PROMOTING CONFLICT PREVENTION AND HUMAN SECURITY
WHAT CAN THE G8 DO?

Centro alti studi per la difesa (CASD)
Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
University of Toronto G8 Research Group
Rome, 16/VII/2001

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Istituto Affari Internazionali

Research Group
University of Toronto

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Rome, 16 July 2001

Centro Militare di Studi Strategici
Piazza della Rovere, 83 – Palazzo Salviati
- Sala Montezemolo -

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9:00-9:10 **Welcome Address**
Ugo de Carolis, President, CASD, Rome

9:10-9:30 **Introduction**
Stefano Silvestri, President, IAI, Rome
John Kirton, Head, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto

9:30-11:15 **Conflict Prevention: Performances, Prospects and Potential**
Chair: Carlo Bellinzona, Director, CeMiSS, Rome
Panel:
Julian Lindley-French, Research-Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Roberto Toscano, Head of Policy Planning Unit, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
David Malone, President, International Peace Academy, New York
Radoslava Stefanova, Head of the South-East Europe Programme, IAI, Rome

10:40-11:15 **Discussion**

11:15-11:45 ***Coffee Break***

11:45-13:30 **The G8 Genoa Summit and Conflict Prevention**
Chair: John Kirton, Head, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto
Panel:
Peter Penfold, Senior Conflict Advisor, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development, London
Sir Nicholas Bayne, LSE, London
Mario Sarcinelli, President, CERADI, Rome
Ella Kokotsis , G8 Research Group, University of Toronto
Gina Stephens, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto

12:45-13:30 **Discussion**

13:30-15:00 ***Lunch***

15:00-17:00 **The Larger Institutional Framework**
Chair: Roberto Toscano, Head of Policy Planning Unit, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Panel:
Robert Fowler, Ambassador of Canada to Italy, Rome
Frank Loy, former US Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs
Reinhardt Rummel, Director of the EU Commission's Conflict Prevention Network, Brussels
Larry de Boice, Deputy Director, UNDP Emergency Response Division, Geneva
Ralph Thiele, Chef de Cabinet, NATO Defence College, Rome
Massimo Tommasoli, DAC, OECD, Paris
Jeff Fischer, Senior Advisor for Elections, IFES, Washington

16:20-17:00 **Discussion**

17:00-17:15 ***Coffee Break***

17:15-18:45 **Advancing The Current Priorities**
Chair: Stefano Silvestri, President, IAI, Rome
Panel:
Umberto Triulzi, Director, IPALMO, Rome
David Nyheim, Director, FEWER, London
Wim van Meurs, Senior Research Fellow, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Munich
Mario Zucconi, Professor, University of Urbino

18:15-18:45 **Discussion**

18:45 **Concluding Remarks**
Ugo de Carolis, President, CASD, Rome

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Organisation and Empowerment: the Role of the G8 in Conflict Prevention & Global Governance

By

Dr Julian Lindley-French

Assessing the ability of the G8 in any area of the crisis management cycle depends upon what G8 is. It is certainly not an Alliance, even though seven of its eight members are members of NATO because it has none of the formal rights and obligations of such a form of inter-state co-ordination. It is not even a regime because it has no secretariat to speak of. A regime is a governing arrangement for a particular service or issue in the international system that combines normative and legal agreements underpinned by organisation. It is, as its name suggests, a grouping, that most informal of bodies that lacks even the defined single-issue mission of an ad hoc contact group.

So, what is its defining feature? Even that is not clear. At G7 it represents an informal economic grouping of the world's top seven economies who come together to discuss the economic issues of the day that are relevant to their interests, most notably exchange rate stability. It has never had an overt security mission although security issues have progressively crept onto the agenda in recent years. However, agreement even among

these apparently like-minded Western powers has been notoriously hard to find, as the often tortuous wording of summit-end communiques demonstrates. With the inclusion of Russia and the expansion to G8 an implied security mission could be said to have been included but only as a passive attempt to embrace Russia in what had been hitherto an unashamedly Western structure. It was, if you like, a statement of acceptance (and a statement of hope) that Russia was welcome as a Western power, if it so chose. It did little for effect co-ordination and organisation of G8.

The tenor of this conference implies a further question. Can the G8 form the basis of a directoire as part of a global governance package that will have sufficient cohesion and tools available to it to actively manage all or any aspect of a crisis?

Let's face it, we're a long way from that. First, there are other instruments that are more representative and legitimate – the UN pre-eminent amongst them. The management of crises is not only a question of power, it is also one of legitimacy and the G8 is very lop-sided.

Second, even if the UN, OSCE or some other regional regime found themselves unable to act the nature of crises means that a range of actors would be involved. That suggests that any ad

hoc grouping involved in the management of such a crisis would be properly represented by a Contact Group that involves not only the rich and the powerful, but also those willing to put troops in harms way and those who have local knowledge – such as the coalition that was put together under UN Security Council auspices following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Can the G8 evolve into a global crisis management directorate? The answer to that depends on where and how it adds value.

Certainly, G8 plays an informal restraint and co-ordination role of sorts. One of the defining features of the foreign policies of all countries, but in particular those who see themselves firmly in the West, is to restrain and influence the US. There are several bilateral and multilateral ways in which this can be achieved. However, the uniqueness of the G8 represents an important forum to communicate alternative viewpoints of the powerful to the most powerful. However, it pre-supposes that Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and, now, Russia can agree, a big 'if' and, as with all such groupings, there is no real sanction on defection. Certainly, if that is its one utility it would work more efficiently at G7 than at G8.

Another role it could perform is to maximise the foreign policy impact of those members that are not permanent members of the UN Security Council. For Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan it is an important statement of prestige that partially offsets lack of P5 status. Equally, if Tony Blair's recent proposal comes to fruition to include Germany and Japan in an enlarged P7, or whatever, that utility will increase for Italy who can feel rightfully miffed if Germany and Japan are accorded such privilege. I have long argued that the UNSC is precisely that – a security council. It is not an Executive Committee of the UN. The reason for P5 membership is that it confers responsibility on those powers to deploy forces in pursuit of security. Chequebook diplomacy is not enough and over the past decade Italy has proved herself a willing and active partner. A stark contrast to Germany's lamentable performance over defence expenditure, re-organisation and now Macedonia, which is even putting the future of EU security and defence efforts at risk. Canada? Well, the state of the Canadian armed forces speaks for itself. Canada has a noble peacekeeping tradition that will doubtless continue at the modest level that it can afford. Unfortunately, Canada lacks critical mass in any of the real indices of power to be on the top table: population, military power, even economic clout. G8 will certainly not provide an alternative route thereon.

That said, G8 is a power grouping. However, even if it could organise itself effectively and express that power efficiently, there is a down side. The only way that the current grouping could play such a role would be through the coercive imposition of security – a kind of neo-imperialism that would probably give Sam Huntington's fear of a clash of civilisations some real meaning.

However, let's assume that G8 can evolve from a grouping into a regime and maybe, in time, transform itself into a problem-solving alliance that combines several levels of crisis management capabilities from the economic to the military. What would it need?

First, it would need a broader membership to reflect power in various forms. The economic and military power of the West is not enough, given that crises in the world do not happen in those states. It will need other forms of power, such as that reflected by the populations of China, Brazil and India. Additionally, it would also need what one might call 'natural power', such as that conferred upon those who provide the world's raw energy, such as certain Middle Eastern states. It would also need cultural balance and although Japan provides that to an extent it is an hermetically-sealed culture. Moreover, it is beyond even

the power of the West to impose solutions on a solution-resistant world. Indeed, global governance itself is a Western concept.

Second, it would need an agreed set of norms about how and when to act. If you like, a crisis management or security concept. Now, those of us involved in the European defence debate know how difficult that is for a group of similarly-sized, European states who live on the same bit of planet, have by and large identical interests and who enjoy similar levels of development. The problem is too much historical baggage. Imagine that on a global scale with states with very different concepts of what security is, how it can be provided and who provides it.

Third, it would need access to a range of crisis avoidance, conflict management and post-crisis reconstruction tools. It would therefore need an ability to organise itself and organise the exercise of power on its behalf. If it was to be more than an ad hoc contact group that would mean supreme political command and control, a bureaucracy for the implementation of civilian and military assets and resources that can be applied. From whom, by whom, for whom?

There is a further implied question in the concept. Can the G8 form the basis for some form of universalism. Herein lies the

paradox. Such a system of global governance will only work at a supranational level that sees power re-organised at the systemic level through the progressive reduction of anarchy that is the essence of the Westphalian STATE system. In other words, a self-help grouping based squarely upon state interests and, by its own definition, created to reflect the distribution of capabilities within the system amongst certain status quo powers who wish to remain precisely that, seems very ill-suited to form the basis for some kind of transformation into a neo-Kantian mechanism for global governance that does away with the nation-state through the creation of a representative and legitimate Leviathan.

So, if the EU has trouble becoming a functioning security organisation G8 is unlikely to become an effective security actor. Unless, that is, it reinvents itself and becomes the United Nations, but someone else is doing that already. If I were Canadian, I would settle back into my position as the world's safest country. Free-ride gracefully on that neighbour to the south and deploy my limited resources when and where I so chose. If I were Italy, I would work hard for the reform of the UNSC and the creation of, maybe, three rotating EU seats with two of the big four represented at any one time, before hoping against hope that the future is G8.

But, then again, a certain country I know well might have a few words to say about that.

Thank you.

Julian Lindley-French,

Rome,

July 2001

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Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security
What Can the G8 Do?

Concentrating the Mind: Decision-Making in the G7/G8 System

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"When a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." (Johnson)

Introduction

This paper is not about conflict prevention as such. It is instead about how decisions are made – on conflict prevention or any other subject – at the G8 summit and in the G7/G8 system as a whole. Summit meetings like the G7 and G8, where heads of government meet informally in a small group, are a device to 'concentrate minds' on cooperative decision-making, in response to intractable problems where international and domestic pressures interact.

For about 15 years after the G7 summits began, decision-making took place on two closely-knit levels. One level comprised the heads of government themselves and the foreign and finance ministers who always accompanied them to the summit. The second was composed of a small team of bureaucrats led by the head's personal representative or 'sherpa'. Follow-up was entrusted to wider institutions. But during the 1990s, the shape of the G7/G8 summits changed radically. The heads of government detached their flanking ministers and began meeting by themselves. The supporting apparatus, at both official and ministerial level, became much more complex and developed a life of its own. Many more outside contributors became involved both in the preparation of the summits and in their follow-up.

This paper examines the recent development of decision-making in the G7/G8 system.[i] The analysis falls under three headings:

- The contribution of the heads themselves;
- The contribution of the supporting apparatus;
- The contribution of other actors, both state and non-state.

Most of the examples will be drawn from economic activities, but there will also be reference to political ones, especially conflict prevention.

The main conclusions of this paper are:

- The heads of government have gained new freedom by meeting on their own. They contribute independently to decision making by innovation, especially in agenda-setting and procedural initiatives, and by following their political reflexes. Meeting their international peers concentrates the minds of the heads most when this also advances their domestic agenda.
- Most cooperation at the summit still emerges from the work of the supporting apparatus, whether by the sherpa team or the growing network of G7/G8 ministerial groups. The preparations enable the heads to add their authority to work in progress; to induce agreement at lower levels, without acting themselves; and at times to go further than is possible at lower levels. The imminence of the summit concentrates the minds of other ministers and bureaucrats – but will it still do so if the summits become more detached from their base?
- Other actors – non-G8 governments, business and NGOs - are increasingly involved both in summit preparation and, alongside international institutions, in follow-up. The institutions are treated more persuasively and systematically than before. This greater dispersion and transparency is necessary, if the summits are to concentrate the increasingly independent minds of other players in the system. But will it lead to a loss of efficiency?
- The tensions between the greater freedom of the heads, the proliferation of the supporting apparatus and the growing involvement of other actors are not easily resolved and each summit finds a different equilibrium. But the treatment of conflict prevention should follow a predictable sequence.

Decision-Making in the G7/G8 Summits: A. The Contribution of the Heads

The G7 summit was conceived as a personal encounter of the leaders of the world's most powerful economies. The founders believed that bringing the heads of government together would enable them to understand better both the domestic problems of their peers and the international responsibilities that they all shared. This would enable them to solve problems that had baffled their bureaucrats. The bureaucrats themselves ought to be kept out of the process entirely.[ii]

Even before the first summit of all, at Rambouillet 1975, it was clear that this vision was out of reach. The subject-matter of international economics was too complex for the heads to reach decisions without some preparation. So they reconciled themselves to playing roles at the summit which had been written for them by others, especially their personal representatives or 'sherpas'. This was the first stage in institutionalising the summits.[iii] But the prospect of informal and spontaneous contacts, at which they could develop their own ideas, continues to exercise a powerful attraction on the heads. This section of the paper therefore looks at the ways in which the heads make their personal contribution to the summit, without relying on the supporting apparatus.

The Heads and Summit Process

During the 1990s, the heads always professed to want summit procedures made simpler. They complained that the agenda and the documents were too long, giving them no scope to make their own input. As wil appear, however, some of their own practices contributed to this expansion.

Size. Once the size of the summit had been settled in the 1970s, at seven powers plus the European Community, the heads resisted any move to add new members. They believed small numbers were essential to informal exchanges. As British prime minister Callaghan had said in 1976:

> "The numbers attending are small and compact. Discussions are businesslike and to the point. We do not make speeches at one another. We talk frankly but also as briefly as we can, and a lot of ground is covered."[iv]

In 1991 the heads agreed that British prime minister Major could invite Soviet president Gorbachev as a guest to the London III 1991 summit. But once the Russians came, the G7 had to go on inviting them, as a refusal would be a severe setback to post-Cold War reconciliation. By skilful salami tactics, Russian president Yeltsin got invited to more and more of the summit. Eventually, US president Clinton called Denver 1997 'the Summit of the Eight', while British prime minister Blair made Birmingham 1998 the first G8 summit.

Despite the political reasons for adding Russia, this enlargement has drawbacks. Yeltsin used to 'make speeches' at his colleagues, though his successor Putin picked up the informal mode at once at Okinawa 2000. Russia's comparative economic weakness means that some issues still have to be kept in the G7. So the heads are wary of extending invitations to other powers, like China (as suggested by Japanese prime minister Obuchi before Okinawa), because, once invited, they cannot be 'un-invited' without giving offence. There is no agreement among the heads to admit other countries to summit membership.[v]

Agenda and Use of Time. The addition of political to economic issues at the summit, from the early 1980s, together with new topics provoked by the end of the Cold War, produced severe overloading of the agenda. A campaign led by Major in 1992-3, to shorten both agenda and documentation and to cut down on ceremonial, had only short-lived effect. In 1998 Blair tried again, proposing an economic agenda of only three items – employment, crime and debt relief – for Birmingham 1998, though new financial architecture was added in response to the Asian crisis. A short agenda at a heads-only summit (see below) allowed the documents issued to be pruned severely.[vi] Since then both agenda and documents have got longer again, especially at Okinawa 2000, for reasons explained below, though Genoa 2001 may reverse the trend.

Participation. Ever since 1975, the heads had been flanked at the summits by their foreign and finance ministers. This was originally on American insistence, though it also helped those with coalition governments, like Germany. By the 1990s, however, the heads and their ministers were meeting at the summit in separate groups, with only rare plenaries. In 1998 Blair proposed to separate the flanking ministers in time

as well as space. Only the heads came to Birmingham 1998, with foreign and finance ministers meeting a few days earlier. 'Heads-only summits' have now become established and are clearly welcome to the heads themselves.

The establishment of heads-only summits is the fundamental reform of the summit format of the last decade. But its full significance is more complex than it appears. At first sight, meeting alone gives the heads greater freedom to choose their own agenda and develop their own ideas. But this freedom is constrained by other trends in summit decision-making, especially the growth of separate ministerial groups and the involvement of non-state actors in the G7/G8 process. These will be analysed later in this paper.

The Heads and Summit Content

Innovation in Agenda-Setting. Each G7 country hosts the summit in turn, in a predictable sequence.[vii] While many topics are carried over from previous summits, the host has the ability to propose as innovative an agenda as the others can accept. This is the point at which the host has most influence over the proceedings and most heads take the opportunity to intervene personally, by writing to, telephoning or visiting their peers.

Here are some dominant themes for the summits since Naples 1994 – the last summit held in Italy:

- For Halifax 1995, Canadian prime minister Chretien proposed reform of the international monetary system.
- For Lyon 1996, French president Chirac proposed development and invited the heads of the IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN to the summit.
- For Denver 1997, Clinton proposed help for Africa.
- For Birmingham 1998, Blair proposed 'employability' – agreeing the topic bilaterally with Clinton even before Denver.
- For Cologne 1999, German chancellor Schroeder proposed debt relief for poor countries, reversing the policy of his predecessor Kohl. Under the pressure of events in Kosovo he added conflict prevention – with strong Italian support.

- For Okinawa 2000, Obuchi proposed information technology (IT) and the 'digital divide'.
- For Genoa this year Italian prime minister Amato proposed world poverty – 'beyond debt relief' – and conflict prevention again; his successor Berlusconi has wisely endorsed this choice.

Some of the items on the list are recurrent summit items, but others, like Africa, IT and conflict prevention, are wholly new. This shows how different leaders have added new ideas to the summit agenda – themselves increasing the overload about which they complain.

Innovation at the Summit Itself. Innovation by a G8 head at the summit may be substantive or procedural, but substantive innovations are rare. Ideas for brand new policies seldom prevail, if they have not been filtered through the preparatory process.[viii] So Clinton was blocked by the Europeans at Naples 1994 when he proposed without warning a new round of trade negotiations. Back at the Paris summit of 1989, Italian prime minister Fanfani urged that the summit should act to avert the risk of conflict in Yugoslavia. But in their excitement about the fall of communism in Central Europe, none of his colleagues would listen – if only they had!

New procedural proposals launched at the summit itself are both more frequent and likely to succeed. Clinton made his mark at Tokyo III 1993, his first summit, by suggesting a special meeting of G7 employment ministers. (Chirac did the same at *his* first summit, Halifax 1995). Yeltsin produced a whole range of proposals for G8 meetings in Moscow, on nuclear safety and energy, to show that Russia was really part of the summit process. These procedural proposals, whatever their merits, also tend to expand the summit's agenda and its apparatus.

Innovation also includes the personal crusades of certain summit heads, often going beyond the advice of their officials. The most conspicuous of these was Kohl's insistence on getting environmental and nuclear safety issues onto the agenda, in addition to launching, as host, a meeting of G7 environment ministers before Munich 1992.[ix]

Political Reflexes. Another personal contribution from the heads comes when their political instincts lead them to pick out certain issues or go against what their officials have prepared. The heads are often moved to react to sudden crises happening just before a summit. For example, a terrorist attack on US servicemen in Saudi Arabia just before Lyon 1996 meant that Clinton persuaded his colleagues to convert material prepared on violent crime into a sharp condemnation of terrorism.

On other occasions the heads' political sense tells them that the conclusions prepared for the summit are not adequate, so that they do not accept them. Halifax 1995 had made detailed preparations on reform of the IMF, rather less on the UN. But the heads themselves decided that the 50th anniversary of the UN that year was an opportunity not to be missed, so that they greatly expanded their conclusions. At Denver 1997 the heads were not satisfied with the progress being made on trans-border crime, which worried their electorates. They sought to accelerate G7 work in this area, making crime a major theme for Birmingham the next year. These interventions by the heads against the grain of the preparations are different from deals struck on the basis of the preparatory work, which are discussed in the next section.

Domestic Motivation. As these examples show, often the leaders make personal use of the summit to respond to domestic pressures or to advance their domestic agenda. Kohl's concern with the environment reflected strong public interest in this subject in Germany. Blair in 1998 and Schroeder in 1999 were newly elected left-of-centre leaders, who used the summit to advance their own domestic objectives in employment and social protection. Successive Italian prime ministers have promoted conflict prevention because of the domestic disruption caused by the turmoil across the Adriatic, especially by flows of refugees. These political objectives and pressures, of course, do not always have positive effects. French president Mitterrand felt obliged to hold up progress on concluding the Uruguay Round at Munich 1992, for fear that would upset the farming vote before the referendum in France on the Maastricht treaty.

The Heads and Summit Follow-up

Once the summit is over, the leaders rarely intervene to ensure its conclusions are carried out. Late in 1991 and 1992 there was much telephoning between G7 leaders in a vain attempt to conclude the Uruguay Round by the end of the year, as they had promised at the London III and Munich summits. In October 1998, Blair sounded his colleagues on whether the worsening monetary crisis called for an extraordinary summit – but they were content just to issue a statement encouraging their finance ministers. But these personal interventions by the leaders are exceptional.[x]

The position is quite different as regards communicating the summit outcome to the media. All the heads take pains to convey their own views to their national press corps, who have followed them to the summit site. The leaders want to make a good impression back home, which often leads them to stress their personal victories, rather than the agreed results achieved at the summit. Comparing national accounts reveals inconsistencies, which can focus public attention on points of difference rather than agreement.

Summary of the Contribution of the Heads

The main personal contribution of the heads of government to decision-making at the G7/G8 summit, independent of their officials, can be summarised thus:

- A strong attachment to simplicity of process, recently advanced by the launch of 'heads-only' summit, though some of their other practices conflict with this;
- Innovation by the summit host in agenda setting and by all leaders at the summit, though more often in procedure than content;
- Political reflexes, triggered by sudden crises or a sense that the preparations are inadequate, and often reflecting domestic pressures or objectives;
- Rare involvement in implementation, but close attention to media treatment of the summit, which can stress differences more than agreement.

The prospect of meeting their peers at the top table thus concentrates the minds of the leaders, especially where this international encounter can also advance their domestic agenda.[xi]

B. The Contribution of the Supporting Apparatus

The preparation of the summit is largely in the hands of the supporting G7 or G8 apparatus. Even what happens at the summit itself usually owes more to the preparatory process than to the personal intervention of the heads. This section therefore looks at what supporting G7/G8 bureaucrats and ministers do, both on their own and in combination with the heads of government.

The Supporting Players

The Sherpas. Traditionally, summit preparations have been in the hands of a small team of bureaucrats, led by the sherpas, who are chosen either for their personal closeness to the head or their seniority in their parent department.[xii] The sherpas are supported by two 'sous-sherpas', one each from the finance and foreign ministries, to work on the main summit agenda, and by the 'political directors' from foreign ministries, to prepare foreign policy subjects. While originally the entire group would meet together, during the 1990s the sherpas, each set of sous-sherpas, and the political directors took to meeting separately, to cover the growing agenda. Plenary meetings of the full team have become rare. In addition, groups of specialist officials have grown up to deal with recurrent summit themes, such as terrorism or disarmament.

Summit preparations are concentrated in several meeting each spring, to select the agenda and start drafting the necessary documents. In many ways the dynamics of summit meetings are reproduced at sherpa level. At these small gatherings, discussion is frank, with plenty of personal interaction.[xiii] The sherpas get to know each other well, they understand each others' domestic background and they develop a sense of solidarity and shared responsibility. The sherpas become adept both at seeing what arguments would prove convincing, against their colleagues' domestic backgrounds, and at picking up ideas from the others which they can use to good effect back home.[xiv]

The Other Ministers. At the outset G7 foreign and finance ministers attended the summit as supporting the heads. But each group has steadily asserted its independence. During the 1980s the secretive G5 was absorbed into the public G7 finance ministers, while G7 foreign ministers began meeting on their own on the margin of the UN General Assembly. Since Birmingham 1998, both groups meet just before the summit, but no longer attend it. They also meet at other times: G7 finance ministers on the margins of IMF meetings; G8 foreign ministers as issues require it. For example, the foreign ministers held a special meeting on conflict prevention in December 1999, to carry out a remit from the Cologne summit.

Meanwhile, other ministers became associated with the summit in the 1990s, largely thanks to personal initiatives by the heads themselves. There are now regular or periodic meetings of environment ministers (promoted by Kohl), employment ministers (backed by Clinton, Chirac and Blair), energy ministers (started by Yeltsin), interior and justice ministers (focused on terrorism and crime) and education ministers (first in 2000, thanks to Schroeder). These ministers meet not only to prepare for summits and carry out instructions from the heads, but also to pursue their own independent agenda. Most of these groups include the Russians, though finance ministers remain as G7 only. Each has its own apparatus of supporting officials.[xv]

Once the summit began meeting as heads only, these separate ministerial groups no longer felt bound to preserve the strict G7 or G8 format. G8 Foreign ministers have invited selected other countries to join them for meetings focused on specific problems – for example, on Balkan stability in June 1999, in response to the Kosovo crisis. The G7 finance ministers have created a new permanent grouping, the G20, linked to monetary reform in the IMF, which includes major developing countries active in the system.[xvi]

The proliferation of these ministerial groups counter-balances the effect of the heads meeting alone at the summit and introduces a certain tension. The heads have to decide whether to exercise their own freedom, at the cost of allowing these other groups to operate independently too, or to try to keep control over an ever-expanding pyramid of activity.

Summit Preparations

Agenda-Setting. This is the task for the first sherpa meeting of the year. The host head of government, as shown earlier, focuses on new ideas to make that year's summit distinctive. The sherpas, on the other hand, have to wrestle with the on-going summit agenda, of items started but not completed in earlier years. This agenda is always under pressure.[xvii] The difficult issues that come up to the heads often need recurrent summit treatment, like international trade or debt relief for poor countries. While most items can be handed on to other established organisations for follow-up (see below), sometimes the institutions are inadequate, so that the G7/G8 remains responsible for them.

The innovative ideas of earlier years, such as employment or information technology, become recurrent items later. After Blair's reforms of 1998, which were meant to check this inflation of the agenda, the next two summits kept on adding new items – education, conflict prevention, aging, information technology, infectious diseases – without taking old ones off. For Genoa in 2001, the Italians have rightly sought to return to a limited, three-part agenda of poverty reduction, environment and conflict prevention. But, in general, the hardest part of agenda-setting for the sherpas is deciding what to leave out.

Summit Endorsement – Work in Progress. Endorsement takes up the largest and the easiest part of the summit agenda and documentation. It consists of the heads putting their authority behind work that is going on elsewhere. Often this will be activity that has been generated by earlier summits, so that the heads give their blessing to work in progress. In other cases G8 governments find it useful to have the endorsement of their peers for policies they have decided to adopt already, since this can be useful in overcoming domestic opposition.

This part of the summit agenda, however, is most subject to inflation. There is a strong incentive for G8 governments to expand the area of their policies carrying summit endorsement. But the wider this endorsement is given, the more its value becomes diluted. The move to heads-only summits was intended to allow more

issues to be pushed down to other ministers and this is happening, to some extent. But once the heads have lent their authority to a particular subject, they are often reluctant to abandon it, for fear others should conclude that they have ceased to care about it.

Stimulating Agreement at Lower Levels. A more demanding technique is where summit discussion, or even the prospect of it, is used to resolve differences between G7 or G8 members which persist at lower levels and may prevent agreement in wider international contexts. A good example is seen in the international financial architecture agreed after the Asian crisis. The essential work on this was done by the G7 finance ministers and their deputies. On some issues there were deep divisions between them, but the approach of the summits at Birmingham in 1998 and Cologne in 1999 gave them an incentive to resolve these differences. The heads gave their authority to what their finance ministers had agreed, without adding anything of their own. The work done so far in conflict prevention also illustrates this well. After the initial impulse from the heads at Cologne, the foreign ministers worked up a detailed programme at their meetings in Berlin in December 1999 and Miyazaki in July 2000. The imminence of the Okinawa summit, a week after the Miyazaki meeting, concentrated their minds, so that heads only needed to endorse what the foreign ministers had done, without having to discuss it themselves.

A more controversial example is seen in the summits' involvement in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. At three summits - Houston 1990, London III 1991 and Munich 1992 - the heads undertook to complete the round by the end of the year, but because of differences on agriculture they always failed to meet their own deadline. For Tokyo III 1993, however, the preparations called for the G7 trade ministers to meet as the 'Quad' just before the summit itself.[xviii] The imminence of the summit encouraged the trade ministers to reach agreements that opened the way for the Uruguay Round's final completion in December 1993.

Stimulating Agreement at the Summit Itself. The two techniques described so far cover most of the summit content and often they will produce the most important evidence of G7/G8 cooperation. But the heads also play a more direct role. In some cases they have to engage their own authority to give the necessary impetus to a wide-

ranging or innovative programme. The work on the digital divide at Okinawa 2000 is one example of this; the decisions on action against infectious diseases expected from Genoa are another. In other cases agreement can only be reached through the intervention of the heads themselves. This applied to the peace arrangement for Kosovo in 1999. Detailed preparations had been made, but everything hinged on the position of Yeltsin, which did not become clear until he reached the Cologne summit in person.

In yet other cases the heads are able to reach agreements which are not attainable at lower levels. Debt relief for low-income countries provides successive examples of this technique throughout the 1990s. At London III 1991, Naples 1994, Lyon 1996 and Cologne 1999, the heads succeeded in advancing agreement on this subject further than their finance ministers had taken it. They tried hard to do so at Birmingham 1998 and Okinawa 2000 as well, but did not succeed. Debt relief is thus one area where the summit has become identified as the place where things happen, so that it attracted huge demonstrations to Birmingham and Cologne.

Such agreements exploit the heads' wish for some achievements of their own. They are not happy when everything at the summit has been 'pre-cooked'. The sherpas try to provide some scope for the heads to go beyond what has been prepared for them – though whether they will do this on conflict prevention for Genoa is not clear. Without this, the heads will be tempted to take their own unprepared initiatives – as described earlier. But this strategy does not always work – and once discord is registered at the summit it may be harder to find agreement elsewhere. This is shown by the summits' treatment of environmental issues both before and after the UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio in 1992. The early summits, from Paris 1989 to London III 1991, were able to stimulate much new thinking on the environment and to feed ideas into the preparations for Rio. However, as discussion moved from broad ideas to specific commitments, it became harder to overcome differences between the United States and Europe. When the summits took up the environment again, at Denver 1997 and Okinawa 2000, in advance of climate change meetings at Kyoto and The Hague, raising the issue to head of government level did not resolve the disagreements – nor is it likely to do so at Genoa.

Domestic Motivation. When the heads are ready to go a bit further at the summit than their officials or ministers, that again usually reflects their judgement of the balance of domestic and international advantage in reaching agreement. Yeltsin knew that the Kosovo settlement was unpopular in Russia, but he did not want to alienate the support of the G7. Schroeder, Blair and their predecessors were aware of strong public interest in debt relief, mobilised by the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. But these domestic political considerations can work in the wrong direction. On climate change and biodiversity the strongest domestic pressures in Europe come mainly from consumer groups and public opinion, while in North America they come from producers and business interests. So agreement on environmental issues may actually be harder to reach at the summit than lower down.

Summit Follow-Up

In contrast to agenda-setting and summit preparation, the sherpas play little part in summit follow-up. The G7 and G8 ministerial groups, in contrast, have a growing role in the implementation of summit conclusions. They have much greater flexibility than the summit itself, in the choice of when they meet and whether they involve other countries. But by far the largest responsibility for summit follow-up, however, still rests with wider international institutions. The contribution of these outside bodies is considered in the next section of this paper.

Summary of the Contribution of the Supporting Apparatus

The contribution of the supporting apparatus to the summit, whether working on its own or together with the heads, can be summarised as follows:

- The traditional sherpa network has been supplemented in the 1990s by the growth of semi-independent G7 or G8 ministerial groups;
- In agenda-setting, the hardest task for the sherpas is to decide how to leave things out, so as to keep the agenda under control;
- Summit endorsement of existing policies is valuable in giving the authority of the heads, but this becomes devalued if used too much;

- The prospect of summit discussion can stimulate agreement at lower levels, without a direct contribution from the heads being necessary;
- The sherpas try to take advantage of the heads' desire to achieve something of their own, so as to advance agreement at the summits beyond the preparations – but this does not always work;
- Sherpas take little part in follow-up; supporting ministers do rather more, but most is done in wider institutions.

The imminence of the summit concentrates the minds of those involved in the preparations, whether these are the sherpa team or the groups of G7 and G8 ministers, and often this is enough to produce agreement. But the question is whether the heads-only summits can still have this concentrating effect in the more dispersed G7/G8 system.

C. The Contribution of Other Actors

During the 1970s and 1980s, summit preparations were held tightly by the sherpas Summit follow-up was entrusted to other institutions, without much direct involvement by the G7. During the 1990s, however, the self-contained character of the summitry began to loosen up and this process has accelerated rapidly from 2000. This looks like a direct consequence of the heads meeting on their own. Since the summits have detached themselves from their own ministerial apparatus, this gives them greater scope to form links with outside bodies, both other governments and non-state groups. This also reflects a perception by the heads of government of their responsibility to explain policy decisions to their peoples and to reassure them about the impact of globalisation. These changes so far affect preparation and follow-up, but not the summit itself. For example, Chirac's invitation to the heads of institutions to attend the Lyon 1996 summit has not been repeated.

Contribution to Summit Preparation.

For many years, the G7 governments kept summit preparation firmly in their own hands. Other governments had little chance to influence the process directly, except for other member states of the European Community, who were consulted to some degree by the Commission and Presidency. The OECD also held its annual ministerial meeting a few weeks before the summit, so that the non-G7 members could make their views known. As for non-government influences, these hardly went beyond visits to the host head of government by business and trade union delegations under OECD auspices. But this hermetic character of the preparations is being eroded rapidly.

International Institutions and Other Governments. The growing involvement of supporting ministers in the preparatory process has enabled other international institutions to be involved. G7 and G8 ministers often invite senior staff members from these institutions to join them. The supporting ministerial groups also allow other governments to become involved, as they are not limited to a strict G7/G8 format. A more radical move was made before Okinawa 2000, when most of the G8 leaders met a group of heads of government from developing countries in Tokyo on their way to the summit.[xix] A similar meeting is envisaged before Genoa 2001, but it will remain distinct from the summit itself.

Private Business and Non-Governmental Organisations. In 2000, the Japanese prepared the treatment of IT and the digital divide at the summit by involving a range of major multinational companies. They organised a special conference shortly before Okinawa and incorporated most of its findings in the summit's own report. The involvement of NGOs took off at Birmingham 1998, where the Jubilee 2000 Campaign organised a march of 50,000 people calling for debt cancellation. Since then, the host head of government has always met a delegation of NGOs present at the summit. In 2000 the Japanese not only provided an NGO centre at Okinawa, but also involved NGO groups in consultations with their sherpa team. These consultations have been conducted much more systematically by the Italians in 2001, for example involving groups active in conflict prevention like 'International Alert'.[xx]

Contribution to Summit Follow-Up

International Institutions. In contrast to the preparations, summit follow-up has relied on other actors from the outset. The summits of the 1970s and 1980s largely delegated the responsibility for implementing their economic decisions to bodies like the OECD, the IMF and World Bank and the GATT. During this time the summit took a detached attitude to these institutions, handing down its decisions as *faits accomplis* and expecting them to be adopted without further debate. But this approach would no longer work in the 1990s, as more countries became active in the international system and the G7 became less dominant.

When the G7 members conducted their review of international institutions, begun at Naples 1994 and continued till Denver 1997, they realised that they would have to use more tact and persuasion to get their ideas for reform accepted by the wider membership. Meanwhile, the expanding agenda has taken the summit deeper into unfamiliar policy areas. Its links have spread beyond economic bodies to various organs of the United Nations, as well as security institutions like the OSCE. In some subjects the summit has found the existing institutions to be inadequate, for example in crime and money–laundering. This has been a factor behind the creation of G7 and G8 ministerial groups, such as the interior and justice ministers.[xxi]

Business and NGOs. Both private business and NGOs started to become involved in summit follow-up during the 1990s. An initial involvement of private business came with the 'Global Information Society' conferences launched from Naples 1994, to promote the wider diffusion of information technology, but these ran out of steam.[xxii] The renewed interest in IT at Okinawa 2000 has led to the creation of the 'dot force' to recommend ways to overcome the digital divide, with strong participation from business and also from NGOs. Business and NGOs are involved in two other programmes agreed at Okinawa: the campaign against infectious diseases in poor countries; and the task force on renewable energy. Their participation has the merit of tapping additional sources of expertise and financial support, even though these new follow-up structures may be harder to integrate into the existing framework of international institutions. This mixed responsibility for follow-up will also apply to the fund to fight infectious diseases expected to be launched at Genoa 2001. In

addition, recent summits have called for the involvement of 'civil society' in the wider follow-up to their recommendations on debt relief and on trade.

Summary of the Contribution of Other Actors

The contribution of other actors to summit decision-making can be summarised as follows:

- The formally hermetic system of summit preparation now gives rather more access to other governments and international institutions, as well as to business and NGOs.
- International institutions have always been entrusted with summit follow-up, but the G8 now treats them more persuasively and systematically;
- There are problems however, when the institutions are inadequate; involving business and NGOs can compensate for this, but at the risk of overloading the summit again.

In the early years, it was enough for the summits to make recommendations for these to concentrate the minds of others. But power is now much more dispersed, both among states and among other actors in the system. So other players are increasingly involved and contribute to the results – again at the cost of more dispersed decision-making in the G7/G8 system.

Conclusions

This paper has analysed the decision-making methods of the G7/G8 system, especially of the summits, as they have developed over the last decade. The main findings have been summarised at intervals earlier in the paper. It remains to establish how the different strands interact with one another.

The G7/G8 summit meetings, as noted at the outset, are a device to 'concentrate minds' on finding cooperative solutions to intractable problems where international and domestic pressures interact. They exercise a strong attraction not only on the G7/G8 leaders, but on heads of government worldwide. This is shown by the great increase in international summit meetings in the 1990s, both in limited groups like the

European Council and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and on a wider scale, like the Summit of the Americas and the forthcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development.

The original, tightly-knit methods of decision making served the G7 summit well in its earlier years. But they are no longer an adequate response to the pressures of globalisation, which have brought many new subjects onto the summit agenda and many new actors, both state and non-state, onto the international stage. After many years when the summit became overloaded, the G7/G8 leaders have responded by cutting loose from their governmental apparatus and meeting on their own.

This move gives the heads new freedom of action, which they greatly welcome. But it also confronts them with new and difficult decisions. For example:-

- Separating the supporting apparatus from the summit opens new opportunities for the G7/G8 ministerial groups which have developed during the 1990s. They can help to prepare and follow up the summit, but they can also pursue their own agenda. Will the summits remain detached and allow this to develop? Or will they try to keep control of the G7/G8 system, on the grounds that only the link with the summit effectively concentrates the mind?
- Meeting alone also enables the heads to establish links with wider networks, for example of non-G8 governments, private business and civil society. With the advance of globalisation, these have become essential contributors to decision-making, in the preparations and especially in follow-up. Their involvement also helps to make the G7/G8 process more transparent. But will this dispersion of activity make it harder to concentrate minds in the inter-governmental institutions, on which the summit still largely relies?

There are no definitive answers to these questions yet. So far, each summit since Birmingham 1998 has found its own equilibrium. After Birmingham sought to give the heads the freedom of a short agenda, Cologne and Okinawa allowed the agenda and the documentation to expand again. Genoa 2001 may return to the spirit of Birmingham in this respect. Okinawa made major moves towards admitting outside players. Genoa will continue this trend, which would be difficult to reverse. This

increases transparency, but may make it harder to strike deals at the summit or to ensure that summit recommendations are in fact carried out.

Finally, what conclusions can be drawn about the subject of this conference: 'Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security: What Can the G8 Do?' From this analysis of decision making, the following sequence emerges:

1. Conflict prevention is firmly on the summit agenda. It arrived at Cologne in 1999 and the Italian chair has ensured its prominence for Genoa.
2. Two years of preparatory work have already been carried out by the G8 foreign ministers, through their meetings at Berlin in 1999 and Miyazaki in 2000, endorsed by the Okinawa summit.
3. NGOs with ideas to contribute, like International Alert, have been involved in this year's preparations.
4. Sherpas and Political Directors will by now have concentrated their minds: to obtain summit endorsement, where needed, for uncontroversial work in progress; and to encourage foreign ministers to reach maximum agreement in Rome this week, to which the heads can give their authority at Genoa.
5. At Genoa itself, the sherpas may have provided scope for the heads to take agreement further than their foreign ministers could. Alternatively the heads, following their political reflexes, may themselves decide on a different outcome from what their advisers recommend.
6. As a leading summit topic, which arouses strong public concern, the results on conflict prevention should feature prominently in the heads' briefing of the media.
7. Finally, whatever is agreed will be followed up: partly, no doubt, by the foreign ministers; but mainly in the United Nations and the wider international and regional bodies concerned with security and conflict resolution.

Next year the cycle will start again. It will be for the Canadian hosts to decide what place conflict prevention should have on the agenda for the summit of 2002, against all the other subjects competing for attention.

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Notes

[i] Nearly all the examples of decision-making in the main body of this paper are taken from Bayne 2000, Chapters 5, 8 and 10.

[ii] This view was held strongly by French president Giscard d'Estaing and German chancellor Schmidt; see Putnam and Bayne 1987, pp. 32-34.

[iii] For an account of the development of the sherpa process, see Putnam and Bayne 1987, pp. 48-61.

[iv] Quoted in Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 44.

[v] For an analysis of G8 relations with China, see Kirton 2000b.

[vi] The communiqué issued after Tokyo III 1993 was down to six pages. At Denver 1997 the heads issued a total of 29 pages of documents. This was cut back by half at Birmingham 1998.

[vii] The order is: France, US, UK, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada. There is still debate on whether Russia can host its first summit in 2003, at the end of the current cycle.

[viii] The classic example of a new policy introduced without preparation at the summit is the agreement on hijacking from Bonn I 1978 – see Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 87. But even at early summits such initiatives were uncommon.

[ix] Kohl's crusade goes well back into the 1980s. He tried to hold a G7 environment ministers meeting before Bonn II 1985, but the French declined to come. His political reflexes led him to propose a statement from Tokyo II 1986 on the Chernobyl nuclear accident, which had happened just before the summit. See Putnam and Bayne 1987, pp. 202-3 and 213-4.

[x] Sometimes the follow-up includes a further summit meeting of the G8 and others, such as the Moscow nuclear safety summit of early 1996 and the Sarajevo summit of July 1999 on Balkan reconstruction.

[xi] This process has been well analysed by Professor Robert Putnam in his model of 'two-level games', which he developed from his observation of the Bonn I summit of 1978. See Putnam 1988 and Putnam and Henning 1989.

[xii] There were some changes in national practice during the 1990s. Under presidents Reagan and Bush I, the US sherpa had been a senior State Department figure, but Clinton chose his sherpas from his White House staff and so has his successor Bush II. Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl had always made the State Secretary at the finance ministry the German sherpa, but Schroeder moved the post to his Chancellery.

[xiii] As with the summit itself, the arrival of the Russians has introduced rather more formality.

[xiv] This again shows Putnam's two-level game model at work - see Putnam 1988 and Putnam and Henning 1989, as in note xi above.

[xv] For an analysis of this development, see Hajnal 1999, pp.35-44.

[xvi] See Kirton 2000a for an account of the G20 and its role.

[xvii] The growth of 'iteration' at the summits is documented in Bayne 2000, pp. 200-208.

[xviii] The Quadrilateral or 'Quad', composed of the trade ministers of the US, Japan and Canada and the responsible European Commissioner, had been founded at the Ottawa summit of 1981, though its links with the G7 process had become tenuous. See Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 131.

[xix] This meeting was arranged without difficulty, in contrast to the resistance by the G7 heads to the proposal from Mitterrand for an encounter with other leaders before the Paris Arch summit of 1989. See Bayne 2000, p. 75, n. 5 and Attali 1995.

[xx] NGOs also influence national preparations. Some of the environmental measures agreed at Okinawa, such as the task-force for renewable energy and the provisions on illegal logging, were British initiatives worked out in cooperation with NGOs.

[xxi] One early example of this trend is the Financial Action Task Force against money-laundering, founded at the Paris 1989 summit – see Bayne 2000, p. 66.

[xxii] For details, see Hajnal 1999, pp. 38-39.

(3)

The G8 and Conflict Prevention: Commitment, Compliance and Systemic Contribution

JOHN KIRTON, ELEONORE KOKOTSIS AND GINA STEPHENS with DIANA JURICEVIC

Introduction

During the past two years, the G8 has moved rapidly to focus on conflict prevention as a new and substantial component of its agenda and action. Starting essentially with the 1999 Cologne Summit and surrounding foreign ministers meetings, the momentum built through the December 1999 Berlin foreign ministers meeting, the first such ever in G8 history devoted to a single thematic area. The process culminated in 2000, when the foreign minister at Miyazaki and the leaders at Okinawa in July moved from agenda setting to action, authorizing concrete measures in five core areas. It is on this promising beginning that many look to Genoa 2001, and the Canadian hosted Summit the following year, to build an edifice that will change the international security system as a whole.

Whether the G8 can and will make this large systemic contribution depends critically on just how potent it has been as a international institution in advancing conflict prevention in the few short years that it has focused on it. There is room for considerable doubt, on several grounds. Many argue that the venerable, established United Nations, replete within a formal charter, big budget and massive bureaucracy all its own should be and will be the dominant actor in conflict prevention as in all other peace and security fields, and that the powerful Permanent Five (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will kill any effort to dilute their special status through the construction of a separate centre outside. Many critics of the G8 charge it with having only an episodic interest in most subjects, implying that the Kosovo and German driven concern will conflict prevention will quickly pass as other hosts and political priorities exert their pull. Many see the G7/G8 as essentially an economic institution with a claim to newer global/transnational issues, and thus relatively poorly equipped, intellectually and institutionally to deal with any field and security subject. And even those who credit the G7/G8 system with considerable ability to arrive at timely, well tailored commitments across a comprehensive array of issue areas, still call into question how ambitious and significant those collective commitments are, and whether members countries, beginning with the United States and France, will comply with them in the months and years that follow.

In order to assess the potential of the G8 as a productive forum to advance the conflict prevention agenda, and before crafting conflict initiatives to feed into and through it, it is thus important to take a detailed look a its recent record in generating commitments and compliance in the conflict prevention issue area specifically, in the political security domain more generally, and in its agenda as a whole. This paper begins that process through a systematic evaluation of the commitments made at the leaders level at Okinawa, and the compliance of members with them, in comparison with their compliance record in the previous years. Employing a method for identifying commitments and assessing compliance developed by Eleonore Kokotsis, a method for assessing the ambition and significance of those commitments created by Diana Juricevic, and data produced by the G8 Research group under the co-ordination of Gina Stephens, this paper first examines the number and ambition-significance of the Okinawa commitments as a whole, in

the peace and security domain, and in the specific conflict prevention area. It then assesses how much G8 members complied with their Okinawa commitments, how this record compares to that of the previous five and twenty-five years, and whether they actually comply with the particular commitments that count. Only on this foundation can analysts and policymaker alike proceed to ask why and how the G8 institution works to make and keep meaningful promises, and thus how it can best be used and reformed to promote the cause of conflict prevention in the wider world.

This study offers three tentative conclusions for policymakers wishing to take up this important task. First, the G7/G8 Summit, especially from its Okinawa platform, has been a productive institution for having the world's most powerful countries generate ambitious and significant collective *commitments* on core conflict prevention issues. Second, it has done less well, if adequately, in *complying* with the priority conflict prevention commitments it has made. That is, the leaders' G7/G8 gets higher marks for "promises made" than "promises kept" in the conflict prevention field. Third, given the recent commitment-compliance record of the G7/G8 Summit, both overall and in the global-transnational field so closely related to conflict prevention, the G7/G8 is, going forward, a promising institution through which to forward the conflict prevention cause. The policy challenge is to devise ways to strengthen the institution so it can more fully live up to this potential and contribute more robustly to meeting this pressing global need.

The Okinawa 2000 Commitment Record

To what extent did the 2000 G7/G8 Summit held in Okinawa, Japan, which was only the second such summit to deal directly with conflict prevention, produce timely, well tailored and ambition collective decisions, or "commitments" in this field, as part of its overall work? In making such judgments, it is important to recall that the Summits perform many valuable functions, with their core being their deliberative, directional and decisional role. Indeed, at their early stages of dealing with new issue areas, such as conflict prevention, their most important one can be the deliberative one of educating their peers about the subject, its importance, and need for attention and the decisional one of establishing and legitimizing the issue area, identifying its priority, and establishing the principles that will and should guide its treatment and those of related areas. Making actual collective decisions, through the declaration of identifiable, specific, future-oriented commitments in the concluding communiqué, is thus not the only, or even them most important of the recent G7/G8's contribution to the conflict prevention cause. However in an international political world awash in high-level rhetoric, and badly in need of real action on conflict prevention, the G7/G8's decisional record, even at this early stage of its conflict prevention agenda, is of important concern.

In overall terms, the 2000 G7/G8 Summits proved to be a most productive meeting, judged by the number and range of decisional "commitments" made by the leaders in their concluding communiqués.[i] Together the five documents issued by the leaders at Okinawa offered 169 such commitments. Of these, 12 came in the G7 communiqué, 97 in the G8 communiqué (when Russia joined the original seven), 54 in the G8's separate Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, and 6 in the G8 Statement on Regional Issues. The fifth document issued by the leaders, the G8 Statement on the Korean peninsula, contained no actual "commitments".

In the four documents containing actual commitments, the commitments were distributed across 18 issue areas, as follows:

G7 Communique:	12
International Financial Architecture	3
Enhanced HIPC Initiative	4
Abuse of Global Financial System	3
Nuclear Safety/Ukraine	2
G8 Communique	97
World Economy	1
Information/Communications Technology	3
Development	15
Debt	5
Health	15
Trade	4
Cultural Diversity	2
Crime and Drugs	18
Ageing	6
Biotechnology/Food Safety	3
Human Genome/Environment	11
Conflict Prevention	3
Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Arms Control	7
Terrorism	4
Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society	54
Introduction	1
Seizing Digital Opportunities	14
Bridging the Digital Divide	11
The Way Forward	7
Fostering Policy Regulatory and	6

Network Readiness	
Improving Connectivity and Access, Lowering Cost	7
Building Human Capacity	5
Encouraging Participation in Global ECommerce Nets	3
G8 Statement on Regional Issues	6
Middle East Peace Process	2
Balkans	2
Africa	2

The number of commitments by issue area in the two main G7 and G8 communiqués suggests that the Okinawa Summit had as its main focus and legacy cooperative achievements in the areas of crime and drugs, development, and health (particularly infectious disease). Combining the last two areas, it was thus genuinely a development-oriented summit.

The 54 commitments in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, especially when combined with the three ICT commitments in the G8 communiqué, suggest it was also the first G7 "digital summit." Yet the heavy emphasis in this separate charter on "Bridging the Digital Divide," led by the 11 commitments specifically under this heading, suggests that development was a primary focus and one well integrated into and supported by the second major theme.

The 14 commitments in the G8 communiqué on conflict prevention, disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control, and terrorism, together with the six commitments in the Statement on Regional Security, suggest that the Okinawa was also genuinely a political-security summit. It contained a total of 20 commitments in this realm. Political-security commitments thus took 12% of the total. While this may appear to be a small share, it is significant for a G7/8 that developed its formal political-security agenda and supporting process later than others, and that has seen some of its members, notably France, insist that the prerogatives of the UNSC should not be infringed on in this domain. The 2000 Okinawa's commitments on the particular issues areas relating to regional security notably embraced equally the three regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. Perhaps due to the sensitivities of Japan's regional neighbours, no commitments were made on the Korean peninsula, either in these documents or in the separate statement issued on this subject.

It is difficult to assess whether the 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit was more productive than G7/G8 summits in earlier years, as a similarly comprehensive assessment of commitments has not been conducted for those earlier years. However, a partial estimate is available by comparing those issue areas where commitment data in the main G7 and G8 communiqués, produced by the same methodology, do exist. This information exists in earlier work by Ella Kokotsis, detailed in *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988–1995* (Garland Publishing, New York, 1999). This work has shown that the summits from

1989 to 1995 produced a yearly average of 4.8 commitments on climate change, 2.1 in biodiversity, 1.6 on developing country debt (from 1988 to 1995), and 3.5 on assistance to Russia (from 1990 to 1995). A comparison of similar issue areas at Okinawa suggests that the G7/G8 in 2000 was considerably more productive on developing country debt, much less productive on assistance to Russia (whose economy was then doing relatively well), and somewhat less productive on climate change and biodiversity. This confirms the development focus of Okinawa. Given the variable pattern and limited number of issue areas for comparison, it is not possible to offer even a suggestion about how productive Okinawa was overall compared to summits of previous years.

Okinawa's political-security agenda offered commitments arranged by issues area as follows: disarmament 7, terrorism 4, conflict prevention 3, and nuclear safety/Ukraine, Mid East peace process, Balkans, and Africa each with two each. Only five non-political-security issue areas secured more than the top-ranked one of disarmament. It is understandable that a Summit held in Asia, where the cold war continued and where the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions and North Korea's recent launch of a missile over Japan has brought arms control issues to the fore, would wish to highlight this issue area, as well as the imminent regional question of stability and political change on the Korean peninsula.

With these preoccupations in the traditional G7/G8 political-security realms of disarmament and regional security, it is significant that conflict prevention at the leader's level came in third place, in the middle of the range. The leader's decisions to highlight three particular conflict prevention issues, from three different subjects areas (children, diamonds and small arms) and move them from being a matter of concern into action, was an important investment in this new cause. Moreover, these three commitments were arguably at the centre of the global conflict prevention agenda as it then stood. They were (in the G8 Communique):

- Para 73: " We commit ourselves to work for their implementation particularly with respect to economic development and conflict prevent, children in conflict, and international civilian police."
- Para 73: "We therefore call for an international conference, whose results shall be submitted to the UN, building on the UN Security Council Resolution 1306 and inter alia the "Kimberley" process launched by the Government of South Africa, to consider practical approaches to breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed conflict, including consideration of an international agreement on certification for rough diamonds."
- Para 73: "We invite the international community to exercise restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work jointly to this end".

The Ambition-Significance of the Okinawa Commitments

In order to secure a more refined understanding of how productive the Okinawa Summit was in its overall, political-security and conflict prevention commitments, it is important to assess not only the overall number and range, but also the ambition and significance, of each individual commitment the Summit generated.

An evolving framework, developed by Diana Juricevic working with the G8 Research Group, allows for such a ranking of commitments according to their level of ambition-significance. An ambitious commitment is one that clearly identifies a goal, clearly identifies

measures to attain that goal, and clearly identifies a target date at which time that goal is to be completed. A significant commitment is one that is timely, novel, and has appropriate scope. A commitment that is both "ambitious" and "significant" satisfies the above six criteria. The ambition-significance ranking is scored out of a possible six points corresponding to the six criteria. A score of 6 entails both a high level of ambition and a high level of significance. A score of 3 entails a high level of ambition but has no level of significance. A score of 0 entails no level of ambition and no level of significance. (For further details see Appendix A).

The results are listed immediately below.

Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G7 Communiqué 2000

	Goal	Measure	Target Date	Novelty/ Timeliness	Scope	Content	**Total**
International Financial Architecture							
7	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
8(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
8(b)	1	1	0	0	1	1	**4**
HIPC							
20(a)	1	0	0	0	1	1	**3**
20(b)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
22	1	1	0	0	1	1	**4**
23	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
Global Financial System							
26(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
26(b)	1	1	0	1	0	1	**4**
26(c)	1	0	0	1	0	1	**3**
Nuclear Safety							
29	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
30	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**

Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G8 Communiqué 2000

	Goal	Measure	Target Date	Novelty/ Timeliness	Scope	Content	**Total** (score=6)
World Economy							
9	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
Information and Communications Technology							

11	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
12(a)	1	1	0	1	0	0	**3**
12(b)	1	1	1	1	1	0	**5**
Development							
13	1	0	1	1	0	0	**3**
15	1	0	0	1	1	0	**3**
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
19	1	1	1	1	1	1	**6**
20(a)	1	1	0	1	0	0	**3**
20(b)	1	0	1	1	0	0	**3**
20(c)	1	1	1	0	1	1	**5**
20(d)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
Debt							
24(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
24(b)	1	1	0	0	1	0	**3**
24(c)	1	1	1	0	1	1	**5**
24(d)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
25	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
Health							
29	1	1	1	1	1	1	**6**
30	1	1	1	1	1	1	**6**
31(a)	1	1	1	1	0	0	**4**
31(b)	1	0	1	1	1	1	**5**
Trade							
35	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
36(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
36(b)	1	0	1	0	1	0	**3**
38	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**

Cultural Diversity							
41	1	1	0	1	0	1	**4**
42	1	1	1	1	0	1	**5**
Crime and Drugs							
43(a)	1	1	1	1	0	1	**5**
43(b)	1	0	1	0	1	0	**3**
43(c)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
44	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
45(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
45(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
45(c)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
45(d)	1	1	1	1	0	0	**4**
46	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
47(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
47(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
47(c)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
49	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
50	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
Aging							
52	1	1	0	1	0	1	**4**
Life science							
55	1	0	0	1	1	0	**3**
58	1	1	0	1	0	1	**4**
59	1	0	0	1	1	0	**3**
Human Genome							
62(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
62(b)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
63	1	0	0	1	1	0	**3**
64	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**

65(a)	1	0	1	1	0	0	**3**
65(b)	1	1	1	1	0	0	**4**
66	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
67	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
68	1	1	1	0	0	0	**3**
69(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
69(b)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
Conflict Prevention							
73(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
73(b)	1	1	0	1	1	0	**4**
73(c)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
Arms Control							
74(a)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
74(b)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
77(a)	1	1	1	1	0	0	**4**
77(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
78(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
78(b)	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
78(c)	1	0	1	1	0	1	**4**
Terrorism							
79(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	**2**
79(b)	1	1	0	1	0	0	**3**
80	1	1	0	0	0	0	**2**
81	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**

The average scores, arranged by issue area, by communiqué, and overall, are listed immediately below.

The 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Commitments Ranked by Average Ambition-Significance

G7 Communiqué

International Financial Architecture	2.67
HIPC	2.75
Global Financial System	2.67
Nuclear Safety	2.00
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Area	2.52
Average by Individual Commitments (N12)	2.6

G8 Communiqué

World Economy	1.00
Information and Communications Technology	3.33
Development	3.25
Debt	2.80
Health	5.25
Trade	1.50
Cultural Diversity	4.50
Crime and Drugs	2.21
Aging	4.00
Life Science	3.33
Human Genome	2.18
Conflict Prevention	2.67
Arms Control	2.29
Terrorism	2.00
Average by Equally-Weighted Issue Area	2.88
Average by Individual Commitments (N70)	2.69
Average of G7+G8 by Equally Weighted Issue Areas (N18)	2.80

Average of G7+G8 by Individual Commitments (N82)	2.67

These figures indicate that the Okinawa Summit, with an average score of 2.8 by equally weighted issue areas and 2.69 by individual commitments, came close to the midpoint of the scale of 0–6 for assessing the ambition-significance of a summit's commitments. These scores are consistent with qualitative judgments, issued at the immediate conclusion of the Summit, that Okinawa was a summit of "solid achievement" (Kirton 2000).

It is notable that both the G7 and G8 Summits score in this midpoint range. While the G8 scores slightly higher on the measure of equally weighted issue areas, the variation is sufficiently slight to make interpretations based on this difference hazardous. The pattern does suggest, however, that the presence of Russia may marginally help and at a minimum does not harm G7/G8 performance (although the different set of issue areas dealt with in each forum is the critical factor). This suggestion is reinforced by a direct comparison of G7 versus G8 in those issue areas (the G7's HIPC versus the G8's debt, the G7's nuclear safety versus the G8's arms control) that are to some degree similar. By this standard only the G8's low score on world economy supports the case for caution in allowing Russia more of a place in the G7's economic/financial domain.

As suggested by the table below (which combines the G7 and G8 issues areas in a single scaled ranked by their ambition-significance score), there is a wide variation by issue area in the performance of the Summit.

G7/G8 2000 Issue Areas Ranked by Ambition-Significance of Commitments

Health	5.25
Cultural Diversity	4.50
Aging	4.00
Information and Communications Technology	3.33
Life Science	3.33
Development	3.25
Debt	2.80
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Areas	2.80
HIPC (G7)	2.75
Conflict Prevention	2.67
International Financial Architecture (G7)	2.67
Global Financial System (G7)	2.67
Average by Individual Commitments	2.67
Arms Control	2.29
Crime and Drugs	2.21
Human Genome	2.18
Terrorism	2.00
Nuclear Safety (G7)	2.00
Trade	1.50
World Economy	1.00

There are several striking patterns in this data. First, issue areas from the G8 rather than the G7 tend to dominate the list. In fact, no issue area from the G7 ranked above the overall average by equally weighted issue areas. This suggests that the innovative dynamism of the G7/G8 system has passed decisively from the G7 to the G8.

Second, the highest scoring issue areas are those that are relatively new to the G7/G8 agenda, and in at least one case (cultural diversity) are entirely new. Leading the list are health, cultural diversity, aging, information and communications technology, and life science, followed by development, debt, and HIPC. This suggests that Okinawa was indeed a development summit, as its producers had planned. But in some ways the competing theme of information technology

in the end took precedence (especially if one adds the results of the commitments in the separate Okinawa Charter on Information Technology that is not included in this analysis). Even more importantly, Okinawa was marked by its domestic intrusiveness, through its ambitious and significant commitment in areas long the preserve of domestic politics, and ones where often state-provincial and local governments as well as national ones have significant responsibilities. Given this strong performance in regard to the new areas, the novelty of conflict prevention on the G8's agenda provides no excuse for any poor performance there.

The Okinawa G7/G8's premium on innovation is also evident in the political-security domain. Here conflict prevention itself ranks first as the most ambitious-significant issue area in the political security domain, and eighth among the Summit's issue areas overall. More venerable subjects, even those featured at recent summits, such as arms control, crime and drugs, terrorism, and nuclear safety, rank well down on the list. (The regional security commitments issued in a separate declaration are not included in this analysis. They all received rather low ambition-significance scores). The low ranking of nuclear safety is somewhat of a surprise, given how large the 1999 criticality accident at Tokaimura loomed in Japanese political life. It is also worth noting that of the three individual conflict prevention commitments, that dealing with diamonds, scored 4 out of 6, ranks in the top half of the scale.

This solid conflict prevention performance takes on more significance, given the low ranking for those issue areas where the G7/G8 summits, and especially Japanese-hosted G7 summits, have traditionally excelled. Trade stands out, with a very low score that confirms the harsh judgement of informed observers about the Okinawa Summit's performance in this domain (Bayne 2001, Ullrich 2001). Moreover the low score for world economy, delivered by a G8 that was about to go into sharply slower growth in the coming months, and at a summit hosted in a long stagnant Japan suggests that complacency rather than prescience and prevention was the dominant approach.

At first glance, this overall pattern lends support to those who criticize the summit for its episodic focus on an ever-changing array of issues, rather than praise it for its persistent iteration on the most difficult but central issues in the world (Bayne 1999). Yet the solid scores on development, debt and HIPC, and the international financial architecture and the global financial system belie this criticism, and suggest a good balance between the new and the old. While Okinawa was thus at its most productive as an agenda-setting summit for the new century, it also "hung in there" (Bayne 2000) to make progress on some persistent problems left over from the old one.

Promises Kept: Compliance with the Okinawa Commitments

It makes little sense for the leaders of the G7/G8 countries to invest their time, reputations, and other resources to generate ambitious-significant collective commitments at their annual summits, or for citizens to take these commitments seriously, if the institution's members do not comply with them in the following year.[ii] Before judging the G7'G8 Summit's performance and potential as a conflict prevention institution, it is thus important to assess the actual compliance the leaders boldy articulated commitments of Okinawa actually secured in the following 10 months. This task begins, modestly, with an examination of "first order" compliance – are member governments at least trying by actually deploying instruments to implement their commitments, even if they have nor yet succeeded in securing the intended outcomes that ensure a better world. The analytic framework and method developed by Eleonore Kokotsis provides a way of

systematically assessing this first-order, instruments-focused compliance record. (compliance is assessed in the following application not in regard to all 169 commitments but against the 12 specific commitments judged to be the most important priority commitments, in each of the major issues areas treated in the comprehensive G7 and G8 Communique).

By these standards, the Okinawa G7/G8 Summit was a highly credible Summit, indeed perhaps the most credible G7/G8 summit ever held. G7/G8 members complied with during the following ten months the priority commitments made in the 12 major issue areas 81.4% of the time (see Table A). This 81.4% takes on added force when it is recalled that it comes from a scale where 100% equals perfect compliance, but where –100% is also possible for situations in which all members doing the opposite of what they had pledged.

As Table B shows, this 81.4% compliance record compares very favourably with the 39% compliance record with the priority commitments of the 1999 Cologne Summit, the 45% compliance record of the 1998 Birmingham Summit, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996. Whereas the four summits prior to Okinawa yielded an average compliance score of 37%, Okinawa itself soared to register an 80% Okinawa's exceptional status is confirmed by Kokotsis' compliance studies from 1988 to 1995, which yielded scores of 43% for the United States and Canada on all their commitments in the four issue areas of "sustainable development" and to "aid to Russia." It is also confirmed by the score of 32% (found by von Furstenberg and Daniels using different methodology) for the compliance of all members with all the economic and energy commitments made at the summits from 1975 to 1988.

Compliance with Okinawa's priority commitments was particularly high in the issue areas of information technology, health, and trade, where the Summit secured a perfect score. The highest complying members were Germany and Britain, the immediately prior hosts. They each had a perfect compliance score. They were followed by France with 92%; Italy with 89%, Canada with 83%, Japan with 82%, the United States with 67%, and the newest G8 member, Russia, with only 14%.

Table A: Summary Scores

Issue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Russia	Average Score by Issue Area
1. World Economy	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	**.86**
2. ICT	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	**1.0**
3. Health	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	**1.0**
4. Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	**1.0**
5. Cultural Diversity	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	–1	+1	0	**.63**
6. Crime and Drugs	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	**.88**
7. Aging	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	**.86**
8. Biotech	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	–1	**.75**
9. Human Genome	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	**.80**
10. Conflict Prevention	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	**.63**
11. Arms Control	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	**.88**
12. Terrorism	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	**.40**
Average Score by Country	**.83**	**.92**	**1.0**	**.89**	**.82**	**.67**	**1.0**	**.14**	**1) .808 2) .784 3) .814**

Notes[iii]:
(i) N/A indicates that information is not available and no compliance score has been awarded.
(ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming.
(iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 81.4%
2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 80.4%
3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 78.1%
Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings.

Okinawa's Compliance Compared to the 1996–2000 "Globalization Era"

The outstandingly high compliance rate with the Okinawa commitments can be seen through a more direct comparison with the compliance record of the G7/G8 in the preceding five years.

This was the time when the G7/G8, starting at its 1996 Lyon Summit, directly and consciously addressed the process of "globalization." (It is also the time when the G8 Research Group began its annual compliance studies. The following tables report the results, by country, of the compliance of G8 members with their priority commitments at the Summit from Lyon 1996 to Okinawa 2000 (with the latter's compliance assessed through to May 2001).

Table B: G8 Compliance Assessments by Country, 1996–2001a

	1996–1997b	1997–1998c	1998–1999d	1999–2000e	2000–2001f
France	+0.26	0	+0.25	+0.34	+0.92
United States	+0.42	+0.34	+0.6	+0.5	+0.67
United Kingdom	+0.42	+0.5	+0.75	+0.5	+1.0
Germany	+0.58	+0.17	+0.25	+0.17	+1.0
Japan	+0.21	+0.50	+0.2	+0.67	+0.82
Italy	+0.16	+0.50	+0.67	+0.34	+0.89
Canada	+0.47	+0.17	+0.5	+0.67	+0.83
Russia	N/A	0	+0.34	+0.17	+0.14
European Union	N/A	N/A	N/A	+0.17	N/A
Average	**+0.36**	**+0.27**	**+0.45**	**+0.39**	**+0.80**

Notes:
a: Scores are an equally weighted average of a country's compliance to commitments made at the summit.
b: Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.
c: Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.
d: Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (illegal trafficking of human beings).
e: Applies to six priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).
f: Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control, terrorism).

Table C: Compliance Scores by Country

	1996–2001 Average	1988–1995	1975–1989
United Kingdom	+63%	N/A	+41.3%
Canada	+53%	+53%	+40.9%
United States	+51%	+34%	+24.6%
Italy	+51%	N/A	+27.4%
Japan	+48%	N/A	+26.2%
Average of G8	*+45%*	*+43%*	*+30.7%*
Germany	+43%	N/A	+34.6%
France	+35%	N/A	+24.0%
Russia	+22%	N/A	N/A

During the first half decade of the "globalization era" (1996–2001), the average compliance score was 45%. This is slightly higher than the 43% for the 1988–1995 period identified by Kokotsis for the U.S. and Canada alone on four issues areas (Kokotsis 1999). It is notably higher than the 31% discovered by von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) for all members on all commitments for the 1975–1989 period. (They found the 1975–1988 average of the U.S. and Canada alone to be 33%). This data thus confirms the portrait offered by Kokotsis on the basis of much more limited evidence. It also suggests that the post cold war years — begun with the Gorbachev letter to the G7 at Paris 1989 — have made the Summits more credible than they were before.

In some ways, this data for the first half decade of the "globalization era" (1996–2001) confirms the pattern of compliance by country first identified by von Furstenberg and Daniels for the initial 1975–1989 period. Britain continues to ranks first on compliance, followed closely by second-place Canada. France continues to rank near or at the bottom.

But there are some notable changes. Most strikingly, the United States has risen from second last in 1975–1989 to a strong third-highest in 1996–2001. This is consistent with the higher scores Kokotsis found for the U.S. on four issue areas for the period 1988–1995 (Kokotsis 1999). Italy has risen somewhat in the ranking and substantially in the percentage score. Moreover the newest G8 member, Russia comes in last place. This is perhaps due to the slow process of socializing a new member, but more likely due to limitations on the capacity of the Russian government to implement G7/G8 commitments. These often require more adjustment on even a reforming Russia's part than they do for other G8 members.

The data in Table B, while slender, are inductively suggestive of one possible pattern. In the year leading up to a country hosting a G7/G8 summit, that country will comply with its commitments from the previous year's summit at a higher level than it did in the immediately earlier year. The prospective new host thus appears to take its G7/G8 responsibility seriously and make the G7/G8 system appear credible, by leading through example, with a higher-than-usual compliance record. (We are indebted to Caroline Konrad for this point.)

Even with its much higher overall compliance scores, Okinawa showed considerable variation by subject domain, issue area, and issue. As Table D shows, as against an overall compliance score of 78%, Okinawa scored 81% in the global/transnational domain, 74% in the economic domain, and 64% in the political security domain. This pattern suggests that the recent G7/8 as an institution requires improvement, from political will through to institutional development, in the political security sphere to bring its performance here up to the Summit normal. Moreover, as conflict prevention issues may be more akin to, and closely related to, transnational/global ones that many others in the political-security sphere, the high G7/G8

compliance scores in the global/transnational domain suggests that the Summit, once improved, could be a very effective vehicle for advancing the conflict prevention cause.

Among individual issues, Okinawa received a perfect compliance score in IT, trade, and health. Its lowest scores came in terrorism (40%), conflict prevention (63%), and cultural diversity (63%). This suggests that the above improvement could usefully be targeted at the conflict prevention domain.

The relatively poor Okinawa compliance performance on conflict prevention is highlighted by the fact that, when compared to the 1996–2001 average, or to any individual year within this period, Okinawa had a higher (or an equal) score on virtually every priority commitment measured for 2000–2001. The only areas where it under-performed were macroeconomics and, especially, terrorism. (There si no data on conflict prevention from previous years).

In a longer tem comparison, the "globalization era" summits of 1996–2001 had remarkably high compliance in several domains and issue areas. For this half-decade, the average compliance level was 39%, but 59% in the global/transnational domain, 37% in the economic domain, and only 33% in the political-security domain. The Okinawa cross-policy domain pattern was thus consistent with the Summit's compliance performance in recent years. The increase in compliance for the globalization half-decade was thus driven almost entirely by the global transnational/domain and it in turn was driven by the heavy investment in this domain at Okinawa. Nonetheless, it is clear that the age of social globalization has arrived and that the G8 has moved sharply to mount an approach of socially sensitive governance in response.

Comparisons over a longer period by issue area are possible only in three issue areas. Here it is clear the summit has suffered a sharp decline in its performance in the trade field and, less dramatically, in development assistance/aid. Conversely, in the field of exchange rates, it has experienced a sharp increase, despite the onset of intense financial globalization. While limited data make any conclusions, hazardous, this finding does suggest that G7/8 governments are by no means powerless in the face of the most globalized of economic markets, and by no means cowering in self imposed fear from intervention in the belief that they can no longer win. If they are willing and able to confront such difficult-to-control societal actors and forces in the economic domain, it is reasonable to call on them to be equally bold in the political-security domain and its conflict prevention component.

Table D: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996–2001

Issue Area	**1996–1997**	**1997–1998**	**1998–1999**	**1999–2000**	**2000–2001**	**Average 1996–2001**
TOTAL (based on average *n*)	+36.2% (22)	+12.8% (6)	+31.8% (6)	+38.2% (6)	+78.1% (12)	+39.42
Economic Issues						
Average Economic	+39%	+19%	+17%	32%	+74%	+37%
Economic Issues	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
IFI Reform	+0.29c	–	–	–	–	+0.29

Exchange Rate	–	–	–	0	–	0
Macroeconomics/ World Economy	+1.00	–	–	+1.0	+0.86d	+0.95
Microeconomics	+0.29d	–	–	–	–	+0.29
Employment	–	+0.375e	0f	–	–	+0.19
Aging	–	–	+0.33g	–	+0.86n	+0.60
GIS/ICT	+0.57d	–	–	–	+1.0	+0.79
Trade	+0.29d	–	0.33h	–0.57	+1.0n	+0.26
Development	0d	0	–	–	0	0
Debt of Poorest	–	–	0	+0.86	–	+0.43
Global/Transnational Issues						
Average Global	+34%	+25%	+63%	+0%	+81%	+41%
Transnational General	+0.48	–	–	–	–	+0.48
Environment	+0.14	+0.5e	–	–	–	+0.32
Climate Change	–	–	+1.0j	–	–	+1.0
Nuclear Safety	+0.29	–	–	–	–	+0.29
Health/Disease	–	–	–	–	+1.0n	+1.0
Biotech	–	–	–	–	+0.75	+0.75
Human Genome	–	–	–	–	+0.80	+0.80
Crime	+0.43d	0e	–	0k	+0.88 (includes drugs)	+0.33
Human Trafficking	–	–	+0.25	–	–	+0.25
Cultural Diversity	–	–	–	–	+0.63	+0.63

Political Security Issues						
Average Political–Sec'y	+39%	–06%	–	+100%	+64%	+49%
East/West Relations	+0.80d	–	–	–	–	+0.80
Terrorism	+0.71d	–	–	+1.0	+0.40o	+0.70
Arms Control	+0.29	–	–	–	+0.88	+0.59
Landmines	+0.71	+0.75e	–	–	–	+0.73
Human Rights	+0.71d	–	–	–	–	+0.71
Security Issues	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
Regional Security Asia	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
Europe	+0.86m	–	–	–	–	+0.86
Middle East	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
Russia	–	–0.86	–	–	–	–0.86
Conflict Prevention	–	–	–	–	0.63	+0.63
Governance Issues						
UN Reform Financing	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14
UN Reform Develop't	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14

Notes:
a: Data refer to members' compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior to the next summit (i.e., 1996–1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve of the 1997 Denver Summit).
b: Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7/G8 countries.
c: Excludes Italy and France.
d: Excludes Italy.
e: Refers to G8 (includes Russia).
f: Refers only to Japan, UK, Russia.
g: Refers only Canada, Germany, U.S.
h: Excludes Germany.
i: Refers to debt of the poorest and the Cologne Debt Initiative.
j: Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitment referring to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.
k: Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.
l: Refers only to France, Germany, Japan.
m: Excludes Japan.
n: Excludes Russia.
o: Excludes Germany, Italy, Russia.

Table E: Compliance Scores by Issue, 1975–2001

Issue Area	1996–2001 Average	1988–1996	1975–1989
Total (per average *n*)	+39%	43% (C+US)	31%
Economic Issues			
Macro/World Economy	+95%		
GIS/IT	+79%		
Aging	+60%		
Debt of the Poorest	+43%	+73%a	
Average of G8 All	*+39%*		
Average of G8 Economy	*+37%*		
Economic Issues	+31%		
IFI Reform	+29%		
Microeconomics	+29%		
Trade	+26%		+73%
Employment	+19%		
Development/Aid	0		+27%
Exchange Rate	0		–70%
Demand Composition			+23%
Real GNP Growth			+40%
Fiscal Adjustments			+26%
Interest Rate			+22%
Inflation Rate			+22%
Energy			+66%
Global/Transnational Issues			
Climate Change	+100%	+34%a	
Health/Disease	+100%		
Human Genome	+80%		
Biotech	+75%		
Cultural Diversity	+63%		
Average of G8 on Global/Transnational Issues	*+59%*		
Transnational General	+48%		
Average of G8	*+39%*		

Crime	+33%		
Environment	+32%		
Nuclear Safety	+29%		
Human Trafficking	+25%		
Political/Regional Security Issues			
Europe	+86%		
East/West Relations	+80%		
Landmines	+73%		
Human Rights	+71%		
Terrorism	+70%		
Conflict Prevention	+63%		
Arms Control	+59%		
Average of G8	*+39%*		
Average of G8 on Political/Regional Security	*+33%*		
Security Issues	+31%		
Asia	–43%		
Middle East	–43%		
Russia	–86%	+81%a	
Governance Issues			
Average of G8	*+39%*		
Average of G8 on Governance Issues	*+14%*		
UN Reform Financial	+14%		
UN Reform Development	+14%		

Note:
a: Includes only Canada and the United States.
Source: Ella Kokotsis and Joseph Daniels (1999), "G8 Summits and Compliance," in Michael Hodges, John Kirton, and Joseph Daniels, eds., *The G8's Role in the New Millennium* (Aldershot, Ashgate), pp. 75–94.

The Okinawa Compliance Record Corrected for Priority Commitment Ambition-Significance

This comparison of the Okinawa compliance record with that of the summit in previous years highlights just how exceptionally high Okinawa was. This may well be an accurate reflection of reality. Japan traditionally takes the Summit and its role as host more seriously than virtually any other country. It devoted large sums of money, highest-level political management, and domestic political attention to Okinawa. And the mounting G7/G8 involvement of civil society actors, and their protests at other major international fora, may well have led Japan and its G7/G8 partners to be exceptionally vigilant in keeping the faith with their Okinawa pledges.

However, another possibility is that the particular commitments selected by the G8 Research Group in 2000 to monitor compliance against were unusually low in ambition and significance, making it very easy for G8 members to comply and thus generate these uniquely

high compliance scores for 2000. However checking the individual priority Commitments selected for compliance monitoring, against the average level of ambition-significance for all commitments in their issue area, suggests that the particular commitments selected for compliance monitoring were not unusually "easy" commitments to comply with.

A second way of checking and controlling for the possibility of "easy commitment selection bias" is to take the set of selected priority commitments as given, but weight them according to their level of ambition and significance, and use these weights in the compliance analysis[iv]

As the results in Table F indicate, applying this individual ambition-significance weighting control does reduce substantially Okinawa's overall very high compliance scores. Yet it still leaves Okinawa as the most credible G7/G8 Summit ever. By this weighted ranking, G7/8 members complied with the priority commitments across the 12 major issue areas of the Okinawa Summit during the following ten months 59.2% of the time. This 59.2% compliance record still compares very favourably with the unweighted scores of 39% for Cologne 1999, the 45% for Birmingham 1998, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996.

Compliance with Okinawa's priority commitments remained particularly high in the issue area of health where the Summit secured a perfect score. The highest complying members were again Germany and Britain. Each had a compliance score of 72%. They were followed by France with 66%, Italy with 64%, Canada with 60%, Japan with 59%, the United States with 48% and the newest G8 member Russia, with only 10%.

Conclusion

It is clear that there is a pressing need for further work on the G7/G8's commitment and compliance record in regard to its overall, political-security and conflict prevention agenda.[v] In addition to empirically reinforcing and analytically refining the above analysis, there is a need to explain the actual processes through which and causes from which members countries ambitiously commit and faithfully comply. There is equally a need to explore the commitment-compliance record and process on conflict prevention at the G8's ministerial as well as leaders level, but it is the foreign ministers that have devoted much more attention to this subject and who may be closer to commanding some of the conventional instruments required to ensure that their country complies.

As a foundation for this further work, this study offers three tentative conclusions. First, the G7/G8 Summit, especially from its Okinawa platform, has been a productive institution for having the world's most powerful countries generate ambitious and significant collective *commitments* on core conflict prevention issues. Second, it has done less well, if adequately, in *complying* with the priority conflict prevention commitments it has made. That is, the leaders' G7/G8 gets higher marks for "promises made" than "promises kept" in the conflict prevention field. Third, given the recent commitment-compliance record of the G7/G8 Summit, both overall and in the global-transnational field so closely related to conflict prevention, the G7/G8 is, going forward, a promising institution through which to forward the conflict prevention cause. The policy challenge is to devise ways to strengthen the institution so it can more fully live up to this potential and contribute more robustly to meeting this pressing global need.

Table F: Weighted Summary Scores

sue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Russia	Weight	Weighted Average Score (by Issue Area)
1. World Economy	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	0.667	**0.57**
2. ICT	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0.833	**0.83**
3. Health	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	1.00	**1.0**
4. Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	**0.5**
5. Cultural Diversity	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	–1	+1	0	0.833	**0.52**
6. Crime and Drugs	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0.833	**0.73**
7. Aging	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.667	**0.57**
8. Biotech	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	–1	0.667	**0.50**
9. Human Genome	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	0.833	**0.67**
10. Conflict Prevention	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0.667	**0.42**
11. Arms Control	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0.667	**0.59**
12. Terrorism	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	**0.20**
Weight	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.722**	
Weighted Average Score (by country)	**0.60**	**0.66**	**0.72**	**0.64**	**0.59**	**0.48**	**0.72**	**0.10**		**1) 0.578** **2) 0.564** **3) 0.592**

Notes[vi]:
(i) N/A indicates that information is not available, and that no compliance score has been awarded
(ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming
(iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa. See attached Development Compliance Report.
(iv) The weights are calculated using the ambition-significance ranking. A commitment in a given issue area that has a higher ambition-significance ranking has a correspondingly higher weight score. See attached note on compliance for further details.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 57.8%
2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 56.4%
3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 59.2%

Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings

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Appendices

The coding manual for assessing the ambition-significance of each individual commitment is presented immediately below.

A. Ambition

1. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify a **goal**?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

2. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify **measures** to attain the goal?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

3. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify a **target date** at which time the goal is to be completed?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

B. Significance

4. Timeliness*

Is the purpose of the commitment to respond to a current crisis?

Is the purpose of the commitment to prevent/address a future crisis/issue?

(1 point)

5. <![endif]>Scope*

Is the commitment directed only at G8 countries?

Is the commitment directed at countries outside G8 membership?

(1 point)

6. <![endif]>Novelty*

Is the commitment referring to an issue that was addressed in previous summits?

Is the commitment referring to an issue that has not been addressed in previous summits?

(1 point)

* Note that the scoring criteria for (4), (5), and (6) is specific to the particular commitment to be ranked. Take the issue of scope, for example: at times, it is appropriate for a particular commitment to be directed only at G8 countries (in this case, a score of 0 would be allocated), while at other times it is appropriate for the commitment to be directed outside G8 membership (in this case, a score of 1 would be allocated). Every effort has been taken by the Research G8 Group to minimize the measurement error associated with this ranking process, including the implementation of a two-stage verification process to ensure that, if there is a bias in the ranking, this bias is applied consistently across all commitments and across all issue areas.

Taken together, these criteria suggest that each individual commitment, and through normal or weighted averages an entire summit, can be judged as follows:

Ambition-Significance Ranking

0 = No Ambition, No Significance

1 = Low Ambition, No Significance

2 = Moderate Ambition, No Significance

3 = High Ambition, No Significance

4 = High Ambition, Low Significance

5 = High Ambition, Moderate Significance

6 = High Ambition, High Significance

Before applying this framework to the entire set of 169 commitments, it must be noted that ranking commitments by ambition-significance is an arduous task involving several methodological challenges. In this exercise, the G8 Research Group is attempting to quantify an essentially qualitative enterprise. Every effort has been made to reduce the level of measurement error and simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, these two problems still exist. As a result, there tends to be a systematic overstatement of the level of ambition-significance for each commitment as well as a systematic overstatement of the level of compliance. Given the fact that the G8 Research Group has been examining this issue from a political science perspective and not from an

economics perspective, no regressions have been employed and the corresponding economic techniques to correct for simultaneity bias have not been used.

With these caveats, the ambition-significance framework specified above has been applied, on a trial basis, to the 12 commitments in the G7 Communiqué and to the 97 commitments in the G8 Communiqué, as noted above. For this exercise, however, the individual subcommitments listed above have been amalgamated into a single commitment, thus reducing the overall number of commitments from 109 (12+97) to 82 (12+70). (This comes from the consolidation in the G8 Communiqué of commitments in development from 15 to 8, health from 15 to 4, crime and drugs from 18 to 14, and aging from 6 to 1.).

Notes

[i] The precise commitments identified and the method and coding instructions for identifying individual commitments are available on the G8 Information Centre at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca. Note that commitments that contain subheadings with further commitments are counted separately, with one number assigned to the main heading and separate number for each of the individual commitments listed below.

[ii] This study is based on the revised version of the G8 Research Group's Compliance Assessment, as of July 7, 2001.

[iii] The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country's compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column (e.g., no score was awarded to Italy in issue no. 1, "World Economy." Hence Italy is excluded from the average score by issue area result of 0.85 for issue no. 1. Also, Italy's average score by country excludes issue no. 1 from the result of 0.89.

[iv] Consider a commitment on trade that has a compliance rate of 100%, but an ambition-significance ranking of only 3/6 = 50%. Consider another commitment on the environment that has a compliance rate of 80%, but an ambition-significance ranking of 6/6 = 100%. In the previous analysis, the commitment on trade would be deemed more successful than the commitment on the environment because it has a higher compliance score. This compliance score, however, is misleading since it does not take into account how difficult the commitment is to comply with. The difficulty of complying with a commitment is measured through the ambition-significance ranking. Coming back to the example, the trade commitment with an ambition-significance ranking of 50% is much easier to comply with than the environment commitment that has an ambition-significance ranking of 100%. To account for the difficulty of complying, the ambition-significance ranking is used as a weight in the compliance analysis. A given commitment would now have a weighted compliance score that is the product of its original compliance score multiplied by its ambition-significance ranking. In the example, the trade commitment would now have a weighted compliance score of 50% while the environment commitment would have a weighted compliance score of 80%, derived once again by multiplying their original compliance scores by their respective ambition-significance rankings.

[v] The current analysis itself is offered with an invitation for others to challenge, confirm, enrich and supplement them. Contributions are particularly welcome if they are:

a. Empirical: Are there additional or alternative data that would adjust the scores?
b. Methodological: Have the existing data been correctly applied to the first-order, instrumental compliance criteria employed in this study?
c. Analytical: Is there any systematic bias in the selection of the priority commitments or the 12 issue areas chosen for assessment this year?

For additional material see the analytical studies listed at www.g8.utoronto.ca.

[vi] The "average score by issue area" is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The "average score by country" is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country's compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective score column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective score column (e.g. No score was awarded to Italy in issue #1, "World Economy". Hence Italy is excluded from the "average score by issue area" result of 0.57 for issue #1. Also, Italy's "average score by country" excludes issue #1 from the result of 0.64).

F. LOY (4)

Notes for Conference on Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security.

What Can the G8 do?

Rome, 16 July 2001

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1. Focusing on "the larger institutional framework" is another way of asking "Whom are you going to call on, when you need help in preventing or limiting conflict/". The UN? Regional organizations such as NATO or the OAU? The US military? Neighboring countries? Non-governmental organizations?

2. I suggest that in answering this question, the place to start is to be really rigorous in making some critical distinctions:

    - Is the purpose of the mission a humanitarian one, to relieve short-term suffering, or are we trying for something much more ambitious, such as conflict resolution and state building?
    - Is neutrality an option, or is this an instance where we need to, and are willing to, take sides, recognizing that this means a much longer, harder road, with the probability of an occupying force?
    - Is it possible and realistic for personnel of neighboring states to bear the bulk of the burden, for that appears to improve the chances of success?

3. The reason the distinction between conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance is important is that however neutral the institution or country

providing the conflict prevention services thinks it is, one side or the other will usually consider it partisan. Humanitarian assistance, on the other hand, can actually be neutral – if you pick the right entity and are lucky. The ICRC and some NGOs such as Oxfam are two examples of organizations that have earned credibility as neutrals.

4. An example. The issue of neutrality in providing humanitarian assistance came into focus for the US in connection with Sudan. The struggle between the government forces of the North and the rebels of the South has been long and brutal. The suffering immense. Our sense was that clearly pressure had to be brought on the government in order to give it an incentive to come to the bargaining table. One of the points of pressure, obviously, could have been in the area of food delivery, i.e. delivering food to the rebels and not to the government. Or reducing the allocation that went to the government controlled areas.

5. The discussion surrounding this point was heated and sharp, evidencing conflicting points of view. It was influenced by our perception that the government itself had been using food as a weapon. In the end, we decided that our humanitarian goals world wide – in which reliable food delivery plays an important role – would be unacceptably compromised if in a conflict situation we treated food as we do weapons, which we often provide to one side but not the other.

6. The issues of neutrality and credibility are key elements in trying to determine nation or entity would be most effective, and how to maximize the likelihood

that the actor really will be effective. Let us see what lessons we can learn from that particularly unhappy chapter that involved both – Somalia.

7. You will recall that civil war erupted when President Ali Mahdi refused to give up his position to Mohamed Farah Aideed, who was elected (fairly?) chair of the United Somalia Congress. The civil war caused a severe famine; a true humanitarian crisis. The international community did little to intervene. When several African leaders tried to mediate between the warring factions (the Djibouti Conference of 1991), neither the UN nor Western powers nor the OAU found themselves in a position to support the mediation efforts with resources or troops. I might add that Italy did offer its good offices to help resolve the conflict, but its offer was rejected by Aideed because he believed Italy secretly favored Mahdi. The intervention of African leaders at Djibouti lacked credibility because they were not supported by resources. The efforts of Italy lacked credibility because it was not considered "neutral".

8. In January 1992 the UN became involved, with a Security Council mediated cease-fire. It didn't last, and the violence that followed complicated efforts to send humanitarian aid, particularly food. When media coverage showed the resulting famine, the US, in response, sent troops to ensure that food aid actually got through. All this in the absence of an effective cease-fire. Local clans, many of whom supported Aideed, interpreted the international effort as helping the government, and they sought to subvert the humanitarian mission. This led to new Security Council resolutions, that, among other things, sought to disarm the population and to capture Aideed.

9. This all led, in March 1994, to the humiliating loss of American (and Pakistani) lives. Within a year all UN troops had been withdrawn from Somalia. And we in the US are still laboring under the fall out from this exercise.

10. Let me note two lessons that might be learned from this case. First, it's very important to be clear whether the effort is one of alleviating short-term humanitarian suffering, or one that approaches the realm of state building. The first requires true neutrality. The second cannot be accomplished without in some measure taking sides. Therefore the two have to be kept as separate as possible, either in terms of time or in terms of the identity of the actors.

11. The second lesson is that if you change the mission from peacekeeping (where the peacekeepers are explicitly and implicitly neutral) to a collective security operation, you need to admit that this involves taking sides, and one of the sides will become your enemy. The result is that you will need an occupying force -- and this, in the case of Somalia was not forthcoming from the international community.

12. East Timor provides a useful contrast. There, after the citizens of East Timor, in August 1999, overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia, the pro-Jakarta paramilitary groups increased their violent attacks against pro-independence supporters. Thousands were forced to flee to West Timor. The UN sent personnel to assure the safe evacuation or flight of these individuals, and when the militia fired on the UN personnel the UN evacuated some 200 of them.

13. Indonesia asserted that the disturbances were an internal matter, declared martial law, and sent some 4,000 police officers into East Timor. After intense diplomatic pressure and US threats of economic sanctions, Indonesia allowed an international force to restore order in East Timor. And order was restored, and those who fled are largely back. By any reasonable standard, a successful mission.

14. Why? There are surely many differences from Somalia, but I will I will focus on three of them. First, the UN and the West got Jakarta at least to announce publicly that it would abide by the referendum. So on paper, at least, both sides supported the purpose of the mission. Second, seventy percent of the UN forces are from states of the region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. These have a real interest in the stability of the region. Perhaps this formula – UN and Western pressure and authority and predominantly regional personnel – is as close as we can come to answer the question "Whom do we call."

(5)

Conference on

Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security. What Can the G8 Do?

Rome, 16 July 2001

The Role of Development Co-operation for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: DAC Orientations and Policy Guidance

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The DAC, a policy forum for development co-operation

1. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) offers a rare opportunity for OECD bilateral donors, the UN, and the International Financial Insitutions to work together and share information. They strive to increase the effectiveness of common efforts to support sustainable development. Its mission is to foster co-ordinated, integrated, effective and adequately financed international efforts in support of sustainable economic and social development in work toward the International Development Goals. The Members and Observers to the DAC have certain common objectives on how to run their aid programmes and work to achieve best practice and improve the overall effectiveness of assistance. Recognising that developing countries themselves are ultimately responsible for their development, the DAC concentrates on how international co-operation can contribute to the capacity of those countries to participate in the global economy their people to overcome poverty and participate fully in society.

2. Once a year, the DAC brings together Development Ministers, Heads of Development Aid Agencies and other Senior Officials from organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF to review aid policies and endorse areas for key policy advances in development co-operation for the international community. This year, on 25-26 April 2001, Development Ministers and Heads of Agencies endorsed key policy guidance on poverty reduction, trade capacity development, sustainable development and conflict prevention. Policy statements and guidelines are now available on each one of these topics on the website of the DAC www.oecd/dac.org

DAC work and policies on conflict prevention and poverty reduction

3. Today, I simply want to take a short time to give you a very general overview of DAC guidance that is highly relevant to the discussion on the role of development co-operation for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, within the broader framework of enhanced, more effective and partner country-owned poverty reduction policies. Again, you can find more specific information and the texts in full at our website, in particular:

- The DAC Policy Statement and Guidelines on *Poverty Reduction*, and
- The DAC Statement and Guidelines on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners.*

4. These statements and guidelines are the fruit of joint efforts of DAC Members to reflect on the effectiveness of aid for sustainable development and poverty reduction. One key message that runs throughout that work is policy coherence. In the Statement on conflict prevention, in particular, Ministers, in effect, said:

> *"We will strive to increase coherence among our policies – trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defence and development co-operation – that have an impact on conflict prevention. We intend to promote a culture of prevention in our work with developing countries, shared consistently across our government departments."*

DAC Guidance on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation

5. In 1995, as the post-Cold War crises became more and more prevalent, the DAC decided to take a closer look at the nexus between development and conflict-torn countries and recognised how devastating violent conflict is to a country's people and development efforts. They established a Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation to give donors a chance to work together more proactively on conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

6. This Network has developed unique, extensive guidelines to support agencies in this complex area and make efforts to mainstream conflict prevention into their policies. In 1997 the DAC endorsed a first policy document entitled *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* which gave the international community a roadmap to use to consider the role of development co-operation in preventing conflict and enhancing peacebuilding in conflict-prone areas. The original guidelines were recognised by the 1997 Denver G8 as an important roadmap for peacebuilding initiatives at the regional, sub-regional and national levels in conflict-prone situations and are still very relevant today. The

supplementary guidance approved by Ministers last month extended knowledge to other policy areas. Through this guidance, DAC Members recognised how violent conflict in developing countries touches on the basic values and interests of their societies, and reaffirmed their commitment – within the international community – to finding better ways to help prevent such conflicts at their roots. Work in war-torn or conflict-prone societies must be seen as an integral part of the co-operation challenge. Helping strengthen a society's capacity to manage conflict without violence is a foundation for sustainable development. Structural stability and the role of development actors play in strengthening it is a central focus of the guidelines. Structural stability embraces the interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, social and economic development, supported by dynamic and representative political institutions capable of managing change and resolving disputes without resorting to violent conflict.

7. Though deep-rooted societal conflicts do not follow any standard, predictable patterns or cycles, we do have best practices and lessons learned from past experience that can help in the future. With the update to the guidelines, the DAC also agreed on some key areas of assistance and main lines of action for development co-operation in different situations. The guidelines and the DAC itself stress the critical role of development assistance programmes in promoting the democratic stability of societies. They also underline innovative approaches to helping defuse the potential for violent conflict where tensions have not escalated into violence, based on measures ranging from more traditional areas of assistance to democratisation, good governance (including justice and security systems) and respect for human rights. In fragile transitional situations, in particular it is important to help transform a fragile process into a sustainable, durable peace in which the causes for conflict are diminished and incentives for peace are strengthened. The challenge of peace and reconciliation is also addressed. They finally stress that post-conflict reconstruction is much more than just repairing physical infrastructure, and underline that the first priority is to restore a sense of security. This includes restoring legitimate government institutions that are regarded by citizens as serving all groups and that are able to allay persisting tensions, while carrying out the challenging and costly tasks of rebuilding.

8. These key recommendations of the 1997 DAC guidelines have been further strengthened and reaffirmed in the 2001 policy statement. The guidelines and statement on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners* are based on policy analysis and lessons learned in three main areas:

(a) The role of development aid as an incentive or disincentive for peace in conflict situations or in conflict-prone countries.

(b) The contribution of development co-operation to security sector reform.

(c) Development co-operation and conflict prevention.

9. They are also based on a consultative process that involved dialogue with representatives of partner countries, civil society organisations, research institutions, as well as international organisations and aid agencies active in the region. Three regional consultations were held in 1999 and 2000 in Africa, Latin America and Asia/Pacific. They stressed in particular the need to: enhance donor responses, policy and capacity; issues of implementation and accountability; assess and monitor impact; foster and support local capacities and partnerships; promote alternative opportunities by providing incentives to individuals and community groups to refrain from engaging or re-engaging in violent conflict. Other important topics raised include: reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian society, dealing with internally-displaced persons [IDPs], helping children in conflict situations, supporting primary and other educational activities as incentives to resist involvement in violent conflict; addressing issues of military expenditure, illicit flows of small arms and ammunition. The conclusions of the three consultations fed into the key messages for the 2001 DAC policy statement on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

10. The document approved by Development Co-operation Ministers on last April cover nine broad areas, across which the issue of policy coherence is constantly stressed. The main chapters of the documents address the following key issues:

(a) *Basic guiding principles* for effective action in conflict situations.

(b) *Integrating a conflict prevention "lens"*, i.e. creating a "culture of prevention" in development co-operation and foreign policy action.

(c) *Security and development*: in this perspective, security is considered as an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace and sustainable development.

(d) *Supporting regional co-operation and consultation*, i.e. addressing the regional dimensions of conflict.

(e) *Peace processes, justice and reconciliation*, i.e. making sure that peace processes address differing viewpoints on issues of justice and reconciliation in order to avoid the recurrence of violence.

(f) *Engaging in partnerships for peace*, by considering the need to build partnerships with states and the civil society.

(g) *Working with business*, by raising awareness of conflict prevention issues among the national and international business communities.

(h) *Countering negative economic forces*, and addressing the political economy of war and violent conflict.

11. This work also carries partnership a step further step to recommend that donors explore alliances with the private sector to battle against "bad" business practices while working with "good" business. To quote the Ministerial statement once again,

> *"It is important to understand and take account of the political economy of violent conflict. Powerful groups, businesses and individuals, using violent or non-violent means, can acquire a vested interest in sparking and perpetuating violent conflict."*

12. Other key areas covered include: supporting inclusiveness for peacebuilding; strengthening regional approaches and regional response capacities; minimise detrimental consequences to civilian populations of the suspension or withdrawal of aid; and exploring innovative aid modalities and mechanisms.

Some key commitments made by Ministers: the DAC policy statement on conflict prevention

13. With the statement on policy goals and orientations related to conflict prevention, DAC Members agreed on some key messages that are particularly relevant to the discussion of the *ad hoc* working group. I would like to recall the following points. The DAC recognised that:

(a) Conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty. DAC Members reaffirmed their commitment to building peace and addressing conflict as part of their efforts to help partner countries reduce poverty, promote economic growth and improve people's lives in the context of sustainable development. They stressed their intention to promote a culture of conflict prevention in their work with developing countries, shared consistently across the different parts of OECD government with an enhanced policy coherence.

(b) Coherent policies can help ensure that the work of aid agencies has maximum positive impact on preventing conflict. Coherence among DAC Members policies in trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defence, and development co-operation, is seen as a crucial factor for conflict prevention.

(c) It is important to counter negative economic dynamics, fight corruption and combat illicit trafficking, and in more general terms understand and address the political economy of violent conflict. This can be done through joint international actions, like UN and G8 embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds, and the OECD conventions, guidelines and recommendations on various aspects of such phenomena, like the Convention on combating bribery of foreign officials in international business transactions.

(d) Greater co-ordination will improve responses to conflict. The DAC recognised the need for improving prevention initiatives and responses to violent conflict through better co-ordinated decision making. This will involve, wherever feasible, shared analysis, effectively co-ordinated and agreed strategic mechanisms and frameworks for action.

(e) Encouraging and supporting timely action can help prevent conflict from turning violent. The DAC recognised that lasting peace and structural stability require long-term processes, and committed to encouraging and supporting early action and seizing opportunities to strengthen co-operation in societies, in particular those at risk.

(f) Some key principles will guide the action of DAC Members, such as:

- Recognise the potential – and limits – of the international community to take actions that favour peace and discourage violence.
- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace.
- Act on the costly lessons learnt on the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
- Support peacebuilding initiatives early on and continue even when peace processes are perceived to have been achieved.
- Actively engage women, men and youth in policy-making processes and peacebuilding.
- Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.

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CENTRO ALTI STUDI PER LA DIFESA **IAI** **UNIVERSITA DI TORONTO**

Promoting Conflict prevention and Human Security
What Can the G8 Do?

VULNERABILITY
THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Rome, 16 July 2001

VULNERABILITY
THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT

By Umberto Triulzi*

BACKGROUND

The rising number of violent conflicts in poverty-stricken areas has become an increasingly more common characteristic of the post-Cold War era. Economic crises, natural disaster and civil conflicts are the three most important causes of aggregate shocks and sharp increase in the incidence of poverty (WDR 2000, Chap. 9). Between 1990-97 more than 80% of all Developing Countries experienced at least one year of negative per capita output growth as a result of these phenomena. Whilst the international community has focused a large part of its attention on issues of conflict management and resolution, little academic or policy-making effort has been directed at the study of the underlying causes of war and at the construction of plausible preventive strategies. As a result, insufficient information, *ad hoc* interventions, and often a lack of political will on the part of powerful actors have contributed to the statistical rise of world conflict. In addition, post-conflict reconstruction aid has often been ill-targeted and badly managed, while economic stabilization programs have rarely produced the highly desired effect of lasting stability, the percentage of conflict recurrence also remaining quite high. As a result, numerous and multifaceted international efforts aimed at social stabilization, poverty alleviation and conflict resolution have been altogether ineffective and all too brief, overarching wasted resources and spoiling the credibility of the international actors involved.

In conjunction with this failure to adequately respond to increased political conflict, there has also been an overriding failure of donors and international organizations to eradicate problems of poverty and underdevelopment. This

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failure of current development promotion and poverty eradication strategies has resulted in an increased interest by the major international organizations in analytical methodologies that have been effectively implemented in other sectors, namely vulnerability analysis.

VULNERABILITY: THE EMERGENCE OF A CONCEPT

The term vulnerability has its origins in the fairly recent concept of *sustainable livelihoods*, first coined at the World Summit on Environment and Development in 1992 to describe the combination of local knowledge, science and technology and policy structures available and accessible to a particular unit (individuals, households and communities). The concept was born out of the belief that it is no longer sufficient to simply evaluate disposable assets at the macro and micro level; rather, for a complete understanding of the degree of sustainability of poor people's livelihoods it is necessary to analyze the dynamics and characteristics of a unit's reaction strategies in various political and socioeconomic contexts.

Other than being defined as the opposite of sustainable livelihoods, the term vulnerability has yet to be well-articulated. There is no unanimous and consistent definition of the phenomenon. Neither is there a complete and systematic theoretical analysis of vulnerability in the major political and financial international organizations. At least, two ideas of vulnerability are currently in use (Ravaillon, 2001): vulnerability as down-side risk to living standards (considering different poverty weights) and vulnerability as the probability of being poor in the future (i.e. ex-ante poverty).
Nevertheless, we can affirm that, in general, it is the description of the characteristics of an area, an individual or anthropologic group and the causes that determine the probability that a risk will translate into a concrete event. According to the UNDP, vulnerability can be divided into two different elements: external and internal. The external elements entail the level of exposure to a risk, whilst the internal aspects refer to the absence of the means to react to and handle the shock without losses (UNDP, 1997).

In 2000, the World Bank updated this definition by stating that vulnerability is the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in well-being due to a situation of non security linked to exposure to different kinds of risks (World Development Report *Attacking Poverty*, 2000-2001). *Well-being* in this sense is understood as the combination of a household's asset endowment and insurance mechanisms, and the characteristics (frequency and severity) of the shocks the household undergoes.

Up until recently, the concept of vulnerability has been used almost exclusively in reference to studies on food security and to the creation of Early Warning Systems to allow policy-makers to identify at-risk areas and groups. Both the FAO and the WFP have, logically, been the most involved and active in this aspect of vulnerability analysis. According to the FAO's *Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems* (FIVIMS), vulnerability comprises a wide range of factors that put a population at risk for food insecurity. The degree of vulnerability for an individual, a family unit or a group of people depends on the exposure to risk factors and the unit's ability to face and adapt to adverse circumstances. The WFP defines vulnerability as the probability of a consistent decline in levels of food access and consumption below the minimum survival threshold. The risks included in the analysis are natural and human disasters, drought and floods, insect invasions and epidemics, conflict and civil wars.

Only recently has the term vulnerability been incorporated, by the World Bank and the UNDP, into a more complete and transversal understanding of the characteristics of multidimensional phenomena, such as development and poverty. The latest *World Development Report* (World Bank 2000-01) assigns vulnerability a central role among the many variables that influence human security. The reduction of vulnerability represents, in fact, one of the objectives of the World Bank's strategy to reach the social development goals established for 2015. Vulnerability as a method of analysis in these contexts does not override traditional research studies in this area; rather, it offers a

different angle from which to examine the dynamics of development and poverty and understand their various manifestations.

According to the UNDP, development problems depend more on the possibility to access resources and the capacity to use them efficiently than the absolute lack of resources. Vulnerability, therefore, is defined by the UNDP as a multidimensional phenomenon which does not depend so much on the *quantity* of productive resources available as much as a situation of disempowerment relative to an ideal situation.

We need a forward-looking view to identify the "vulnerable", moving from an ex-post toward an ex-ante approach in poverty reduction. Comparing 13 panel studies for DCs in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Russia (Baulch and Hoddinot, 2000) confirms the assessment that the percentage of households which are sometimes poor is surprisingly large (it ranges from 20 to 66%) and contrasts with the share of always poor which range from 10 and 25% (while measurement errors may substantially inflate the estimates of total and transient poverty, other studies that explicitly correct for measurement error still find such significant share).These findings suggest than an ex-post focus on poverty miss necessarily all those that are not poor at the moment but can be so in the next period. A similar picture emerges when panel data is used to estimate changes in the relative welfare position of individuals. Less than a half of the households remain on the diagonal (i.e. maintain their relative welfare position over time) with some 30-40% move by one quintile and another 15/20% move two quintiles or more.

THE ROAD TO A VULNERABILITY APPROACH TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT: TAKING THE DAC'S LEAD

While vulnerability has made appearances in studies on food security and, more recently, poverty, it has yet to be tightly linked with conflict prevention —In general, conflict prevention analyses have tended to focus on Early Warning Systems, which track the progress of various risk factors. The term

vulnerability, however, has only recently entered the vocabulary of those who deal with development and conflict prevention authorities. In 1997, the DAC created a committee formed for the express purpose of linking conflict prevention schemes with development cooperation strategies. That same year, the DAC Committee published its first guidelines on *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*, formalizing for the first time an international interest in preventing conflict and building peace through development cooperation mechanisms. The DAC has recently (May 2001) renewed its commitment to the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The Network will aim to look at how to integrate conflict analysis, risk assessment and prevention lenses into established development co-operation mechanisms and mindsets. Furthermore, it intends to "review how Member/Observer institutions incorporate conflict-peace analysis, vulnerability and risk assessment, scenario building and DAC conflict material into their established policy/planning/operational activities." One of the Network's primary objectives, in fact, is to better integrate conflict prevention and peacebuilding into development cooperation policies, employing a culture of conflict analysis, risk/vulnerability assessment, appropriate conflict prevention responses and coherent policies.

The DAC's *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners,* (OECD, 2001) also touches on the topic of vulnerability, stressing the need to strengthen analytical capacities and information systems "through the use of various tools, including vulnerability and risk analysis." Furthermore, DAC believes that peace and conflict impact analysis, and risk and vulnerability assessments should be mainstreamed to become as common as cost-benefit analyses. Such early warning tools can help promote explicit and timely attention to risk factors, encouraging a "culture of prevention" and providing information required for situation-specific decisions.

However, if we look at recently realized development cooperation projects, it is clear that international development agencies still have a long way to go in understanding the link between conflict prevention and development cooperation. The story of two water projects in Sri Lanka, reported by the

DAC (OECD, 2001), is illustrative of this lack of understanding. The Gal Oya water management project in Sri Lanka fostered a peacebuilding function which was entirely incidental to the project. By cultivating the mutual interests of members from different ethnic and socioeconomic groups, the project managed to thrive, and even spawn a few *ad hoc* cooperation institutions, even in the midst of severe communal conflict. The project had a positive impact on the incentives for peace within this particular region of Sri Lanka. In another water management project in Sri Lanka, the project planners did not fully consider the highly political issue of population displacement and resettlement in the context of a communal civil war. The project, therefore, failed to achieve its objectives.

A vulnerability analysis of the affected socioeconomic groups involved in the water management projects would have been aware of the potential for positive externalities in the first case and able to predict the internal risks in the second case.

Although vulnerability is still fairly uncharted territory, we can nevertheless see traces of its use and its importance in the analysis of various development phenomena in proceedings, studies and reports from the major international governing bodies. What needs to be done, however, is consolidate the scattered and disconnected traces of vulnerability analysis and make them coherent, consistent and bring them to the forefront of not only conflict prevention and development cooperation analysis, but all development cooperation and poverty reduction initiatives as well.

GOING BEYOND PREVENTION: APPLYING A VULNERABILITY LENS

At the recent meeting in Paris of the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Paris, May 2001), 19 official delegations from DAC member countries, along with representatives from the World Bank, UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHA and the IMF, participated. Representatives, experts and diplomats came from either conflict prevention and peacebuilding organizations or economic development agencies.

Notwithstanding the high quality of the participants, I found that the culture and background of the two distinct groups hindered them from finding common ground, especially with regards to vulnerability as a potential joint instrument to achieve both groups' objectives. The explanation for this is possibly twofold. On the one hand, authorities on conflict prevention rarely understand socio-economic vulnerability as their focus lies in the political shocks that cause conflict, rather than the dynamic and long-term economic risk factors; on the other hand, development cooperation policy-makers are overly concerned with the physical realization and outcome of projects, without any consideration of their effects within the broader context of vulnerability. It is essential then that a common vision, with shared methodologies and mutually accepted philosophies, is achieved. The two-year timeframe allotted to the Network to better integrate conflict prevention and peacebuilding into development cooperation policies should be sufficient to reach a common approach.

In this direction, the DAC is already making efforts to apply a conflict prevention "lens" to policies in many departments to make them consistent and comprehensive, the lens being a metaphor for looking at how conflict prevention can be incorporated into all arenas of policy (e.g. from development to trade, investment and foreign policy). But, a prevention "lens" is not enough. We need to go a step further back and mount a *vulnerability* lens in which prevention methods are based on an understanding of the root causes of underdevelopment, poverty and conflict. This understanding, however, can only be reached through a lens which looks at the *dynamism* of changes and the trend of transformations over the long-term. Vulnerability is not a static phenomenon. Consequently, only through a constant, coordinated and coherent system of monitoring and evaluation, which is capable of analyzing the changes that occur over time in groups or individuals, can we obtain a long-term and deeper understanding of socioeconomic vulnerability and its corresponding risk factors.

In the context of conflict prevention and development, then, a vulnerability approach is the *missing link* as it provides us with a wide-angle lens to view

socioeconomic phenomena, encompassing a broad spectrum of perspectives (economic, social, health, environmental, cultural, gender, religious etc.) and the various ways in which groups and individuals react and handle risks. In particular, instituting a vulnerability lens would allow us to potentially identify the precise kind of causal relationship between economic underdevelopment and relative poverty, on the one hand, and social strife and communal violence, on the other.

From the analysis we have considered up to now, we can draw some initial conclusions:

- Vulnerability is about both *being* poor as well as *becoming* poor. On the one hand, we cannot ignore that persistently poor people are just as vulnerable. On the other hand, while there is only a small proportion of the population who are chronically poor, there are many, many more who are vulnerable to falling into poverty or becoming poorer. As mentioned before, the most recent studies show that the percentage of households which are sometimes poor is surprisingly large (it ranges from 20% to 66%) and even if the majority of them is not below the "poverty line" at the time of a typical survey (i.e. they are not classified as permanently poor) they could be pushed into poverty in the future by life-cycle events. This means that poverty is not a constant or static condition; rather, it is the result of dynamic transformations, processes, shocks, and events. At any point a person can be more or less poor, or rather, more or less susceptible to a decline in his/her well-being. In this light, it is more accurate to define individuals and groups as "vulnerable" to becoming poor(er), instead of simply "poor".

- The second important point is that there is no single, universal vulnerability. Groups and individuals differ on the basis of their degree of vulnerability, which can be quantified using appropriate socioeconomic indicators and other more appropriate statistical tools

to correctly measure various levels of vulnerability and understand its variations in space and time.

- This brings us to the third, and possibly most crucial, aspect of a vulnerability approach: measuring it. The quantitative analysis of vulnerability is extremely important. It allows us to find significant differences across groups that would be missed by the current static measurements of poverty. The World Bank, for example, weights distance squared below the poverty line as essentially the sole criterion for concern and social policy. The concept of variability, however, receives little weight in this measurement of vulnerability. As vulnerability is a dynamic process, this oversight on the part of the World Bank represents a fundamental flaw.

- Finally, another – mistake (or problem) is the fact that only the poverty line is used as an indicator to measure vulnerability. Vulnerability, as I have mentioned before, is a multidimensional and all-encompassing phenomenon, poverty representing only one part of the whole. Considering this limited vulnerability indicator, it goes without saying that we need to create a new, and more appropriate set of indicators and statistical tools which properly reflect all the factors and elements that influence vulnerability.

The path to incorporating a clear and focused vulnerability approach into conflict prevention and development cooperation analyses will be long and most probably arduous. However, vulnerability's already wide presence on the stage of international organizations such as the DAC, FAO, WFP, the World Bank and the UNDP are encouraging signs that a socioeconomic vulnerability analysis will become as common as a cost-benefit analysis in policy decision-making. Nevertheless, today it still remains a supporting actor, rather than a leading role on the stage of conflict prevention and development cooperation. Integrating the study of vulnerability with the study of other socioeconomic phenomena would therefore be a step in the right direction.

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OECD

"Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners"

Statement by Development Ministers and Heads of Agencies at the High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), April 2001, endorsing the Supplement to the DAC Guidelines, "Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century"

Conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty.

1. The widespread recurrence of violent conflict and its ruinous impact bring us to renew our commitment to building peace and addressing conflict. We reaffirm conflict prevention as an integral part of our efforts to help partner countries reduce poverty, promote economic growth and improve people's lives, in the context of sustainable development. We intend to promote a culture of conflict prevention in our work with developing countries, shared consistently across the different parts of our own governments. We endorse *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*, a supplement to the DAC guidelines on conflict, peace and development co-operation. This Supplement relates primarily to collective conflict – among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

Coherent policies can help ensure that our work has maximum positive impact.

2. We will strive to increase coherence among our policies – trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defence, and development co-operation – that impact on conflict prevention. We will strengthen our capacity to analyse risks and causes of violent conflict through approaches such as vulnerability analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building. This will help identify coherent strategies and opportunities to prevent conflict.

It is important to counter negative economic dynamics, fight corruption and combat illicit trafficking.

3. It is important to understand and take account of the political economy of violent conflict. Powerful groups, businesses and individuals, using violent or non-violent means, can acquire a vested interest in sparking and perpetuating violent conflict. Just as it is important to limit the proliferation of weapons, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, corrupt resource deals, rent seeking and the flow of economic resources that can stoke or be the aim of violent conflicts. This can be done through joint international actions including: UN and G8 embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds; the *Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions; OECD Principles of Corporate Governance;* the *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises;* and the *DAC Recommendations on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement.*

Greater co-ordination will improve responses to conflict.

4. Africa has been hit the hardest by violent conflict. But every region of the world has experienced widespread violent conflict with its devastating impact on human lives and development. We will improve our prevention initiatives and responses to violent conflict through better co-ordinated decision making. This will involve, wherever feasible, shared analysis, effectively co-ordinated and agreed strategic mechanisms and frameworks for action.

Encouraging and supporting timely action can help prevent conflict

5. Lasting peace and structural stability require long-term processes. We will encourage and support early action and seize opportunities to strengthen co-operation in societies, in particular those at risk, to help prevent the outbreak of collective violence. Where this can be done it is far less costly in human,

Business can help actively prevent violent conflict.

12. We encourage trends towards partnership with business – domestic and international – to raise awareness of how firms can be good corporate citizens, avoid feeding the negative dynamics of conflict, and make positive economic and social contributions to preventing violence.

Good governance is fundamental to peace.

13. Enduring peace rests on fundamental principles of governance, human security, democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights, gender equality and open and fair market economies. It relies on good governance at the national, regional and international levels. We commit to furthering our efforts and working together, across our governments, to strive towards peace.

(8)

OECD

Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

Orientations for External Partners

Supplement to the DAC Guidelines on
Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
on the Threshold of the 21st Century

FOREWORD

The work of development co-operation in conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery has been guided by a set of policy guidelines, *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century,* approved by the High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in May 1997. In the past five years, OECD Member governments in the DAC have expanded their work in situations of potential, current, and recent conflict, often in countries where they have been working for many years.

Knowledge and practice have evolved since the guidelines were published. Painful experience shows that preventing violent conflict would bring enormous benefits in terms of human life, poverty reduction and growth. Substantial progress has already been made on some fronts, while other challenges remain. Though the guidelines are still highly relevant, the DAC recognised the need to broaden its work on conflict prevention to address these challenges.

This Supplement updates and amplifies the initial guidelines for DAC Members and their work[1] with government counterparts in other ministries, the international community and partners in developing country governments, civil society and business. It draws on three main sources derived from the intensive projects of the Task Force[2] set up to investigate linkages between conflict, peace and development co-operation:

- Studies in several fields: the influence of development co-operation activities in conflict situations based on case studies on Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka; security, development and "security sector reform"; and the uses of aid to help prevent violent conflict[3].
- The results of informal consultations held in 1999 and 2000 with a wide range of practitioners and experts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific.[4]
- Evolving experience on the ground and in international action.

These efforts attest to the deepening interest in conflict-related development assistance since 1997. They also demonstrate how much remains to be done in implementing the stated commitments and best practices identified in the 1997 guidelines and in this Supplement, *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*[5].

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1 There are clear linkages to other DAC work, particularly in poverty reduction, gender, governance and environment.

2 The DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation was established in 1995. As of 2001, the Task Force is called the DAC CPDC Network.

3 "The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict", the synthesis report on case studies of aid incentives and disincentives is available as DCD(2000)16, as is the commissioned report on security and development co-operation DCD(2000)4/REV2. The work on conflict prevention and development co-operation was reviewed in a consultative workshop held in Sweden in August 2000.

4 The regional consultations provided distinct and compelling perspectives from the diverse vantage points of different groups and interests in many developing countries. They gave tangible reinforcement to the original guidelines and subsequent commissioned work. Reports on these consultations in Addis Ababa, Cartagena de Indias, and Bangkok are available as documents DCD(2000)5, 17 and 18. A synthesis of main lessons and common themes can be found as document DCD(2000)19.

5 "External partners" refers to any actor (government, NGO, multilateral institution, development bank, bilateral aid agency, private sector representative) that has a legitimate partnership with the developing country in question. In this context it also indicates that different OECD government ministries or departments, not just their development agencies, can have a role to play.

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Boxes

Acronyms

ACP	African Caribbean Pacific States
ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association for South East Asian Nations
CSCE	Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reconciliation
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
IDEA	Institute Democracy & Electoral Ass.
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OOF	Other Official Flows
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank Group
WTO	World Trade Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Violent conflict and its ruinous impact on people's lives demands that the development co-operation community renew its commitment to peace and prevention. To prevent violent conflict, societies must build voluntary co-operation that results in peaceful co-existence among diverse communities within and between nations. Conflict prevention[6] is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Development agencies now accept the need to work *in* and *on* conflicts rather than *around* them, and make peacebuilding the main focus when dealing with conflict situations.[7] This is a significant step toward long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts. This supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines on *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* relates primarily to collective conflict – conflict among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

2. To work effectively toward peace, development agencies need to work alongside partners in developing countries before, during and after conflict. Promoting peacebuilding and conflict prevention require that donor agencies work with other relevant branches of their governments and other actors in the international community. With a "culture of prevention" and in-depth analysis such as peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building, donors can work better together to achieve sustainable peace. Policies also need to be clear, coherent, comprehensive and co-ordinated in order to improve effectiveness in conflict prevention and management. Relevant policy areas involve trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defence, and development co-operation. Responding to this imperative, development agencies are accepting the risks of moving more deeply into this sensitive political terrain.

3. Economic well being, social development and environmental sustainability and regeneration are major goals of development co-operation that require structural stability. Structural stability[8] embraces the mutually reinforcing goals of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by dynamic and representative political structures, including accountable security systems capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Experience and research point to some basic principles for preventing conflict that are enumerated in more detail in this Supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines. These principles call on the development community to:

- Recognise the potential -- and limits -- of the international community to take actions that favour peace and discourage violence.

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[6] In this Supplement, "conflict prevention" means the prevention of *violent* disputes, controversies and conflict. It includes the notion of long-term engagement, not only short-term response. Non-violent conflict is a normal part of society. What has to be prevented is the use of large-scale violence to address or resolve conflict as well as activities that can destabilise and lead to collective violence.

[7] When development agencies working in crisis or in pre-war situations circumvent conflict-related issues they are, in the terms of the guidelines, "working *around* conflict". When they modify their programmes and make efforts to recognise the conflict they are "working *in* the conflict". When there is an attempt to proactively prevent, mitigate or resolve the conflict(s) this is "working *on* the conflict".

[8] Defined in the 1997 guidelines entitled *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*. Structural stability requires voluntary co-operation between individuals and groups in a society and between communities based on their belief that the benefits of co-operating outweigh the costs entailed.

- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace.
- Act on the costly lessons learned on the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
- Actively engage women, men and youth in peacebuilding and policy-making processes. All actors need to take better account of the pervasive linkages between gender differences and violent conflicts and their prevention and resolution.
- Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.
- Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion.

Engaging long term and using a conflict prevention "lens"

4. "Moving upstream" to help prevent violent conflict at its source is a shared goal of the development co-operation community. Donors are learning to apply a conflict prevention "lens" to policies in many departments to make them coherent and comprehensive. The "lens" is a metaphor for looking at how conflict prevention can be incorporated into all arenas of policy, e.g. from development to trade, investment and foreign policy. This can also be referred to as building a culture of prevention. Concrete actions such as analysing and monitoring developments in conflict-prone situations are steps toward detecting and curbing conflict early on. Growing evidence suggests that early preventive action that works is far less costly than coming in later to stop violence and repair damage.[9] Working with a human rights focus as part of a conflict prevention lens is important and helps minimise potential negative side effects of development co-operation in conflict situations.[10]

5. Donors recognise that all aid can influence conflict situations and create incentives or disincentives for peace. They are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peacebuilding both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues. To do so, they need to:

- Disentangle and analyse factors of grievance and greed at play as conflict situations evolve.
- Devise appropriate ways to evaluate, monitor and assess their action and its impact in close collaboration with developing country partners, particularly since this type of development co-operation work does not always fit a general framework for "results-based management".
- Extend this concern for the impact of aid on conflict to the design of policies aimed at macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in order to encourage growth in incomes, employment and public services.
- Target assistance to help strengthen democratic systems toward the structural stability that allows for the non-violent resolution of conflicts, taking account of the distribution and the transfer of power, as well as the protection and inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups.

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[9] As one illustration, the Carnegie Commission estimated in 1999 that if effective preventive measures had been taken in nine countries affected by conflict in the 1990s, OECD countries alone could have saved more than US$ 160 billion. This is apart from the incalculable human costs to those countries in conflict.

[10] This includes: working with international refugee law; international humanitarian and human rights law and conventions including the convention on the rights of the child; and the convention on eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.

- Recognise how important it is for countries to form political parties and support this step as part of a democratic process and as a way to promote the transformation from violent conflict to peace. The perspective of democratic, inclusive governance is an important aspect of this dynamic process.
- Maximise opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict, including support to a range of state functions and activities as well as partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs).
- Promote multiculturalism and pluralism by reinforcing activities that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement and support partners working toward this goal.

6. Setting up monitoring and evaluation systems presents a challenge in these complex new areas of development co-operation. Sharing results, establishing benchmarks and evaluating lessons are vital to improving approaches and co-ordination.

Ensuring peace through security and development

7. Security, including "human security", is a critical foundation for sustainable development.[11] This implies protection from systematic human rights abuses, physical threats, violence and extreme economic, social and environmental risks, and territorial and sovereignty threats. It is a primary pre-condition and goal for poor people to make lasting improvements in their lives. The *Draft DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction*, and consultations with the poor in all regions, have underlined how critical basic security is for them.[12]

8. Poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other. The requirement for security in this context has to go beyond the classic requisites of defence from military attack and extend to the well-being and the protection of persons and property. Actors in international, national and local government and civil society have thus come together around a changing concept of security aimed at freeing people from pervasive threats to their lives, safety or rights. This is especially critical for the poor.

9. Helping developing countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security — in defence, police, judicial and penal systems — has become a high priority, including for external partners, even though there are risks involved. Security system reform should be treated as a normal part of work on good governance. Though this is a vital area for donors, not all development agencies are equally ready or have the mandate to engage in activities directly related to improving security systems. Development agencies are working together to define agreed uses of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in such activities.

10. Donor assistance can help improve the capacity of relevant civilian bodies in government to manage the security forces more effectively. Within developing countries, there is growing recognition of the need to use the same principles of good public sector management in the security sector as apply to all public sectors. These principles include transparency, accountability and informed debate and participation and are key to getting military expenditure and other security-related spending planned and implemented right. Reinforcing legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight of security forces, in particular the role of relevant parliamentary committees, is one such area for assistance.

[11] This Supplement addresses security reform processes, one key aspect of providing human security, but does not discuss the security, sustainable development and human security linkages at any length.

[12] See, for example, *Voices of the Poor,* World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2000.

Supporting regional co-operation

11. Even with the predominance of intra-state conflicts, there are cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts. Strategies for prevention, peacekeeping, and recovery can be regionally designed. Many national conflicts can only be dealt with effectively in their regional contexts, taking account of cross-border influences. Regional co-operation and integration — through economic, environmental and other measures — can contribute to peacebuilding, particularly around scarce common goods such as water. Donor support should focus on strengthening the capacity of relevant regional institutions.

12. Co-ordinated foreign policy actions are needed to support regional and sub-regional co-operation in combating drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, and controlling illicit or irregular arms trade, as well as the flow of arms generally. Such co-ordinated action can also underpin peace negotiations and regional peacekeeping capabilities, help build regional networks for the protection of human rights, refugees, peace initiatives, and democratisation, and establish security reform processes. The business sector, including foreign investors, also has a role to play in regional co-operation.

13. While pursuing "regional solutions for regional problems" is a good principle, there are situations -- like those in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes and central African regions and others -- which call for a response by the whole international community to support regional actors.

Peace, justice and reconciliation

14. The international community, including donor agencies, can assist peacebuilding before violence erupts, support peace processes and opportunities, help societies grapple with the complexities of justice and reconciliation in the wake of violent conflict, and encourage fundamental principles of democracy. There are no easy formulas, but there are ways to support national solutions that respect basic international legal norms.

15. Once the peace is deemed won, donors tend to focus their support more on the state, away from civil society. This happens even when donors have channelled support exclusively to civil society during the conflict. But donor support to civil society peacebuilding initiatives should begin early and continue. Further efforts are required to include marginalised or weakened segments of society in peace processes and to recognise women's abilities to manage survival and negotiate and implement peace at the local and informal levels. More can be done to involve women in national level peace negotiations.

16. A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation is to promote open and continuing communication as a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and to avoid relapses into violent conflict. Support for non-partisan and peacebuilding media is important here.

17. To avoid the recurrence of conflict, long and short-term peace rely in part on:

- Demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants, including women and child soldiers.
- Reintegration of all people uprooted and affected by conflict -- women, men, youth, children and ex-combatants.

In supporting peace processes donors, the international community and developing countries need to realise that the challenge of reintegration depends on jobs and growth, but can only be fully achieved with reconciliation.

Partnerships for peace

18. Peacebuilding hinges on trust and co-operation among groups and is reinforced by wider and

deeper partnerships. A legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other. However, a crisis of legitimacy exists in many states, not only in "failed" or "failing" ones. Signs of this can be seen when the state takes on an oppressive and predatory role in relation to society, foments internal conflict and abrogates its core functions as "protector". Donor engagement with oppressive regimes can be problematic. At the same time complete withdrawal of donor involvement may have negative impacts and be read as a signal of external indifference. Normal partnerships are difficult or impossible to maintain in some conflict situations. But experience and realism now suggest that external partners, including multilateral institutions, can play key roles in encouraging partnership between government and civil society organisations, including with those who are excluded or in opposition. The extent and types of partnership must be gauged by the country situation.

19. For donors to enter into effective partnerships for conflict prevention with developing countries, a pivotal requirement is greater coherence and co-ordination among donors themselves. The recent pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership among development co-operation actors offers an important opportunity to address conflict issues and co-ordinate more effectively (e.g. Comprehensive Development Frameworks, country-produced poverty reduction strategies and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks).

20. It has become clearer that a constructive relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation entities requires shared objectives, common approaches to planning processes, and co-ordination mechanisms. In harmonising these efforts, donor and humanitarian assistance agencies entrusted with these responsibilities cannot escape the need to work together better through quite long transition periods.

Working with business

21. Another widening space for stronger partnerships is with business — local, national and international — to help maximise its positive economic and social contributions and to ensure against feeding into the negative dynamics of conflict. At times this involves dialogue between external partner governments and firms that are taking actions that worsen violent conflict.

22. Virtually all developing countries are now convinced they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate strong enough economic growth for sustainable development. Fostering private sector-led growth in jobs and incomes within a rights and rules-based approach is a basic long-term component of conflict prevention.

23. A widening community of business actors internationally is already moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and pursuing a "triple bottom line" of profitability, social responsibility and good environmental practices. Enlightened economic self-interest of firms can lead them to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict. Donors should support these trends by taking steps such as raising awareness of conflict prevention issues among national and international business communities.

Countering negative economic forces

24. However, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, rent-seeking and corrupt resource deals that fuel and thrive on conflict. This can be done through G8 and UN embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds[13] and be supported by other international instruments[14]. Donors must take account of the political economy of violent conflict in which powerful groups and networks, using violent and non-violent means, develop a vested interest in their perpetuation, as well as the corrupt and ethnically biased economic practices that can help start them.

[13] Prospects of serious action on these issues by the international community have been heightened by UN Security Council action against embargo-breaking trafficking in diamonds and subsequent measures undertaken by the main actors in the international diamond trade to stifle the traffic in conflict diamonds.

[14] *Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*; *OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises;* and *DAC Recommendations on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement.*

I. SOME BASIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES

25. The experiences of the development co-operation community, other external actors and developing countries provide the basis for the following principles for effective action in conflict situations.

Recognise the potential — and the limits — of external influence

26. Outside influences can shift balances and relationships between conflicting parties to some degree. These can be positive or negative. Coherent and comprehensive policy responses, involving diplomacy, security relations, finance and trade, and development co-operation are crucial. Addressing potential root causes of conflict with coherent responses early on is more likely to help prevent violent outcomes or ensure that outside influences are positive. As for all development co-operation, local ownership is vital and irreplaceable. Outside actors need to adopt a realistic modesty in their approaches and put priority on areas where co-operation can make the most difference with limited resources.

27. Development co-operation and other external actors must:

- Work on conflict, rather than working around it.
- Accept and manage the heightened risks encountered in this type of work.
- Recognise that the potential influence of outsiders has its definite limits. Most conflict situations have powerful internal dynamics and long histories of grievance and recrimination.
- Acknowledge that political will to forge solutions, from all actors, is crucial.
- Be more creative in providing aid that promotes systems that allow for the peaceful management of conflicts, for example, countering predatory state behaviour and systems of nepotism and one-sided benefit.

Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good

28. All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results. The first principle for aid policy makers is to do no harm and to guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts. Since the cost of not acting is usually equally unacceptable, donors need proactive and innovative approaches in different conflict situations that strengthen incentives for peace for key actors, and help strengthen security for both people and countries. They need to work coherently with other external actors, such as their own ministries of foreign affairs or defence, international organisations and NGOs, and entities responsible for humanitarian assistance and relief. In trying to help steer a society away from potential dangers towards positive directions, donors need to be open and flexible in their support to a variety of, sometimes evolving, options. As they do so, external actors have to recognise that, in conflict situations:

- Perceptions, of all involved, often matter as much as facts.
- Who gets, or does not get, which share of benefits can be as important as the total benefits generated.
- "Not doing harm" does not mean not taking considered risks.
- Speed and "efficiency" in development operations may sometimes need to be sacrificed to some degree for greater stability and peace, as well as local "ownership."
- Development discourse can be used and abused for many political purposes.
- Broadly, processes by which development outcomes are produced are as important as the results.

Be transparent and communicate intentions

29. Transparency and full communication with key actors in a developing country and amongst all external actors are essential to making the objectives of external actors clear. This makes actions and policies more likely to be sustainable and improves mutual trust and confidence on all sides. But there are difficult dilemmas to manage. In some conflicts, public transparency on approaches to peacebuilding entails risks for donors and other external partners as well as for national actors. But this does not preclude their responsibilities to be accountable, open and clear with each other. It should help avoid uncoordinated and conflicting actions among them. This is important in relation to the perceptions of local protagonists and other actors. This basic ground rule will need to be tailored to particular conflicts.

Widen and deepen dialogue

30. Encouraging and sustaining broad and inclusive dialogue — with demonstrated follow-through — is critical. It is one way that development co-operation can address different interests and perceptions of contending groups in a conflict, listen to the marginalised and ensure that the wisdom and bridge-building potential of a wide range of possible "connectors",[15] including Diasporas, are kept in the picture. This must be done carefully for several reasons. Dilemmas arise about how representative certain groups actually are, and the risks involved in deciding who and how to consult and how to encourage constructive solidarity, especially in volatile situations. External partners can be facilitators, for example by providing acceptable space and platforms for dialogue. The media can play an active and positive role in informing populations and providing space for dialogue and exchange. Donors and international media can reinforce open debate by supporting accurate and responsible media coverage.

Reinforce local capacities

31. External actors — multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental — individually and collectively need to identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions, even in the most grave conflict or post-conflict situations. Resources provided should be commensurate with absorption capabilities. Local capacities should be supplemented, reinforced or strengthened by external resources, not substituted or overwhelmed by them. Too many resources can detract from or undermine local efforts and create avoidable dependencies. Donors should give particular consideration to understanding and, where appropriate, supporting indigenous and customary peacebuilding capacities and other potential connectors, such as women's organisations with the potential

[15] This term refers to the wide range of individuals and institutions in a society that normally have natural tasks in maintaining inter-group peace – including justice systems, police forces, school teachers, clergy and other respected and trusted figures. Even where their roles have not been strong enough to prevent violent conflict, they may continue to have latent potential for rebuilding non-war relations.

to play bridging roles. These can have a major impact on building solidarity and boosting local confidence and capacity.

Recognise women as stakeholders and peacemakers

32. War is a "gendered" activity with a strong division of labour. Most fighters are men, most institutions involved are male-dominated, and definitions of masculinity and femininity are created and mobilised. Women become the bearers of the culture that their men are fighting to defend. They also hold economies together and keep communities functioning. This is why women are so often targeted in armed conflict – and become prey for the destruction of whole communities and cultural identities. Women respond to evolving and difficult environments and often find themselves making or partaking in decisions formerly made by males in their communities, devising coping strategies at different scales. These responsibilities need to be acknowledged in post-conflict rehabilitation and negotiations.

33. Although conflicts affect men, women, youth and children differently, all suffer during times of war. The long-term effects of traumatic experiences are marked by gender differences. Despite the increase in involvement of civilians, men are still more likely to be killed during and missing after war. Men and boys are more likely to be directly involved in fighting and perpetuating violence, forcibly or otherwise. Both men and women can experience trauma, rape, harassment, beating and torture, arbitrary detention and sexual slavery and servitude, and they are often singled out as targets for different types of violence based on their gender.

34. Women play complex and important roles as bridge-builders and peacemakers. These contributions to peace often go unrecognised, especially at the more formal levels. There is a clear need to make fuller use of the genuine potential of women's groups, networks, and modes of operation in peacebuilding activities.

Address implications of war-affected youth and children

> *"Children who grow up in a climate of murder, abduction and terror tend to reach adulthood with no idea of what it means to be able to learn, to play, to live safely at home with their families, or to socialise with their peers. And so they perpetuate the cycle of war and violence to the next generation. That is why we believe, with every fibre of our being, that protecting children from the impact of armed conflict is so basic that it is everyone's responsibility - governments, international organisations and every segment of civil society: community workers, teachers, elders, parents, celebrities, children and all sectors of the business community."*[16]

35. Conflict can forever change a child's aspirations and capabilities by subjecting him or her to horrific physical, psychological, sexual and societal violence, as noted in the Ministerial Statement from the International Conference on War-Affected Children, held in September 2000. Young people's frustrations over both present prospects and future outlooks may lead them to destructive engagement in violence, and their energies may easily be lost to offers of lucrative benefits from dubious activities. Children and youth are directly targeted by armed conflict and constitute a large segment of refugees, but their rights and perspectives are not always included in relief efforts. Security and well-being of youth and children is part of the overall security environment and human rights system and ultimately an issue of governance. Many development co-operation programmes work intensively on activities on the special re-entry needs of children and youth. This includes children and youth as refugees and asylum seekers.

[16] Graca Machel on the initiative "A Global Partnership for Children", UNICEF.

Programmes for children and youth address issues such as psychosocial care, protection, family tracing and reunification, education, training and access to information, health, and defence of children's rights.

36. With the 1989 adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2000 Optional Protocol to eliminate the use of child soldiers in armed conflict, political and legal awareness and commitment have strengthened to address the special problems of war-affected children and youth. The UN Security Council agreed that the impact of armed conflict on children constitutes a threat to long-term peace and stability. A Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 2001 "A World Fit for Children" will review the first decade's progress with the Convention and is expected to further focus attention of the entire international community.

Act in timely and flexible ways, and think long term

37. Promoting peace is a dynamic process that requires long-term commitment. Sustainable peace is not something that can be produced rapidly or with a technical "quick fix." It is a process rather than a clear state that can be achieved once and for all. Long-term vision should be maintained in short-term complex crises.

38. However, experience and analysis constantly point to a tension between the need to act quickly and flexibly in complex conflict situations, where matters can rapidly deteriorate and many lives can be lost, and the need to ensure that actions contribute to positive recovery in the long term. It is important to know as much as possible about potential vulnerabilities in order to inform one's actions by strengthening analytical capacity and information systems, using tools such as vulnerability and risk analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments, and scenario-building, and engaging in dialogue with other actors. This is true for all external actors. To illustrate the kind of balance required, an analogy can be drawn to the kinds of protocols for rapid response used in the best hospital emergency rooms. Drawing on vast experience, a number of urgent actions are prescribed based on identified symptoms, with an awareness of both the dangers of a mistaken action, and the requirements for longer-term recovery.

39. Humanitarian assistance by itself cannot bring about peace. It can only help people survive in the short run although it can provide space for further peacebuilding initiatives. The growing experience with unanticipated conflict situations shows the need to better calibrate relief with development aid and its long-term goals. Humanitarian relief and humanitarian assistance has too often been left to serve as the only response in complex emergencies and peacebuilding. There is a risk of a "suspension" of development-based approaches in relief efforts and of current development activities. For example, refugee camps rarely provide education even though children may remain there indefinitely. Humanitarian aid may become a substitute for coherent and explicit policymaking, and opportunities and needs to forge social capital and cohesion may be missed.

Use creative, incentive-driven approaches for constructive engagement

40. Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for violent conflict regardless of whether these effects are deliberate. How can incentives be managed so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution? Numerous alternative or complementary approaches for constructive influence are available for external actors, including donors, to try to mitigate conflict and reinforce peacebuilding.[17] These include some of the following examples:

[17] The Cotonou Agreement, concluded in 2000 between the European Union (EU) and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) states, is an example of a framework with clear benchmarks, mutual accountability mechanisms and use of peacebuilding tools.

Long-term, coherent and constructive engagement: This allows donors and their governments to engage in policy dialogue and use a wide range of other incentives for peace. Long-term engagement can be misinterpreted and carries risks with it. For example, continued engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate or stop them. In some circumstances actions can appear to be impotent at least in the short run. Dilemmas arise on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit gross and systematic human rights abuses, target civilian populations and foster or wage war in neighbouring countries. This includes situations where legitimately elected governments are overthrown or governments maintain armed intervention in other states, unrelated to a clear case of self-defence as recognised by international law. But such risks are worth running in some cases. External actors must be clear, including with their own publics, about their assessments, concerns, and goals.

Negotiated benchmarks: Donors should seek to negotiate political benchmarks for improved governance in the context of their long-term commitment.

Transparent and co-ordinated conditionalities: Where specific conditionality on aid flows is still to be applied, as part of a broader framework of incentives for peace, a more explicit policy should be articulated. It should be explained as clearly and transparently as possible to minimise misunderstanding. Broader experience with conditionality demonstrates that it rarely works unless linked to domestically-owned reforms. In conflict-related situations specifically, experience suggests that conditionality for aid needs to be:

- Based on clear analysis and specified conditions.
- Co-ordinated among donors to prevent donor shopping.
- Used as a last resort, rather than regularly employed.
- Based on ethics of responsibility, with provisions for transparency and accountability.
- Monitored and evaluated clearly, and preferably jointly.
- Part of a broader strategy of using incentives for peace.
- Anchored in civil society, with a strong domestic base for the policy goal sought.
- Exercised in compliance with humanitarian principles.
- Consistently applied across cases.

Sanctions: Controversies over sanctions as an instrument to influence the course or prevention of conflict are based to some degree on their potentially adverse impact on social and economic welfare of people in the country in question. "Smart" sanctions that are clearly targeted against those individuals responsible for atrocities might minimise adverse social and humanitarian impact. These include, for example, freezing individual bank accounts, blocking entry visas, and other such personalised, tailor-made sanctions.

Act on the costly lessons learned about the need for co-ordinated and coherent action and policy

41. Improving co-ordination among donors, and more broadly within the international community, is a major preoccupation of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance efforts. Equally important, there is growing recognition of the need for greater and better synchronised coherence among the actions of different ministries in OECD countries, other foreign policy actors and international institutions. Co-ordination at the regional level as well as addressing issues from a regional perspective are essential. Recognition of the complementarity between mandates and responsibilities of different actors is key to better coherence. Experience since the 1997 guidelines reveals improvements in co-ordination, and in some aspects of policy coherence, e.g. with respect to countering illegal resource flows that feed conflict.

42. However, international organisations, governments and individual ministries, and international non-governmental actors still rarely exercise the level of discipline and co-operation that responsible behaviour would dictate. The growing movement toward improved co-ordination in development co-operation in general needs to be re-doubled in conflict situations when strategic frameworks can be used to guide the activities of all agencies. Drawing on the sometimes disastrous experience documented in case studies, recognising the difficulties that often delay formal co-ordination arrangements and in the absence of an agreed framework, donors should consider how to have less formal and more flexible ground rules for actions and decision making in order to reduce the dangers of unco-ordinated actions.

II. INTEGRATING A CONFLICT PREVENTION "LENS"

Understanding conflict

43. To create a "culture of prevention" in development co-operation and foreign policy action, the international community needs to better analyse the causes and dynamics of conflict and peace in order to understand how their actions will affect the "structural stability" of a society or country. They need to be more aware of the political aspects of any activity and understand how its aims, design, and implementation may interact with the political and economic dynamics in that society, including their effect on poverty. In short, all actors need to apply a conflict prevention "lens" to policies and activities.

44. Donors need to be politically sensitive about how activities generate benefits or cause poverty, dislocations and inequities between different groups such as returnees and local populations. In Rwanda, many donors abandoned targeting for fear of being seen as partial to one side. In Afghanistan, they strengthened targeting to women, out of a concern for the need to counterbalance and contest exclusionary government policies. Others abandoned their aid in protest to those policies.

Box 1: The "Three Thousand Houses" - Sri Lanka

The project sought to provide 3000 houses in a community consisting of equal percentages of Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim populations. The decision by the community was to allocate the houses equally between each group, i.e. 1000 houses to each group. Despite complaints about this decision, the whole community accepted it, and the houses were introduced. Yet, these populations had not been affected equally by the violence: some communities in fact had a far greater need for housing.

This example illustrates how the standard development criteria (needs-based decision making, efficiency, product-oriented rather than process-oriented approaches) may have to be modified to meet peacebuilding objectives. In this case, the principle of equity (needs-based allocation) was subordinated to the political expedient of equality (arithmetic allocation). It gets more complicated yet: we have to ask ourselves, even if the decision was made by the communities themselves (as it was), did this development project reinforce politicised ethnic boundaries? In some ways it did. Was there an alternative? Perhaps the full example of success in this project would only have come when the communities themselves made their own decision based purely on need rather than ethnic or religious groups. The task development co-operation faces now is how to get there from here.

"The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict" [DCD(2000)16].

45. Donors are beginning to modify their project designs to adapt to or influence conflict dynamics, as DAC case studies have traced. Regardless of the specific sector, donors can try to design their activities to reinforce incentives to move toward a peaceful society, and minimise those for violence. Given the unique elements of conflict dynamics, developing one common set of universally valid responses is unlikely. But it is possible to work on universal techniques to aid judgements, such as conflict analysis, in order to design activities better targeted at conflict prevention and peacebuilding to promote structural stability in societies. It is important to:

- Encourage institutional cultures that promote in-depth understanding of the specific dynamics of a particular conflict and the impact of any actions.
- Foster constant dialogue, local thinking and awareness with partners in government and civil society so that viable solutions emerge and become part of aid agency approaches.
- Promote multiculturalism and pluralism by rewarding projects and partners that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement; help build or reinforce interdependency among communities; and guard against polarisation between perceived "winners" and "losers".

46. To help understand and foresee the impact of development programmes in conflict-prone and divided societies, development co-operation activities can:

- Recognise that resilient, diversified economies are less vulnerable to conflicts and not so easily destabilised by them.
- Profile the socio-economic and gender realities of all communities on the ground and ensure that impact assessments address economic, ethnic, regional and gender issues and sustainable poverty reduction activities.
- Analyse and disentangle the often intertwined factors of grievance and greed that may be at play in the evolution of a conflict situation (see Section VIII, "Countering Negative Economic Forces").

Box 2: Early warning and risk indicators

Early warning tools can help promote explicit and timely attention to risk factors. This helps encourage a "culture of prevention" and provides information required for situation-specific judgements.

- The loss of political space for opposition, civil society and media to engage in public discourse.
- Social, economic and political exclusion of certain groups from mainstream development.
- Large proportion of unemployed youth.
- Impoverishment, rapid decline of access to basic services and livelihood opportunities.
- Distorted distributional effects of development, and increasing horizontal inequalities.
- A rising sense of indignity, human rights violations.
- Increased insecurity and perceived threats.
- Migratory flows, both internal and external, for economic and political reasons.

Most of these indicators were suggested by participants in the DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000. A resource for continuing work on indicators is the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (www.fewer.org).

Conflict and risk analysis and assessment

47. Peace and conflict impact analysis, and risk and vulnerability assessments should be mainstreamed to become as common as cost-benefit analysis. These tools can identify potential harm and constructive actions, improve coherence and provide different branches of all governments concerned with fresh insights and angles to contemplate further actions.

48. For these reasons, donors have been encouraged to continue efforts to develop improved conflict and risk analysis and impact assessments. Many bilateral and multilateral actors, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have already tested instruments and operational tools intended to assess conflict potentials. These may be categorised as peace and conflict impact assessments, strategic conflict analysis, conflict vulnerability analysis, and analysis of early warning response and preventive assistance measures. Many donors are sharing experiences on the use of these operational tools with a view to propagating good co-ordination and best practices.

49. Such tools need to consider the social and political dynamics of conflict and include a focus on the specific impact of conflict on women, men, youth and children and their potential contributions to peace. There is rarely one, simple, universal formula. Furthermore, causes and grievances are replaced or transformed as conflict evolves. For example, "victims" may themselves become perpetrators of abuses over the course of a conflict, resulting in new long lasting grievances among other sections of the population. Analyses should therefore not be expected to deliver "objective" results, or a single "truth".

> *"In Africa, political, economic and social reforms are taking place in a short period of time, producing significant numbers who feel they have been detrimentally affected. These rapid reforms are not allowing institutions and societies to adjust in a gradual way, thus contributing to instability and insecurity. The donor community needs to strengthen the credibility and transparency of its support to the process of political reforms."*
>
> DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 1999.

50. Analytical approaches to understanding the potential impact of an activity on conflict should be guided by a human rights focus. The rights-based perspective, comprehensively applied, should help ensure attention to the legitimate immediate and longer-term interests of all individuals and representative groups. This will help maximise benefits and minimise negative side effects of development co-operation in conflict and conflict-prone situations.

51. The concern for the impact of development co-operation must extend beyond the effects of individual aid programmes and projects. Although many of the stabilisation and adjustment activities of the Bretton Woods[18] institutions are not generally considered security-related, their work can have far-reaching implications for poverty, peace, conflict and security. Their recognition that combating poverty requires increasing opportunity, security and empowerment for the poor highlights this linkage.

52. The widespread de-stabilising impact — and conflict-causing potential — of major macroeconomic imbalances and downturns (particularly extreme inflation) are well known. The G8[19] in 2000 recognised that economic downturn, and its social fallout can have explosive consequences for welfare and stability. It lent its support to "assistance to build capacity and ensure appropriate social investments in education, health and nutrition, and other programmes targeting vulnerable segments of society, seeking to protect these expenditures during economic downturns and times of crisis." In parallel, governments need to address how stabilisation programmes affect the capacity of states to provide basic security, as their first function, and to modernise their security sectors. Because conditions of economic crisis and violent conflict come together in so many countries, the interdependent challenges of security, economic stabilisation, and development must be analysed collectively, and activities designed to respond to all three.

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[18] The World Bank Group (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

[19] G8 = Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Russia and the United States. G8 Information Centre, www.g7@toronto.ca.

Box 3: Contrasting impacts on peace and conflict of two water projects in Sri Lanka

The Gal Oya water management project in Sri Lanka is an example which generated both development and peacebuilding benefits. Interestingly, its peacebuilding function was entirely incidental to the project which was designed and implemented according to development criteria. By cultivating the mutual interests of members from different ethnic and socio-economic groups, the project managed to thrive even in the midst of severe communal conflict. And perhaps more importantly, it resulted in the construction of *ad hoc* institutions of inter-communal co-operation beyond the scope of water management. In other words, it had a significant, positive impact on the incentives for peace within a particular area of Sri Lanka.

Another water project in Sri Lanka — the Maduru Oya project which was one component of the massive Mahaweli Project — illustrates the dangers of not considering the peacebuilding requirements of development projects. Although the Maduru Oya project was designed to meet a number of development objectives, the failure to fully consider the highly political issue of population displacement and resettlement in the context of a communal civil war, ultimately led to its downfall. The project would have resettled displaced Sinhalese villagers in the Batticaloa District where Tamils constitute two thirds of the population and where ethnic tensions were escalating. Opposition to what some called the West Bank plan to alter the demographic and thus political balance in the East had reached a critical point even before project implementation started.

What does the Gal Oya teach us about successful peacebuilding? Some of the factors that contributed to its success as a development project also contributed to its success in peacebuilding. Its success in both areas is explained in part by its thoroughly participatory development approach. The emphasis on promoting participation — as both a means and an end — generated a number of operating principles which have clear peacebuilding implications:

- Ensuring continuity of personnel to make a learning process more feasible.
- Having a network of supportive, committed persons in a variety of positions.
- Avoiding partisan political involvement.
- Attracting and retaining the right kind of community leadership.
- Going beyond narrow conceptions of self-interest.

DAC case study on the "Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations in Sri Lanka", 1999.

53. It is important that all actors be aware of the possible unintended negative side effects of aid activities. A more positive framework would strengthen the foundations of structural stability and sustainable development so that countries can achieve and maintain the underpinnings needed for a peaceful society. At the same time, many conflict situations require external actors to take calculated risks whereby unintended negative consequences can not always be avoided.

Box 4: Impact assessments and prevention

When conflict risk and vulnerability analysis and impact assessments demonstrate that a country is in acute danger of severe conflict, concentrating external actions in the following areas seems to produce positive results. Some of these actions involve development co-operation. Many require coherence across governments.

The *DAC Latin America Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation,* 2000, raised the following points related to prevention:

- External actors are better able to engage constructively and help prevent violence when they know and analyse the ways in which the conflict is transforming.
- Conflict is a normal part of societal transformation. Maintaining legitimate space for opposition and protest can keep societies from resorting to violence. Conflicting tendencies in societies should not be suppressed.
- Dissemination of information on humanitarian law and human rights norms, and how they relate to local traditional value systems, may help groups establish creative measures to reduce brutality and increase the accountability of all warring parties. As shown by the case of Chiapas, promoting a cultural resistance to violence can contribute to humanising war and dissuade many people from resorting to violence.
- Promoting citizenship and a culture of peace and social cohesion is an investment in prevention. This can be done through formal and informal education at all levels.
- Criminalisation, corruption, and the emergence of economies which breed violence cause "human security" problems and eventually threaten state security. Providing expanded development alternatives might curb these tendencies.

Illegal economic activities and illegal trade routes often sustain and transform conflict. For example, the link between violent conflict and drug trafficking in Colombia has been a formidable complicating factor in negotiating political peace. These illegal activities can be prevented in part by disseminating information on consequences of national and international legal norms and punitive measures.

III. SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Security as a vital base for development

54. The security of persons, property and assets, and the protection of human rights are fundamental to sustainable development and a pre-condition for people to improve their lives, particularly the poor. Assets include public goods such as common water points, access roads and social infrastructure. Development co-operation aims to support and help create the conditions for dynamic and representative governing structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Poorly functioning security systems can create or destroy prospects for peace, and social and economic progress. There is growing concern over the interaction between development and security and the role this plays in shaping people's lives.

55. In a "post-conflict" country, security is widely seen as one of the crucial elements for any reconciliation and long-term development. It requires both ending the insecurity resulting from war, and new forms of (criminal) insecurity that so often hit countries that have been in conflict for a long time. Insecurity limits the likelihood of reconciliation, undermines the legitimacy of the institutions of the state, and hampers any possible recovery and economic development. It has become a widening area for donor involvement, with specific activities in training and capacity building.

56. The concept of security has shifted away from a fundamentally military focus on protecting territory and sovereignty with strength of national defence forces. The new conceptualisation includes the responsibility, principally of the state, to ensure the well-being of people.[20] As a consequence, discussions of security issues, "systems" and actors have become comprehensive and no longer refer to military systems only.

57. The majority of victims of violent conflict and complex emergencies are civilians. This has led to a convergence of conventional development and anti-poverty actions with peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. The development community is often involved in the implementation of peace agreements and rehabilitation. Different actors from the same (OECD) governments are now working more closely together in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Traditionally, this was not the case since the strategic objectives of development and security practitioners were often parallel or in opposition with each other, partly because their focus tended to be uni-disciplinary.

Governance and security

58. The way traditional security actors interrelate with political, judicial and penal systems, and the rule of law, or lack of it, influences the overall security system of a country. This governance aspect is of particular concern to the development community, as is civilian capacity within the government and civil society to oversee and control these "security" actors. The influence the business community may wield over security issues, security actors and the overall security framework is also of growing concern (see Section VII, "Working with Business").

[20] Predictable patterns of sustainable development provide security including human security, but this report does not address these linkages.

Box 5: Security-related definitions

"Security" is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme and widely used by development actors.

The **"Security sector"** includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).

"Security sector reform" is the transformation of the **"security system"** which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

59. Security is an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace and sustainable development. Recognition is growing that what happens in this sector has a significant impact on a country's overall prospects for development as well as the effectiveness of international assistance provided in other sectors. Many in the international community and conflict-prone countries increasingly recognise that direct measures to help improve governance and accountability in their security sectors are a high priority for conflict prevention and development. These measures are also a focus for international co-operation among some donors and other parts of their governments, with a recognition that this work needs to be undertaken in a spirit of partnership and sustained joint effort. Actors involved from both partner and donor countries range from the military and the police, and the judicial and penal systems to government, ministries of foreign affairs, trade and commerce, as well as from the media to civil society organisations and the business community.

Assessing security needs

60. National security reviews, including the development of effective threat assessments, can help a country elaborate an overarching policy on national security in the context of national development goals. Reviews provide a basis for managing security resources more effectively. Efforts to improve security expenditure management should be set in the broader context of strengthening the institutional framework in which public spending and security decision-making occurs, ensuring due transparency and attention to corruption. The widening, and worrying, role of private security activities is an important element. In many countries they undermine the "public goods" character of providing security of persons and property — the most basic function of government. Both donors and partner countries need to invest in deepening and widening their understanding of security challenges and possible responses. Governmental, parliamentary, civil society and independent research capacities should be reinforced, and direct dialogue with security professionals should be regularised. These goals can be further strengthened when assessments take into account opportunities for strengthening security through regional co-operation, and the needs for regional peacekeeping capabilities.

61. In accepting the legitimate needs for well-functioning security systems with professionalised security forces, a single-minded focus on down-sizing the security sector and reducing military and/or security spending, often a key component of donor conditionality, may not be consistent with the need to enhance security as a foundation for development. Strengthening state capacity to fulfil legitimate duties may help restore and maintain security. More stability may come from redistributing spending from the military to the police to provide correct security for productive economic activity. Informed debate and participation strengthen such governance and are important keys to getting expenditures right.

62. In conclusion, the governance approach to security systems recognises that countries have legitimate security needs that must be met efficiently and effectively. It requires a security system with security forces that are the right size, appropriately tasked, and cost-effectively equipped. This has implications for the way resources are managed, including the budget planning and execution process. Civilian government must be able to oversee the security forces and their spending.

Increased policy coherence

63. Actions by donors and other parts of their governments may indirectly compound security problems, especially in "failing" and war-torn countries in which the patterns of civil/military relations are extremely skewed. A focus therefore on policy coherence and co-ordinated action is crucial. The capacity to address and carry out operational activities for this "cross-cutting" policy domain is often lacking in departments in OECD and developing country governments. Ideally, sensitivity to security issues would be incorporated across all areas of government. The aim would be to broadly agree on the security challenges with the partner country and identify appropriate roles for their different government departments and those of various external actors. But co-operation between government departments occurs sporadically. Actions are rarely set in broader contexts. And when they are, actions in areas touching on security issues can remain hostage to concerns from other government departments, including strategic geopolitical, trade and business interests. There is a clear call for greater policy coherence.

Box 6: Eligibility of peace-related assistance as official development assistance

From the earliest stages of the collective international aid effort in the 1950s and 1960s, donor countries have worked together in the DAC to agree on definitions of the characteristics and boundaries of aid that should be categorised and calculated as Official Development Assistance (ODA) for purposes of international reporting and comparisons. The basic criteria that have always been applied are that aid, to be counted as ODA, must be provided to or for specified developing countries and territories, by the official sector in DAC countries, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, and meeting a minimum level of concessionality in the financial terms.

Many, if not most, of the donor countries have provided other forms of international assistance over the decades, which have been reported on nationally and internationally, as appropriate [included in DAC reporting as Other Official Flows (OOF)]. The statistical experts of DAC Members have discussed interpretation of the ODA eligibility rules, reaching decisions by consensus, as in all DAC deliberations.

With the growing recognition over the 1990s of the close linkages between peace, security and development, and expanding activities by donors in related areas, the eligibility of these expenditures as ODA has become a topic of considerable discussion. It has not always been easy for Members to reach consensus on some components. The reasons for these difficulties include differing judgements as to whether development is the main objective of some such forms of assistance. This is compounded by a special sensitivity (and, in some countries, legal restrictions) around security-related assistance in the light of much Cold War experience, and other instances of assistance to security forces which subsequently engaged in human rights violations, attacked neighbouring countries, or other abuses. In addition, the large scale of some peace-related international assistance in the 1990s has intensified concerns about the possible diversion of limited and declining levels of ODA expenditure from core development co-operation work to activities that might more appropriately be financed from other budgets. If other budgets claimed some of their expenditures as ODA, then governments might claim that those contribute towards the UN 1 % of GNP ODA expenditure target – and thus in effect "divert" possible funding that would go directly to traditional aid programmes.

Discussions among Members have led over the years to agreement on the eligibility of a broad range of assistance to be classified as ODA. These include activities under UN post-conflict peacebuilding operations; demobilisation, the conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; and explosive mine removal for developmental purposes. A number of civilian, security-related development activities, including civilian oversight of police forces, police and judicial reform, and justice systems, are also considered for ODA eligibility, though it does not yet cover support to civilian oversight of defence and military issues and sectors.

As of December 2000, a number of other areas of peace-related activities were still being debated for ODA eligibility, with no consensus emerging. These include support for: security reviews that examine the roles of security forces such as military, *gendarmerie*, police and security institutions and mechanisms such as intelligence, foreign affairs, justice and penal systems. Other areas being considered are: the management of security-related expenditures; military reforms and training and sensitising military forces in areas such as human rights; civilian expertise on security issues; civilian oversight of the military; regional confidence-building and peacekeeping capacity; preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; and building developing countries' research capacities on external security matters.

In general, there is not a consensus to broaden ODA eligibility to include expenditure items within the security sector itself. Several Members are also concerned that even if parts of certain activities could be considered ODA-eligible, identifying and accounting for these components could be extremely difficult.

ODA eligibility of peace-related assistance

64. The ODA eligibility of peace-related assistance is an area of sensitivity and high risk, but many OECD countries have accepted a role in security reform, in several cases through their development co-operation programmes. However, not all DAC Members are equally ready to engage directly in work on security issues which frequently involve other parts of their governments (especially Defence and Foreign Ministries) or in activities such as military training and equipment supply, that do not qualify as ODA. These distinctions reflect some longstanding concerns related to security co-operation, as well as questions of appropriate mandates and budgetary responsibilities. The rules and issues on which types of expenditure should be categorised as ODA are periodically reviewed and monitored by statistical experts of DAC Members who meet in a Working Party of the DAC.

65. No matter what approach donors take to engaging directly in security-related support, there is a new appreciation internationally of the legitimate role of a properly governed security system to assure an environment in which any development can be advanced and sustained. The testimony of the poor on how much a basic lack of security maintains and deepens their deprivation has been widely heard. Developing countries need help to face massive and fast changing security challenges. They range, for example, from basic policing and core defence requirements, to border control and natural resource protection, and the fight against international crime, hostage-taking and various forms of illicit trafficking in goods and people, very often women. The military is often diverted to non-military functions because of the institutional weakness or under-funding of other necessary services. Therefore, before support to these non-traditional activities of the military is removed, the capacity of other parts of the government or the private sector to take them over should be ensured.

Demobilisation and reintegration

66. The demobilisation and the sustainable reintegration of former combatants into society, and removing arms from circulation, are fundamental to the long-term success of peace processes and establishing well-functioning security systems. Successful peace processes build confidence between all actors to allow former combatants to enter into their implementation, e.g. through security guarantees against reprisals outside the law. It can be helpful to designate a specific negotiating table on reintegration issues to identify long-term and short-term objectives. In this way all parties, including security forces, minority communities and the opposition, can establish a common understanding over time. In supporting these processes, donors need to realise that the challenge of full integration can only be achieved with reconciliation.[21]

67. The formal disbanding of military formations is the start of a process that only concludes successfully when ex-combatants have been effectively reinserted into civilian society. Trust is an essential element of the whole reintegration process. Convincing ex-combatants to release their arms and help curb the illegal flows of small weapons reinforces reintegration. But demobilisation and reintegration are fundamentally about the need for new forms of livelihood for ex-combatants, including female, that ultimately require the creation of new jobs. The task is all the tougher because child soldiers and other ex-combatants often have no other job market skills. Many of the ex-combatants concerned may never have been part of a normal, peaceful society, so that the challenge is one of basic social and economic integration rather than reintegration. An overly technical approach to demobilisation and reintegration underplays the critical economic, social, political and psychological barriers to effective reinsertion. This can be a difficult job.

[21] See also Section V, "Peace Processes, Justice and Reconciliation".

68. Successfully incorporating ex-combatants requires economic sustainability, which has a longer time-frame than the political dimension of demobilisation and integration. A lack of employment and income-generating opportunities for ex-combatants increases risks of economic migration including into criminal activities, arms and goods trafficking, and private armies. Different approaches (e.g. "bridging" public works projects, micro-enterprise) work better in different settings and require flexibility and creativity. Employment training is often not relevant to the local market and does not compensate for years of lost education. Ex-combatants must often adapt their skills to several fields before they find employment, and income generation schemes tend to require high maintenance as well as financial and technical support to succeed. The political will of donors and the state to provide long-term support, and to engage the private sector, is thus vital.

69. Reintegration efforts have good results when they are part of a broader local development programme that integrates combatants, their families and displaced persons into the community. This requires shared benefits as well as broad and sustained support to reconciliation processes. Where this does not occur, ex-combatants may be subject to discrimination or face other problems. The state's active role in this area can be reinforced but not substituted by international assistance. It is key to ensure national and community based ownership and responsibility for programmes in a manner that sustains them. Where no adequate support services are in place, a vacuum can be created that produces frustration amongst demobilised persons, and have a potential destabilising effect on the overall peace process.

> *"The emphasis on efficiency of aid must not undermine the need to support locally initiated, often fragile processes of peace and reconciliation."*
> DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

Reducing the means of violent conflict: landmines, small and light weapons

70. The widespread and complex problems (and experiences) of landmine removal are a major development co-operation challenge, because anti-personnel and land mines prevent large portions of land from being developed, instil fear and mistrust in populations and act as a silent coercive tactic. The promotion, coming into force, and ratification by some 140 signatories to the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Convention, and the political and legal basis for ending this scourge have been strengthened. At the same time expertise and best practice in landmine removal and rehabilitation programmes has been widely disseminated, and indigenised. These activities continue to be an important preoccupation of OECD countries. There is less coherence in some OECD countries which continue to produce a large proportion of the world's landmines. In the year 2000, landmine use continued in areas such as Angola, Burma, Chechnya and Kosovo, and much still remains to be done in spite of marked improvements in most regions. Illicit trafficking of landmines continues, and 70 million landmines remain planted in one-third of the world's nations.[22]

> *"The proliferation of small arms and light weapons outside formal control of the state is one of the serious challenges to peace and security. Research indicates that the Southern Asian region alone may have upward of 7 million sophisticated military-type weapons outside state control."*
> DAC Asia Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

71. Some of the most appalling levels of violence have continued to be perpetrated with small arms and rudimentary weapons. There is widespread consensus on the need to do all possible to limit the proliferation and illegal circulation of small and light weapons. International efforts to come to grips with this problem have been encouraged by the progress made in banning landmines. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on Import, Export and the Manufacture of Light Weapons, 1998, and experience in Central America demonstrate the potential impact of local initiatives and political will. Donors are engaged in a variety of supportive activities aimed at: reducing the

[22] United Nations Press Release GA/9833 28 November 2000.

demand for small arms and light weapons; strengthening appropriate supply-side behaviour; and helping partner countries tackle the trade routes which results in the illicit supply of such weapons. As an illustration of the range of possible areas for targeted assistance, while often working with regional and international security organisations, donors can:

- Support public information activities at national, regional, and international levels to inform and advocate against small and light weapons.
- Help develop national and regional consultation mechanisms, including codes of conduct, in connection with legal manufacturing, transit, transfers, and reduction/control of small and light weapons.
- Provide support to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination as well as training and information sharing between law and order forces and customs officials.
- Support weapons collection and destruction programmes and related disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes of ex-combatants (micro-disarmament).

> *"Lack of transparency in the security sectors of a large number of Asian countries increases threat perceptions and reduces potential for civilian oversight. Nearly half of the Asian countries do not even participate in the UN Register for Arms."*
> DAC Asia Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

72. In addition, donors can help in the following areas to create an appropriate supportive environment for more direct small arms initiatives which:

- Support education on small arms, reconciliation and peacebuilding in order to promote the non-violent resolution of disputes.
- Underpin local and national mechanisms, including traditional methods that contribute to the alleviation of any root causes of conflict, and are able to manage change without resort to violence.
- Provide support to ensure appropriate budget making in defence, including accountability and right sized force structures, and arms procurement procedures.[23]

73. Since much of the activity in the effort to limit small arms and light weapons is carried out by Interior or Justice Ministries in DAC Member countries, the development co-operation arm needs to communicate and co-ordinate well with them, at home and at the regional and international levels.

74. International support for disarmament processes often does not achieve the expected success due to the absence of a climate of security following the termination of armed conflicts. Given persisting tensions between groups, disarmament is a long-term challenge that cannot be separated from broader confidence-building measures. Development assistance of a technical nature can be complemented with efforts to enhance political dialogue between divided groups.

75. The significant advances that have been made in addressing the problem of war-affected children and youth in the international legal arena and security sector reform objectives can be mutually reinforcing. The proliferation of non-state security forces that are virtually immune to outside influence can only be effectively addressed in the context of efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. Long-term solutions lie in a dual strategy of working at all levels to outlaw and end the recruitment of children in conflict, and addressing the lack of jobs and educational opportunities that can be such powerful "push" factors of economic necessity for the young people concerned.

[23] This illustrative list is drawn from the terms of reference for the UNDP Trust Fund on Small Arms.

IV. SUPPORTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND CONSULTATION

76. Even with the predominance today of intra-state conflicts, there is wide recognition of the cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts themselves, and in strategies for peacekeeping, recovery and prevention. At the same time, the potential positive benefits of regional co-operation and peacebuilding seem slow and difficult to realise and promote, although there may be some grounds for restrained optimism, for example in Central America, and the Mekong River Basin. Meanwhile, examples of negative regional dynamics seem both abundant and powerful, with Central Africa perhaps providing the most prominent case in recent years.

77. The history of the European Union (EU) — cited as "probably the most successful example of conflict prevention in the last half-century" by the UN Secretary-General in July 2000 — continues to inspire hopes that the model of economic and functional co-operation can be applied elsewhere in the world as a basis for regional or sub-regional "security communities" within which major conflict becomes impossible. The further enlargement of the Union itself is in part an additional initiative toward wider European stability and security. At the same time, the EU and the European Commission (EC), in their own international activities, have a special interest and capacity for supporting regional co-operation and consultation efforts elsewhere, on a region-to-region basis. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is sometimes cited as a hopeful example of a co-operative framework in a tinderbox region.

78. In recent years, however, even quite strong and resilient regional organisations like those in Southeast Asia have been tested by the combined pressures of economic crises and cross-border environmental, refugee and insurgency spillovers. This happened even after making some major progress in extending the membership of the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) throughout the region, largely driven by political and security concerns for peaceful management of disputes and "constructive engagement" of differences among the countries of the region.

79. Despite the continuing difficulties, visionary leaders within regions, and far-sighted external partners, continue to believe and invest in the need for much stronger regional consultation. Ensuring that consultations take place regionally as well as nationally is vital. Even from the perspective of economic growth alone, and its attendant potential benefits in so many other areas, many donors are giving steadily greater weight to regional programmes, or regional linkages within more traditional country programmes.

80. Regional economic co-operation and integration (through trade liberalisation and other measures) can achieve important benefits even for poor regions and can be managed on a basis of "open regionalism" that is compatible with wider multilateral liberalisation and helps countries capture the gains. This can be supported by a regional emphasis on the increasing interest and activity of donors in trade-related assistance — both to help developing countries to negotiate and apply international trade disciplines, and to strengthen the capacities needed to integrate and operate successfully in the globalised economy.

81. Looking ahead, donors and others are investing in strengthened regional consultation and co-operation for the management of shared resources and environmental challenges in areas such as the Middle East. There and in regions like South Asia, the obstacles are forbidding. But some encouragement can be drawn from the steady strengthening of co-operation on infrastructure, even in war-torn regions, and among the Mekong River Basin countries.

The regional dimensions of conflict

82. A number of guidance points on the regional dimensions of conflict and its prevention have been amplified in the last five years, such as the need to resist any tendency to compartmentalise conflicts to fit existing bureaucracies and funding mechanisms. In the case of Rwanda, the regional dimension of the conflict did not disappear with the breaking up of refugee camps and return of the refugees; if anything it became even more intractable.

83. Policy coherence for regional consultation and co-operation needs to encompass diplomatic and possibly military and peacekeeping efforts — including arms trading, peace negotiations, and regional peacekeeping capabilities, and co-operation on economic and other fronts. International action and attempts to influence it need to be directed to all sides in conflicts in a manner that is consistent with the objectives sought. In acute conflict situations, the scope for the use of aid is limited and primarily useful to creating incentives or disincentives to the governments of the countries donors work in, but typically it cannot do the same with rebel movements, or neighbouring governments. Support for democratisation within countries should seek supportive action from or within neighbouring countries and at the regional level, since it is far more difficult for countries to build and maintain democracy when surrounded by non-democratic regimes.

84. In security reform processes, neighbouring countries need to be considered and treated as main stakeholders. This is in part because they can play active roles – either for peace, or for fostering conflict or waging war in a region. Regional instability contributes to the maintenance of large standing armies and to elevated levels of military spending. Tensions and suspicion that lead to militarisation can be reduced through effective regional mechanisms for enhancing security and co-operation, along with internationally-supported confidence-building measures [similar to those used in Europe with the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] that can include the disclosure of information by countries on military strategy, force size, and procurement plans. Once sufficient levels of confidence are achieved, regions can focus more on positive, "win-win" scenarios to strengthen security and co-operation. Foreign offices of OECD countries can play a lead role here at the diplomatic level, complemented by capacity building within regional organisations supported by development and defence ministries. In terms of peacekeeping capacities, finding "regional solutions for regional problems" is a good principle. However, there are situations, like those in Central Africa, East Timor, the Great Lakes region, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and others, which call for a much wider response by the whole international community, a more regional approach to solutions and added help to regional actors.

Assistance for regional capacities

85. While the cardinal development co-operation rule of respecting local ownership and local leadership applies strongly to support for regional co-operation, several specific opportunities for constructive external assistance have been identified and, in many cases, tested. Donors should:

- Help ensure that regional engagement is supported through regional diplomacy and flexibly resorts to sub-regional bodies, where appropriate.
- Assist in forging regional networks between community groups and civil society engaged in peace activities to stimulate mutual learning in transforming communal conflicts.
- Protect and promote the role of regional mechanisms in areas such as human rights. Neutral legal forums can offer balanced solutions to concrete cases of human rights violations that may be too politically contentious for national systems.
- Further support regional and sub-regional capacities for early warning, with a clear understanding of the criteria for predictable regional response.

- Support regional and sub-regional response capacities whenever such capacity has a comparative advantage in addressing situations of emerging or escalating conflict.
- Recognise and support the role of regional bodies in addressing cross border issues such as security and the illegal economy.
- Support measures to reduce the production, export, redistribution and recycling of small arms and light weapons.
- Assist in the development and financing of integrated programmes for peace and post-conflict reconstruction among countries of sub-regional groupings emerging from conflict situations.
- Help support longer-range work on regional economic, environmental and resource-management co-operation. Regional environmental security and resource management are challenges that will inevitably grow more critical, with possibilities either of new co-operative solutions or widening conflict. They merit major investment in analysis, capacity building and diplomatic support, and development assistance could make a notable contribution.

86. Forced displacement and the related issues of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are especially important dimensions of regional peacebuilding and conflict prevention approaches. The scale of the problem of forced displacement — both within and across borders — is one that calls for greater use of regional mechanisms and efforts. The linkages need to be made between the situations of refugees and IDPs and other regional issues including the trafficking in human beings and drugs, indentured labour and cross border natural resource management. Donors should support momentum in existing cross border co-operation in different regions, as well as in transnational or regional exchanges on these issues. Capacities for technical training and research at the regional level should be strengthened.

87. Regional institutions should be encouraged to take responsibility in meeting the challenges of conflict which result in flows of refugees across state borders, even though more effective regional approaches to tackle forced displacement are currently constrained by political sensitivities and by differing capacities for engagement by member states. In the regional consultations, people from developing countries stressed that "sovereignty with responsibility" needs to be emphasised. Clear statements, standards and norms comprising the responsibilities of sovereignty and a system of accountability are needed at various regional levels.

88. Development co-operation strategies should reflect such regional and cross-border approaches. External assistance on refugee and IDP issues should be addressed within a holistic approach to conflict resolution and prevention. For states in crisis, a comprehensive settlement integrating political negotiations, aid engagement, and refugee protection and repatriation should be attempted under a common international strategy. Current separate actions on relief do not address the dynamics of causal linkages between political crises and humanitarian outcomes, and micro project-level action does not add up to meeting the macro-level challenges of large refugee and IDP populations.

89. Development co-operation should better address other factors which lie behind population flows. These include land dispossession, environmental change, HIV-AIDS, etc. The particularly vulnerable position of women to and during displacement needs to be fully recognised and reflected in programming.[24]

[24] See also the "Report on the DAC Informal Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation for Asia-Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand", 25-27 October 2000 [DCD(2000)18].

V. PEACE PROCESSES, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

90. Lessons emerging from violent conflict identify ways to prevent both recurrences and new conflicts. This entails ensuring that peace processes address differing viewpoints on issues of justice and retribution and what is required to reconcile differences so that further violence is avoided. A high risk factor for the outbreak of violent conflict is a history of past conflict, especially when the root causes and impacts have not been satisfactorily confronted and addressed.

91. Development agencies are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peacebuilding both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues.

Supporting peace processes

92. Leaders need to recognise that winning the peace is just as important as winning the war. Negotiated peace agreements often bring together those individuals who provoked or maintained conflict in the first place. In order to have peace settlements and agreements in which all major protagonists feel ownership, perceptions of mutual benefit between them are crucial. When peace processes work towards providing the conditions necessary for participatory democratisation processes, they lay the foundations for peaceful dialogue.

93. Sustained, comprehensive and committed support to conflict resolution by the international community in all areas (diplomatic, political, technical, financial and in the security sector) is key to supporting peace processes. Mending war-torn societies takes time, and predictable and sustained commitments of aid within realistic time perspectives contribute a great deal to creating a positive and constructive approach.

94. For the donor community, some of the most prominent elements identified as contributing to the success of peace processes are to:

- Recognise and address the high expectations raised by peace agreements.
- Build confidence among all the different parties.
- Proactively engage in peace processes by facilitating dialogue among all local parties concerned including civil society, even on contentious issues. A clear understanding of the principles of neutrality and impartiality in these politically-charged contexts is crucial.

- Provide opportunities for civil society groups of all types, business, media, religious groups, professional associations, women's groups, youth, and academia to become engaged and play a constructive role in peacebuilding and reintegration.
- Ensure clarity on donors' objectives linked to aid, especially during low-intensity conflict situations, not least in terms of mitigation, prevention and the resolution of conflict. The frequent perception that donors are applying double standards can be detrimental. Approaches to similar situations of conflict in different countries (inter alia in relation to human rights) are seen as inconsistent. This inconsistency in turn undermines the credibility of aid objectives and donor motivation, and undermines confidence.
- Overcome institutional and political resistance (and explicitly managing the risks) to offering assistance to countries in a state of fragile peace, as they emerge from war and struggle to prevent a relapse into violent conflict.
- Consider factors that contribute to effective implementation of peace agreements, such as flexibility to react to early warning signs around sensitive issues before they give rise to new conflicts. Early warning signals of impending unrest include the inability of public authorities to pay the civil service and meet public service responsibilities, and the national military assuming government responsibilities.
- Take into account the dynamics through which war-torn societies perceive an increased tendency towards violence and brutality in general, mostly towards civilian populations. This can disrupt social cohesion for long periods.
- Build the capacity of people and organisations defending human rights by strengthening monitoring skills, training in legal rights and state obligations in relation to international conventions, and consulting with resource persons from within the region who have experience in working in similar situations.
- Bolster state-sponsored or independent institutions like national human rights commissions in order to improve capacity and state accountability. Within active conflicts, donors can support more energetically various initiatives to build humanitarian space, e.g. for immunisation campaigns. These can include, for example, days of tranquillity, zones of peace, and temporary cease-fires.
- Avoid overburdening fragile and emerging state structures, by ensuring better co-ordination of coherent policies and working towards the fiscal sustainability of the state, through fiscal reforms aimed at increasing state revenues.

95. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (October 2000) expresses concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and are increasingly targeted by combatants. It also recognises the consequent impact on durable peace and reconciliation efforts and calls upon the Security Council, the United Nations Member countries and all other parties (i.e. non-state actors, militias, humanitarian agencies, civil society) to take action in four areas: participation of women in decision-making and peace processes; incorporating gender perspectives and gender training in peacekeeping operations; protection of women; and gender mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and programmatic implementation mechanisms.

"The greatest challenge in a peace process comes once the peace accord has been signed and is expected to yield concrete outcomes. Unrealistic expectations on the immediate benefits from peace can do more harm than good and generate a risk that those who perceive themselves as losers in a peace process become its very spoilers, either by breaking the peace or through other forms of violence, notably criminal activities."

DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

Supporting local capacities and initiatives

96. International support for civil society in peace processes, justice processes and reconciliation is important. The development community and other external actors need to recognise that:

- Communities have the capacity to initiate peacebuilding activities even at the height of conflict, before formal peace processes are initiated. Donors should be aware of such initiatives and support them where appropriate.
- A peace agreement is only one step in a peacebuilding process. There is rarely an identifiable end; peacebuilding efforts need to continue if peace is to be sustained and peace agreements are to be respected. Once the peace is deemed "won", donors have tended to shift their support heavily towards the state — away from civil society. Consultations emphasised that donor support to civil society peacebuilding initiatives should not be curtailed when peace processes are perceived to have ended.
- Aid can play a catalytic role in promoting peacebuilding dialogue among contending partners, and can help create the climate for reconciliation. Such dialogue, however, to produce sustainable results, needs to be driven by the protagonists' genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation, and not by the promise of aid.
- Donors have a responsibility to avoid drawing the most competent people out of local civil society institutions or organisations to better paid positions in international organisations and bilateral agencies.

97. The international community particularly needs to take a more active role to:

- Help build the capacity of CSOs to enable them to meaningfully participate in formal peace processes and power structures. This includes support for training and leadership development. Donors and other external actors need to bring influence to bear on states and warring parties engaged in peace processes, to accept a structured role for CSOs. Such assistance needs to be sensitive to special interest groups such as women, youth and disarmed young militants.
- Promote the engagement of the marginalised and weakest segments of society in peace processes. These groups should have broader access to independent information and better opportunities to voice their concerns and interests. This can be complemented by training on negotiating skills, for example to enable their active participation in peace processes, including in the verification and implementation stages.

Understanding gender issues in violent conflict and peacebuilding

98. War itself is a "gendered" activity, as explained in Section I, "Some Basic Guiding Principles". Analysis and policy relating to violent conflict and peace processes are often gender blind. To try to prevent violent conflict and mitigate the social, political and economic consequences of war the strengths and needs of men and women should be addressed. This does not always occur because it is assumed that differences between genders are not relevant at this level.

99. Some governing systems use coercion and force to engineer consent and acquiescence in society. To create more participatory frameworks of governance, such methods may need to give room to alternative models that lead to voluntary conflict resolution and alternative discourses on issues of justice and reconciliation. Women's initiatives for peace and conflict resolution are collective and collaborative in nature, often focused on the principle of community action, across ethnic, linguistic, religious and other divides. This is part because their principal objectives are to fulfil the practical needs of households and

the community, and to maintain security and livelihoods. Women's individual and collective experiences of building co-existence within and among communities during conflict, coupled with social and gender analyses, should provide donors and developing country governments with a useful resource base, especially for the post-conflict and reconciliation phases.

100. In heavily militarised or insecure societies, the general level of violence, including domestic and gender-based violence, increases and becomes a major source of insecurity for women, men and children all over the world. Children, men and women undergo sexual and physical violence and abuse, as well as psychological and emotional trauma as a consequence of long periods of living in insecure conditions, witnessing extreme forms of violence and being victims of violence themselves. Human rights violations include rape, harassment, beating and other forms of torture, arbitrary arrest and detainment, and various forms of sexual slavery and servitude.

101. Violence, especially sexual, can undermine one's role and position in the household and the community, and undermine confidence. In conflict situations people experience increased levels of gender-based violence in their daily lives. In the former Yugoslavia many thousands of men and boys were rounded up, murdered and imprisoned just because they were men. Thus, there should be special programmes designed to raise awareness and sensitivity to these issues and to deal with all aspects of violence. These should focus on the causes of violent acts and the psychological traumas leading men (and women) and groups in power to become more violent. Special ways of dealing with victims of violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict need to be supported and examples include the ad-hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court. Donors should support building databases and gender-specific statistical material.

Women as peacemakers[25]

102. Focusing on women solely as victims of violent conflict can obscure their roles as potential peacemakers in reconstruction and rebuilding processes. Around the globe women and their organisations have initiated dialogue and reconciliation in communities and villages. Their coping experiences during war provide them with specific perspectives and insights that should not be lost. Indeed, their voices and viewpoints regarding peace and security issues are essential to the peace and policymaking processes at all levels.

103. Donors are currently redefining their policies for conflict reduction strategies to include the relevant gender perspectives and identify requirements for specific attention to women or men. Donors should:

- Support women's organisations during conflicts to enable them to become involved in mediation, negotiations and attempts to institutionalise the peace process. Seeking peace requires insights into the economy, the community, and social and health situations. Women are often well informed on these issues and have devised coping strategies.
- Donor policies and programmes can extend support to women's organisations that focus on the conflict situations; and encourage women's coalitions and alliances for peacebuilding across regions and sub-regions. It is just as important to strengthen the position of women within mixed and mainstream organisations working, for example, on human rights, relief and rehabilitation and peace building.

[25] Extracted and expanded from "*Women, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding: Global Perspectives*", International Alert, London, 2000.

- Encourage capacity building for women in public life. Women who have more prominent public roles in conflict, whether as peacemakers or combatants, may find that in times of peace there is an attempt to push them back into traditional roles. One factor that contributes to this is the shift in donor funding away from support to civil society towards more support to formal state administration. Strengthening the position of women within mixed and mainstream organisations, such as working on human rights, relief and rehabilitation and peacebuilding, is an important part of capacity building. Peacebuilding and peacemaking processes should incorporate women as decision makers at each level and consider their concerns at every stage. Promotion of the redistribution of power and the construction of sustainable and democratic political procedures provides opportunities for advancing gender equality.
- Support the representation of women in peace processes. The effect of militarisation during the pre-conflict period is often to marginalise women from the decision-making processes. This is replicated in peace processes where negotiations take place between authorities controlling different areas, which may not be accountable to the population they control. There is much positive experience of women's activism during peace processes. For example, in parts of Latin America, women have been successful in insisting that peace processes should not be at the cost of amnesty for human rights abuses.
- Improve women's access to resources during post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation processes. Many arrangements for public administration and legislation are renegotiated after a war. These can provide opportunities for securing or increasing women's legal rights, their control over key resources, such as land and their access to education and mechanisms for justice.
- Develop special ways of dealing with women (and men) who have been victims of gender-based violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict. Some examples of distinctive approaches can be found in the ad hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court. The rape of males and females as a systematic weapon of war to demoralise communities under threat has recently been recognised as a war crime by the United Nations.
- Consider designing special programmes to deal with the psychological and emotional trauma of all aspects of violence against women and men. This would be useful not only to address those aspects of violence that are particularly linked to the conflict but also to raise awareness about the rise in the general level of violence in a heavily militarised society, including domestic violence. These programmes should focus on the causes of violent acts and the psychological traumas leading men to become more violent. Work is needed to strengthen gender-specific information, including databases and statistical material, on these problems.

"There is a need to transform formal space in peace processes to allow informal groups to sit at the negotiating table."
DAC Asia Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

Peacebuilding through democracy building[26]

104. The 1997 DAC guidelines outlined some of the main ways that donors can help strengthen democratic systems toward the structural stability that allows for the non-violent resolution of conflicts, taking account of the distribution and the transfer of power, as well as the protection of minorities and marginalised groups. Subsequent experience has taught donors more about how to target assistance to these objectives. Most of the principles and lessons apply in anticipatory and preventive efforts, but they often

[26] Many of these points are taken from the report by IDEA on *"Democracy and deep-rooted conflict: options for negotiations,"* Stockholm, 1998.

emerge most sharply following periods of violent conflict.

105. Cold war strategies focused on short-term stability rather than longer-term sustainability. More of today's conflicts are propelled at least in part by quests for self-determination or adequate recognition of communal identity rather than by ideology or extra-territorial conquest. Issues around the internal political organisation of a state are much more important in managing conflicts today, since identifying conflict is complex, persistent and intractable, and thus much less amenable to compromise, negotiation and trade-offs.

106. More attention needs to be given to the types of political choices that those negotiating an end to violent conflict must make in order to rebuild their country. The way democratic procedures and institutions are developed and implemented — i.e. the clarity, quality of preparation and participation, timing — can play a more constructive role in post-conflict peacebuilding than has been the case to date.

107. The international scene is littered with post-conflict settlements that broke down in part because of inappropriate and unsustainable institutional choices for deeply divided societies. Where perceived imbalances in economic distribution coincide with identity differences, there tends to be heightened potential for conflict. Poorly designed democratic institutions often do not, or cannot, promote peaceful co-existence. Instead, they can inflame communal conflicts. In deeply divided societies, a combination of simple majoritarian political institutions and "winner take all" elections can often make things worse, especially if there is a rush to hold elections without leaving adequate time for political and procedural preparation.

108. It may be necessary in many cases to move away from thinking about the resolution of conflict towards a more pragmatic interest in a society's capacities to manage conflict without violence, a cornerstone of DAC Members' agreed approach in their 1997 guidelines. Government systems that embody the main hallmarks of democracy and have the institutional capacity to uphold them have the best chance of durably helping manage conflict without violence. For a system of government to be considered democratic, it must combine three essential conditions: meaningful competition for political power amongst individuals and organised groups; inclusive participation through free and fair elections and a supportive level of civil and political liberties. (This includes protecting freedom of political expression and the right to organise political formations.) When civil society has direct access to Ombudsperson systems, states may act more responsibly.

109. Donors recognise how important it is for countries to form political parties and support this step as part of a democratic process and a way to promote the transformation from violent conflict to peace. The perspective of democratic, inclusive governance is an important aspect of this dynamic process of transformation. A static view could well consolidate an autocratic form of democracy and lead to descent into violent conflict. Authoritarian systems can present an illusion of short-term stability, but are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term.

Post-conflict justice and reconciliation

110. Establishing the conditions necessary to promote justice and reconciliation is an essential task for societies in transition. It is also one of the most difficult and complex, heavily shaped by: cultural norms and expectations in the society concerned; the presence or absence of a peace accord and the way it was negotiated; the presence and strength of inter-group "connectors"; and other factors. In the end, distinctive national solutions need to be found in each case, but it is important that these solutions respect basic international legal norms.

"It is important, where possible, to begin a process of reconciliation before conflict has ended. The processes have to be set in motion while the conflict is raging, by identifying and working with stakeholders. Victims of conflict should not be looked upon and addressed merely as victims but as stakeholders. This is part of the empowering process that will lead to reconciliation and social cohesion.
DAC Asia Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

111. With all the complexities, however, it is clear that protagonist groups must find a sufficiently acceptable balance between concerns of justice and reconciliation, so that they can move peacefully forwards. The dilemmas are often challenging:

- On the one hand, truth and justice (as ultimately interpreted by all those involved) are seen as indispensable conditions for reconciliation. They require the recognition of the suffering of victims, the identification of atrocities and human rights violations, and the guaranteed ability to bring to justice those who are individually and institutionally responsible for crimes.
- On the other hand, experience has underlined the potential contradictions between peace and any absolute sense of justice by stressing that "more" peace cannot always coincide with greater justice. Those who have lived through such processes stress, however, that even if "full" justice cannot be achieved, it is necessary to give clear priority and some formal recognition to reconciliation, as evidence of the tangible willingness to enforce justice. Reconstructing the history of pain and social wounds, and differentiating between war actions and brutality, are considered key. Using traditional and customary mechanisms for reconciliation may be helpful, especially for people who have limited access to formal state systems. At the same time, a focus on exemplary cases — possibly to be tried in international courts — could be the basis of a learning mechanism for the society as a whole.

112. In some cases and circumstances, amnesty has been considered an acceptable contribution to collective reconciliation. General amnesty, however, can tend to create impunity for crimes committed during the conflict and can leave the structures that committed the violations intact. This can create resentment in society leading to mistrust and seeds for further conflict over the long term. In order to support reconciliation, all involved in the transition, including donors, must help generate long-term processes that give priority to the legitimacy and dignity of the victims and of all those who have suffered the violence of the conflict. This requires that the truth about the past be known by society at large and that individuals and institutions recognise their responsibilities for past violations, including the armed forces.

"The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or Committees provide an opportunity to deal with the feeling of injustice on the part of the victims and their families with regard to atrocities committed either by the state or other groups. There is potential, however, if gross abuses of human rights are not punished for a culture of impunity to emerge. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions should not be seen as an alternative to punishing those guilty of such crimes; they can complement other legal processes."
DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Peace, Conflict and Development Co-operation, 2000.

113. A key element to consider in reconciliation is the emotional nature of the dynamic between victims and perpetrators of past human rights violations. Psychosocial trauma emerging from conflict should be given greater attention in reconciliation efforts. The rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as citizens should be respected and promoted broadly. Solutions to their humanitarian plight should be a national priority in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts.

114. A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation, and an important way to help address the emotional dynamic and psychosocial trauma, seems to be the need to promote wide, open, and continuing communication. This is a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and potential returns to violent conflict. Donor countries and agencies can play an important role in giving tangible and moral support through steps such as providing whatever protection possible for non-partisan and "peacebuilding" media, and others who take risks in exercising their right to freedom of expression.

115. Reaching beyond local level support and protection, the creation of the International Criminal Court may represent progress in establishing international mechanisms for dealing with violent crimes and human rights abuses that occur during times of internal conflict. This may particularly be the case when the balance of power in transition does not favour criminally prosecuting the people responsible for past violations under the state's own jurisdiction. There is still, however, a clear need to establish national judicial frameworks and legal systems able to manage any reconciliation process.

116. The case studies demonstrate that post-conflict justice has become an increasingly important field for ODA. In Rwanda, more than a hundred justice projects have been funded. In Bosnia, too, there was significant donor involvement in the justice and police sectors. Both cases saw the establishment of war crimes tribunals — a testimony to a certain degree of coherence between foreign policy and ODA within a strategy of strengthening incentives for peace. However, in both cases, the positive effects of these tribunals have been long awaited and are only starting to emerge. Budgetary shortfalls account in part for the slow progress.

117. A sustainable reconciliation process takes time. It is necessary to allow enough time, since unresolved reconciliation might bring about new conflict. Reconciliation must therefore be considered a crucial factor in future conflict prevention. Often in a post-conflict situation, donors are perceived as concentrating only on demobilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of physical infrastructure — almost exclusively implemented by the government and chosen from a government dictated priority list. There is a frequent misunderstanding, therefore, that peace comes when open hostilities end. The reality is that new conflicts will often emerge. The end of violent conflict, through peace treaties, etc. may only establish the foundations for stability and economic development. Structural changes needed to address the root causes of the original conflict, such as political participation, are rarely addressed or implemented in a comprehensive manner. The international community has often been seen to have lost interest when the conflict and crisis is perceived to have "gone away".

> *"Donors are working with a short-term perspective on processes that may take a generation. Building capacities and then withdrawing because the donor does not feel enough progress is being made may be more destructive than not having become involved in the first place. It creates unsustainable capacities that may collapse when the donor leaves."*
>
> DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

VI. ENGAGING IN PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE

118. The nature of the relation between state and society is evolving in many countries, particularly in states affected by conflict. There is a crisis of legitimacy of the state in many countries, not only in "failed" or "failing" states. This is characterised by an oppressive and predatory role of the state in relation to society, an inability to fulfil its core functions, and involvement in internal conflict. Since peacebuilding hinges on strengthening trust among all groups, this ambivalent relation between the state and its people has implications for donor-state and donor-civil society partnerships.

119. As an important precept, experience and realism suggest that legitimate state institutions and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other to prevent conflict. The development co-operation community should seek ways to engage the state and mechanisms of governance and rule of law at all levels and with all partners. This includes local, civil society, regional and private sector partners. Donors often face a dilemma: should they engage with oppressive regimes, which would appear as though they *de facto* support them, or disengage and lose opportunities for positive influence? Depending on the type of governance prevailing, donors should therefore try to balance relations with partners at all levels. Furthermore, a key requirement for effective partnerships for conflict prevention is better co-ordination and coherence with other departments of donors' own governments, and between all external partners involved. The current and potential contributions of the multilateral institutions merit greater recognition and support to improve co-ordination.

> *"We should not ignore that between prevention and rehabilitation there is the plight of countries in a situation of 'neither total peace nor total war'. Hence a large space is left unaddressed - that of countries struggling not to fall back into war and which have not yet crossed the bridge towards rehabilitation. In these countries, development assistance could make a significant difference."*
> DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation 1999.

Partnership with states

In situations of weak governance

120. During conflict, many governments cease to function, or operate effectively, particularly in areas of heavy violence. Even when the worst violence has ended, existing governments may remain weakened, or fledgling governments may be in place. These weakened institutions face several obstacles: often, competent staff have fled or been killed; records and infrastructure have been destroyed; and policies must be developed from scratch — a daunting task even under the best of circumstances. At the same time, the needs of the population tend to be more acute: refugees need to be resettled; critical infrastructures rebuilt; service delivery programmes regenerated, and the economy kick-started.

121. A sense of urgency therefore typically prevails. A dilemma arises between the need to act quickly in a crisis and the need to engage in longer-term dialogue with government and civil society to ensure that programmes are nationally and locally owned, and to build mechanisms and processes that will reinforce and improve state capacity. To avoid this, capacity-supporting and building concerns should be added to any donor strategy from the very beginning, even in the most urgent response. The Central American peace process is often cited as an example whereby implementation has visibly benefited from relatively strong local ownership instilled early on.

In situations of repressive or divisive governance

122. Providing development or even humanitarian assistance to, or through, oppressive regimes engaged in conflict with their own citizens can serve in effect to support or legitimise the regime. This can happen through diversion of resources away from intended beneficiaries, fungibility of assistance or conferring a "moral" legitimacy by being perceived to support the regime in question. However, complete withdrawal of donor assistance, including via NGOs, and disengagement may have negative impacts. It risks, for example, encouraging state actions contravening human rights standards, possibly leading to state collapse, or denying humanitarian assistance to affected populations. Balancing these opposing risks is a difficult task. It should be informed by in-depth country analysis.

123. Donors and all external actors need to recognise these dilemmas head on. Experience suggests that donor countries should seek opportunities for continued engagement with such states. In situations of internal oppression and conflict, it is usually not a question of *whether* humanitarian assistance should be provided but *how* best to provide it in ways which minimise potential negative effects. Humanitarian assistance should not be driven by partisan or narrowly defined political concerns. Assistance to such states should be based on analysis to clarify the impact of aid conditionality and sanctions to minimise the impact on civilians of conflicts over which they have little or no control.

124. Conditionality clearly works best when it builds on a strong domestic basis for the desired policy goal. This is most evidently the case where a peace agreement exists: donors can condition their aid to the implementation of the agreed-upon provisions. Another possibility occurs where there exists a strong and organised civil society with a clear agenda that backs sanctions or conditionality, as in the case of South Africa with the African National Congress (ANC).

Strengthening state capacity and governance

125. Donors need to maximise opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict. This can include support to a range of state functions and activities. Training government staff on peacebuilding approaches and exposing them to peace processes in other countries is one example. Others examples include: strengthening state capacity to implement joint conflict management initiatives with civil society organisations (CSOs), NGOs and customary organisations; reinforcing justice systems; improving capacity to analyse and respond to local level conflicts; and strengthening human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms, etc.

126. Development co-operation needs to maximise opportunities to support all governance approaches. Its work must focus on influencing and reinforcing state policies of social inclusion based on principles of equality and non-discrimination (specifically addressing gender-based discrimination). This should include support aimed at building links between state and civil society and enhancing appreciation of the social contract between state, citizens, and civil society, and the conditions needed to make it a reality. Preventing conflict in divided societies requires keeping a cross-section of the community involved, communicating and overseeing post-conflict processes.

127. The 1997 guidelines addresses issues of good governance and civil society as "foundations for peacebuilding," with a number of key principles and specific orientations for donors[27]. Governance support often focuses on capacity building, training, skills transfer, etc. in areas such as the judiciary, accountability institutions, security systems and constitution building.

[27] DAC guidelines entitled *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the21" Century*, pp. 54-72.

128. These processes seem to be difficult areas for donor involvement. Some key orientations for donors engaging in state capacity building approaches require them to:

- Seek out opportunities to identify and influence potential change agents and structures within a state/regime since state institutions and regimes are not monolithic.
- Aim at supporting effective, functioning, viable and legitimate state institutions rather than specific governments in power.
- Identify and seize opportunities to work with and support the peacebuilding capacity of local level, regional, national and other governance structures. In doing this, it is worthwhile for donors to make the extra effort to co-ordinate and devise appropriate divisions of labour.
- Adopt a long-term view of engagement based on analysis of conflict and state roles/interests in relation to it. Donor support should be provided in a phased way with close and continued monitoring. It also needs to be linked to more consistent lobbying or advocacy work by donor countries in order to maintain political will of public opinion.
- Include views of local society in implementation combined with support to the capacity of CSOs to monitor the state behaviour and hold it accountable. Enhancing participation in political discourse of marginalised ethnic, regional or political groups is key.
- Recognise that these approaches will involve genuine dilemmas, and need to be handled on a case-by-case basis.

Partnership with civil society

129. A central component of conflict prevention and peacebuilding through development co-operation should be strengthening civil society's role in these areas. Donors need to develop effective partnerships with a wide range of CSOs, keeping in mind the strength of diverse societies that can be undermined by polarisation.

130. Before engaging, donors need to assess the full context of the conflict, present and past, and the role of civil society actors in relation to it, in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. Donors should ensure a real appreciation for the range of local actors and look beyond civil society actors who are "approved" by the state to those who represent voiceless sectors. In some cases, donors have failed to be properly informed of what activities already exist before initiating prevention related programmes.

131. In addition, donor relations with civil society should go beyond just funding NGOs to include genuine community level activities, "citizen peacemakers" and civil society organisations. However, donors need to keep in perspective what civil society organisations can and cannot do. Donor support to civil society has to be placed in a broader context and co-ordinated strategy to address the conflict while also encouraging effective use of diplomatic instruments to influence the political direction of states in conflict.

Donor capacities and co-ordination for partnership

132. Developing country partners repeatedly stress that in order to enter into effective partnerships with other actors for conflict prevention, donors must have greater coherence and co-ordination amongst themselves. This includes the need for improved and shared analysis of conflict situations as a precursor to developing joint approaches to conflict situations in particular countries and regions. It further implies that the donor community needs to equip itself better to respond in a more timely and sustained manner to crises, and break out of a recurrent pattern of slow programming and spending after the pledging of

support. This demands that donors exercise policy coherence and co-ordination across government ministries and departments, which can involve foreign policy, defence, trade and others.

133. The weakness or lack of co-ordination among external actors (including multilateral agencies and international NGOs) is partly due to widely recognised factors, such as:

- The multitude of actors, often numbering in the hundreds and including many transient ones (most dramatically exemplified in Bosnia and Rwanda).
- The high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination entails.
- The need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests.
- Competition for influence and visibility between donors.
- The general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for manoeuvre by the discipline of co-ordination.

134. There are both urgent needs and good opportunities for more coherent support to locally based initiatives to overcome inter-communal violence well before formal cease-fire or political settlements have been reached. Strategies for peacebuilding should foster locally driven peace processes early on and be responsive to priority concerns of affected populations. Differing studies[28] all highlight the need for more effective engagement in meeting protection and security concerns of war-torn societies, whether in Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo or in many places in Africa. Promoting initiatives for peaceful co-existence among war-torn communities is accepted as both a humanitarian and a developmental endeavour. The UN Secretary-General's call for a reinvigorated capacity for UN peace operations in the "Brahimi Report" argues in favour of deploying integrated teams with expertise from development, human rights, police, humanitarian and civil administrations working in tandem with local capacities, whether at the level of the state or civil society. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 agrees that more women are needed as special representatives, envoys, observers, civilian police and humanitarian personnel in the field and as part of peace operations.

135. Today there are more examples of collaborative projects, better sharing of information, and more of a readiness to recognise the high costs and dangers for intended beneficiaries from unco-ordinated action. At the same time, however, working out agreed common "strategic frameworks" for assistance has not yet been carried far enough, lacking a sense of serious strategic co-ordination, or any pronounced impetus toward a proactive approach to co-ordination. A strategic framework approach can serve to co-ordinate donor approaches to states in conflict situations and ensure that they are based on a common set of principles. The Task Force's case studies in four major conflict situations indicate that in developing such a framework, donor agencies should:

- Be aware of the complexities of a situation and the geo-political and economic considerations that may have an impact on the conflict and on its resolution.
- Ensure that diplomatic initiatives dovetail with humanitarian and development strategies.
- Strive for a spectrum of engagement and of responses that emphasise the inter-dependence of state and civil society, and seek "win-win" scenarios.
- Respect the need for flexibility in aid responses as a consequence of the dynamic and changing nature of conflict.

[28] The *World Development Report 2000/2001*; the *"Brahimi Report", August 2000* on UN peacekeeping; and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 1999 consultations on *"People on War"*.

- Recognise the limitations of donor responses and of the risk factors involved in providing assistance to communities in conflict, both for the provider and for the recipients.
- Be aware that the primary criteria for determining activities and programmes for assistance in conflict situations should focus on the benefits to the civilian population living in the conflict areas and ensure consideration of their views and opinions.
- Ensure approaches are gender-sensitive and are based on the principle of equality between men and women; this work could be informed by UN documents and by work done by other agencies and institutions on the specific issue of women in conflict situations.

> *"The core values leading to political reforms are basically the same, namely good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. All donors seem to agree on these values. The problem is that the donor community operating in African countries is not homogenous: national differences, interests, perceptions and even rivalries are there to be seen, all of them trying to influence the process of political reforms, their own way."*
> DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 1999.

136. Co-ordination also fails for more complex reasons. First, decision-making in aid agencies is often slow and centralised. Second, understandable and legitimate differences often exist between donor countries in their assessment of the situation. A concerted donor strategy of incentives for peace, therefore, is hard to achieve. Yet, it is widely agreed that an appropriate measure of co-ordination is a necessary precondition for the effective use of incentives. The recommendations of the 1997 guidelines (see especially p. 38, paragraph 72) remain relevant today. In addition, further work has suggested approaches that may be considered stepping stones toward the ideal of full-fledged co-ordination. They are:

- *Transparency:* Donors should be more clear and transparent in their assessments, concerns, goals and strategies.
- *Local ownership* creates a solid basis for co-ordination.
- *Decentralisation* of decision-making allows for more flexible and rapid response, including opportunities for joint action.
- *Leadership* can still be exerted by donors — preferably multilateral ones — who are willing to internalise the cost of co-ordination.
- *Innovation in diversity*, meaning that some countries may be more willing and able than others to take risks, to innovate, or to engage conflicting parties in dialogue.
- *Joint analysis, monitoring and evaluation* of projects and programmes may contribute to joint knowledge, render criteria of success explicit and, possibly, strengthen the potential for policy harmonisation.
- *Sharing techniques* on efforts to integrate a conflict prevention lens into all humanitarian and development work in conflict-prone countries, conflict awareness training, and development of models, tools, and best practices should be exchanged with other donors and local partners.

137. The recent, more serious pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership styles in development co-operation should have its impact in conflict-related work, where it can be especially critical. The objective of working together, within a comprehensive development framework, guided by a country's own Poverty Reduction Strategy (which should itself increasingly take account of conflict potentials) should be reinforced by further international consensus and co-ordination on peacebuilding and peace operations. UN Development Assistance Frameworks and Common Assessments are being adapted to take account of conflict potentials. Questions in existing development assistance co-ordination forums such as Consultative Groups and Round Tables also need more attention. It is noteworthy that the National Human

Development Reports and medium-term economic frameworks prepared by some countries already reflect a strong consciousness of conflict risks and security concerns.

138. Effective partnership engagement on conflict issues also requires that donors commit long term to developing countries, their governments and CSOs, at both micro and macro levels, and co-ordinate their engagement. As part of a commitment to co-ordination, they must work to strengthen coherence between development, economic, security and classic foreign policy initiatives.

Managing the risks and building trust

139. Donors face a fundamental choice of strategies when attempting to strengthen incentives for peace in violence-prone countries. One strategy relies more heavily on trust, with a commensurate willingness to accept risks. It seeks to strengthen the government's own capacities to finance and manage its own priorities. This strategy is largely based on the use of non-conditional incentives. Donor influence here comes from the increased capacity for dialogue that follows from this strategy, and from strengthening capacities and dynamics that favour peace.

140. An alternative strategy emphasises control that leads to a reduced dialogue. It seeks maximum and direct control over the use of funds, either by keeping the funds and their use in the hands of the donor or by delegating them to third parties (NGOs or multilateral or bilateral arrangements). This strategy of control often coincides with a greater use of disincentives.

141. In reality, donors never find themselves at either of these extremes. Where they end up reflects differences in: (a) their assessment of the nature of the situation; (b) their level of confidence in the government and consequent willingness to engage with it in some form of partnership; and (c) their willingness to engage and take risks. All these judgements should ideally be based on high quality political analysis.

142. There is broad debate on issues of aid allocation and selectivity. But there is widespread agreement that donors as a group should not turn their backs on countries in conflict and other "poor performers". The cost of escalating conflict and "failed" states requires continued attention in aid allocation to these countries.

143. An interesting example in Rwanda of aid to a conflict country consists of a judicious combination of elements of a trust strategy with control mechanisms. One donor has made significant long-term programme commitments under a mutually agreed protocol containing political benchmarks. At the same time, budget support is accompanied by requirements of budgetary transparency and monitoring, allowing, among others, for a better tracking of military expenditures. Here, an attempt is made to marry trust and control, and local ownership.

VII. WORKING WITH BUSINESS

144. Virtually all developing countries are now convinced that they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate the economic growth that is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for their sustainable development. The fostering of such a private sector is thus a basic long-term component of conflict prevention. At the same time, a widening community of business actors around the world is moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and a "triple bottom line" of profitability, social and environmental responsibility.

145. Under the right conditions, the private sector may be able to help prevent violent conflict. Like public and aid supported investments, the private sector needs to be guided by an informed commitment to guard against side effects of its investments which may have negative impacts on the "structural stability" of the local and national host society, and plan for ways in which it can ensure the maximum positive benefits.

Roles of business in conflict situations

146. Business — local, small and medium-sized enterprises, multinationals and large national companies — can play a useful role in conflict situations. Conflict implies higher risks and costs for businesses, and it is therefore in the interest of most businesses to support efforts that prevent, resolve or avoid exacerbating conflicts. Challenges include how to:

- Develop a sufficiently long-term perspective to promote sustainable development and help reduce conflict, strike a balance between long-term thinking and short-term investment horizons, with the need for quick returns in unstable situations.
- Understand the role of some trade actors or networks in causing or exacerbating conflict — in particular in extractive industries (diamonds, gold, forest products, etc.) that are major sources of revenue for warring parties and arms sellers.
- Encourage big business to stimulate local development, job creation and basic social infrastructures, especially in remote areas. This can contribute to long-term social stability and improved local livelihoods.
- Link the social investment programmes that are sometimes supported by companies, in particular in the health or education sectors, to wider development and conflict concerns.
- Harness the potential role of companies as powerful players who could use their influence positively on political actors not only to negotiate immediate conditions for their investments but also to avert conflicts.
- Ensure that the use by companies of private security firms to secure installations and protect staff is not at the expense of the security of the local population, and that illegitimate armed groups are not being inadvertently supported or financed by them.

Business and development co-operation

147. Building business-donor partnerships is a new and challenging area for development co-operation. An enlightened economic self-interest is part of the incentive for firms to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict, and to avoid exacerbating situations or taking advantage of "chaos" for business interests.

148. Further work is needed on raising awareness of conflict prevention issues among the national and international business communities, and on developing and reinforcing norms (some of which already exist in current codes of conduct). Important issues include:

- The social responsibility of firms and implications for their behaviour as stated through codes of conduct. States can play a role in reinforcing codes.
- Taking more account of the role of the media, which is increasingly part of the globalised business world and, in particular, its linkages with the commercial system and its awareness-raising potential.
- Considering the current role and further potential of consulting companies, as well as think tanks or academics, in analysing conflict and social impacts.
- Exercising greater transparency and debate around sovereign guarantees — a governance issue.
- Drawing attention to examples of best practices in employment creation, technical training, social services, etc., and using public awareness campaigns to influence consumers' behaviour as well as to disseminate/share best practices.

Orientations for development co-operation

149. The following key areas and actions have been identified where donors could engage productively to help enhance the development and peacebuilding aspects of private sector activity:

Capacity building

- Support governments' capacities to define or enforce national legal frameworks and corporate governance regimes in line with international laws/norms in order to ensure accountability, in particular for corporations in the extractive industries (e.g. *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*).
- Support efforts to find solutions for special claims of indigenous peoples such as those for ancestral land rights, and formalisation of control over investment projects, employment preferences, etc.
- Provide support for the effective enforcement of national legislation on labour and environmental standards.
- Promote the use of peace and conflict impact assessments by local, national, international/big businesses (whether national or foreign).
- Encourage Diasporas to become engaged in positive development roles in their countries of origin.

- Explore the scope for support to partnership programmes that can be developed through co-operation between government, NGOs and enterprises, i.e. development of clear laws and local regulations, compensation, community funds, grant making activities, capacity building and creation of local employment.

Helping create an enabling environment

- Explore how development co-operation assistance can foster and promote private sector development, with particular respect to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in order to create more opportunities for employment and other local spin-offs which will reduce risks of disaffected groups (e.g. ex-combatants) engaging in violence.

- Support local co-operation and bridge building, and building social capital, e.g. through agricultural co-operatives and small entrepreneurial activities.

- Streamline and improve codes of conduct on specific issues and risk-insurance mechanisms.

- Identify types and areas of collaboration between national and international trade unions to work with national and international NGOs to lobby companies to respect relevant rights and standards.

- Engage business in responding to natural disaster relief.

Creating space for dialogue

- Define country-specific approaches, and creation of fora for dialogue between industry, the government, NGOs and other actors to agree on common principles of engagement.

- Identify mechanisms and create space to involve the private sector in the peacebuilding process.

- Work with chambers of commerce and other business associations — with both economic development and civil society bridging functions.

- Promote greater policy coherence (for example in the field of environment or as regards policies on trade access, export subsidies, or intellectual property rights).

VIII. COUNTERING NEGATIVE ECONOMIC FORCES

150. It is important to focus on controlling the proliferation of weapons. It is just as important to control the flows of economic and other resources which continue to fuel, can be the aim of and often stoke violent conflicts as well as some of the corrupt and nepotistic economic practices that can help spark and thrive on them.[29]

151. The experience of recent years has highlighted the phenomenon of the transformation of conflicts over time, with a political economy of violent conflict taking shape in which some powerful groups and networks take on a compelling vested interest in continuing warfare. This is coupled with an increased importance of economic factors such as the exploitation of valuable natural resources and linkages with systems of organised crime of global reach.

152. Some of the key orientations that have emerged for external actors are:

- Disentangling the political, economic and criminal interests and actors at play and working to find the appropriate responses to each. When a "rebel" movement is, or has degenerated into, an organised crime organisation, responding with political solutions is likely to be misguided and ineffectual. But some governments have become highly corrupt, and ineffectual at reinforcing laws to counter organised crime.
- Strengthening norms to ensure enforcement of the prohibition of bribes, ensuring transparency and defining appropriate mechanisms to ensure such enforcement, recognising corruption as an obstacle to civil peace, as well as economic development. (see *OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*).
- Understanding the economic aspects of civil wars and, in particular, working to counter the criminal forms of business often flourishing in situations of conflict and the rent-seeking and loot-seeking "spoilers" — who can in some cases include the military engaged in profitable activities — that tend to exacerbate and perpetuate conflicts, and obstruct peace.
- Discouraging and, where illegal, preventing the negative roles that can sometimes be played by individual and corporate citizens (including Diasporas) from feeding conflicts in other countries.
- Recognising that conflict prevention should enhance transparency in trade transactions, eliminate corruption at all levels, as well as exploitation of common goods which sustain the power of kleptocratic groups or regimes and fuel conflict.
- Working with countries in troubled regions to prevent the spread of cross-border corrupt business practices and illegal resource flows. Criminality, corruption and conflict usually go hand-in-hand.
- Establishing international norms to strengthen accountability in the use of private security firms — by public bodies or private enterprises.

[29] Refer also to Section II on security and development.

153. The control over territory for cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs is part of the economic forces fuelling conflict, as are the growing interlinkages between criminal trafficking in illicit commodities and in human beings — it is becoming clear that the "trade routes" are the same. The prospects of serious action on these issues by the international community has been heightened by the exposure by the UN Security Council on embargo-breaking trafficking in diamonds, and the subsequent measures undertaken by the main actors in the international diamond trade to stifle the traffic in "conflict diamonds." Donors and their counterparts will need to address the political economy of violent conflicts as a major focus of their work in the future.

CONCLUSION

154. Enduring peace rests on fundamental principles of democracy, human security, respect for the rule of law and human rights, gender equality, good governance, social and economic development in the context of sustainable development and open and fair market economies. Helping developing countries to achieve these goals will not be easy. But OECD/DAC countries are committed to working together - across different parts of government - to improve analysis of violent conflicts, build a culture of prevention, use a lens of conflict prevention and try to ensure more coherent policies. They intend to try to better co-ordinate timely action among all external actors and with developing countries in violent conflict settings. A broad range of solid partnerships between development co-operation and government, civil society including women's organisations and the private sector in developing countries are key to success and human security.

155. Lasting peace requires that men, women and children feel secure from violence and extreme economic, social and environmental damage. In many cases, this may call for reformed security systems and particular support in demobilisation, reintegration, justice and reconciliation processes. As part of building human security, external actors are also trying to understand the political economy of violent conflicts and work to dismantle the negative economic forces that can perpetuate violence.

156. In the face of these challenges, donor agencies intend to work together and with other actors, internal and external. The guidance provided in this volume is based on experience provided by practioners in donor agencies and conflict experts worldwide and is intended to contribute to donor governments' policies and operational activities to help prevent the scourge of violent conflict.