


**EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE
IN A CONFLICT PREVENTION PERSPECTIVE:
APPLYING EXPERIENCES IN THE EURO-MED CONTEXT**

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
Amman, 1-2/X/2001

- a. Programme
- b. List of Participants
 - 1. Introductory remarks / Kamel S. Abu Jaber (5p.)
 - 2. Address / Stefano Jedrkiewicz (2p.)
 - 3. Commentary / James Moran (7p.)
 - 4. "A strategic framework for conflict and policy assessment : requirements for a coherent conflict prevention approach: possibilities and limitations"/ Suzanne Verstegen (26p.)
 - 5. "Tools for a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area: the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain and the Med Country Conflict Profile"/ Laura Guazzone (42p.)
 - 6. "Early warning and conflict prevention: limits and opportunities in today's EMP"/ Roberto Aliboni (6p.)



SEMINAR

“Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention Perspective: Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context”

1-2 October, 2001

**Jordan Institute of Diplomacy – Istituto Affari Internazionali
Amman - Jordan**

PROGRRAMME

DAY ONE: Monday, 1/10/2001

9:00 REGISTRATION

9:30-9:45 *Welcoming Remarks: H.E. Prof. Kamel Abu Jaber, President of the
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy*

9:45-11:20 SESSION ONE

**Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Recent Directions in the
European Union and International Organizations**

*Chairperson: H.R.H. Princess Wijdan Ali Ph.D.
Vice President, Dean of Academic Research, Jordan Institute of
Diplomacy*

9:45-10:05 *Speaker: Dr. Ettore Greco, Vice Director, International Affairs Institute,
Italy*

***“Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Recent Trends in the
European Union And Other International Organizations”***

Commentator(s):

10:05-10:20

- **Dr. Reinhardt Rummel**, Conflict Prevention Network/Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, Germany

10:20-10:35

- **H.E. Dr. Abdullah Touqan**, Jordan

10:35-10:50

- **Mr. James Moran**, Head of Delegation, European Commission
Delegation, Jordan

10:50-11:20 Open Discussion

11:20-11:40 Coffee Break

11:40-13:30

SESSION TWO

Policy-Oriented Models of Early Warning and Response and their operational contexts

Chairperson: H.E. Dr. Ma'rouf Bakhit, Foreign Ministry, Jordan

11:40-12:00

Speaker: Dr. Georg E. Frerks & Dr. Suzanne Verstegen, Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands

"Requirement for a Coherent Conflict Prevention Approach: Possibilities and Limitations"

12:00-12:20

Dr. Laura Guazzone & Dr. Daniela Pioppi, International Affairs Institute, Italy

"Tools for a Conflict Prevention System for the Euro-Mediterranean Area: The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain and The Med Country Conflict Profile"

Commentator(s):

12:20-12:35

- **Dr. Albert Jongman**, PIOOM, University of Leiden, The Netherlands

12:35-12:50

- **Dr. Zina Haj-Hassan**, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

12:50-13:05

- **H.E. Ambassador Abderaouf Ounaies**, Retired Ambassador, Tunisia

13:05-13:30

Open Discussion

13:30

Lunch

DAY TWO: Tuesday, 2/10/2001

9:00-12:20

Round Table and Closing Session

Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the EMP: the Role of Academic Networking

Chairperson: H.E. Professor Kamel Abu Jaber, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

9:00-9:30

Speaker: Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, International Affairs Institute, Italy

"Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limits and Opportunities in today's EMP"

9:30-10:00

Open Discussion

Discussant(s):

- **H.E. Major General (Ret.) Mohamad Shiyyab**, Jordan
- **Dr. Jesus Nunez**, Director, Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH), Spain
- **H.E. Ambassador Abderaouf Ounaies**, Retired Ambassador, Tunisia

10:00-10:20

Coffee Break

10:20-12:20

Discussion Continued

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SEMINAR

**“Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention Perspective:
Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context”**

1-2 October, 2001

**Jordan Institute of Diplomacy – Istituto Affari Internazionali
Amman - Jordan**

List of Participants

1. Prof. Kamel Abu Jaber
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
2. HRH Princess Wijdan Ali
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
3. Ms. Ghadeer Al Adwan
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
4. Prof. Roberto Aliboni
Director of Studies
International Affairs Institute
Rome, Italy
Tel: +3963224360
Fax: +3963224363
5. Mr. Hasan Anbari
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
6. Ms. Rania Atiah
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
7. Major General (Ret.) Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Bakhit
General Coordinator of Peace Issues
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amman, Jordan
Fax: 4648825
8. Mrs. Nancy Bakir
Prime Ministry
Jordan
Fax: 5652953
9. Ms. Ghadeer Al Fayez
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

10. Dr. Georg E Frerks.
Head Conflict Research Unit
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael 7
2597 VH
The Hague
Fax. 0031 70 3282002
Tel. 0031 70 3245384
gfrerks@clingendael.nl
11. Dr. Mazen Gharaibeh
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
12. Dr. Ettore Greco
Vice Director, International Affairs Institute (IAI)
Rome - Italy
Tel: +3963224360
Fax: +3963224363
E-mail: e.greco@iai.it
13. Dr. Zina Haj-Hasan
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
14. Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim
Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
Al-Ahram Building, Al Galaa Street
Cairo - Egypt
Fax. 0020 2 5786037 - 5786833
Tel. 0020 2 5786037 - 114
15. Mr. Basel Al Kayed
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
16. Mr. James Moran
Head of European Delegation
Fax: 5686746
Amman, Jordan
17. Brig. Gen. Ziad Al Najdawi
Public Security Directorate
Tel: 5685755
Fax: 4630322
18. Major General Inad Odainat
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fax: 5606582
Amman, Jordan

19. Dr. Atef Odeibat
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
20. Amb. Abderaouf Ounaïes
Retired Ambassador of Tunisia
Bhar Lazreg, Sidi Fredj, Km 15
2036 La Soukra – Tunis
Tel. 00216 – 1- 764924
Fax 00216-1- 864055
abunais@planet.tn
21. Dr. Daniela Pioppi
Researcher
International Affairs Institute
Rome, Italy
Tel: +3963224360
Fax: +3963224363
22. Mrs. Raghda Quandour
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
23. Mr. Qasem Rawashdeh
General Intelligence Director
Jordan
Fax: 5864111
24. Dr. Reinhardt Rummel
Head, Conflict Prevention Network
SWP
Ludwigkirchplatz 3-4
10719 Berlin
Fax. 0049 30 88007100
Tel. 0049 30 880070
25. Major General (Ret.) Mohammad Shiyab
Department of Disarmament & Security Studies
Telfax: 5337302
26. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Ehssan Shurdom
Jordan
Fax: 5411477
27. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Tahseen Shurdom
Jordan
Fax: 5812170

28. Colonel Khalid Al Saidat
Public Security Directorate
Tel: 5685755
Fax: 4630322
29. Mr. Abdul Hamid Shishani
General Intelligence Director
Jordan
Fax: 5864111
30. Mr. Andreas Strub
General Secretariat, EU Council
Policy Unit
Rue de la Loi, 175
B – 1048 Brussels
Tel: 003222858321
Main telephone number: 003222856111
E-mail: andreas.strub@consilium.eu.int
31. Dr. Rateb Sweiss
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
32. Ambassador Nabil Talhouni
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amman, Jordan
Fax: 4648825
33. Ms. Maaret Tervonen
TAPRI, Mediterranean Study Project
University of Tampere
Finland
Tel: 0035832156111
Fax: 0035832236620
34. Dr. Abdullah Touqan
Tel: 5412719
35. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Salem Al Turk
Chairman and Managing Director
Economic and Social Association of Retired Servicemen & Veterans
Jordan
Fax: 4203395
36. Dr. Suzanne Verstegen
Conflict Research Unit
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael 7
2597 VH
The Hague

Fax. 0031 70 3282002
Tel. 0031 70 3245384
E-mail: sverstegen@clingendael.nl

37. Mr. Jesús Núñez Villaverde
Director
Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH)
Madrid - Spain
Tel: 0034915592523
director@iecah.org
38. Major Naser Al Zoubi
Jordanian Arms Forces

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Workshop On
“Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention
Perspective:
Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context”

Organized By
The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
and
Istituto Affari Internazionali

Introductory Remarks by
Professor Kamel S. Abu Jaber
President
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

Amman – Jordan

Oct.1-2, 2001

The holding of this workshop at this time appears appropriate for the entire world changed mood in strange ways after the September 11, 2001 attack on the twin trade Center towers of New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Rightly the peoples of the world and in particular America and the West were shocked at the senseless terrible carnage and the loss of life. While conclusive evidence have not yet emerged, the finger of accusation soon was turned towards the world of the Arabs and Islam. So far all the persons that have carried the terrible deed have been identified as Arabs and Moslems. Two days ago was also the first anniversary of the Palestinian Intifadah which Sharon celebrated with his own terror and the promise of more terror to come.

The Arabs and Moslems continue to suffer a three wave shock: one at the horrendous loss of life and property which they consider inhuman; two that there is ample evidence that those who carried the attacks were Arabs and Moslems and a process of soul searching continues to ask how can young men raised by Arab mothers in the love, warmth and the gentility of the Arab family and the spiritual values of Islam that consider life holy, do such a deed? In the Holy Quran there is a verse that states that he who kills one soul senselessly and unjustly it is as if he killed humanity in its entirety. Life is sacred.

The third wave shock came when acts of terror and terrorizing both verbal and physical were conducted against Arabs and Moslems in their countries in the West. This shock will continue to reverberate, no doubt, for a long time and it comes sadly at a time when a dialogue of religion and civilization have been going on for nearly five decades. That Israel and its Zionist allies may wish to fuel the flames of prejudice and hatred is understandable, or at least almost so.

The So-called slip of the tongue by the leader of the West President Bush calling the campaign "Crusade" was most unfortunate. The word Crusade generates terror in the hearts of the Arabs with bitter memories of the havoc and destruction the earlier Crusades surfacing once again.

This is indeed a conflict of strange proportions, certainly no early warning was at hand. Most questions so far relate to the how, when and where with little attention as to why such an act was perpetrated. Hesitantly, many Arabs presuming themselves to be judged guilty anyway began looking for the reasons why and or linkage began to emerge to the injustice, the terror and the atrocities that the Palestinians in particular, and the Arabs in general are undergoing. How is it that the world remains silent to the terror that Sharon is committing everyday? Israel is the only state that has exempted itself from abiding by the provisions of international law, UN resolutions and the normal

behavior of states. It has a policy of assassinations and it carries out such acts with the curious though ferocious silence, perhaps even approval of the entire "civilized" international community .

King Abdullah II was the first to speak frankly of the linkage, of the double standards, the uneven approach and the injustice.

The response to the horrible deed is as clouded in mystery and wrapped in the clouds of enigma as the acts of violence themselves. This is a strange approach to a strange war with cloak and dagger in shadowy alleys, even caves.

The act was ugly but it was not an "Attack on America" nor was it an attack on "civilization", but the act of young desperados who could not communicate the injustice they feel in a different manner. No question that the act should be condemned and abhorred but it must give rise to a process of questioning as to the reasons why both socially and economically. One Russian writer, D. Polikanov from the PIR Center Nonproliferation And Arms Control categorically states that the "...Terrorist attacks ...[are] a growing uncompromising, ideological, political and military confrontation between the extremists of the South and the liberal anthropocentric civilization of them West..."*

* See Dmitry Polikanov [divalen @ online. ru], Sept. 26, 2001.

Such evil Nostradamus type declarations no doubt find solace in the writings of Samuel Hantington and theme, "the clash of civilizations", and Fukuyama's dire and irrational millennial predictions of the end of history.

I wanted to share with you these thoughts because we are still living in the shadow of this most recent conflict. Can an early Warning be predicted?

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Address of the Ambassador of Italy, Stefano Jedrkiewicz, to the Seminar

"Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention Perspective: Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context"

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy – Istituto Affari Internazionali

1-2 October 2001, Amman

Mister President,
Your Royal Highness,
Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is indeed an honour and a privilege to attend the inauguration of this Seminar. For the Italian Ambassador to Amman, this is an event of special importance: it is a major step in the implementation of a specific initiative, which was jointly launched by the Jordanian and the Italian Governments a few years ago, and which has been implemented up to date by the Institute of Diplomacy of Amman and the IAI – Istituto Affari Internazionali of Rome.

Let me briefly recall the rationale and the aims of the initiative. It all started in the mid-nineties. At that time, the idea was jointly conceived of an activity designed to contribute to the Political and Security Dialogue of the Barcelona Process. In this framework, it was also discussed in the Senior Officials Group. By an happy convergence of political will, Jordan and Italy eventually decided to set up the hard chore of a network on conflict prevention and to convene special workshops to elaborate procedures for "early warning" in case of crises and emergencies.

One important aspect was clear from the beginning: the opportunity that the real, hard work be carried on, not through the official channels of formal diplomacy, but through ad hoc Institutions. This is why both the Institute of Diplomacy and the IAI were enrolled, with the financial support of my country. One final aim is to endow the Amman Centre for crisis prevention with the required equipment (that is, a data-base). This process is being successfully developed today.

I would like to stress that this can only be an "open" initiative. In fact, in order to be successfully implemented – and even, to be implemented at all - it requires the broadest intellectual contribution from all the countries which are actors in the Barcelona Process. Seeing the panel which is assembled here, I would like to congratulate the Institute of Diplomacy for having been so successful in this regard.

Of course, the outlook of the Euro-Mediterranean area is rather different, today, from what it was like five or six years ago. Everybody can see the differences, and I am not going to elaborate on this point. I just would like to offer certain remarks on what can be the meaning of holding a Seminar on conflict prevention in the Euro-Med context on the 1st of October 2001.

I will do that by stressing one word. The context of Euro-Med cooperation should enable us to face some specific problems, challenges and threats: I mean common problems, common challenges, common threats. It is particularly urgent today that we

assess them according to common parameters, in order to be able to give them the only kind of response which is effective, that is, a common response.

When I say "we", I specifically refer to all the countries and supranational organizations represented around this table. But I also refer to all countries which are part of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. And in fact, I should refer to all countries, to all states, to all organizations which are actually striving in order to protect the security of the human lives which are entrusted to them. And I would like to make the following point in my capacity as Italian Ambassador: I believe that a common assessment and a common response are necessary and indeed possible, because we all share the same basic values which are the fundamentals of civilization.

In this connection, I think I should also recall one of the cornerstones of the Cooperation and Security Process in Europe, the so-called Helsinki process: that is, that no entity can achieve its own security at the expense of the security of another entity. I would like to add that you cannot even safeguard your own security if this means disregarding the basic rights of other peoples, or denying implementation to international law.

Ladies and Gentleman, during this two-day seminar, you will try to define how to implement conflict prevention in the actual Euro-Med context. I do not envy you your task: but I admire your intellectual courage. You need a lot of it. We all need a lot of courage in facing the present situation. We need the conceptual instruments which will empower us and enable us to manage crises and conflicts which represent a common challenge to all of us, the members of the Euro-Mediterranean family. I would like to thank you in advance for your efforts and for the results.

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17 OTT. 2001

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**Commentary by H E James Moran, Head of European Commission
Delegation Amman at the Seminar on Conflict Prevention
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, 1st October 2001**

Your Excellency, Professor Abu Jaber, Ladies & Gentlemen

It is true that after the events September 11th, this is a subject whose time has surely come. But while we are all now focussed on how best to counter terrible acts of the kind suffered in New York and Washington I think it may be a little early to get into that. Suffice to say that the EU is playing a full and active part in building the coalition against terrorism, and there are number of new measures in the offing, such as the establishment of a Europe-wide arrest warrant before the end of the year.

Whether its manifestation is a hijacked flying bomb full of people or a rumbling horde of armour, conflict stems from complex roots, and it is this that I want to concentrate on today.

The answer to why conflict prevention is the easiest part: it is above all a moral and political imperative, but it also makes sound economic sense. It is cheaper to channel conflict into dialogue and constructive action than to try to deal with the damage after the bombs have exploded.

Here in Jordan, which has paid a high human and economic price for conflict in the region over the last fifty years, this has been self-evident for generations, and the Kingdom has been a consistent force for peace in the region and around the world. This conference could not be held in a more appropriate place.

We in Europe have also long been preoccupied with the subject. It is not new for us. Indeed, The EU is itself in a sense the ultimate peace project, and perhaps the most successful. It has been the prime mover behind reconciliation and prosperity at home for fifty years and more. Living proof that, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, 'jaw-jaw is better than war-war'.

With this in mind, and given the importance of the Union on the international scene, our interests, ambitions and the massive resources we commit worldwide to assistance and cooperation, there is no question that Europe should play its full part in all efforts at preventing bloodshed of any kind.

And that is exactly what we are trying to do. Just a few months ago, we at the European Commission published a new strategy for our efforts in the field, and in this brief commentary, I want to give a flavour of it.

There are basically four main messages, all of which are relevant to the EuroMed context:

First, we need to make more systematic and coordinated use of our cooperation programmes to get at the root causes of conflict. We

should, in other words, get better leverage from our position as the world's largest aid donor.

The EuroMed partnership is a prime example of how we can contribute to nipping conflict in the bud. All three 'pillars' of the partnership have a role to play here:

- The political and security chapter involves regular political dialogue and numerous 'soft' security-building measures, such as training of diplomats and networks of Foreign Policy Institutes, of which this fine institution is one. It is of course true that the parlous state of the Peace Process has inhibited progress toward the 'hard' aim of agreeing a Med Charter for Peace and Stability, but that is not to say that it is any less of a priority. Moreover the growing political role that the EU plays in the search for a settlement is among many other things a complement to the Charter.
- The EuroMed free trade area to be set up over the next decade can be seen as a major conflict prevention measure in itself, involving, as it does, the promise of real and sustainable prosperity for the entire region in the longer term, with some 13 Billion Euros of assistance over the next six years to back it up.
- The social/cultural chapter is a major contributor to democratisation, protection of human rights, the rule of law and development of civil society in the region, key elements in supplanting conflict with dialogue. Common understanding, through cultural cooperation, has also improved, but I daresay we

need to do more here. The attacks of September 11th have among other things served to bring out the confusion and ignorance that still resides in parts of our region, and we need to reflect on how this can best be countered.

The second message is that we must raise the effectiveness of our actions through *tackling cross-cutting issues* which can cause conflict. Among those relevant to the EuroMed region:

- **Drugs:** there is a close relationship between drugs, crime and terrorism throughout the world, and there are many EU-funded programmes aimed at countering the drug trade. One such, which is for obvious reasons coming under intense scrutiny nowadays, is the so-called Afgan heroin road, where we have working with local authorities to set up 'filters' in Iran, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. We have also funded the preparation of a National Drug Master Plan here in Jordan, which has helped authorities here to develop a more comprehensive approach to interdiction and rehabilitation of addicts.
- **Sharing of water resources:** the EU has supported many actions here in the region aimed at dealing with water-related conflicts both real and potential. One such, known as 'EXACT' has led to very useful cross-border technical collaboration here, based on the common goals of respect for water-sharing conventions and fair management of water resources.

- **Environmental degradation:** with endemic drought and destruction of the flora in the region, the conflict potential is on the rise, and the EU is stepping up efforts to fight this, for example through supporting environmental law enforcement here in Jordan.

Third, we must *promote international cooperation* with Governments, International Organisations and Civil Society in conflict prevention. The UN is a key partner here, and we often work with the UN on preventing a resurgence of conflicts in peacekeeping operations. East Timor and Kosovo are recent examples. We are following closely the implementation of the UN's Brahimi report, which has helped to inspire the rapid reaction mechanism which I will speak of in a moment. There are of course many other entities involved here, but I just want to mention the important cooperation we have with NGO's, a fine example of which exists here in Jordan, with the Noor Al Hussein Foundation's culture for peace programme, which some of you may know. That operation, which benefits from a 1 million Euro EC grant, is doing tremendous grass roots work here and around the region in showing children and youth how to solve conflicts peaceably.

All of what I have said so far deals with the medium or long term aspects. But what about now? And, you've guessed it, that is the final message of our strategy, i.e. a *rapid response mechanism* to handle situations where tensions are growing but crisis has not yet become confrontation.

This requires an effective early warning system, and the establishment of an EU High Representative for Foreign Policy in 1999 has been a key development here. Javier Solana, so well-known to us here in the Middle East, where he has given a major boost to our political efforts to contribute to peace, has together with the European Commission and the Member states, been developing such a capacity, and this is already contributing greatly to our readiness to act.

The new EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism which I mentioned now allows us to bring a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation which would previously have been subject to cumbersome bureaucracy. These include everything from mediation or dispatch of observers through to peace-building, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The EU also has a variety of political and diplomatic options in a situation where conflict looms. Formal statements, political dialogue, dispatch of observers and Special Envoys all feature.

Political dialogue often involves the recalling of common commitments entered into, such as on human rights and democratisation, but to be of use in defusing conflict, it must be more focused and robust than has been the case in the past.

Special Envoys have been concerned mainly with open conflict, but they also have preventive role. Miguel Moratinos here in this region is not only concerned with putting out fires. He is also working on

some of the longer term issues, such as water and refugees that must be resolved if conflict is to be effectively defused and peace built.

Finally, we should note the new EU civilian and military crisis management tools that are being developed under the European Security and Defense Policy, including the 60,000 – strong force that will come into being in 2003. Although these means are designed primarily for crisis management, they could also be effective in a ‘pre-crisis’ role. But these are early days for the ESDP, and I don’t want to speculate too much on what is to come. One thing is sure, and that is in future years the EU will play a much more significant role across the board in preventing conflict, commensurate with its ever growing presence on the world stage.

But to prevent any conflict with our chairman today, I think I should avoid going beyond my allotted time and stop there!

Thank you for your attention.

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A Strategic Framework for Conflict and Policy Assessment

Requirements for a Coherent Conflict Prevention Approach: Possibilities and Limitations

By
Suzanne Verstegen¹

DRAFT, DO NOT QUOTE

Conflict Research Unit
Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
The Netherlands
e-mail: sverstegen@clingendael.nl
www.clingendael.nl/cru

¹ This paper is based on a number of joint publications of the author with Luc van de Goor.

Introduction: The Need for a Strategic Framework for Conflict and Policy Assessment

A steadily growing number of states and organisations has endorsed conflict prevention as a core objective of their foreign and security policy, but the record of undertaken early actions remains poor. Conflict prevention policy often adds up to 'too little, too late'. Time pressure results in inadequate interventions due to a lack of in-depth understanding of the underlying problems and the possible (unintended) impacts of the measures taken. This paper therefore starts from the truism that *early intervention* is generally better than late intervention. This requires of intervening agencies that they have at their disposal the capacity for early recognition of situations in danger of violent escalation. Moreover, they need to have a thorough understanding of their intervention capacity and possibilities for international cooperation. Conflict prevention, in short, requires an integrated approach that includes issues such as predicting and understanding conflict escalation as well as guidelines for policy intervention. This implies the building of an *in-house* knowledge and capacity basis. Sensitising the policy context to conflict prevention and creating a 'culture of prevention' at the national or institutional level therefore is an important first step.

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' has executed several research projects on the practice of conflict policy. At the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have attempted to deal with the challenge of operationalising a conflict prevention policy from the perspective of state (donor) actors. The overall aim has been to identify and elaborate options for policies and instruments on the basis of which the Ministry could improve on the signalling of, and intervention in (potential or actual) conflicts in so-called Third World countries. Similarly, it should identify ways and means with which the Ministry could enhance its activities to ameliorate post-conflict situations, and hence avoid the re-occurrence of these violent periods. In the light of this project a 'Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework' (CPAF) was developed with the objective of offering the Ministry a practical instrument for dealing with exactly these situations.² Before setting out the main elements of this framework, we will discuss some of the basis challenges in the effort of building a conflict prevention capacity.

² See L. van de Goor, S. Verstegen (1999), "Conflict Prognosis: Bridging the Gap from Early Warning to Early Response, Part One", *Clingendael Occasional Paper*, The Hague: Clingendael; and L. van de Goor, S. Verstegen (2000), "Conflict Prognosis: A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework, Part Two", *Clingendael Occasional Paper*, The Hague: Clingendael.

Operationalising Conflict Prevention Policy: Increasing the Applicability and Effectiveness of Models in their Operational Contexts

The Problem Defined: Official Policies versus Practice

Security issues and conflicts remain at the top of the international agenda. This is not only the result of an (apparently) growing number of conflicts, but also a consequence of increased expectations in the field of conflict prevention. There is a growing body of policy documents and statements on conflict prevention among a large number of national (donor) governments, international organisations and NGOs.³ Yet, attempts of the international community to deal with violent conflicts through the UN system or (sub)regional security organisations have seldom been successful. In this regard, Bigombe *et al* conclude that 31% of conflicts that have ended worldwide resume within a period of ten years. The record of African conflicts is even worse: half of African peace restorations last less than a decade.⁴

What are possible reasons for this poor state of record? Lacking political will and commitment were for a long time considered the main obstacles to conflict prevention. Today, however, a realisation is growing that the problem is not merely getting action, but implementing *effective* action. Goetschel and Schmeidl⁵, for example, distinguish between several shortcomings:

- Failures in analytical capacities, such as wrongly targeted information, inadequate analytical techniques.
- Failures in institutional capacities, such as poor communication channels, incoherent response strategies, ineffective co-operation.
- Failures due to external influences, such as an unfavourable political environment, priority setting, other conflicts etc.

Many policy-makers still lack a full understanding of the practical meaning of conflict prevention. They remain unable to act in concrete terms on their own rhetoric. A related issue is the hesitation to

³ See e.g. a number of policy documents produced by the European Union, United Nations, OECD/DAC; national governments such as Sweden, Great Britain, Germany, Norway and The Netherlands; and international NGOs such as International Alert and Oxfam.

⁴ B. Bigombe, P. Collier and N. Sambanis (2000), "Policies for Building Post-conflict Peace", p. 2.

⁵ L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2001), "Building Capacities In-house", pp. 7-8.

devote major attention and resources to conflict prevention as a result of ingrained organisational habits and associated vested interests.⁶

Within the multitude of issues and questions related to implementing and improving conflict prevention practices, we will here focus on the *in-house institutional capacity* of a 'third party' actor to improve its organisational capacity in the field of conflict prevention. Several aspects are of concern here, which will be addressed in the following paragraphs: Firstly, conceptual clearance on the meaning and objectives of conflict prevention, reflected in a common language and mission. Secondly, an understanding of implementation processes and the impact of policy responses. And lastly, the process of institutional learning and information mechanisms.

Conceptual Clearance: A Common Language and Mission

It is important to pay some attention to what is understood when talking about conflict prevention, since different understandings often reflect different strategies that actors might wish to follow. Any attempt to redress the gap between aspirations and reality should start by defining the means and objectives of conflict prevention.

Mission Statement: Conflict Prevention as a Policy Objective

Conceptual clearance should first of all contribute to the formulation of a common set of objectives: a mission statement and an integrated foreign and security policy. When conflict prevention is understood as a policy objective we need to keep in mind the importance of dissociating rhetoric from practice. Adopting a long-range approach to foreign policy or having adopted a foreign policy grounded in the search for non-violent outcomes cannot be equated with having a sound conflict prevention policy.⁷ It, indeed, seems hard to match idealistic polemics with real action. In conflict prevention, therefore, vision alone is insufficient. Intervening actors need to turn these visions into operational and realistic goals that could form the basis for the development of an effective intervention strategy. For this reason effectiveness seems to be a better criterion, referring to the ability to redress conflict proneness. As Paffenholz explains, these goals are best clarified through analysing an intervening actor's capacities and limits, values and interests. "While goals must be clear, the strategies employed to reach these goals can vary and will most likely be adapted or modified during the process of conflict transformation."⁸

Conflict Prevention Strategies in Practice

There is confusion between a multitude of actions under the heading of conflict prevention, management, mitigation, resolution, peace-building etc. This conceptual muddle is the result of a

⁶ As a research community, however, we have to limit ourselves to addressing the question of what intervention is possible and preferable at what moment in time in the conflict life cycle. It is another issue whether it is politically feasible and desirable for policy-makers to act upon this information. This involves policy and political decisions at various levels, and serving different goals.

⁷ See E. Brusset (2001), "Conflict Prevention within State Actors: How advanced are governments?", draft paper prepared for *CPN Annual Conference 2001*, The Hague 8 and 9 June 2001.

⁸ T. Paffenholz (2001), "Designing Intervention Processes", p. 3.

failure to distinguish between two basic elements of conflict prevention. Firstly, the conflict itself, i.e. the problem. And secondly, the various means for dealing with the problem, i.e. prevention. "Many discussions of this subject focus immediately on the latter, without recognising that the process of preventing conflicts must first diagnose particular conflicts, and only then prescribe possible 'solutions'."⁹ We can distinguish three essential criteria needed for a definition of preventive action: timing (when is the action supposed to take place?), actors (who is supposed to engage in preventive action?), and instruments (what strategies and actions fall under preventive action?).¹⁰ Lund provides an all-inclusive definition of conflict prevention that is useful for this context:

"conflict prevention may include any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence, to strengthen the capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully, and to alleviate the underlying problems that produce them. (...) Prevention can come into play both in places where conflicts have not occurred recently, including forestalling the spread of already active hostilities into new places, and where recent but largely terminated conflicts could recur. In principle, it can involve the particular methods and means of any policy sector, whether they are labeled prevention or not (e.g. sanctions, conditional development aid, mediation, structural adjustment, humanitarian assistance, media, preventive military deployment, democratic institution-building, etc.). These might be carried out at the global, regional, national or local levels by any governmental or non-governmental actor. *But whether any such means are in fact conflict preventive depends on how they are applied.*"¹¹ [italics added]

The last sentence of this description of conflict prevention might be considered the crux of the concept: It is important to look whether certain techniques are suited to the conditions in particular settings. If not, they often may be ineffective in preventing particular violent conflicts or even be harmful, rather than helpful.

Implementation: The Impact of Policy Responses

Most important therefore seems to be the incorporation of certain preventive ideals (peace promotion, conflict management skills) into the existing routine operation of 'third party actors'. It is now common knowledge that short-term and long-term frameworks need to be combined in effective strategies, as the sum total of many different interventions at various times within an overall process. We therefore should look into how different policy sectors can be targeted more precisely and operated more sensitively to prevent violent conflicts. This implies that certain preventive ideals need to be incorporated into the existing routine operation of third party actors. Moreover, different sections of an administration need to co-operate in order to achieve a coherent and effective prevention policy. This means for example that export promotion, human rights and governance aspects need to be put into one policy package regarding one country or region. Notions of (structural) prevention therefore also need to be present in the heads of actors less used to think in these categories than their colleagues

⁹ M. Lund (2000), "Introduction and Overview", p. 13.

¹⁰ See L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2001), "Building capacities in-house: Lessons learnt and training courses", draft paper prepared for CPN Annual Conference 2001, The Hague 8 and 9 June 2001.

¹¹ M. Lund (2000), "Introduction and Overview", p. 13, footnote 3.

from political or security departments, or departments dealing with peace-building efforts.¹² Hence, actors should remain aware of the entire set of strategies to implement the most appropriate approach. This requires flexibility. In finding entry points and partners, the strengths and weaknesses of all potential partners (international, regional, local) need to be analysed.

Preventive Capacity: Conflict-related Interventions

At various stages of the so-called conflict life cycle different policy responses are possible. Conflict analysis and trend analysis is therefore intricately linked to the options for response. As regards timing, often a distinction is made between structural (long-term) prevention and operational (short-term) prevention, but these are not mutually exclusive. Instead, there is an on-going continuum in which the two complement each other. Moreover, it is often difficult to distinguish between redressing the causes and the consequences of conflict, since we are dealing with dynamic processes. Hence, rather than speaking of specific conflict prevention tools, we prefer to apply the term 'conflict-related intervention'. Here a distinction is made between direct and indirect conflict-related intervention. 'Intervention' is here taken to mean or involve any activity that is intended to influence the course, intensity or scope of hostilities and/or activities geared at attenuating the effects of conflict. In this way the concept captures a range of activities: not only military actions are interpreted as intervention, but also activities in other areas, such as economics, development co-operation and, indeed, even 'mere' communication between one actor and the object of its intervention. This approach has the benefit that it underlines the importance of gradualism and incrementalism as features of the intervention concept. In this sense the intervention concept does not necessarily have to involve a rupture from conventional or 'normal' behaviour of one actor towards another.

Measuring effectiveness and impact

The sensitisation for conflict proneness and the effectiveness of particular interventions can be measured, as is suggested by the term Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). A common methodology, however, is still lacking. This is at least the case when one assumes PCIA to refer to measuring the impact of one particular measure. It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of particular policy instruments in isolation or judge it apart from the particular conditions under which it was put to use. The importance of putting emphasis on PCIA is therefore found in a more balanced understanding of the reality that external intervenors may contribute to conflict as well as mitigate or prevent them. Positive as well as negative results should be taken into account. Miall therefore argues that "[i]f one abandons the attempt to identify with precision the impact of particular policy interventions but instead concentrates on the conditions which favour benign or malign spirals, it appears that it may be possible to identify combinations of conditions which have helped to reduce proneness to violent conflict".¹³ Hence, conflict impact assessment is here understood as the combined effort of conflict assessment and policy assessment. This should be undertaken in the process of planning and strategy design (ex ante), but also during implementation to assess for unintended impacts or changes in the conditions. Lastly, the impact needs to be assessed on the longer term, after 'finalisation' (ex post), to learn the lessons and implement best practices in future policy planning.

¹² L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2001), "Building capacities in-house", p. 6.

¹³ H. Miall (2000), "Preventing Potential Conflicts", p. 45.

Embedding International Capacities in Local Networks

When extracting general findings, we need to recall that external conflict prevention measures are dependent for their effectiveness on contextual conditions, and their impact cannot be easily distinguished from the effects of domestic conflict prevention capacity. An external actor's capacity and toolbox assessment therefore does not suffice as a basis for intervention. Effectiveness will depend on the needs of the particular country situation, and on the local actors involved. Central to any intervention strategy should be the understanding that prevention cannot be orchestrated from outside, but needs to build on local circumstances, priorities and capacities. "Often those who may need preventive mechanisms most (countries in crisis areas) may not be able to afford the development of appropriate tools (lacking resources and/or know-how). Thus, partnerships are extremely crucial ...[and] the building of local capacities on the ground needs to be a key priority."¹⁴ Hence, from the beginning of an intervention, external actors should clearly understand their role. This is a limited role, and their effectiveness will depend on the degree to which they manage to support internal actors.

Institutional Learning and Information Mechanisms

In the last couple of years a large number of lessons learned studies on conflict prevention have been executed, often with sombre conclusions on past efforts. Many of these conclusions related to institutional capacities and processes of information sharing. In an evaluation of German development co-operation, for example, Klingebiel¹⁵ concludes that in some cases potential sources of conflict were overlooked or underrated. In other cases, there was a tendency to avoid certain types of critical information. He even concludes that the actors involved perceived the linking of conflicts to development cooperation as unnecessary, unless there was a direct impact on the technical implementation. As regards the recording, forwarding and interpretation of information he identifies various problems. Most important was the finding that there was a wealth of information, but that the information was inconsistent. In the same regard, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD¹⁶ concludes that the necessary information on conflicts usually existed, but that the available knowledge about facts and processes only seldom lead to action. Analysis of four cases (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka) resulted, amongst others, in the following findings concerning this aspect:

- Knowledge is not known by the right people at the right time;
- Background knowledge allowing people to interpret the facts, and to situate them and understand their wider significance, is absent;
- The salience of the information is not high enough to move those who could act effectively to do so.

Research into Dutch policies and interventions in six countries in conflict (Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Guatemala) resulted in similar findings. In these cases, conflict prognosis and diagnosis, as well as monitoring and evaluation, were incidental and rather unstructured. The

¹⁴ L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2001), "Building capacities in-house", p. 11.

¹⁵ S. Klingebiel, (1999), "Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations".

¹⁶ P. Uvin (1999), "The Influence of Aid in Situations of Conflict", p. 16.

overall picture is one of *ad hoc* policy instead of a coordinated and coherent approach. In some instances response amounted to 'business as usual'. In addition to imperfect decision making and inconsistency of the policies applied, most responses to conflict were reactive instead of proactive.¹⁷

Learning the Lessons Learned

In many cases, 'lessons learned' studies are taken up by outsiders. These are, moreover, mainly *ex post facto* assessments that focus on interventions at the macro level. What is needed, instead, is to include these monitoring and evaluation activities within the policy planning, decision-making and implementation process. Retrospective evaluations, such as lessons learned, thus need to be complemented with prospective assessments such as early warning and *ex ante* impact assessments. Research and expert capacity can be included here, but not without an involvement of the people in the field.

The biggest challenge, however, is learning the lessons learned. Goetschel and Schmeidl argue that the problem of many institutions is routine thinking over creativity, technocratic measures over craftsmanship, and evaluation processes that favor application of lessons learned rather than new assessments. "In the light of the above, lessons learned are only then a good tool for conflict prevention if they lead to important insights, and do not impair a proper judgement about the situation at hand. In addition, lessons learned (as other analytical mechanisms) only then serve a purpose for the mainstreaming of preventive action if they are not merely used as an alibi function (lip-service), but are actually implemented. Thus, evidence of the impact of lessons learned should be shifts in policies and changes in preventive behavior and not scores of reports."¹⁸ This implies a continuous effort in information building, institutional learning, and information sharing, and reconfirms the need for in-house capacity building.

Concluding Remarks

In addition to awareness raising on the possibilities of effective conflict prevention, training is important for building an in-house prevention capacity. Training may include skills of information collection, analysis, formulation of case-scenarios, translation of knowledge into response options and more practical conflict management and resolution skills. Entry points for building institutional capacity therefore are:

- Strengthening analytical capacities (early warning, impact assessments and lessons learned)
- Assuring coherent processes (a clear and shared mission, adequate linkage of communication channels and institutional structures)

¹⁷ For the reports see: Goor, L. van de, and M. van Leeuwen (2000), *The Netherlands and Afghanistan. Dutch Policies and Interventions with regard to the Civil War in Afghanistan*; S. Verstegen (2000), *The Netherlands and Guatemala. Dutch Policies and Interventions in the Guatemalan Conflict and Peace*; K. van Walraven (1999), *The Netherlands and Liberia. Dutch Policies and Interventions with respect to the Liberian Civil War*; P. Douma (2000), *The Netherlands and Rwanda. A Case Study on the Foreign Policies and Interventions in the Contemporary Conflict History of Rwanda*; G. Frerks and M. van Leeuwen (2000), *The Netherlands and Sri Lanka. Dutch Policies and Interventions with regard to the Conflict in Sri Lanka*; M. van Baarsen (2000), *The Netherlands and Sudan. Dutch Policies and Interventions with respect to the Sudanese Civil War*.

¹⁸ L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2000), "Building Capacities In-house", p. 19.

A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework

The overall assessment of the gap between rhetoric and practice has pointed to the observation that institutional and decision-making procedures require substantial improvement in the following fields: *understanding* conflict situations; recognizing and *anticipating* patterns leading to potential crisis; communicating this information adequately to policy-makers; identifying the right moments, areas and policies for *intervention*; and *monitoring* these interventions.

An integrated framework for assessing conflict and policies should address the main question of what to do with early warning signs and how to mobilize effectively when an alarm is deemed credible. It should do so on the basis of a better understanding of the conflict situation, and relating this information to the overall policy objectives in order to make decision-making more rational and effective. For this aim, we here present the 'building blocks' of a *conflict and policy assessment framework* (see figure 1 for a schematic overview). In the following paragraphs, we will run through the various steps in the model. The steps as mentioned here are straightforward. In the report¹⁹ each step is described in detail as regards the type of activities involved, the nature of information needed, and an outline of the several papers/products.

I. Conflict Analysis: 'Good Enough' Analysis

Conflict preventive decision-making should evidently be based on an understanding of the conflict situation and its dynamics. Policy-makers can choose from a wide range of models in this regard, varying widely in methodology, types and phases of conflict, indicators, and comprehensiveness. Strategies and tools differ between academic and practical, quantitative and qualitative, participatory and non-participatory, and at a range of levels. The objectives of these approaches also differ.

There, however, is a tendency of models becoming too complex for practical use by state actors or other intervening agencies. As it is evident for reasons of timing and swiftness that such analysis cannot go beyond certain levels of detail, the issue arises of finding the 'level of optimal ignorance'. In terms of analysis, this implies what Fein has called a 'good enough analysis'.²⁰ Such an analysis suggests identifying cause-effect relationships to such an extent for the user to understand a conflict, and to be confident that a given policy activity it wants to embark upon will be sufficiently effective.

¹⁹ L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen (2000), "Conflict Prognosis".

²⁰ H. Fein (1994), "Tools and Alarms".




Figure 1: A Schematic Overview of the CPAF

Step 1: trend analysis

In order to move beyond a 'snap shot' approach to a country situation, the focus of attention in early warning analysis is on the identification of changes over time, i.e. trend analyses for anticipating *escalation* of violence. Related to the 'good enough analysis', that negates the possibility of secure predictions, this implies that policy makers should be provided with an indication of conflict trends of the middle to short-term conflict escalatory process. Just as in medical analysis one does not need all indicators to be present for a positive diagnosis of a syndrome. Hence, just as physicians evaluate a disease or its recovery or remission on the basis of a limited number of indicators, so can conflict trend analysis indicate whether symptoms of conflict worsen or improve. This requires evaluating the

frequency and intensity of indicators over time.²¹ A first requirement for trend analysis is the creation of *country profiles* of those countries that are deemed to be the most important to monitor for potential conflict escalatory processes. These countries should then be monitored and assessed according to a standardized conflict analysis methodology.²²

Step 2: analysis of problem areas

The conflict analysis assigns weights to specific indicators, that furthermore indicate areas for response, i.e. so-called *problem areas*. For instance, exclusionary government, a lacking state capacity and a legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions indicate that governance is a problem area. Other examples of problem areas are, e.g., justice and human rights, the socio-economic setting, the internal security setting, or the regional security setting. These problem areas should be indicative of potential opportunities for policy interventions to redress a negative trend. The linkage of the problem areas to specific policy fields, instruments and actors should suggest operationally and logistically realistic responses.²³

Step 3: a conflict analysis paper

The product of the response-oriented conflict analysis should be a *conflict analysis paper* that builds on the country profile, the indicator trend projection and the key linkage to aspects of conflict and problem areas. Hence, this paper gives an overview of trends, the causes of these dynamics, and the main areas that require some form of conflict-preventive measures.

II. Policy Analysis

Just as conflict assessment provides clues on negative trends and significant problem areas, so should policy assessment shed light on the preventive capacity of specific actions. This assessment needs to build on the conflict analysis. The policy analysis should enable the identification of viable options for policy intervention, and should recommend policy-makers a coherent policy approach to the conflict.

Step 1: organisations capacity assessment

The simple finding or message that 'something needs to be done' does not imply automatic action. This results partly from the diversity at the operational level: the broad range of organisations, their different policy frameworks, mandates and operational mechanisms. The issue of who should be

²¹ This analogy is used by the Fund for Peace. See P. Baker and A. Weller (1998), "*Fund for Peace Analytical Model*", p. 14. Here the importance of following a conflict *over time* stands out. In order to establish the extent of danger, one must look at trend lines and evaluate the frequency and intensity of the indicators as these evolve over time. As with the medical diagnosis, a decrease in frequency and intensity of the indicators (or 'symptoms') indicates a road to recovery. Contrary, an increase in intensity points to a road to collapse.

²² From a selected overview of various conflict analysis and early warning methodologies, we have selected a model that is based on 'twelve top indicators' that cover a range of political, social, economic and security issues. This indicator list, as developed by the Fund for Peace, functions as the key-instrument for a, more or less, standardized approach to the analysis of conflict situations (see annex for a listing of these indicators).

²³ See annexe.

involved and who should decide are crucial in conflict prevention. Conflict prevention therefore constitutes an inherent part of the policy planning and decision making process. As each actor in the international arena (governments as well as intergovernmental organisations and NGOs) has its own 'toolbox' of instruments, mandates and operational frameworks—each with particular strengths and weaknesses—the policy assessment first of all consists of an appraisal of an organisation's available capacities.

Step 2: toolbox assessment

Analysis should then move on to identify the policy instruments available for response. When assessing these instruments, it is important to include issues such as timing and potential combinations of instruments. In this regard, the linkage of the conflict and policy analysis remains crucial.

Step 3: policy assessment and lessons learned

The key-quest then is to find out what is effective in the particular setting. The answer lies in so-called *peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA)*. A first question concerns the *prospective evaluation*: which strategy is likely to be effective? In this regard, experiences with previous responses to conflict situations can provide important information. A second question relates to the lessons-learned or retrospective analyses. As Reyhler points out, evaluations can choose as their focus different units of analysis. As a result 'there may be several sets of lessons about what is effective or ineffective, depending on the level at which prevention activity is being evaluated.'²⁴ Prospective or retrospective evaluation, therefore, can only provide informed judgements for policy makers and are no guarantee for successful and effective prevention.

Step 4: assessment of the overall security context

For a variety of reasons, it can be useful to opt for partnerships and coalitions in the intervention policy. The aim of this step therefore is to assess partnerships and coalitions that could enhance and broaden the in-house capacity for dealing with a particular conflict. These partners for alliances should be assessed on their capacities and objectives, as well as their activities so far in the regions/countries under consideration for intervention.

Step 5: a strategic policy paper

The 'informed judgements' then should recommend which policy instruments to use for specific opportunities for intervention, as well as which partnerships or coalitions would be best. These recommendations should be put in a *strategic policy paper*.

III. Planning, Assessment and Decision-making

Finally, decisions have to be made. This implies that priorities need to be set, and that a specific plan of action has to be designed. To come to a realistic policy design, ideally, the information of the

²⁴ L. Reyhler (2000), "An Evaluation of International Efforts in Burundi", p. 66.

conflict analysis paper and the strategic policy paper should be linked to policy priorities as formulated in the mission statement on conflict prevention.

Step 1: draft plan of action

The draft plan provides the first outline of the final strategy for dealing with a conflict situation. If intervention is deemed possible and relevant (there will always be a cost-benefit analysis involved), it will be necessary to specify who will be involved, and who will do what and when. Since no intervention will be embarked upon *ad infinitum* (in time nor in money), the design of such a *draft plan of action* will also involve the definition of so-called exit strategies.

Step 2: political cost benefit analysis

The draft-strategy has to be assessed for political and financial costs. The political costs refer to the internal and external basis of support for the suggested strategy. It will be important to assess whether action affects political relationships or conflict with other policy goals. In addition, it is necessary to assess whether suggested plans are financially feasible. The best options may not always be attainable in practice. Non-involvement is an option as well.

Step 3: plan of action

The final plan of action contains the overall strategy for managing or mitigating the (potential) conflict situation. The main objectives and priorities are set, as well as guidance notes for management procedures and terms of reference for responsibilities and cooperation.

IV. Implementation

In the implementation phase, the main goal is not just to implement policies, but also to assess their impact. Hence, in order to determine whether the strategic goals have been reached and whether the impact in practice coincides with the assumed effects, intermediate evaluations have to be made. It could very well be that changing circumstances and unintended and unforeseen effects require new approaches, plans, and/or timing of activities. This could best be attained through continued application of the conflict trend analysis.

Concluding Remarks

The presented assessment framework is foremost a procedural model. It does not offer detailed policy recommendations. Since each conflict is complex and unique, with its own history, culture, economy, set of actors and set of power relation, there is no single solution or 'magic formula'. It is intended that the framework will be applied for country cases. This exercise should enable policy makers:

- to define the mission
- to anticipate, understand and assess the conflict situation
- to catalogue the conflict situation and to relate it to the policy response capacity available
- to improve the communication and co-ordination between the various policy actors and fields

- to identify and prioritise options for response
- to identify and prioritise tasks for the short, medium and long-term that need to be accomplished in an operation
- to identify shortcomings in existing policies and instruments during implementation, to adapt these and/or to develop new ones

Current 'State of Affairs' of CPAF

Among a number of policy directorates at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an awareness is growing of the need for a more integrated conflict prevention policy. For this reason, the Clingendael Institute was requested to prepare an introduction workshop on implementing CPAF within the policy practice. One case study has been selected to act as a pilot case. The workshop is expected to take place in the first quarter of 2002. The main expected outcome of the first introduction of CPAF to the Netherlands Ministry is to sensitise the policy- and decision-making community for the opportunities of an effective conflict prevention policy. Since various actors outside the strict security and conflict field dispose of a broad range of preventive instruments, an effort should be made to link these tools in a strategic policy design.

Conclusion

An awareness has grown that 'doing something, anything' might just be the wrong thing to do. The complexity of conflict situations cannot be dealt with in a simple way, and standard operational procedures or quick fixes will not do. The disillusioning yet realistic 'do no harm' approach might be most appropriate in the field of conflict prevention. This implies an explicit conflict impact assessment exercise. On the one hand, this might suggest a hint at neglect for the need for action, as decision-making will take more time. On the other hand, it is an acknowledgement of the observation that successful intervention requires recognition and understanding of the processes at hand. To deal with conflicts in an effective way thus requires a more delicate approach. Intra-bureaucratic channels appear to be among the most promising routes to establishing a regular policy of prevention. Requirements appear to be:

- A coherent terminology
- Coherent knowledge and skills
- Coherent institutional and operational processes (co-ordination of different policy instruments)
- Coherent linkages and structures among actors (proper communication channels within and between countries/actors)
- Coherent linkage and sequencing of tools²⁵

At the moment these requirements appear absent from current practice in conflict prevention. They, however, need not be viewed as insurmountable 'obstacles'. Instead, they would shift attention to timely intervention, and the combination of long-term and short-term interventions. Structural prevention, thus, might become institutionalised in development co-operation efforts in unstable countries. At the moment, however, the main complaint of practitioners, whether in the field, or at the headquarters (the policy-makers) remains the lack of developed tools that can be implemented in practice. Placing solid knowledge and concrete guidelines in the hands of decision-makers about what approaches to preventing conflicts are effective, ineffective or harmful and under what conditions is an important ingredient of any operational framework. An important objective of further efforts therefore is to improve the effectiveness of preventive efforts by analysing the consequences of *different* policies in *particular* conflict settings and at *different* moments in the conflict life cycle.²⁶ Conflict prevention policy, however, most of all requires fundamental attitudinal change among its end users and a firm commitment on the longer term.

²⁵ L. Goetschel and S. Schmeidl (2001), "Building capacities in-house", p. 10.

²⁶ E.g. at the moment, the Clingendael Institute is developing tools for specific areas of intervention, among which the security sector, power sharing, poverty reduction and post-conflict institution-building.

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Annexe – Fund for Peace Top Indicators and Measures linked to CPAF Aspects of Conflict and Problem Areas

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|---|---|---|---|
| I Mounting Demographic Pressures | A. Pressures deriving from high population density, relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources (agricultural failure, environmental disaster) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Competition over resources ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Lack of economic potential | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resource management ▪ Governance Related problem areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Socio-economic setting |
| | B. Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, social interaction, religious worship, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entitlements versus distribution ▪ Demographic pressure ▪ Destabilizing settlement patterns ▪ Group-based inequality ▪ Lacking state capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resource management ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Governance |
| | C. Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entitlements versus distribution ▪ Demographic pressure ▪ Destabilizing settlement patterns ▪ Group-based inequality ▪ Lacking state capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resource management ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Governance |
| | D. Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a 'youth or age bulge', or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entitlements versus distribution ▪ Demographic pressure ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups ▪ Lacking state capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Resource management Related problem areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Socio-economic setting |

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|---|---|---|
| II Massive Movement Of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons | A. Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Destabilizing settlement patterns ▪ Private militias/paramilitary ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violation of political group rights ▪ Political exploitation of differences | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting |

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|--|---|---|
| III Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia | A. History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Contested state control ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Regional inequality ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Governance |
| | B. Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violation of political group rights ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | C. Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violation of political group rights | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Governance ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | D. Institutionalized political exclusion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Governance ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | E. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of 'hate' radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting |

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|---|---|---|
| IV Chronic and Sustained Human Flight | A. 'Brain drain' of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violation of political group rights ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | B. Voluntary emigration of 'the middle class', particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Economic deterioration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Resource management |
| | C. Growth of exile communities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Contested state control ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Internal security setting |

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|---|--|--|
| V Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines | A. Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, access to land and economic status | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Regional inequality ▪ Entitlements versus distribution ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Resource management |
| | B. Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, educational levels, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Regional inequality ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Entitlements versus distribution | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Resource management |
| | C. Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contested state control ▪ Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Regional inequality ▪ Entitlements versus distribution | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Resource management |

| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|---|--|--|
| VI Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline | A. Pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Lack of economic potential | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Resource management |
| | B. Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Destabilizing external investment patterns ▪ Macroeconomic instability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ International political-economic setting |
| | C. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Destabilizing external investment patterns ▪ Macroeconomic instability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ International political-economic setting |
| | D. Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programmes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Macroeconomic instability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ International political-economic setting <p><i>Related problem areas:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Socio-economic setting |
| | E. Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Economies of war ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Criminalization ▪ Regional war economies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Resource management ▪ Internal security setting ▪ International political-economic setting |
| | F. Increase of levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the population | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions ▪ Economies of war ▪ Lack of economic potential ▪ Criminalization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Resource management |
| | G. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Economic deterioration ▪ Destabilizing external investment patterns | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ International political-economic setting |


| Top indicators | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|---|---|--|--|
| VII Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State | A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions ▪ Criminalization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Internal security setting |
| | B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g. widely boycotted or contested election, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions ▪ Lacking rule of law | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting |
| | D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Criminalization ▪ Lacking rule of law | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting |


| Top indicator | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Conflict areas |
|--|--|---|--|
| VIII Progressive Deterioration of Public Services | A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lacking state capacity ▪ Lacking rule of law | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting |
| | B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Inter-group inequalities ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Justice and human rights |

| Top indicator | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|---|--|---|---|
| IX Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights | A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Justice and human rights |
| | B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent citizens | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Internal security setting |
| | C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and cultural institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Internal security setting |

| Top indicator | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|---|--|---|
| X Security Apparatus Operates as a 'State Within a State' | A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Private militias/paramilitary ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Justice and human rights |
| | B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected 'enemies', or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media ▪ Criminalization ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Justice and human rights |
| | C. Emergence of an 'army within an army' that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Human rights violations ▪ Violations of political group rights ▪ Criminalization ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Justice and human rights |
| | D. Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaign against state security forces (contested state control) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contested state control ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Lacking rule of law ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Regional inequality ▪ Private militias/paramilitary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Political-cultural setting ▪ Justice and human rights |

| Top indicator | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
|--|--|--|--|
| XI Rise of Factionalized Elites | A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Biased law application and enforcement by judiciary and security services ▪ Inter-group inequality ▪ Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Justice and human rights ▪ Socio-economic setting ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| | B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive government ▪ Political exploitation of differences ▪ Distrust among (identity) groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance ▪ Political-cultural setting |
| Top indicator | Measures | Potential aspects of conflict | Problem areas |
| XII Intervention of Other States or External Political and/or Economic Actors | A. Military or paramilitary engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contested state control ▪ Support of outsiders to militant groups ▪ Political instability in neighbouring countries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Internal security setting ▪ Regional security setting |





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5

Tools for a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area:

The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain and The Med Country Conflict Profile

by Laura Guazzone

Seminar on ***“Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention Perspective:
Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context”***

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***Tools for a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area:
The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain
and The Med Country Conflict Profile***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| BACKGROUND..... | 1 |
| SECTION ONE The Conceptual Framework of Conflict Prevention..... | 2 |
| 1.1 Basic concepts | |
| 1.2 Recent trends | |
| 1.3 Conflict prevention in the Euro-mediterranean framework | |
| SECTION TWO The conceptual framework of patterns of conflict..... | 7 |
| 2.1 Patterns of conflict in the Mediterranean & Middle East area | |
| 2.1.1 Global patterns | |
| 2.1.2 Regional patterns | |
| SECTION THREE The Euro-med conflict prevention chain..... | 11 |
| 3.1 reference models | |
| 3.2 Early Warning tools of the Euro-med Chain | |
| 3.3 The CPB paper (format) | |
| SECTION FOUR The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP)..... | 16 |
| 4.1 An Overview | |
| 4.1.2 Main Features | |
| 4.1.3 Criteria and mechanisms | |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 23 |
| APPENDIX 1 Survey of tensions and conflicts in the Mediterranean region | 25 |
| APPENDIX 2 List of indicators..... | 40 |
| CHARTS 1-3 Sample of data elaborated by the CCP software | |

INTRODUCTION

This paper is about the *Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain* and the *Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP)*. The former is a model of early warning and early response developed with a view to concretely introducing conflict prevention facilities in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); the latter is a computerised tool for early warning devised to be used in the *Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain*. The paper describes the conceptual framework, operational mechanisms and potential developments of both the Chain and the CCP, developed at the Istituto Affari Internazionali of Rome as part of a project called *Setting Up a Nucleus for Conflict Prevention in the Euro-med Framework: Towards a model for early warning and early response*.

The background section of this paper describes the project for which the Chain and CCP have been developed. Sections one and two of the paper delineate the conceptual foundations of both the Chain and the CCP, while sections three and four analyse their workings and state of development. More precisely: section one of the paper summarises the basic concepts about conflict prevention adopted in order to determine the main requirements of a conflict prevention system (CPS) for the Euro-Med area, while section two analyses the patterns of conflict in the Mediterranean-Middle East areas in order to determine what are the object and main requirements of early warning in this regional context. Taking a more operational approach, section three of the paper sketches the 'conflict prevention chain' of the envisaged Euro-Med CPS and elaborates on its early warning components, while section four analyses in detail the mechanisms and state of development of the CCP.

The elaboration of the IAI model builds on existing knowledge in conflict prevention and early warning methodologies and benefits from the ideas of many authors; in this regard, I am particularly indebted to two sources of inspiration: the work by Luc van de Goor and Suzanne Verstegen of the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International relations 'Cligendael', and the work by Albert Jongman and Alex Schmid at the PIOOM Center of Leiden University in the Netherlands.

BACKGROUND

At the beginning of 2000 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate of the Mediterranean and the Middle East commissioned the Istituto Affari Internazionali to develop a model of early warning and early response, intended as a basis for setting up a database with a view to concretely introducing EW facilities in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); the ensuing IAI project was called *Setting Up a Nucleus for Conflict Prevention in the Euro-med Framework: Towards a model for early warning and early response*.

This assignment was the result of several factors: first of all, the security dimension of the EMP enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration (1995) is regarded by many officials and researchers as inherently and largely dedicated to preventing new conflicts rather than solving existing ones. In addition, the Italian Foreign Ministry has played a leading role in orientating the security dimension of the EMP towards conflict prevention,¹ and the Istituto Affari Internazionali has drawn attention to conflict prevention and early warning in the Euro-Med framework, essentially through a research project carried out in 1996-1997 with the support of the United States Institute of Peace,² and

¹ Italy held the EU presidency in the first semester of 1996, when the implementation of Barcelona Declaration was initiated (for more details see Istituto Affari Internazionali 1998).

² The project has given way to the following publications: Aliboni, Miggiano 1999, Biad 1999, Guazzone 2000, Soltan and Said Aly 1999.

through the research on the Euro-Med Charter of Peace and Stability carried out in 1996-97 and 1998-99 by EuroMeSCo Working Groups³ with the support of the European Commission.

The IAI's *Setting Up...* project was designed to elaborate an overall model for early warning and early response, test it and make it operational at a non-governmental level by a network of selected Euro-Med research institutions. Once consolidated, it is hoped that this network of non-governmental Euro-Med institutes will be able to co-operate on conflict prevention with the official side of the EMP.

According to these objectives, in 2000-2001 the IAI team for the project -formed by Roberto Aliboni (project director), Laura Guazzone (senior researcher) and Daniela Pioppi (researcher and research assistant)- sketched out an overall model of early warning and early response (the *Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain* described in section three below), developed a first prototype of the early warning tool called CCP, and started the ongoing co-operation program⁴ with the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID) to discuss the conceptual and political framework of the model, test its tools and provide the first nucleus of the envisaged network. The continuation of the project to fulfil its broader objectives is already planned, but still to be confirmed.

SECTION ONE The Conceptual Framework of Conflict Prevention

The focus of this section is on the conceptual foundations of conflict prevention mechanisms to be developed in the framework of the EMP. It explores the current debates on conflict prevention models to determine the main requirements of an overarching conflict prevention system for the Euro-Med area. In order to do so it stresses the basic requirements of *any* conflict prevention system, as they emerge from the literature on conflict prevention theories, empirical models, and policy experiences.

1.1 Basic concepts⁵

The idea that the international community could and indeed should act to prevent or terminate violent conflicts worldwide really only emerged at the end of the Cold War, although it had circulated before. However, after almost two decades of academic research and policy experience on conflict prevention, the stark reality is that the international community -international organisations and individual states- can field only very limited political consensus and operational capabilities in implementing conflict prevention policies in the face of a high number of new and recurring conflicts. As a consequence, just like conflict management and conflict resolution, conflict prevention remains an elusive goal: so much needed and so difficult to achieve. In addition, experts lament that there is still 'little agreement amongst theoreticians and practitioners on the most effective practical methodologies⁶'.

³ The EW/CP dimension has been dealt with in the following publications: (1996-97 Group:) Aguirre 1998; (1998-99 Group:) Aliboni 2000, Calleya 2000, EuroMeSCo 1999, Stefanova 1999.

⁴ The Directorate of the Mediterranean and the Middle East of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported in 2000 - 2001 the IAI-JID co-operation program.

⁵ Those interested in the subjects touched upon in this section can refer, among others, to Bloomenfeld and Moulton 1997, Brown and Rosecrance 1999, Holl 1997, Reychler 1994, Walraven 1998.

⁶ FEWER 1999, p.3.

Our model of early warning and early response in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EMP adopts as working definitions a few, widely shared concepts of conflict prevention, as elaborated by several authors:

- The purpose of conflict prevention is not to abolish violent conflicts, but to reduce the number of political tensions and disputes which turn into armed conflicts, thus mitigating the human, economic and political costs that armed conflicts bear to all parts directly or indirectly involved;
- Conflict prevention is a policy that deals with political tensions to avoid their evolution into armed conflicts and embraces all "actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken...to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle political disputes"⁷; following this approach, also in the Euro-Med context conflict prevention policies should deal only with *potential* conflicts (see below)⁸.
- The fundamental components of conflict prevention are early warning and early response; early warning is 'the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from area of crises [and] the provision of policy options to influential actors'⁹; adopting this definition, the *Med Country Conflict Profile* collects and analyses data about potential conflicts in the Euro-Med region, while the other early warning tools of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system (see section three below) link conflict analysis to policy options for preventive actions;
- Preventive action or (early) response, the other essential component of conflict prevention, consists of timely and targeted actions, undertaken by concerned actors on the basis of early warning, with the aim of preventing the (re-) emergence of violent conflicts; more precisely, preventive action embraces "response measures to deal with root causes and risk factors in politically tense situations"; more remote or diffuse conflict factors are addressed through "structural measures", while more focussed "operational tasks" address short-term risk factors;¹⁰ therefore, the aim of the response component of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system is the definition of a response strategy for the potential conflicts of the region and the selection, planning and implementation of the more appropriate preventive actions.
- Types of conflict conflicts can be defined quite differently according to the different parameters considered (e.g. participants or issues involved; stage in the conflict life-cycle etc.)¹¹; conflicts are not always violent, nor necessarily detrimental, and only violent conflicts require prevention; the envisaged Euro-Med conflict prevention system deals only with potential conflicts and in its framework violent conflict is defined by the existence of systematic armed violence between the conflicting states and/or groups¹²; theorists of early warning have often stressed that early warning tools should be different according to the different types or aspects of the conflict to be analysed¹³.

⁷ Schmid 1999, p. 16.

⁸ Sometime conflict prevention is defined to include any kind of activity aiming to prevent the *escalation* of violence; I have not adopted this broader definition because, although plausible and widely used, it is confusing as it includes a number of quite different policies – such as preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-building (for more details see Schmid 2000, p. 24-25).

⁹ FEWER 1999, p.3.

¹⁰ This distinction, introduced by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Schmid 2000, p. 67), has been adopted by the EU which distinguishes between "structural long-term and direct short-term preventive actions" (EU 2001b, point III).

¹¹ For instance, Schmid lists twelve acceptable definitions of conflict (Schmid 2000 pp.12-13).

¹² See § 4.1.2 below.

¹³ As detailed in section two below, the CCP adopt this definition, as it is especially designed for the conflictuality of the Mediterranean area.

- Potential conflicts are situations of political tension where armed violence is absent or sporadic, but likely to (re-)erupt; in the conflict life-cycle (the sequence of phases in which a conflict can pass through)¹⁴ potential conflicts are situated in the pre- and post- conflict phases; the main aim of the Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP) is to evaluate the origin of vulnerability to violent conflict of the regional countries, and to analyse the content of the single potential conflicts detected.

1.2 Recent trends

In its initial phase, research on conflict prevention methodologies focussed on early warning, a natural choice since prevention requires first of all that potential conflicts be detected and their causes and dynamics understood. Priority on early warning oriented research towards 'detection tools' (e.g. indicators) and formalised systems for data collection and classification. However, the sophisticated results of this first wave of research often remained remote from the policy-making needs of conflict prevention. This is why more recent research on conflict prevention methodologies,¹⁵ striving to develop viable conflict prevention capabilities, shows a strong shift of emphasis from warning to response, and adopts a bottom-up approach that focuses not only on the individual conflict, but also on the "end-user", i.e. the state/institution that tries to prevent and manage conflicts.

Our effort to develop a model of early warning and early response with a view to concretely introducing early warning facilities in the Euro-Mediterranean context, shares the objectives of this more policy-oriented wave of research and builds on its main tenets, which can be summarised as follows:

- a conflict prevention system consists of dedicated structures (e.g. situation centres) operating on the basis of: (a) a political mandate and process; (b) a formalised sequence of procedures; to be politically and practically viable, the system needs standardised procedures and parameters, but conflict prevention remains a political act and cannot be automated;
- the prevention of each potential conflict requires a specific conflict prevention strategy, tailored to its unique characteristics and the overall political contingency in which it takes place, structured according to a coherent methodology and customised to the aims and means of the specific institution establishing it;
- effectiveness is the second most important ingredient for the success of conflict prevention, (after political will); in order to be effective, response actions must be framed in an integrated, customised *system* of conflict prevention, based on a "good enough" methodology,¹⁶ which should be practical enough to permit timely response, and should be evaluated only against its concrete impact on conflict prevention.¹⁷

Putting theory to work, it emerges from the above that a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area (Euro-Med CPS) must satisfy two main specifications: (1) it should be tailored to the basic characteristics of conflictuality in the region concerned – the Mediterranean-Middle

¹⁴ See Schmid 2000, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵ For an overview of past and ongoing research in conflict prevention methodologies Van de Goor 1999, Appendix 1 and 2; Pioppi in Aliboni et al. 2001 (Part III).

¹⁶ The importance for early warning of "a Good Enough Model instead of a Causal Explanatory Model" is stressed by Helen Fein (de Goor 1999 p. 8 and Appendix 2, v. Fein 1994).

¹⁷ An ongoing effort concerns the development of standardised methods for the evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of response actions (see Lund, M. & Rasamoelina (eds.) 2000)

East area¹⁸ and (2) it should be customised to the aims and means of conflict prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

1.3 Conflict prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean framework¹⁹

The "security environment" of the Mediterranean countries is characterised by a substrate of basic instability -made up of underlying factors such as economic and social underdevelopment and inadequate political institutions in the Southern and Eastern rims, widespread cultural and ethnic differences, sharp South-South and North-South cleavages- which represent diffuse and interdependent factors of risk throughout the region. This structural instability of Mediterranean security is aggravated by more proximate causes such as the link between conflict, demography and migration,²⁰ the vulnerability of strategic communication lines, the diffusion of unconventional weapons, the transregional impact of long-standing internal and external conflicts (such as the confrontation between regimes and Islamic oppositions or the Arab-Israeli conflict), and the high number of open and potential conflicts (see Survey in Appendix 1).

This interdependence and transnationality of risk factors in the Mediterranean region is not matched by a coherent set of national and multilateral security policies. Quite to the contrary, the security perceptions and needs of regional states differ widely and co-operative security schemes are absent or weak. EU countries (and more in general G-8 countries) feel threatened by instability and conflict in the non-EU Mediterranean countries and would like the latter to co-operate in conflict prevention by applying their recipes to address the structural and proximate sources of instability in the region. Non-EU Mediterranean governments reject the component of conflict prevention policies which they perceive as Western intervention in their internal affairs, but confronted as they are with multidirectional threats, need Western help to increase their security.

As a result of this security environment, there is a real demand for a new, more co-operative security architecture in the Mediterranean region today. Its development is nevertheless hindered by numerous political constraints due to the asymmetries of the security agendas of the countries of the region. These asymmetries make any agreement on the mandate and mechanisms of a multilateral conflict prevention system for the Mediterranean region very difficult to achieve. Witness to this difficulty are the meagre achievements to date of the security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

In principle the EMP is the institution best equipped to develop a co-operative security regime for the Mediterranean: not only does it bring together more regional countries than any other of the existing initiatives for Mediterranean co-operation but, more importantly, it is the only forum where the security needs of non-EU Med countries are approached comprehensively through economic, political and security co-operation. The Barcelona Declaration undersigned in November 1995 by the European Union and the foreign ministers of twenty seven countries -the EU members plus their Mediterranean partners-²¹ established a "comprehensive partnership" based on three pillars: economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation. The content of the security chapter of the Declaration indicates

¹⁸ This requirement is discussed in Section Two.

¹⁹ This subject is developed in greater depth in Aliboni et al 2001 see Part I, § 3.4; see also Soltan 1999 and Guazzone 2000.

²⁰ For an analysis of this issue, see Choucri 1997.

²¹ Non-EU countries participating in the EMP include Malta, Cyprus and Turkey (which are candidates to become members of the EU); Israel, which has a "special relationship" with the EU; the quasi-state represented by the Palestinian National Authority; the seven Mediterranean Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon).

that the participants in the EMP agree on building an environment conducive to a regional system of cooperative security ("the common area of peace and stability").

Neither conflict prevention (CP), nor early warning (EW) were mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration itself. They were first introduced by the 1996 "Action Plan" covering six sectors of activity: strengthening of democracy, preventive diplomacy, security and confidence-building measures, disarmament, terrorism and organized crime. The objectives of the Action Plan were first scaled down and then put aside, with discussions concentrated on drafting a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability. Subsequently, while CP has been mentioned constantly in successive drafts of the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability, EW has only resurfaced - as a topic possibly to be discussed further on - in the "Progress Report on the Charter" presented by the Portuguese Presidency in May 2000. In the most recent draft of the Charter prepared for (but not adopted by) the November 2000 Ministerial Conference in Marseilles, there are no explicit and specific allusions either to EW or CP. The draft suggests, though, that in the "longer term" the Parties would consider the adoption of "several instruments crucial to preventive diplomacy" according to a list to be agreed upon.

In fact, because of the weak political consensus underlying the Barcelona process and the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EMP Parties have been unable in their negotiations so far to establish any common conflict prevention policy, or mechanisms. Still, in spite of its many limits, the EMP remains to date the only institution that could produce a multilateral political mandate for conflict prevention in the Euro-Med region. Waiting for political conditions for co-operative security to mature, conflict prevention in the Mediterranean area remains the task of the individual countries and of the European Union. This is of direct relevance to our model, whose Euro-Med Chain assumes some EMP autonomy with respect to the EU. In any case, when and if an EMP policy of conflict prevention were to mature, it could not but depend to a very large extent on the use of EU instruments, in particular when it comes to structural measures and long-run policies.

It is therefore interesting to note that the European Union, which has included conflict prevention among the objectives of its external relations since 1995, has recently delineated the main features of an emerging conflict prevention system.²² This development consists of:²³ the establishment of new institutions (the Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) and the streamlining of existing ones, the development of a set of guidelines and procedures for more coherent use of instruments for conflict prevention. As regards instruments:

The Union has an extensive set of instruments for structural long-term and direct short-term preventive actions. The long term instruments include development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies as well as political dialogue. The Union also has a broad range of diplomatic and humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention. Structures and capabilities of civil and military crisis management, developed within the framework of the ESDP, will also contribute to the capabilities of the EU to prevent conflicts.²⁴

The Commission has set out a concept of long-run structural policy that allows for more rational and effective use of the instruments it possesses as well as an improved division of labour with the Council, which in turn looks decidedly oriented towards providing responses to crisis in the shorter

²² This evolution is documented in recent statements by the EU Commission and the EU High Representative (see European Union 2000, 2001a); the more comprehensive description of the EU conflict prevention system (mandate, structures procedures) to date is a Coreper document endorsed by the Göteborg European Council in June 2001 (see European Union 2001b).

²³ For a detailed analysis, see International Crisis Group 2001.

²⁴ European Union 2001.

run. Both the Commission and the Council propose to base their crisis response and preventive policies upon the use of models of early warning and conflict analysis.

The evolution of the political and institutional context for conflict prevention in the Mediterranean is of direct interest to our model of Euro-Med CPS. Its overall design will remain valid whether the end user is the EU itself or the EMP; of course, the differences would instead be significant for the political mandate, structures and policy instruments.

SECTION TWO The Conceptual Framework of Patterns of Conflict

Most of the existing early warning models have been constructed starting from a preliminary hypothesis about the kind of conflict, or conflict parameters, to be observed. For instance the *Minority at Risk* and the *State Failure* projects -both developed at the University of Michigan and directed by Prof. Ted Gurr- focus on a specific kind of conflict (involving communal minorities or failing states, respectively) and concentrate on the identification of the structural indicators of that kind of conflict.

Our model for early warning and early response in the Euro-med context also starts from a preliminary hypothesis: it is designed to detect (and hopefully contribute to prevent) potential interstate conflict, the most diffuse cause of violence in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Of course, our model analyses domestic sources of conflicts, as well existing internal conflicts, but considers them mainly as precursors of violent interstate conflicts.²⁵

The choice to focus our model on interstate (potential) conflicts derives from a basic fact: in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and namely in the Near East and North Africa, the incidence of interstate conflicts is (still) high (see point 2.2. below). To a much lesser extent, our focus was also due to a policy-oriented consideration: since the political consensus that supports the security dimension of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation excludes explicit intervention in internal conflicts, conflict prevention in the EMP was likely to concentrate on interstate conflict (see point 1.3 above).

2.1 Patterns of Conflict in the North Africa and Middle East Area in the post-Cold War Period

2.1.1 Global Patterns and Early Warning

It is a common perception that after the end of the Cold War and with the rise of the information revolution the world has been changing at an unprecedented speed not only in the political sphere, but also in almost every aspect of human activity. A considerable body of literature has already tried to interpret the impact of these changes on the prospects for international war and peace, noting the emergence of new security concerns - including ethno-nationalism, environmental degradation, economic competition, and technological fault lines - and the new prevalence of internal conflict over 'traditional' interstate wars. In this regard, Jongman drew the following global picture of conflicts:

The majority of 110 armed conflicts between 1989-99 were internal, with most of the fatalities being civilians...Of the 110 conflicts, 60 reached the level of war (1,000 battle-related deaths in a year) at some time during the period 1989-99.

²⁵ How this focus is reflected in the mechanisms of the CCP model is described in section four.

Only 7 were inter-state wars...9 cases were intrastate wars with foreign intervention.²⁶

But as Levy remarked, "the perception that the end of the Cold War has changed 'all the answers and all the questions' goes too far, however, and the theme of change must be tempered by that of continuity."²⁷ In other words, it is true that the influence of societal, bureaucratic-organisational and individual factors on the causes of war and, more in general on international behaviour, "in the past has been seriously underestimated",²⁸ however, the present and future influence of these factors should not be overstated either. 'Traditional' systemic factors,²⁹ like geopolitics or the search for power, which are at the heart of the realist paradigm, continue to have an important role in determining the emergence of violent conflicts, including interstate wars, which have not disappeared. In addition, events at the global level suggest that some "new" trends in conflict patterns may already be losing their prominence, as Jongmann recently noted:

Recent assessment suggests that the role of ethnicity in warfare may be on the wane ...of 59 armed ethnic conflicts under way in early 1999, 23 were de-escalating...and only seven were escalating. Between 1993 and the beginning of 2000, the number of wars of self-determination has been halved...The shift is due, according to Gurr,³⁰ to the emergence of improved methods of managing minority-majority relations.³¹

Therefore, there is a general agreement that the end of bipolarism has brought about profound changes in global patterns of conflict, but the consequences of these changes are still emerging and, in the end, their respective role may be different in different places and times.

What matters here, in view of developing the conceptual basis for a conflict prevention system, is that most existing early warning models are structured on the assumed prevalence of internal conflicts and of some specific kind of internal causes of conflict.³² The majority view among early warning practitioners is that this is the right focus because of: (1) the statistical prevalence of internal conflicts world-wide; (2) the prevalence of internal causes in the violence afflicting the most conflict ridden regions of the world, namely Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, south-east Asia.

My hypothesis does not contradict this view, rather it specifies that the focus on internal conflict may not be the most appropriate when dealing with Middle East and North Africa, where early warning needs to focus *also* on interstate conflicts. The reason for this rests on two main arguments: (1) the empirical observation of the patterns of regional conflictuality: which stresses the high incidence of interstate conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region; (2) the structural analysis of patterns of Middle East and North Africa security, which stresses the centrality of interstate relations in the prevalent causes of conflict in the region.

2.1.2 Regional Patterns of Conflict and Early Warning

Security studies centred on the Middle East and North Africa provide a structural analysis of the regional patterns of conflictuality, and help to single out regional peculiarities within the global

²⁶ Jongman 2000, p.1.

²⁷ Levy 1996, p. 3.

²⁸ Idem.

²⁹ 'Systemic' here refers to the international system level of analysis of international politics (see Levy 1996, p.4).

³⁰ Gurr 2000.

³¹ Jongman 2000, p.2.

³² Van de Goor 1999.

context. As regards the relative role of systemic and sub-state factors, in their "Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context"³³ Korany, Brynen and Noble argue that "though still relevant, geopolitics ...[are] more useful if limited to being one variable in an explanatory scheme".³⁴ Their basic explanatory scheme is that in the Middle East and North Africa, the "specific properties of the conflict phenomenon are a function of the Arab - and Third World - state, with its two main characteristics for national security analyses: internal fragility and external vulnerability".³⁵ Korany and his co-authors trace the reason for these characteristics back to the specificities of the process of state- and nation-building in the Third World, a process which is still at an early stage but has to be "telescoped" to adapt to international realities.³⁶ This remark suggested some interesting (although debatable) reflections to Mohammed Ayoob, who argues not only that a degree of societal and state violence is inevitable in the Third World (an enduring and growing category in world politics, according to Ayoob), but also that the imposition of some international standards (namely the inalienability of statehood and individual and group political rights) has an adverse security impact on Third World states.³⁷

Starting from the premises discussed above, Korany and his co-authors analyse "the many faces of national security in the Arab world" and note the regional "prevalence of a special type of conflict...dubbed *protracted social conflict*. It is essentially multidimensional...The internal, religious, cultural and socio-economic factors become inextricable from interstate conflicts...The result is an interconnectedness and overlapping - rather than separation - between internal and international politics"³⁸.

The basic security implications of the "internal fragility" of the Arab state discussed in Korany's book coincide with the main focus of most early warning models developed for conflict prevention purposes. By contrast, "external vulnerability" - the other characteristic of regional states most relevant for international security - is usually considered less (if at all) by early warning models. Here again it can be argued that vulnerability to external pressures and dependence on the outside is typical of Third World regions (and small countries). However, the extent and nature of external vulnerability in the Mediterranean-Middle East is specific to this region: on the one hand, due to its unique endowment with strategic resources of global relevance (most notably energy), no other region in the contemporary world has experienced the same degree of foreign intervention and competition.³⁹ On the other hand, the reactions of Middle East and North Africa countries to external penetration have been particularly intense.⁴⁰ In other terms, while state fragility and external vulnerability are common features of Third World conflictuality, the way these ingredients combine in the MENA region is specific, especially as regards the incidence and nature of interstate conflicts.

Some light on the nature of interstate conflicts in the MENA region is provided by Aliboni and Miggiano in their *Conflict and Its Sources in the Near East and North Africa*⁴¹. Their arguments about the quality and patterns of conflict in the Near East and North Africa confirm Korany's findings, and expand the analysis in a conflict prevention perspective, stressing the role and incidence of different kinds (intra-state/interstate) and levels (underlying and proximate) of factors of conflict in the region. Aliboni and Miggiano's main arguments can be summarised as follows:

³³ Korany et al. 1996.

³⁴ Idem, p.6.

³⁵ Idem p. 11.

³⁶ Ibidem

³⁷ Ayoob 1996.

³⁸ Korany et al. 1996, p. 11.

³⁹ Morris 1993.

⁴⁰ Binder 1964, Chapter 9.

⁴¹ Aliboni and Miggiano 1999.

- In the post-Cold War period, patterns of conflict in the Near East and North Africa countries are similar to those observed globally, as far as the incidence and causes of domestic ("intra-state") conflict are concerned, but differ from global patterns as far as inter-state (international) conflict is concerned, because of a higher than average propensity to and persistence of international conflict.
- In the region, the main causes of domestic conflict derive from two underlying factors: structural fault lines in the "ethnic, religious and communitarian geography" and "weaknesses in nation- and democracy-building".
- The origins of inter-state conflicts, in ultimate analysis, go back to one main underlying cause "the existence of (three) unsolved national questions": the Palestinian question (with its cluster of associate Arab-Israel conflicts), the question of primacy in the Maghreb (symbolised by conflict over Western Sahara) and the question of Turkey's national and international identity (which irradiates over relations with Europe, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia). (To these, I would add the Iraqi national question, with its reverberation on conflicts in the Gulf region).
- Some of the main interstate conflicts in the region, namely the Arab-Israeli and Western Saharan, are terminated but not solved: i.e. the prevailing political and military conditions prevent them from escalating, but they reverberate into intrastate conflicts (and could revert to violence under different conditions). The Iraqi question is neither solved nor terminated.
- Intrastate ethnic and religious conflicts (e.g. Islamist opposition vs. regime in Algeria and Egypt) "is not bound to translate in inter-state conflict and will hardly give way to international actions", mainly because they will not bring about the failure or collapse of the state (as in Somalia), since regional states, in spite of their many weaknesses, are well "implanted" and consolidated.

The conclusions reached by structural analysis of regional patterns of conflict are therefore that state fragility and external vulnerability specifically combine in the MENA to produce a high incidence and persistence of interstate conflicts. These theoretical findings are confirmed by the empirical observation of today's regional conflictuality, which is summarised in the "Survey of tensions and conflicts in the enlarged Mediterranean region" provided in Appendix 1.

In particular, the analysis of the survey confirms the high incidence of interstate conflicts in the MENA region and the necessity to target them through conflict prevention since:

- the large majority of the cases recorded (18 out of 25) are interstate conflicts (conflicts in which the main parties are states);
- in more than half of the cases recorded (13 out of the 25), conflicts are in a pre- or post-violent stage and therefore should be monitored through early warning and could benefit from preventive actions;
- the large majority of potential conflicts (11 out of 13) are inter-state tensions and disputes.

SECTION THREE The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain

As argued above, a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area should operate on the basis of: (a) a political mandate and process; (b) dedicated resources⁴²; (c) a formalised sequence of procedures. The focus of this section is on this formalised sequence, dubbed the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain⁴³.

3.1 Reference Models

Two recent works provide particularly useful models for the development of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain: *Conflict Prognosis: the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework* by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Cligendael";⁴⁴ and the *Peace Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical Guide*, by the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)⁴⁵. The relevance of these works is manifold: they build on a thorough survey of previous research and -to a lesser extent- of policy experience; they blend European and US approaches to conflict prevention; and last, and most relevant to our purposes, they are policy-oriented and the envisaged 'end user' is either the European Union (CPN), or one of its member countries (Cligendael).

The work by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International relations 'Cligendael' -elaborated on the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs- develops in detail an operational "conflict and policy assessment framework (CPAF)" to be used by the Dutch Foreign Ministry for the purposes of its development cooperation policies. The purpose is to provide a single and coherent framework to devise, implement and assess a conflict prevention strategy tailored for a specific potential conflict; the basic pillars of the CPAF are three format documents: the Conflict analysis paper, the Strategic policy paper and the Plan of Action.

The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN, established in 1997) is a network of European research institutes, NGOs and individual experts, commissioned to provide the European Commission and the European Parliament with analyses and policy options *vis-à-vis* potential conflicts. Michael Lund and Andreas Mehler developed the *Practical Guide* for the CPN on the request of the Directorate General VIII of the European Commission. The *Guide* is intended to provide "informed and practical guidance for policy-makers and administrators of the European Commission" to help them identify "what concrete measures exist and are likely to be effective in addressing the causes of conflict and problem areas that have been identified as significant in a particular country".⁴⁶

As mentioned above, the different components of a conflict prevention system form a sequence (chain), and each main component is composed of different procedures and steps that may require specific tools, such as databases and format documents.⁴⁷ *Figure 1* summarises the main components of the conflict prevention chain according to the Cligendael and CPN works. Looking

⁴² The content of the political mandate and the nature of the dedicated structures of an Euro-Med CPS linked to the EMP are analysed elsewhere by Aliboni (see Aliboni 2000).

⁴³ This label is modelled on Krummenacher and Schmid's "early prevention chain" (as quoted in Van de Goor 1999, Appendix 2-VI).

⁴⁴ This project, consisting of two parts (Van de Goor 1999 and 2000), is also reviewed in Aliboni et al. 2001, Part III, point D8.


⁴⁵ Lund and Mehler 1999: this publication is a draft and its continuation was recently announced (see *Atlantic News*, n.3251, 5 dec. 2000, p. 3); this project is reviewed in Aliboni et al. 2001, Part III, point D6.

⁴⁶ Lund and Mehler 1999, p. 8.


⁴⁷ This conceptualisation borrows from Cligendael's work (see Van de Goor 2000, figure 2.2 "A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework in Practice", p.12).

Figure 1: The Conflict Prevention Chain

Clingendael:



CPN:



at the two "chains" described in Figure 1, it appears that the two approaches are similar, but have some differences. Both Cligendael and CPN consider four main steps in the chain:

1. early warning and conflict analysis: to track a potential conflict and its characters;
2. policy analysis: to map the available response options and their implications;
3. policy planning and implementation: to translate options into practical actions;
4. impact assessment: to review the effects of preventive actions and feed results back into the chain.

As regards early warning, Cligendael's work offers detailed guidance incorporating the model developed by the Fund for Peace,⁴⁸ while in this respect the CPN's Guide offers only some broad guidelines (namely the basic concepts about causes and stages of conflict, and modalities of response).⁴⁹ As regards the following steps in the chain, both models offer useful insight for the development and implementation of preventive actions and, in spite of differences in terminology and focus, are quite similar in their approach. For instance, both models base the elaboration of policy options on a system of key linkages between "problem areas" and policy measures. However, the Cligendael model is more detailed and comprehensive, while the CPN provides a quick reference to the "toolbox" of response measures available to the EU, the most relevant "prevention actor" in our region of concern.

It is a combination and re-elaboration of these two models that provides the matrix of the conflict prevention chain envisaged for the Euro-Med CPS (described in Figure 2) and of the early warning tools to be used in that framework.

3.2 Early warning tools of the Euro-Med Chain

The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain (see Figure 2) envisioned for the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention System is composed of four building blocks: early warning; policy analysis; policy planning; implementation and assessment. Each building block represents a phase in the process of conflict prevention and has a series of requirements, which include the use of formalised tools.

It may be useful to specify that formalised tools are not a whim of theory addicts: they are needed to optimise the use of the often scarce resources -time, funds, manpower and political will- available for conflict prevention. More in particular, the standardisation of evaluation procedures makes it possible to compare the requirements of different potential conflicts and the results of different conflict prevention actions: in the field of early warning this will, for example, mitigate the distortion effects of political proximity to (or remoteness from) a given conflict; in the field of impact assessment, standardisation allows for, among other things, systematic feedback of "lessons learned" into the prevention chain in order to refine or change procedures and tools.


However, for all their usefulness, the merits of formalised tools in conflict prevention (and political processes at large) should not be misunderstood: they should complement case by case qualitative analysis, planning and decision making, but cannot (and must not) substitute them. It is with this caveat in mind that I have striven to develop some "good enough" early warning tools.

Two main early warning tools have been designed for use in the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain :

⁴⁸ Baker and Weller 1998.

⁴⁹ This concepts developed by Michael Lund are more detailed in other works (see Lund 1996 and Creative Aassociates 1998)

Figure 2: Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain



- The *Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP)* software (analysed in section four);
- The *Conflict Prevention Background Paper (CPB)* format (briefly described below).

The CCP provides systematic data collection and analysis about potential conflicts, while the CPB furthers conflict analysis and maps basic policy options. The sources of inspiration of the CPB format are manifold: FEWER's conflict analysis model,⁵⁰ Cligendael's 'Conflict analysis paper' and 'Strategic policy paper' formats and CPN's Guide system of correspondences between the EU's policy objectives and tools.

3.3 The Conflict Prevention Background Paper Format

The *Conflict Prevention Background Paper (CPB)* format is a short written document (ideally 3-4 pages) that builds on the CCP database to provide a basic assessment of an individual potential conflict and of the main policy options for its prevention. The purpose of documents applying the CPB format is to provide the key linkage between early warning and policy planning. The methodology of the CPB combines standardised inputs, mainly deriving from data provided by the CCP, with qualitative analysis provided in a narrative form. The blueprint of CPB format (still to be fully developed and tested) is given below. The CPB format is divided into two parts:

CPB Part I: Conflict Analysis

The first part should provide a *concise analysis of the potential conflict* singled out by the CCP, reviewing its structure and conjunctural situation through the following elements:

- 1 identification data of the potential conflict (data from CCP⁵¹)
 - name of conflict
 - stage of conflict
 - history stage (new, new phase etc.)
 - main belligerents
 - escalatory potential
 - victims
- 2 concise history of potential conflict (narrative)
- 3 synopsis of sources of risk (data from CCP)
 - by category
 - by problem area
 - by disputed issue
- 4 analysis of the problem areas and disputed issues (narrative)
- 5 list of the actors of conflict (data from CCP)

⁵⁰ FEWER 1999.

⁵¹ Our main reference here is the CCP database that will contain historical series of the Country Profiles; the CCP database (still to be developed) should be integrated (e.g. on history and denomination) with data provided by other compatible databases on conflicts such as the KOSIMO database <http://www.kosimo.de> (see Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000), and the *A study of Crisis* database (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, CD-ROM).

- by role (adversaries, allies, mediators...)
- by issue

6 analysis of nature, actions, and agenda of the actors of conflict (narrative).⁵²

CPB Part II: Policy Background

The second part should map out the main *policy options for preventive action* by relating the data about the conflict described in the first part to: (a) the mission statements of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system (CPS) and (b) the Euro-Med CPS toolbox of preventive measures.

The Policy Background should include the following elements:

7 Elements of mission statement(s) relevant by country, stage of conflict, or problem area involved (narrative)

8 List of most relevant areas of intervention and functional objectives according to the problem areas involved (synopsis: see *table 1*)

9 List of main tools available to the Euro-Med CPS:

- by area of intervention (synopsis)
- by stage of conflict (synopsis)

10 Analysis of the main policy options and instruments available (narrative).

⁵² See FEWER 1999.

**Table 1: From Problem Areas to Functional Objectives.
Synopsis of Correspondences**

| PROBLEM AREAS | AREAS OF INTERVENTION¹ | FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES² |
|------------------------------|--|---|
| <i>Political</i> | <i>Governance</i> | |
| Regime | Democratisation, good governance, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights | Political dialogue, capacity building, international incentives, dispute resolution |
| Institutions | Democratisation, civil society development, judicial & legal reform, human rights | Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, political dialogue |
| International relations | International organisations membership, democratisation, good governance, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights | International political dialogue, international incentives, capacity building, dispute resolution |
| <i>Economic</i> | <i>Economic setting</i> | |
| Economic stability | Good governance, economic reform, resource management | Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, international incentives |
| Living conditions | Economic development, poverty reduction, education, resource management | Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, political dialogue |
| Economic relations | Good governance, economic reform, investment patterns | Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives |
| <i>Socio-cultural</i> | <i>Socio-Cultural Development</i> | |
| Type of society | Democratisation, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights | Political dialogue, dispute resolution, capacity building, monitoring & controlling |
| Socio-demographic transition | Democratisation, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights | Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives |
| Culture and ideology | Democratisation, civil society development, education, media | Political dialogue, dispute resolution, capacity building |
| Cultural relations | Democratisation, civil society development, education, media | Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives |
| <i>Security</i> | <i>Security Structures</i> | |
| Role of security forces | Democratisation, civil society development, judicial & legal reform, | monitoring & controlling, capacity building, |

¹ The main source for this list is Clingendael 's list of "policy fields" (see Van de Goor and Verstegen 2000, p. 61).

² This list elaborates on the CPN list of "areas of intervention" (see Lund and Mehler 1999, p.70-75).

| | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--|
| | human rights | political dialogue |
| Internal disputes | Migration & resettlement, resource management. | Dispute resolution, political dialogue |
| Strategic power | International organisations membership, arms control | monitoring & controlling, capacity building, political dialogue |
| International disputes | International organisations membership | Dispute resolution, political dialogue, monitoring & controlling |
| <i>Victimisation</i> | | |
| injured & casualties | Humanitarian aid | |
| Refugees, endangered people | Humanitarian aid, migration & resettlement | |

LIST OF FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES APPLIED³

Functional objectives are the main functional results that the preventive actions planned should try to reach, according to the analysis developed in the CPB paper. The five main objectives listed in table 1 may have a different orientation and content according to the problem areas in which they are applied. The list below suggests some of the potential sectorial aims that can be reached through different sets of practical measures (not listed here).

1. Capacity building

Strengthening of political & public institutions

Elections (example of associated measures: voter registration, election observers)

Improvement of the performance of public services

Strengthening of professional standards

Access to basic needs and public services

2. Political Dialogue

Awareness raising (example of associated measures: training on human rights for civil servants, army, police)

Stimulation of public debate

Re-establishment of trust & reconciliation

Creation of opportunities for dialogue

Demobilisation & reintegration

3. Dispute Resolution

International mediation (by international organisations, concerned states or NGOs)

Strengthening of domestic dispute resolution mechanisms

Alternative (NGOs) dispute resolution

4. Monitoring and controlling

³ This list elaborates on the CPN list of "areas of intervention" (see Lund and Mehler 1999, p.70-75).

Arms proliferation control systems

Development of domestic systems of accountability (key fields: tax, corruption, human rights)

5. International Incentives or Sanctions

Economic aid (extension or withdrawal of)

Diplomatic support (extension or withdrawal of)

SECTION FOUR

The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP): Model and Software⁵³

The following paragraphs provide first a concise overview of the CCP, with a focus on its main functions and underlying conceptual assumptions, and then an assessment of the state of development of the CCP (prototype, testing program, future use). Here, the term "Country Conflict Profile (CCP)" is used comprehensively to indicate both the underlying analytical model and its software application; when the description refers only to one of the two, this is explicitly mentioned.

4.1 An overview⁵⁴

The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP) is a computerised tool for the analysis of potential conflicts in the Mediterranean countries. The CCP was designed as the main building block of early warning in the Euro-Med conflict prevention chain (see section three above), although much of its content and methodology is relevant to other countries and users of concern and can be used independently of the Euro-med CPS.

The principal aim of the CCP is to single out the sources of risk and the stage of development of potential conflicts involving the non-EU Mediterranean countries of the EMP.⁵⁵ To this end, the CCP works through standardised mechanisms of evaluation of conflictuality, based on the values attributed to a list of indicators covering the main components of the country-system. The CCP analyses the underlying structure of conflictuality of a given country-system and its medium term (6 months to 1 year) modifications.

The data produced by CCP can be used for background monitoring, through databases (of the individual countries and the region as a whole), as well as to provide the basic inputs for conflict analysis and policy planning (for instance through the CPB format described above). Used in the framework of a conflict prevention system (as defined above), in conjunction with other practical tools, the CCP can be usefully applied for both long-term and short-term conflict prevention; if used alone, the CCP is best applied to long-term structural conflict prevention.

4.1.1 CCP: Main features⁵⁶

As its name suggests, the CCP is centred on two elements: country and conflict. Each Country Profile is structured in two parts:

1. Questionnaire (*data input*)
2. Assessment (*data output*)

⁵³ The Country Conflict Profile model and software were developed for the IAI by this author with the assistance throughout of Daniela Pioppi; software engineering was by I.Soft (Rome, Italy).

⁵⁴ For a full description of the CCP software, see *The CCP Handbook* (Guazzone and Pioppi 2001a).

⁵⁵ Non-EU countries participating in the EMP are the seven Mediterranean Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), plus Palestinian National Authority, Israel, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.

⁵⁶ Terms underlined are defined in the CCP Glossary (see Guazzone and Pioppi 2001a).

(1) The *Questionnaire* part consists of a list of indicators (see Appendix 2),⁵⁷ which appear as questions about the potential conflictuality of the country considered (indicators are negative, conflict prone factors, used as predictors or signals of potential conflict). In the CCP, indicators are distinguished according to: categories (political, economic, socio-cultural, security), levels (underlying factors, root causes, triggering events) and problem areas (regime, international relations, economic stability, etc.) The questionnaire requires the input of information about each indicator, assessing it in three fields: activation (is this factor active or not as a cause of conflictuality?), intensity (what is the relative weight of this cause of conflictuality on a 1-5 scale?), and actors (what states, groups or organisations are associated to this factor? in what role?); data input is facilitated by pop-up memos that help to interpret the issues involved. *Figure 3* shows a page in the Questionnaire (Egypt 2000).

(2) In the *Assessment* part, statistical elaboration of the data associated with the indicators allows for various quantitative and qualitative assessments. The CCP assesses four main parameters of potential conflictuality:

- Risk: indicating the overall propensity to violent conflict;
- Vulnerability: considering the likelihood of the eruption of a violent conflict in the short term (6 months to one year);
- Sources of risk: identifying the functional areas most vulnerable to conflictuality because of structural weaknesses or specific ongoing tensions;
- Actors of conflict: involved with different roles in the set of tensions and disputes that constitutes a conflict potential.

The CCP assessment part allows for queries about specific aspects of potential conflictuality. *Queries by country* are carried out on all data and assess the characteristics of the country conflict potential. In the CCP software, queries by country are listed under *Country Assessment*.

Queries by conflict assess the characteristics of a single potential conflict and are carried out on data associating the profiled country and a given adversary actor. In the CCP software, queries by conflict are listed under *Potential Conflict Assessment*.

Figure 4 shows the home page of the CCP assessment section (Egypt 2000) and gives an overview of the queries that can be elaborated through it. A sample of data elaborated through the CCP is given in charts 1 to 3. (Data used in charts 1-3 derive from the Country Profiles developed by a team of the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy: see § 4.1.4 below).

Chart 1 compares the evolution of the conflict potential of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco over the 1991-2000 period.

Chart 2 shows the sources of risk by category (i.e. by country's sector) of Egypt (chart 2 a) and Jordan (chart 2b) in the same period of time.

Chart 3 (a-d) shows the sources of risk by problem areas of Egypt in the same period of time (problem areas of the political category chart 3a; problem areas of the economic category chart 3b; problem areas of the socio-cultural category chart 3c; problem areas of the security category chart 3d).

4.1.2 CCP: Criteria and mechanisms

⁵⁷ The CCP list of indicators elaborates on a number of existing lists and namely on PIOOM's Domestic Conflict Escalation Early Warning Indicators in A. P. Schmid (1996), PIOOM Master List of Potential and 'Good Prospect' Domestic Conflict (De-)Escalation Indicators, Leiden, PIOOM.

Figure 3: CCP Questionnaire (Data Input) – Egypt 2000

Microsoft Access - [Data editing]

EGYPT

DATA INPUT

Select Category

Select Area


Select Area

| Indicator Name | Position | Intensity | Actors |
|--|--|--|--|
| <input type="button" value="Authoritarian regime"/> | <input type="button" value="Political indicators"/> <input type="button" value="root causes"/> <input type="button" value="regime"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Category <input type="text" value="3"/> Level <input type="text" value=""/> Area | <input type="text" value="NDP&, Military&, Mus Brotherhood#, Gama' Islamiya#, Trade Unions#, Professingna"/> |
| <input type="button" value="Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House)"/> | <input type="button" value="Political indicators"/> <input type="button" value="root causes"/> <input type="button" value="regime"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Category <input type="text" value="4"/> Level <input type="text" value=""/> Area | <input type="text" value=""/> |
| <input type="button" value="Regime is controlled by a communal (religious or ethnic) group"/> | <input type="button" value="Political indicators"/> <input type="button" value="root causes"/> <input type="button" value="regime"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> Category <input type="text" value="0"/> Level <input type="text" value=""/> Area | <input type="text" value=""/> |

Record: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Start | Microsoft Access - [D... | 14.41

Figure 4: CCP Assessment (Data Output) - Egypt 2000



The CCP is based on a series of general criteria: the conceptual basis and main references for criteria about the patterns of international conflict, the aims of conflict prevention, and the mechanisms available for early warning are analysed in sections one and two above. There are however other criteria underlying the CCP model: some are broad and relate to the basic tenets of political science (e.g. the notion of 'country-system'), international relations (e.g. the role of perceptions in foreign policy behaviour) or security studies (e.g. the dynamics of arm races); other concepts are more specific (e.g. phases in the conflict life-cycle and their relation to violence thresholds). This author's assumptions for each of these criteria have somehow been translated into (or adapted to) software mechanisms. The following paragraphs give a sample of some of these correspondences between concepts, assumptions and software mechanisms. (More technical aspects, such as the mathematics behind the assessment part, are considered only incidentally.)

- *the emphasis of the CCP model on interstate conflict* is reflected at various levels. To give an example, it is reflected in the choice of indicators through: (1) the inclusion of a category of indicators labelled "security", which regroups and details factors typical of interstate conflict (e.g. disputed borders); (2) the inclusion of a problem area about "international relations" in each of the four categories of indicators considered (political, economic, socio-cultural and security). The focus on interstate conflict is also reflected in the assessment mechanisms: (3) each active indicator bears equal weight in the statistics on which the assessments described above are based, but the model includes a great number of indicators relating to factors typical of interstate conflict; (4) also, each category of indicators - security, political, social-cultural and economic - participates equally in the statistics, but according to the assumed difference in their relevance for interstate conflict, categories, areas and levels include a different number of indicators: thus, in the final analysis, security, political, social-cultural and economic indicators weigh differently, in descending order.
- *the choice of indicators* gives emphasis to causes of conflictuality which are deemed more (or less) important in the North Africa and Middle East countries. Thus, contrary to other early warning models, which focus on specific patterns of internal conflict (such as human rights violations or state failure) and specifically target certain problem areas, such as the fractured communal structure of society, the CCP model always considers ethnic or religious issues as component parts of broader political, cultural or security problem areas. In other words, ethnic or religious diversity is not listed as a distinct problem area, but is dealt with through specific indicators in relevant problem areas (e.g. among political indicators, in the problem area "type of regime" or in the socio-cultural indicators, in the problem area "culture and ideology"). Conversely, the CCP model emphasises - through a number of dedicated indicators - other factors for their assumed relevance in the specific regional context: these are, for instance, the historical legacies of the Islamic (especially the Ottoman) empires and the colonial experience, which are detailed through a number of underlying political, cultural and security indicators. Also, analysts using the CCP are advised to evaluate the intensity of each indicator (which assesses the relative weight of a specific conflict factor on a 1-5 scale) keeping in mind not just the profiled country, but also the regional context; (i.e. considering the weight of same indicator in other regional countries).
- *country-system and problem areas* : like most early warning models, the CCP adopts the country-system as the framework of the early warning analysis. The country-system is represented in its components parts and dynamic processes through the indicators: the four categories of indicators considered - political, economic, socio-cultural, security - separate the different spheres of the country on a functional basis, while the different kinds of indicators

(structural, root and trigger) corresponds to the different level of analysis of country's dynamics seen in an historical perspective.⁵⁸

In the CCP perspective, the country-system concept stresses the interdependence and yet the autonomy of component parts: interdependence within the system is mirrored in the concept of "conflict potential" (see below), while the relative autonomy of the conflictual dynamics taking places in different sectors/levels of the system translates into the concept of "problem areas". The combined assessment of these two interrelated aspects is a crucial linkage to response analysis: response measures should target problem areas differently according to the overall conflict potential.

The CCP Country Conflict Potential indicates the overall intensity of the country's propensity to internal and external conflict; this potential is ranked on a three-level scale as high, medium, low, according to the average intensity totalled on all active conflict indicators, plus a complexity premium associated to the percentage of active indicators on the total of indicators (it is assumed that a high number of distinct tensions/disputes involving the same country has a cumulative effect and enhances the country's propensity to conflict); the country conflict potential does not necessarily indicate the more or less aggressive "nature" of the country's regime and society; instead it indicates the likelihood of political tensions escalating into violent conflicts, because of the concomitance of a high (or low) number of factors of conflict, such as an unfavourable historical legacy, a hostile international environment, an irredentist political culture or the lack of appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Sources of Risk queries, developed through the assessment part of the CCP (see above), analyse the country conflict potential in its component parts to highlight the fault lines of the country-system. It singles out the sectors (i.e. categories) of the country's life and activities most vulnerable to conflictuality because of structural weakness or specific ongoing tensions; sources of risk can emanate from policies and structures in the political, economic, social-cultural and security sectors. Once singled out, the main sources of risk can be analysed by problem area (e.g. economic stability), and with regard to a single issue (e.g. decline of foreign aid, tense bilateral relations), and/or to a single actor associated. These data make it possible to target preventive actions in the most risky sectors/areas/issues (or, according to policy choices, in less sensitive, but still relevant areas).

- *stages of conflict and levels of violence*: in addition to assessing the conflict potential of the country-system, the CCP can be used to assess the characteristics of individual potential conflicts involving the country considered in a given profile. The more general of the queries by conflict (see above) assesses the stage of the potential conflict detected. In line with the concept of conflict prevention adopted, the three stages considered in the CCP are pre-violent stages, that is they are not characterised by armed violence, however they do not exclude some casualties and victims:

(1) *Political tension* refers to an apparent, although often undeclared, degree of tension between the country of the profile and the adversary actor(s); the object of the dispute is limited and still largely controlled by political means; it might also refer to previous crises successfully managed and/or repressed by the regime;

(2) *Political dispute* refers to an open, declared dispute between the country of the profile and the adversary(s); it might entail some degree of violence (assumedly between 1-30 casualties).

⁵⁸ This typology of indicators, adopted by many authors for early warning purposes, corresponds to the hierarchical distinction between "structure, conjuncture and event" adopted by historians and sociologists alike to analyse social processes (see for instance Braudel 1977 and Tilly 1981)

Political means of conflict resolutions might at this stage fail to have a positive effect and the conflict might degenerate into a crisis or worse.

(3) *Crisis* refers to tense confrontation not yet escalated into a full blown armed conflict; it might entail deployment of armed forces and significant violence (assumedly 30-100 casualties).

The CCP three stages of potential conflict are characterised by the overall intensity of the political tensions and disputes, not by the level of violence or material damage. Violence is however considered in the CCP through a separate category of indicators ("victims"), which does not consider only casualties (battle-related or not), but also endangered populations (refugees and others). The tentative choice of these mechanisms relating to stages of (pre-)conflict and levels of violence touches a key and much debated point in early warning theory.⁵⁹ Violence is clearly a key determinant of conflict escalation and often the main trigger of conflict prevention actions, however trying to establish any mechanical relation between levels of violence and response risks would be highly misleading, because the same level of violence (and material damage) can impact differently on different countries, for instance because of the different size of the population and the economy.

There are, of course, a number of other assumptions underlying the workings of the CCP: some are detailed in the CCP Handbook, others become self-explanatory when using the CCP software. In any case, the structure of the model and, to some extent, of the prototype software⁶⁰ itself, has been designed to allow a certain degree of flexibility: for instance, the number, content and distribution of the indicators can be changed without prejudice to the overall working of the CCP; this will enable a progressive fine-tuning, as the database is tested and some of the initial choices are revised or reconsidered.

4.1.3 CCP: Progress Report

Research on the CCP has now passed the initial development stage and is approaching the operational phase. The following phases have already been completed: 1) design of the software prototype (CCP 1st release); 2) trial testing and second release of the prototype (CCP 2nd release). Two other steps are presently under way: 3) a testing program carried out jointly by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy; 4) an agenda for Improvement of the CCP. The next steps envisaged are: 5) the development of a new CCP software to be used through a dedicated website; 6) the development of a CCP database, recording the pattern of conflict in the Euro-Mediterranean region in the last two decades and monitoring its evolution on a (tentatively) bi-monthly base.

The development of a web version of the CCP and the creation of a CCP database are designed to provide a hub for the network of NGOs working on early prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

⁵⁹ The relationship between levels of violence and types of conflict is a moot point in conflict research, resulting in sometimes substantial differences in the evaluation of global trends (see Jongman 2000, p.2).

⁶⁰ The CCP prototype is an Access 1997 application (see Guazzone and Pioppi 2001b).

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Appendix 1:

A survey of tensions and conflicts in the enlarged Mediterranean region (June 2001) by Daniela Pioppi

1. Definition of area

This review focuses on the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean areas encompassed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). However, other adjoining regions are considered due to the influence they exert on the area of the EMP from a conflict analysis perspective. In particular, the review includes the following countries: *Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen.*

2. Definition of tension/ violent conflict

This review considers *violent conflict* following the Uppsala University's definition of armed conflict,¹ i.e. 'a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties (or more), of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility'.

However, to keep a 'conflict prevention' perspective in tune with the CCP project,² the review will also consider situations of *tension*, that is to say a contested incompatibility where the use of force between two or more parties has occurred in the past and/or could not be excluded in the future.

In order to consider both situations (conflict and tension) the review will utilise two measures of intensity. The first, following the Uppsala University definition, is quantitative and rests on the number of battle-related deaths per conflict:³

minor armed conflict (less than 25 battle-related deaths per year); *intermediate armed conflict* (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but less than 1,000 death per year); *war* (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year); *major armed conflict* (includes the two most severe levels of conflict, i.e. intermediate armed conflict or war).

The second measure adopted is qualitative and indicates the position of the given conflict in the conflict life-cycle: **cold peace, tense peace, unstable peace, low-conflict, quasi-crisis, crisis, war.**⁴ The first three stages are non violent situations of political tension (potential conflicts), while the remaining four are characterised by growing levels of armed violence (open conflicts).

3. Chronology

The review briefly considers the main stages or events in the evolution of the conflict/tension starting approximately from the last two decades.

¹ Sollemberg 1998, p. 21.

² This review covers potential and open conflict and does not use the same terminology of the CCP model, which is focused on 'potential conflict' (the CCP model considers three stages of potential conflict: 'Political Tension, Political Dispute, and Crisis (see section four).

³ Sollemberg 1998.

⁴ This is an elaborated version of Lund's categories (Lund 1996) adopted by Guazzone (Guazzone 2000).

4. 'Underlying factors' and 'root causes'⁵

In this review 'underlying factors' are considered as being those factors which, although they are not prevalent causes of conflict, are nevertheless important in understanding the situation, or can be considered as 'prerequisites' to the escalation of violence. In particular, the *underlying factors* mentioned by the review are:

colonial legacies (state formation, boundaries); *uneven development* or *economic crisis*; *a larger conflict in which the specific conflict under analysis should be placed* (i.e. Cyprus and the Turkish-Greek conflict); *external involvement* (when it is not the direct cause of conflict); *ethnic geography/nation state*;

Root causes of conflict are:

sovereignty (disputed sovereignty of a state over a territory or a population); *territory* (conflict over the control of a territory-s); *legitimacy* (incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of central government or change in its composition); *state structures* (incompatibility arising from the way the state is organised, structured or exclusionary nationalist policies); *ethnic factor*; *natural resources* (disputes over the control of natural resources); *international involvement*; *economic problems or harshness*. (Some of the categories used as prevalent causes could become underlying factors when they are relevant but not the direct cause of conflict).

5. Definition of main actors/parties

Main actors/parties of a conflict/tension can be other states, internal or external opposition organisations, ethnic groups, international institutions, and so on.

6. Main sources of the review

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⁵ Here again the terminology of the survey does not coincide with that adopted in the CCP model, but it is compatible with it (see section two).

| | Main party | Other party | Root cause-s | Underlying factor-s | Chronology (80s-2000) | Intensity (Lund) | Intensity (Uppsala) |
|---|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|---------------------|------------------------|
| 1 | Algeria | Fis/Gia ¹ | legitimacy /state structures | uneven development/ economic crisis | 1992 military coup/ banning of Fis 1993-98 the conflict escalates to full scale war 1999 beginning of a process of 'civil concord' with a referendum. 2000 violence continues. 2001 rioting and unrest in the north-eastern region of Kabylia and in Algiers. | crisis | major armed conflict |
| 2 | Republic of Cyprus | Turkish Republic of Cyprus | territory; ethnic factors | see Turkey-Greece conflict | 1974 Turkish intervention and de facto partition of the island 1997-98 Republic of Cyprus starts negotiation with the EU for inclusion. 1999 the situation improves when Turkey is accepted as EU membership candidate following an improvement of Greece-Turkey relations. | low conflict | minor armed conflict |
| 3 | Egypt | Islamic opposition | legitimacy | uneven development | 1981 murdering of Sadat. Mubarak comes to power. 1990s the confrontation between the Islamic opposition and the regime escalates with various terrorist attacks - also to foreign tourists - and the use of the army by the regime. 2000 the Islamic opposition is successfully repressed by the regime and appears to be more and more incapable of presenting a real alternative to government politics and economic reforms. | low conflict | minor armed conflict |
| 4 | Egypt | Israel | sovereignty | | 1978-82 Camp David and normalisation process between the two countries. 1993 Middle East Peace Process. 1996 Netanyahu government. The Middle East peace process is stalled. 1999 Barak government gives a new push to the peace process. 2000-2001 breakdown of the Oslo process and new Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories. 2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections. | cold peace | |
| 5 | Egypt | Sudan | territory; government legitimacy | see Sudan-NDA conflict | 1989 NIF ² coup d'etat in Sudan - Egypt is not favourable to the new Islamic government 1992 Egypt assert its claim to the Hala'ib Triangle. 1992-95 clashes at the borders. Egypt occupies the disputed territory. | crisis | minor armed conflict |
| 6 | Iran | Mujahidin al-Khalq | legitimacy | | 1970-78 Mujahidin al-Khalq start activity as an opposition organisation to the Shah government. 1978-79 Islamic Revolution. 1980-90 the Mujahidin al-Khalq are successfully repressed by the Islamic government 1991-1993 popular riots and terrorists attacks are claimed by the Mujahidin al-Khalq. 1997 Khatami wins presidential elections, it is the beginning of a period of reforms. 2001 Khatami wins elections and is confirmed for the second term. | unstable peace | |
| 7 | Iran | United Arab Emirates | territory | legitimacy | 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran | unstable peace | |

¹ Front Islamique du Salut/Groupe Islamique Armée

² National Islamic Front

| | Main party | Other party | Root cause-s | Underlying factor-s | Chronology (80s-2000) | Intensity (Lund) | Intensity (Uppsala) |
|----|------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|---|---------------------|------------------------|
| | | Emirates | | | Disputes over islands in the Persian Gulf (Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb, Abu Musa). 1997 in Iran Khatami wins presidential elections and starts a normalisation process. 2001 in Iran Khatami is confirmed for the second term. | peace | |
| 8 | Iran | US-Israel | legitimacy (Us and Israel vs. Iran), sovereignty (Iran vs. Israel) | | 1978-79 Islamic Revolution – American hostages 1997 Khatami wins elections. 2001 Khatami wins elections and is confirmed for the second term. | unstable peace | |
| 9 | Iran | Iraq | territory, legitimacy | external involvement | 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran. 1980 Iraq attacks Iran. 1988 end of the war 1990-1991 Second Gulf War and UN embargo against Iraq. 1992-2001 Iran and Iraq slowly restore diplomatic relations but are still trying to work out written agreements settling outstanding disputes (border demarcation, prisoners of war, freedom of navigation, sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab). | tense peace | |
| 10 | Iraq | Kurdish minority | ethnic factors, sovereignty, state structures | ethnic geography/nation-state; external involvement | 1980s Kurdish tribes' rebellion against Sunni central government. 1988 violent repression from Baghdad. 1990-1991 Second Gulf War. Allied establishment of a no-fly zone in the North of Iraq, and 'operation provide comfort' to protect the Kurdish-Iraqi population. 1992-94 US attempts to create an autonomous Kurdish government in North Iraq. Clashes between the Puk and Kdp ³ . Turkey intervenes various times in Iraqi territory against Pkk bases. | crisis | major armed conflict |
| 11 | Iraq | Shia community (SAIRI ⁴) | legitimacy, ethnic factors | | 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Shia community rebels against the Sunni government. It is violently repressed. 1990-1991 Second Gulf War. 1991-1992 intensification of riots followed by central government repression. A no-fly zone is established in the South allegedly to protect Shia population. | unstable peace | |
| 12 | Iraq | US- GB | Iraqi compliance to the disarmament programme; legitimacy | | dec. 1998-2000 a controversial military action is taken by the US and GB in response to Iraqi refusal to fully comply with its obligations under security council resolutions. Since then occasional bombing is carried out by US and UK air force. Dec. 1999 a new commission is set up by the UN (UNMOVIC ⁵). Iraqi authorities react in an ambivalent way towards the new UN commission. | crisis | Intermediate conflict |
| 13 | Iraq | Kuwait | territory | colonial economic legacies; indebtedness | 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait 1992 The UNIKBDC ⁶ announce its demarcation of the borders between the two countries. 2000 the problem remains of Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf (Warba and Bubiyan island) | low-conflict | |

³ Patriotic Union of Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Democratic Party

⁴ Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

⁵ UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission

| | Main party | Other party | Root cause-s | Underlying factor-s | Chronology (80s-2000) | Intensity (Lund) | Intensity (Uppsala) |
|--------|------------|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 4 | Israel | Jordan | sovereignty; territory | | <p>1994 peace agreements between Jordan and Israel.</p> <p>1996 The Netanyahu government puts in question a number of previous agreed matters and leaves the final status in a limbo.</p> <p>1999 Barak wins elections in Israel.</p> <p>2000-2001 breakdown of the Oslo process and new Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories.</p> <p>2001 Sharon wins elections. The conflict escalates.</p> | tense peace | |
| 1 5 | Israel | Lebanon | territory, sovereignty | see conflict Israel-Syria | <p>1975 -1989 civil war in Lebanon</p> <p>1978-82 Israeli occupation of Lebanon to Beirut (1982),</p> <p>1985 Israel unilaterally withdraws from Lebanon, but maintains a 'security zone' on the Lebanese side of the frontier.</p> <p>The Shia Hezbollah in South Lebanon starts guerrilla activities against Israel.</p> <p>2000 After the failure of the peace talks with Syria, Barak decides to withdraw unilaterally from the security zone in South Lebanon.</p> <p>2001 the breakdown of Oslo process, the al-Aqsa Intifada in the occupied territories and the new government of Ariel Sharon bring new tension between the two countries. Hezbollah in South Lebanon resume guerrilla activities.</p> | quasi- crisis | major armed conflict |
| 1 6 | Israel | Palestinians | sovereignty | | <p>1987-1991 Intifada</p> <p>1991 Madrid Conference</p> <p>1993 the Middle east Peace Process begins</p> <p>1996 Netanyahu wins elections in Israel. The Peace process is stalled.</p> <p>1999 Barak wins the elections in Israel and gives a new push to the peace process.</p> <p>2000 Barak and Arafat fail to reach an agreement on the final status at Camp David.</p> <p>New Intafada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories.</p> <p>2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections in Israel, the conflict escalates.</p> | crisis | major armed conflict |
| 1 7 | Israel | Syria | territory; sovereignty | | <p>1975-89 Civil war in Lebanon with Israeli and Syrian involvement. In 1985 Israel withdraws from Lebanon except the security zone. Syria (with Iran) supports Hezbollah guerrilla.</p> <p>1993 Middle East Peace Process. Peace talks between Syria and Israel.</p> <p>1996 Netanyahu wins elections, peace talks are interrupted.</p> <p>1999 Peace talks resume following Barak elections, but fail to reach an agreed solution.</p> <p>2000 Israel unilaterally withdraws from the security zone in South Lebanon.</p> <p>2000 Breakdown of the Oslo Process and new Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories.</p> | Crisis | Major armed conflict |

⁶ UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission

| | Main party | Other party | Root cause-s | Underlying factor-s | Chronology (80s-2000) | Intensity (Lund) | Intensity (Uppsala) |
|--------|------------|---------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|-------------------------|
| | | | | | 2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections in Israel. Israel hits Syrian military in Lebanon. | | |
| 1 8 | Libya | US | legitimacy | | 1980s US-Libyan relations worsen 1986 US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. 1988 alleged Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie case. US/UN sanctions against Libya. 1999 Libya hands over the two suspects to an extra-territorial Scottish court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands and shows a more open international approach. 2001 one of the two Libyan defendants is found guilty and the other acquitted the issue is renewed. 2001 Libya and the US have not re-established official relations. | low conflict | |
| 1 9 | Morocco | Sahrawi- Algeria | sovereignty | colonial legacies; natural resources | 1991 UN resolution for a referendum and establishment of a UN presence in Western Sahara (MINURSO ⁷). The peace plan is accepted by Morocco and POLISARIO. ⁸ 1992 Algeria and Morocco sign the Convention on the demarcation of their common borders. Although Algeria still contests Morocco's sovereignty in Western Sahara. 1992-2001 the referendum on self-determination is postponed over and over. 2001 new plan of the UN criticised by both Algeria and the POLISARIO for being pro-Morocco and for passing up the promised referendum. | tense peace | |
| 2 0 | Sudan | NDA ⁹ | sovereignty; legitimacy; natural resources; ethnic factor | colonial legacies; uneven development external involvement | 1983-85 Sudan's second civil war commences notwithstanding the peace treaty of 1972 which granted a more autonomous status to the South. Nimeiri government introduces Islamic laws. 1986-89 new elections, Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes new Prime Minister. The NIF of Hassan al-Turabi becomes more and more powerful. 1989 a military coup, backed by the NIF, brings to power al-Bashir. 1990-2000 war with the South continues with the NDA, largest opposition group comprising the SPLM/A ¹⁰ of John Garang, been backed by external actors (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Egypt). | war | major armed conflict |
| 2 1 | Turkey | Syria | ethnic factors, territory (Hatay or Iskanderum) | see conflict Iraq-Syria- Turkey/ Syria-Israel | 1980s PKK ¹¹ launches military operation in Turkey from the Syrian territory. Damascus shelters Ocalan, the PKK leader. 1996 Turkey and Israel agree to military co-operation. Sept. 1998 Turkey masses 10,000 troops on the border with Syria and threatens Damascus with military action unless it expels Ocalan. Oct. 1998 Syria expels Ocalan. | unstable peace | |
| 2 2 | Turkey | Syria-Iraq | natural resources (water) | | 1990 Turkey starts the Gap ¹² project: a system of control and utilisation of the Euphrates' water in Kurdish areas. Both Iraq and Syria are concerned for the reduction in quality and quantity of the river's water. 2001 Although the parties involved reached temporary agreements, a final agreement has not | tense peace | |

⁷ UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

⁸ Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro

⁹ National Democratic Alliance

¹⁰ Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army

¹¹ Kurdish Workers Party

| | Main party | Other party | Root cause-s | Underlying factor-s | Chronology (80s-2000) | Intensity (Lund) | Intensity (Uppsala) |
|--------|------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------|------------------------|
| | | | | | been signed yet. The general political situation of the region (the renewed Israeli-Palstinian conflict), bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria, and the situation in Iraq do not ease the matter. | | |
| 2 3 | Turkey | Kurdish minority | ethnic factor; state structures | uneven development | <p>1984 the PKK starts its guerrilla warfare in South East Anatolia.</p> <p>1991-94 PKK activities reach a peak, establishing a de facto control over large parts of south-east Turkey.</p> <p>1994-98 Turkey's securities forces begin to regain control, pushing the PKK towards the mountains and Iraqi territory.</p> <p>1998 Syria expels Oçalan.</p> <p>1999 Oçalan is captured by Turkey.</p> | cold peace | Major armed conflict |
| 2 4 | Turkey | Greece | territory; ethnic factors | colonial legacies | <p>1980s -90s Greece and Turkey come various times near a crisis. Greece puts its veto to allocation of European funds to Turkey and to the Turkish candidacy to the EU.</p> <p>1996 the new Greek government (Costas Simitis) starts gradually a less nationalist approach towards Turkey.</p> <p>After the brief Cyprus crisis in 1997-98, the two countries seem to start a slow rapprochement. The events of the Oçalan capture and the acceptance of Turkey as candidate country to the EU (1999) contribute to this rapprochement.</p> | tense peace | |
| 2 5 | Yemen | Saudi Arabia | territory | | <p>1994 South Yemen attempts to break away from the newly formed union of Yemen supported by Saudi Arabia. The North successfully acts to crush the secession.</p> <p>In late 1994 Saudi troops move in the Asir province, already contested by Sana'a and Riyadh in the 1930s. In 1995 fighting was renewed along the Saudi-Yemeni border and there were reports of Riyadh claim to a permanent lease of a strip of land running through Yemeni territory from the Saudi border to the Indian Ocean along the border with Oman.</p> <p>1995 a memorandum of understanding is reached between Riyadh and Sana'a and a Commission is nominated to settle territory disputes. However the situation remains tense.</p> | unstable peace | |

¹² Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (South-East Anatolia project)

Appendix 2:

List of Indicators¹

POLITICAL INDICATORS

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Regime

- 1) Unfavourable legacies of previous political regime

International relations

- 2) Unfavourable position in the international system
- 3) Unfavourable position in the regional system

ROOT CAUSES

Regime

- 4) Authoritarian regime
- 5) Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House)²
- 6) Regime is controlled by a communal (religious or ethnic) group
- 7) Legitimacy deficit of government /regime
- 8) Instability of the regime
- 9) Ongoing regime transition
- 10) Detrimental political leaders personality

Institutions

- 11) Lacking or ineffective legal framework
- 12) Repressive or discriminatory legal system
- 13) Ineffective governance

International Relations

- 14) External pressures to adopt international standards
- 15) Uncooperative foreign policy behaviour
- 16) Detrimental external actor(s)'s political interventions
- 17) Troublesome country's political intervention abroad
- 18) Detrimental external actor(s)'s policy of mediation
- 19) Troublesome country's international political alliances
- 20) Tense bilateral relations

TRIGGERING EVENTS

Regime

- 21) Separatists declare independence
- 22) Attempted/ successful coup d'etat

¹ The CCP list of indicators elaborates on a number of existing lists and namely on PIOOM's Domestic Conflict Escalation Early Warning Indicators in A. P. Schmid (1996), PIOOM Master List of Potential and 'Good Prospect' Domestic Conflict (De-)Escalation Indicators, Leiden, PIOOM. Each indicator is associated in the CCP software to an explanatory note (including examples and/or details) to help the analyst to understand and assess it.

² Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondences are: average score 1-2 = null; average score 2-3 = intensity 1; average score 3-4 = intensity 2; average score 4-5 = intensity 3; average score 5-6 = intensity 4; average score 6-7 = intensity 5.

- 23) Breakdown of internal peace negotiations/peace accord
- 24) Opposition establishes government in exile
- 25) (Attempted) assassination of political leader
- 26) Political power passes to the military

Institutions

- 27) State of emergency is introduced
- 28) Sudden deterioration of the capacity of public services to provide basic needs

International relations

- 29) Hostile foreign policy behaviour
- 30) Aggressive foreign policy behaviour
- 31) Hostile foreign policy behaviour against country
- 32) Aggressive foreign policy behaviour against country
- 33) Breakdown of international mediation
- 34) Breakdown of external peace negotiations/peace accord

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Economic stability

- 35) Poor geographical features
- 36) Scarce natural resources

Economic relations

- 37) Unfavourable position in the international economy
- 38) Unfavourable position in the regional economy

ROOT CAUSES

Economic stability

- 39) Negative structural indicators
- 40) Negative macro-economic indicators

Living conditions

- 41) Human development index, UNDP³
- 42) Large income inequalities (gini index)⁴
- 43) Decline of the economy (last 5 years)
- 44) Economic transition

Economic relations

- 45) High external economic vulnerability
- 46) Low degree of economic openness and trade
- 47) Tense economic bilateral relations

³ Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondence is: score 0.9-0.8 = nul (high human development); Score 0.8-0.6 = intensity 1 (medium human development); score 0.6-0.5 = intensity 2 (all developing countries); score 0.5-0.4 = intensity 3 (least developed countries); score 0.4-0.3 = intensity 4 (very low human development); score below 0.3 = intensity 5 (alert situation).

⁴ Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the score 60-70 = intensity 4; over 70 = intensity 5; score 40-50 = intensity 2; score 50-60 = intensity 3.

TRIGGERING EVENTS

Economic stability

48) Presence of current risk indicators

Living conditions

49) Sharp decline of the economy (last 6 months)

50) Sharp worsening of environmental conditions

Economic relations

51) Hostile foreign economic policy

52) Aggressive foreign economic policy

53) Hostile foreign economic policy against country

54) Aggressive foreign economic policy against country

55) Economic boycott/sanctions/embargo imposed against country

56) Marked decline in international economic aid

57) International economic crisis with a negative impact on country economy

58) Detrimental external actor(s)'s policy of mediation

59) Detrimental external actor(s)'s political interventions in economic dispute

60) Debt crisis

SOCIO-CULTURAL INDICATORS

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Type of society

61) Rapid social modernisation

62) History of fighting among communal groups

Culture and ideology

63) History of cultural (religious, linguistic, etc.) diversity among population

64) Late/ traumatic modernisation

Cultural relations

65) History of discrimination in the international system

ROOT CAUSES

Type of society

66) High degree of communal diversity

67) One sizeable group has dominant/ sub-servient position within society

68) Great social inequalities coincide with communal divisions

69) Communal groups are concentrated in specific parts of the country

70) Population age distribution shows relatively large age cohort 15-29 (youth bulge)

71) Gender discrimination (GDI index, UNDP)⁵

72) Manifest signs of cultural (religion, language) exclusion/ oppression

⁵ Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondence is: score 0.9-0.8 = nul; score 0.8-0.6 = intensity 1; score 0.6-0.5 = intensity 2; score 0.5-0.4 = intensity 3; score 0.4-0.3 = intensity 4; score below 0.3 = intensity 5.

Socio-demographic transition

- 73) Demographic population shift threatens dominance of most powerful social group;
- 74) Increasing population pressure through influx of large numbers of refugees or migrants
- 75) Society suffers from consequences of recent foreign or civil war

Culture and ideology

- 76) Regime has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
- 77) Opposition has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
- 78) Regime identifies and targets internal/external enemy
- 79) Opposition identifies and targets internal/external enemy

Cultural relations

- 80) Minority groups receive support from abroad
- 81) Detrimental external actor political interventions in cultural sphere
- 82) Detrimental country's political intervention in cultural sphere abroad
- 83) Revanchist attitudes towards international/regional system
- 84) Country is culturally isolated from the external world

TRIGGERING EVENTS

Type of society

- 85) Regime policies towards communal groups worsen suddenly

Culture and Ideology

- 86) Regime begins to prescribe official religious belief or ideology
- 87) Fanatical groups with exclusionary ideologies/religious belief gain strength

Cultural relations

- 88) Rising hostile attitudes towards external actors
- 89) Rising hostile attitudes towards country

SECURITY INDICATORS

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Internal disputes

- 90) History of civil wars or communal fightings
- 91) Recent history of violent changes of regime

Strategic power

- 92) Unfavourable geo-strategic position

International disputes

- 93) History of external conflictuality
- 94) History of national military defeat

ROOT CAUSES

Role of Security Forces (armed forces, police, special corps)

- 95) High degree of militarisation
- 96) Controversial role of military in society
- 97) Security forces as a "state within the state"

Socio-demographic transition

- 73) Demographic population shift threatens dominance of most powerful social group;
- 74) Increasing population pressure through influx of large numbers of refugees or migrants
- 75) Society suffers from consequences of recent foreign or civil war

Culture and ideology

- 76) Regime has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
- 77) Opposition has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
- 78) Regime identifies and targets internal/external enemy
- 79) Opposition identifies and targets internal/external enemy

Cultural relations

- 80) Minority groups receive support from abroad
- 81) Detrimental external actor political interventions in cultural sphere
- 82) Detrimental country's political intervention in cultural sphere abroad
- 83) Revanchist attitudes towards international/regional system
- 84) Country is culturally isolated from the external world

TRIGGERING EVENTS

Type of society

- 85) Regime policies towards communal groups worsen suddenly

Culture and Ideology

- 86) Regime begins to prescribe official religious belief or ideology
- 87) Fanatical groups with exclusionary ideologies/religious belief gain strength

Cultural relations

- 88) Rising hostile attitudes towards external actors
- 89) Rising hostile attitudes towards country

SECURITY INDICATORS

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Internal disputes

- 90) History of civil wars or communal fightings
- 91) Recent history of violent changes of regime

Strategic power

- 92) Unfavourable geo-strategic position

International disputes

- 93) History of external conflictuality
- 94) History of national military defeat

ROOT CAUSES

Role of Security Forces (armed forces, police, special corps)

- 95) High degree of militarisation
- 96) Controversial role of military in society
- 97) Security forces as a "state within the state"

98) Communal security forces (militias)

Internal disputes

99) Frequent use of armed violence in support of political struggles

100) Large numbers of refugees/immigrants are a security problem

101) Presence of foreign armed forces on national territory

Strategic power

102) Unfavourable international military balance

103) Unfavourable regional military balance

104) Troublesome country's military alliances

105) Country's armed forces abroad

International Disputes

106) Disputes over refugees or migrants abroad

107) Disputes over transnational minorities

108) Contested borders (land, maritime, waterlines)

109) Disputed territories

110) Disputed water resources

111) Disputed energy resources

112) Disputed access (to sea, river; overland transit)

113) Dispute over strategic political interests

TRIGGERING EVENTS

Internal disputes

114) Hostile acts over problem groups (refugees, immigrants, etc.)

115) Hostile acts from problem groups (refugees, immigrants, etc.)

116) Intense revolutionary/separatist political activity

117) Police force are given special power to provide domestic security

International disputes

118) External military support of country's communal groups, opposition forces

119) Military support of foreign communal groups, opposition forces

120) Hostile acts over contested borders or disputed territories

121) Foreign hostile acts over contested borders or disputed territories

122) Hostile acts over disputed resources

123) Foreign hostile acts over disputed resources

124) Aggressive acts over contested borders or disputed territories

125) Foreign aggressive acts over contested borders or disputed territories

126) Aggressive acts over disputed resources

127) Foreign aggressive acts over disputed resources

128) Hostile military deployments

129) Foreign hostile military deployments

DATA ON VICTIMS


1) Civilian casualties

2) Armed/Security forces casualties

3) Refugees


4) Endangered population

Chart 1
Conflict Potential of Morocco, Egypt and Jordan in 1991, 1995 and 2000




See § 4.1.2

Chart 2 (a)
Sources of Risk by Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000




See § 4.1.2 (Sources of Risk Queries) and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 2 (b)
Sources of Risk by Category
Jordan 1991, 1995, 2000




See § 4.1.2 (Sources of Risk Queries) and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (a)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Political Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000




See § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (b)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Economic Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000




See § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (c)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Socio-cultural Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000



See § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (d)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Security Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000



See § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)



Istituto Affari Internazionali

Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: limits and opportunities in today's EMP

by Roberto Aliboni

**Seminar on "Early Warning and Response in a Conflict Prevention Perspective:
Applying Experiences to the Euro-Med Context"**

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Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: limits and opportunities in today's EMP

This paper presents some remarks on early warning (EW) and conflict prevention (CP) within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). These remarks are preceded by an evaluation of the present EMP's political status and capabilities.

Evolution and present state of the Euro-Med political context

The EMP is one out of the four schemes of inter-regional co-operation in which the European Union (EU) is presently involved, with a view to helping prevent and manage conflict by means of co-operative security policies and eventually upgrading its own security.

The Barcelona Declaration has given CP a pivotal role in the EMP. Geared to intervene on conflict's structural causes by means of sweeping economic and political reforms, the EMP is first of all a policy of long-term conflict prevention. In the Declaration, however, beside this overall orientation towards peace-building and structural conflict prevention, there are also indications on joint action to manage conflict and carry out preventive diplomacy in the shorter run.

The objective of providing the EMP with proper crisis-response capabilities was pursued by talks aimed at establishing a Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability. These talks shed vivid light on the fundamental disagreement that exists with regard to human rights and democracy. Yet, they also pointed to conflict prevention and human security as a common ground on which the EMP could be based.

The outburst of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis since September 2000 has prevented the Charter from even being considered by the November 2000 EMP conference in Marseilles and the talks from being pursued. Further to the discontinuation of the talks on the Charter, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis has practically resulted in a suspension of EMP's political and security dimensions and impressed a strong bilateral emphasis on economic co-operation¹.

Given this crisis, does it make sense to continue to talk about Euro-Med CP and EW systems in the EMP? A response to this question depends first of all on what the EMP's outlook is believed to be. On the basis of such an evaluation, one can speculate on whether and what CP and EW can be developed in the EMP. Let's first consider the state of the EMP today.

Despite the crisis, the EMP is unlikely to vanish or suffer a recess similar to that of other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern fora (like the CSCM; the ACRS; the MENA economic summits, and so forth). The EMP is a multi-layer structure in which political, cultural, social, security and economic dimensions are brought together without being necessarily interdependent. If some dimensions recede and multilateralism weakens, the EMP can still survive by working on remaining dimensions and using the EU's preponderant role as a stabiliser. Moreover, the Southern Mediterranean Partners have in any case a broad interest in the existence of the EMP and in having an EU presence in the overall process that, willy-nilly, brings together the North and the South across the Mediterranean.

¹ An overview of the present status of the EMP is provided by an array of oral and written contributions in House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, *The Common Mediterranean Strategy*, Session 2000-01, 9th Report, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 14 March 2001.

What is happening as a result of the present crisis is that EU-South Mediterranean relations are assuming once again the "hub and spokes" pattern of the past. Admittedly, it is not the most effective pattern of relations, and in this sense it has been criticised and the Barcelona Declaration was precisely a response to this criticism. The "hub and spokes" model is less effective than other models, in particular the multilateral pattern of relations the EMP has tried to set in motion. But it is not ineffective in absolute terms. And today's context allows for no more than a pattern of relations which is closer to the "hub and spokes" than to the multilateral model. Although not the best solution, it does not exclude significant Euro-Med working relations.

Thus, in this author's view, the EMP will continue to work, though short of previous ambitions. It will work essentially as a "hub and spokes" pattern of relations, where the EU would play a central role and mediate relations among the "spokes". It is with reference to this model that we can speculate on what CP and EW arrangements could be like in today's EMP, without losing touch with reality.

To this purpose, the paper considers three points: (a) it summarises the model of EW&CP that emerged from the talks on the Charter; (b) it speculates about what EW&CP arrangements may be established with the EMP as it is today; (c) it provides some suggestions on the role of confidence-building and civil societies in present conditions.

EW and CP in the talks on the Euro-Med Charter: a possible agenda

In their talks to set out the Euro-Med Charter, the Senior Officials considered various drafts, almost invariably coming from the EU side. In general, these drafts were basically oriented towards the idea that long-term CP and peace-building should be the main task of the EMP and that the political dialogue should be enhanced and work, among other things, as an EW arrangement on the basis of regular information-sharing. While there was consensus on these broad orientations, the Southern countries - as already pointed out - never shared EU's systemic link between political and economic reform in order to fight the root causes of instability and conflict. Most EMP Southern Partners maintain that the EU should help remove structural economic and social imbalances and leave Partners free to seek their way towards political stability and reform.

The Southern vision seems closer to the "human security" approach², as developed in the Lysøen process, than to the more traditional (and less pragmatic) approach recently finalised and adopted by the EU Commission³.

If the talks on the Charter were resumed, differences would not disappear but the "long-term" approach to CP - whether more or less traditional - could be the building block on which consensus could be based. Very little was said in the Charter talks on this long-term approach (even though it was, meanwhile becoming the central approach in the EU doctrine of CP).

In the talks and the Charter's drafts more was said about preventive diplomacy and the instruments and procedures to set up an EMP system proper. True, what the Senior Officials discussed were more scattered measures than an organic draft for the implementation of a short-term CP arrangement (thus reflecting the scant consensus on conducting preventive diplomacy). However, by referring to the drafts of the Charter, in particular the one presented by the Portuguese Presidency in the first semester of 2000⁴, it is possible to get an overall tentative view of how EW and short-term CP could look in the EMP framework:

² Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 265-276.

³ *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM (2001)211 fin., Brussels 11 April 2001.

⁴ Quotations are from the Portuguese draft.

- EMP's institutions would consider available information and eventually make decisions on joint preventive action; as in other bodies of regional co-operation (e.g. the Permanent Council in the OSCE), they would work as an element of EW, using "dialogue as an early warning procedure"⁵; it must be noted that, in this perspective, EW would be understood as an information-sharing activity, intended eventually to start processes of preventive intervention (information > consensus > action);
- beside coming from information-sharing in EMP institutions, EW would also come from "structures that would facilitate crisis prevention meetings and common perceptions in identifying structural risk factors and root causes of conflict", i.e. from some kind of EMP situation centre or national and/or intergovernmental (e.g. EU) situation centre;
- in implementing joint preventive actions, EMP institutions would be supported by some kind of conflict prevention centre, i.e. a "Euro-Mediterranean mechanism for preventive diplomacy and crisis management"; beside logistics, this centre would provide "training in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy" (and possibly other facilities of the same kind);
- EMP institutions would dispose of a set of specific instruments of conflict prevention, that is "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation"; "judicial settlement of differences and disputes"; and "adherence to appropriate international conventions", which - depending on the case - could be operated by the institutions themselves, by means of "Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms" (e.g. the CP centre or centres), or deferred to incumbent international courts.

EW and CP in the present Euro-Med context: a feasible agenda

Today, pending the crisis unleashed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the project sketched out by the Charter's drafts, as incomplete and modest it may appear, cannot be implemented. In the present Euro-Med context, the EW and CP agenda is shaped by two parameters: (a) the limits set by the overall Euro-Med political context; (b) the role of the EU. A strong EMP would be able to make its own EW&CP arrangements and tend to limit its dependence on the EU and its preponderant means. A weak EMP will tend to be more dependent on the EU and take advantage of the latter's firm and diversified structure. The present context suggests a weak EMP based on a "hub and spokes" pattern of relations, where the hub is provided by the EU. Despite the considerable dangers of unilateralism and Southern disaffection, this pattern of relations may make the EMP work. It is, therefore, in such a scenario that EMP's arrangements for EW and CP have to be figured out.

As we know, EW may come from information-sharing within the Senior Officials Committee. It may be brought in by individual Partners (both EU and non-EU). It may derive from EU institutions, which provide EW information on their own initiative or because so mandated by the EMP (as its hub). Whatever the format of such EW, in the present conditions, EMP institutions are poorly prepared or plainly unable to respond. In particular, their ability to respond is very different according to whether the action to be taken concerns the long- or short-term. As far as short-term action is concerned (late prevention, i.e. preventive diplomacy, or early management), the problem is that the EMP has not yet approved any mechanism or framework to make joint action possible. As things stand today, if a consensus arises to proceed on a specific case, the Senior Officials would have to prepare an *ad hoc* decision to be approved by the 27 Ministers and the latter would have to gather purposely to approve the decision: something that, for the time being, would require more political will than the EMP seems to enjoy. Thus, while the EMP in its present state can obtain and generate EW, preventive diplomacy and other short-term action can hardly take place.

⁵ As it was put by the "Action Plan", an early working document presented by the Italian Presidency in the first semester of 1996 and then superseded by the start of the talks on the Charter.

Instead, as far as long-term action is concerned (i.e. early or very early prevention), in particular actions related to aid and economic co-operation, the current institutional set-up largely allows for action. Within broad orientations approved by the EMP Ministers and the EU Council, the Commission works out policies and decisions that are approved by the standing Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona Process and then implemented by the Commission itself. Thus, there is a working framework for extending aid and economic co-operation on a multi-annual basis (essentially, the national and regional indicative plans), whereby long-term economic and financial policies can be implemented with a view to affecting the root causes of conflict.

Is there a system of EW when coming to long-term CP? As a matter of fact, there is an important interaction here between the EMP and the EU Commission, whereby the EMP can receive and contribute EW to a large extent. Before approval of the national and regional indicative plans and other economic measures by the Euro-Med Committee, there are significant opportunities for EW interactions between the Southern Partners and the Commission. These opportunities are mostly provided by the organisational and institutional set-up of Association Agreements and, where these agreements are not in force, by long-standing relations and diplomatic contacts between the Commission and the countries concerned. Thus, national and regional plans, submitted to the MED Committee and later on to the Euro-Med Committee, do incorporate previous information and negotiations. This means, among other things, that the relevant aspects of these plans in terms of EW and CP must already have been considered by both sides.

With the mainstreaming of the Country Strategy Papers in the EU's system of EW/CP, the consideration just mentioned is bound to assume compelling significance. In fact, the strategy papers will focus on the identification of the "root causes" of instability in the countries concerned and, in this sense, will bring about far-reaching and diffuse consequences in terms of policies and objectives. The analysis of the root causes of instability by the strategy papers and its policy implications, as legitimate as they are from the point of view of EU policy-making, may not match with the Partners' consensus. EMP's previous experience with the talks on the Charter suggests that there would hardly be a consensus on political "root causes" and related reforms. The countries concerned may disagree, even strongly, with donors' analysis and have difficulty in accepting policies stemming from it. It must also be noted that, if the same analyses and policies were presented in a more general perspective, they might result acceptable. It is the explicit statement of root causes of instability by the strategy papers that may, in fact, create a political problem which otherwise would not exist.

If this is true, the EW evidence provided by the strategy papers must be submitted to some consensus-building procedure. They should be at least commented, if not approved, in some EMP's political instance, like the Senior Officials Committee. In other words, the strategy papers or some cross-cutting elements of them should be mainstreamed in the EMP political dialogue. For sure, in a "hub and spokes" context, they should be mainstreamed, first and foremost, in the Association Agreements' institutions.

In conclusion, today's EMP is by far more prepared to develop long-term EW and CP than short-term. In the shorter-term, the EMP can share information within its institutions and obtain information from the EU, but would hardly be able to act. In the longer-term, the combination of multilateral and bilateral structures brings in EW, fosters consensus, and permits action to be undertaken. The recent reform by the Commission of its system of CP, in particular the introduction of the strategy papers, can provide an opportunity to strengthen EMP's capability in long-term EW and CP.

Confidence-building and the role of civil societies

Despite efforts and goodwill, a "hub and spokes" model cannot but reveal strong limits in developing and strengthening co-operative frameworks. The model is fatally predicated on a more or less large degree of unilateralism. It risks to weaken rather than strengthen co-operation and cohesion. For this reason, it must be supported by confidence-building and efforts to secure transparency. Furthermore, civil societies and non-governmental networking should play an important role in it.

While in present conditions the establishment of EMP proper facilities for EW/CP is highly unlikely, EW in the form of information-sharing in the EMP institutions could be encouraged as an exercise in transparency and confidence-building. Initiatives in this respect from individual Partners, especially on the Southern side, can hardly be expected, though. It is the EU which should make an effort to submit information coming from its expanding structure of EW and CP units to EMP institutions. This effort should concentrate on short-term crises and issues, for - as we know - with respect to long-term issues and crises, the EMP is more equipped to reflect and even act. In any case, with the mainstreaming of CP in the EU overall agenda, improvements in co-operation and involvement are needed, in particular in regard to the process of the strategy papers.

In order to help introduce EW in the EMP institutions, the EU could ask for a mandate. Even without a mandate, it could take the initiative of inviting liaison personnel from the Southern Partners in its EW/CP units and introducing other measures of transparency and confidence-building (visits, seminars, etc.).

The setting up of regional centres for conflict prevention should also be encouraged. In general, a conflict prevention centre is less an instrument to gather information than one to manage procedures seeking to settle disputes and prevent latent or potential conflict between more or less consenting parties. The establishment of these regional conflict prevention centres could encourage the Southern countries concerned to take initiatives. Furthermore, the centres could be given a broad task of analysis and planning that they could make available to EMP institutions.

Networking remains a most important instrument of cohesion and co-operation. There could be forms of networking between national and EU's situation centres on a voluntary basis. Above all, though, networking concerns the civil societies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). EMP's think tanks could share a Euro-Med dedicated model for conflict analysis, like the one the Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI is exploring, and help feed a joint data-base. Their information and analysis could be made available to the officials in the EMP/EU and the public.

In the same sense, another measure that could contribute to introducing EW/CP in the EMP could be the establishment of some kind of co-operation between the Conflict Prevention Network-CPN and a similar Euro-Med network of think tanks. This co-operation would be related to the compilation of the country strategy papers. This agenda would be without prejudice to Commission and EU conclusions, but would certainly attenuate perceptions of unilateralism, improve confidence and accustom the EMP to some common work in a EW/CP perspective.

Conclusions

This paper presents some remarks on EW and CP within the EMP. It summarises the model of EW&CP that emerged from the talks on the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability but could not be pursued essentially because of the crisis erupted between Israel and the Palestinians in September 2000. The paper argues that, because of current political constraints, the EMP has to work, as of today, on the basis of a "hub and spokes" pattern of relations, with the EU working as the hub.

Because of these limitations to political will, the paper concludes that today's EMP is far more prepared to develop long-term EW and CP than short-term. In the shorter-term, the EMP can share

information within its institutions and obtain information from the EU, but would hardly be able to act. In the longer-term, the combination of multilateral and bilateral structures could bring in EW evidence, foster consensus, and permit action to be undertaken.

EMP's EW/CP capabilities can be stimulated by fostering confidence-building measures and the role of NGOs. To help build confidence, the EU could submit information coming from its expanding system of EW to EMP institutions, and foster liaisons and voluntary networking between the EW structures in the partner countries and EMP's. Also, it could encourage the establishment of regional centres for conflict prevention seated in Southern Mediterranean countries.

The recent reform by the Commission of its system of CP, in particular the introduction of Country Strategy Papers, can provide an opportunity to strengthen long-term EMP capability in EW and CP. This opportunity concerns both governments and NGOs. Euro-Med networks of think tanks and NGOs could be associated to the EW process that is expected to be based on the strategy papers.

