domestic Realities

Iranian Domestic Reality No. 1

Tehran's Perception of "True" US Goals. In the views of many Iranians, especially the various groups of "new" and "old" conservatives in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) and in the powerful Council of Guardians, the United States has never accepted the idea of an Islamic Republic and never will. It is hostile to Iran not because of its specific actions or specific policies, but rather is implacably hostile to Iran's very self-identity and national founding doctrine. In this perception or worldview, all US critiques of specific actions in the nuclear, missile, or terrorism issue areas (including relations with Hizbollah) are actually window dressing for the true issue: the character of the Iranian government as a whole. While US officials and experts claim there is no "Iran policy" due to factionalization in the Bush administration, in fact US actions and public statements clearly show that its latent or tacit strategy is one of isolating, pressuring, undermining, and ultimately overthrowing the Islamic Republic. In the minds of many senior Iranian media commentators and officials, this wish for regime change will therefore be the de facto goal of any UN Security Council resolution on the nuclear issue, whatever the Europeans may do or say.

Iranian Domestic Reality No. 2

The True Nature of Tehran's Nuclear Energy/Weapons Debate. Many US officials and analysts in DC on both the left and right have mischaracterized Iran's domestic nuclear

debate. They have explicitly or implicitly argued that the Iranian debate is between two loose groups of experts and political elites in Tehran:

- Liberal progressives and pragmatic, business-oriented technocrats who would be willing to entirely give up an indigenous fuel-cycle capability in the name of economic growth, international trade, foreign direct investment, and a more enlightened Iranian approach to national and regional security.
- Right-wingers who would like nothing more than to weaponize, deploy, and threaten neighbors at the first possible instant.

Both of these groups do exist in Tehran. And while the first group is highly unlikely to get its full preferences enacted into policy, given Iran's heavy historical investment of political and economic capital in the nuclear energy program, the second group has not yet won the debate about whether to weaponize the nuclear energy program. The nuclear fuel-cycle issue has become a political football in Tehran, and the majority of political elites want to score the same touchdown—namely, a full indigenous fuel-cycle capability, a negotiated agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and outside powers on close monitoring and scrutiny, and an agreement from Iran that it will never weaponize. (What is meant by close international scrutiny is hotly contested and many different interpretations of the exact requirements of the Additional Protocol and its impact on Iranian sovereignty exist.)

In short, it is doubtful that outside powers can do anything at this point to stop an indigenous fuel cycle. The standing EU proposal that Iran give up entirely on its own domestic production capability is likely to fail, even if the United

States and Europe can agree to play the “good cop, bad cop” routine better than they have thus far. The real question is whether weaponization and outright deployment of nuclear warheads on Shahab-II and Shahab-III long-range missiles can be avoided, since the latter development would directly undermine stability in both the Gulf and the larger Middle East.

Iranian Domestic Reality No. 3

Tehran's Willingness to Bargain. Many Iranian conservatives and reformists alike are in principle willing to bargain, Turkish-market style, on any issue under the sun, including sensitive issues surrounding Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas as well as internal human rights practices. However, there is one exception to this rule: the right of Iran to uranium enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This said, the “glass half full” is that compromise and even mutual advantage on all other sticky issues, including those involving Israel, are eminently possible—both tactically in the short term and strategically in the long term.

Recommendations Based on These Iranian Perceptions and Domestic Realities

Recommendation No. 1

Grant to Iran a Minimal Level of “Existential” Security. Recognize the negative role that latent US regime change desires have on the nuclear issue, including the hard work of Europeans to reach a new agreement. The United States must erase the implicit (and sometimes explicit) hostility toward the very idea of an Islamic regime in Tehran, accept the basic results of the Revolution, and work with the factions in power through the Foreign Ministry in Tehran.

Future Activities

Stanley Foundation research on Iranian-related security issues and travel to Tehran will continue into 2005 as part of a larger, multilateral “Gulf Security Initiative” that will create new off-the-record dialogues with representatives from Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and the Arab Gulf monarchies. See www.stanleyfoundation.org and click on the “Gulf Security” link for more details.

In sum, give Iran what North Korea has been asking for: recognition of the right of the Islamic Republic to exist and the legitimacy of Iran's minimum security concerns. Agree to work with Iran from this basis. This will strengthen Europe's hand a great deal in its negotiations on nuclear and human rights issues because, currently, Iranians do not just view the United States as the "bad cop"—rather, they view the United States as judge, jury, and executioner standing in the background behind Europe with a huge axe ready to fall on Tehran. Until this changes, Europe's strategy of cooperative engagement will likely fail in the long run. This despite recent advances in US-European cooperation, including recent US offers of World Trade Organization membership to Iran and some spare parts for Iran's deteriorating civil aviation industry. These very limited openings by the United States, in league with Europe, are unlikely to succeed against the backdrop of official US hostility toward the ruling clerics in Tehran. Until Washington eases its rhetoric and actions, Iran will continue to view all issues of international concern through the prism of its intense rivalry with the United States, to the detriment of global nonproliferation goals.

Recommendation No. 2

Do not carry out preemptive or preventive military strikes on (suspected) Iranian nuclear weapons facilities. Preemptive and preventive military strikes by either the United States or Israel in the name of counterproliferation would be a political catastrophe of major proportions for US, regional, and global security because it would raise Israel to enemy No. 1 in Iranian threat perceptions—which is much worse than the current Iranian perception of the United States as the main enemy. Even worse, a strike by Israel could make the Iranian bomb an *Islamic bomb* in the perception of Arabs and Muslims worldwide, making the current bilateral animus between Israel and Iran a global and regional security issue.

Thus preemptive military strikes by Israel would make the overall Arab-Israeli dispute much more central to Gulf security for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, who are currently aiming their missile defense systems *east* rather than west—toward Iran and Pakistan rather than toward Israel. Such strikes would also turn Iran's domestic populace against the United States in a way that would directly strengthen the hard-line conservative circles within Tehran, and it would end all debates in Tehran (which are still unresolved) about whether or not Iran should weaponize its growing latent nuclear capability. Such strikes could further cause indirect retaliation by Tehran through Iranian-supplied insurgents and terror groups within Iraq and on Israel's border with Lebanon, whereas for the moment Iran is largely either passive or is broadly cooperative in damping the extreme wings of Hezbollah.

In short, a counterproliferation approach (and especially preventive military strikes) would provide the United States and its allies purely short-term, tactical gains in regard to larger Gulf and Middle East security, while in the longer term such an approach could be disastrous for the larger war on terror—particularly those forms of transnational terrorism which are anti-Western and anti-globalization in their focus. For instance, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf are currently international leaders in very close cooperation with the United States to track, monitor, weaken, and defeat transnational terror groups with extreme forms of anti-Western Islamic ideology. This includes substantial cooperation in special forces operations, intelligence-sharing, and economic measures to curb terrorist financing. If the United States or Israel undertakes preemptive military strikes against a *legal and avowedly peaceful Iranian nuclear energy program* (as seen in the perceptions of people within the region), then this sort of close antiterror cooperation with GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, could be adversely affected due to popular pressures on the regimes in these countries.

In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the developing world in general supports and lives by Article IV of the NPT, which states that any state can build an indigenous fuel-cycle capability for energy and scientific purposes as long as IAEA safeguards are firmly in place. Thus, in the absence of clear intelligence about the near existence of Iranian nuclear weaponization, the regional popular reaction to such military strikes is likely to be extremely negative and further strain already fragile US-GCC ties.

Recommendation No. 3

Pursue a realistic, feasible solution to the nuclear crisis that relies on the demonstrated historical US ability to manage thorny conflicts of interest over long periods of time. In debating the utility of various options, including military strikes on Iranian facilities, use history as a guide: the United States had a very similar, equally stark debate (though behind closed doors) in the Johnson and Nixon administrations about the danger of a growing Chinese capability, and military strikes and/or an invasion of some type were fully considered and seriously vetted. What declassified memos show is that the United States accepted the reality of a nuclear China and decided to make a secure, stable Asia around it, both through nuclear and conventional security guarantees to Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea and through traditional US containment and deterrence. The Cultural Revolution in China led to massive deaths, torture, and imprisonment beyond anything seen in Iran now, and yet the United States was eventually able to engage when China moderated its goals. A Chinese nuclear capability did not lead to any of the worst-case scenarios laid out by alarmed Johnson officials in the '60s.

Mao's regime was certainly more "rogue-ish" than Iran's current elites, who have largely given up on earlier offensive revolutionary goals and are now playing a much more sober geopolitical game with their neighbors on

nearly all issues (trade, finance, and military confidence-building measures).

Therefore, rather than unending pessimism about the inherent downward spiral of Persian Gulf stability, the United States should consider the applicable positive lessons from the past 40 years of Asian security management and recognize the hesitant but positive trends in Arab-Iranian relations, both finance and trade and in the area of military confidence-building—particularly the joint military exercises being held between Oman and Iran. The United States should not shy away from traditional problem management, since it worked quite well during the Cold War.

Another bit of relevant history: India achieved fissile material production capabilities in the late 1950s yet sat on those capabilities and did not weaponize until an explosion in 1974. Then, when the international community reacted negatively, India again sat on its latent weapons capabilities until its official 1998 tests. Basic conclusion: through traditional diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks, the United States was able to manage a latent Indian capability—without weaponization or deployments by India—for more than 40 years. This is not a trivial accomplishment and should not be brushed aside.

Bottom line: the stable plateau that is achievable is an indefinite Iranian *latent* weapons capability (much like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have today), in which Tehran firmly and verifiably agrees to a heavily monitored energy fuel cycle. The feasible solution is to negotiate this grey-area plateau and then create a Gulf environment as secure as possible for all states—Iran included—so that explicit weaponization and nuclear weapons deployments never occur. Indeed, the United States has successfully kept South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan from pursuing weaponization of their latent nuclear option for decades, and it can use similar bilateral clout to keep not just Iran but also US friends from going nuclear at the start of the 21st century.

Recommendation No. 4

Work closely with US friends in the Gulf to coordinate and integrate their interactions with Iran, including increased Arab investment in Iran's faltering economy. Iran today is a mess domestically, suffering from stagnant growth, declining industry, a soaring unemployment rate among both the unskilled and the college-educated, a population increasingly apathetic about politics, and a leadership hungry for cash and internal domestic legitimacy. Iran needs infrastructure and technology improvements across the board. And it is Iran's own neighbors, the Lilliputian Arab monarchies who are slight on geopolitical power but flush with investment capital, that could conceivably tie Gulliver down and satisfy his regional ambitions at the same time. Kuwaiti policy expert Sami Al-Faraj has argued persuasively for a capital/security exchange in which Iran provides trust about its strategic intentions in exchange for badly needed economic growth.¹ In the past several years, for instance, there has been an increase in bilateral deals between Iran and individual neighbors involving basic infrastructure improvements in strategic sectors such as telecommunications, transportation, and natural gas exploitation.

True, these positive trends have been reversed since the engineered election of a new generation of conservatives to the Majlis in 2004. These vocal and highly nationalistic MPs, in league with the Council of Guardians and Revolutionary Guards, have managed to freeze, postpone, or cancel projects such as an agreement to supply potable water to Kuwait, a deal with a Turkish-Austrian consortium to run Iran's new international airport, and a telecom contract with Turkcell that did not involve majority Iranian control. However, some analysts argue that this negative trend is temporary and represents a wish of the up-and-coming conservative political elite to get credit for

Iran's gradual opening to the globalized world. In any case, Iran cannot realistically remain shut off from the financial and material realities of an increasingly globalized Gulf economy forever; eventually, new deals will be made and old deals will be revived where possible.

In the background, therefore, the United States should have serious discussions with Iran's Arab neighbors—as well as Turkey, India, and China—about the optimal way to increase economic ties with Iran if and when Tehran's elites again decide that economic integration with its closest neighbors is a net plus rather than a threat to Persian national autonomy. Foreign direct investment and trade with Iran should not be viewed by Washington as a threat to US security interests. While Iran mulls over its strategic economic options, the United States can and should withdraw its behind-the-scenes pressure on GCC states and others to forgo concerted investment in important sectors of Iran's economy. Allies and friends should be encouraged rather than browbeaten for their attempts to bring Iran out of its often self-imposed isolation.

All of this said, it should be noted that GCC states do not want to get too close to Iran, given centuries-old distrust between the Arab and Persian sides of the Gulf. However, the GCC leadership expects the United States to manage the sensitive security problems surrounding both Iran and Iraq, just as numerous Asian states have expected the United States to manage a growing China.

The United States should follow the same script it did with Europe and the Soviets during the Cold War; i.e., do not leave the regional allies in the cold, but do not demonize the enemy to the point of black-and-white policy solutions either. The Europeans expected the United States to walk the tightrope between a

¹ For more details on this proposal, see Sami Al-Faraj, Mustafa Alani, and Antonia Dimou, "Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and European Perspectives," *Middle East Policy*, ed. Michael Kraig, Vol. XI, No. 3, 2004 Fall Special Issue on "Alternative Strategies for Gulf Security," pp. 42-45.

total Cold War with the Soviets, on the one hand, and a cozy security condominium with the Soviets that left Europe on the sidelines, on the other. Both policy extremes were seen by European allies as dangerous and destabilizing, and so Europe always argued for strategic solutions that fell somewhere in the middle. The Arab GCC states have the same worries and the same expectations. This is where the true solution to the Iranian nuclear dilemma lies.

Recommendation No. 5

Reduce the fears of existential destruction that Israel and Iran harbor toward each other. Do not forget Israeli nuclear capabilities and Israeli offensive/preemptive threats toward Iran's facilities—as well as Iranian offensive threats toward Israel. Restrain Israeli public pronouncements, because if Iranian elites on both the left and right feel as though they are in the cross hairs of Israeli nuclear weapons, then Iranian weaponization of a latent capability is far more likely. Likewise, Iran must be convinced of the absolute necessity of moderating *its* bellicose language, which is largely geared toward a domestic audience and is meant to gain legitimacy internally, but which convinces Israel and others that Iran will destroy Tel Aviv at the first possible instant.

The ultimate goal in dealing with both parties is to replace the bilateral fear of absolute, total, existential extinction with a more moderate, defensive posture on each side, which of course was the goal of Nixon and Kissinger's détente policies toward China and Russia in the 1970s. This goal is likely to be hardest to achieve with clerical elites in Tehran, who do not have many threads of domestic legitimacy left beyond their antipathy toward Israel. However, the difficulty of convincing Israel to forgo offensive, preemptive threats should not be underestimated, given the prevailing view in Tel Aviv that Iran is dead set on its ultimate destruction. The rhetoric that each uses toward the other is the first place to start; actual policies can follow later.

Overall, the United States should assure Israel that it will not forget Israeli security interests. But it should also let Israel know that it does not plan on a regime change in Iran any time soon, and Israel should not base its international policies on the assumption of eventual Iranian domestic revolution, which reputable Western experts have virtually ruled out because of the social and political exhaustion of the average Iranian in the street. Also, Israel should not go public with new military threats or other potentially destabilizing statements without first coordinating such developments with the United States. In general, Israeli national security policies and military practices should support, rather than undermine, US efforts to stabilize the Persian Gulf. (But likewise, Iranian actions and policies toward Israel should be moderated to allow a real chance for US stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.)

Conclusion

Pursuing Détente by Focusing on Common Interests

The Iranian nuclear crisis is inherently a slow-going affair, and any positive solution will take months or years of hard work to construct and implement. Throughout this timespan, the United States should emphasize the common threat perceptions and international security interests shared between the United States and Iran, and make progress on mitigating these shared fears while dealing with major disagreements in a separate bilateral track.

For instance, there is a cold, hard fact that has gone unreported by the Western media: although Iran aids vehemently anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon and the West Bank who use terrorist methods, it utterly fears the very transnational, anti-globalization, anti-US, Sunni terrorist groups that Washington is battling on the global scene. Al Qaeda and its virulent variants around the globe are every bit as much an ideological enemy of Shiite Iran as they are of the United States.

Geopolitically, Iran and the United States also share an interest in stable oil supplies and prices, curbing the regional drug trade, and stemming the flow of arms and extremists across borders from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. For instance, in the past 25 years, more than 3600 Iranian border agents and drug enforcement officers have lost their lives in the never-ending battle against the illicit drug and arms trade emanating from Iran's eastern neighbors. The United Kingdom is already a close partner with Tehran through direct financing of Iran's antidrug efforts; the United States could also help Iran stem the tide of drugs and transnational extremists currently infiltrating the Greater Middle East, easing Iran's burden and simultaneously increasing the domestic security of US friends such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

These are all common factors that would allow a more strategic, long-term, cooperative approach to the Iranian nuclear crisis. The end result would be an outcome much more positive for US national interests than the simplistic solution of military strikes.

While the United States pursues this strategy of détente, it should not become oversold on either a "grand bargain" addressing all out-

standing issues *or* an "issue-by-issue" approach based on incremental, tactical, overlapping interests on specific issues. The United States should hold out either approach as a goal to Tehran. The main thing is engagement. Iran has a cluttered, messy, complicated, and factionalized domestic system that involves a great deal of what might be called pseudo-democratic debate. It is not up to the United States to decide how détente or rapprochement may occur. Rather, it is up to the United States, as the much stronger power holding most of the cards, to express a willingness to cooperate tactically on key common issues such as squelching the drug trade in volatile areas surrounding Iran such as Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the United States should hold out the possibility of a more strategic compromise on multiple issues.

Or, put another way, until the messy domestic debate occurs in Tehran on US recommendations, it is impossible to tell what will work better: full, comprehensive solutions or tactical bargains. In the end, both will probably have to occur simultaneously, and both will be negotiated against a background of confidence-building measures such as diplomatic statements forswearing the first use of force by one party against the other. ■

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
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INEGMA

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis

Political & Security Brief

A Quarterly Report

April 2005, No. 0001

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Syria and Lebanon: The Winds of Change

Synopsis

Syria seems to have finally heeded international calls to withdraw all its troops from Lebanon before the May Lebanese general elections, thus bring about an end to 29 years of military presence on two-thirds of Lebanese territories. Syrian Foreign Minister, Farouk Sharaa, made the withdrawal announcement on April 3 in a joint press conference with UN envoy, Terri Rhod Larsen. But would this withdrawal end Syria's influence in Lebanon? How would this long-awaited pull-out affect the complicated political landscape in Lebanon? What could be the impact of this new geo-political shift on regional issues like Iraq, the Arab-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian nuclear program, and the US-led Western drive towards promoting democracy in Arab world?

Analysis

Most observers and analysts following up the Lebanon-Syria file agree that it would be quite some time before Damascus' long-established influence in Lebanon fades away. Even if Syrian troops and intelligence units are out, Damascus would continue to have considerable political weight in Lebanon through its allies in the Lebanese presidential palace, security forces, leftist parties and parliament. Moreover, Syrian intelligence has established, in nearly three decades of presence in Lebanon, a solid infrastructure of informers, safe-houses, communication lines and secret operatives stationed throughout Lebanese territories, ready to perform a wide-ranging scope of missions. Moreover, quite a few officers within the Lebanese army and security forces have had training in Syria and owe favors to Syrian counterparts. The Lebanese opposition has expressed strong concern over the credibility and loyalty of these few security chiefs and has been pressing for their resignation.

Syria's strategic interests in Lebanon - as stated by many Syrian officials - revolve around the following issues:

1. Stable economic ties with Lebanon to ensure usage of the Lebanese banking system as well as sea and air outlets and market.
2. To have an early-warning mechanism that would alert Syrian military to potential Israeli air or land-born attacks via the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon.
3. To ensure a friendly regime in Lebanon that would not be party to any plots against the Syrian regime and would not allow designs against Syria to be planned and carried out from the Lebanese territories.
4. Assurances from the Lebanese government that it would not hold peace talks with Israel or sign a pact with the Jewish state without close coordination with Syria.

5. The full implementation of the Taif Accord's clauses that govern Syrian-Lebanese relations in all areas (political, economic, social and security).

According to some senior Syrian officials, Damascus is concerned that it might be the target of a design by Washington to topple the Syrian regime. This fear of Washington's "ill-intentions" was the main drive behind the decision to pull out from Lebanon in line with U.N. Resolution 1559, in order to avoid being accused of defying the international will and subsequently coming under sanctions or even a possible US-led offensive like the one carried out against Iraq in 1991. That's why, as one Syrian official said, Damascus is worried that Washington might seek other means, especially through Lebanon, to weaken the Syrian regime. Therefore, the Syrian leadership will try as much as possible to either keep the current Lebanese authority in power much longer or have any change in Beirut be of minimal effect on the current level of Lebanese-Syrian ties. Some observers and members of the Lebanese opposition believe that such likely Syrian objectives can be ensured through the following steps or scenarios:

1. Try to either cancel or indefinitely postpone the next Lebanese general elections in order to keep the current, mostly pro-Syrian, Lebanese parliament in office. This could be done through the help of the pro-Syrian Lebanese President and House Speaker, who can give legitimacy to a pro-Syrian Lebanese Prime Minister and government and thus implement whatever policies they wish, including the extension of the current parliament's term.
2. Undermine the security conditions in Lebanon to create an atmosphere unsuitable for elections.
3. Have the pro-Syrian Lebanese parliament and cabinet draft and endorse an election law that would permit the authorities to manipulate the results of the elections and ensure an easy victory to pro-Syrian candidates.
4. Use armed radical Palestinian factions in Lebanese refugee camps or elements within Hizbullah, to provoke Israel into a military showdown in south Lebanon that could weaken the momentum currently enjoyed by the Lebanese opposition, by turning the ongoing internal political struggle into a confrontation between what would appear to be a pro-Israel group (opposition parties) and a nationalist anti-Israel group (pro-Syrian parties). This would impact on the elections' date and outcome.
5. Use Iranian influence to pressure Hizbullah into rejecting internal and international demands to give up its arms in line with Resolution 1559, which might prompt the U.S. and the U.N. to take some disciplinary measures. Such measures - that could vary from sanctions to military action - will ultimately heighten internal sectarian feuds in Lebanon, which would have a negative impact on a general election and the security of the country.
6. Re-emphasize Syria's strategic alliance with Iran to ensure positive coordination on common issues like Iraq, Lebanon and the Middle East peace process.

7. Keep sending messages to U.S. and EU warning them about the likely adverse consequences that they could face if the Syrian regime was weakened or toppled. Damascus has been warning U.S. and Western officials that if the regime collapses, radical Islamic movements associated with al-Qaeda will spread all over Syria and pose a serious security threat to Israel in the Golan Heights, as well as U.S. forces in Iraq. Damascus has always maintained that it has been a crucial ally and main source of intelligence information to the U.S. in the ongoing war on terrorism.
8. Utilize its most recent (and ongoing) gestures, with drawing from Lebanon and pressing radical Palestinian factions to cooperate with the current Palestinian Authority, to reopen channels of communication with Washington.

The Lebanese opposition is made up of several parties with different agendas. What unifies them now is the call for a Syrian withdrawal from the country. But once pull-out is complete the alliance might weaken as each side starts preparing for political gains through the upcoming elections (provided an election law is passed in time). The main struggle within the opposition will not be along sectarian lines as much as on the leadership of the two major sects: The Christian Maronites and the Muslim Sunni. While the Maronite side is overcrowded with candidates, the Sunnis lack a powerful candidate to fill the vacuum left behind by the assassinated ex-premier Rafik Hariri. For now, the current strategy of the opposition seems to be aimed at achieving the following objectives:

1. Maintain international pressure on Syria and the Lebanese government to ensure the complete pull-out of Syrian forces from Lebanon.
2. Keep up internal and external pressure on Damascus and Beirut to hold an internationally-monitored election in time and according to an acceptable election law.
3. Keep pushing for the resignation of commanders of security forces in Lebanon to weaken the grip of regimes in Beirut and Damascus.
4. Insist on full and transparent international investigation into Hariri's assassination in line with UN resolution 1595.
5. Mediate between the West (mainly Washington) and Hizbullah in order to ensure the Party's political status and future as a major Shiite power in Lebanon.
6. Seek an understanding with Hizbullah on the issue of the Party's weapons and other outstanding political issues, like the elections and the status of the Shebaa Farms. Many opposition figures do not believe the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese and that insisting on this could lead Lebanon into collision with the UN Security Council, which has ruled that the area was Syrian territory occupied by Israel in the 1967 War.
7. Avoid further internationalization of the Lebanese conflict to keep control over events.
8. Re-engage Syria to keep assuring it on future ties with Lebanon based on the Taif Accord.
9. Maintain efforts to restrain potential internal trouble

makers and prevent minor incidents and occasional car bombings in Christian neighborhoods from escalating into another civil war.

10. Help prevent deterioration of economic conditions that might affect public support to the opposition and the "uprising" that followed the assassination of Hariri.

The pro-Syrian Lebanese officials and parties (better known as the "loyalists front") have been on the defensive ever since the February 14 assassination of Hariri. Despite some attempts to regain the momentum and counter-attack through Hizbullah-organized pro-Syria rallies, their rhetoric stayed pretty much on the defensive, trying to explain why conditions have reached the current stage in Lebanon. Hizbullah has emerged as the main power-base for the "loyalists" proving its ability to mobilize tens of thousands of people in a few demonstrations. Prominent Shiite figures like House Speaker Nabih Berri, seem to have lost considerable ground to Hizbullah's Secretary General, Hassan Nesrallah, who is seen today by most Lebanese analysts as the undisputed leader of the powerful Lebanese Shiite community. The majority of the "loyalists" appear weak with bleak political prospects after the departure of the Syrians and the next general elections. That's why most of the "loyalists" politicians, especially those who are holding office in civilian or military sectors, are expected to keep betting on Syria until the very end, while those who have popular base could shift alliances or move to neutral grounds to guarantee their political survival in the post-Syrian pullout era. Thus, the "loyalists" likely strategy in the foreseeable future will be as follows:

1. Delay or stall the constitutional process leading to the elections in order to create a status quo that would compel the extension of the parliament's term until a suitable time with more favorable conditions for controlled elections.
2. Should pressure force through elections on time, they will resist international monitors and insist on large constituencies to take advantage of the Shiite majority in some provinces that have some non-Shiite parliamentary seats.
3. Keep referring to hard issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugee camps and the possibility of resettlement in Lebanon, and also the status of weapons in these camps. The Loyalists have indirectly linked current changes in Lebanon to alleged Western designs to resettle the pre-dominantly Sunni Palestinian refugees, a topic of particular sensitivity to a few Lebanese sectarian groups like the Shiites and Maronites, due to the demographic implications of such a move.
4. Present the Lebanese army and security forces as too weak to handle security challenges (like disarming Palestinian factions) in Lebanon after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops.
5. Revive old civil war-era files like the alliances that once existed between Israel and some Lebanese right-wing Christian factions who have today joined the opposition front.
6. Warn against some policies and changes proposed by the

opposition as a destabilizing factor that could push Lebanon back into another civil war.

7. Portray the opposition as a force driven by external powers, mainly Washington and Paris.
8. Distance themselves from the assassination of Hariri and present themselves as good allies of the late premier, and maintain that his assassination was the work of Israel or Western intelligence agencies.
9. Insist on special ties with Syria, according to the Taif Accord.
10. Maintain that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese and subsequently the Lebanese Resistance, led by Hizbullah guerrillas, must continue until all Lebanese land is free and a comprehensive peace settlement is reached in the region.

Hizbullah stands today on the brink of some major turning points in its history. Its leadership is very much aware of the internal political strength it has accumulated not only on the Shiite level, but also on a wider Lebanese, as well as Arab and Islamic level. Hizbullah has built itself a legacy of a party that drove Israeli forces out of Lebanon, provided the needy with help and jobs and was never linked to corruption. But with the political split in Lebanon, the desire by many opposition figures to stabilize the situation along the borders with Israel together with growing international pressure over Hizbullah's military activities, the party finds itself pressed to make a tough choice: either maintain its regional role as an ally to Damascus and Tehran and behave as a proxy force to both sides, or preserve its political legacy and become a major Shiite and political power in Lebanon. The former choice will place Hizbullah on a collision course with opposition groups as well as the international community, while the latter choice might undermine its links with Iran and Syria but will not cut them off. Most analysts familiar with Hizbullah's pragmatic policies, believe the party's leadership will ultimately opt for a compromise solution with the opposition front and preserve its current powerful political standing in Lebanon. Likely scenarios to resolve Hizbullah's dilemma are:

1. Some opposition figures have asked U.S. and European officials to convince Israel to pull out its forces from the Shebaa Farms and place the area under a mandate of UN peacekeepers. Such a move would make it easier for the Hizbullah leadership to disarm its guerrillas and become a purely political party.
2. Hizbullah will cease military operations, hand over medium and heavy weapons to Lebanese regular forces, pull back its guerrillas out of south Lebanon and allow Lebanese troops to deploy along the demarcation lines, but will continue to call itself a resistance force with an objective to liberate Shebaa Farms. However, the party will function only as a political party.
3. Set up a "resistance" paramilitary force that would absorb Hizbullah guerrillas. This force would be under the command of either the Army or Defense Ministry, thus giving it a legitimate political cover.
4. Hizbullah will use the pretext of national unity to announce that it is abandoning military operations in

favor of political dialogue via the peace process to achieve the liberation of Shebaa Farms. Hizbullah guerrillas could be merged with the Lebanese regular troops.

5. Use Lebanese army or multinational troops to disarm Hizbullah by force. This approach would be very costly, ineffective and almost impossible to achieve due to Hizbullah's wide popular base and extensive experience in guerrilla warfare. It could also trigger a Lebanese civil war.

Lebanon is now high on Washington's list of priorities. But many analysts argue that Lebanon is not the objective but rather the means to deal with two, so-called, 'rogue states': Syria and Iran, which are both on the U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism and compiling weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Washington continues to accuse Syria of aiding "terrorist groups" and holds Damascus responsible for attacks by radical Palestinian factions on Israel in the occupied territories. Washington also wants Syria to give up an alleged arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. President George W. Bush has made clear threats of resorting to international sanctions on Syria before considering any military options. The State Department even received in late March a delegation from an exiled Syrian opposition party, a gesture perceived by many observers as a message to Damascus that a regime change in Syria was an option considered by the United States.

The U.S. recalled its Ambassador to Damascus shortly after Hariri's assassination and has effectively cut off all main channels of communication with the Syrian government prompting the latter to feel very concerned and threatened. Damascus has a list of U.S. conditions or demands that must be fulfilled before channels of communications can be reopened. One U.S. official said Syrian officials have received on more than one occasion, messages from Washington asking them to take a series of steps such as halting aid to Palestinian and Lebanese groups regarded as terrorists, and to apprehend Iraqi Baath officials taking refuge in Syria and Lebanon and assisting the insurgency in Iraq. The official added that Washington also sensed, along with Paris, that Syria's role in Lebanon was becoming destructive to the Middle East peace process and to Lebanon's democratic system. "The Syrian regime has turned a deaf ear to all calls from the U.S. and Europe to introduce economic reforms, quit aiding terrorist groups, withdraw from Lebanon, not aid Iraqi insurgents, stay out of Palestinian affairs in the occupied territories and to distance itself from Tehran's radical anti-Western policies," the American official said.

The repeated mentioning of Lebanon's name by President Bush and other senior U.S. officials has made Lebanon a primary objective in the Administration's quest to promote freedom and democracy in the region. Thus failure in Lebanon is out of the question for Washington, especially after the setbacks in Iraq. The direct approach towards Lebanon and the indirect approach strategy towards Iran and Syria will likely achieve the following objectives for

Washington (provided there were no major complications):

1. Disengage Lebanon from Syria and achieve a public victory to its "freedom and democracy policies" by helping the opposition (seen universally as the forces of change) to move into power through the next general elections.
2. Keep up the pressure on Beirut through the United Nations Resolution 1559 and the UN investigation into Hariri's assassination to further weaken the pro-Syrian regime there and consequently reduce Damascus' influence on Lebanon.
3. End Hizbullah's military role and stabilize the situation along Israel's northern borders.
4. By neutralizing Hizbullah's military power, Iran would be deprived of its tool to project power along Israel's border that could be used to retaliate against a possible Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, as has been frequently threatened by Israeli officials.
5. Keep ignoring signals from Damascus and push for more Syrian concessions.
6. Weaken the Syrian regime to force it to be more responsive to Washington's policies in the region, especially on the issues of aiding Iraqi insurgents, building WMDs, and harboring Palestinian "terrorist" groups.
7. Topple the Syria regime if it continues to defy Washington's policies in the region. Overthrowing the regime will likely be brought about through suffocation by using U.N. sanctions to cut off economic lifelines and shutting the borders with all its neighbors. But the question asked by many analysts on this issue is that: what sort of a regime would replace the current one in Damascus? There does not seem to be a clear ready answer for that yet.
8. Utilize the heavy media coverage of pro-democracy rallies in Lebanon to pressure neighboring regimes, including Iran, to introduce reforms or face the possible contagious street anger of the masses.
9. Use the success of reformist movement in Lebanon (and other regional states) to improve public image of the U.S. in Arab and Islamic world.
10. Create a better atmosphere for the Palestinian Authority to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel based on Bush's vision of two independent states: Palestine and Israel. The U.S. believes it can exercise more pressure on Israel if radical Islamic Palestinian groups based in Syria halt their "terrorist" attacks on Israel. Such a settlement would also boost the damaged U.S. image and credibility in the region, which is threatening Washington's long-term interests in the Middle East.
11. After bringing about these sought for changes (mentioned above) in Lebanon and Syria, Iran will be more isolated regionally and vulnerable to regime change, and, if need-be, a more possible target for a military strike against its nuclear facilities from either the U.S. or Israel.

Conclusion

The Lebanese scene will witness fierce political struggle between the Opposition and the Loyalists, with Hizbullah in

the middle trying to strike a balance between the two that would ensure its political survival and stature. While Syria will do everything possible to retain a strong political influence on Lebanon, the United States and other Western countries will maintain current efforts to weaken Syria, disarm Hizbullah and fully isolate Iran. The number one near-term priority is holding Lebanese parliamentary elections free of Syrian influence and according to a law acceptable to most Lebanese parties and under international supervision. The U.N. investigation into Hariri's assassination will act as a pressure tool against both Beirut and Damascus. Hizbullah realizes it has to disarm, but is seeking the best formula to go about it and yet maintain its political prestige. Lebanon will likely overcome economic difficulties as a Syrian pullout would likely attract more Lebanese, European and Arab investors into the country. The strength of Syrian-Iranian relations will be tested as U.S. and international pressure grows on them, especially Damascus, through the Lebanese arena. The main outside player that could undermine U.S. interests in Lebanon now is Israel. Any Israeli political or military interference in Lebanon would ultimately weaken the opposition movement and strengthen pro-Syrian Loyalists and Hizbullah.

Larger than Expected 2004 GCC Treasury Returns, Likely Impact on Procurement Plans.

Summary

The larger than anticipated demand for increased oil production during 2004 generated significantly higher than expected treasury returns for OPEC members, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Oil revenue for the combined GCC states increased 35 percent and gross domestic product is up 9.4 percent from 2003. The increased revenue will allow for expansionary government spending during 2005. It is likely that military and security program spending will increase due to the liquidity of capital available in the revised budgets.

Analysis

Saudi Arabia, the world's top oil exporter, will benefit from a \$26 billion surplus against a projected deficit of \$8 billion. Oil revenue accounts for 70 to 80 percent of state revenue and constitutes 40 percent of GDP. The Saudi government projects 2005 revenue at \$74.77 billion and overall economic growth of 6.2 percent. During the next few years oil production capacity is set to increase to 12.5 million barrels per day, which represents the majority of the 15.5 million barrels per day currently produced by GCC members. These developments continue to place Saudi Arabia in a strong fiscal position with large quantities of liquid capital.

Oman's total revenue was recorded at RO4.177 billion, \$10.849 billion, a 43 percent increase over projected growth for the year. Oil revenue accounted for 69.5 percent of total income. Oman's external debt stands at \$3.376 bil-

lion and GDP growth is 12.5 percent or approximately \$24.373 billion. The total budget expenditure for 2005 is \$9.570 billion, which represents an increase of four percent.

Kuwait recorded revenue of KD6 billion, \$20.548 billion, for the fiscal year 2004. This represents substantial growth for the oil rich Gulf state; more than 32 percent over the previous years growth. Kuwait's expenditures increased to KD2.88 billion a modest twelve percent increase when compared to the exceptional growth in income during the same period. The increase in capital is chiefly due to oil revenue increases of 37.5 percent. This growth corresponds to a real GDP rise of 6.8 percent. However, analysts predict that 2005 will see the economy plateau as demand increases for oil levels.

Bahrain experienced GDP growth of 5.1 percent during 2004. Analysts predict a modest increase in growth to six percent during 2005. A major factor contributing to the stunting of Bahrain's economic growth compared to other GCC states, is the ongoing feud regarding oil reserves with Saudi Arabia. The disagreement began because Bahrain inked a free trade agreement with the United States in September 2004, to which Saudi Arabia strongly objected. Saudi has suspended its supply to Bahrain of 50,000 barrels of crude per day due to the disagreement. If not resolved it is likely that Bahrain will suffer continued adverse economic conditions. Qatar's GDP growth reached a healthy ten percent, beating the anticipated growth rate of 8 percent. The United Arab Emirates growth increased to 10.4 percent during 2004, besting the anticipated rate of eight percent.

The Gulf States are expected to invest major portions of extra oil cash from larger than expected 2004 profits into their economies to improve socio-economic conditions and reduce rising unemployment rates, especially in Saudi Arabia and Oman. A considerable sum of the revenues is also expected to go to defense procurement programs that have witnessed cutbacks in the past several years due to declining oil profits during the late 1990s. Top of the security agenda is to bolster Special Operations Forces units to improve their capability to combat terror networks operating within Gulf countries.

A critical component of Special Forces support hardware is a helicopter procurement and update program. Several Gulf security forces are bolstering their helicopter capabilities. The Qatari Air Force is planning to purchase 20 medium multi-role helicopters during 2005. According to a Qatari official, the new helicopters will replace an aging fleet of 12 Westland Commando helicopters that are scheduled to be phased out of service. Last year the Royal Air Force of Oman ordered 20 NH90 tactical transport helicopters; delivery is scheduled for 2008. Oman also requested an order of six AB139 utility and transport helicopters. The United Arab Emirates is engaged in talks with Augusta Westland and Bell Helicopters to purchase additional AB139s for police

and Special Forces units. The UAE Air Force is also considering a purchase of additional ex-Libyan CH-47 transport helicopters. Saudi Arabia is finalizing talks to purchase an additional 12 to 24 Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters to augment their existing fleet of 20 Black Hawks.

There has also been increased interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) which will aid in maritime interdiction and patrol as well as counter-terrorism operations. The successful implementation of UAV operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres has raised interest in the comparatively low cost alternative to traditional manned reconnaissance aircraft. The UAEAF is working to develop an operational UAV component. Early warning and missile defense systems are being implemented in the UAEAF as well. Other GCC members are interested in missile defense because of lessons learned during the Gulf War and of a potential Iranian threat. However, the most important part of the missile program is an early warning and detection system. The UAEAF is shopping for early warning aircrafts fitted with communications equipment that integrates data from land, sea, and air sources.

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Security Implications for Iran's Nuclear Program

Summary

The United States is endorsing the European Union diplomacy approach to resolving the most recent row over Iran's nuclear program, in a calculated measure to exhaust all options available in settling the dispute. The lack of substantiated human intelligence regarding the development program and the previous failures in Iraq has forced the US government to support the diplomatic mission while it amasses intelligence. Upcoming presidential elections will slow the pace of diplomacy and allow Iran time to continue their development program.

Analysis

The United States position is that possession of a fuel pro-

cessing cycle indicates intent to develop weapons capability. However, the US intelligence community has no clear evidence proving that Iran has nuclear weapons capability. An intelligence source commented, "All available data indicates that Tehran was adamant at completing the fuel cycle system and proceeding at a later stage to processing fuel." Solid information is difficult to obtain for western intelligence services. There continues to be a drought of human intelligence information because it has been difficult to penetrate the Iranian nuclear shroud.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has good access to known facilities but has been unable to substantiate allegations of fuel cycle development. It appears that the mere possession of a fuel cycle adds ambiguity to Tehran's position when added to the occasionally furious statements made by hardliners in the regime. Therefore, it is accurate to conclude that Washington will not tolerate the presence of fuel cycle capability in Iran regardless of assurances made by the government. The American view is closely supported by the Israeli interpretation of events.

Iran is reported to have set up sophisticated air defenses around its nuclear facilities. US officials in February said pilot-less US drones had been sent from Iraq since last year to test the air for traces of uranium enrichment. Iran has confirmed that it is excavating deep underground tunnels to protect some nuclear facilities. Iran has also been upgrading its Shahab-3 missile, which can reach Israel and US forces in the region. Iran's armed forces have conducted high-profile military exercises since last fall with large numbers of military personnel in western Iran. There is also an investigation being conducted by Ukraine's new pro-West lawmakers regarding "smuggled" shipments of a dozen Soviet-era Kh-55 cruise missiles to Iran in 2001.

Washington seems for now to be giving peace negotiations a chance in resolving the issue via diplomacy, using the United Kingdom, France, Germany (EU-3) approach. The latest series of negotiations between Tehran and the EU-3 resulted in the Europeans offering economic incentives they were willing to extend in exchange for the Iranians' termination of their uranium enrichment program. These incentives included security guarantees, facilitating Iran's entry into the World Trade Organization, and supplying parts and equipment that will be used to support the national civil aviation industry. The latest round saw the United States assume a more active role in the negotiations. However, most experts and analysts regard this US step as symbolic more than a serious step towards resolution.

A well-informed Iranian official cast doubt in the ability of any Iranian leader to make concessions on the nuclear issue during an election year. Iranian presidential elections are due in early summer 2005. The nuclear issue has become a hot topic on Iranian streets and the leadership in Tehran has used this momentum to rouse nationalist feelings. Therefore, it will be difficult for candidates to reduce rhetoric and extend dialog with the West, which may be

interpreted by hardliners as concessions and a sign of weakness.

The active European Union diplomacy will likely be an effort that will neither satisfy Iran nor the United States. Many regional and international observers share the view that Iran sees its nuclear capabilities as an essential mechanism for ensuring continuity of government and state survival. The Iranians might continue to negotiate while building their development facilities. The talks will most likely stall as the presidential election nears. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is expected to be elected and form a new government. The United States position is that nuclear weapons possessed by Iran threaten regional stability and national security interests. The nuclear issue will probably continue to escalate as neither side is willing to compromise its views. IAEA inspection demands will increase the difficulty that Iran faces in building a fuel cycle system. It is not clear how much time the US has decided to give the EU-3 diplomacy process to achieve an acceptable resolution. As far as Washington is concerned, the military approach remains a possible last resort.

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The Coming Iranian Elections: Projections

Summary

After last year's sweeping victory for the conservatives in the Iranian general elections, eyes are now fixed on the upcoming presidential elections on June 17, the outcome of which will determine whether another reformer or a conservative will replace the current reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Thus far, conservative nominees have surfaced as the most powerful candidates.

Analysis

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has emerged as the early frontrunner in this year's presidential election in Iran. According to a February 2005 poll by the Islamic Republic News Agency, 28.2 percent of respondents would vote for Rafsanjani in the ballot.

Former President Rafsanjani, whose supporters say has the political acumen to resolve Iran's problems with the West, has dropped a heavy hint he will make a comeback bid in June's presidential elections.

Rafsanjani served as president from 1989 to 1997, and was substituted by current President Mohammad Khatami. After winning elections in 1997 and 2001, Khatami is ineligible for a third term. Rafsanjani has been reportedly backed by some reformist and conservative leaders, but has not officially announced his candidacy. If he does not run in the June 17 election to replace the reformist Khatami, a hard-line conservative is almost certain to win. Reformist candidates are expected to struggle overcoming tough vetting procedures run by hardliners and public frustration with Khatami's limited reforms after eight years in office.

Hard-line parties within the government have lent candidate Ali Larijani their support. Larijani has spoken out against Tehran's efforts to defuse international concern about its nuclear program through diplomacy. His stance seems to have won him the support of the Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Forces, making him a leading contender in the June 17 vote. Before the support announcement was issued Larijani claimed 4.4 percent support in the February poll.

Former parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karrubi, a reformist, is second with 8.8 percent, followed by conservative former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velajati, with 5.6 percent and former science minister, Mostafa Moin, with 4.1 percent.

In January the Guardian Council, a panel of clerics and jurists which vets the suitability of election candidates, reiterated its constitutional interpretation that only men could stand for president. An optimistic female candidate, Rafat Bayat, hopes that the Council can be swayed to allow her candidacy. Iranian women enjoy more rights than in many neighboring Gulf countries but are poorly represented in senior public positions. Outgoing President Khatami appointed just one woman to his cabinet and there are only a dozen female lawmakers in the 290-seat parliament.

By May, only a handful of candidates are expected to remain in contention. In Iran, voters can head to the polls at the age of 16.

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Strategic Whispers

Anonymous intelligence insight gained from one-on-one interviews with regional officials.

Oman - Free Trade Agreement

According to an Omani business official Oman is set to sign a free trade zone agreement with the United States during July 2005. The source indicates that Muscat expects to draw strong criticism from Saudi Arabia because of the deal. Riyadh objected to a similar deal inked last year between the United States and Bahrain.

The United Arab Emirates government also decided in late 2004 to enter a bilateral free zone agreement. An Omani official said future financial and economic deals could undermine existing Gulf Cooperation Council business and finance agreements.

Bahrain - International Labor Law

A Bahrain cabinet member has expressed concern over intentions by the United Nations and the International Labor Organization to introduce laws that force governments worldwide to naturalize expatriates who have lived and worked in non-native countries for a set period of time. The official points out that such a law would seriously threaten the national identity of almost all GCC states that depend on foreign labor. According to the official, Manama was considering options including the signing of bi-lateral agreements with all countries that have large numbers of laborers in Bahrain, to act as a safeguard against foreign labor and naturalization laws.

Bahrain - Sunni Fundamentalists

A well informed U.S. military official in Manama said that military intelligence sources have noticed a considerable increase in Sunni fundamentalist activities in Bahrain. The official said the Bahrain government refused to either acknowledge the increase in Sunni fundamentalism or take any action to combat the threat, which compelled the 5th Fleet command to send one thousand relatives of U.S. service people back from Bahrain.

Qatar - Armed Forces

A senior Qatari official said that Doha was considering downsizing its armed forces and turning the force into a border security and internal security service. The source pointed out that Doha was engaged in talks for the sale of its Mirage 2000 jets and acquisition of new helicopters to support the maritime and border security missions. The official added that the government believes the current geo-political situation makes it pointless for a small country like Qatar to insist on building a military force. The government would rather direct resources to improving the economic infrastructure. He noted that the current threat to the GCC is terrorism, which requires better internal and border security capabilities. Bilateral defense pacts between Doha and Western powers like the United States would be sufficient to protect the small oil-rich state against foreign threats, the official added.

Israel - Election Timing

An Israeli official source expressed concern over the possibility of violent action by hard-line right-wing, ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups seeking to hinder the withdrawal of Israeli settlers from the occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The source also said that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon may be compelled to call for snap elections following settlement removal to take advantage of the street tempo and secure an easy victory. However, early elections would require a freeze on peace talks with the Palestinian Authority for at least six months. Sharon's desire to seriously engage the Palestinians would depend on the outcome of elections as well as strength of pressure from Washington, according to the source.

Kuwait - Improved Intelligence

Increased intelligence cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council has yielded regular success in the battle against Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups, according to a senior Kuwaiti official. The official pointed out that tips from intelligence officers in Saudi Arabia were behind some of the raids on terrorist hideouts in Kuwait earlier this year. He said continued intelligence cooperation would help security services to pre-empt the terrorists. The source added that more human intelligence resources have been implanted within tribal communities, which straddle borders, in an effort to identify terror recruits and leaders. The official also said that Iraq has taken the place of Afghanistan as the primary training ground of Al-Qaeda and other similar groups. He noted that almost all terror suspects had received training in Iraq, especially in explosives training.

Palestinian Authority - Lebanon Camp Disarmament

An advisor to Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas said that a Palestinian delegation visited Beirut and Damascus earlier this year and delivered a letter from Abbas to Lebanese and Syrian government officials. The letter offered a solution to the proliferation of weapons in refugee camps in Lebanon. The source said that the Abbas offer included an order for the PLO factions in the camps to turn in all weapons to Lebanese authorities and to transfer responsibility for camp security to Lebanese forces. However, the governments in Beirut and Damascus turned down the offer saying that regional conditions and timing was not right for this issue.

Lebanese Opposition - Israel

According to an Israeli official and other well-informed Israeli sources, the United States government was angered by statements made by Israeli officials, alleging ties with members of the Lebanese opposition and claiming credit for United Nations Resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hizbullah. The official said the White House and State Department have both asked Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to keep Israeli officials and politicians out of Lebanon's internal affairs, especially during the current sensitive situation in Beirut. A few Lebanese opposition figures have urged Washington to intervene and prevent further "harmful statements" by Israeli officials. Pro-Syrian Lebanese officials have used statements made in late February by the Israeli Foreign Minister and other Israeli politicians, as a proof that the Lebanese opposition movement was being organized and run from outside the country by Israel and the U.S. The Lebanese opposition leadership has categorically denied any current links with Israel. It is worth pointing out that Israeli officials have maintained silence on developments in Lebanon over the past few weeks.

The Stanley
Foundation



January 15, 2005
Atlanta, GA

The United States and the Muslim World: Critical Issues and Opportunities for Change

In 2004, US relations with the Muslim world reached a low point. To many Muslims, the war in Iraq and the conflation of Iraqi regime change with the “war on terror” seemed a bid to deepen US control over geostrategic regions and energy resources. Other US policies also generated popular hostility: violations of human rights and international law in the treatment of prisoners of war in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, tacit approval of Israel’s policies regarding the Palestinian Authority, and US visa restrictions. Taken together, these actions fostered a perception that the United States was engaged in a war against Islam, despite formal pronouncements to the contrary.

At the same time, however, declarations of US support for democratization generated hopes and expectations for political reform in much of the Muslim world. Longstanding cooperation with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, came under increasing criticism. With the revelation that Saddam Hussein had lacked weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration increasingly argued that the establishment of democracy in Iraq would facilitate its emergence in other countries of the region. Democratic governance throughout the region, it was argued, would effectively undermine the terrorist threat posed to the United States by radical, transnational

Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda. The assumption that Iraq would set off a democratic ripple effect was, however, strained by realities in Iraq, where the ongoing insurgency undermined the provision of security and public services, hindered the building of state institutions, and reportedly provided a training ground for new radical groups and individuals.

Recognizing these challenges to US relations with the Muslim world, the Stanley Foundation convened a meeting January 15, 2005, outside of Atlanta, Georgia, that brought together policy experts from government, academia, and leading Muslim community organizations. The working group discussed an array of short-term, pragmatic recommendations and the need for long-term, consistent efforts to inform legislators, the media, opinion leaders, policymakers, and the broader public about the importance of the Muslim world to US national interests. Discussions focused around four themes:

1. Understanding terrorist threats and radical Islam.
2. Exercising US power constructively.
3. Rethinking the promotion of democracy.
4. Building new political coalitions within the United States to promote more constructive US-Muslim relations.

More information on the US-Muslim World Initiative is available online at stanleyfoundation.org.

This Policy Bulletin summarizes the primary findings of the conference as interpreted by the rapporteur and program officer. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this bulletin. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

...the challenges that have long plagued US policy toward parts of the Muslim world remain.

A confluence of events in early 2005 opened new opportunities for US policy-makers and advocacy organizations to pursue these recommendations. The “orange revolution” in Ukraine, the Beirut street demonstrations and announced withdrawal of Syrian troops, the elections in Iraq and in the Palestinian Authority, and the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip have combined to create space for new political initiatives that could improve US standing in the Muslim world. At the same time, the challenges and contradictions that have long plagued US policy toward parts of the Muslim world—the Middle East in particular—remain unchanged. Iraq continues to be an unstable situation from which it will be difficult to extricate US forces while still achieving the desired policy goals.

Political Islam and the Nature of Terrorist Threats

A poor understanding of the range of Islamic organizations among the American public and US policymakers alike has led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the diversity of political Islam and its associated movements. There have also been missed opportunities for constructively engaging with a range of Muslim groups to promote democracy from within.

Facile classifications, such as the myth of a “totalitarian Islamic threat,” are unlikely to yield fruitful policies. Priority should be placed on helping policymakers understand key aspects of political Islam, including why some Islamist groups use violence. Key themes include stressing that:

- The United States is dealing with a transnational identity movement, not a

coherent organization with traditional command structures or a uniform ideology. These groups differ in their theological views and their conceptions of the Muslim role in the world. Many, however, feel a sense of urgency in confronting what they see as American “imperial” designs.

- While the US government frames the problems of the Muslim world as one of freedom versus tyranny, many in the Muslim world relate to Islamist perspectives that portray their struggles in terms of the powerful and greedy against the weak and poor. US disregard for this classic populist appeal at the core of much of the Islamist message, and the importance of socioeconomic issues more generally, means that the ideological appeal and the capacity for popular mobilization of many Islamic movements and organizations is only dimly perceived.
- A common denominator in most of these movements is the desire to get their own regimes to live up to the principles of Islam, though they differ on how to achieve this goal—either through violence or participation. Relatively few Islamist organizations in the Muslim world are violent, and reaching out to Muslim opposition groups advocating reform within authoritarian regimes will be essential to realizing US aspirations to bring democracy to the Middle East.
- In sum, there are diverse grievances driving political Islam and Islamist movements that vary by region and by conflict. These differences are often masked by common populist and religious rhetorics. The notion of a

totalitarian Islamic threat is both inaccurate and dangerous in the kinds of policy prescriptions it produces.

Make the Most of US Superpower Status

Because the consequences of US action abroad are magnified thanks to its superpower status, participants considered how US strength might be more constructively deployed around the world. There is still a significant reservoir of good feeling toward the United States in the Muslim world, and a few well-thought-out corrective measures could go a long way in rebuilding the American image.

Perhaps the most important step is to reaffirm American commitments to human rights and civil liberties at home. One of the United States' greatest strengths, historically, has been the ability to inspire others through key values and democratic practices. But the narrative of liberal democracy does not project well when the civil rights of Muslims are threatened or fundamental human rights are violated. To regain its credibility abroad, the United States should assert the primacy of human rights and reaffirm the importance of international law. It is also essential to reopen US society to the world by relaxing visa restrictions, reviving educational and cultural exchanges, and backing these exchanges with significant funds. Ensuring that future Muslim leaders enjoy access to the unparalleled educational opportunities found in the United States is one way in which to immediately revive these connections.

The projection of American power in the Muslim world should also be consonant with broader notions of the common

good for Muslim regions and societies. Instead of continuing the "you are for or against us" approach toward Muslim countries in the war on terrorism, policymakers should enlist potential Muslim allies in the war on terror by focusing on shared benefits that could accomplish the same goals.

Rethink Existing Democracy Promotion Efforts

Democracy has become the watchword of efforts to reshape the Middle East in particular. But too often, as one participant noted, "democracy appears to many as a punishment inflicted on our enemies, but never a gift delivered to our friends." Despite its best intentions, externally driven social engineering generally does not produce the desired outcomes and is almost invariably accompanied by an array of unintended negative consequences.

The US policy of promoting democracy in order to eliminate terrorist threats is based loosely on "democratic peace theory," which promulgates the notion that democracies do not go to war with other democracies. It is unlikely, however, that the spread of formal democracy will bring peace to the Middle East, as the administration anticipates, in the short and medium run. First, Al Qaeda and similar radically violent organizations are transnational in both origin and in conduct, not confined to a set of rogue states or authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, democratization alone cannot substitute for solving problems that are at the root of much of the region's instability. These include the land-for-peace process undertaken to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the development of viable national economies.

There is still a significant reservoir of good feeling toward the United States in the Muslim world....

The greatest potential for creating more positive US relations with the Muslim world may be right here at home.

US democracy promotion initiatives in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world can be made more effective and more credible by undertaking the following measures:

- Lessen the link between the promotion of democracy and its imposition by unilateral force and occupation. The United States should consistently support ending occupations through negotiation, adherence to international law, and the principle of self-rule. This should be as true for Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority as for Syria in Lebanon.
- Replace the top-down utopian project of externally imposed democratization with a more contextually sensitive approach to economic and political liberalization that does not uphold electoral competition as the sole litmus test, but as one aspect of emerging democratic polities.
- Develop contacts with a range of Islamist movements. Religiously based organizations played a significant role in the evolution of American democratic practices, and democratization only has staying power when there is a sense of "ownership" by key stakeholders. The practice of democracy must be perceived as congruent with national interests and with public values.
- Encourage and support contact with a wide range of civil society actors in the Muslim world. Such contacts not only benefit groups within the Muslim world but also bring a more nuanced, in-depth understanding of the region to US policymakers.

Build New Political Networks Within the United States

The greatest potential for creating more positive US relations with the Muslim world may be right here at home. First, contacts between experts on the Muslim world and policymakers should be strengthened to educate and raise awareness about key issues. US national interests have not been well served by the marginalization of substantive expertise on the Arab world, for instance, in the making of US foreign policy.

This may well happen, however, only when Muslim domestic constituencies become politically organized and systematically engaged. Congressional voting and legislation have traditionally reflected the concerns of a relatively small number of interest groups. Legislators concerned with foreign policy may face considerable pressure from domestic constituencies focused on single issues, particular countries, or limited ideological agendas. American civil society is therefore a crucial arena of engagement for organizations interested in improving US relations with the Muslim world.

Effective groups typically have a comprehensive strategy for coordinating organizations and individuals which in turn have some influence with congressional representatives. Currently, with regard to the Muslim world, efforts are episodic and financially, strategically, and institutionally inadequate. In addition, Muslim communities in the United States are diverse and often divided in their foreign policy agendas.

A multipronged strategy to build civil society and improve connections to

policymakers would involve some of the following measures:

- Identify key people in the political process who are regular channels for legislators to identify constituent concerns—e.g., state and local party chairs, deans of law schools, journalism programs, social science professors, and deans of theological seminaries—and create networks between them and Muslim community groups.
- Nurture relationships between advocacy groups and policymakers. Policymakers often need help identifying civil society groups that are reliable, legitimate sources of information, while at the same time—through regular interaction with policymakers—community groups can develop a greater sense of efficacy by seeing that they have an opportunity to share their expertise and influence public policy.
- Build relationships between Muslim community organizations and policy experts. By speaking at Muslim com-

munity events, reviewing policy reports, and facilitating contacts with the policy world, policy experts help build a sense of common agendas and help citizens affirm that their efforts are not conducted in isolation. Their expertise might bolster the arguments of Muslim advocacy organizations who are just beginning to involve themselves in the political process.

- Increase the ranks of Muslims practicing in the fields of journalism, law, and public affairs, to make these fields more representative of the diversity of American society.
- Organize more educational and fact-finding trips to the Muslim world for legislators, congressional staffers, and outgoing public officials. Such trips have proven very effective at producing dramatic transformations in attitudes. Energy should be devoted to expanding these underfunded programs and generating resources for them within the US and the Muslim world. ■

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The Stanley Foundation, a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, is focused on promoting and building support for principled multilateralism in addressing international issues. The foundation is attracted to the role that international collaboration and cooperation, reliance on the rule of law, international organizations, cooperative and collective security, and responsible global citizenship can play in creating a more peaceful and secure world.

Consistent with its vision of a secure peace with freedom and justice, the foundation encourages public understanding, constructive dialogue, and cooperative action on critical international issues. Its work recognizes the essential roles of both the policy community and the broader public in building sustainable peace.


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*Strategic Issues In The Northern Gulf:
Scenarios & Policy Options For The GCC
And The Coalition*



Dr. Sami M. Al-Faraj
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Studies

A Paper Presented at the *INEGMA*
Conference
Dubai (UAE)

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POLICY-MAKING MATRIX

***Possible Scenarios &
Policy Options***

GUIDING STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

- (1) To enter war only to create a better peace
 - (2) To continue economic and social development as the corner-stone of GCC national security policy
 - (3) To calibrate means to fit ends.
 - (4) To avoid over-extension due to rising political, diplomatic, and financial commitments abroad
-

Principles: Continued

- a. Evidence 1: The experience of the last 35 years
 - b. Evidence 2: The significance of the 2004 budgets
 - c. Evidence 3: lagging deficiencies in the overall GCC strategic economic planning since 1990 (with varying degrees). This has been demonstrated in the inability to chart a clear strategic vision, to diversify and properly manage resources (water, gas, manpower, ..etc), and to deal with social dislocations and rising expectations. The case of Iran is almost identical
-

Development, War & Terrorism

Size of Northern Gulf Economies

GNP between 2001-2004

□ Saudi Arabia: \$ 83.3-236.1 billion

□ Iran : \$ 84.8-149.4 billion

□ Kuwait : \$ 34.1- 49 billion

□ Iraq :

Forecast for 2005-2010

Steady increase even for Iraq

Non-Oil Sectors

Example: Kuwait's Financial Situation

Significance of the Year 2004

- (a) Increase of 14.9% in GNP (KD 14.3 billion)
 - (b) Increase in oil prices (KD 6.6 billion in the first 10 months of the Financial Year 2004-2005 measured on \$ 34.1 PB as set price level). Production has reached 2.4 million b/d
 - (c) Increase of 31.5% in balance of trade (KD 4.7 billion)
-

Kuwait's Financial Situation

- (d) Increase of KD 2.58 billion in budget surplus
 - (e) Increase of 31.7% in non-oil sectors (KD 660 million) . Largely because of the use of Kuwait as a platform and a warehouse for the transit trade to Iraq
-

Iraq

IRAQ

Introductory Remarks

- ☐ In 2300 BC *Asseria* starts the first use of mercenaries
- ☐ In 300 BC *Sumeria* establishes the first standing army
- ☐ Through the first two Muslim states; *al-Rashidoun* and the *Umayyeds*, Iraq's name is synonymous with instability and sedition
- ☐ *Caliph al-mu'tasim* establishes the city of *Samarra* as the first garrison city in Iraq

Iraq: Continued

- ☐ Iraq only witnessed two types of governments in its long history (that is from time immemorial to Saddam Hussein); bloody autocratic and non-bloody autocratic. It has no history of 'democratic government' in the western sense
- ☐ We in the GCC have no recollection of such system in the Western sense either
- ☐ Iraq has been and perhaps will remain a tribal system like all Gulf nations. A government that has no roots in Iraq's tribal system has no chance of survival

Iraq: Continued

- ☐ The stability of the Gulf region requires the establishment of a **multi-polar** Iraq
- ☐ In Gulf eyes, Multi-polar system will render a decision to go to war difficult and perhaps unlikely, because it has to get the agreement of all parties to such system
- ☐ To wish for such Iraq to grasp '*democracy*' and becomes a '*beacon for change*' is a far fetched notion, which must be considered by all of us, as members of a coalition, a strategic over-extension of our resources

Iraq: Continued

Possible Scenarios

- a. A mixture of soft and hard approaches by coalition forces succeeds in restoring peace and security to Iraq.
- b. Coalition authorities partially succeed in restoring peace and security to major Iraqi cities, while remote areas remain uncontrollable.
- c. Coalition forces fail in achieving the political aims of the military intervention in Iraq because of the challenges of nation-building, and a growing military insurrection in major Iraqi cities

Iraq: Continued

-
- d. The number of casualties in the Iraqi populace and coalition forces is on the rise. Public opinion in the US, the UK, and other coalition partners turn against the US-led intervention.
 - e. Oil markets respond accordingly with varying increases in oil prices.
 - f. As a result of all the above, international calls for coalition forces to withdraw from Iraq and to put it under a UN trusteeship mount

Iraq: Continued

Policy Options

Combinations of the following approaches:

- a. Remain steadfast in providing political and material support to coalition actions.
 - b. Render practical advice on the management of such troublesome situations in a Middle Eastern setting.
-

Iraq: Continued

- c. Underwrite coalition actions in Iraq with a short to long term strategy of financial and economic subsidies to ameliorate conditions in southern Iraq. This could be done through strategic projects centred on a show piece like the southern city of Basra. By declaring ***Basra is a Gulf City Too***, GCC nations can begin to make Basra a model of a developed Gulf city for all Iraqi cities to see and emulate. The recent attempt to change all of Iraq is futile.
-

COALITION POLICY OPTIONS

On The Policy Front

- ☐ Never lose sight of establishing a balance of power within Iraq and in the region as a whole
- ☐ Never forget that regional *Coalition* members have entered war in order to get a better peace. Failing that partially or completely, they are the ones who are going to grapple with the ramifications of unsecured Iraq
- ☐ Do with putting artificial time-frames. These hamper the execution of *Coalition* political strategy

Iraq: Continued

- ☐ Provide more and better suited means to deal with rapidly changing military environment
 - ☐ Failing that, limit *Coalition* political objectives, or at least execute them in a gradual manner. A good start could be derived from the original plan of *Desert Storm*, and/or by emulating the example of the Kurdish 'safe haven' in northern Iraq in 1991-2003
-

Iraq: Continued

- ☐ Remember that direct political elections lead to another Rwanda situation. Any elections must be done under two conditions:
 - (a) To be as local as possible
 - (b) To be part of creating a federal system
 - ☐ Invest heavily in creating a prosperous model
 - ☐ Rely more on regional expertise in Iraqi affairs
-

Iraq: Continued

On The Military Front

- ☐ Reconsider military objectives in light of means available
 - ☐ Delegate more security in the inner cities to Iraqis, but control communications and choke points outside
 - ☐ Establish garrison entities and safe heavens for people to approach for security and livelihood. Copy the model partially applied in the *Balkans*, but provide greater logistics and formidable protection
-

Iraq: Continued

- ☐ Stop the influx of coalition citizens into Iraqi cities, it is against the *Fourth Geneva Convention*, or at least reconsider if their protection is necessarily a mission of coalition forces
 - ☐ Apply the *Geneva Conventions* and additional *Protocols* when possible on the basis of reciprocity
-

Iran

IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Possible Scenarios

- a. A genuine desire by the Iranian leadership to conform to international standards, and to avoid confrontation with the international community.

Evidence of Case (a): The current Iranian leadership applied the same style vis-à-vis the issue of banning chemical and biological weapons).

Iran: Continued

- b. A hard-liners approach within the leadership, which sees total security from a US attack in Iran becoming a nuclear power very fast. This, they estimate, could take place by utilizing the cover of cooperation with the *IAEA* and the *EU* nations.

Evidence of Case (b): The negotiating team is stacked with members of the *Supreme National Security Council* aligned with the *Leader*.

- c. An Iranian leadership unable to sort out its priorities and regional role because of a highly fluid regional situation.

Iran: Continued

Policy Options

Combinations of the following approaches:


- a. On the short term, to rely on the compelling power exerted by the Western alliance to deter Iran from regional adventures (like in Iraq or Lebanon)
-

Iran: Continued

- b. On the medium term, to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran on regional issues (settlement of the *Three Islands* dispute with the UAE, and the *Continental Shelf* with Kuwait, enforce CBM's, and other pending issues).

- c. On the long term, to continue utilising financial and economic subsidies, and forming strategic joint ventures to pacify Iran.

Terrorism ?



on ^{LCC} ~~the~~ door step / GAC direct challenge to
their legitimacy -
(long term societal/cultural challenge) (middle class
crayons)

GAC disagree on strategy: This may
under collective action (defect possible)

- no more all holders ~~being~~ (experts?)
- different levels of planning, by state
etc among the various cells -
(Traffic Police Dept.)

A Jul. 2003 Riyadh ~~attacks~~
came out by large group
had organization - and high
def of info / ~~experts~~

- direct attack (disfranchised)
- highly coord. attacks -
- report lessons and many policies
state sponsored lessons -
- combinations -

Terrorism

TERRORISM

Introductory Remarks

- ☐ From a layman's perspective, recent spate of terrorist attacks brings the struggle for what we believe in not just to our home front, but to our door steps.
- ☐ Most GCC nations share (in varying degrees) that recent terrorist attacks form a direct challenge to their legitimacy.

Terrorism: Continued

- ☐ GCC nations disagree (in varying degrees) on the most suitable response to terrorism whether short term military action, or long term multi-pronged action.
 - ☐ A number of GCC planners believe that if such disagreements develop further, they may hinder a robust and timely collective action.
 - ☐ In such eventuality, they believe, all we shall all lose.
-

Terrorism: Continued

- ☐ The difference in the level of organisation, accuracy, and potency of recent terrorist attacks indicate either:
 - (a) That they are not necessarily *al-Qaeda*-masterminded operations, but that they could have been organized by new aspirants to *al-Qaeda* membership; or
 - (b) That they are different in such aspects due to the level of planning and logistics available to the different cells of *al-Qaeda*.
-

Terrorism: Continued

- However, there is a frightening feature of the April 2004 attack on the *Traffic Police Dept.* in Riyadh in that it indicates that the cell which has carried it out has had a high level of organization, which enabled it to discriminate in targeting between combatants and non-combatants (i.e. civilians). It also demonstrated a high level of sophistication in the cell's propaganda arm when it disavowed the operation shortly after realizing its negative impact upon the Saudi public.

Terrorism: Continued

- This greatly differs from the results of the attack on *al-Muhayya* residential complex (November 2003) when all the victims were non-combatants.

Terrorism: Continued

Possible Scenarios

- A. Unrelated and dispersed attacks by individuals and groups which claim representation of disgruntled and disfranchised segments of the population.
 - B. Highly coordinated attacks by one solid infrastructure related to *al-Qaeda*, working under its auspices, or at least sympathetic to it.
-

Terrorism: Continued

- C. Regional tensions and rising political violence spill over the GCC nations.
 - D. Attacks by state-sponsored terrorist groups
 - E. Variations of combinations of (a), (b), (c) and (d).
 - F. Scenarios mentioned in (e) above may be coupled with inability of GCC agencies to respond to terrorism on the propaganda and intellectual levels.
-

Terrorism: Continued

Policy Options

Combinations of the following approaches:

- a. To discard police-influenced approaches and to set up specialised counter-terrorism infra-structures.
- b. To enhance intelligence gathering and inter-service coordination domestically, regionally, and internationally.
- c. To reorient armed forces doctrine in order to meet this change in threat perception.

Terrorism: Continued

- d. To chart long-term development, education, media, and religious propagation strategy.
 - e. To enforce special counter-terrorism legislations without infringing upon human rights.
 - f. To chart and implement a long term strategy of political reforms centred on internationally recognized basic human rights.
-

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Consortium of Research Institutes'
Project on
*Regional Co-operation and Security in the Middle East
and North Africa*

Project Backgrounder

The Consortium of Research Institutes was founded at a conference in Dubai, hosted by the Gulf Research Center on 26 February, 2005. The Consortium will lead the next phase of an ongoing project to consider the creation of a Framework, or Charter, for Regional Co-operation and Security in the Middle East and North Africa. Previous work includes the project run at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI (1995-1999)¹ and the project in 2003 to draft a Regional Security Charter for the Middle East, sponsored by UCLA and the Danish Government.

This will be a Track Two project, involving experts from across the Middle East and North Africa. Also invited to participate will be experts from regional organizations, such as the Arab League, the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Maghreb Arab Union. Finally, experts will be invited from certain countries and multilateral organizations external to the region. All participants will be acting in their personal and private capacities. All conferences will be informal and closed to the media. The Chatham House Rules will apply to all discussions.

Objectives of the Project

The Consortium will hold three conferences. Participants from across the region, and selected participants from outside the region, will jointly develop both the idea of, and a strategy for the creation of, a Framework, or Charter, for Regional Co-operation and Security in the MENA region.

Structure

The first conference will be hosted by the Centre Tarik Ibn Zyad in Morocco in June, 2005, on behalf of the Consortium. This conference will consider

¹ The SIPRI Report, entitled *Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options*, is available at <http://projects.sipri.se/mideast/MEreport.pdf>

the experiences of other regions in developing their regional co-operation and security structures. It will pay particular attention to the conditions that prevailed when these processes began and seek to explore the possible relevance of these experiences to the task of developing an indigenous system for the MENA region. It is recognized that the MENA region is unique and that no other model can simply be applied. However, an exploration of these other regional experiences may be useful in stimulating thinking about how a process might be initiated in the MENA region.

The second conference will be hosted by the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Egypt in the autumn of 2005, on behalf of the Consortium. This workshop will feature working groups, reporting to a Plenary. The groups will be devoted to consideration of specific topics that are likely to arise in any attempt to develop a Framework, or Charter, for Regional Co-operation and Security in the MENA region. Emphasis will be placed on how a future regional Framework, or Charter, may be structured to facilitate dialogue amongst the participants on the key issues that face the MENA region. These could include such topics as arms control (including the question of a WMDFZ), the management of change in the region, the relationship of the region to the outside world, and others.

The date and location of the third conference will be announced shortly. It is expected that this conference will consider possible elements of a strategy to launch a Framework, or Charter, for Regional Co-operation and Security in the Middle East and North Africa, once the political situation in the region permits.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of the project, the Consortium members will jointly, and in their own names, issue a policy paper for the consideration of regional Governments summarizing the proceedings and identifying possible ways forward.

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ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE

10

1. With a transformed Alliance determined to respond to new challenges, NATO is ready to undertake a new initiative in the broader Middle East region to further contribute to long-term global and regional security and stability while complementing other international efforts.

2. In this context, progress towards a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should remain a priority for the countries of the region and the international community as a whole, and for the success of the security and stability objectives of this initiative. Full and speedy implementation of the Quartet Road Map is a key element in international efforts to promote a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security. The roadmap is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

3. NATO's initiative, based on a series of mutually beneficial bilateral relationships aimed at fostering security and regional stability, should take into account the following principles:

- a) the importance of taking into account ideas and proposals originating from the countries of the region or regional organisations;
- b) the need to stress that the NATO initiative is a cooperative initiative, based on joint ownership and the mutual interests of NATO and the countries of the region, taking into account their diversity and specific needs;
- c) the need to recognise that this process is distinct yet takes into account and complements other initiatives including by the G-8 and international organisations such as the EU and the OSCE as appropriate. The NATO initiative should also be complementary to the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue and could use instruments developed in this framework, while respecting its specificity. Furthermore, the new initiative could apply lessons learned and, as appropriate, mechanisms and tools derived from other NATO initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- d) the need to focus on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, particularly in the security field. Participation of countries in the region in the initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest;
- e) the need to avoid misunderstandings about the scope of the initiative, which is not meant to either lead to NATO/EAPC/PfP membership, provide security guarantees, or be used to create a political debate over issues more appropriately handled in other fora.

4. Taking into account other international efforts for reforms in the democracy and civil society fields in the countries of the region, NATO's offer to those countries of dialogue and cooperation will contribute to those efforts where it can have an added value: in particular, NATO could make a notable contribution in the security field as a result of its

particular strengths and the experience gained with the PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Aim of the initiative

5. The aim of the initiative would be to enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region. This could be achieved by actively promoting NATO's cooperation with interested countries in the field of security, particularly through practical activities where NATO can add value to develop the ability of countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance including by contributing to NATO-led operations, fight against terrorism, stem the flow of WMD materials and illegal trafficking in arms, and improve countries' capabilities to address common challenges and threats with NATO.

6. Countries of the region might see benefit in cooperation with the Alliance through practical support against terrorist threats, access to training, defence reform expertise and opportunities for military cooperation, as well as through political dialogue on issues of common concern.

Content of the initiative including priority areas

7. The initiative's aim would be essentially achieved through practical cooperation and assistance in the following priority areas, and illustrative menu of specific activities:

a) providing tailored advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations.

b) promoting military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability¹ through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations consistent with the UN Charter:

- invite interested countries to observe and/or participate in selected NATO/PfP exercise activities as appropriate and provided that the necessary arrangements are in place;
- encourage additional participation by interested countries in NATO-led peace-support operations on a case-by-case basis;
- c) fighting against terrorism including through information sharing and maritime cooperation:
 - invite interested countries, in accordance with the procedures set out by the Council for contributory support from non-NATO nations, to join Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in order to enhance the ability to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism through maritime operations in the OAE Area of Operations;
 - explore other forms of cooperation against terrorism including through intelligence exchange and assessments as appropriate.

¹ Interoperability requirements constitute firm prerequisites for contributing nations such as the need to communicate with each other, to operate together, to support each other, and to train together.

d) contributing to the work of the Alliance on threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery:

e) promoting cooperation as appropriate and where NATO can add value in the field of border security, particularly in connection with terrorism, small arms & light weapons, and the fight against illegal trafficking:

- offer NATO-sponsored border security expertise and facilitate follow-up training in this respect;
- access to appropriate PfP programmes and training centres.

f) promoting cooperation in the areas of civil emergency planning:

- offer NATO training courses on civil emergency planning, civil-military coordination, and crisis response to maritime, aviation, and surface threats;
- invitations to join or observe relevant NATO/PfP exercises as appropriate and provision of information on possible disaster assistance.

Geographical scope of the initiative

8. Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the initiative could be opened to all interested countries in the region who subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as described above. Each interested country would be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. This initiative would complement NATO's specific relationship with the partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue².

Implementing the new initiative

9. This initiative would carry NATO into a new set of relationships with countries that may have a limited understanding of the Alliance as it has been transformed. Since an underlying requirement of success for the initiative is the development of ownership by countries of the region, it will be necessary to update governments' and opinion-formers' understanding of NATO and the initiative and, in the light of the reactions of the countries concerned, consider a joint public diplomacy effort. Furthermore, in developing and implementing the initiative, the views of interested countries in the region will have to be taken into account through a process of regular consultation.

10. This initiative will be launched at the Istanbul Summit. Subsequently, in consultation with interested countries, NATO would offer a menu of practical activities within the above-mentioned priority areas for possible development with interested countries of the region. The Alliance would engage these countries, on a 26+1 basis, to develop and execute agreed work plans. While doing so, the new initiative could apply lessons learned and, as appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, mechanisms and tools derived from other NATO initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Appropriate legal, security and liaison arrangements should be put in place.

² Specificity in this respect refers in particular to the composition of this initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as the multilateral dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

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(trap) - prepare to leave / ~~de~~ emphasize direct business
with Baghdad government - de-emphasize
relation with the coalition force -
Prepare having more / multi lateral
with GCC /
opened to Palestine
strong force

HOUSE OF ABDEL
HAMAD

Perkins Islamic (summit)

Sudan - / MSF
800 steps
1- 4. me
not Defri

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a) continue to concentrate on how / objective :
to avoid how denigrate the NAT
to control / diminish / possibly phase out
out the nuclear fuel chain, at least
to value enrichment facilities to a
broken / research amount
to try to make the US more directly

(but ~~is~~ unlikely
because the window
of opportunity, closed
with the invasion of Iraq
and with the policy change of
Israel

another one could be
opened depending on what
will happen in South Asia

Person discussion on CRM both in the West
and in the Gulf → under the WMD
free zones? as a long term perspective could
be discussed / starting from transparency (first
objective to have Israel recognise the existence of
its nuclear arsenal and clarify its strategic intentions)

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Structure of the Gulf

~~also~~

a) increase the credibility of GCC policies
and collective security
GCC and other to avoid
the worst in case of future
crises -

more with incentives, attempts to reconnect with
them

it was important
key Israeli? (Zionist lobby in US)

of course we have the end of double containment
regime in Iraq was designed to
to come

but it could start again is a much
worse situation. (Saudi)

following by
America presence - along with the Saudi
or being more "even"?

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Relate

what will happen if they
will ask US troops to leave.

GCC is a protection for external threats
or for domestic stability / defence of
existing law

liberal + labourist?

Will GCC endorse/support actions
against Iraq, or what do
they do?

Summary? aspect of support

e) a GCC subject / fundamental contribution for
the security/stability of Gulf region

f) can it serve as a bridge / through domestic

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Regional security / (see yeske...)

① Arab-Israeli conflict / to be solved (Israel Robb... / Israel Fine...)
Libanese better (under the shadow of "Iranian")
Israelis makes
solutions to be solved

② but Gulf is different from Rest of ME & NA
e.g. GCC is not unilaterally owned by Israel or
but by Iran ... or among themselves

or Iraq...
The Gulf Security Framework has two levels
one general "Arab-NE"
and one more specific geopolitically

③ GCC becoming more of a collective/cooperative strategic
unity / interaction with a) Iraq, b) Iran

- Iraq a very critical issue (to stabilize it)
we are feeling that

- Iran, not feeling and could be a problem for
regions...

④ Per Regional/Arabian Concerns: Israel

⑤ Now, for problems to be solved (cannot concentrate
on a single issue at the time)

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2 ^{possible} ~~main~~ - strategies for Iran

- a) US recognize diplomatically Islamic Iran
- b) Ted Bush new President, present policy continues & it is (in isolation) - mid-term elections

Regime change is not ~~an~~ only a matter of military invasion - - -

Bush admin. takes as a model the fall of the Soviet Union

Nuclear / Iran could ~~be~~ be completely
X) disarmed
short / conflict building process


Y) manage a "latent" nuclear Iran (like Japan, Sweden, South Korea and others) -

Europe has failed (largely because he consider Europe too much "transatlantic") - so they will not trust Europe or the Bush admin.


Sanctions

as


Iran / Russia? But - Brazil? could freedom? present
the nuclear fuel credibility -



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well sense of security / should be high
they are threatened practically only
by terrorists / not can be solved by
no further of works
(worrying security problems
to the level of reality?)



Robert Abdel Hamid

how
worse security is with the GCC, possible
cooperation in counter terrorism
but also etc

Regional security area / linkage with Red
Mushar / WMD free zone

Handwritten notes in a circle:
Karo Lakshmi
Kumarit
Kumarit
Kumarit

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Redo

the exercise of the pro-British
opponents of -?

The situation is very likely
different / it would only be a
distortion /

From is not denouncing the MT - I hope that this



will continue even after the failure
of the review conference: it is the
best avenue we can use and we are
using it.

I agree that the problem is
to control, diminish, possibly
cut the fuel chain - in here - ~~the~~
Provided - Every EU/EEA essential
(fuel is not in use, but is in the EU)

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Can't be Rel. Indicators?

low of the sea

and new
of specimens
on 'Mushroom water
mosquito / mosquito etc...

How to protect what a pair are shared
person of law (human worth? let's) protection
share but also ~~needs~~ defence against misdoing

Tenant is a WMS -

New rules on consideration about misdoing

can we identify the demerit line?

Can we identify who is 'next in line', to
become tenant?
(tenant's debt?)

'Islamic' human is a very definitive
(dash of understanding what)

How to impose human rights etc...

From Zoroaster to Ba'phonet

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Rumell "draining the swamp" a stupid phrase -
"diminishing" the undesirable conditions : how?
Sp. op command (SOC) - confusion about terminology etc.
Who's responsible for what

Various interactive issues difficult to handle / Which is
"normal" or benign, and which is not? E.g. Dubai
forming hub (positive and negative) -

Isolation extremism - Bush review of the "world we
are leaving" : trying to remove specific or terminology

By "leaving" we are really talking about these
"extremisms" - getting more specific (e.g. Isolation
extremism)

Smuggling
Isolation extremism
etc. - - -

a) Domestic policy issues
b) political forces and extremism
c) It possible to sever terrorist links
without losing political concerns etc. - - -
(Liberia, Palestine etc.) -

US may - Smuggling
Drug trade - Weapons - Refuge - WHD model -

What course actions to follow (WHD/E)

process of coordination
very noisy.

So may many? -
differences remain and
should be maintained -

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but the main diff. has been, and I
 hope still is, that the control
 over the political identity of the
 Afghans is the tribe / family, not
 the religious ~~group~~ identity (Shiite / Sunni
 etc.) nor even the ethnic identity -
 is that still the case - ~~group~~? or
 larger identities ~~too~~ have established
 themselves, so large as being able
 capable of successfully challenging
 the central state? This seems to
 be the case of the units / ^{not} ~~groups~~ ^{hopefully}
 divided among themselves
 and who may be close of the
 kind - even if party divisions
 still apply. - - -

Up party divisions
 of political
 identities

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full security / outside forces
CS vs. ^{Europe}

GA should ^{bring} ~~bring~~ be courts (they receive
note for Iran - - -)

comprehensive effort

3 + shares. (GATE)
Conference self (Kunat)
etc -

long term - strategic joint venture

e) Iraq (near central state)? is that
a ^{basic} ~~basic~~ ^{working} ~~senior~~? It is in Afghanistan
(for entrance it - survived with a
relatively near central point able to
manage tribal conflicts on war lords)

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Try again

GMP 2001-2004

Land	83.3	236.1	(3 times)
Water	84.8	144.4	(almost 2)
K	34.1	49	(50%)

2005-10

steady growth

current 2009 GMP +14.8 (increase price and volume of oil)

+31.5% balance of trade

+31.7% non oil sector (mainly trade)

Multi-polar deep sea sector

Bone as a GCC town? (full city)

Call for "coalition"

management
(local people or host that are going to pay when we leave)

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