WHAT COMMON SECURITY POLICY?
MANAGING 21ST CENTURY THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY
A EURO-AMERICAN POLICY DIALOGUE

Centre Thucydite - analyse et recherche en relations internationales
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA)
Paris, 15-16/XI/2002



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Centre Thucydide – Analyse et recherche en relations internationales
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
Association américaine pour les Nations Unies (UNA-USA)

Maison de la Chimie,
28 rue Saint-Dominique, 75007 Paris

15 – 16 November 2002

"What Common Security Policy? Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security" A Euro-American Policy Dialogue

Friday 15 November, 9 h 30

Welcome : Général Michel Masson, Head, International Division, Etat-Major des Armées

I. - Security Challenges in a Re-Scrambled World Order

Chairman: Serge Sur, Director, Centre Thucydide, Paris

1. Terrorism's Realignments : What Change in Threat Assessments?
Lawrence Korb, Council on Foreign Relations
Respondent : Antonio Missiroli, Institute of Security Studies, European Union
Discussion

11 h 15 – 11 h 30 : Coffee break

Chaiman: Robert Orr, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

2. Controlling weapons of mass destruction: What concern to NATO's members?
Bernard Sitt, Direction des applications militaires, Atomic Energy Commission (France)
Respondent: Frank Gaffney, Center for Security Policy Discussion
Discussion

13 h – Lunch for participants

Friday 15 november, 14 h 15

II. - Maintaining stability amid simmering conflicts

Chairman: Yves Boyer, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Paris

1. Calibrating use of force in international interventions: Who, when, how?
Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institution
Respondent: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Bosch Foundation
Discussion

2. NATO action "out-of-area ": Coalitions and capacity-building
Steven Grand, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington
Respondent: Peter Schmidt (Germany), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Discussion

16 h – 16 h 45 : Coffee break

Chairman: Peter Schmidt, SWP, Berlin

3. The Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf: What common concerns?
Roberto Aliboni (Italy), Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Respondent: Christopher Dickey, Middle East Regional Editor, Newsweek
Discussion

18 h – End of working day

20 h – Dinner for participants

Saturday, 16 November, 9 h 30

III. - Changing Landscape for International Instruments

Chairman: Donald Payne, Member of the House of Representatives, Washington

1. The West's Stake in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: What works, whose work?

Nancy Bearg Dyke, EnterpriseWorks Worldwide

Respondent: Jean-David Levitte, Ambassadeur, Représentant de la France auprès de l'ONU

Discussion

11 h – 11 h 30 : Coffee break

Chairman: Admiral Richard Cobbold, RUSI, London

2. Organizational Competencies: Political Decision-making and Military Command in the E.U., NATO, and U.N.

Julian Lindley-French, Institute of Security studies, European Union

Respondent: General William Nash, Ret., Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Respondent: Colonel Ralph Thiele, German Bundeswehr

Discussion

13 h – Lunch for participants

Saturday 16 november, 14 h 30

IV. – Military Preparedness for International Security

Chairman : Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Roma

1. Stability operations, post-Afghanistan: War-fighting, peace-keeping, and changing divisions of labor

Admiral Richard Cobbold (United Kingdom), Royal United Services Institute
Respondent: Jeffrey Laurenti, UNA-USA

Discussion

16 h – 16 h 15 : Coffee break

Chairman : Jeffrey Laurenti, UNA-USA

2. Common European security and defense policy: What's hard, what's soft, and what's funded?

Yves Boyer, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique
Respondent: To be confirmed, USA

Discussion

17 h : V – Concluding Remarks

François Heisbourg, Director, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique

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"What Common Security Policy? Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security"

A Euro-American Policy Dialogue

Centre Thucydide, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, United Nations Association-USA

Paris, 15-16 November 2002

Participants

Gregory AFTANDILIAN, Professional Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, USA

Roberto ALIBONI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma

Gilles ANDREANI, Directeur du Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision, Ministère des Affaires étrangères ; Professeur associé à l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2)

George AYACHE, Cabinet du Ministre, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris

Mario BETTATI, Professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2)

Amaya BLOCH-LAINE, German Marshall Fund, Paris

Yves BOYER, Directeur adjoint de la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Frédéric BOZO, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris

Rear Admiral Richard COBBOLD, Director, Royal United Service Institute, London

Pierre-Alain COFFINIER, Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques, Ministère de la Défense, Paris

Ivo DAALDER, Brookings Institution, USA

Kimberly DASHER, Policy Associate, UNA-USA, New York

Christopher DICKEY, Middle East Regional Editor, Nesweek, USA

✓Hugh DUGAN, Foreign Policy Advisor, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on terrorism, International operations, USA

Nancy Bearg DYKE, Enterprise Works Worldwide, USA

Frank GAFFNEY, Center for Security Policy, USA

Steven GRAND, International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

François HEISBOURG, Directeur, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Chantal de JONGE OUDRAAT, Georgetown University, Washington

Lawrence KORB, Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Bernard KOUCHNER, Ancien Ministre, Paris

Jeffrey LAURENTI, Executive Director, Policy Studies, UNA-USA, New York

Jean-David LEVITTE, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent de la France auprès des Nations Unies, New York

Jullian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Institute of Security Studies, European Union

Gustav LINDSTROM, Institute of Security Studies, European Union

Jean-Luc MARRET, Chercheur, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Général Michel MASSON, Etat-Major des Armées, Paris

Dr Holger H. MEY, President, Institute for Strategic Analyses, Vice President, EuroDefense, Germany

Antonio MISSIROLI, Institute of Security Studies, European Union

General William NASH (Ret.), Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

Robert ORR, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

Colonel Patrice SARTRE, Secrétariat Général à la Défense Nationale, Paris

Bernard SITT, Direction des applications militaires, Commissariat à l'énergie atomique, Paris

Peter SCHMIDT, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin

Serge SUR, Directeur, Centre Thucydide, Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2)

Colonel Ralph THIELE, German Bundeswehr

(1)

**"What Common Security Policy?
Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security"**

Centre Thucydide, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, United Nations Association-USA

Paris, 15-16 November 2002

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN A RESCRAMBLED WORLD ORDER

Lawrence J. KORB

The Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

During the Cold War the US and Europe agreed that the most important threat to their peace and security was Soviet Communist expansionism. This common view that the Soviet Union had to be contained enabled the transatlantic partnership to remain strong and viable for nearly 50 years. However, this shared vision of the threat should not obscure the fact that there were severe differences within the US and Europe and between the US and Europe over how best to contain the USSR. Over the 50 years that the Cold War lasted these differences occurred in a number of areas.

Many European governments disagreed with the US over such issues as American policy toward China and Cuba, the US war against Vietnam, America's unwillingness to share nuclear weapons technology with other members of the alliance, the US invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1966 and of Grenada in 1983, and US support for the Contras in Nicaragua, and President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. The Europeans also had concerns about whether the US would really risk American cities to deter attacks on western European capitals. For its part, the US government opposed the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez in 1956, the German policy of OSTPOLITIK, and the agreement between the USSR and West European governments to build a natural gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe. Moreover, there were significant sections of the population in both the US and Europe that supported the positions of governments on the other side of the Atlantic. For example, thousands of Europeans and Americans took to the streets in their own countries to protest the US role in the Vietnam War as well as the plans of the Reagan administration to introduce the Pershings and Cruise missiles into Europe.

Nor were the European governments completely united on these issues. The British were normally closer to the US view while the French usually had the most problems with some US positions. In fact the French left the military structure of NATO in 1966 because of disagreements with the US over the role of nuclear deterrence and war fighting. The Germans and the smaller European members of the alliance were normally somewhere in between the French and British positions.

In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, it began to become clear that the US and Europe had different views about the major security challenges confronting the West and how best to deal with them. The US believed that major security challenges would come from the rogue states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba and North Korea. To deal with this threat, the US developed a Two Major Regional Contingency Strategy (MRC) and kept its military spending relatively high. For example, during the 1990's, the US defense spending in real terms remained at 85% of its Cold War level and President Clinton left office with a defense budget that was higher in real terms than that of President's Nixon, Ford or Carter.

The Europeans saw the main security challenge coming from failed states like Yugoslavia and humanitarian disasters like Rwanda. Consequently they chafed at the unwillingness of the US not only to not get involved in these situations but also preventing the UN from taking appropriate action. In 1995, President Jacques Chirac of France was so frustrated at US passivity toward Bosnia that he proclaimed that the post of world leader was vacant. While American military spending remained at or near Cold War levels, European governments allowed their defense budgets to fall precipitously. By the end of the decade of the 1990's, the US defense budget was about twice as high as that of all European governments combined.

Nonetheless in the first decade after the end of the cold war the US and Europe worked reasonably well in dealing with international crises. In the spring and summer of 1995, when the Serbs seized UN soldiers, and committed atrocities against civilians in Srebrenica, the US and Europe worked together to create the military force (first called IFOR for international force, later SFOR for stabilization force) that intervened in Bosnia. In fact the Europeans supplied more military personnel to IFOR and SFOR than the US.

Similarly, the US and Europe worked together on expanding NATO by agreeing to add three countries in 1999 (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Finally, in March 1999, NATO waged a successful air campaign that prevented the Serbs from ethnically cleansing Kosovo and then sent in a ground force (KFOR) to protect that province. While the US had a dominant role in the air war against Kosovo, the Europeans provided most of the ground forces that still occupy Kosovo. In addition they took responsibility for providing security for the most dangerous sectors of Kosovo.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND EUROPE

Since the arrival of the Bush Administration in Washington, US-European relations have deteriorated rapidly. Robert Kagan, a supporter of the Bush Administration's foreign policy,[1] pointed out that when it came to dealing with Europe, this administration came into office with a chip on its shoulder. The real question is whether the deterioration in US-European relations is a result of the attitude and actions of an individual administration or whether it is the result of a profound shift on both sides of the Atlantic on how to deal with the current threats to international peace and security.

[1] Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, June/July 2002, pp 3-28.

Relations between the Bush Administration and Europe can be broken down into three phases. The first phase lasted from Bush's inauguration in January 2001 through the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Phase two lasted from September 11 through the end of 2001. The third phase started in 2002 and continues to the present.

In the first phase, the Bush administration's message to the world was "you need us more than we need you."[2] Therefore, we will pursue US interests and only US interests. If you wish to join us, fine, then, we will do it multilaterally. Richard Haas, the Director of Policy Planning at State, called this approach "a la carte multilateralism." On the other hand, if you do not see things our way, then we will act alone. And we have enough economic and military power to achieve power objectives unilaterally.

In the first phase, the Bush Administration torpedoed five treaties on everything from global warming to the International Criminal Court to the global small arms trade. In addition, it damaged, put aside, blocked or undermined several initiatives in the arms control and disarmament field. For example, the new president not only made it clear that he would pursue a robust national ballistic missile defense system regardless of the constraints of the ABM and Outer Space Treaties; he also made it clear that he would not submit to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for ratification; would not commit itself categorically not to conduct future nuclear tests and would not fund on site inspections for implementing CTBT; rejected the enforcement protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention; slashed funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs; and placed negotiations with North Korea on hold. In addition, members of the Bush Administration talked about withdrawing American peacekeeping forces from the Balkans and the Sinai.

Initially the tragic events of September 11 seemed to mark an end to the extreme unilateralism of the first nine months of the Bush Administration. Throughout the fall of 2001, the US began to work cooperatively with other nations to attempt to dry up the financial assets of the Al Qaeda network and to share intelligence that would enable the US and other nations to prevent future terrorist attacks by arresting the terrorists. The US also worked with the international community to provide aid to rebuild Afghanistan and to create an International Stabilization Force (ISAF) to provide security for the interim government of Afghanistan's President Hammed Kharzi. In addition several countries provided military forces to the US led military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. All and all some 90 nations including all of the members of NATO and the European Union cooperated with the US. In fact in the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan eleven European nations took part in ground operations, ten in air missions, and nine in naval operations.

Unfortunately this multilateral phase was short lived. The president abruptly changed course in his State of the Union address. He not only did not mention the contributions of other nations to the war, he also expanded the war against terrorism to war against evil, actually naming Iran, Iraq and North Korea the axis of evil states, without consulting any of his allies (or his own State Department for that matter). In addition, in the first several months of 2002, the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty, unsigned that the

[2] For a complete discussion of this phase see Lawrence J. Korb and Alex Tiersky, "The End of Unilateralism? Arms Control after September 11," Arms Control Today, October 2001, pp 3-7.

International Criminal Court treaty, and walked out of the meeting to enact the protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.

The current attitude the Bush Administration toward Europe and the rest of the world is best illustrated by the ideas contained in two documents prepared for the Congress: the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the National Security Strategy (NSSS).

The NPR, which was released in the spring of 2002, stated that the US would consider developing a new generation of smaller nuclear weapons for use against hardened underground targets or bunkers that might be used by terrorists or rogue leaders to protect themselves, their command and control systems, or biological and chemical weapons. Not only would the new strategy potentially lower the threshold for employing nuclear weapons, it could also require the US to resume testing nuclear weapons.

The second document, the National Security Strategy, was released in late September 2002. It makes two main points. First, the US will now emphasize preemption over deterrence as the preferred strategy for dealing with threats to its security. Second, it is now the policy of the US to maintain so much military power that no nation or group of nations will ever challenge its military dominance.

REACTION TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNILATERALISM

Not surprisingly the Europeans were disappointed that the Bush Administration reverted to its pre 9-11 attitude so soon.[3] After all, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks a headline in Le Monde had proclaimed that we are all Americans. Moreover, within days after the attacks under pressure from the European members, NATO 'took the unprecedented step of invoking Article V of the treaty, thus making the attacks of 9-11 not just an attack on the US but on the entire alliance.

Europeans were not the only ones disappointed that the Bush Administration had reverted to its extreme form of multilateralism so soon after 9-11. Many Americans both inside the administration, among the foreign policy elite, and in the informed public became alarmed by this trend.[4] This disagreement with the approach of the Bush Administration toward the world surfaced in the way that the President dealt with Iraq. Within the administration the unilateralists were led by the Pentagon's hawks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton. The unilateralists received strong support within the Administration from Vice President Cheney. The multilateralists resided primarily in the State Department, personified by Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage. The Powell approach found strong support from most civilian and military careerists throughout the National Security bureaucracy. National security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, originally

[3] See for example Harold Mueller, "Europe and the Axis of Evil," Center for International Trade and Security, Summer 2002, pp. 12-.

[4] For a good discussion of the differing views of Bush's approach to the world see "Rumsfeld's War and Powell's Battle," Newsweek, September 16, 2002, pp. 20-31.

thought to be in the Powell Camp in the early days of the Bush Administration, moved closer and closer to the unilateralist approach after 9-11.[5]

Most members of the foreign policy elite lean toward the Powell position. This became evident during the summer of 2002 when Brent Scowcroft, the National Security adviser for the elder President Bush and mentor for Dr. Rice, and James Baker, the Secretary of State for the first President Bush, both wrote editorials urging the administration to work when the international community in dealing with Iraq. This position was supported by Richard Holbrook, Clinton's UN Ambassador and leading Democratic foreign policy intellectual.

The unilateralists are supported by the neo-conservative veterans of the Reagan administration and include Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, his Secretary of State, George Shultz, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, his UN ambassador, as well as Richard Perle and Ken Adelman subcabinet officials under Reagan.

Republican and Democratic Congressional foreign policy experts like Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Joseph Biden (D-DE) support the Powell position on working with allies, particularly those in Europe. Members of Congress from the South like Senators Trent Lott (R-MS), John Kyl (R-AZ), and Zell Miller (D-GA) and Congressmen Tom Delay (R-TX), strongly support the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz go it alone preemption position.

Interestingly enough, most American people support the Powell position. Although a slight majority of the Americans support military action against Iraq, that number drops below 50% when they are asked whether they support a war with Iraq without authorization from the UN and without the support of our allies.

Finally, not all defense hawks support the approach of the Bush Administration to dealing with threats to US security. Many traditional hardliners are uncomfortable with the doctrines of preemption and preeminence. These detractors like John Mearsheimer, Steve Van Evra, and Barry Posen believe that the primary threat to US security is the Al Qaeda network. Consequently they are concerned with Bush's expansion of the war against Al Qaeda to a war against all terrorist organizations with a global reach, to a war against all terrorists and finally to a war against all evil. They worry that this unilateral expansion of the aims of the war will cause the campaign against Al Qaeda to lose focus and will alienate governments whose support the US needs to eliminate Al Qaeda cells. They also fear that seeking to maintain military superiority unilaterally will lead to a backlash among other nations or groups of nations. These realists are much more comfortable with a traditional Hans Morgenthau balance of power approach.[6]

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[5] Nicholas Lehman, "Without a Doubt: How the White House Changed Condoleeza Rice," The New Yorker, October 14-21, 2002, pp. 164-179.

[6] For a good discussion of the views of the realists see Nicholas Lemann, "The War on What: The White House and the Debate About Whom to Fight Next," The New Yorker, September 16, 2002, pp. 36-44.

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

What are the causes of this split between European and American views of security and what are its implications? Is it permanent or a temporary phenomenon? Is it a result of the actions and attitudes of a single administration? What are the short and long term consequences for the US and Europe and for the world? Just as there is debate in the US about the strategic threats to the US, there is also a debate within the US about the meaning of the split.

The most pessimistic view of the difference in US and European approaches to security issues is held by Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment.[7] According to Kagan, on the all important question of power in international politics, the American and European perspectives are diverging. Moreover, this divergence is not the result of the policies of the Bush Administration. Nor is it transitory. When it comes to foreign and defense policies the US and Europe have parted ways permanently.

Kagan argues that the warring factions in the Bush Administration have more in common than Secretary of State Powell, who is the leader of the multilateralist faction, has with his counterparts in France and in Great Britain. And when it comes to use of force, American Democrats have more in common with the Republicans than they do when the European Socialists and Social Democrats.

The source of these differences in strategic culture has nothing to do with the national character on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Kagan, there are two other sources of these differences. First, the relative power positions of Europe and the US have changed. In the nineteenth century, European nations were strong while the US was relatively weak. Now they have traded places. The second source is ideological. Because of the unique historical experience in the post-World War II period, which has not been shared by the US, Europe has developed a set of ideals regarding the utility and morality of power that is different from that of the US.

Kagan rejects the argument, which some Europeans make, that Americans have an unreasonable demand for perfect security. Since Europeans have lived side by side with evil for centuries, they point out, they have a greater tolerance for threats like that which is posed by Saddam Hussein. He argues that Europe's greater tolerance for threats is necessitated by its relative weakness. Moreover, because Europe is weak, the rogue states do not pose the same level of threat to it as they do to the US.

Kagan contends that the most important reason for the divergence of views between the US and Europe is America's willingness to exercise its power unilaterally if necessary, which is a threat to Europe's new sense of mission. Such exercise of power by the US demonstrates convincingly that Europe's new ideals are not universal.

Kagan concludes that there are steps that both sides can take to bridge the gap somewhat. Europe can increase its military capabilities and the US can show more understanding of Europe's sensibilities and a global generosity of spirit. While Kagan hopes

[7] Kagan, "Power and Weakness."

that a little common understanding can go a long way, he does not believe it will address the deep problems that beset the transatlantic alliance and more importantly he does not seem to fear the consequences to the US of this split.

Kagan's view is not widely shared by other analysts, even in the US. His colleague at the Carnegie Endowment, Anatol Lieven contends that while Kagan's article is an intelligent and well argued representation of the ideology of the Bush Administration, this ideology is self serving.[8] Just because Europe may be arguing from a position of relative military weakness, it does not follow that Europe's arguments are wrong. As it considers what to do in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the US could learn from the French experience in Algeria and the British experience in Kenya. As Lieven notes, France withdrew from Algeria not because it was too weak to hold on to it, but because the human, moral, and financial costs of occupation far outweighed the benefits of keeping Algeria as part of France. The British made a similar decision after crushing the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya.

Lieven also demonstrates that Kagan's picture of a Hobbesian world of state against state is not true for most of the world. Moreover, in places where the Hobbesian state exists, US interests for the most part are not affected and in South Asia where US interests are deeply involved, the situation has been kept under control by a mixture of European and US diplomacy.

Finally, Lieven notes that even if Europe is unable or unwilling to provide military force to a war against Iraq, the US cannot succeed in removing Saddam without using European bases and overflight rights. Moreover, by providing the use of these bases to US invasion forces, the Europeans themselves will become targets of future terrorist attacks.

Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations takes issue with the claim that the transatlantic split will not harm US security.[9] He argues that the split in transatlantic relations will severely damage long term US interests. In the long run, according to Kupchan, US primacy is far less durable than people like Kagan argue and in fact it is already beginning to diminish. Moreover, the rising challenge to US supremacy is not China or the Islamic world but Europe, more specifically the European Union.

Rather than the weak Europe, depicted by Kagan, Kupchan sees a united Europe that is in the process of marshalling the resources of Europe's individual states. He predicts that Europe's economic output will soon match that of the US and the Euro will challenge the dollar. He also envisions Europe adopting a common foreign policy and defense policy and building armed forces capable of acting independently of the US.

For Kupchan history has come full circle. The thirteen colonies broke away from the British Empire, and after they become a single country, these former British colonies amassed enough power to eclipse Europe. Now Europe is unifying and will break away from an America bent on global domination. And when that happens, Europe will be Pax Americana's principal competitor and the West will be divided against itself.

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[8] Anatol Lieven "The End of the West?," Prospect Magazine, September 2002.
[9] Charles Kupchan "The End of the West," The Atlantic Monthly, November 2002, pp. 42-44.

What is the answer? First, the US should take advantage of its present position to create a climate that will protect its long term interests. As Henry Kissinger concludes in the last sentence in his most recent book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?. "America's ultimate challenge is to transpose its power into a moral consensus, promoting its values, not by imposition but by their willing acceptance in a world that for all its seeming resistance desperately needs enlightened leadership."[10] In his new book The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, Joseph Nye agrees with Kupchan that while the US is supremely powerful right now, this condition is temporary and the US should take advantage of this unipolar moment to create a complex web of alliances that bind the rest of the world to our interests.[11]

The second thing that the US should do is to find a new purpose for the transatlantic alliance. With NATO and the EU expanding from the Baltic to the Black Sea and relations between Russia and the West improving, Europe is no longer threatened from within. However, as Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack note, this does not mean that America and Europe are safe and secure.[12]

Both the US and Europe are now faced with new scourges, which Asmus and Pollack describe as "terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mass migration, rogue and failed states and the threat of disruption to the economic life lines of the world."

Unlike Kagan, who thinks Europe will not be a target for terrorists, Asmus and Pollack note that there is evidence of past terrorist plots by groups like Al Qaeda against Europe. Moreover, as the US improves its ability to provide security for its homeland, Europe will become more of a target. Finally, Europe could be more easily hit than the US by a medium range ballistic missile launched by a rogue Middle Eastern state.

Asmus and Pollack argue that the terrorist threat is concentrated in one specific geographic area that they refer to as the greater Middle East. This region extends from Northern Africa and Egypt and Israel in the East throughout the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To meet this new challenge the US and Europe need a strategy that is more than just a military campaign against a single country like Iraq. The US and Europe must work together to bring about political and economic change in the entire region, if they are to conquer this threat as they did the threat from the USSR and its allies.

Asmus and Pollack have five specific suggestions for implementing the new strategy. First, the allies must remain engaged in nation building in Afghanistan. Second, the US and Europe must bury their differences and make a more determined and sustained effort to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Third, NATO should bring about a regime change in Iraq. Fourth, the US and Europe need to accelerate the on-going process of regime change in

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[10] Henry Kissinger, "Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century" New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001, p. 288.
[11] Quoted in Lemann, "The War on What," p. 39.
[12] Ronald A. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The New Transatlantic Project," Policy Review.

Iran. Finally, the US and Europe need to promote regime change among the authoritarian governments who are currently their friends and allies.

Just as neither the US nor Europe acting alone could have contained Soviet Communist expansionism, so neither of them acting alone can deal with the new common threat. They triumphed over the USSR because they had an integrated political, economic and military strategy. There is no reason the US and Europe cannot do the same against the terrorist threat.

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A EURO-AMERICAN DIALOGUE

PARIS, 15-16 NOVEMBER 2002

CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION : WHAT CONCERN TO EUROPE AND NATO ?

(talking points)

Bernard Sitt*
Director for International Security Affairs
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique
France

Introduction and background : a perspective from recent history

Today I would like to adress some issues concerning the control of massive destruction weapons (MDW)[1], as seen both from a global and from a specifically European viewpoint. Of course I will be rather brief, but my purpose here is just to underline a few fundamental ideas.

On January 31, 1992, the UN Security Council met at the level of the Heads of State and Government and issued a well-known statement where it declared that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a threat to international peace and security.

At that time, we were right in the middle of a « golden decade » for what one may be called « formal » arms control. This period started in the bilateral realm with the historical Reykjavik Bush-Gorbatchev summit in 1986 and saw the negociation, entry into force and implementation of a number of treaties and arrangements of major importance dealing among others with nuclear weapons, other MDW and missile systems : INF treaty and MTCR in 1987 ; joint US-Soviet disarmament initiative in 1991, essentially on tactical nuclear weapons and SNF ; START I and II treaties in 1991 and 1993 ; NSG Guidelines in 1992 ; CWC in 1993 ; Wassenaar Arrangement in1994 ; NPT prorogation for infinite duration in 1995 ; CTBT in 1996 ; and last but not least, continued consolidation of the Australia Group, and creation in 1995 of an Ad hoc Group to negociate an efficient verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.

But over the same time frame and beyond, one could observe simultaneously two fundamentally opposite trends : while a continuously increasing number of states adhered to the overall architecture of treaties and control regimes governing MDW[2], public events and political and intelligence analyses have been witnessing that a small number of states were developping

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* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the CEA

[1] Although there are substantial differences between nuclear, biological, chemical and other types of non conventional weapons that could conceivably be used for massive destruction or disruption, we will use in this article the commonly accepted designation of WMD. As far as radiological weapons are concerned, although they could not cause massive destructions, they could be used as an efficient tool of panic and mass destabilisation.

[2] One should not forget that, in particular, the NPT is now almost universal.

more radical proliferation programs and becoming a serious concern, and potentially a threat, for their region and for global security and stability.

And more recently, in the aftermath of the horrifying attacks of September 11, a new category of threat, already anticipated by some analysts, came into reality, linked to the destructive commitment of certain type of non-state actors ready to use any type of current technology, and preferably any category of non conventional weapons if they can acquire it.

Faced with this evolving, global and quite complex reality, where is Europe ? and how can one view its strategic priorities ? Should it concentrate on the immense task of defining its identity through enlargement, or should it try to be a strong actor by playing a role of its own and effectively contributing to the resolution of international security issues concerning WMD proliferation ?

While not having any ambition to give definitive answers to these open questions, I would just like to contribute to the debate by making some remarks.

MDW risks, threats and actors : what may be specific to Europe ?

How different is the post-September 11 world ? : everyone can recognize the fact that the threat environment has changed very much.

Of course the determination of proliferating countries having acquired or seeking to acquire WMD has not been changed, and the primary risks in this regard lie in the weaknesses of the non-proliferation treaties and regimes.

And new threats have been added to preexisting threats, not in the least because new weapons have been invented, but because new actors have appeared on the scene : non-state transnational entities with unforeseen strategies of violence, establishing invisible networks without national territory and without political identity, and using everyday low or high level technologies and trying to acquire WMD by establishing or taking advantage of illicit trafficking on the territory of their host countries.

Now, an additional dimension of these threats is the possible complicity between some states of concern and the terrorists in their region. To answer this question on a case by case basis, one can only rely on a closely organized cooperation and exchange between police and intelligence among close partners and allies.

But everyone will agree, here, that the proliferation of MDW increases the risks of acquisition by terrorists.

- Now my first point is : Are there any differences in perceptions of these threats between the US and Europe ?

I would tend to say no as far as WMD proliferation is concerned : US and Euopean countries have globally the same knowledge and analysis of the proliferation picture all over the planet, and feel concerned in very much the same way.

But I would tend to say yes as far as mass terrorism is concerned. For years now, Western European countries have been struck by terrorist attacks that have caused many casualties and losses of human lives, and left traumatic perceptions. And because of recent history in this regard

and of geographic vicinity, Europe has long felt a sense of vulnerability of its territories and of its population. But what is certainly regrettable is the absence of any strong collective response, despite some useful initiatives, for instance in terms of police and intelligence. But what would happen is a massive attack occured on the territory of any Western European country ?

- The second point I would like to raise is : What are really the threats in Europe, and are there any that are specific to Europe ?

One would tend to say that the effective threats are the same as in the US, in terms of proliferation and of the foreseeable aftermath of critical scenarios in one of the « hot » regions of the world. Solidarity in this respect among the Euro-Atlantic nations is firm and clear, and should remain so.

But as far as the threat of a terrorist attack with CBRN is concerned, one may argue that the threat on the US is greater : being the only superpower with worldwide visibility may make such a target much more attractive in the schemes of some sick extremist minds. But one should not be mistaken : Western European territories would come second.

What response from Europe

Dealing with WMD proliferation or WMD attaks by any actor implies a whole range of actions in terms of defense and security policies. One can consider four categories, namely : deterrence, prevention, political-military action, protection. My sense is simply that each one separately is necessary, but none of them alone is sufficient. And the best policy is obviously a well-balanced combination of these four caategories.

- Deterrence

As long as there are known and less known or unknown arsenals of nuclear weapons and other MDW with delivery systems, some of them under sustained development, nuclear deterrence will continue to play a unique role in the foreseeable future. France, UK and US have in the recent past expressed that nuclear deterrence may deal with any kind of use or threat of use of WMD by any State. For France in particular, national missile defense (NMD) is not an option that could replace deterrence.

- Prevention

This is the domain of action against WMD which builds on arms control in association with preventive diplomacy. Arms control has been and remains an essential tool of national security policies.

One may debate about the respective merits of « formal » and « unformal » arms control and the interest and efficiency of the wide variety of instruments that we have at present, and the political or technical means to improve its efficiency, with national technical means and intelligence analysis, on a multilateral basis.

More generally, one should not underestimate the power of collective norms, all the more so if they are accompanied with an effective and dissuasive sanction regime. Any systematic mistrust of non-proliferation norms would entail their delegitimation. In this sense, US selective multilateralism should be the object of closer consultations (and shared decisions ?) with European Allies.

In this regard, Europe as a whole can and should be a strong proponent of initiatives.

What is worth mentioning : G8 Kananaskis decisions concerning CBRN materials ; list of concrete measures concerning non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament adopted by the EU Council in April 2002 (measures which are worth full implementation) ; NATO WMD Centre (to be reinforced with enlarged participation and cooperation ?).

Political-military action

This is where we have an asymmetric euro-american relation, because of a commonly perceived capability gap and budget gap, which is of course a matter of debate *per se*.

But this gap should by no means lead to a « policy gap » when it comes to military operations against WMD threats (Irak and Al Qaîda are generic examples, but one might expect others in the future).

One important aspect here (this is a constant position of the EU) is the legitimacy of a large scale military operation before the international community (which may include unfriendly States and organisations) because such an operation, if not recognized as legitimate, would always end up with counterproductive and damaging results.

This naturally means full support of the UN Security Council, ideally by consensus (the consensus reached on Irak is exemplary in this regard).

Protection

Apart from the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) question, protection is not the most politically sensitive issue, and it is an area where well-balanced cooperation can be established in a Euro-Atlantic framework.

As far as TMD is concerned, there is much food for thought in the current debate, in Europe, in the US and elsewhere. In particular, one can easily imagine TMD concepts and systems that would be fully compatible with deterrence and would complement it.

Conclusion

All European States have common perceptions of WMD risks and threats of all kinds to their national security, and common needs.

A important strategic objective for the years to come is to contribute to the absence of any « policy gap » with the US (« bilateral » responsibility).

Political dialogue is active in Europe ; unfortunately this has not led yet to active common non-proliferation policies. In particular, how is ESDP going to deal with MDW proliferation as such ? How is it going to interact constructively with NATO in this specific field ?

As an important test of political will in these matters, Europe should be able to elaborate on « multilateral arms control against terrorism ». This would be a meaningful contribution to leadership in a potentially multipolar world where it should be one of the poles.

(3)

The Use of Force in a Changing World — U.S. and European Perspectives*

By Ivo H. Daalder
The Brookings Institution
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The eight-week long Security Council debate about Iraq was less about how to ensure Baghdad lives up to its UN obligations than about who should decided whether and when force can be used in this and other circumstances. France spoke for many in Europe and on the Council when it argued that the use of force must both be a very last resort and legitimized through explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. The United States, while willing for political reasons to give the United Nations a role, essentially argued that today's threats make the early — possibly even preemptive — use of force necessary in circumstances like these, and refused to subordinate its ability to do so to an explicit future decision by the Council.

This, of course, is not a new debate. Four years ago, France and the United States also argued about the appropriate role of the UN Security Council in authorizing the use of force to prevent Serbia from committing gross violations of the human rights of its citizens in Kosovo. Then, expediency won out, with an agreement that force was necessary to prevent a great humanitarian emergency. Now, with passage of a unanimous resolution on Iraq, the questions of whether, when, and how force might be used have merely been deferred — and to some extent left to Saddam Hussein to decide.

These differences are partly due to a disparity in power — the United States can essentially do what it wants and therefore wants to retain its freedom of action, while others, lacking that capacity, have a natural interest in constraining the ability of the United States to go it alone. But the more important reason is that the existing framework for deciding questions about the use of force is less and less applicable to the vastly and rapidly changing circumstances of today's world. The existing rules on the use of force, as codified in the Charter of the United Nations, are based on

* I want to thank Paul B. Stares of the United States Institute of Peace for his thoughtful contribution to this paper. A more detailed, co-authored version of the argument in this paper is forthcoming.

traditional notions of state sovereignty. The rules applied to an era in which states had an absolute monopoly on organized violence and in which force was of consequence only when it was used by one state against another. The right of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states was absolute. Accordingly, the use of force was justified only in cases of individual or collective self-defense or as a consequence of a decision by the UN Security Council when there was a clearly identified threat to international peace and security.

Sovereignty in today's ever changing world is more limited than this traditional notion suggests. States no longer have a monopoly on organized violence. Terrorists can inflict massive damage on a country even as powerful as the United States. Organized crime syndicates and narco-traffickers now possess military-style arsenals equivalent to many a small nation's army. And insurgent movements of various stripes have been able to challenge government control over vast swaths of territory — sometimes even including the territory of more than one state. Sovereignty has also become more limited as a result of rapid globalization, which has increasingly called into question the operational validity of distinguishing between a state's internal and external affairs. It is also becoming more evident that some developments within states — from providing safe haven or training grounds to terrorist groups to developing or failing to secure weapons of mass destruction — can have a negative impact on the security of others. Finally, the growing demand for and acceptance of democracy and human rights has increasingly pitted the rights of individuals and their communities against that of the state.

The 1990s witnessed an increasingly heated international discussion about humanitarian intervention and what obligations states had to secure the rights of individuals in cases where governments systematically sought to deny even the most basic human rights to life, food, or shelter. The present debate about how to deal with the threat posed by catastrophic terrorism — the combination of terrorists, tyrants, and mass destruction technologies — is in many ways an extension of this earlier discussion. Both highlight the pressing need to devise a new framework for determining when and how and by whom force can be used. The old rules, which in many instances prevent the use of force in a timely and effective manner, are clearly no longer adequate to deal with many of the new threats. But the new rules suggested by the Bush administration's doctrine of preemption, while enhancing the possibility that force can be used in ways that deal effectively with the new threats, ignore the need to legitimize the use of force, which for the purposes of

maintaining a viable international order remains as vitally important as ensuring greater effectiveness in its application. The challenge, therefore, is to craft new rules that enhance both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the use of force. It is a challenge that can be met only if the United States and its major international partners, especially its friends in Europe, work together on devising new rules to deal with new threats.

Two Models of the Use of Force

The UN debate about Iraq revealed two very different models on the use of force. France (supported by Russia, China, and a majority of other Security Council members) argued that the use of force in the case of Iraq had to be explicitly authorized by the Council in a new vote. As French President Jacques Chirac put it, "In the modern world, the use of force should only be allowed in the case of legitimate defense, or by decision of the competent international authorities," meaning in this case the UN Security Council.[1] At this stage, neither France nor any other Security Council member aside from Britain and the United States was prepared to authorize the use of force against Iraq. In contrast, the United States insisted that it had the inherent right to use force against Iraq no matter what the UN Security Council decided. As Secretary of State Colin Powell contended, "even though we're talking about resolutions and we are trying to get the collective will of the United Nations through the Security Council behind this resolution, the president still retains all of his options to act in any manner that he believes is appropriate to protect American interests and American lives."[2]

The difference between these two approaches to the use of force is, as Robert Kagan has so eloquently argued, partly the result of a disparity in power.[3] The United States has the ability in many instances in which military force may be necessary to use it on its own. It is therefore understandably reluctant to subject a decision to use force to a decision by other countries, not all of

[1] Quoted in Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, "Fear of U.S. Power Shapes Iraq Debate," *Washington Post*, October 30, 2002, p. A16.

[2] "Interview on CNN's Late Edition," September 15, 2002, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/13481.htm (accessed November 2002).

[3] Cf. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* (June/July 2002), pp. 3-28.

whom share its perspective on the threat or the necessity for using force to deal with it. In contrast, for a country like France, maintaining the primacy of the UN Security Council (in which it is not-coincidentally one of only five veto-wielding members) is essential to assuring its continued influence in international affairs.

But the difference also reflects the differing world views of the two sides in the debate about the use of force. For many in Europe, the consistent application of agreed-upon rules and norms are essential to maintaining international order. If everyone does as he pleases, the world will be a jungle in which life would truly be nasty, brutish, and short. With regard to the use of force, there are clear, universal rules in the UN Charter on how decisions like these must be made, and it is incumbent on all to follow the rules in order to avoid the anarchy that would otherwise be attendant. To many Americans, the international system looks indeed like a Hobbesian world. There are tyrants out there, who have little regard for rules and norms, but rather thrive on violating them at will. There are terrorists, to whom the rules do not even apply. And the vast destructiveness that can now fall more easily in the hands of these tyrants and terrorists bent on denying the efficacy of a rule-based system, makes continued reliance on such rules for the safety and security of the United States and its allies and friends around the world unwise. Whence, as the Bush administration's new *National Security Strategy* argues, the need for preemptive action: "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first."[4]

European Truths and Fallacies

Though vastly different in their content and implications, both perspectives hold important truths. Both also contain critical fallacies. Europeans are surely right that order depends on the existence of a set of agreed rules to underpin a normative framework — especially when it comes to the use of deadly force. And this fact is widely recognized, even in the current situation concerning Iraq and the war on terrorism. In the case of Iraq, a succession of UN Security Council resolutions

[4] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington: The White House, September 2002), p. 15, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed November 2002).

has provided the essential framework for action ever since Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 — up to and including the most recent UN resolution, which while declaring Iraq in material breach, gives it one final opportunity to comply with its disarmament and other obligations. As for the war on terrorism, the UN Security Council passed historic resolutions after the September 11 attacks enlisting all states in a proactive effort to combat international terrorism — an effort that has led to an uncommonly productive cooperation among the vast majority of member states.

At the same time, the existing framework for deciding and implementing many of the rules no longer provides a fully adequate guide for addressing many of the new threats and problems that have arisen in recent years. The UN Charter was drawn up at a time when inter-state conflict — that is, war between states — was the central concern of the framers. Its main purposes was to advance peaceful relations among states and to provide a framework for addressing serious infractions of that central purpose. It thus recognized the right of individual and collective self-defense in case of an armed attack — and it vested in the Security Council the authority to act in case of threats to or breaches of international peace and security.

It was only after the cold war that this construct was allowed to fully come into its own — and it did so, ironically enough, precisely in the case of Iraq. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was a textbook case for the application of the UN Charter, and the UN Security Council worked as intended in the months immediately following the invasion — ultimately authorizing member states to use "all necessary means" to evict Iraq from Kuwait and restore international peace and security in the region. But when the world confronted a new set of less traditional challenges — from genocide in Rwanda to wholesale ethnic cleansing in Kosovo — problems with the construct became more evident. The Charter's underlying assumption was that member states, and particularly the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, would have a similar view as to what constituted threats to international peace and security, and thus when the use of force would be appropriated. Kosovo demonstrated that this was not necessarily the case. While Serb actions against its own citizens were deemed a threat to international peace and security by the UN Security Council at two separate occasions, two of the five permanent members (supported by many other UN members) believed that military or other interventions violated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state and therefore rejected attempts to authorize the use of force to enforce demands made by the Council in these earlier resolutions. Had NATO been guided by the

notion that only the Security Council could authorize the use of force and thus foregone an intervention that ultimately ensured hundreds of thousands of people could safely return home, the world would hardly have been a better place. This point was well-made by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan some years ago:

> To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might say: leave Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?[5]

The absence of a common view among the five permanent members of the Security Council on what constitutes threats to international peace and security sufficient to require the use of force can therefore have a debilitating effect on international security. To be sure, the lack of consensus can often be a useful prod to find compromises that serve the interests and reflect the views of the many over the few — as was evidently the case most recently during the debate over the new Iraq resolution. But it nevertheless remains a strange definition of world order — indeed of legitimacy — to believe that consensus (or at least acquiescence) among five quite disparate nations is its prerequisite. Is it really the case that legitimacy is possible only if these five nations agree on the use of force in circumstances other than self-defense? The case of Kosovo — and, indeed, potentially in Iraq — suggests it is not. Absent a developing consensus among the big powers (not to speak of the many other members of the international community) an alternative means for securing legitimacy must be created.

American Truths and Fallacies

The Bush administration has now proposed such an alternative. It has rightly concluded that old rules may need to be adapted to deal with new threats. Those threats include not only the wanton violation of human rights by governments, but also the growing danger that, as advanced technologies proliferate, weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of those willing to use them for purposes other than deterrence. Traditional measures for dealing with these threats —

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[5] Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, September 19, 1999.

including preventive efforts like diplomacy, arms control, and export constraints as well as containment and deterrence — can only offer so much. The vast diffusion of technology, coupled to the strong desire of some to acquire the means to fashion weapons of mass destruction, means that determined efforts are bound to succeed sooner or later. And while deterrence may be operable in some instances (though clearly not in the case of suicidal terrorists bent on mass destruction), the risks and consequences of it failing suggest that sole reliance on the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in response return is not very a wise policy either.

It is this set of circumstances that has led the Bush administration to argue in favor of its doctrine of preemption. While recognizing that different circumstances may require different policy responses, the administration argues that the "greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."[6] The legal justification for this doctrine resides in the concept of anticipatory self-defense — that is, the notion, long recognized by international law, that states can take defensive action even before an attack has occurred if the threat is truly imminent (traditionally when an opposing force mobilizes in anticipation of an attack). The classic example is Israel's preemptive attack that started the 1967 war, which came in response to the imminent threat of invasion by its Arab neighbors. What makes the current situation different from previous instances is the need, as the Bush administration sees it, to "adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries" — *i.e.*, terrorists and tyrants armed with mass destruction weapons.[7] Since it cannot be known when a state or terrorist organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction will use them and since weapons like these can be delivered without warning, the administration argues that rogue states pose an "imminent threat" when they seek to acquire technologies necessary to build these weapons, and especially nuclear weapons.

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[6] *The National Security Strategy*, p. 15.

[7] *Ibid.*

The promulgation of this new doctrine has been met with concern at home and abroad — and not without reason. The doctrine suffers from considerable conceptual confusion. Most importantly, it conflates the notion of prevention with that of preemption. *Preventive* war refers to a premeditated attack of one state against another, which is not provoked by any aggressive action of the state being attacked against the state initiating the conflict. In contrast, a *preemptive* attack is launched only after the state being attacked has either initiated or has given a clear indication that it will initiate an attack.[8] A war against Iraq that is justified by the belief that will soon acquire nuclear weapons which it then may use to threaten the interests of others would be a preventive war; an attack against an Al Qaeda cell believed to be plotting a terrorist strike would be a preemptive strike. While the latter can readily be justified on the basis of self-defense, the former, especially if launched by a single state on its own accord, raises profound questions about the legitimacy of the contemplated action.

The doctrine of preemption is also strategically imprudent. If taken seriously by others, it will exacerbate the security dilemma among hostile states, by raising the incentive of all states to initiate military action before others do. The result is to undermine whatever stability might exist in a military standoff. Fearing that the other state might initiate an attack, the incentive will be strong to go first instead — a dynamic that naturally repeats itself within all the countries involved. As a result, the use of force will increasingly be viewed as a first resort, thus undermining whatever moderating influence diplomatic intervention might otherwise have had. Moreover, even if this dynamic does not necessarily apply in any situation involving the United States, the public promulgation of a preemption doctrine will invariably lead other states to embrace arguments in its favor as a cover for settling their own national security scores. As Henry Kissinger has argued, "It cannot be either in the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security."[9]

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[8] I borrow the distinction from Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 225n, 241.

[9] Quoted in James Harding, "Albright laments 'rash exuberance' over Iraq," *Financial Times* (U.S. Edition), September 27, 2002, p. 2.

The Bush administration recognizes this problem, and in its *National Security Strategy* warns other countries not to "use preemption as a pretext for aggression."[10] But that is easier said than done. The administration, while arrogating to itself the right to use force whenever and wherever it believes the preemption of potential future threats warrant it, has made no effort to define the line separating justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression. And that may well be the gravest flaw of the new doctrine. For by presuming that the concept of self-defense now includes preemption (as broadly defined), the administration has erased any viable distinction between the offensive and defensive purposes of military action. Yet, the legitimacy of using force depends crucially on a clear and agreed understanding of precisely this distinction.

Force and Limited Sovereignty

For all their differences, the two models of using force have one major element in common — both view the issue of using force from a statist perspective. European insistence on the central role of the Security Council and the continued validity of longstanding rules as the basis for ensuring the legitimacy of using force presume that states are the only actors able to use force. Similarly, the American preference for enhancing the effectiveness of force in dealing with new threats by stretching the concept of self-defense to include preemption presumes that only states can use force legitimately.

What both these perspectives ignore, however, is that the traditional notion of state sovereignty no longer matches current realities. Globalization in all its dimensions has increasingly eroded the distinction between the internal and external affairs of the state. Sudden currency fluctuations of the Thai Baht ripple through economies as far apart as Brazil, Russia, and Indonesia. Excessive releases of greenhouse gasses by the United States this past century help increase global temperatures, raising the sea-level and causing killer floods in a country like Bangladesh, which contributes very little to global warming. A computer hacker in the Philippines can temporarily shut down e-commerce in Seattle. And terrorist training camps in Afghanistan prepare suicide killers to launch devastating attacks against the World Trade Center in New York.

[10] *The National Security Strategy*, p. 15.

Equally important, today's world is one where the number of actors in international politics far exceed the number of nation-states. Multinational corporations transfer capital, goods, and services in ways well beyond the control of even the most powerful governments. Non-governmental organizations have created transnational networks of cooperation and pressure that severely limit the power of governments — including in such critical areas as maintaining control over their own populations. And terrorist groups with global reach are able to strike with devastating effectiveness against targets as widely dispersed as an American embassy in Tanzania, a naval warship in Yemen, a tourist hang-out in Bali, and the Pentagon on the outskirts of Washington DC — killing many hundreds at almost ever turn.

Finally, the march of human rights has reached the point at which states are increasingly called to account internationally for the way they treat their own citizens. When the rights of individuals are violated by the state, the right of the state to do as it wishes will be curtailed. As Kofi Annan argued:

> State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined — not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty — by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties — has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.[11]

The transformation and limitation of sovereignty has had a profound affect on the potential utility of force by loosening the bonds constraining its use in many instances. Since the end of the cold war, there has been mounting pressure to forcefully breach state sovereignty not just for narrow, self interested reasons, but also increasingly in support of the common good. There have been interventions for humanitarian purposes Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, and East Timor, anti-terrorist interventions in Afghanistan and Sudan, and counter-proliferation strikes in Iraq (with more to come). Aside from their purpose, what each of these uses of force had in common was their preemptive nature. Thus, quite apart from using force for purposes of individual or collective self-

[11] Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty."

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"What Common Security Policy?
Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security"

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The Gulf, the Near East and the Balkans: What Common Concerns?

Roberto Aliboni[1]

The 11th September events have stirred common concerns among the Western allies. At the same time, the evolution of the American policy since then has also caused new differences to arise and old ones to resurface. While there is agreement on combating terrorism and the rogue states that support it, there are disagreements on the way to do it as well as priorities.

When coming to the pivotal areas of the Gulf, the Near East and the Balkans - definitely an important segment in the arc of crisis surrounding the huge European periphery - this combination of common concerns and different responses deserves particular attention. Transatlantic gaps risk widening here, whereas there is a large part of opinion that wishes to preserve cohesion. This opinion is trying to optimize the combination of transatlantic and transmediterranean relations. It is in that perspective that this paper looks, first, at American and European concerns in the Gulf, the Near East and the Balkans, their points of agreements and disagreements and, second, tries to envisage some way to harmonize responses.

Concerns on the Gulf: Iraq

As noted by President Bush, the most important danger the United States perceives after 11th September is at the "intersection" between terrorism and WMD. While terrorists can produce some kinds of WMD, as chemical or biological weapons, they can hardly produce nuclear weapons or middle- and long-range missiles. However, almost everything can be acquired on the international market or from rogue states interested to reach out to political and military objectives indirectly and covertly. Thus, the most concerning intersection is between terrorists and rogue states. In this sense, the fight against rogue states is a most important aspects aspect of that against terrorism.

After the defeat of the rogue coalition between Al Qaeda and the Talibani regime in Afghanistan, next target is now Iraq. Iraq has long been considered a rogue state. It is now on the short list of evil states set out at the beginning of 2002 by President Bush, thus a strongly suspected candidate to supply WMD and other support to terrorists. Why specifically Iraq?

In fact, rogue states supporting terrorism are not in the Gulf only. Libya and Syria were more or less strongly suspected of supporting terrorism in the past. North Korea has played a role as rogue state in the Middle East. In the Gulf, according to available information, there is no reason to believe that Iraq's support to terrorists, in particular Al Qaeda's, is more likely or more important than Iran's. Both countries are committed to develop WMD - Iran with fewer hindrances than Iraq. Allegedly, there have been contacts between Iraqi officials and Al Qaeda's leading agents in Iraq. By the same token, terrorists from Afghanistan are allegedly hosted in Iran today[2].

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[1] Vice President, International Affairs Institute-IAI, Rome.

[2] There is also the case of Ansar-al-Islam, an Islamist group settled in Northern Iraq at the boundary with Iran, which seemingly raises the interest of Al Qaeda, Iraq as well as Iran. See "Al-Qaeda in Northern Iraq? The Elusive Ansar al-Islam", *Strategic Comments*, IISS, Vol. 8, No 7, September 2002.

In principle, mainstream analyses suggest that there are good reasons to expect from Iran a more cautious and responsible - or less adventurist - attitude than from Iraq. First, Iraq is on the record for using WMD on varying fronts. Second, Iraq has consistently conducted a policy of aggression in the region. Third, while Iraq is a compact tyranny, Iran is an articulated regime where there is public opposition and criticism towards the policies carried out by the hard-liners to "export" revolution[3]. In important occasions, as the talks in Germany that brought Mr. Karzai to power in Afghanistan, the Iranian government has demonstrated cooperative attitudes, restraint and a reasonable balance in pursuing its national interest. It is also clear that, while Iran is pursuing national interests, Iraq is nothing else than a platform to promote the interest and power of an extremely reduced Baathist ruling class.

However, the American government is not maintaining that Iran is better than Iraq, nor definitely excluding Iran from the ranks and file of the rogue states. For the time being, the administration is primarily targeting Iraq because it assigns to this country the role of a pivotal stumbling block on the road to stability and reform all over the region. It does not believe that this role can be modified by policies attempting at influencing the regime's behaviors. These policies have largely failed to work in the nineties. For this reason, it advocates a regime change.

Apparently, in the government and its think tanks' background there are two diverse interpretations[4] of the role Iraq plays in the region and the consequences that would stem from a regime change and a new regional Iraqi role. One school of thought believes that the Iraqi regime is a symbolic and practical support to every kind of regional radicalism, be it religious or nationalist. Toppling the regime would weaken hard-liners, rule out the myth of a principled and powerful nationalist state working for the dignity of Muslims and Arabs, relieve pressures on Israel and moderate Arab regimes alike, allows for some political reform in the region.

The other school of thought, supported by the so called "neo-cons", believes that the regime change in Iraq should be accompanied by a long American occupation geared to a complete re-building of the Iraqi state so as to translate it in a full-fledged democracy. As Steven Simon points out, what they have in mind is an Iraqi "MacArthur decade". The change in Iraq is expected to open the way to democratic reform all over the region. The regional countries would be enabled to get rid of present tyrannies and gain structural stability.

What "neo-cons" have in mind is a Balkan-style protectorate with the tasks of institution- and state-building currently carried out in Bosnia and Kosovo. The "neo-cons" are moved sometime by an even more profound revisionist mood, up to the point of planning to overthrow the Saudis - now regarded as an illiberal country inimical to the United States - with a view to bring the Hashemites back to Mecca[5]. One has not to overlook that this kind of revisionism is well entrenched in the administration as well[6].

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[3] See, for instance, the article by Daniel Sobelman, "Hizbollah Two Years after the Withdrawal: A Compromise between Ideology, Interests, and Exigencies", *Strategic Assessment* (Tel Aviv), Vol. 5, No 2. August 2002, pp. 14-21, reporting the Iranian internal debate on Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi's warnings of caution to the Hizbollah in the Spring of 2002.

[4] For a detailed account on American point of views see Steven Simon, *The US and Iraq: Next Steps*, paper presented to the IISS Global Strategic Review, London, 13-15 September 2002; and Judith S. Yaphe, *America's War on Iraq: Myths and Opportunities*, paper presented to the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum "Iraq If and When", London, 9 September 2002.

[5] These ideas were presented to the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board on 10 July 2002 by an analyst based at the Rand, Laurent Murawiec and were reported in the form of a PowerPoint text by *Middle East Economic Survey*, Vol. 45, No 32, 12 August 2002, pp. D4-6, with the title "Taking Saudis Out Of Arabia", after the text had been published by the on-line magazine *Slate*. In the Rand website, there is a disclaimer emphasizing that Mr. Murawiec expressed his ideas only.

[6] In 1996, Richard Perle, presently chairman of the Defense Policy Board in the Pentagon, built on the idea of supporting the Hashemites to return to Baghdad in a paper written for Mr. Netanyahu's incoming government in Israel in his capacity as leader of a study group of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem (in which Douglas Feith, Undersecretary at the DoD in the present administration, was also included). See Richard Perle, *A*

What approach is prevailing in the administration is not clear, however. The Vice President, Dick Cheney, in a speech to the Veterans on August 26, 2002, said, "Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab 'street', the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are 'sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans'. Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991."[7] Subsequently, however, the administration has indicated that Gen. Tommy R. Francks would do in an occupied Iraq the same job Gen. MacArthur did in Japan[8]. This decision unveils a different expectation from the joyful democratic domino effect envisaged by the Vice President in the Middle East.

The administration will make its final decision, as the right moment to decide will come. For sure, however, the administration sees the regime change in Iraq as a necessary condition for a political change in the region, as a condition to foster the influence of liberals all over the region and go back to the peace process in a more favorable context.

In fact, as soon as the most revisionist agendas stemming from the "neo-cons" circle are left aside, it is clear that in the American approach to Iraq there are two components: (a) the dangers it poses because of its behaviors and objectives: aggressiveness, WMD, radicalism and the lack of any inhibitions so that the country could well constitute the intersection President Bush is afraid of; and (b) its character of primary obstacle to democratic change in the region. From what Vice President Cheney says, Iraq looks like the dam that prevents democracy and stabilization from flooding the Middle East.

The final goal of the administration seems to get a chance to reshape the architecture of the Middle East. Toppling the Iraqi regime would be instrumental to that chance. The profound reshaping of the region, its political reform, would be in turn the only way to undermine in the long run radicalism and terrorism in the region and in the Muslim world. Thus, what matters is regional architecture. In this perspective, the regime change in Iraq would be the first step only. In this sense, it is not true that the United States are providing only military responses to the crisis stirred by the 11th September attacks. They want to use war to make political responses possible in a region where such responses seem otherwise prevented by standing conditions.

The Europeans share the first component of the American position, although they may have questions and objections (e. g. on evaluating Iraq's WMD arsenals). The European governments are not convinced that the Iraqi intersection with terrorists is as close as the Americans seem to believe. Many governments in Europe guess that a war on Iraq may push Baghdad precisely towards such intersection. Broadly speaking, the majority of European states think that containment and deterrence can still helpfully be used.

Some European governments are playing the role of staunch supporters of the United States for their specific reasons, but they would not oppose a common EU stand - in case it is finally assumed - or a European convergence in the UN supporting containment and deterrence, in particular sending in UN inspectors anew, prior to waging war[9].

Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, IASP Research Papers in Strategy, Jerusalem, June 1996 (www.iasps.org.il).

[7] "Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention", Nashville, August 26,2002, White House Release.

[8] Daniel E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report", *The New York Times*, October 11, 2002.

[9] Beyond different positionings and rethorics, this position has been shared by the Europeans in the October 2002 debate on the UNSC resolution aimed at reintroducing inspections in Iraq. A careful analysis of the European positions is made by Marta Dassù, *How to Deal with Iraq: the European Perceptions*, paper presented to the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum "Iraq If and When", London, 9 September 2002

The Euro-American gap seems more significant, however, as far as the second component is concerned. Let's focus now on regional political architecture, by considering the Gulf and the Near East together.

Middle Eastern Concerns: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

In the average European view, the mother of concerns is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its role in the region rather than Iraq. If the Middle Eastern architecture is to be changed, the first building block is a reasonable and widely supported solution to this conflict. In the US administration opinion, Iraq's regime must be defeated and the country democratized in order to get a chance to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European mainstream opinion maintains that things are the other way round. Once the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is solved, the forces of democracy and moderation will be able to wake up in the region and the Iraqi regime will not need a war to fall apart.

The military victory over Iraq and its guardianship would definitely contribute - as already noted - to defuse some tensions in the region. This would not bring about, however, the structural effect the administration does expect, namely the democratization of regional political regimes. While a nexus between successful occupation and some stabilization may be taken into consideration, there is no logic and empirical nexus between Iraq occupation and region-wide democratization. The occupation of Iraq would bring about everywhere a strong nationalist reaction. The reaction would play essentially in the hands of radicals, Islamists and nationalists alike. Such reaction would compel Arab regimes to increase repression to face turmoil and prevent their own destabilization[10]. Unless, the reaction comes from inside the armies, it would be contained thanks to the strong repressive instruments available to regional governments[11]. Thus, stability may happen to emerge. It would so in a repressive rather than democratic context, however.

All in all, this kind of evolution would raise even more enemies to the West than todays. Most of all, it would strongly diminish rather than increase the chances of reshaping politically the Near East and the Gulf towards democracy. In fact, all such evolution could bring about would be an oppressive imperial order.

In order to start a transition towards democracy in the region, the first challenge is to render regimes less oppressive and to create an alternative between oppressive regimes and ruthless extremism in the political domestic arenas of the regional countries. To make regimes less oppressive and provide room in between to moderate and democratic forces, the central problem is the Israel-Palestinians conflict. The long-standing lack of solution to this conflict has discredited regional governments, fueled religious and nationalist radicalism, and compelled regimes to suppression. As a result, it prevents whatsoever moderate and democratic alternative between oppressive regimes and ruthless extremism from emerging. It brings about an absolute political standstill in the region and prevents whatever democratic transition from starting. This is the opinion which prevails in Europe (and democratic, moderate America). Consequently, the architectural reshaping of the region rests essentially upon a peaceful and stable solution to the Israelis-Palestinians conflict.

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[10] This is also the point made by Prof. Shibley Telhami, "A Hidden Cost of War on Iraq", *The New York Times*, October 7, 2002: "One of the most appealing thoughts about a possible war with Iraq is that it could help spread democracy ... But, more likely, such a war would render the Middle East more repressive and unstable than it is today".

[11] Efraim Inbar, "Ousting Saddam, Instilling Stability". The Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2002, believes that the ousting of Mr. Hussein is so important for Israel that is worth paying the price it may exact from the country in terms of terrorism and missiles. To concerns on regional destabilization he responds: "Critics of American war plans warn against great domestic turmoil in pro-Western states such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia because the Arab masses pathologically identify with Saddam Hussein as a symbol of Arab resistance to Western encroachment. Yet,. such an alarmist view underestimates that ability of the current regimes to suppress their opposition". In this view - that is likely to be shared by many members of the administration - the real stake of the war on Iraq is Israel's security as the springboard from where it could be possible to start a reshaping of the Middle East.

In sum, the Palestinian issue is definitely a concern that both the United States and European countries' governments do share. Still, because their basic disagreement on architecture, they envisage different responses and priorities. Meanwhile, however, the United States has provided a response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the Rose Garden speech given by President Bush on June 24, 2002. The Rose Garden speech does not offer a direct solution to the conflict. It plans a transition from the present standstill to conditions that would allow the resumption of positive negotiations towards a compromise. Consistent with American principal assumptions on changing Iraq and the region, the Rose Garden strategy envisages a period of three years to take up the Israeli-Palestinian issue again. These three years will have to be employed to help the Palestinian National Authority democratize and build viable institutions. In Europe, as well as in moderate Arab states, while this perspective is well received, it is considered with some reservations.

It is well received, first of all, because in the Rose Garden speech the two-state solution is unambiguously asserted. After the speech, the two-state perspective has been consistently maintained and generated a number of clear American warnings about Israeli military occupations and re-occupations of Palestinian territories and the consequences on civilians they bring about. This can definitely be regarded as a victory of the moderate wing of the administration over the radical one, which more often than not is less pro-Israeli than pro-Likud that is bent on fostering one Israeli state only. For sure, such course of action may have a tactical significance only and stem from the need to keep a redline the Israelis have not to cross in order to allow Arab regimes to abide by the anti-Iraqi coalition. In any case, the two-states goal establishes an important shared perspective in transatlantic relations.

The setting up of the Quartet and the Task Force on Reform is also a positive development. For sure, however, the role of the Task Force in a democracy- and institution-building perspective must be well understood if it is to bring about significant political results. The Task Force must be regarded not only as a tool to give Palestine viable institutions. Also, it has to reinforce Palestinian moderates by providing them with control over the new institutional, political and economic resources, so that they are given a concrete chance to establish a nucleus of democracy and prevail over radical oppositions. Americans, Europeans and Arabs should specifically agree on this point and act consequently.

Reservations stem, first, from basic strategic differences as far as priorities between Iraq and Palestine are concerned in reshaping the region, as already noted. Second, the Europeans are convinced that, as linked as the chance of resuming a peace process may be to the restructuring of the Palestinian regime, that chance has to be no less linked to a clear containment of Israeli nationalism and its consequences. If, at the end of the day, an emerging democratic Palestinian leadership, ready to compromise on a two-state solution, will be confronted by an Israeli government inspired by ultranationalist goals as the present one, no compromise will be possible and another cycle of violence may start. The international community must be prepared to act with strong resolve with respect to such government. Third, this point entails the more comprehensive notion that the two parties cannot be left alone in solving their differences. The international community has to be involved in the process and be prepared to enforce solutions if necessary.

In sum, it may be that the American administration is just looking at a scenario where in the next three years the occupation of Iraq would have broken nationalist and religious opposition in the region and whatever solution could be imposed to the Palestinians, from a democratic Bantustan-state in Cisjordanian to an as much democratic settlement in Transjordanian areas (from where the Hashemites would have moved meanwhile to Baghdad and/or Mecca). The Europeans believes that this scenario would be a serious self-deception and a factor of further destabilization in the region. In contrast, it may well be that the Rose Garden strategy will be carried out with balance and pragmatism and work in the hands of Palestinian moderates. Thus, it would bring about a well-balanced and stable two-state solution.

Peace Processes and Regional Architecture: Concerns in the Balkans

With respect to the Gulf and the Near East, the Balkans today, substantially stabilized after ten years of wars, may look as a minor concern. Transatlantic cooperation is just working there. The problem is now to assure a smooth transition from American to European leadership, as the United States is withdrawing its forces gradually with a view to use them to combat terrorism and pursue other tasks elsewhere. This transition is not an operational question only, however. There are political aspects as well, which stem from institutional and political weakness of the EU as well as transatlantic political differences. These issues and differences cannot be ignored. They may have an impact as a result of the alternation. In many respects, they mirror transatlantic concerns and differences relating to the Gulf and the Near East.

Unlike the Near East, the Balkans have been at least stabilized. However, while in the Near East - although without success - a political solution was envisaged, planned and negotiated and, to some extent, even implemented between the parties, no political solution whatsoever has been envisaged in the Balkans between the numerous parties involved. Efforts geared to foster shared activities between parties in Bosnia have substantially failed so far. Kosovo continues to think in absolute independentist terms. Montenegro is more and more loosing interest in staying in the Yugoslav Federation. In the Fyrom, secessionist trends have been reined in by NATO military presence; still the reforms introduced to increase autonomies and ethnic inclusion have not stopped divisions from growing as yet. No answer to these problems is in sight.

Carl Bildt noted very aptly that Western countries seem to believe that peace processes have to stem almost spontaneously from what stability and democracy may have been enforced so far[12]. In contrast, the introduction of a democratic regime in Serbia, the military protection extended to Fyrom democracy, and the guidance of the international commissioners in Bosnia and Kosovo, have not generated any dynamics of peace nor compromise, i. e. any Oslo-type process in the Balkans. Nor can they do it, until the parties come to conceive, as in the Oslo process case, of some solutions to the hard political conflict they are separated by. The Balkans is today marked by a situation of stability. To turn today's well-guarded military cease-fires into a durable political peace, they need to envisage solutions to their national conflicts, however. Unlike what happened with the Oslo agreement, for such solutions to be envisaged, the parties in the Balkans need more univocal and convincing guidelines from their protectors.

The transatlantic countries have failed, however, to give consistent indications about solutions to the Balkans' national questions. The United States has been always more open to revisions of the Balkans' map, in the same way it is today looking at redrawing the map of the Middle East. They believe that main national aspirations cannot be completely ignored and thus have to be accommodated (while offset by respect for minorities, where it needs be). The Europeans are more conservative. In some instances, because of the belief that the region needs a larger country - a Serbia-led Yugoslav Federation - to stabilize the tendency of the region to fragmentation. In others, because a modern concept of state and democracy cannot accept ethnic or religious divisions but must secure cohabitation and equality among citizens. Yielding to this principle would open the way to a domino effect throughout the region.

In exercising their leadership in the region the Americans have not imposed and agenda of architectural changes but have always acted having it in mind. This has definitely given American policy more impact than the long-term, basically rationalist policies of the EU. In the American view, the conservative and rationalist European approach cannot open the way to any peace dynamics. [13] Apparently, this seems to be true.

All in all, architecture is separating Europeans and Americans in the Balkans as well. So far, these differences have been trivialized and obfuscated by the actual exercise of American leadership. What is

[12] Carl Bildt, "An Unreal Peace Process", *International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 2002.
[13] Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt, "Can the EU Hack the Balkans? A Proving Ground for Brussels", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), September&October 2002, pp. 2-7.

going to happen with the impending transfer of leadership from the Americans to the Europeans in the Balkans?

If the United States will neglect the Balkans and leave the Europeans to manage the crisis alone, there will be no question of common concerns in the region. This seems unlikely, though, for as downgraded as the Balkans may now be in the range of American concerns, the region remains crucial for an array of soft security issues the United States can hardly neglect, in particular Islamist terrorism. What is likely is that the United States will continue to monitor European management of the region and act with a view to contribute to shape it. In this sense, the Balkans will remain included in a transatlantic perspective in which, however, common concerns risk being matched by different responses. These differences in turn may prevent the Balkans countries from singling out solutions to their national conflict and launch more effective processes of peace.

In a Transatlantic Perspective

The analysis conducted in previous sections suggests two broad conclusions: (a) there are not negligible disagreements and differences between United States and Europe on assessment and approach to the regions concerned, especially the Gulf and the Near East; (b) there are, however, important cooperative endeavors and areas, as the Task Form on Reform, the Quartet and the varying ongoing arrangements in the Balkans.

As for disagreements and differences, positions, expectations and goals tend to remain far away or grow apart because of the growing imbalance affecting the United States, on one side, and the small European countries, on the other, in economic and military terms. Europe as a Union does not manage to reach out to a common foreign and security policy going beyond the present intergovernmental model. The telephone number Mr. Kissinger was looking for is now there, but the number has not really solved the problem. The EU High Representative has in fact the task of guaranteeing rather overcoming the intergovernmental character of the CFSP. The absence of an effective EU foreign and security policy prevents in turn that an effective and flexible military instrument at its service does emerge. Furthermore, the individual countries of the Union on the average have failed to invest significantly in their defense. In fact, they have failed to match the targets established in the 1999 initiative approved by NATO in Washington D.C.

Thus, beyond the more or less unilateralist mood of old and new US Presidents, the Europeans risk at any moment to become irrelevant for the Americans, that is to policies the United States can implement without needing any indispensable support from Europe. In the Alliance and, more broadly speaking, in overall transatlantic relations, the Europeans just lack the authority to support their point of views or have no common EU views at all (as it is now the case with Iraq). These points of views, more often than not, are valuable and sensible, still this is not a good reason for Europe to be able to prevail or have a distinctive voice on political ground.

For these very reasons, the alliance with the United States, be it in multilateral or bilateral terms, is more and more a factor that makes up for European military and political weakness, while allowing Europe to keep a privileged international status. The basic strategic option for the European, therefore, remains alignment with the United States, in the Atlantic Alliance or bilaterally, even when they do not share or do not share completely the American point of view. They have considerable latitude to express their point of views, which sometime works. However, at the end of the day, if their point of view is not accepted, all they can do is to share American policies and support them concretely - if such support is received by the United States - or maintain a low profile, according to domestic factors or ideological propensities.

This situation of painful imbalance is, however, attenuated by important factors, which make European role in transatlantic relations and decisions making more significant than objective conditions would allow. The two sides of the Atlantic are united by a strong common cultural and political background, that has increased and solidified in the decades after the Second World War, and is predicated

essentially on the existence of similar strong civil societies based on democratic regimes and practices. This common background unites American and European bodies of opinion across the Atlantic, independently of governments. In this way, as weak and irrelevant European views may be in intergovernmental relations, they may easily prove effective in terms of civil society and thus come to influence US policies.

For instance, in the present debate about Iraq, the surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in the framework of their "Worldviews"[14] project show very clearly a transversal Euro-American body of opinion believing that Iraq is a danger to be tackled by a war if necessary, but within the rule of international law, an opinion that is not coinciding with the American administration approach. There is no doubt that this transversal opinion across the Atlantic is a support to the campaign the Europeans are currently carrying on to convince the United States to try again and more seriously the policy of containment towards Iraq, that was practically and mistakenly abandoned in 1998, and, if it fails, go to war. This campaign has been carried out by European governments in different ways, some more vocally and visibly on the forefront of the stage, like France, other more diplomatically or ambiguously in the back of the scene, like the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain. Differences being due to national positioning, it remains nonetheless that all the European countries support a more articulated position. This campaign has not and will not reverse the Administration's position; still it is modifying and improving it significantly in legal terms. It is the special tie, which exists across the Atlantic that is permitting the Europeans to influence the American position at this difficult juncture.

In sum, when it comes to international politics, what must be discussed is less whether Europe has to align with the United States or not than how such alignment has to take place. How aligning includes not only the way a policy can be influenced and reshaped in the course of its implementation, but also the debate preliminary to its implementation, which can well bring about reshaping. While something has been just said about the current preliminary debate, it is important now to understand what should be done in the stage of policy implementation with respect to the Gulf, the Near East and the Balkans. Three policy-areas seem more relevant here: the Task Force on Reform, the American-European alternation in the Balkans and the role of social and economic cooperation and aid to less developed countries in general and the Greater Middle East countries in particular. In these areas, the Europeans may have a major role and come to contribute, reshape or redirect transatlantic policies.

The Task Force - presently guided by a road-map set out by the EU - can play a capital role in re-orienting both Palestinian policies and Western policies towards the Palestinians and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On this point, it has already been noted that the opportunity regards the way Reform will be addressed. Reform should not be conducted as a neutral policy of state-building. Daily policies to implement reforms must be essentially directed at giving control to moderates and weaken hard-liners. The Europeans will do part of this daily work. It will have to rest upon a more disinhibited political practice than the one that has guided the Europeans in the Balkans so far. It should look more at the short- than long-term. The wrong wine may easily fill a democratic bottle.

The way reform will be shaped by the Europeans will increase (or decrease) their influence on the overall reshaping of the conflict in the Near East and give them (or not) more authority vis-à-vis the American ally. A successful European action within the Task Force will reinforce the role of the very Task Force and the Quartet. Such reinforcement will strengthen in turn the European role in the peace process. The Quartet will never be a major player in Israeli-Palestinian relations, but could be so in transatlantic relations.

As far as the Balkans is concerned, the alternation of American with European leadership is another opportunity from the European point of view. This opportunity cannot be given for granted, however. If current transatlantic disagreements on key political issues and policies will not be taken carefully into consideration and their effects not preempted by the Europeans, the opportunity may be turned into a

[14] www.worldviews.org.

liability. As noted, there are important differences between Europeans and Americans about regional architecture, the Americans being more open than the Europeans to changes in the Balkans' map reflecting national aspirations. The alternation has not to be interpreted by the Europeans as a license to implement their own views and discard the American ones. The EU should act as the administrator of a common transatlantic asset. In this sense, the EU must insist on establishing a common EU-American body with the task of monitoring the situation in the Balkans and working out the main policy guidelines. The responsibility of how things will be managed in the area will remain in European hands, however. Here again it must be said that a more pragmatic and direct style would be welcome.

Finally, in the European debate the stronger effort in terms of social and economic aid the US government is preparing to help defuse the roots of terrorism is going slightly unnoticed. In contrast, this kind of effort is very important in establishing the basic conditions for political reform in the regions concerned. Europe and the EU may have a special role in this endeavor.

Richard Haass[15], on the basis of the findings and conclusions of the *Arab Human Development Report* published by the UNDP and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development[16], has recently emphasized the need to help the Arab world to overcome its condition of deep social and economic underdevelopment. He says: "Ignoring internal dynamics in many of these societies only allows alienation and despair to multiply, creating a climate where support for terrorism can grow. Instead, we need to forge new, broader relationships that encourage and enable Arab regimes to gradually address the freedom deficit that has developed in their own societies. We need to gently recalibrate our policies to place greater emphasis on promoting market economies, educational reform, the participation of all citizens - men and women - in society, and the gradual strengthening of democratic institutions and procedure. Such a reorientation is not simply the 'right thing to do'. It makes strategic sense."

This is more or less the agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Euro-Med initiative has been weakened by objective conditions (the failure of the Middle East Peace process) but also by mistaken ambitions and European sectarianism. A Partnership more clearly predicated on socio-economic development and soft security, at the same time more open to transatlantic influence would be very important for the region and for enhancing transatlantic cooperation.

[15] Richard Haass, *Reflections on US Policy One Year On*, paper presented to the IISS Global Strategic Review, London, 13-15 September 2002.

[16] United Nations Development Programme, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, *Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Ftuure Generations*, United Nations, New York, 2002.

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THE WEST'S STAKE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: WHAT WORKS? WHOSE WORK?

Nancy Bearg Dyke[1]

Not for quote except by attribution

OVERVIEW

It is growing exceedingly dangerous and expensive to wait until the last stage of escalating crisis to solve crucial international problems. In today's world, with its many challenges to peace and security, the threats posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international terrorism, and North Korean nuclear weapons alone make the case that it is dangerous to wait. The grave risks of conflict spread and the enormous costs of military action, peacekeeping, and reconstruction only exacerbate the risks of waiting until crises peak before addressing them. Likewise, failure to secure peace after conflict poses significant dangers of conflict recurring with renewed vigor and consequence, including increased potential for escalation and spread. Conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding are imperatives.

We have to think in new terms to do justice to the subject of conflict prevention. It is a new century with new, still evolving circumstances that create perilous situations throughout the world. When compared to the days of deterrence, conflict in general and threats to Western interests are taking on forms that are not easily managed by reactive policy prescriptions: international terrorism, nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East tinderbox, other long-standing conflicts, escalation or other follow-on consequences. Weak states and unstable states now present the greatest threat in that regard. Whether those weak states are in the midst of development or in the lengthy post-conflict stage of rebuilding, they share characteristics that make them ripe breeding grounds for many of the most dangerous threats to themselves and Western interests.

These threats hold very high stakes for the West and the whole world. Unchecked – and we have seen this - these situations have the potential to undercut world order and stability and to jeopardize primary economic, political, and social interests in Europe, the United States, and worldwide.

A shift in priorities is urgently needed at the policy level with regard to how to deal with such threats through preventive means before they become unmanageable. While both the United States and Europe need to address this issue in earnest, we must acknowledge that forceful military intervention involving Europeans is less and less likely. Military power is simply not their power or policy of choice. At the same time, we need to accept that the United States will not be dissuaded from maintaining military force and capabilities it deems necessary for its own security and global role – and using it unilaterally when it deems necessary. The United States will decide, though, when to use its military power. In some cases, others may clamor for it and the United States may refuse. Rather than dwelling on the differences this creates, I suggest that there must be a clear re-orientation of policy choice to address conflict prevention, including techniques, norms and personnel, that can be adopted and pursued deliberately and vigorously by both sides. *The United States and Europe need to create jointly, and in conjunction with the United Nations and others, a strong system of conflict prevention and post-*

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[1] Paper prepared for conference "What Common Security Policy? Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security" sponsored by Centre Thucydide, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and United Nations Association-USA; Paris, 15-16 November 2002

conflict peacebuilding to make it less likely that conflict will escalate to the point of requiring forceful outside intervention. This system would incorporate the spectrum of prevention efforts– from creating the conditions for stability to early warning to preventive deployment and preemption to post-conflict peacebuilding. The stakes of waiting or inaction or insufficient post-war peacebuilding for the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world are too high to ignore.

THE WEST'S STAKE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS AND PREFERENCES

What is the stake of the West in conflict prevention and in breaking the cycle of violence after conflict? Is there agreement on the two sides of the Atlantic on the stakes, or do governments on each shore have their own views of the stakes? What can and should be done by the transatlantic powers to deal with these many and diverse security threats in the short term in defined pre-and post-conflict situations and in the long term for broader structural change? Is it better to declare a division of the labor rather than making it a joint effort, or is the answer a combination of the two? In order to gauge the stakes to Western interests, a brief exposé of the most pressing and current threats to those interests is warranted:

- Terrorism against the interests of perceived enemies rather than to advocate a particular cause.
- Nuclear weapons more widely held and more real a threat now than in the Cold War because the two governments who understood the implications for mankind and carefully (for the most part) circumscribed them have been joined in the owners' club by rogue states, owner-neighbors mutually threatening each other, and potential non-state owners.
- Other weapons of mass destruction are available to be used to gain power or retribution regionally or by terror attack anywhere, including in the United States and in Europe.
- The Middle East Arab/Israeli tinderbox remains white hot and ever more susceptible to other events in the region, the most obvious being a US or coalition war with Iraq that could trigger wider conflict and also creation of more terrorists.
- Other long-standing ethnic, religious, and cultural differences that have led or could lead to violent conflict still simmer. They are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by an individual leader or group. And they are particularly dangerous if those in power have access to weapons of mass destruction.
- Not all conflict situations are immediately so high profile or dangerous. They nonetheless are a threat to their own people and they can spread to affect other regional states and external interests. If conflict occurs and further weakens the state, then the norms of sovereign statehood are stretched and frayed such that the cycle of violence escalates and spills wider – with much greater negative consequences.
- Escalation or spread of any of the above.

These threats all have the potential to jeopardize primary interests in both Europe and the United States. In order to address both these immediate threats, as well as impending future security concerns, one must discern what conditions give rise to such threats.

To begin, weak states pose a greater danger today than strong states. They are threats to themselves, their neighbors, and stronger states. Their problems create instability that can spread as violence increases, refugees flee, and humanitarian crises build. Weak states can harbor non-state international actors like terrorist network leader Osama bin Laden or be susceptible to local dissidents who derive power from violence to effect change. Weak states are likely to be weak because of long-standing structural factors, such as poverty and lack of good governance, that tend to hold back social and economic progress and can leave the state open for rogue actors.

Secondly, none of the late 20th century conflicts that brought Western military intervention have resolved to the point of being taken off the danger list for violence to reignite. The cycle of violence has not yet been definitively broken. The potential of another conflict will remain in each case until real or strongly perceived injustices and inequities are addressed and there exist conditions of economic opportunity, reconciliation and normalization, institution building of a democratic structure suited to the culture, and a sense of common stakes among former foes. *Post-conflict peacebuilding* remains a consuming and necessary mission for the United States and European states, as members of the United Nations, NATO, and coalitions. Without it, or if it fails, we can be assured of reengaging in urgent measures to prevent renewed conflict, suffering direct or indirect consequences of inattention, or committing forces to create fundamental change. One need only think of the example of Afghanistan after the Soviet forces left. The parties were left to fight themselves and their country to near death instead of rebuilding, and the Taliban emerged victorious to become host to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

Terrorism is now a worldwide phenomenon and a worldwide threat that must be dealt with deliberately and effectively along the whole spectrum of prevention and, frankly, by people and governments everywhere. Europe may feel less in the cross hairs than the United States since 9-11, but terrorism is no longer local, or if it is local, it reverberates worldwide. It is incumbent on the United States and Europe (and others) to create the conditions that will wipe out terrorism and decrease the likelihood of new terrorists born of zealotry, frustration and despair over real or perceived inequities, or lack of hope for their future.

Although mutually threatened, Europe and the United States have different views of the threats and how to counter them. As Robert Kagan relates,[2] Europe worries about issues such as migration, ethnic conflict, and poverty because they are on their doorstep, while the United States worries more about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and rogue states. Each is concerned about and makes policy based on what it perceives as a direct threat to its national interests. Each is considering what it feels it can deal with best. In that sense, the Europeans rely on soft power such as economic strength and social cohesion. The United States stresses military power, though the new National Security Strategy does give new emphasis to treating root causes.

Although the preferred means to counter threats may vary, conflict prevention can no longer be viewed as a luxury. It cannot be an afterthought or sideshow in international policy. *Conflict prevention is essential and is as important as direct defense spending and the force capabilities that those expenditures buy.* Successful conflict prevention first and foremost saves lives and suffering, especially of civilians. It lessens the need for expenditure of external military forces in combat and for those human and material costs. Averting violent conflict makes spillover less likely and reduces the requirements for post-conflict reconstruction. Properly done in the short term when conflict looms, it can initially defuse the immediate momentum toward violence and buy time for fundamental change. Properly done over the long term, conflict prevention lays the foundation for the economic and social growth that creates stability for all.

As long as defense budgets and hardware and military units make it possible to respond to problems, though, we all will continue to rely on - or hope for - that last resort far too much. I am not suggesting that the United States toss aside its principles and the forces that embody our ability to respond to virtually any problem militarily – nor am I overlooking the tendencies of others around the world to rely on that protection. Forceful military intervention will continue to be an absolutely necessary policy choice, especially where prevention has failed or where lack of timely, forceful intervention or preemption would create a horrendous aftermath. That power will not always be

[2] Robert Kagan, "

used, but, I do believe that the US ownership and demonstrated willingness to use its profound military capabilities causes the United States and others to spend less effort on conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding than should be the case.

Moreover, given current trends, it is unlikely that the European Union or individual European countries will want to intervene with military force in other countries. Certainly, the European Union has made clear its preference for soft power, such as economic power and social cohesion,[3] to persuade would-be antagonists that peace and development are preferable to military force to solve problems. The United Nations Security Council is not likely to often give its approval to massive military response for the kinds of problems and transgressions that manifest themselves in the post-Cold War period, in part because members will not want to participate. Iraq's blatant invasion of Kuwait was one of a kind and inspired an equally unique and robust international military response. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were equally blatant and galvanizing. Even Iraq's aggression and the shock of 9-11, however, created only temporary consensus around major military response.

Given these differing priorities, the mutual challenge of the United States and Europe is to ramp up conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding and find common ground so that it is done effectively. The stakes on both sides of the Atlantic and worldwide are too high to risk not succeeding in such an effort. However, a change in strategic priorities must first occur. Once a decision for such a shift has occurred, a balanced effort that utilizes the differing comparative advantages and priorities in Europe and the United States should develop into an international system of norms, mechanisms and strategies devoted to conflict prevention short of engagement of major military forces, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

It is time to look seriously outside the traditional security realm to the larger world and the circumstances that comprise the context in which security operates today – the underlying factors that can create, stimulate, escalate, spread, and reignite violent conflict. Some of the main *features of the world* today that directly impact security are listed below. Note that they all fundamentally relate to inequities:

- Unequal globalization, which has benefited mostly wealthier countries but could provide a path to peace and prosperity to those currently left out. Its currently somewhat discredited condition could be viewed as a course correction that should actually broaden its meaning and achievements and lead to a stronger and more stable international system.
- Debilitating poverty, which affects two-third of the world's population, mostly/often in places where instability can upset regional balances, trade routes, access to resources key to those enjoying globalization but also in places less critical to "the West" but that is important too as a matter of inequity.
- Current and impending resource scarcity, such as struggles over water;
- Poor or dictatorial governance;
- Demographic change, including, e.g., major population growth centered in developing countries and increasing numbers of Muslims in Europe. The equity component is two-fold. First, even more of the world will be poor and potentially unstable. Second, it has the seeds of disruption in Europe over Islamic and non-Islamic differences *and* over identity with the real and perceived inequities experienced by Muslims in the developing world.

[3] See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power

At the same time as these threats loom to challenge international peace and security, the *features of the world system* have *not* caught up to the challenges. This gap increases the dangers they pose. Several features that represent real inadequacies for conflict prevention are:

- Institutions that for the most part do not recognize the interaction between traditional military security and resources from other factors and activities that directly affect security. There is not enough emphasis – or money - on cause and effect.
- International leadership with a short attention span that deals with the crisis of the moment better than it acts to get out in front of potential crisis or to follow through after a conflict to prevent its recurrence.
- Good examples but inadequately developed norms to deliberately and successfully usher the world to the next level of peace and prosperity.
- Insufficient resources devoted to conflict prevention resources and mechanisms along the whole spectrum from combating global poverty to following through on peacebuilding activities.
- Politics of self interest, a factor that will continue to severely limit dedication to conflict prevention unless the perceptions and understanding of self interest of governments on both sides of the Atlantic are broadened to include the well-being of the rest of the world. The good news is that the Bush administration is offering to lead the global effort of furthering freedom and guiding the world to a better future by promoting its own values. The self interest link between promoting US values overseas and thereby advancing US security is definitely made.

WHAT WORKS IN PREVENTING CONFLICT AND CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

The array of potential conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding tools is formidable. In theory, it includes all of the political, economic, legal, and military capabilities throughout the international system. Those assets can be shaped and applied by individuals, governments, organizations, and media in the service of preventing or breaking cycles of violence – if the choice is made to do so. In many cases, the tools have been used successfully, although in many cases, the import of those successes is often overlooked. Successful conflict prevention doesn't generate many headlines.

Following is a discussion of norms as mechanisms of peace, then a **partial** list of other tools and techniques, organized roughly from addressing root causes to potential conflict to post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as some of the success headlines.

NORMS AS MECHANISMS OF PEACE

We need more and stronger norms and mechanisms of peace in the international system. The world has long had in place norms of war: well-defined acts of war, declarations of war, armies that can be counted and deployed, military codes of conduct, international law regarding prisoners of war and treatment of civilians during war, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, formal military alliances.

We know how to do war better than we know how to do peace. Maybe that is because when there is peace, we don't go all out to consolidate it or preserve it. When there is war, it is a total focus and commitment of resources and will. It is harder to expend resources on preserving peace than on conducting war. The numbers speak for themselves, both in established budgets and in the wartime supplementals that are always so large and so relatively easily approved because they manifest that we are doing something.

The difference between war and conflict prevention is that war temporarily addresses a problem – and always requires extensive follow through to sustain the solution or find a more sustainable one - while conflict prevention builds up antidotes to war. The more those antidotes become a major focus and priority of international activity (standardized, supported, legitimized, recognized, used, and sustained), the fewer deadly conflicts will arise and the less likely will be the need for use of force to deal with conflicts. The premium should be on reasonable norms agreed within the international community, to which individual states should be held accountable.

To be effective, norms and the demands to meet them must be made to stick by a united front and steady resolve. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the UN Security Council passed 11 resolutions that he ignored for the most part. He should not have been in a position to negotiate or fail to comply, but he was. A united front and a steady focus in backing up those resolutions was lacking. That firmness, followup, and credibility is absolutely needed for any of the norms that are set.

Some Standards/Norms That Work

- **Helsinki** – Who knew back in the early 1970's that the Helsinki Accords on proper behavior of states would become the standard after the Cold War? This was a valiant effort that proved very practical as it evolved into the Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As an organization that promotes democratic principles, it has facilitated peaceful change in central Europe, as well as played a major post-conflict role in the Balkans.
- **OSCE High Commission on National Minorities** has been important with its norms and a highly respected and visible Commissioner whose function is to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions. His mandate empowers him to conduct on-site missions and engage in preventive diplomacy at the earliest stage of tension.
- **International Criminal Court on the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda** - The ICTY has the disadvantage of being ad hoc, so its specific standards and mechanisms are not as permanent and official as norms ideally would be. But, the precedents it is setting are critically important to the international system and hopefully will serve as a deterrent to future potential war criminals.
- The permanent **International Criminal Court of Justice (ICCJ)** is a necessity to creation of a full international system of norms and as a tool in conflict prevention and in the post-conflict healing process. Now, as with any new organization, the new court must be launched efficiently and effectively.
- **NATO membership qualification requirements**
- **European Union membership qualification requirements**
- **World Trade Organization membership qualification requirements**

Standards create expectations. Standards have helped prospective NATO and EU countries know what they need to do to gain entry. I am convinced that in the Balkans, those standards, particularly expectations set forth by the EU, are the key to peace. As long as the people and governments are striving to join the EU and to become part of a larger, prosperous region, they are less likely to be fighting. As former combatants, they have a responsibility to cultivate peace. Likewise, as owners of gated communities and greater stability and prosperity, we have an obligation to work with those who are trying to meet the standards. It is in our self interest too to be more inclusive than exclusive in a world so interlinked economically and in which security threats can be posed easily from the disgruntled. It is also in our self interest to maintain the standards and expectations. If promises of

achievement are made and not kept, as seems to be the case in accessions of some NATO members,[4] the whole system is undermined.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

First, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding do work, though headlines on conflicts prevented are few and far between. A fairly robust tool kit exists, though it is vastly underutilized and should be developed further, especially as organizations continue to evolve in the post-9-11 global environment. What is in the toolkit that works and what needs to be done to enhance the tools and their availability?

ADDRESS ROOT CAUSES TO STRENGTHEN WEAK STATES

That means economic opportunity, rights of minorities, and other factors that promote a stake in a healthy peace rather than divisions and inequities that can lead to conflict or threat to well being of others.

Ending the Cycle of Poverty and Building Economic Prosperity to Build Common Stakes – Jobs, hope, ownership, sustainable development are all part of building a better future. The real key is building a middle class because that lays the groundwork for civil society and progress toward a more open society with good governance. These combinations are essential to ending the cycle of poverty that plagues two-thirds of the world's people. This is long-term structural work that is essential to changing conditions that can breed instability and terrorism. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen recently said that "We will never be secure as long as there is global instability and global poverty, global hunger."[5]

Foreign assistance clearly has a major role in conflict prevention, and the funding NEEDS to increase from the United States and the Europeans both. On the role of foreign assistance, Brent Scowcroft noted, "Foreign assistance is the preeminent way to avoid resorting to military force – by all odds the most costly and brutal way to carry out or to rescue a policy." "What we don't seem to realize is by the time military force is necessary, in most cases our policy has already failed." (put this elsewhere)

[redacted] We should be asking how to best speed up development that works.
NEED more resources more flexibly available outside of cycling the money through governments to scale up programs that work

Economic and Business Development
Crucial element in economic growth, and it contributes to political development as well. NGOs, corporations, and universities can help with this.

Building Institutions to Create Good Governance
This is an essential element of structural change that leads to more stable societies. The United Nations, OSCE, US and European governments, NGOs, NATO, universities, and others have done it in post-Wall Europe and in post-conflict peacebuilding. It can never have enough resources, but it must be done in a way that the people themselves create the institutions and own them.

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[4] Article in Nov/Dec. 2002 Foreign Affairs
[5] cohen

Election assistance, something the UN has done since the late 1980's, is helpful and should be continued and probably expanded. Election monitoring is extremely important to build trust in democratic processes and elected leadership, especially after conflict or during major transition.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

There is a "ladder of prevention," techniques that traditionally step up from early warning to use of force. States in potential conflict situations and the international community can and do try the various measures, though there is not a system or central coordinator for any of it. Some of the efforts have been quite successful, as noted in the "Successes" below; many others ended up in conflict between parties and eventually deployment of external peacekeepers or peacemakers, using military force.

Early Warning Followed by Early Action

NEED better and faster connection between early warning and early action and more resources to support early action. More early warning is not the problem.

- Success: "Massive Famine and Potential Major Instability Averted in 11 Southern African Countries by Early Action Following Early Warning"
  In 1992, when early warning was acted upon by the then-new United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), food flowed into the region and reached people in spite of enormous logistical and political problems, due to the efforts of the United Nations and various of its bodies and individual states and leaders.[6]

Strengthening Civil Society

A robust civil society is one of the best ways to preserve or create peace. NEED to massively support efforts of NGOs, media, grassroots lesson-learning and spreading lessons among transitioning countries.

- "Catastrophic Civil War Prevented in South Africa"
  Civil society worked together with the government and police forces in a network of regional and local peace committees to stop escalation of violence and encourage political and racial cooperation in the successful transition from minority rule to majority rule. Major violence was avoided through constant dialogue and cooperation around agreed norms of behavior.[7]

(**Other steps on ladder**, such as negotiations and other diplomacy from many quarters, sanctions, UNSC resolutions, expelling from organizations, etc.)

Preventive deployment

Preventive deployment provides a deterring presence if inserted in a timely fashion and with sufficient credibility. This can be a good role to build up for regional forces. NEED to use this technique more often.

- "UN Preventive Deployment Force Discourages Spread of Balkans Conflict into Macedonia"
  The UN Security Council created this 900-man unit to discourage the spread of violence to Macedonia during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Though small in numbers, the force was a successful statement of international resolve (perhaps fortunately not tested), and the war

[6] Information provided by then-UnderSecretary of the United Nations for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Elliason

[7] For a remarkable first-hand account from one of the civilian leaders of the process, see Susan Collin Marks, Watching the Wind, United States Institute of Peace, 2000.

did not breach that border. Size was always an issue, i.e.whether that small a force would actually stop an attack. It will still be an issue in future preventive deployments.

Preemptive action as prevention

Though the newly articulated Bush strategy of preemption is being debated, there are circumstances under which it would be beneficial to view preemptive action as conflict prevention. It is interesting – and not unappealing in today's climate of terrorism, etc. - to think of it as an early use of force, which is counter to traditional thinking of holding off military action.

POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

- Success: "Western Europe Peaceful and Prosperous After Centuries of Conflict Due to Conflict Prevention Measures"
  How many people attribute the peace to the *post-conflict peacebuilding* powers of democracy building, economic progress, and building a common stake?

- Success (to date) : "International Peacekeepers Have Succeeded Thus Far in Keeping the Peace in Bosnia Since the End of the Conflict There"

The peacekeepers' presence, their foot patrols, the presence of their official vehicles have contributed to a non-violent environment in which a nation and civility are supposed to be being rebuilt. Conflict has not reignited, but the jury is still out because the other elements crucial to success, such as institution building, economic and social progress, reconciliation and reestablishing trust, and building that common stake, are still painstakingly being crafted.

Whether it is called peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction or nationbuilding it is crucial there and elsewhere. Frankly, it is the exit strategy, and the best assurance of not having to return.

A word on Somalia and why it should not color our view of nationbuilding. It was two operations. The first was humanitarian relief provided by United States forces when UN peacekeeping was too weak to allow it. The second was international peacekeeping with elements of post-conflict peacebuilding poorly carried out plus a unilateral diversion by independent US forces to take the major warlord by force. The misperception in some quarters (including the American public and Congress) of Somalia as a failed operation and a big nationbuilding exercise that exceeded the mandate has been extremely damaging to progress in peacekeeping and post-conflict efforts since then. It has stood in the way of establishing peacebuilding/reconstruction/nationbuilding as an indispensable part of ending a conflict and preventing its cyclical return. I personally would drop the patronizing term "nationbuilding" and replace it with "peacebuilding and reconstruction" in a campaign to persuade the United States and the European Union to redouble these efforts.

Disarming and Demobilizing Combatants and Finding Them Jobs

This must be part of every peacekeeping operation if another conflict is to be averted. Disarming and demobilizing are very difficult tasks, often not carefully planned for or carried out. The job-finding/job creation is done by a different department and requires effort and coordination. It has to be done though to allow people to begin the process of building a stake in peace rather than war.

Justice and Rule of Law after Conflict

The now-famous truth and reconciliation process employed in South Africa was a remarkable balance of exposure, taking responsibility, and forgiveness. Along the way, it was done within a legal structure set up by the South Africans themselves. Others have done it similarly; others have relied on external courts to clear the air. However done, the process is crucial to moving a society forward past a conflict. If it is not done, the seeds of the next conflict are right at the surface. These efforts

and establishment of rule of law and all its institutions should receive extremely high priority from the international community. Post-conflict peacebuilding cannot progress without these efforts.

Building an Economic Stake
It is crucial to build or rebuild the economy as fast as possible for obvious reasons of restoring standard of living, rebuilding, entering or reentering markets, regional economic integration, and simply building a stake in the future and peace. The points under "Breaking the Cycle of Poverty" apply.

UN Political and Peace-Building Missions
These offices, deployed by the UN Department of Political Affairs in a handful of countries, are doing low key work in conflict prevention. They are on the ground, right where potential or former combatants run into problems to solve. NEED to expand the program and put more resources in it. It is a very solid UN innovation. Other organizations could do it too in different locations.

TECHNIQUES
Always Gather Lessons Learned and Names of Experts
The international community in all its parts must systematically keep track, keep records, and make available the information on lessons learned in all conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. This body of knowledge cannot be created long after the fact. It is crucial to progress and to speed of getting a successful operation/program underway. Budget information and costs of things should be included. Names of people with previous experience should be on rosters for contact.

Bringing Women to the Table
Women should be better integrated into formal and informal peace processes around the and promoting peace, as they focus on the people and the life of a country more than on the power issues likely to be discussed by men. This element lends a reality to peacemaking and peacebuilding processes that can speed up attention to issues such as education, health, normalcy, reconciliation, and teaching non-discrimination – all significant aspects of returning a country to peace or avoiding violent conflict in the first place.

Which Technique?
Get used to thinking about programs that help in changing conditions, considering what potential parties to conflict want that will lead to conflict if they don't get it OR that they will be peaceful in order to get, eg. EU membership

[redacted]We should be asking how to best tackle conditions that allow dictators/bad guys to take advantage of their people's vulnerabilities/sense of unfairness, etc. to move to/foment violence and support for violence.
Tackle those conditions for those reasons to weaken the power of the dictator but also as important because tackling those conditions is necessary to BUILDING the conditions most likely to preserve peace.

If such tools are readily available, why are they not used?

Whose Work
So, the work is

- building an international system with the standards for peace preservation/conflict prevention
- spreading the standards and enforcing or insisting on them
- building peaceful conditions after conflict to break the cycle of violence

- building the structural conditions most likely to preserve peace

Who should do this crucial conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding work? At this point, both the Europeans and the Americans are pursuing conflict prevention in their own ways and pursuing post-conflict peacebuilding a bit more in concert, but still not adequately focused.

My reading is that the Europeans are engrossed in consolidating their newfound unity and are willing to share it with those on its borders to help secure it. They are willing too to spread their belief in and knowledge of many of the elements of conflict prevention to those regions and beyond. Through the EU and the UN and individually as states, European governments promote good governance, development cooperation and external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, peaceful resolution of conflict, and means to prosperity in regions of interest.

The European Union and European Commission both have formally designated non-military conflict prevention programs, which should continue and be enhanced. The Commission's conflict prevention objectives, for example, relate to targeting root causes of conflict; targeting specific causes of conflict in crosscutting issues, such as illicit trade of diamonds and small arms and competition over scarce water resources; improving early action; and promoting cooperation with partner countries, NGOs, and international organizations. Following September 11, 2001, the Commission has increased emphasis on the "dark side of globalisation," such as the divide between rich and poor, environmental degradation, and trafficking in human beings. The Commission's Conflict Prevention Policy is a formal program with formal leadership. This will be needed in the US Government as well.

The United States is bound by its own capability and commitment to possess adequate force to respond with military force when it deems it necessary. Though the US has created, belongs to, and continues to tout alliances and coalitions, the United States maintains the range and depth of forces to carry out military tasks worldwide alone. This is both a strength and a weakness (or drawback), as governments everywhere assume the United States will provide the military option when it is needed to preserve security. It has been thus for 50 years. The United States has believed in a division of labor, in which the Europeans would provide more on the post-conflict side to compensate the U.S. for its military input. The Europeans have resisted a facile formula like this. Perhaps now, with the new Bush National Security Strategy, there will at least be a stronger effort on both sides – and with the United Nations – to work out a specific plan of action for each situation. (This particularly is crucial for Iraq. Without a solid plan and details on who does what, the post-conflict peacebuilding effort for Iraq will be subject to failure, with enormous implications for the region and for the West's position in the region.)

Neither the Americans nor the Europeans can prevent conflict alone. Conflict prevention is necessarily a joint project, just as it must be a joint concern of very high priority. It must include the United Nations and many other international players such as
OSCE and other regional organizations, NGOs, civil society, media, private corporations, foundations, and others. But it has to start with leadership and will, which must come from the United States and Europe.

Agenda (partial) for the Initiative
Shift priorities and some resources to set up international priority on conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding
Need a dialogue – Both sides should undertake with the United Nations and other international actors a concerted dialogue to develop a solid conflict prevention policy and give it urgent priority. That dialogue should delineate what to do and who does what.

Requires a political framework with the institutional structure centered around the UN(?) to act quickly and decisively in the early stages of conflict.
Everyone.
United front.
Both sides should continue to use and strengthen their conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities along the whole spectrum of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding
Much more focus.
Need international cooperation
Need norms
Get the headlines - Get more media attention to successes, both for politicians to see but also for publics to see.

(6)

**"What Common Security Policy?
Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security"**

Centre Thucydide, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, United Nations Association-USA

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STABILITY OPERATIONS - WAR-FIGHTING, PEACE-KEEPING AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

(DRAFT ONLY NOT FOR CITATION)

**Rear Admiral Richard COBBOLD,
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Caveat: the views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone, and should not be construed as representing the corporate views of the RUSI.

INTRODUCTION

On Saturday 2 November 2002, the (London) Daily Telegraph published a story that the Finance Minister, Gordon Brown, had objected to the costings of the Ministry of Defence's plans for forces to contribute to the United States led coalition for action against Iraq in the next few months, and had asked for other less expensive options to be put forward. Although the story was swiftly denied, and may indeed have little or no truth in it, it raises some points of interest particularly relevant to today's forces whether they are for war-fighting or stability operations.

First, in the 21st Century, we are no longer engaged so much in wars of national survival as in wars of choice. It may be that there are compelling reasons to engage in particular wars of choice, and that the nature of these conflicts may be severe, but they are not wars of survival in the conventional sense. Aligned with that is the acceptance that the extent of the commitment to a 'war of choice' is also a matter of choice. Given that, and that the costs of specific operations are calculated as being the additional costs beyond the normal costs of ownership, and keeping the forces sustained, equipped, trained and ready for a whole range of approved commitments, then the extent of a commitment to an operation can be expressed in financial terms. In a war of national survival, there is a virtually limitless commitment, and planned expenditure has to be arranged to fit the requirement based on threats. The overall capability required of the British forces is expressed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review as re-balanced by the 2002 New Chapter. In broad terms the MoD's financial programme sets out each year, to allot funds so that the capabilities can be provided. A Central Contingency Fund provides resources for actual operations, and it is spending from this Fund that remains a matter of choice. Naturally the key decisions on what capabilities are to be provided for operations are made with the authority of the Cabinet. So there is choice as to cost.

Secondly, there is a strategic choice of whether a contribution should be 'coherent' or 'incoherent'. A coherent contribution can operate on its own in a national sense, and if it is coherent to the operational level, say to the 2* national commander, then this gains a fair measure of influence on the conduct of the operation for the contributing nation. Britain provided this sort of contribution for the Gulf War and also for the Kosovo campaign, even though in the event, the ground intervention was not opposed and was a peace-enforcement

operation that subsequently translated into an orthodox stability operation. However in Afghanistan, the British contribution was incoherent in that capabilities were provided precisely as the US requested; these included Tomahawk land/attack missiles, air-to-air refuelling, special forces, photo-reconnaissance and mountain warfare trained troops. If the coalition leader is strong, then an incoherent contribution may seem best, not least because the conduct of the operation may be less complicated. If the same partners join up each time, and if the same capabilities are requested each time, then there is a real possibility that capability specialisation may become attractive. However such specialisation has disadvantages: the same partners may well not sign up each time for a 'coalition of the willing'; countries loss of military autonomy will be aggravated; the same capabilities may not be required each time and thus may not be available; and if a full range of capabilities are to be available for selection, then this could be costly, even wasteful. For countries like Britain and France, with residual national commitments, a fair degree of national autonomy is probably essential, but they keep the ability to make either coherent or incoherent contributions.

Thirdly, there is a choice over what sort of capabilities should be provided. Given that the cost of operations are calculated separately from the costs of maintaining standing forces, the costs of various deployment options can vary widely. This may well affect the choice of options. Perhaps the most evident difference is between naval and ground forces. Ground forces deploying have to take with them a substantial and costly additional logistic train, whereas naval forces are established to take their logistics around with them constantly, and at the first level of approximation, their only additional costs cover the ammunition expended. This may explain why quite a number of partners are keen to contribute naval units to coalition operations when their utility is not entirely clear. Equally there may be an argument for ensuring that an accounting system does not dominate military decisions, and there may also be cause to question whether the initial costs of procuring and supporting naval forces are not high relative to ground forces, in terms of anticipated capability. Only two broad examples have been mentioned, but they bring out some relevant points.

THE IDENTITY OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

All this is by way of introduction. Stability operations can be narrowly defined, but perhaps in the context of this paper it better not to attempt to do so. Stability operations are required after conflict, or if a state has failed. They seek to restore order and to create and maintain an environment in which services may be restored and the civil infrastructure rebuilt, and then for civil government to return. At a crude level of simplicity, war-fighting breaks down an unacceptable regime and stability operations builds up something better thereafter. Between them they can change regimes. In effect, the functions are the same as those required in peace support operations, that is peace-keeping and peace enforcement, and in this paper, the terms are used almost interchangeably. But stability operations are not the same as gendarmerie duties. The critical difference is that stability operations have to be able to counter successfully armed opposition and if necessary to control escalation. Thus stability operations have to be able to connect seamlessly with the war-fighters to provide the final assurance of security. This means in many operations in the post-post- Cold War era, with the United States' forces. Thus no line can clearly be drawn between war-fighting and stability operations for all that they are very different.

CHANGES IN WAR-FIGHTING

War-Fighting is changing in its nature; it changed at the end of the Cold War, and it changed again after 11 September 2001. The changes were not instantaneous and some of the changes have been happening remorselessly on a different timescale, some driven by technological

advances, others by the changing security environment. The former have ensured that the forces of a coalition led by the United States are likely to be overwhelmingly powerful in conventional conflict. The latter have ensured that those who wish us ill, will not meet western forces face to face, but will seek an asymmetric engagement, where the United States' power may perhaps be neutralised and great harm done probably to non-military targets.

The nature of conventional warfare, at its most technologically advanced, will remove operators further from the point of application of violence, though enemy and civilian people will still be in and around the targets. There will be a compression of time, with sensitive sensors connected by communications systems to long-range precision weapons, in such a way that decisions to attack can be taken in real time, by the right people. This is facilitated by 'networked enabled capability' which maximises effect in a force whilst minimising the assets required to produce it. War-fighting is dominated by the effectiveness of information systems, with the aim of having total information supremacy for one's own forces and total shared awareness of the situation, while denying information to the enemy. Also in making operators more remote, more platforms - air, land and sea - will operate without people in them. Unmanned Air Vehicles are probably leading the way, and the recent example of a Predator UAV firing a Hellfire missile against a vehicle in the Yemen desert apparently full of terrorists, is a foretaste of more to come. This is a case of the war-fighter going asymmetric in turn, though others might argue that this is just a new tactic in a manoeuvre strategy.

The pace of technical advance, building on massive research and development effort by the United States, has left European capabilities at lower levels. Consequently there are wide-spread interoperability problems, with the dilemma that the extra spending to ensure connectivity by the US' coalition partners may be unaffordable to partners, and this puts pressure on the United States to invest in retro-connectivity. This in turn raises the issue - to which we shall return - of whether the United States actually wants military allies, or would prefer the simplicity of going it alone.

The desire to conduct warfare remotely is not as readily applied to ground operations as it is to air. Certainly having advanced systems will enable ground forces to have very high kill ratios against their enemies, and air and information supremacies will lead not only to great effectiveness but also to force protection. If however the enemy decides reasonably that he does not wish to be the target in a turkey shoot, and adopts asymmetric tactics, coalition forces could be faced with problems. First, the enemy may colocate his key military assets with sensitive civilian places, for example mosques, schools and hospitals, rendering the military assets as off-limits for targeting, even with the most precise weapons. Second, the enemy may withdraw into the cities and invite the coalition to flush him out with urban warfare. Although not suggesting that this is a feasible tactic for Saddam Hussein to adopt - though he may be tempted by it - it is a conceptual problem and represents the antithesis of remote war-fighting. It is not clear that 'fighting in built up areas' is doctrinally, politically or emotionally an act of war that the West relishes becoming involved in.

CHANGES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

The nature of the most demanding opposition, makes it likely that the United States will want and need to have allies, particularly for stability operations. Military power can readily despatch inferior forces arrayed against it. But the opposition does not cease to exist, it just fades away to return maybe at a more propitious moment. The asymmetric opposition, or terrorists, are not constrained by political ambitions nor by laws of war. The start of stability operations does not mean that terrorist activity ceases though it may make a tactical or temporary withdrawal. There is likely to be, at the end of the conflict phase, a pause during which the incoming peace-keepers

can win 'hearts and minds' before the honeymoon period ends and the stability force starts to be blamed for all the deprivations the civilian population are suffering.

During this period, the peace-keepers have to get across the message that what can be achieved is substantially better for all concerned than that which went before and reverse the trend that the victims of the war can be persuaded to be the best recruiters for the terrorists. To do this, the peace-keepers have to win trust, and do well to exhibit a human, and if possible smiling, face behind the paraphernalia of war. This means that force protection has to be subordinated, and the distance between the peace-keepers and the local population - that may have terrorists embedded within it - has to be reduced to a minimum. This is an important difference between war-fighting and peace-keeping, but it is not borne out of naivety. Closing and communicating with the locals not only breeds trust, but also produces vital local intelligence, often of high value further afield as well. This intelligence, largely human rather than technically derived intelligence, linked with the trust, can induce a new dynamic, a virtuous spiral.

But optimism must not be blinkered and the peace-keepers must have the ability to control escalation, and preferably by demonstrating a credible capability to do so, will deter it. Controlling escalation demands what is known as C3ISR capabilities, similar in principle to that employed by the war-fighters. This is necessary not only to connect with the war-fighters if needed, but also because the opposition, whilst decrying the technologies of globalisation are quick to use modern and often quite complex information systems to communicate and to coordinate their operations.

To this may be added a further advantage, that in the right circumstances, an oppressive presence on the ground may be reduced without reducing capabilities. Small sections of troops will need to know accurately what is going on in their area - a common operations picture - and junior commanders will have to make swift decisions that may have wide repercussions: hence the concept of the corporals' war and of the 'strategic corporal'. One reason why the corporal may be strategic, may increasingly be the effectiveness of the network in which he works. At present he can call in help from neighbouring units, but very soon he will, if needed, be able to summon help in the form of close air support that will arrive in minutes or even seconds, and change the shape of events. The same network may in time connect what the corporal sees and says all the way up the chain of command, with the corollary that the Commander-in-Chief may be tempted to communicate directly with the corporal and try to drive his decisions from the back-seat.

Another reason why the corporal can be strategic is the almost certain pressure of the media, the guardians of public sensibility. Like war-fighters, terrorists, and peace-keepers, journalists will have capable communications and an enthusiasm to use them. News reporting has a rapid pulse, more rapid than that of war-fighting or peace-keeping. So journalists constantly need new angles, and during stability operations, rather differently from war-fighting, have a largely unrestricted right to roam. They can report from all perspectives and all sides during stability operations, will report fearlessly any perceived errors, excesses and inefficiencies by the peace-keepers and will with generosity provide the oxygen of publicity to terrorists. They are a necessary incubus in a democratic society, but they do increase the burden on subordinate peace-keeping commanders in a way that does not happen in war-fighting. Unless controlled - and they are notoriously difficult to control - journalists can be a risk to tactical security.

NGOs also play a necessary part in post-conflict stability and reconstruction, but they cherish their independence from governments, and are careful to emphasise that they are in no way under command of the military. Nor should they be, but sometimes getting the message across

that cooperation and communication between them and the military may lead to both sides achieving more of their objectives quicker, and more securely, is not always easy. NGOs may see their objectives being, at least in part, opposed to those of the military, and both groups may find each other's tactics irritating. NGOs can be ruthless and skilful in exploiting links with the media to publicize their points of view. Usually it is the military that has to take the lead in building an understanding.

THE PACE OF EVENTS

During the Cold War, events moved at a glacial pace, although more notice might have been taken in longer term planning of the nature and incidence of the conflicts that Britain became involved in, in the quaintly named 'Out of Area' missions. In the turbulent years post-Cold War the nature and frequency of stability operations changed, certainly peace-keepers found that sitting detached between two defined sides was no longer a profitable doctrine. The Falklands War and the Gulf War, each in their own way, did not require stability operations, because they were concerned with the recovery of territory. But the various conflicts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia began to set a trend of having a short burst of war-fighting followed by a more prolonged period of stability operations.

Despite this prolongation, there is little doubt that the initial period of peace-keeping is likely to be the most problematic; it is likely to be rather chaotic and consequently dangerous. Whether done well or badly, the initial period is likely to set the pattern for subsequent periods. The initial peace-keepers will have to be more rapidly deployable to get into theatre swiftly, more capable to make order out of disorder, more mobile in theatre, more able to link effectively with the war-fighters. For Britain, the New Chapter to the SDR makes clear that the most stressing concurrency requirements are those of many smaller operations or commitments. If the short spates of war-fighting are each followed by a longer period of peace-keeping then it is almost inevitable that peace-keeping commitments will not be discontinued at the same rate as new ones are added. This is a sure recipe for over-stretching the stability operations providers.

Particularly for the countries most likely to contribute to early stability operations, it is important to find a mechanism whereby the volume of commitments is kept under control, hence Britain's expressed wish to volunteer to be the first in, and also to be the first out. So far the latter has been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. On the assumption that there is not an inexhaustible supply of countries wanting to volunteer their people for peace-keeping duties, then a means will also have to be found to reduce the overall peace-keeping demands, either by shutting stability operations down earlier, or at least reducing the sizes of stability forces quite rapidly, though that, of course, brings the danger that the opposition would merely go underground, confident that it could re-emerge before long once the peace-keepers had moved on.

DIVISIONS OF LABOUR

There are a number of relevant divisions: the divisions within war-fighting and stability operations respectively, the divisions between war-fighting and stability operations, the divisions within a coalition, and the divisions within a country.

The pre-eminent war-fighter is the United States. During the Kosovo air campaign, the Americans provided over 80% of air combat sorties, and a rather higher proportion when it came to effectiveness. Over Afghanistan the figures were higher yet again and this trend seems set to continue. On the ground, however, a rather different picture emerges. Had there been an

opposed ground invasion of Kosovo, the figures would have been almost reversed, with Europeans providing the bulk of ground forces. In Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance, with capabilities well-boosted by both Russia and more importantly by America, did the bulk of the conventional ground operations, acting, in effect, as surrogates. It seems likely that the Kurds in Northern Iraq may not be capable of acting as effective surrogates in Iraq. This may all be a key to why the United States does in fact want war-fighting allies, even if they seem at times to be intensely irritating. When the fighting is technical and remote, the need for allies is less, but when it comes to being up to your arm-pits in muck and bullets (as opposed to a nice uncluttered desert scenario), there is a visceral desire to share the load.

In the area of special forces there does seem to be a genuine load sharing, though who contributes and to what extent, is rightly kept in the shadows. The load can also be shared by a geographic division as well as a functional one, with less capable allies being invited to look after some less demanding tasks as happened when the Western European Union's mine countermeasures force was stationed during the Gulf War in a part of the Gulf well away from the action and the most likely concentration of mines.

But there is a political reason why The United States need militarily capable allies, and that is to establish legitimacy. Unless there is credible capability, the political link looks weak. For partners in this division of war-fighting labour, there is the opportunity to influence the outcome, so that it more closely aligns with national interests. Clearly the capability of the share offered will affect an ability to influence, although this can be taken a stage further by sharing in the detailed planning and preparations. In late 2001, Britain supplied over 70 staff officers (under a 3* commander) to US Central Command in Florida. With that sort of leverage, Britain clearly had an inside track in working the interface between the war-fighting and the subsequent stability operation, ISAF. It seems logical for the United States to prefer allies that have a track record of ready political, and credible military, support, with whom interoperability is well-established.

From the point of view of the allies, judgements have to be made on how national interests are best served. Countries will not support the United States against their own perceived interests, however convoluted the description of those interests may be. Thus the two major contributing European military powers, Britain and France, go about their business of being useful allies in very different ways: Britain works away on the inside while France shouts the odds from the outside; both turn up on the day. Not that even the most loyal ally will sign up every time; certainly Britain did not actively side with the US in Vietnam - a war of choice - despite American blandishments. So also the reasons for not joining may not always be clear: choice means that the reason could in reality be a perceived lack of affordability, but be couched in phrases of morality and national interest.

The United States is not the prime mover of stability operations, but it has two vital and dominant functions to perform. First, by being the war-fighting leader it creates the framework for stability operations; secondly, it retains the ultimate sanction of controlling escalation at the highest level and returning to war-fighting in the event of the stability operations failing. Thus the US retains a hand on the tiller, even when ostensibly not involved. The 'war on terror', taking in a conflict in Iraq and then moving on, could define the agenda for stability operations for years, if not decades, to come. In order to generate stability operations, the 'war on terror' does not have to be against states, indeed it may well be against groups of non-state actors, who may, by their acts of devastation, cause a state to fail.

As described above, this could lead to an overload of peace-keeping. While Britain certainly sees an international role for itself at the sharp end of stability operations, there will be increasing

opposition to becoming bogged down in protracted commitments. The difficulty in arranging the roulement of the ISAF after the first few months, points to the incipient problems of international peace-keeping fatigue. The global peace-keeping task is huge, and getting bigger, and the load has to be shared between many nations. To be fair, many volunteer, but the offers are often small, require support and coordination from others, and may lack military capability under deteriorating conditions. Others again can only come under political constraints that limit their value.

There is also the difficulty that some offers by nations may not be acceptable either to the 'host' country or to neighbours, for cultural or political reasons. This may distort the structure of peace-keeping forces. There is certainly a case for regional peace-keeping forces, and equally certainly a positive role by African nations to take on the onus of stability operations in Africa would be widely welcomed both by African countries and those outside.

The European force that should result from the Helsinki headline goals, should become operational at the end of 2003 and have the capabilities to undertake the full range of 'Petersberg' tasks. The political debate about the nature of this force is not germane to this paper, but the capabilities required - to the upper reaches of peace-enforcement - are challenging and the willingness of European countries to make the necessary investment is not yet confirmed by results.

The relationship of this force with NATO, and with NATO's Response Force, and hence with the US may cause friction in reality as it has in anticipation. NATO itself is in evident need to reform, and the task for the Europeans is to encourage this reform, in parallel with European military efforts. However the recently trumpeted initiative on response forces, has stumbled amongst the undergrowth of the alliance bureaucracy. Perhaps the United Nations is ready to take on a greater and more positive role, and perhaps the recent muscle-flexing within the Security Council will give confidence to do more and better.

DIVISION OF LABOUR WITHIN A COUNTRY

Britain is holding on to an autonomous warfighting capability but is stretched to the limit in trying to keep up - at least to be able to connect - with the United States. It also seeks to play an appropriate, indeed leading, role in stability operations. Doubtless much the same could be said of France. But Britain in the post-post- Cold War environment is also being dragged gradually and rather unwillingly into Home Defence. Just at the moment, the effectiveness of the military for war-fighting is being put at risk by the threat of a strike by the Fire Brigades Union. This risk is being run whether or not a strike actually takes place because troops have to be withdrawn from other duties to undertake fire-fighting training. Although the police have the lead responsibility for homeland security through the Home Office there is a likelihood that Reserves will become involved in training to provide internal reaction forces, which will cut into the regular forces flexibility to meet commitments abroad. Even with a small real uplift in the Defence Budget announced in July 2002, there is evidence of over-stretch getting worse. This conclusion may apply to other European partners.

Conventional wisdom has it that forces prepared for war can readily be re-trained to do peace-keeping effectively, whereas the reverse is not true; peace-keepers cannot be turned into war-fighters. This has dominated British force structures for decades, particularly applicable to the Army. However since the end of the Cold War, and arguably specifically since 11 September 2001, the foundations for this consensus view may have been undermined. The nature of war-

fighting and of war-fighting forces is being 'transformed'. The United States is leading this transformation process. Systems and organizations that were being adapted from the Cold War to fit uneasily into the new environment are being replaced often at considerable discomfort and with an increasing rate of change. The new forces should produce the desired effect affordably. In Britain a similar process is underway, albeit in a rather understated way. Our ground forces, hitherto configured to hold ground on the North German Plain with heavy armour, are looking to convert to something more agile and versatile yet still having impressive fire-power. Being more versatile, these remodelled forces will be able to contribute to a wider variety of tasks. It should be remembered that Britain's tanks were unable to contribute to the recovery of the Falklands in 1982, so this is hardly a new problem.

But if the balance of commitments for the British Army is starting to shift from war-fighting to peace-keeping, and if the balance of the systems is becoming better suited to contribute to either, then another look at this issue may be justified. There is probably no justification for a complete shift, but there may be a case for a rebalancing. There is some agreement that some of the 'line' infantry regiments should be re-skilled to be more interchangeable with the Royal Marines and the Paras, who are apparently always the first choice for stability operations. If there is already de facto specialisation, then some objective assessment of further adjustments may be useful. The question is how much dedicated war-fighting capability is needed, and what advantage might be gained by having some specialists for stability operations. The other area that may merit development is the Reserves, where a peace-keeping role probably is an option, even though it would go against the thrust of the SDR.

CONCLUSIONS

Although many of the examples in this paper have been about Britain, taken in the context of the post-post-Cold War environment and particularly of the United States predominance of conventional war-fighting, they may apply in principle to other European countries suitably adapted, and in particular to France. Clearly they do not apply to the United States, except as specified.

In the present environment there are choices to be made, and even in the 'war on terror' there is no formula to define how much defence spending is enough.

Choices concern whether to contribute, what to contribute, and when to contribute. The choices can also bring forward a range of reasons for not contributing.

Although some countries will continue to want to maintain an autonomous war-fighting capability, the challenge of maintaining connectivity with the United States will become more severe.

The US will also find that their own need to expand and transform their war-fighting capability, will leave them with a more difficult task of maintaining retro-connectivity, which they may, in some cases, choose not to afford.

Nevertheless the US will still need militarily capable allies, politically for legitimacy, generally for the less remote capabilities and specifically for discrete capabilities, for example long range land attack and special forces.

Although there are real and deep differences between war-fighting and stability operations, the division between the two is not sharp and they are interconnected. Equally in intensity of

operations there is comparatively little difference between the high end of peace support operations and the low end of war-fighting.

The global load of stability operations seems set to increase and is in the initiation, reactive. On the other hand the initiation of war-fighting is often proactive, although if it is viewed purely as self defence, then it is also reactive.

Countries that take on stability commitments may find they are of longer duration than originally expected, therefore the loading will remorselessly increase, with the risk of over-stretched forces that may in itself restrict choices.

There is a need to spread the stability operations load more widely, using for example regional groupings.

Pressure on national defence budgets will tend to increase rather than reduce, although the financial load could reasonably be spread more widely between government departments as the functions of defence departments also spread more widely.

Within a country, the division of labour between war-fighting and stability operations should not be seen as immutable.

Having many options does not mean there are as many ways of meeting commitments; equally having many options does not mean that there are enough trained people to undertake them all. Once the forces have been established, there is only one force.

"What Common Security Policy?
Managing 21st Century Threats to Peace and Security"
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Common European security and defense policy: What's hard, what's soft, and what's funded?

(DRAFT ONLY NOT FOR CITATION)

Yves Boyer*

The development, within the European Union (EU), of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) is born a decade ago. In the very late 1980, when international landscape was beginning to shatter with the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, EEC members decided to develop a closer relation into the framework of a global political project with associated new decision-making structures. Accordingly, whatever be their respective flaws, the Maastricht treaty in 1991 and later the Amsterdam treaty represented a milestone in the European construction. In the field of security and defense they provided the political and juridical framework to develop a military tool aimed at giving the EU its own capacity to act with military forces if necessary. This goal was, obviously, not aimed at prejudicing the Atlantic alliance. The basic military objective presiding to the set up of EU's defense capabilities were encapsulated into the Petersberg tasks. It was only at the end of the 1990s that CESDP took a concrete dimension when, at Saint-Malo in December 1998, Paris and London agreed to effectively start the project then stalled. Both capitals agreed to jointly and

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actively work to make the European Union "*able to carry out some security tasks on its own*"[1]. From that beginning one can infer at least three basic remarks.

Firstly, the new European endeavor in security and military fields rapidly collide with a conservative view of what was needed to give EU a potent military capacity. It remains very hard in some political circles among various European capitals to get rid of old habits and disrupt past arrangement when, 50 years ago, in defense matter primacy was given to the United States then providing the bulk of military and economic resources to defend the Atlantic alliance. This legacy survives even if the threat no longer exists and the balance of power has shifted for better to the benefit of the Europeans. If, in order to efficiently cope with the Soviet threat the Western was structured and organized under US leadership, this legacy is becoming cumbersome when interests and "Weltanschauung" are no longer necessarily coinciding between Europe and the United States. It becomes indeed growingly difficult to take as granted that automatically allied military forces would be systematically packed and used together under US leadership when on many crucial issues, to begin with the Middle East situation, risks assessment and interests are not on the same wave length.

Indeed, international challenges are less military than before and the EU as a global player in many domains has its own agenda no longer coinciding with the US. Globalization is nowadays bringing the biggest challenge to the perpetuation of the transatlantic relations, as they stood in the past, in the measure that old structures, like the Nato integrated structures, are neither fully adjusted to new parameters nor suited to deal with complex challenges requiring the dual use of soft and hard power. Without the cement of a common enemy, global perspectives may diverge between the two sides of the Atlantic. Frictions resulting from political, economic, trade or monetary divergences are indeed more frequent than ever between Washington and most West Europeans capitals. These disputes now encompass a wide array of topics ranging from the application of extraterritoriality laws to disputes on environmental issues not mentioning the different role Washington and the Europeans want multilateral forum to play in dealing with international challenges. Indeed, at a time when temptation arouse in the US to use Nato as an instrument of stability out of area,

[1] Tony Blair, Speech, RUSI, March 8, 1999, London.

one runs the risk of overloading the boat because precisely political differences have a spill-over effect already altering the strength of the Alliance. If existing military arrangement cannot be used because of political divergences, the EU members may then be deprived of any collective and coherent capacity to act jointly with military forces if necessary. This uncertainty underlines the basic rationale to fully develop CESDP.

Secondly, any form of comparison with what has been so far achieved by the Europeans regarding CESDP on one hand and Nato on the other hand is jumping to conclusions in an irrelevant manner. This is like comparing apples and pears. Undoubtedly the current ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) is not an end in itself. CESDP is a much more larger concept. In the framework of CESDP, European countries discuss ways and means, as well as structures to give potent military capabilities to the EU. These are serious, real and concrete issues and political leaders try hard to muddle through very complex problems having to take into account many different parameters to make things progressing. The endeavour is long, painful and seldom immediately rewarding. It is very easy to look at it and emphasised backtracks even more so when the process is under severe attack to limit its scope. In that matter, it appears that the US are balancing between paying lip service to the will of the European to built and develop CESDP and temptation to systematically limit the scope of their project that should be kept under severe limits. One cannot, at the same time, underline the current insufficiency of the CESDP and rise up against any significant effort made by the Europeans to move on.

Thirdly, the very political nature of the EU makes CFSDP of a different essence than a traditional alliance among sovereign states like Nato. Indeed European march towards a common defense correspond to world transformation where under the surface tectonics plates are moving. Indeed, Nato is exhausted as exemplified by its growing paralysis of the Alliance as witnessed during the Kosovo and the recent Afghan crisis when there was not any more political consensus throughout the management of the different issues. Corresponding to a transformation of an historical nature, EU's CESDP, like a see-saw will void Nato of its usefulness even if the Alliance retain

some utility. In such context the CESDP has to overcome a certain number of difficulties.

The need for a military doctrinal revival in Europe

When the CESDP will move on after a first round of development opened at Saint-Malo leading to current creation of adequate political-military structure and of the ERRF, the choices of proper of military means for the EU will eventually raise the question of a proper military doctrine. Should then the Europeans follow the inclination taken by US military forces or should they invent a proper "grammar" of warfare which could better correspond to their views on warfare. This question is at the heart of the transatlantic debate about the gap between US and European forces. Traditionally the notion of gaps has a certain meaning in the context of the Atlantic alliance. It usually refers to discrepancies regarding the capabilities of Western Europe's armed forces and those of the United States, a song as old as the Atlantic alliance itself. Fortunately for the Europeans, it is worthwhile to recall that EU's military capabilities largely exceed those of their immediate neighbors and, at the world level, stand only second to the US. The motives behind the current US admonishing their Europeans partners not to let the gap widening are indeed more important than the findings themselves. Among those motives, two are of a particular significance : the failure by the Atlantic Alliance to fully implement the DCI (*Defence Capabilities Initiative*) and the growing assertiveness of the Europeans in key high tech programs, with the risks for the US to see competitors in domains where they still remains in a position of monopoly.

With the DCI, he Europeans were offered to radically transform their military posture in rallying prescription stemming out from "visions" elaborated by the US military. The Atlantic alliance should thus be transformed in a unified zone in strategic and defense affairs under American leadership. Seen from Washington, the best guarantee to see US military orientation to be followed by their allies in an era where the former Soviet threat which glued together the allies has vanished away is to use technological innovation to redirect their military apparatus. Technological progress became a

substitute to an identified threat to push military interoperability a mean to maintain and even to deepen integration within the Atlantic area to a magnitude never seen even during the Soviet threat era. The mirage of high-tech solutions, as the panacea to military problems, was then sold to the Europeans. US views on future warfare strongly influenced by processing combat intelligence in a revolutionary manner epitomized in the notion of "network centric warfare", were supposed to become the standard views in Europe as well. In emphasizing technology as the main driver of military action, it was easy to highlight the significance of an apparent gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. If the Europeans rallied to US prescription and choose to be part of the "system of systems" developed by the US they abandon their determination to use all their weight "so that the EU equips itself with the necessary autonomous means to decide and deal with crisis"[2]. They would pay a certain form of military efficiency by a greater dependence on the United States, Washington being the sole holder of the "keys" of the "system of systems" which is the essence of "network centric warfare". Is it a coherent policy at a time when the EU is trying through CESDP to acquire a political role and influence on the international scene beyond the sole economic and monetary realm?

Indeed the Europeans have the military competence and most of the technological know-how to develop by themselves high tech military systems as they were able to compete efficiently on world markets in civilians high tech goods. An unexpected strong resolve in high tech fields from the Europeans is currently seen with the Galileo project decided despite US lack of sympathy and hard lobbying to kill the project. An attempt badly felt on this side of the Atlantic. The Americans behave, at this occasion with arrogance giving lessons and telling what the Europeans should do or not. When US prescription are followed, it sometimes have damaging effects for Europe as seen with the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) program. Three members of the EU, UK, Italy and the Netherlands, will indeed divert from EU's R&T resources almost 4 bn $ that will go to the US. A financial investment that will greatly benefit US companies at the detriment of EU's capacities when European research programs aimed precisely at closing the gap in R&T such as ETAP (European Technology Access Program) would

[2] 73th Franco-German summit communiqué, Toulouse, May 1999

be needed in the years ahead with greater investments. ETAP represents now the last ditch against the disastrous situation created for the Europeans with choices made on the JSF. ETAP is aimed at working, in basic research on a next generation of combat air systems, including UCAV. It may receive around 600 million of Euro between 2002 and 2009 from the six European nations part of it.

Instead of brooding over the issue of a technological gap, it is probably more useful for EU's members to reflect on the dynamic of CESDP. After a first round of development between 1999 and nowadays which saw the creation of a political military decision making process and the setting up of a Rapid Reaction Force of about 60 000 men (a very modest fraction of the combined military capabilities of the EU members) a second cycle need to be launched. The question of the military means and operational doctrines that may flesh out the CESDP is seldom discussed, however the Europeans have to invent a model of warfare "made in Europe" specifically tailored to the needs of the European Union with probably less over emphasize on technology than in the US. This dynamic corresponds, according to French authorities, to a necessity in the present international system, and President Jacques Chirac has stressed at many occasion that a truly multi-polar international system was urgently needed for world stability. That goal will be reached particularly if "the European Union becomes a power in its own right ". After the creation of the Euro the next objective of the EU ought to be a common European defense policy. This goal, as far as the French are concerned is strongly expressed into the 5 years defense planning law (2003-2008) currently discussed at the Parliament.

In doing so the Europeans will meet serious challenges. The most serious lies in the difficult reappraisal of the "ideological" prism they used in the 1990s to look at military issues. The peace dividends drawn from the end of the Cold War made possible to think that future military problems will be met on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, i.e. mainly when implementing peacekeeping operations. That perspective, which by and large was the logic underlying the military interventions in the Balkans between 1992 and 1995, led to the development of a dominant idea around the notion of "*maîtrise de la violence*" (violence'control). According to that concept, military forces have to be used in a very tightly control manner in such way to limit

their effect to the bare necessities mostly against an asymmetrical adversary deprives of strong high tech forces. That view of using military power is still weighting on the Europeans. It makes difficult for them to go beyond that scheme and think in terms of military confrontation in a symmetrical mode. To a large extent the debate on the nature and the scope of the Petersberg tasks epitomized this debate. It is probably once the EU countries will have accepted to envisaged to deal with the full spectrum of military contingencies that CESDP will make new progresses.

Another challenges facing CESDP is about dealing efficiently with imbalances within the EU regarding military capabilities. One cannot ignore that 4 countries are providing almost 80% of the military resources of the EU. This unbalance has strong implication when looking at the further development of CESDP. The more qualitative issues will have to be tackled with, the more military discrepancies between EU members will have deep political and organizational consequences. In that matter two issues have to be mentioned as example. The first one is about proper command structures to conduct military operations on a large scale and at the higher end spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. Currently only two countries have, so far, developed command structures to plan and lead a military operation at the operative level[3]. Accordingly, mechanism will have to be imagined to efficiently use these national assets into the framework of a EU military operation. Transformation of both PJHQ and CPCO to give them such capacities would have to be worked out sooner rather later notably in opening more widely these structures to European staff officers.

The second issue is the prospect of a growing role specialization among EU members. This is a very touchy question that was taboo for long. It notably entails, in the long term a radical reshuffle in the ways military careers are defined in a European context. Specialization is growingly necessary under the double pressure of weapons costs and complexity of high tech weapons systems notably in the fields of "enablers" (space systems, fusion centers, data processing, etc.) that are becoming out of the reach of any single EU countries in the context of defense budget culminating at best at about 2% of GNP. The common development of these "enablers" will not only provide CESDP

[3] This is the PJHQ (Permanent Joint Headquarters) in the UK and the new CPCO (Centre de Planification et de Conduite Opérationnelle) in France.

with adequate means to conduct military operations on a large scale, they will also highly facilitate the emergence a this new "grammar of warfare" made in Europe already mentioned.