

# MULTILATERALISM IN THE XXI CENTURY

Lisboa, 14-15 December 2000


Instituto de estudos estrategicos e  
internacionais



# IEEI

**MULTILATERALISM IN THE XXI CENTURY**  
Instituto de estudos estratégicos e internacionais (IEEI)  
Lisboa, 14-15/XII/2000

- a. Programma
- b. Lista dei partecipanti
  - 1. "Palavras de abertura"/ José Calvet de Magalhães
  - 2. "The new international system"/ Helio Jaguaribe
  - 3. "New regionalism and world governance (summary)"/ Mario Telò
  - 4. "Prosperity, security, democracy in the EU perceptions towards the Mediterranean (summary)"/ Roberto Aliboni
  - 5. "Civil-military relations (speaking points)"/ Claire Spencer
  - 6. "Valores na política internacional"/ Celso Lafer
  - 7. "Legitimacy, legality and determinants of humanitarian intervention (summary)"/ Christoph Bertram
  - 8. "O caso da Europa, identidade múltipla (resumo)"/ Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins
  - 9. "How can wars be stopped in Africa? (Summary)"/ Gabriel de Bellescize
  - 10. "The role of international cooperation (summary)"/ Stephen Morrison
  - 11. "Lessons from the Asian crisis and the ASEAN experience (summary)"/ Dewi Fortuna Anwar



**20th Anniversary**

**XVIII**

**International  
Lisbon Conference**

**Multilateralism  
in the XXI Century**

**Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation  
14 - 15 December 2000**



**20 Anos do IEEI**

**XVIII**

**Conferência  
Internacional de Lisboa**

**O Multilateralismo  
no Século XXI**

**Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian  
14 e 15 de Dezembro de 2000**



Comemorando os seus vinte anos, o IEEI organiza, em colaboração com a Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, a XVIII Conferência Internacional de Lisboa para debater o sistema internacional e o multilateralismo nas primeiras décadas do século XXI.

O mundo neste final de século é muito mais complexo que o da bipolaridade, o que o torna mais interessante para os especialistas, mas menos previsível a sua evolução. Por isso, quando procurarmos identificar a matriz do sistema internacional, mesmo no futuro próximo, é mais fácil colocar as perguntas que encontrar as respostas.

Será que a tendência para o unilateralismo vai prevalecer ou irá antes consolidar-se um novo multilateralismo, mais assente no regionalismo? Será que um mundo em que se afirma a multipolaridade será mais estável e equilibrado que o actual e dele decorrerá necessariamente um reforço do multilateralismo?

Será que a convicção de Kofi Annan de que "quando as fronteiras deixarem de constituir refúgio inexpugnável os Estados não adoptarão comportamentos criminosos convencidos da sua imunidade" vai ser universalmente partilhada?

Será que as Nações Unidas serão capazes de se reformarem, de forma a serem elas a legitimar as intervenções humanitárias? Em que condições podem e devem estas intervenções ter lugar?

Será que tem valor universal o modelo europeu de integração, de associação livre entre os Estados, de superação das tensões e conflitos pela inclusão? Irão o Mercosul, a ASEAN ou a SADC consolidar-se como espaços integrados e fazer do regionalismo uma componente essencial do novo sistema internacional e a forma mais eficaz para regular a globalização?

Que relação existe entre democracia e segurança? Será que a segurança dos cidadãos vai sobrepor-se à dos Estados, e que a paz entre as nações e dentro delas é impossível sem o império da democracia?

Será a evolução da ordem internacional percebida da mesma forma nas diferentes regiões do mundo?

Estas são algumas das questões para cuja resposta procura contribuir a última Conferência Internacional de Lisboa do século XX.

**ÁLVARO DE VASCONCELOS**  
Director do IEEI

Lisboa acolhe, uma vez mais, a Conferência Internacional de Lisboa, sob o tema *O Multilateralismo no Século XXI*, evento este ano duplamente significativo, tendo em conta a comemoração do vigésimo aniversário do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais.

A Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, ao patrocinar esta décima-oitava edição da conferência, vem assim reiterar o empenho da cidade de Lisboa, enquanto cidade multissecular e multicultural, na promoção do debate de ideias, do diálogo e da união dos povos e culturas, procurando levar alento e esperança aos povos martirizados por situações de conflito, como aconteceu nos casos da Bósnia, de Angola, de Moçambique e de Timor-Leste.

Num mundo cada vez mais globalizado, o debate e o aprofundamento dos temas internacionais e transnacionais passam por todos e cada um de nós, e a presente conferência constitui, sem dúvida, um forum privilegiado para a discussão dos mesmos.

**JOÃO SOARES**

Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

21360

A presente conferência inscreve-se no esforço que ao longo de vinte anos o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais tem vindo a desenvolver, preenchendo uma lacuna que em Portugal se fazia sentir no campo da discussão científica das relações internacionais, versando especialmente o estudo das questões relativas à segurança e estratégia, à integração e à cooperação entre Estados e espaços regionais. Revelaram-se as passadas conferências marcos importantes no caminho que o Instituto se impôs prosseguir; e estou certo de que a XVIII Conferência suscitará interesse semelhante ao das anteriores e que muito aproveitará ao aprofundamento da matéria que ora escolheu para objecto dos seus trabalhos.

A integração europeia é simultaneamente resultante e ponto de partida: ela resulta do esforço histórico das nações europeias na procura de uma unidade, forjada ao nível da civilização e da cultura, mas à qual falta ainda acrescentar a plena consolidação política; e, na consecução desta tarefa, ela é também um ponto de partida. Noutros espaços, os países procuram igualmente unir-se para enfrentar em conjunto os desafios da globalização, e as grandes questões que, pelo seu carácter transnacional, exigem respostas que transcendem a capacidade dos Estados isolados.

O multilateralismo do século XXI, com o alastrar dos valores universais que subtemem o processo de construção europeia, não será igual ao do século que finda. A tendência geral para a integração que o mundo de hoje experimenta indica que terá de assentar num papel mais marcante dessas mesmas regiões na conformação do sistema internacional que irá reger o mundo nos próximos anos - em que a União Europeia se prepara hoje, quando novamente se expande e completa com a defesa europeia a sua política externa e de segurança, para ter um papel mais interveniente.

Possam, assim, a XVIII Conferência Internacional de Lisboa colher-se contributos marcantes para o esforço que a todos nós será exigido na construção de um multilateralismo mais sólido e mais justo.

**JAI ME GAMA**

Ministro de Estado e dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Quinta-feira, 14 de Dezembro

10:00 **SESSÃO DE ABERTURA**  
JOSÉ CALVET DE MAGALHÃES, Presidente, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa  
JOÃO SOARES, Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa  
JÚLIO CASTRO CALDAS, Ministro da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

11:00 Café

11:30 **O SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL NA PRIMEIRA DÉCADA DO SÉCULO XXI**  
HÉLIO JAGUARIBE, Decano, Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, Rio de Janeiro  
CHARLES GRANT, Director, Center for European Reform, Londres  
MARIO TELÔ, Université Libre de Bruxelles

14:30 **DIREITOS HUMANOS E DEMOCRACIA NA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL**  
PRESIDENTE JOSÉ LUÍS DA CRUZ VILAÇA, Conselho Directivo, IEEI, Lisboa  
CELSO LAFER, antigo Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil; Professor da USP, São Paulo  
JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiro, Governo de transição da UNTAET, Díli  
JOSÉ MANUEL DURÃO BARROSO, Presidente do Partido Social Democrata, Lisboa

16:00 Café

16:30 **MESAS REDONDAS**

Mesas Redondas

DEMOCRACIA E PAZ NO MEDITERRÂNEO

Quinta-feira, 16:30  
QUE RELAÇÃO ENTRE SEGURANÇA E DEMOCRACIA?

Sexta-feira, 11:30  
PARA UMA CULTURA DE SEGURANÇA POST-SOBERANA

INTRODUÇÃO  
ROBERTO ALIBONI, IAI, Roma  
KHALID ALIOUA, Deputado, Rabat  
MAY CHARTOUNI-DUBARRY, IFRI, Paris  
MAHDI ABDUL HADI, Director, PASSIA, Jerusalém  
MARK HELLER, JCSS, Tel-Aviv  
IAN LESSER, RAND, Washington  
CLAIRE SPENCER, King's College, Londres

COMENTÁRIOS  
FIFI BENABOUD, Centro Norte-Sul, Lisboa  
MARIA CARRILHO, Deputada ao Parlamento Europeu  
KHALIL BALLA GUEYE, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação, Nouakchott  
MUSTAFAH HAMARNEH, Director, CSS, Amã  
EDWARD KAUFMAN, Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Jerusalém  
RENÉ LERAY, Notre Europe, Paris  
ALEJANDRO LORCA, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid  
AFIF SAFIEN, Representante da Autoridade Palestina, Londres  
ELVIRA SÁNCHEZ MATEOS, CIDOB, Barcelona  
HELENA VAZ DA SILVA, Presidente, Centro Nacional de Cultura, Lisboa  
MODERADOR MARIA DO ROSÁRIO DE MORAES VAZ, IEEI, Lisboa  
RELATOR GEORGE JOFFÉ, IEEI, Londres

Sexta-feira, 15 de Dezembro

09:30 **LEGITIMIDADE, LEGALIDADE E CONDICIONANTES DA INTERVENÇÃO HUMANITÁRIA**  
PRESIDENTE GIANNI BONVICINI, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma  
CHRISTOPH BERTRAM, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen  
JAMES STEINBERG, Markle Foundation, Nova Iorque  
ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY, Director, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

11:00 Café

11:30 **MESAS REDONDAS**

14:30 **IDENTIDADE, VALORES E INTEGRAÇÃO**  
PRESIDENTE GUILHERME D'OLIVEIRA MARTINS, Ministro da Presidência, Lisboa  
EDUARDO LOURENÇO, Ensaísta, Vence  
ADAM MICHNIK, Director, Gazeta, Varsóvia  
CARLOS GASPAR, Assessor da Presidência da República, Lisboa  
ABDALLAH SAAFI, Ministro da Educação, Rabat

16:30 Café

17:00 **VINTE ANOS DE MUDANÇA – O NOVO MULTILATERALISMO EM GESTAÇÃO**  
ÁLVARO DE VASCONCELOS, Director, IEEI, Lisboa  
ANTÓNIO GUTERRES, Primeiro Ministro (a confirmar)

ÁFRICA: COMO SAIR DA GUERRA?

Quinta-feira, 16:30  
A NATUREZA DOS CONFLITOS VIOLENTOS

INTRODUÇÃO  
ACHILLE MBEMBE, Secretário Executivo, Codesria, Dakar  
LAURIE NATHAN, Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cidade do Cabo  
GABRIEL DE BELLECIZE, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Paris  
JOSÉ MANUEL ROLO, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Lisboa

Sexta-feira, 11:30  
O PAPEL DA COOPERAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL

INTRODUÇÃO  
STEPHEN MORRISON, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington  
MARTIN LANDGRAF, Comissão Europeia, Bruxelas  
WINRICH KÜHNE, Subdirector, SWP, Ebenhausen  
MODERADOR FERNANDO JORGE CARDOSO, Subdirector, IEEI, Lisboa

O PAPEL DO REGIONALISMO NA ORDEM INTERNACIONAL

Quinta-feira, 16:30  
REGIONALISMO E REGULAÇÃO DA GLOBALIZAÇÃO

INTRODUÇÃO  
MARIA JOÃO RODRIGUES, assessora-especial do Primeiro-Ministro, Lisboa  
DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, The Habibie Center, Jakarta  
ALBERT FISHLOW, Council on Foreign Relations, Nova Iorque  
MODERADOR MIGUEL SANTOS NEVES, IEEI, Lisboa

Sexta-feira, 11:30  
REGIONALISMO E SEGURANÇA INTERNACIONAL

INTRODUÇÃO  
GELSON FONSECA, Embaixador do Brasil junto das Nações Unidas, Nova Iorque  
THÉRÈSE DELPECH, Comissariado da Energia Atómica, Paris  
TERESA DE SOUSA, jornalista, Lisboa  
ANTÓNIO FIGUEIREDO LOPES, Conselho Directivo, IEEI, Lisboa  
MODERADOR MARIA JOÃO SEABRA, IEEI, Lisboa  
RELATOR ALFREDO VALLADÃO, Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris

COMISSÃO DE HONRA  
Presidente JAIME GAMA  
Ministro de Estado e dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa  
JÚLIO DE CASTRO CALDAS  
Ministro da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa  
CELSO LAFER  
antigo Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil; professor da USP, São Paulo  
LUIZ FELIPE LAMPREIA  
Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Brasília  
VICTOR DE SÁ MACHADO  
antigo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros; Presidente da Fundação Gulbenkian, Lisboa  
HELIO JAGUARIBE DE MATTOS  
decano do Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, Rio de Janeiro  
EURICO DE MELO  
Vice-Presidente do Partido Social Democrata  
MÁRIO MESQUITA  
Jornalista e Professor, Universidade Nova de Lisboa  
JOÃO SOARES  
Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

Esta conferência é organizada pela IEEI em colaboração com a Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, com o patrocínio do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e o apoio do secretariado internacional da Natô.

Línguas de trabalho das sessões plenárias: português, inglês, francês e espanhol, com tradução simultânea para inglês.

COMMITTEE OF HONOUR  
President JAIME GAMA  
Foreign Minister, Lisbon  
JÚLIO DE CASTRO CALDAS  
Defence Minister, Lisbon  
CELSO LAFER  
Former Minister for External Relations of Brazil; professor at the USP  
LUIZ FELIPE LAMPREIA  
Minister for External Relations of Brazil  
VICTOR DE SÁ MACHADO  
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs; President, Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon  
HELIO JAGUARIBE DE MATTOS  
Dean, Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, Rio de Janeiro  
EURICO DE MELO  
Vice-Presidente of the Portuguese Social-Democratic Party  
MÁRIO MESQUITA  
Journalist and professor, Universidade Nova de Lisboa  
JOÃO SOARES  
Mayor of Lisbon

The conference is organised by the IEEI under the high patronage of the Lisbon City Council. It is sponsored by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by NATO.

Plenary session languages: Portuguese, English, French and Spanish, with simultaneous translation into English.

Thursday, 14 December

10:00 **OPENING SESSION**  
JOSÉ CALVET DE MAGALHÃES, Chairman, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon  
JOÃO SOARES, Mayor of Lisbon  
JÚLIO CASTRO CALDAS, Defence Minister, Lisbon

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 **THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**  
HÉLIO JAGUARIBE, Dean, Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, Rio de Janeiro  
CHARLES GRANT, Director, Centre for European Reform, London  
MARIO TELÔ, Université Libre de Bruxelles

14:30 **HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**  
CHAIR JOSÉ LUÍS DA CRUZ VILAÇA, Board member, IEEI, Lisbon  
CELSO LAFER, former Foreign Minister; University of São Paulo, Brazil  
JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA, Foreign Minister, UNTAET, transitional government, Díli  
JOSÉ MANUEL DURÃO BARROSO, Leader of the Social-Democratic Party, Lisbon

16:00 Coffee break

16:30 **Panel Discussions**

Panels

DEMOCRACY AND PEACE ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

Thursday, 16:30  
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY: THE MISSING LINK?

Friday, 11:30  
TOWARDS A POST-SOVEREIGN SECURITY CULTURE?

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
ROBERTO ALIBONI, IAI, Rome  
KHALID ALIOUA, MP, Rabat  
MAY CHARTOUNI-DUBARRY, IFRI, Paris  
MAHDI ABDUL HADI, Head, PASSIA, Jerusalem  
MARK HELLER, JCSS, Tel-Aviv  
IAN LESSER, RAND, Washington  
CLAIRE SPENCER, King's College, London

COMMENTS  
FIFI BENABOUD, North-South Centre, Lisbon  
MARIA CARRILHO, MEP  
KHALIL BALLA GUEYE, Foreign and Cooperation Ministry, Nouakchott  
MUSTAFAH HAMARNEH, Director, CSS, Amman  
EDWARD KAUFMAN, Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Jerusalem  
RENÉ LERAY, Notre Europe, Paris  
ALEJANDRO LORCA, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid  
AFIF SAFIEN, PA Representative, London  
ELVIRA SÁNCHEZ MATEOS, CIDOB, Barcelona  
HELENA VAZ DA SILVA, President, Centro Nacional de Cultura, Lisbon  
MODERADOR MARIA DO ROSÁRIO DE MORAES VAZ, IEEI, Lisboa  
RAPPORTEUR GEORGE JOFFÉ, IEEI, London

Friday, 15 December

09:30 **DETERMINANTS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY**  
CHAIR GIANNI BONVICINI, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome  
CHRISTOPH BERTRAM, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen  
JAMES STEINBERG, Markle Foundation, New York  
ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY, Director, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 **PANEL DISCUSSIONS**

14:30 **INTEGRATION, IDENTITY AND VALUES**  
CHAIR GUILHERME D'OLIVEIRA MARTINS, Minister of the Presidency, Lisbon  
EDUARDO LOURENÇO, Essayist, Vence  
ADAM MICHNIK, Director, Gazeta, Warsaw  
CARLOS GASPAR, Assistant to the President of the Republic, Lisbon  
ABDALLAH SAAFI, Minister for Education, Rabat

16:00 Coffee break

17:00 **TWO DECADES OF CHANGE: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MULTILATERALISM**  
ÁLVARO DE VASCONCELOS, Director, IEEI, Lisbon  
ANTÓNIO GUTERRES, Prime Minister, Lisbon (to be confirmed)

How Can Wars Be Stopped in Africa?

Thursday, 16:30  
THE NATURE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
LAURIE NATHAN, Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cidade do Cabo  
ACHILLE MBEMBE, Executive Secretary, Codesria, Dakar  
GABRIEL DE BELLECIZE, Foreign Ministry, Paris  
JOSÉ MANUEL ROLO, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Lisbon

Friday, 11:30  
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
STEPHEN MORRISON, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington  
MARTIN LANDGRAF, European Commission, Brussels  
WINRICH KÜHNE, Deputy Director, SWP Ebenhausen  
MODERADOR FERNANDO JORGE CARDOSO, Deputy Director, IEEI, Lisbon

THE ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN SHAPING THE WORLD ORDER

Thursday, 16:30  
REGIONALISM AND THE REGULATION OF GLOBALISATION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
MARIA JOÃO RODRIGUES, Special assistant to the Prime-Minister, Lisbon  
DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, The Habibie Center, Jakarta  
ALBERT FISHLOW, Council on Foreign Relations, New York  
MODERADOR MIGUEL SANTOS NEVES, IEEI, Lisbon

Friday, 11:30  
REGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
GELSON FONSECA, Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, New York  
THÉRÈSE DELPECH, Atomic Energy Commission, Paris  
TERESA DE SOUSA, journalist, Lisbon  
ANTÓNIO FIGUEIREDO LOPES, Board member, IEEI, Lisbon  
MODERADOR MARIA JOÃO SEABRA, IEEI, Lisbon  
RAPPORTEUR ALFREDO VALLADÃO, Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris

**XVIII International Lisbon Conference**  
**Gulbenkian Foundation, 14-15 December 2000**

**- Speakers and Panels -**

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XVIII Conferência Internacional de Lisboa  
**O Multilateralismo no Século XXI**

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian , 14 - 15 de Dezembro de 2000

***Palavras de Abertura***

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**José Calvet de Magalhães**  
Presidente, IEEI, Lisboa

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Escolhemos para tema desta conferência a organização do sistema mundial no começo do século que entra.

Nos vinte anos do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais que esta conferência assinala de modo particular, pretendemos identificar os grandes rumos que vão tomar as relações entre os Estados, entre os povos e as nações nos próximos anos. Ajuda-nos a coincidência do calendário – um século que realmente finda, outro que realmente principia –, momento que se presta a olhar um pouco para trás mas convida sobretudo a procurar prever o que temos por diante.

O multilateralismo é uma tendência forte no mundo de hoje. Ultrapassado o confronto leste-oeste, tem muito maiores possibilidades de prevalecer. Corresponde à consciência de que os problemas que a humanidade enfrenta exigem soluções que não podem ser encontradas pelos Estados isoladamente, à consciência de que a interdependência – a que agora se chama globalização – é uma realidade indesmentível, e que por isso é necessário que a segurança e a paz internacional, a economia e o comércio mundial, se rejam por regras formuladas em conjunto, aceites por todos e por todos postas em prática, para velar pelo cumprimento das quais existem instituições em que todos participam em pé de cada vez maior igualdade.

Portugal não se alheou deste movimento, e optou por uma presença mais activa quer nos órgãos das Nações Unidas, quer nas operações de paz, designadamente em África, na Europa e mais recentemente em Timor-Leste.

Outra tendência forte é o associativismo entre os Estados, que constituem agrupamentos regionais e se ligam pelo mecanismo da integração. Ao mesmo tempo que adoptam políticas comuns ou concertadas para melhor resolver os seus problemas internos, ampliam assim a sua influência, individual e colectivamente, sobre o modo de agir sobre os problemas mundiais e sobre o modo de organização do sistema internacional.

Portugal fez da integração europeia a prioridade central da sua política externa. Não abandonou por isso os seus interesses mais específicos. Pelo contrário, o seu empenho crescente e a sua intervenção na formulação da política europeia têm contribuído para que reforce laços tradicionais – com os países de língua portuguesa e muito especialmente com o Brasil –, para que se dedique a reavivar laços antigos – no Mediterrâneo, por exemplo –, para que estabeleça inclusivamente laços que até aqui lhe estavam por assim dizer vedados – as relações com a Indonésia são neste ponto paradigmáticas. Também no campo da segurança se fizeram sentir os reflexos da integração de Portugal na Europa, com uma participação mais activa na própria Aliança Atlântica, ilustrada pela presença nas operações da Bósnia e também do Kosovo.

Uma outra característica importante é a convicção cada vez mais generalizada de que os direitos do homem são realmente universais, e de que a paz e a segurança não podem ser monopólio das sociedades ditas desenvolvidas. Daí a maior importância que toma, na política internacional, a defesa dos direitos fundamentais e das normas internacionais. Daí a consideração, que igualmente se generaliza, de que o direito de ingerência de que se falava há alguns anos se transformou em dever de intervenção humanitária. Esta não pode porém


depende dos humores ou da disponibilidade de alguns países ou organizações, há que definir as condições em que deve exercer-se e criar os mecanismos apropriados para prevenir os conflitos e evitar as catástrofes humanitárias, para que a intervenção *a posteriori* se torne cada vez menos necessária.

Procurámos agrupar nesta conferência os temas a que o IEEI mais se tem dedicado e que constituem outros tantos pontos importantes em matéria de política externa e de segurança de Portugal. Sem ser um instituto estritamente nacional – vários colaboradores do IEEI são hoje e têm sido oriundos de outros países – é natural e útil que as prioridades de investigação e debate do Instituto se aproximem das áreas de maior interesse temático e geográfico do país em que exerce a sua actividade. Não só porque assim cumpre a sua função de *think-tank* que exige capacidade de crítica e contributo para a formulação das políticas públicas, como porque cumpre igualmente a função de dar a conhecer extra-fronteiras, nas várias iniciativas conjuntas, redes e reuniões internacionais em que participa, aquele que é o contributo especificamente português para essa mesma formulação em círculos mais vastos.

Fruto da actividade desenvolvida nos temas e áreas que enumerei, e que hoje procuramos reunir num todo coerente, pudemos construir uma teia de relações de colaboração – e certamente de amizade – com muitos dos mais reputados especialistas que sobre elas trabalham, e com muitos institutos e centros que se ocupam de temas semelhantes na Europa e noutros pontos do mundo, e que nesta conferência estão tão bem representados. Sempre tivemos, por intenção deliberada e pela própria natureza da actividade a que nos dedicamos, a preocupação de reunir governantes, políticos, diplomatas, militares, académicos, investigadores, jornalistas, empresários, nas reuniões que organizamos, e mais uma vez assim hoje acontece. A todos, a expressão da nossa gratidão pelos contributos valiosos que no passado, e hoje mais uma vez, quiseram partilhar connosco.

A realização desta conferência foi possível graças ao apoio da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, a quem quero agradecer, na pessoa do seu presidente, dr. João Soares, a colaboração que desde o início tem dado ao Instituto na organização desta iniciativa, e ao apoio do secretariado internacional da Nato, e muito particularmente do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, que tem alternado e por vezes coincidido com o do Ministério da Defesa Nacional. Não quero deixar de agradecer, por outro lado, ao representante do ministro da Defesa Nacional, o secretário de Estado da Defesa, dr. Miranda Calha, o apoio que o Ministério da Defesa tem dado, não só às actividades mais ligadas à defesa e segurança, mas também à própria existência e funcionamento do IEEI. Este apoio foi fundamental no passado, e espero que possa continuar no futuro a acompanhar a expansão da actividade do Instituto a que nos obriga, também, o progressivo alargamento dos interesses de segurança e política externa de Portugal.

Muito me congratulo por constatar que a última conferência internacional de Lisboa do século vinte – nos vinte anos do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais – reúne uma tão expressiva participação, o que testemunha do interesse dos temas que vamos tratar. Apenas me resta pois agradecer a vossa presença, que assegura que dos debates destes dois dias se extrairão conclusões úteis para o futuro.





XVIII International Lisbon Conference  
**Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century**

Gulbenkian Foundation, 14 - 15 December 2000

**The New International System**

Helio Jaguaribe

Dean, Institute of Political and Social Studies, Rio de Janeiro

# **THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

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## **I THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

The international system, after the implosion of the Soviet Union and de-communisation of its European satellites, is marked by the obvious fact that the United States was left as the only superpower. The initial idea put forward by President Bush, that the outcome of the end of international communism would be the establishment of a new era, marked by universal peace and harmony, obviously had no consistency. It expressed, in fact, the American myth that communism was the cause of every international problem and that, with its suppression, the "free world" would realise harmoniously and pacifically its positive potentialities. It was also a way for the United States, as a superpower, to manifest, reassuringly, its intention of only intervening consensually - and not unilaterally - in the international scene.

A few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union into various countries, with Russia receiving the lion's share of the legacy, the international situation has begun to exhibit its post-cold war characteristics. Furthermore, various areas of turbulence in Africa, in the former Yugoslavia, in the ever-troubled Middle East, have made it clear that the international system is not self-adjustable and that shorn of controls, albeit relative, which in the preceding bipolar regime each superpower exerted over its area of dominance or influence, the world would be exposed to continuous conflicts which the United Nations (not receiving the necessary means from member-States), lacks the resources to prevent or settle.

On the other hand, given the new conditions and the relative impotence of the United Nations, the United States has started to exercise, in an increasingly unilateral way, a world monitoring practised in the name of the "international community", allegedly in defence of democracy and human rights, in addition to promoting its own national interests.

Despite being the only superpower and possessing unchallengeable economic-technology and military supremacy in relationship to any other country, the United States lacks the conditions to exercise effective unipolarity, although it frequently seeks to achieve it.

As Samuel Huntington has pointed out,<sup>1</sup> the present world regime cannot be classified as a unipolar one but as having special aspects which one might call "unimultipolarity". Unimultipolarity is characterised by the fact that the United States enjoys a general power to veto important international proposals or anything that affects vital American interests. It is also characterised by the fact that US participation has become an indispensable factor in the success of any important international initiative. It is characterised finally by the fact that the US has considerable scope for unilateral intervention in international affairs, although depending, in important questions, on the minimum support from countries, such as France and Germany, in addition to the almost automatic support from Great Britain.

The unimultipolarity regime currently in force has, of necessity, a transitory character to it. This stems from the fact that the United States, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has a high but not unrestricted capacity for unilateral intervention in the international scene. This world order will tend, therefore, in the coming decades, either to consolidate itself into an unchallengeable American unipolarity or turn into an effectively multipolar system.

## II LIMITS TO UNIPOLARITY

Two main circumstances prevent the United States at the moment, despite its status as the only superpower, from achieving the unipolarity level. Domestically, the fact that North American society and institutions are not geared to running a world empire and the American people refuse to assume the financial and personal sacrifices required for such. And internationally, the fact that, despite its unassailable economic-technological and military supremacy, the United States, given the internal restrictions affecting it, faces sufficient resistance on the part of various powers that prevent it from exercising a unipolar management of the world.

The United States is a mass democracy, although subject to a high degree of oligarchic control. The world empires from Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt and Rome to the Iberian empires of the Renaissance, to the recent British empire, were constituted and directed by authoritarian regimes, even though in the British case, under the guise (and with the resulting restrictions) of an aristocratic democracy. In addition to the significant decline in relative power experienced by the United Kingdom after the First World War, it was a middle-class democracy, under Gladston, increasingly becoming a mass democracy (Atlee), which made the continuance of the British Empire untenable.

In the case of the United States, in addition to the socio-economic restrictions stemming from the regime, the important protestant ethic residue which continues to

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order, Ch. 1, Touchstone Books, London, (1996), 1998 and "A Superpotência Solitária", in Política Externa, Vol. 8, N. 4, March-May, 2000 pp. 12-25



manifest itself in the American people makes violent or malevolent forms of coercion unacceptable for public consumption, and without which, on occasion, it is not possible to preserve an imperial system. More than any other thing, it was the image on American television of a little Vietnamese girl fleeing naked and in terror from a napalm bomb, which led the American people to oppose the continuing military intervention in that country.

Notwithstanding the unassailable American economic-technological and military supremacy, such resistance has proved efficient, both in itself and by the fact that the domestic limitations that surround the United States mentioned above, deprive it of the opportunity of a direct preventive confrontation with major opponents to its hegemony.

Without elaborating too much on this question, it is worth highlighting three of its most important aspects. Two of these aspects are closely connected to the domestic limitations facing the American power elite in any attempt to exercise uninhibited world hegemony. The first relates to the need to transmit to the American public an image of legitimacy for U.S. external interventions. Interventions delegated by the United Nations (Kuwait) immediately confers this legitimacy. Recent American interventions, however, have not counted on the support of the United Nations and only escaped its condemnation by virtue of the United States power of veto. To make up for this, NATO-conferred legitimacy can be a useful second bet. In the absence of this, however, the express opposition of the Europeans, most notably countries like France and Germany, has an inhibitory effect.

The second restrictive aspect of an uninhibited American unipolarity is the fact that, in many circumstances, unilateral intervention would have to be exercised in a malevolent or violent way, which would give rise to strong domestic opposition. The international practice of violence on the part of the United States, besides requiring (in view of American institutions and the moral sensibilities of the public) formal aspects of legitimacy, demands the prior "demonisation" of the country and/or the leader of the intended target of aggression, a typical example being that of Sadan Hussein.

The third restrictive factor for exercising a full unipolarity on the part of the United States, is the strategic and tactical need to prevent the formation and consolidation of dangerous "anti-hegemonic" coalitions. The United States enjoys a clear unchallengeable economic-technological and military superiority over any other country, most notably in the cases of China, India, Russia, Iran or Iraq. The formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition between such countries, even if not all of them, although not reaching the point under present conditions where it exceeds American power, would assume grave proportions and require on the part of the United States incomparably greater effort and sacrifice than that demanded by the Second World War, among other reasons, because of the possibility of a major nuclear conflict.

Under present conditions, the above-mentioned countries are all against American hegemony and all have an equal aspiration to see a reduction in the US area of predominance and influence. Nevertheless, one could not describe the relations between such countries as being co-operative; in fact competitive or even antagonistic would be nearer the mark. In this context, the United States thus seeks to avoid any exacerbation of the anti-Americanism of these countries which might lead them to overcome their reciprocal divergences and band together against the United States.

### III SCOPE FOR INTERVENTION

#### a) General aspect

Within the internal and external limitations mentioned above, the United States still has considerable scope for intervention. To analyse this question, it is necessary to view it from two standpoints: firstly in terms of the main objective pursued by the United States in its international policy, and secondly the means at its disposal to achieve such objectives.

What is sometimes called the "American empire" is something quite different from the traditional empires, from the Roman to the British. These were marked not only by the effective submission of the areas under their control or predominance to metropolitan sovereignty, but also their formal submission. Authorities appointed by the metropolis as pro-consuls, governors and viceroys exercised, with the required military support, effective power in the provinces or colonies of the empire. The inhabitants of those regions, in compensation, enjoyed certain benefits conferred by the empire, ranging from, in the Roman case, the institution of a rational and equitable juridical system, regulated by the *jus gentium* and supervised by the *praetor peregrinus* - the Caracalla edict, extending Roman citizenship to all the provinces - to the status of a British citizen, with the corresponding rights (different from those conferred by U.K. citizenship) to Commonwealth subjects.

The predominance of the United States in the international system is not exerted through the formal imposition of American sovereignty on the territories and people subject to it. The American "empire" is not an empire, it is a field, in the same sense as when we speak of a magnetic field or field of gravity. It is a field in which multiple conditionings are exerted, conditionings of an economic, technological, cultural, psychological, political and military character, coming from the United States, without harming the continuing nominal sovereignty of the countries encompassed by this field. Wherever possible, the United States seeks to influence the choice of local governments. It is not essential, however, for American predominance, that the leaders of the "provinces", whose domestic institutions continue to exist, are people appointed by Washington or pointedly aligned to it. The system of conditionings operates independently of the will of the leaders of these

areas, formally independent but subject to American predominance, generating constraints which would be extremely costly or simply unfeasible to ignore.

In stubborn cases or acts of blatant defiance, the United States exerts strong direct pressure and according to the circumstances adopts (particularly in cases of international terrorism) a policy designed to make the country or leader in question an international pariah (Khadafi, Hussein) and launches a campaign to "demonise" such countries and leaders in the eyes of the American people and world public opinion.

The United States pursues three main types of objectives in the international arena related, respectively, to American power, the expansion of its economy and the dissemination of its values and institutions.

#### **b) Military power**

The objective of preserving, strengthening and expanding America national power at the international level is understandably the most important of the three. Having managed to become, without resorting to war, the only superpower, the United States gives top priority to preserving and consolidating this status. To this end the United States considers it essential to satisfy two requirements: 1) to maintain its control over Eurasia and 2) to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in the sense of making sure that no major power (besides the consummated fact of Russia) reaches a critical nuclear capacity and that no unreliable or rogue country shall have the means to inflict serious damage on American territory.

As Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, the huge continental land mass that stretches from the Iberian Peninsula to the sea of Japan, together with the Japanese islands, constitutes the key area of the world, guaranteeing control over it to whoever controls this area. If unable to control completely and fully Eurasia, the United States has endeavoured to achieve the following objectives in this region:

- (1) to maintain a close military alliance under American command, with Europe and Japan;
- (2) to maintain an active economic cooperation relationship with Russia avoiding, on the one hand, any growth of anti-American feelings, and on the other, any decline in their prejudices against China and the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition with the latter;
- (3) to maintain economic and technological cooperation relations with China, so as to link Chinese development to American cooperation, avoiding the formation of anti-hegemonic coalitions with Russia and Japan;
- (4) to maintain cooperation relations with India and impede the latter from forming an anti-hegemonic coalition with China.

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinsky, The Great Chessboard, New York, Basic Books, 1997.

Europe is the key-figure for preserving the American system of supremacy. Hence the decisive importance for the United States of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance and its military arm, NATO. The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union have made the preservation of NATO particularly difficult, as it was expressly formed as a defence against an enemy, the Soviet Union, which no longer exists.

It goes beyond the limits of this brief study to carry out a detailed analysis of the conditions and circumstances that have allowed NATO to continue. One might just mention, among the most important factors, the radical British opposition to any weakening or the dissolution of NATO, the alliance with the United States being more important to England than its links with Europe. One should also mention the lingering European fear towards Russia and a probable recovery, in the not too distant future, of its national power. A third factor is that France has not found within an exclusively European orbit compensatory forms or mechanisms for the growing disequilibrium resulting from the inferiority of its economy and its international status compared to post-reunification Germany. Finally one should mention the fact that the Europeans do not possess an updated defence system and are faced with multiple difficulties and inevitable delays in their proposals for adopting one. At the moment, as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia made so patently clear, they need to use NATO to tackle problems of this type.

As far as preserving its nuclear superiority is concerned, the United States recognises, as a factor to be reckoned with, the maintenance by Russia, albeit in highly unsatisfactory conditions, of the bulk of the Soviet Union's former arsenal. They do not consider particularly dangerous the fact that England and France have a modest nuclear system at their disposal. But they are making every effort to avoid the proliferation of atomic weapons, although they have been unable to block nuclear development in China. It is the concern about the already existing spread of nuclear weapons, in some cases, already with a critical mass available (Russia) or achievable within a few decades (China) and, in others, subject to the wild adventurism of certain leaders, that is leading the United States to return, under very different conditions, to Reagan's old project of protecting the United States with a reliable missile-interception system. This project is strongly contested by Russia, which considers, quite rightly, that the installation of such a system, besides violating already signed nuclear accords, would make the United States militarily invulnerable, thus consolidating definitively American world hegemony.

In addition to the policies and measures mentioned above, American concern about the international preservation of its power supremacy has led the United States to pay particular attention to the question of regional powers. To this end the United States seeks to identify, as far as possible, in the main regions of the world, both the respective local predominant power and the secondary power most likely to dispute regional primacy.

From the American viewpoint the regional powers and their respective contenders are, in Europe, France and Germany, allies but competitors for supremacy, with Great Britain also as a contender; in the west of Eurasia, Russia, with the Ukraine as a contender; in the Far East, China, with Japan as a contender; in South Asia, India, with Pakistan as a contender; and in South America, Brazil, with Argentina as a contender.

In such a situation American policy is studiously two-faced. On the one hand it seeks to win the support of the predominant power, to act as a local link in the US network of influence, making use of material and honorary incentives to achieve this end. On the other, it nourishes the current or potential contentiousness of the secondary power, using the same resources, with a view to reducing the capacity for action and leadership of the predominant local power.

### **c) Economic power**

American economic supremacy stems from the fact, besides its marked technological-economic superiority, that the country enjoys particularly favourable conditions generated by the globalisation process. The economic superiority of the United States in comparison with any other country is striking. Boasting the largest GDP in the world, representing about one quarter of world GDP, the United States also enjoys considerable technological and managerial superiority, controlling the high-tech sectors of the economy and showing, on average, and in the most important sectors, significantly greater competitiveness than the other countries. It should be added that this formidable productive and commercial system is operated by a network of multinationals that dominate the world market. In addition, the socio-cultural conditions of the United States favour the existence and expansion, in the domestic market, of a large number of small companies with a high capacity for technological innovation, which supplies the market with a never-ending and increasing flow of new technologies and new products.

This marked technological-economic superiority of the United States, as mentioned before, is particularly favoured by the globalisation process. This process - the origins of which go back to the mercantile revolution, followed by the industrial revolution - has not resulted from the initiative of any one country, including the United States, or of any particular economic group. It has resulted from the aggregate effect of the technological revolution in the final decades of the twentieth century, which incorporated the all world into a system of immediate intercommunication and close interdependence, both in terms of the supply of goods and services coming from, and destined to, every part of the world, and, even more significantly, in terms of the almost instantaneous financial movement of many billions of dollars. Within the conditions generated by the globalisation process, the marked economic-technological superiority of the United States and its multinationals is making such a process correspond increasingly to a general Americanisation of the world economy.

It is in such conditions that the economic-technological conditionings regulated and manipulated by the United States are particularly efficient, both directly and through the international agencies conceived and structured in a consistent way with these conditionings, such as the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others. These conditionings obey neoliberalism logic, which leads to international super-competitiveness and the institution of new rules of the game that taken together strongly favour the American economy and its multinationals, to the detriment particularly of countries with less developed and less competitive economies. These are faced, therefore, with the alternative of either opening their internal market to an invasion of goods and services offered by the multinationals, with the elimination of autochthonous productive capacity and a growing loss of operational control over their own economy, becoming a mere segment of the world market, or insisting on the practice of traditional protectionism, bringing about an increasing technology lag and subjecting them in the name of free trade and liberal and democratic principles to intolerable sanctions on the part of the international agencies and the United States itself.

#### **d) Cultural Power**

The cultural power of the United States is frequently underestimated and considered only in terms of its scientific-technological aspects. Certainly science production shifted during the course of the 20th century from Europe to the United States at an ever-increasing rate. Perhaps even more significant here is the concentration in the United States of technological and innovation capacity in this area. Notwithstanding this predominance, the dominant cultural influence of the United States at the "pop-culture" and "American way of life" level is no less apparent, the American cinema exerting an immeasurable multiplying effect in this respect. An effect which, furthermore, is also self-multiplying, in the sense that the screens of the world, with few exceptions, almost only show American films, with the odd non-American movie that somehow manages to get exhibited being so by predominantly American distributors as well.

The immense and powerful dissemination of American values and cultural styles has a corresponding effect on the configuration of values and styles of life in the other cultures of the world. Without getting into too much detail on such a consequential question, one might highlight just three of its most important effects. The first concerns the fact that modernity and modernisation, particularly from the viewpoint of young people in practically every country in the world, are seen as being equivalent to a process of Americanisation and as something resulting from it. Furthermore, American institutions and procedures, such as democracy, neoliberal economics, super-competitive individualism, high and unrestricted consumerism, are seen as universally desirable. Finally, and which tends to lead to disastrous consequences, the conviction is spreading among every nation and in every social class, that the American way of life and its high and unrestricted consumerism are universally accessible whenever American institutions and procedures are adopted.

#### IV INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

The enormous scale and intensity of the American impact on the world is producing very profound and varied effects. Among the countless consequences of this impact, three aspects should be highlighted as being particularly important: the first relates to the image the United States has of itself and its international actions; the second concerns stratification; and the third concerns its real economic-social effects.

##### a) **America's image of itself**

The Americans do not view their country as an imperial power and do not aspire to such. They are fully aware and proud of being the only superpower and intend to preserve and consolidate this position. For many, including significant numbers in Congress and the Executive, this position confers unipolarity on the United States, which carries the obligation of performing a regulatory role in international affairs, which can, and in principle should, replace the work of the United Nations in a more efficient and internationally beneficent way.

The Americans see their country as a benign power - which tendentially it actually is - that seeks to contribute to the institution of world peace, to democracy and the defence of human rights and free trade. The super competitiveness of the American economy giving it advantageous access to all the markets not subject to a protectionist regime, prompts the country to actively defend free trade. From the American viewpoint, it is fair that the most competitive should prevail and the effects of this competitiveness are benefits for consumers in every country in the world.

The view that the Americans have of themselves and their role in the world, genuinely positive, is true in the short run, both for the ordinary man in the street, involved in his daily life, and for political leaders, conditioned by the short duration of elective mandates. The great scholars, such as Brzezinski and Huntington, among others, have a historical view of their country. It leads them, on the one hand, to an awareness of the transient nature of all hegemonies, from the Roman to the British and, of necessity, the current American hegemony. However, they share the favourable self-image that Americans have of their country and its international actions. From this conjugation between historical awareness and self-complacency arises the interesting idea that the United States will be historically the last super power. American hegemony even though non- unipolar, will contribute towards the universalisation of democracy, respect for human rights and a progressive modernisation of the world, generalising higher living standards for all nations and thus instituting an era of universal peace and prosperity.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Samuel Huntington, op. cit. Chap. V and Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit., Conclusion

## **b) World power stratification**

American supremacy and the unipolarity regime, viewed in terms of world power stratification, leads to a world differentiated in three levels: 1) the level of the ruling countries, 2) the level of the resistant countries and 3) the level of the conditioned or dependent countries.

Strictly speaking, the United States has become at the present time the only fully sovereign country. It enjoys the power of veto, not only in the Security Council ritual, but also on the practical level, in any international deliberation of great importance or conflicting with vital American interests. The United States furthermore, is an indispensable partner in any more important international initiative that hopes to succeed. It is militarily invulnerable, having at the same time the capacity to intervene effectively in any part of the world. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the United States, by virtue of domestic inhibitions and efficient international resistance, does not enjoy effective unipolar power. The international actions of the United States are subject to legitimacy requirements dependent on the approval of the United Nations Security Council and, in the final instance, of the European countries, particularly France and Germany, besides the habitual almost automatic alignment of Great Britain.

This circumstance, plus the very weight of the European Union itself, grants co-participation status to the European countries, although to a lesser degree, with the United States at the ruling power level. At this level, also to a lesser degree, Japan co-participates, by virtue of its position as the second economic-technological power in the world and by the fact that the United States depends on the Japanese alignment to maintain its influence in the Far East.

The second level of world power stratification is occupied by countries that are in a position to resist American supremacy but not contest it head-on. This position is typically that of China. Countries like Russia, India and Iran take part, to a lesser degree, in this level. Iraq, if it manages to overcome its traditional rivalry with Iran, which led to a bitter war between the two countries, might have access to this level, as a supporting player of its former enemy. Brazil in the ambit of Mercosul, if it manages to consolidate this union and overcome its current policy of international financial dependence, might also have access to the level of resistant countries.

The third level of international power stratification is that of the conditioned or dependent countries, which comprises the rest of the world. This level is occupied in the main by countries subject to the technological-economic logic of the Euro-Nippon-American system, without important options of their own. In this level there are also a number of Asiatic countries dependent, in different ways, on China, the most typical case being that of North Korea. Occupying a singular position in this level is a small highly developed country, Switzerland, which prefers not to join the



European Union, which would give it greater international participation but deprive it of its assumed neutrality.

**c) Social-economic effects**

The globalisation process which is rapidly spreading throughout the world, within the international power stratification regime mentioned above, produces extremely varied social-economic effects. These effects are conditioned, on the one hand, by the international power level in which a country is situated. On the other hand, for countries situated in the dependent level, these effects vary according to whether the country manages to achieve a satisfactory position in the international market as an exporter of primary products, or remains an under competitive industrialised country.

The countries situated at the ruling level have managed to achieve a high level of general development, enjoy satisfactory living standards at home, even though, in the case of Europe, having to put up with excessive unemployment levels, and maintain internationally balanced economic, cultural and political relations. These characteristics are presented in full in the case of the United States, whose continual international trade deficits, tolerated for the benefit of domestic consumers and the logic of its own multinationals, are amply compensated for by the huge inflow of profits and interest and, at the extreme, by the self-constituting capacity of its own financial reserves. In the case of the European countries the European Union provides them with international and domestic protection, highly compensatory for the restrictions to national sovereignty arising from this same Union.

The situation of the countries situated at the resistance level is more complex and varied. Fundamentally this level provides them with a wider range of options than what the dependent countries have. This fact provides a margin of national autonomy, which the dependent countries are deprived of. This margin of autonomy in turn enables them to promote their own development with a significant degree of independence from the ruling countries. The opportunities provided by this level, however, require a considerable and consistent national development effort, which also needs to be implemented rapidly. The resistance level has a comparatively short horizon. The countries that fail to achieve a satisfactory level of development within the next few decades are unlikely to be able to do so in the course of the second half of the twenty-first century, and will find themselves in the position of a dependent country. This is clearly the case of China but also, of Russia, in terms of its need to rapidly overcome the chaotic conditions of the post-communist aftermath and, the case of Iran, in terms of the need to overcome Islamic dogmatism and become a modern society.

The countries situated at the dependency level, which covers the great majority of countries in the world, present a huge variety of situations, according to their relative level of development and their demographic statistics. As already mentioned, a small highly developed country like Switzerland can enjoy

advantageous conditions without belonging formally to the ruling level. Underdeveloped countries with a small population which manage, however, to place their primary products in the international market on a satisfactory basis, such as Costa Rica, also enjoy relatively favourable conditions. This level, however, is extremely unfavourable to underdeveloped countries with a large population, like Indonesia and Nigeria, or for countries also with a large population, predominantly industrial, but whose productive system is not sufficiently competitive, like Brazil. This latter country as will be briefly discussed next, finds itself in an intermediary situation between the resistance and the dependency level. Its final status will depend, domestically, on the extent to which it is able to overcome its current dependence on the international financial system and, internationally, how far Mercosul can consolidate itself and expand to the rest of South America, resisting its absorption by ALCA.

## **V EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS**

### **a) General aspect**

The current international system and its three-power strata offer little stability. There is inherent instability in the unimultipolarity status of the United States, tending in the course of the coming decades to turn into an effective unipolarity or become a new multipolarity. There is instability in the status of countries situated at the resistance level, as is clearly the case of China. The latter, either achieves by mid-century equipollence with the United States, or it slips into a dependency relationship, amidst considerable crisis and turbulence. Furthermore, numerous countries now situated at the dependency level are exhibiting, both domestically and internationally, signs of extreme instability, as is clearly apparent in the cases of Africa and Indonesia but also, within its own conditions, in the case of Brazil. The huge populations of these countries are not compatible with recalcitrant underdevelopment and a continued situation of international dependency. Such countries, if they do not develop and acquire satisfactory conditions of domestic equilibrium in the coming decades, will become explosive centres of international upheaval.

The instability currently found in the international system will tend to bring about great modifications in the decades to come, which will evolve at three main historical-social levels, which we might describe as (1) the economic-social, (2) the international and (3) the civilizational level.

These levels correspond to processes of different duration and velocity. The economic-social level corresponds to phenomena that are already being felt, resulting from the domestic and international non-viability of the majority of the countries situated at the dependency level. Such phenomena occur, at great speed, in a relatively short space of time. The international level concerns the configuration of the new world order which will result from changes in the current unimultipolar

situation. The corresponding processes develop in the medium term, their effects tending to materialise from the mid-twenty-first century onwards. The civilizational level corresponds to long term processes. It consists in the gradual formation of a planetary civilization through the fusion of elements coming from the currently existing civilizations into planetary universal, which will exhibit distinct characteristics in each of the original trunks.

#### **b) Economic-social level**

As has been pointed out by Aldo Ferrer<sup>4</sup> the current globalisation process constitutes the third wave of a phenomenon whose origin lies in the maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century and the resulting mercantile revolution. A second globalisation wave occurred with the industrial revolution. The third and present globalisation wave has resulted from the technological revolution of our own time.

The globalisation process has acquired steadily growing proportions, both in terms of geographic extension and in terms of its intensity as it has passed from one stage to the next. In all three stages, this process has been marked by the asymmetry - growing geometrically - of its effects. The Asian world in the fifteenth century exhibited a civilizational level equal or superior to that of the West. With the mercantile revolution the Western world began to enjoy an economic advantage of around two to one in its relationship with the Asian world. With the industrial revolution this advantage became ten to one. With the current technological revolution it has become sixty to one.<sup>5</sup>

The effects of this extraordinary asymmetry are extremely destabilising for underdeveloped countries. The latter exhibit great differences, among other reasons, according to whether one is dealing with countries coming from major ancient civilizations, such as India or China, coming from the Iberian cultures, such as Latin America, or whether they are still in a pre-national stage, as in the case of Africa. Despite the profound differences existing between these countries, in all of them the underdevelopment from which they are suffering expresses the effects of the deep asymmetry generated by the globalisation processes.<sup>6</sup> Besides having exponentially raised the difference in levels between such countries and developed countries - the GDP per capita in the case of Africa is around US\$ 500, against US\$ 30,000 in the most developed countries - the third and present globalisation wave has brought the masses of the underdeveloped world, through television and other media into

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Aldo Ferrer, História de la Globalización, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, El Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano y la Teoría del Desarrollo, México, Siglo XXI, 1970 and Jadish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdevelopment, New York, Magraw - Hill, 1966

<sup>6</sup> The underdevelopment of Third World countries is not due only - often not even mainly - to the effects of the asymmetry. This was responsible, generally speaking, for the historical origin of underdevelopment, particularly in the case of Asia. During the twentieth century, especially in the second half, countries like Brazil, up to the 1970s, in South Korea, more recently, managed to overcome the effects of asymmetry. An important factor in perpetuating underdevelopment, has been the excessive cost of local elites, in relation to the surplus generated by their societies, as notoriously occurs in the case of Africa.

immediate contact with the affluent world, including the islands of influence existing in the poor countries themselves, generating acutely destabilising effects, particularly in countries with a large population.

The entry of underdeveloped countries into the Euro-Nippon-American economic-technological system imposes inhibiting constraints on their development, particularly social development, and arouses completely unrealistic expectations, generating frustrations which are expressed in all kinds of violence and rising crime rates. These countries are heading rapidly towards a state of ungovernability, as one can already see in Africa, in Indonesia and in the Andes region of South America. In Brazil itself, despite the stability of its democratic regime, the relatively high average level of the country (US\$ 5,000 per capita) and the important high-tech sectors that it has, the destabilising effects generated, particularly, by the Landless Peasant Movement, are extremely disconcerting.

Any attempt at a more detailed analysis of the conditions of countries at the dependency level falls outside the scope of this brief study. One should just point out, in relation to the asymmetry process, that overcoming underdevelopment requires, among other conditions, balance of trade and balance of payments equilibrium in these countries in order to allow economic growth, it being up to institutions like the World Bank and the IMF to facilitate this process.

### **c) Civilization level**

Western Civilization<sup>7</sup> begins to exhibit, from the end of the nineteenth century and in a process which gained pace after the First World War and even more so after the Second, characteristics which require that it be differentiated from its preceding tradition. One might use the term Late Western Civilization to denominate it, in the same way that Classical Civilization, after Constantine, became known as Late Classical Civilization. The Christianization of the classical world, with the resulting loss by Rome of its previous religious beliefs, led to profound changes in the ancient world. Transformations which in the long term and in the course of great vicissitudes gave rise, after the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, to the emergence of Western Civilization.

In the same way the growing laicization of Western Civilization, the crisis of transcendent values, with Nietzsche and after him, and the de facto replacement, even though not openly, of the belief in God as the basis of the Western cosmovision, by the belief in science and technology, have made the Western Civilization of today something very different from the preceding tradition, making it a late expression of that civilization.

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<sup>7</sup> Western Civilization began to take shape in Europe commencing in the tenth century AD. The bases of Christian Society, which legitimised the Carolingian Empire and which was administrated by it, developed from the Classical-Christian culture of the Late Ancient World, with a powerful Germanic aggregate. In the course of time, from the Middle Ages to the Baroque era, Western Culture developed its main lineages: Germanic, Italian, French, Iberian and Anglo-Saxon.

Concomitant with this process and more markedly after the Second World War, another process has been taking place at a much slower rate, which is the gradual fusion of the civilizations that have come down to the present day into a general single civilization, which might be called a Planetary Civilization.

This second process began basically at the end of the eighteenth century, through the growing influence of important elements of Western Civilization on the other remaining civilizations: Islamic, Indian, Buddhist and Sino-Japanese. The initial penetration of Western Civilization was in the technological and military areas. Confronted with western technology and its military applications, the other civilizations realised if they were to survive the need to incorporate these crucial elements of western superiority. They tried to do so, preserving in the other cultural domains, particularly in the religious and institutional domains, their traditional characteristics. In the course of time, however, this intent proved to be impossible. Western technology brought with it the parallel need to adopt western science with all its ramifications, in the conception of the world and organisation of society. Fundamental conceptions for Islam, such as that of structural unity in the community of the umma of political, civil and religious dimensions, were not compatible with the modernisation of Islamic society. A country like Turkey took the recognition of this incompatibility to its ultimate consequences, converting Islam into a subjective religion and imposing completely western Turkish characteristics on society and the State. Japan moved towards complete Westernisation, except in respect of its ethical values. For the Indo and Buddhist civilizations the conception of samsara, related to the transmigration of souls, central to their religious-philosophical convictions, has proved to be incompatible with modern Biology and Psychology.

The gradual and growing Westernisation of non-western civilizations has not occurred in a linear and continuous way, giving rise in different regions to occasionally violent reactions, such as Islamic Fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the process in the long term follows an inexorable logic. The modernisation of the non-western world is synonymous with Westernisation. It so happens, however, that the Westernisation of the non-western world corresponds, albeit to a lesser extent, to an ample penetration in Western Civilisation of elements coming from other civilisations, as well as African culture. Buddhist practices and concepts have considerable influence on sectors of Western Society. Afro-Americans, to affirm their differences from the Anglo-Saxon World, have adhered on a large scale to Islam. Neo-Confucian ideas are disseminated throughout the world. Black influence is predominant in Western pop music. The illustrations are countless. What results from this process of reciprocal influences is the gradual formation of a Planetary Civilisation. A civilization whose scientific-technological bases come from Late Western Civilization but which tends to present marked differences according to the original trunks of this civilization coming from the non-western civilizations that survived until the twentieth century.

This hypothesis of the gradual formation of the Planetary Civilization differs fundamentally from the ideas put forward by<sup>(\*)</sup> Huntington in his "The Clash Civilizations", mentioned before. What Huntington visualises, however, is the strong tendency for the major conflicts that come about in the twenty-first century to pit the United States<sup>8</sup> and its possible allies head-on against China and, in terms of terrorism and guerrilla conflicts, the Islamic countries. It happens however, that Huntington's predictions, although concerning antagonisms that might well come about (even though in the case of China they will most likely incline towards a new Cold War, an actual war being improbable, in view of the new nuclear impasse that emerges) such antagonisms will not represent a civilizational clash but rather a dispute for world power, within the context of a Planetary Civilization in the process of formation.

As previously pointed out, the world order in force after the implosion of the Soviet Union, characterised by the unimultipolarity of the United States, does not look set for long duration. The unimultipolar regime will tend by the mid-twenty-first century to change into either an effective American unipolarity or, more likely, head towards a new multipolarity. Furthermore, the three-way stratification of world power, split into a ruling country level, a resistant country level and a conditioned or dependent country level is also hardly likely to last. The resistant countries will tend by the mid-twenty-first century to divide into those that achieve ruling country status, as will probably occur with China, and those that slip back into a dependency relationship. Among the dependent countries however, the underdeveloped countries with large populations that do not manage to move towards sustainable development in the relative short term, will tend to experience profound destructive crises, losing internal conditions of governability and constituting explosive centres of upheaval in the world.

It is difficult to forecast the ways in which these different probable processes will manifest themselves and interrelate during the first half of the twenty-first century, which will tend to be extremely tumultuous. The ruling countries will tend to prefer constraining solutions in their respective local areas, for the upheavals caused by the disruption of non-viable societies, by employing suitable coercive means. The globalisation process, which will continue to spread and intensify, contains, however, inevitable channels of intercommunication of everyone with everyone and everything with everything, in an operationally unified world. Under such conditions, islands of affluence, no matter how powerful they may be militarily and technologically, will be unable to survive surrounded by a sea of rebellious,

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(\*) See Note 1

<sup>8</sup> It is important to note in relation to Huntington, that he identifies at the present time the West with the United States, considering as anti-western any resistance to American hegemony. Such an identification obviously has no basis to it. The United States is only a transplanted segment of one of the branches, of Anglo-Saxon lineage, of Western Civilization, which also includes the Germanic, French, Italian and Iberian branches.

wretched populations.<sup>9</sup> The massive extermination of the impoverished masses might be adopted if it were feasible. What makes it impossible, however, is the inevitable contamination of the planet as a whole, which would result from using mass extermination means, such as nuclear or chemical-biological weapons, together with the fact that the higher cultures cannot preserve their own values if they violate them on a large scale in the process of exterminating the outcasts of the world en masse.

In the long term the world is faced with a single alternative: collective suicide or the institution, within the emerging Planetary Civilization, of a rational and equitable world order, establishing in the form of a modern Pax Universalis, the Pax Perpetua which Kant, in the conditions of the eighteenth century, understood as being the only possible way of regulating the world.

## VI ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, MERCOSUL

### a) Mercosul

What is the situation of the member countries of Mercosul and of the latter, as an integrating system in southern South America, vis-à-vis the situation and the international conditions previously mentioned?

Mercosul is both a common market project for its members and also a initiative for coordinating efforts designed to provide its members with greater external weight and better negotiating conditions internationally.

Mercosul represents a market of growing importance for its members. In the period between 1991 and 1998<sup>10</sup> aggregate intra-regional trade was 36.9%, 16.5%, 79.6% and 80.5% for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, respectively, of the trade of these countries with the rest of the world. In this situation, if the relative trade importance of Mercosul is less for Brazil than for the other countries, one should take into account that Brazilian exports to Mercosul are products of high aggregate value, in which manufactured goods represent 90% of the total. To get a comparative idea, Brazilian exports of manufactured goods to the European Union represent only 38.5% of the total. In addition, besides the current importance of Mercosul, intra-regional trade is growing at significantly higher rates than the trade of member countries with the rest of the world. From 1991 to 1997 intra-regional trade grew by 771%, against an increase in trade with the rest of the world of 142%.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The same rule applies in the context of extremely heterogeneous countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and others in the relationship between their affluent elites and their wretched masses.

<sup>10</sup> Data from the "*Boletim de Integração Latino-Americano*," No. 23, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 189, the data from 1998 corresponding, in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, only to the January-June period.

<sup>11</sup> See Note 10.

The two main aspects of Mercosul, as a regional market and as a protagonist on the international scene, require a brief clarification. As a regional market Mercosul is faced in the relative short term with the alternative, strongly supported by Brazil, of expanding throughout the rest of the South American continent, incorporating, if not all the other countries, at least countries like Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela. Opposed to this, there is another alternative, particularly supported by the United States, of instituting an American Free Trade Area - ALCA, extending, to the whole of Central and South America, the present North America Free Trade Area, which at the moment incorporates the United States, Canada and Mexico.

As the 1990s came to a close, the position of Mercosul, and also of Brazil, remains extremely ambiguous in relation to these two alternatives. On the one hand, the Latin American countries have signed declarations of intent with Washington, in respect of ALCA, to finalise the accord by 2005. On the other hand there is a prevailing view in Brazil and, generally speaking, in the other members of Mercosul, that a free trade treaty for the whole of the Americas will eliminate Mercosul's common external tariff, which in practice means winding up the union. It is widely recognised in the region that the huge economic disequilibrium existing between the United States and the Latin American countries, whose competitiveness, particularly in sectors of high aggregate value, is well below that of the US, would reduce the members of Mercosul and, in general, the other countries of the region, with ALCA, to what they were up to the 1930s, mere exporters of primary products, with an enormous decline in their per capita GDPs and employment levels. And so we find the Mercosul countries, contrary to the understandings reached concerning ALCA, making every effort to expand the union, directly or through an accord with the Andean Pact, so as to include other South American countries in Mercosul.

It is obvious that in the relatively short term this ambiguity will have to be resolved, either through the submissive acceptance by Mercosul of American tutelage, or through an open decision to reject ALCA or, at least, to postpone its inauguration until the competitive lag, which the members of Mercosul and the other countries of the region are facing at the moment in relation to the United States, has been significantly corrected.

The other important aspect of Mercosul is the extent to which it functions as an international protagonist, representing the interest of its members. The political importance of Mercosul is in fact considerably greater than its commercial importance. Certainly for Paraguay and Uruguay Mercosul represents a market which absorbs 80% or more of their exports. In the case of Argentina, although on a lesser scale, Mercosul receives about 40% of that country's exports. For Brazil itself, as already pointed out, Mercosul has an important role as a market for Brazilian manufactured goods. Nevertheless, the political importance of Mercosul is even more significant, as only under its auspices do the member countries enjoy any international bargaining power. A bargaining power which, in the short term, gives



them access to the resistance level in the international power stratification, opening up a space in the longer term for access to the higher level. In isolation, not even Brazil would manage to rise in the short and medium term to the resistance level. Potentially, in the long term, assuming that the country achieves a satisfactory level of national development by 2020, Brazil would be in a position to maintain itself at the resistance level, with the possibility of making subsequent progress. In the absence of Mercosul the country would inevitably be absorbed by ALCA by 2005, thus perpetuating its dependency status. More than just a regional common market, Mercosul is for its members their passport to history.

#### **b) Argentina**

Besides external obstacles to its consolidation and expansion, such as those arising from the ALCA project, Mercosul is facing serious internal difficulties, related to the considerable foot-dragging on the part of Argentina in its relationship with Mercosul, in general, and with Brazil, in particular. This is due mainly to three types of factors of a political, economic and psychic-cultural nature.

On the political plane, there are those in Argentina that realise Brazil, due to its large geographic, demographic and economic size, will inevitably be the leader of Mercosul, reducing Argentina to a secondary position. For others, this question has little relevance, as any attempt at exercising arbitrary power or even excessive influence by a member country of Mercosul, in this case Brazil, can be avoided through appropriate institutions. Many people, in addition, consider it much more advantageous for Argentina to belong to Mercosul, with the resulting benefits, even if Brazil exercises a controllable leadership over it, rather than remain isolated and totally dependent on the major powers. There are those, however, for whom the prospects of Brazilian leadership, seen as an exercise in sub-imperialism, is quite unacceptable, it seeming preferable to them, in such a case, to be subject to US leadership.

On the economic plane the problems facing Argentina are more objective and relevant, although compatible with satisfactory solutions. Such problems stem from the fact that Argentina, having opted in the previous military regime for a de-industrialisation policy, is currently faced with insufficient capacity and industrial competitiveness in relation to Brazil. Trade with Brazil tends, therefore, to be characterised by the low aggregate value of Argentinean exports and high aggregate value of Brazilian exports to that country. This problem is a real one and certainly not desirable. Nevertheless, various corrective measures can be taken in the short and medium terms and the problem can be completely corrected in the longer term. Among the corrective measures, particular importance should be given to setting up large bi-national corporations and to a high rate of Brazilian investment in Argentina, in addition to measures that will ensure a balance of trade between the two countries, which in fact in recent years has been showing an Argentinean surplus.

The third factor underlying Argentinean foot-dragging is of a psychic-cultural nature. This relates to the fact that, although not openly declared, there is a certain degree of racial prejudice on the part of a population like that of Argentina, predominately Caucasian, towards a highly mixed population like that of Brazil. This is accentuated even more by the awareness on the part of Argentineans that they have an average educational level considerably higher than Brazil's. In contrast with Brazil, many Argentineans feel psychic-culturally closer to the United States. Such people reason that if they are going to occupy a secondary position in Mercosul, why not choose a secondary position in a system led by the United States, which besides its high cultural level and predominantly Caucasian population, is the greatest power in the world?

It goes beyond the scope of this study to get into a more detailed discussion of the possible factors underlying Argentinean foot-dragging in its relationship with Brazil and Mercosul. Let it suffice to highlight just three important points. The first concerns the fact that any fears that Brazil might exercise, within Mercosul and/or in its bi-lateral relationship with Argentina, any form of sub-imperialism, as proponents of the Brazilian sub-imperialism thesis claim, are completely unfounded. This is due to the obvious fact that in a confrontation with American hegemony, any form of arbitrary power, on the part of Brazil, within Mercosul or South America, would allow the country which was the target of such arbitrary action to withdraw from the system and join ALCA. Brazilian sub-imperialism, would only be possible if Brazil, instead of aspiring to an autonomy level, became a regional agent of American imperialism.

According to some, the thesis that the supposedly inevitable secondary position of Argentina in Mercosul, in relation to Brazil, would render preferable the adhesion of Argentina to a system under the immediate leadership of the United States, does not take into account the terms on which the participation of a country like Argentina are made, in one case or the other. In fact, within Mercosul, the position of Argentina, far from being secondary, despite the size of Brazil, is crucial, because the very existence of Mercosul as a level of international negotiation depends on it. Without Argentina Mercosul will become blurred with the Brazilian position, and would become irrelevant. In Mercosul, Argentina is a fundamental participant, whose relationship with Brazil, despite its greater size, is on the same level. A link between Argentina, without Mercosul and the United States would turn it into one of the countless dependent countries, less important than the Ukraine, which has nuclear arms, and Egypt, which is a key country in the Arab world.

A third point to consider concerns the economic advantages that Argentina reaps from its participation in Mercosul, in contrast with the disadvantages that would follow upon its withdrawal. First and foremost, as mentioned before, Mercosul absorbs about 40% of Argentinean exports, which in itself is extremely important. Furthermore, precisely because Argentina is a crucial participant in Mercosul, it enjoys enormous bargaining power and, therefore, is in a position to ensure balanced

trade relations, besides also enjoying particularly favourable conditions for expanding its industrial capacity and increasing its competitiveness. In contrast with this situation, withdrawal from Mercosul would not bring about any expansion in Argentina's industrial capacity or any increase in its competitiveness. Quite the contrary, in fact. Defenceless, exposed to the tough vicissitudes of the international market, it would be forced as a means of surviving to resort to expanding its traditional agricultural sector, missing the opportunity, which Mercosul offers, to re-industrialise.

### **c) Brazil**

On account of its continental size Brazil is inevitably the central player in Mercosul. This does not mean, as mentioned before, it is in a position to exert predominantly unilateral leadership. On the contrary, the fact that Mercosul lies in the region that is subject to the most uninhibited American hegemony, and is currently and in the course of the early years of the twenty-first century facing the serious challenge of ALCA, means that Brazilian leadership can only be exercised with the consensus of the other member countries. This signifies leadership which stems not from coercive means but the capacity to put forward measures of general interest and contribute towards a rational and equitable administration of the system.

It is important to stress the fact that at the moment the position of member-countries within Mercosul - a situation which will tend to prevail in the hypothesis of other South American countries being incorporated into the system - is of a different nature according to whether one is looking at Brazil or the other member countries. For Brazil, which constitutes the major market to which the other countries of the region are seeking access - while the other national markets are relatively small in size for Brazil - the main importance of Mercosul is political in character. Mercosul is a predominantly economic arrangement for the other members, without detracting from its political importance. For Brazil, without detracting from its economic importance, Mercosul is a predominantly political system. More than being just a market for its exports - notwithstanding the importance of this - Brazil is seeking, through Mercosul, conditions which will enable it to preserve its national autonomy, within the international power stratification, participating at the resistant country level.

This particular position of Brazil, obliges it to satisfy various requirements in order to consolidate and expand Mercosul. Such requirements are of two distinct types concerning, on the one hand, the internal conditions on which the consistency of Mercosul depends and, on the other, the conditions on which Brazil itself depends in order to take advantage of the benefits that Mercosul can provide.

The internal consistency of Mercosul, in relation to Brazil, depends on how far the other participants find satisfactory stimuli to remain coherently within the system and the significant disadvantages of withdrawing from it. Coercive leadership, as a hegemonic power might exercise, depends on the penalties that it can inflict on those

that do not follow it. The leadership that a non-hegemonic power like Brazil can exercise, lacking any coercive means, depends on the advantages that it offers to those that follow it and the disadvantages that result from not doing so.

Within these conditions Brazil has to be clear about what is involved first and foremost in the task, together with the corresponding costs, of reassuring the other participants that their respective membership of Mercosul is advantageous to them and any withdrawal, consequently, disadvantageous. This task, with its respective costs, involves in general the adoption by Brazil of compensatory measures for the greater average competitiveness of its industry, vis à vis that of the other members. It should be mentioned that particularly in the short and medium term, a compensatory regime does not need to be a particularised one and can hardly be so. What matters most is to facilitate the access of the other participants to the large Brazilian market and give them the conditions to achieve balance of trade equilibrium.

The condition, to which Brazil is subject to, of having the major responsibility in the task of reassuring the other members that their membership of Mercosul is an advantageous one, may prove to be excessively onerous. Unlike the impression that some have that Brazil tends to be the major beneficiary of Mercosul, the burden of sustaining the general optimisation of the system may subject it to excessive demands. To correct this situation Brazil needs to set up an alternative system for protecting its international interests, so that in the extreme hypothesis that Mercosul splits up, the country has other means for preserving its autonomy on the international scene.

The same type of caution also applies to the other participants, particularly Argentina, whose greater size would make it, on its own very vulnerable in the event of Mercosul breaking up. The preceding considerations, however, show that the risks of Mercosul disintegrating through internal reasons would only tend to occur if Brazil were subject to groundless demands, in which case it would be up to the other countries to avoid this risk.

Once again the scope of the present study does not allow a more detailed elaboration of how a country like Brazil can set up an alternative system for its international protection. One might just mention two of the most important requirements to this end: (1) a system of close economic-technological cooperation with the other continental countries in the world - China, India and Russia and (2) the negotiation of a wide-ranging cooperation accord with the European Union. It should be added that such initiatives can and should be adopted concomitantly with the consolidation and expansion of Mercosul.

Besides working towards the consolidation of Mercosul and, in fact, as a condition for doing so efficiently, Brazil needs to carry out a profound institutional reform that significantly raises its level of governability, at the moment extremely low, and enable it to carry out rapidly a major comprehensive national development program.

Mercosul provides its members with the conditions internally to conclude their respective development programs and raise their competitiveness. In terms of the international market and system, it provides them with protection for sufficient time to acquire international competitiveness and, in respect of the international power stratification regime, access to the resistance level, giving them a satisfactory margin of national autonomy. For both these effects to come about, the members of Mercosul should adopt, at the national level, the corresponding measures and proceed actively to incorporating other South American countries into the system.

## VII CONCLUSIONS

Events in the world are developing through three main processes, at different levels of historical-social depth and speed: 1) the economic-social process, within the ambit of the various countries and their reciprocal inter-relations; 2) the process of forming a new world order, with its different power tiers and 3) the civilizational process, tending towards the gradual formation of the Planetary Civilization.

These processes are taking place, from the first to the last, at levels of growing historical-social depth and declining speed. The events related to the economic-social configuration of societies affect their daily existence and are being processed rapidly. The twenty-first century inherited from the previous one societies marked by abyssal differences between each other, in terms of income, education and qualifications. A small number of affluent countries in Europe, North America and Japan have a per-capita income of around US\$ 25,000 - in comparison with the rest of the world population which has an average per capita income level of less than US\$ 3,000 - with a large number of poverty-stricken countries with per-capita incomes below US\$ 500. Even greater gaps, however, separate, within the underdeveloped countries themselves, a minority with living standards approaching those of the European countries from a huge mass of excluded subjects.

Various circumstances and factors in an increasingly globalised world, have made this situation untenable, both on the international plane and internally in the countries themselves with excessive differences in income and education levels. The social situation of the world, internationally and at the domestic-level of extremely heterogeneous countries, particularly those with large populations, is becoming explosive and will reach intolerable levels in the comparatively short term.

The affluent countries and, within the underdeveloped ones, their affluent minorities, are inclined to consider the use of coercive means to contain the excluded masses. As was previously mentioned, however, it is not viable, both ethically and operationally to go ahead with what in the final analysis would mean the extermination of the excluded masses. The world, therefore, at both the international and national level, must head towards a much less inequitable economic-social regime, which means a whole set of policies and costs, but also

means, given the high degree of social exacerbation already reached, the need for short-term compensatory measures, which will inevitably require a great effort.

In the international system events are heading, on one side, towards the formation by the mid-21st century of a more stable world order, which will replace the present unstable unimultipolarity regime. On the other, at a faster rate, the relative positions of countries are changing in the three tiers of world power stratification previously mentioned. For the member-countries of Mercosul the fundamental question concerns the extent to which they are able to reach resistance level and stabilise themselves in it, to then possibly raise themselves to the higher level at some future date.

As has been previously discussed, the destiny of the countries in question depends on consolidating and expanding Mercosul and at the same time their own respective national development. Positive results will enable these countries to stabilise themselves at the resistance level, which in turn favours their subsequent development.

In the short-term horizon up to 2005, the significance of Mercosul, besides its international consolidation and expansion to other South American countries, will depend on whether it can defend itself from being absorbed by the American Free Trade Area. Overcoming this important challenge, the significance of Mercosul in the longer term will depend on the type of world order which comes about by the mid-21st century. If a multipolar regime prevails, a greater space for national development will open up for member-countries of Mercosul. Depending on how significant this development is, Mercosul may gain access to the ruling country level. A multipolar world will tend to be administered for a long time by a formal or informal management committee, comprising, although with unequal weight, the major world systems. Countries such as the United States, China, possibly India and Russia, the European Union, an equivalent grouping of Islamic countries and possibly Mercosul, are the likely candidates to sit on this management committee.

In the present stage of humanity's cultural and technological development, in a growing world rapidly being unified by the globalisation process, countries are faced, both individually and collectively, with the non-viability of maintaining intolerable economic and social differences, whether between each other, or within each country itself. The world is equally faced with the need to institute a stable world order, which to be so, will of necessity have to be rational and reasonably equitable. The alternative to a rational, reasonably equitable and egalitarian ordering of the international system and the countries that integrate it, for a large number of countries, is the explosion of uncontrollable social conflicts and, for humanity in general, collective suicide which will result from a world holocaust of global proportions.

Mercosul, faced with the broad historical-social process outlined above, is a collective union of very small proportions and modest weight. Mercosul, however, is

not irrelevant. It is not irrelevant, right now, for its members and the South American countries that might join it, because the possibility of having any historical destiny and escaping the alternatives of becoming mere segments of the international market depend absolutely on Mercosul.

Even in international terms, however, Mercosul is not irrelevant. In a stage of history in which a new world order is in the process of formation, the international posture of a representative system, with the exception of Mexico, of the main countries in Latin America, constituting an important lineage of western culture, can exert an important catalysing effect in favouring the emergence of a multipolar world, within a rational and reasonably equitable world order, and contribute so that the entry of the United States and the European Union into this new system occurs consensually and without jeopardising their legitimate interests.

It should be added, moreover, that in the alternate hypothesis of the United States consolidating its world hegemony, constituting a stable unipolar regime, Mercosul will continue to be a precious instrument in securing a more favourable positioning for its member-countries in this new world order. A dominant Pax Americana, in the conditions of the 21st century as in its time did Pax Romana, will have to manage the world in a rational and reasonably equitable way in order to maximise the self-sustainability of this world, minimising the need and the cost of corrective interventions on the part of the hegemonic power. A more efficiently consolidated and expanded Mercosul will provide the best economic-social conditions within the system for its members and the best economic-political conditions for its relationship with the hegemonic power.

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*The International System in the First Decade of the XXI Century*

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**New Regionalism and World Governance**

– Summary –

**Mario Telò**

Research Director, IEE, Free University, Brussels

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## NEW REGIONALISM AND WORLD GOVERNANCE

Mario Telò, Research Director, IEE, Free University, Brussels

1. This paper is focused on new ways of modern progressive governance at international level. Values and goals are not the topic of this paper, while the main question is how to implement these values at national, regional and international level? Which share of labour and which interaction between the different ways of informal governance and between various levels of institutional government?

2. Two main dangers could undermine the project of progressive and modern governance: on the one hand, centralised global governance can provoke negative reactions, revolts of peripheries, populist uprising, increasing fragmentation and hard oppositions against economic / political centralisation and the myth of an homogeneous culture dominated by the West. On the other hand, excessive decentralisation of governance could provoke either revival of resilient nationalism easier or dissemination of sub-national ethnic and identity movements, supporting values relativism and legal fragmentation. However, this paper draws the attention on the emergence of a third level between the global and the national ones, namely the regional supranational dimension of governance: which contribution can it provide to modern progressive governance?

3. New regionalism is already a matter of facts so as globalisation; however though linked to economic, social and cultural globalisation new regionalism is currently becoming more than a mere regional dimension.

New regionalism is not a transient phenomenon: the increasing number of regional associations (business, social, political, etc.), networks and partnerships and their relevancy for the international governance can only be explained through both internal and systemic factors. On the one hand, the need of developed and developing countries to shape gradually the process of opening their economies and societies to globalisation; the will of States to contrast the decline of their previous sovereignty through enhanced co-operation with neighbour countries; the will to set trade controversies by regional bodies (for example an ad hoc court of Mercosur did set recently the first internal trade conflict); finally, the functional spill over pushing initial sector-based co-operation and regional fora among states to deepen their relationship beyond the first steps and to develop a broader scope of co-operation. On the other hand, new regionalism is somewhere a reaction towards the negative aspects of globalisation: uncertainties, instability, Darwinian competition marginalising the weaknesses and poorer; somehow, it expresses defensive approaches to globalisation.

4 Why do we emphasise the new caricature of regionalism? Because it is more politically relevant than the regional experiences occurred during the first 30-40 years of liberal multilateralism after WW2. It has been accelerated by political causes as the end of post-war hegemonies and the break down of communism and cold war. It is political also in its manifestations and features, linking economy and politics, trade and security issues. Finally it is political as its consequences are concerned, changing the ways that international relations are shaped in the globalised world. An example: the Auswaertiges Amt is about to

reorganise German external relations according to regional entities, beyond former national or continental concepts. In this framework, Latin America is shaped in five regions: Mercosur as a full actor and a partner of international and bi-regional relations; Andean Community as an actor in the making and an object of progressive policies (anti-drugs, democratisation and so on); Mexico's hinge role, between NAFTA and Latin-American countries; other central American countries and Caribbean as developing countries. EU and other Nation-States are going in the same direction.

5. However, in spite of his potentialities, new regionalism is a very diversified phenomenon, rich in ambiguities in terms of its implications for modern progressive governance. The uncertainties and the asymmetries of the globalisation process could transform trading blocs in benevolent and also malevolent actors of economic wars. That's why a broad scientific discussion is open regarding both its internal and international implications central issue for progressive governance is: how to provide a better orientation of new regionalism, a global, bilateral and multilateral framework of fair partnerships supporting his potential contribution to progressive world government? We would like to focus on the following points at stake:

As the international current and potential implications: there is a deficit as the world governance is concerned, a gap between demand and supply of good governance. New regionalism provides a reduction of the number of players, regional balances between developed and developing member states. How can a strengthened regionalism within an international co-operation network, provide an easier management of trade conflicts, reduce the digital divide, allow a broader access to the advantages of globalisation and a more effective reduction of poverty? Furthermore, could regionalization of some security challenges increase the acceptance of conflict prevention and peace making? As the internal implications: regionalism provides the acceptance of liberal and democratic global rules by former protectionist States easier, while offering a progressive framework to sub-national identity movements when weak States are no longer able to face secessionist bias. Regionalism stabilises the States where the conduct of public authorities undermines rule of law and socio-economic development. Regional co-operation makes national democratic governance easier, because of diminishing asymmetries and providing stabilisation. Could new regionalism make global regulation more legitimised and rooted in peoples demands while local regulation more effective and fit to cope with global challenges? New regionalism already supports WTO as a framework towards domestic reforms and adjustments to global market. The new economy expansion on the long run can be better provided by regional organisations. Monitoring of technological and societal innovation by benchmarking, watch dog mechanisms, simultaneous adjustment of neighbour countries to global market, implementation of hard domestic reforms, codes of behaviour, share of responsibilities between private and public sectors according to regional cultures. Only under the over mentioned conditions, could new regionalism become the key element for the new multilateralism of XXI century to succeed. Summing up: New regionalism is a potential third option, a third way to get an international social pact, enhancing the positive side of both global and local-national regulation.

6. USA and EU are both supporting regionalization. However, they are strengthening two kind of opposite regionalism. EU is disseminating and strengthening regional groupings in Africa, ACP countries, Latin America and Asia according to the pattern of deep integration,

while US is supporting the creation of huge intercontinental and interregional liberalisation areas (APEC, Free trade area of the Americas, etc.). A challenging issue is how progressive governance could improve the synergies between these two visions, reduce possible conflicts between such two global strategies and direct them towards the common goal of world governance and the concrete objectives set in the Berlin statement.

7. New regionalism can become a new way to shape the reform of both economic and political international organisations by increasing their legitimacy and efficiency. To make of regional groupings a support of reformed international organisations can be a new way to an international social pact; this goal can be achieved only through the intermediate steps of enhanced political dialogue, economic and social partnership, strengthened regional institutions.

8. The idea of community and solidarity needs to be elaborated at national, global but also at regional dimension. Our concrete proposal: to create a new international scientific network including many specialists of new regionalism, among them some Centres of excellence J.Monnet (interdisciplinary: economics, politics and law), Forum Euro-Latino-Americano (Lisboa, São Paulo, Buenos Aires); Japanese political science association; American political science association; Institute of social studies, New Delhi. Concretely, we propose to write a report, within few months, focused on the analysis of new regionalism as possible solution-provider as the practical goals described by the Berlin statement; detailed formulation according to continental and subcontinental differences; and analyse new regionalism as a potential pillar of a new architecture of world progressive governance and government at the time of the new economy.



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***Democracy and Security: the Missing Link?***

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**Prosperity, Security, Democracy  
in the EU Perceptions towards the Mediterranean**

– Summary –  
Introductory remarks

**Roberto Aliboni**  
Director of Studies, IAI, Rome

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## **PROSPERITY, SECURITY, DEMOCRACY IN THE EU PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN**

Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

1. Strongly influenced by its post-Second World War experience, EU security thinking lies pre-eminently on the need to develop democracy and functional international co-operation – in particular economic integration – so as to reach conditions of democratic peace in inter-state relations, i.e. a peace based on the democratic and co-operative character of states.

With the end of the Cold War, the EU is trying to establish its security internationally by expanding its model and promoting its values, in particular in its closest regions. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is one such policy.

The early agenda suggested by the EMP's Barcelona Declaration starts from the necessity to introduce democracy and pluralism as well as strengthen prosperity, good governance and the rule of law, with a view to achieve, particularly among Southern states, relations based on peaceful resolution of disputes and conflict and the respect of the fundamental principles of international law. In other words, the EU is looking for prosperous, secure, and democratic neighbours with a view to strengthen its own security.

In this model, the broad relations between security, prosperity and democracy are those deserving to be explored.

2. Is prosperity conducive to security in Mediterranean relations? The EU response is that prosperity increases security globally (i.e. for all the Euro-Mediterranean actors), if it brings about political domestic changes conducive, in turn, to inter-state relations based on democratic peace.

Domestic political change is essentially linked to the emergence and empowerment of a politically self-reliant middle class. To foster the emergence of such middle class – be it entirely rooted in the private sector or even in state-owned sectors of the economy, be it secular or religious – the EMP should emphasise structural changes in economic institutions and laws, privatisation, more internal competition and overall liberalisation.

In sum, an increase in prosperity will be as much convincingly conducive to democracy (and democratic peace) as much it will be based on definite and strong domestic economic liberalisation.

3. A successful emerging bourgeoisie would somehow bring about the rule of law, accountability and good governance in a more articulated and pluralist society. This would lay by itself the foundations of a political democracy. Whether this domestic democracy would bring about inter-state conditions of democratic peace, would depend on the ideological and political context, however.

Liberals are very few in the ranks of present Arab middle classes. Nationalism, in secular or religious clothes, is by far the predominating ideology. The political discourse of the emerging middle classes may easily aim at using prosperity to assert ideological and political interests in the region or internationally rather than consolidating an Arab role in a globalising and interdependent international economy.

There are “open questions” in the region – very similar to the “national questions” that used to characterise the two world wars European environment – to a large extent insensitive to changes in prosperity and domestic democracy. As a consequence, while the link established by the EU model between prosperity, domestic stability and democracy may well emerge, the link between the latter and international security may result less achievable.

4. This conclusion introduces some more comments on the link between prosperity and inter-state security.

In 1993, the European Commission was arguing that “The Community's own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration”. This comparison neglects the fact that Europe started economic integration after “national questions” had been – by conviction or force – regulated by two world wars.

The transposition of the European model to the MENA area – the Middle East, in particular – can hardly take place until MENA “national questions”, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, comes to an accepted solution. Inter-state economic integration and other functionalist models look like a *posterius* rather than a *prius* with respect to existing political conditions in the region. This is not to say that inter-state economic integration and co-operation has to be excluded. Results will be very limited, unstable and contradictory, however, and unable to set in motion the virtuous Europe-like circle of prosperity, democracy and security. These results may bring about some prosperity without democratic peace, or some domestic democracy without inter-state security.

5. If the EU model must be of use, Europe-like institutions and supranational empowerment should be established in the MENA as well. These institutions, however, must primarily emerge in the MENA region – e.g. under the security and co-operative regimes envisaged by the Arms Control and Regional Security-ACRS Working Group in the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process or under the umbrella of regional organisations like the Arab Maghreb Union. They cannot be surrogated by EMP's institutions. For sure, co-operation in the EMP can help Southern institutions to emerge, but it would be unable to generate significant results unless Southern indigenous institutions do come into existence.

6. A final argument concerns the asymmetrical effects of economic interdependence and inter-state integration.


The liberal model put forward by the EU in the EMP suggests a quick liberalisation and globalisation of the economies concerned, with a view to

stimulate a fast and substantial inroad of private investment. This is not the place to discuss the effects of globalisation and its inherent ultra-liberist approach. As a matter of fact, the state of economic weakness and fragmentation in the MENA areas may require graduality, differentiation and a case-by-case approach.

A successful economic co-operation towards the South of the Mediterranean Sea remains the keystone to any chance that a virtuous circle between prosperity, democracy and security is set in motion. If economic co-operation failed, not only any virtuous circle wouldn't start, but the Southern state of economic insecurity - in terms of vulnerability, political turmoil, propensity to external conflict, etc. - would increase and make EU security even more distant than it may appear today.



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**Civil-Military Relations**

– Introductory remarks –  
Speaking points

**Claire Spencer**  
Kings College, London

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## SPEAKING POINTS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Claire Spencer, Kings College, London

- 1) Since the mid-1990s, civil-military relations (CIMIC) has been linked increasingly by national governments, the EU, OECD and other international organisations to the question of security sector reform. In the words of Malcolm Chalmers<sup>1</sup>, 'the security sector is taken to mean all those organisations which have authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight'.

The question of reforming the civil-military relationship has arisen in the context of making aid and foreign assistance more effective, particularly in the post-conflict situations facing a number of African states previously riven with violence (Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, for example). Without security, it has been recognised, few of the development objectives of the EU, OECD or individual donor states will produce sustainable results. The role of the military in reforming and safeguarding peace has also been acknowledged to be central to avoiding a resurgence of the kind of violence so destructive to long-term development.

- 2) While African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)s have been the focus for much of this activity, the Mediterranean region has almost entirely escaped attention as regards reforming civil-military relations. In the ACP context, many of the programmes proposed (such as the training and education of militaries and the transfer of 'best practices' in civilian control of the military) have been based on the request of ACP governments, or at least their consent. In this respect, NATO and the EU's relations with the Mediterranean fall between two stools:

(a) most of their Mediterranean partners are not being prepared for either EU or NATO membership, where expectations of military reform and democratic standards are pre-conditions for adhesion to these organisations. The exceptions are Malta and Cyprus and Turkey, which although a highly militarised society is already a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership.

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<sup>1</sup> Malcolm Chalmers *Security sector reform in developing countries: an EU perspective* (Saferworld/University of Bradford, Joint report published by Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network, January 2000, p. 3

(b) the Mediterranean partners are for the most part medium sized economies preparing themselves for the Free trade Zone proposed under the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative. As such, they escape the kind of attention given to poorer nations under development assistance programmes, such as the UK's Department for International Development (DfID), which launched a major security sector reform programme in March 1999.

- 3) Security issues are addressed under the EMP, but largely in their political dimension as Martin Ortega points out<sup>2</sup>. Military contacts have largely been left to the WEU and NATO dialogues with individual partners in the Mediterranean, not least because at the time of the launch of the EMP in 1995, the EU had no defined military, as opposed to loosely defined, security competencies.

The question of civilian control of the military, in turn, is implicit to the provisions of the EMP relating to governance and the rule of law, but not explicitly spelt out. With the EU's changing character in respect of defence and military planning, it is perhaps worth considering how the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) might work to bridge the gap which continues to exist in this area.

- 4) In other respects, the EMP does address issues of conventional and non-conventional arms control, the peaceful settlement of conflicts and limiting the development of 'military capacity beyond ...legitimate defence requirements'<sup>3</sup>. However, in the follow-up to the political and security discussions of the EMP, conducted at the level of all 27 members, the internal (i.e. national) dimensions of civil-military relations have not been directly addressed.

Moreover, the 'Charter for Peace and Stability' which might have served as a basis on which to consider progress in this area, failed to be adopted at the 4<sup>th</sup> Inter-Ministerial Euro-Mediterranean meeting held in Marseilles in November 2000. The failed negotiations and violence in the Middle East of recent months has dangerously overshadowed and stalled any smaller scale, sub-regional activities in this area, thus compounding an already existing gap in the EMP.

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Ortega 'Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence' in *The International Spectator* Vol XXXV, No. 1, January-March 2000, p.115

<sup>3</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 'Political & Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability' in *Barcelona Declaration*, Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995, p.3

It remains to be seen whether (a) the EU's Common Mediterranean Strategy (EU-15 only) of June 2000 and (b) the European Commission's submission on 'reinvigorating' the Barcelona process of September 2000 will serve to re-assess the lack of priority attached by the EU to civil-military relations in the Mediterranean region.

5) The prospects are not resoundingly good. Despite the EU's evolving capabilities in the defence and military spheres, there are three factors at play:


(a) the preference of the EU in the period 1995-2000 to promote a somewhat static form of stability, rather than long-term, dynamic, and popularly accountable security networks in the region. The short-term consequences of provoking change in a region so close to Europe's southern borders are feared, but the longer term consequences of reacting to failed democratisation may be worse;

(b) there is a lack of European leadership in championing the progressive steps towards more accountable militaries in the Mediterranean – for fear of resource implications, overstretch and the unforeseeable consequences of a transition period;

(c) it is still accepted that NATO – as the defence alliance *par excellence* of Europe and North America – is assuming, and should assume, responsibility for military relations in the region, primarily through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (launched in early 1995, prior to the EMP, but including fewer partners than the EMP).

However, until a clear division of labour and pattern of relations is established between the EU and NATO in respect of military and politico-military engagements in the Mediterranean, the shadow of the United States, and its own regional priorities, hang heavily over initiatives undertaken by the EU.

This is in addition to divisions within EU-member states themselves over how to proceed in relation to individual Mediterranean partners, with whom EU states have different levels of bilateral commitments and national interests, not necessarily entirely consonant with those articulated by the EU as a whole.





6

XVIII Conferência Internacional de Lisboa  
**O Multilateralismo no Século XXI**

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian , 14 - 15 de Dezembro de 2000

*Direitos humanos e democracia na política internacional*

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**Valores na política internacional**

**Celso Lafer**

Professor, Universidade de São Paulo

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## VALORES NA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL

Celso Lafer, professor, Universidade de São Paulo

No estudo das relações internacionais, é válido distinguir três campos, para efeitos de análise: o estratégico-militar, o das relações econômicas e o dos valores.

O campo estratégico-militar diz respeito ao problema da paz e da guerra. Tem usualmente como perspectiva organizadora a situação-limite da sobrevivência de um estado como unidade independente, num sistema internacional assinalado pela distribuição assimétrica do poder e concebido como próximo de um estado de natureza hobbesiano. Por isso mesmo os analistas que privilegiam o campo estratégico-militar tendem a qualificar os demais protagonistas da vida internacional basicamente como aliados, protetores ou inimigos.

O campo das relações econômicas articula o que um país representa ou pode representar para outro como mercado em seu sentido mais amplo. Daí a ênfase que se atribui neste campo à noção de interesse econômico e à idéia de que o “*doux commerce*”, de que falava Montesquieu, pode amainar o ímpeto dos preconceitos e promover uma interdependência positiva entre as nações. Nesta moldura conceitual existe uma afinidade entre o campo econômico e uma leitura grociana da vida mundial. Esta leitura identifica na sociedade internacional um ingrediente positivo da sociabilidade que permite lidar, através do Direito e das organizações internacionais, com o conflito e a cooperação e desta maneira reduzir o ímpeto da pura “política de poder”.

Finalmente cabe mencionar o campo dos valores que alude às afinidades e discrepâncias quanto à forma de conceber a vida em sociedade. Quanto mais contrapostos forem na vida mundial os valores - e é o que ocorria, por exemplo, durante a vigência da guerra-fria com a prevalência de polaridades definidas Leste/Oeste; Norte/Sul - mais heterogêneo será um dado sistema internacional e maior o número de conflitos de concepção. Quanto maior forem os valores compartilhados - por exemplo, os da democracia e dos direitos humanos - mais homogêneo será um dado sistema internacional - como diria Raymond Aron - e mais os conflitos adquirem a natureza de conflitos de interesse. Estes são, em princípio, mais solucionáveis por meios pacíficos, mesmo porque no exemplo da homogeneidade mencionada existe uma afinidade entre a prática de democracia no plano interno e uma visão no plano externo de que a diplomacia, como um processo contínuo de diálogo e negociação baseado na persuasão, no compromisso e na pressão, pode promover adequadamente os interesses de um país.

O poder no campo estratégico-militar é, por excelência, o poder político que se vale do uso potencial (por exemplo, o equilíbrio do terror da dissuasão nuclear), ou real da força para obter comportamentos e efeitos desejados. Como são os estados que em princípio detêm o monopólio de uso legal da força, são eles os



grandes protagonistas neste campo, na lógica de um sistema inter-estatal como concebido pela Paz de Westfalia. É por esta razão que, numa concepção clássica das relações internacionais, como também lembra Raymond Aron, são o soldado e o diplomata, na qualidade de expressões de soberania estatal, os agentes das relações internacionais.

No campo das relações econômicas o poder está lastreado na riqueza e no manejo e posse do uso de bens e serviços. Como não existe, sobretudo nesta era de globalização, um monopólio legal do poder econômico, este está distribuído em uma multiplicidade de atores nacionais, transnacionais, governamentais e não governamentais e opera através de um sistema de redes, que exprime a diluição entre o “interno” e o “externo”, dada pela atual porosidade das fronteiras. É por este motivo que são muito diversificados os atores presentes no campo das relações econômicas que é, por excelência, um campo aberto a uma diplomacia global, que vai muito além da ação do diplomata e do soldado.

No campo dos valores o poder deriva do saber e é exercido através da palavra, em especial através dos símbolos, dos signos, que exprimem crenças e idéias. Este poder, que Bobbio qualifica de ideológico, tem como função promover o consenso ou o dissenso. Esta função é exercida no âmbito da sociedade civil onde, através da organização da opinião pública nacional e internacional, se articulam e se formam os processo de legitimação ou da deslegitimação da ação política. A criação e a divulgação do saber nas sociedades contemporâneas é descentralizada, tem escopo planetário, e resulta da ação *lato sensu* dos intelectuais. Estes, por sua vez, para continuar com Bobbio, podem exercer dois papéis, ambos necessários para o exercício do poder político e econômico nas sociedades contemporâneas: o de prover princípios diretivos, ou seja valores que explicitam uma concepção do mundo e da sociedade e o de fornecer conhecimentos-meios, ou seja saber técnico necessário para solucionar e encaminhar os problemas da agenda política. É evidente que a relação entre meios e fins não tem a natureza de uma dicotomia excludente e tem a característica de uma relação de mútua complementaridade, pois o saber técnico é indispensável para converter valores em políticas públicas.

Existem fluxos e intercâmbios entre o campo estratégico-militar, o das relações econômicas e o dos valores cuja dinâmica é dada pelas variáveis regras do funcionamento do sistema internacional e pelas especificidades das conjunturas. É esta dinâmica e são estas especificidades conjunturais que estabelecem as taxas de conversão entre o poder ideológico, o político e o econômico. Assim, para recorrer a Hélio Jaguaribe, é com base no potencial da maior ou menor flutuação da taxa de conversão do poder ideológico em moeda da influência, com curso no campo estratégico-militar e no das relações econômicas, que se pode organizar conceitualmente a discussão sobre valores na política internacional.

## - II -

Começaria esta discussão conceitual apontando que precisamente porque o poder ideológico é conversível, ainda que a taxas flutuantes, na moeda de influência, idéias e valores, sentimentos e percepções influenciam as decisões dos protagonistas do sistema internacional. Com isto estou apontando que a política externa não é comandada apenas pelas relações de força e por interesses militares ou econômicos e que as idéias e os valores não são, como dizia Sir Lewis Namier, “*a mere libretto often of very inferior quality*”, na encenação da ópera do poder político e econômico.

Os valores e as idéias têm um papel na política internacional, em primeiro em virtude de razões epistemológicas, em função da dicotomia política-realidade/política-conhecimento. A realidade da vida internacional existe como um fato. Entretanto o sujeito cognoscente que conhece este fato contribui para a sua constituição como objeto cognoscível. Contribui no plano dos valores porque o tomar conhecimento perante um complexo de circunstâncias de fato sempre tem um componente estimativo, um potencial axiológico, que leva a distintas tomadas de posição. Estas, evidentemente, não são o fruto de um solipsismo subjetivo. Resultam da intersubjetividade, do *inter homines esse*, do estar no mundo que caracteriza a condição humana na lição de Hannah Arendt. No plano das idéias, o sujeito cognoscente contribui para a constituição do objeto cognoscível, porque são as categorias e os paradigmas do conhecimento que organizam a percepção da realidade. Valores e idéias são, portanto, parte do processo de elaboração dos mapas de conhecimento que nos norteiam nos caminhos do mundo, - caminhos que cabe à política externa de cada país trilhar para traduzir necessidades internas em possibilidades externas. É para isto que apontam Judith Goldstein e Robert Keohane no seu livro sobre a relação entre a política externa e as idéias, crenças e instituições, na dinâmica da mudança política.

A estas observações de ordem mais geral cabe acrescentar a reflexão de Ortega y Gasset. Diz Ortega que a perspectiva é um dos componentes da realidade. Ela não a deforma, mas a organiza. Esta avaliação epistemológica é extremamente apropriada para a análise da política externa, que é naturalmente a expressão do ponto de vista de um país e da sua sociedade sobre o mundo e o seu funcionamento. Daí a razão de ser da diferenciação de interesses estratégicos, políticos e econômicos e de visões que dão a perspectiva organizadora e a latitude de inserção de um país no sistema internacional e explicam, ao mesmo tempo, o pluralismo do mundo. Nesta linha de raciocínio e a propósito da relação entre valores e política externa, cabe apontar que existem países que são *like-minded* na sua visão do mundo. Das afinidades provenientes, por exemplo, do código da língua e da cultura, de concepções comuns sobre a convivência democrática e a tutela dos direitos humanos, surgem convergências na ação diplomática que têm o lastro de um nós axiológico, relevante na condução da política externa, seja na esfera bilateral seja na multilateral. Para dar uma ilustração, é o que ocorre na Comissão dos Direitos Humanos da ONU.

No plano do funcionamento do próprio sistema internacional, os valores e as idéias como expressão do poder ideológico que tem como função, segundo foi dito, promover o consenso ou o dissenso, são um ingrediente chave na construção ou contestação da legitimidade das ações da política externa. A legitimidade é, portanto, para adiantar uma conclusão delimitadora do espectro de ações de política externa. Com efeito a *voluntas* decisória de um poder político e econômico não é incondicionada. É condicionada pela *ratio* de um espectro de coeficiente de estimativas, organizado por uma tábua de valores. Como aponta Miguel Reale, esta tábua de valores é dada por “sinais de prevalência de sentido” resultantes da filtragem e seletividade que o tempo cultural opera sobre o tempo histórico. São justamente esta filtragem e seletividade que ao estipularem as taxas de conversão e o curso do poder ideológico, configuram o campo dos valores, como o campo da legitimidade. Este, portanto, estabelece com distintas taxas de conversão, dependendo das circunstâncias, a *ratio* balizadora do espectro de possíveis ações de política externa, sobre a qual incide a *voluntas* decisória do poder político e econômico.

Explico mais circunstanciadamente estas observações valendo-me de uma concepção objetivista da legitimidade, tal como articulada por José Guilherme Merquior. Esta concepção, dá ênfase ao sociocultural do valor, em contraste com a subjetivista que está ancorada numa visão fiduciária de legitimidade, baseada na crença dos governados e na credibilidade de uma reserva de poder dos governantes, à maneira de Max Weber. Assim, a legitimidade passa a ser o efeito da *ratio* de uma associação entre a experiência dos fatos e símbolos de carga axiológica. Como apontou Karl W. Deutsch, é um fenômeno informacional intrinsecamente localizado num tempo histórico-cultural que explicita a latitude do consenso ou do dissenso das ações de política externa no campo estratégico-militar e no das relações econômicas, num dado momento do sistema internacional.

Quais as implicações de uma concepção objetivista da legitimidade, que liga o mundo da cultura e portanto do poder ideológico, ao mundo da política e da economia e portanto do poder da força e da riqueza, para efeitos de análise sobre o papel dos valores em matéria de política externa? Em livro recente, Quentin Skinner aponta que, em política, o campo do possível, regra geral, está circunscrito ao seu potencial de legitimidade. Este potencial não é ilimitado num dado tempo histórico cultural. Está na dependência do espectro de ações que podem ser plausivelmente sustentadas por valores e princípios culturalmente vigentes. Assim, mesmo quando não operam como motivações mas apenas como racionalizações de comportamento, valores e princípios são informadores e delimitadores das linhas de ação que podem ser perseguidas. É por esta razão que os princípios e os valores que consagram são relevantes para explicar que propostas de ação diante dos fatos são escolhidas num dado momento e subsequente articuladas e diligenciadas de certas maneiras e não de outras. Assim a criação de impérios coloniais ou a aquisição de território através do uso de força transitava pelo sistema internacional do século XIX, o que não ocorre no sistema internacional contemporâneo.


Da mesma maneira, o crescente reconhecimento axiológico dos direitos humanos no plano internacional, a partir da segunda guerra mundial, positivado através de normas do Direito Internacional Público e consagrado como inequívoca abrangência no mundo pós guerra-fria na Conferência de Viena da ONU em 1993, tornou a tese da sua tutela um tema global, que transcende a esfera reservada de soberania estatal. É por esta razão que o respeito aos direitos humanos é hoje um parâmetro das formas de conceber a vida em sociedade e como tal um *standard* de legitimidade do poder decisório das soberanias, com impacto na prática interna e externa dos Estados. Não é isto o que ocorria no sistema internacional da década de 1930, na época da maré-montante dos regimes totalitários.

A concepção objetivista da legitimidade proposta por Merquior, com o foco dado pela relação entre a ação política e os valores elaborados por Skinner, pode ser aprofundada e refinada por meio da contribuição dada por Gelson Fonseca Jr. ao tema da legitimidade e da sua função no plano internacional, no qual os dados do poder em função da sua distribuição assimétrica e descentralizada estão sempre presentes de forma muito explícita. Com efeito, Gelson Fonseca Jr., em instigante e original livro, (A Legitimidade e outras questões internacionais – Poder e Ética entre as nações, São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998), discute o papel dos valores informadores da legitimidade – que não são estáticos – e o jogo do poder dos estados no plano internacional, que é também dinâmico. Mostra a relação entre argumento e poder, indica a importância de o argumento do poder possuir uma abrangência generalizadora que o habilita a ir além da subjetividade solipista de um estado soberano e interessar aos demais protagonistas da vida mundial e aponta a relação entre os argumentos e os valores prevalecentes num dado momento histórico.


Gelson Fonseca Jr. esclarece o seu raciocínio ao exemplificar como a reivindicação dos países em desenvolvimento em prol de uma nova e mais justa ordem econômica internacional não se inseriu na agenda diplomática dos anos 60 e 70 apenas em função das brechas do poder abertas pela bipolaridade Leste/Oeste, que ensejou politicamente a polaridade Norte/Sul. Viabilizou-se em consonância com as idéias do keynesianismo econômico; era aceitável pela importância que se atribuía ao planejamento socialista como caminho para o desenvolvimento; tinha apoio intelectual nas propostas de transformação social, como a *Great Society* de Lyndon Johnson de inspiração rooseveltiana, e era compatível com as aspirações da social-democracia européia. Atualmente, estas reivindicações não podem ser apoiadas nos mesmos argumentos, não só porque a queda do Muro de Berlim e a desagregação da URSS mudaram a lógica do poder do sistema internacional com a dessuetude das polaridades definidas Leste/Oeste, Norte/Sul, como também porque foram sendo erodidos os “sinais de prevalência de sentido” dos valores que as justificavam.

Estas considerações, foram as que levaram Gelson Fonseca Jr. a afirmar, na discussão entre valores e prática – que é a legitimidade, na sua acepção objetivista, “que condiciona o espaço das proposições diplomáticas”.

Assim, para concluir esta análise conceitual sobre o papel dos valores e das idéias na política internacional diria que é através deles que se organiza o que entra e o que não entra na pauta da política internacional. Este é um dado que ninguém que se ocupe de política internacional seja como *scholar*, seja como operador, pode ignorar.



Assim, para concluir esta análise conceitual sobre o papel dos valores e das idéias na política internacional diria que é através deles que se organiza o que entra e o que não entra na pauta da política internacional. Este é um dado que ninguém que se ocupe de política internacional seja como *scholar*, seja como operador, pode ignorar.





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XVIII International Lisbon Conference  
**Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century**

Gulbenkian Foundation, 14 - 15 December 2000

***Determinants of Humanitarian Intervention, Legitimacy and Legality***

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***Legitimacy, Legality and Determinants of Humanitarian Intervention***

– Summary –

**Christoph Bertram**

Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

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## Legitimacy, Legality and Determinants of Humanitarian Intervention

### - Points for Discussion -

By Christoph Bertram

1. Humanitarian intervention has been and will remain highly exceptional, both in terms of the conditions in which it occurs and in frequency.
2. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as a military operation by outside powers primarily motivated not by strategic or security concerns but by the altruistic urge to prevent, stop or limit a humanitarian disaster. But there is no accepted definition nor can there be of what constitutes a disaster. The definition will be supplied only by the specifics of each case. Is it the number of people exposed to inhuman treatment? The intensity of suppression? The vicinity of the event, cultural or religious affinity with the sufferers? Rather, the willingness of a state to define a humanitarian emergency so that they lead to the dispatch of its soldiers into a conflict in which its own interests are not at stake will depend on highly subjective circumstances: media attention and public opinion, domestic political considerations, alliance concerns, absence of major international complications, the risks implied, etc.
3. Not only for legal reasons – the need of a mandate by a respected international body – but no less in order to generate the necessary domestic political support, humanitarian interventions will generally be conducted by a coalition of states. Given the very subjective conditions under which each of them decides to commit itself, collective consensus will always be difficult to reach and to maintain.
4. Most interventions labeled "humanitarian" do not belong into this category at all. Usually there lurks a cool-hearted strategic motive behind the humanitarian urge. Nato's Kosovo operation was prompted by members' concern more for their alliance's credibility after having threatened Miloscevic with the use of force should he not give in than for the plight of the Kosovars. East Timor was for Australia a strategic, not primarily a humanitarian issue: for those providing assistance from further afield, the credibility for the UN was the dominant motive. If Western powers should have intervened in Africa's Great Lakes killing fields, this would have been less for humanitarian than regional order reasons; today what should have been recognized then has become crystal clear, namely that failure to act would throw the whole region into a major protracted crisis which significantly affects Western strategic interests.
5. To point to the often decisive non-humanitarian motive behind many so-called "humanitarian" interventions suggests a new hierarchy of interests both in the international and in the internal political arena of major countries. Their most concrete strategic interest in a world devoid of existential threats is the creation and maintenance of a stable international order upheld by effective international organizations. Once that order and its institutions are in jeopardy, their interests are at stake. Massive humanitarian disasters are unacceptable not only, and mostly not even



primarily, because they are an insult to our values but because they introduce turbulence and unpredictability into the international system of order to which, for clear national interests, our governments and parliaments are attached. The UN Security Council has implicitly recognized this by accepting that conflict within states can endanger international peace.

6. Support at home for the use of force abroad has become essential in conflicts where our nation's or our allies' survival is not threatened. Yet for the abstract, if highly important objective of securing international order such support is not readily available. That is different once public opinion is moved by the plight of fellow humans. Moral outrage is, at least while it lasts, a powerful generator of public support for governments intent on acting decisively in a crisis. However, such outrage is never a very reliable factor; if casualties occur or the conflict threatens to escalate public support can collapse overnight.

7. What then are genuine humanitarian interventions? There probably are none in pure form. Even the mid-nineties intervention in Somalia which is often cited for contrary evidence was the result more of the President Bush fearing a loss of international authority from abstaining than of a humanitarian urge, as underlined by the rapid and unceremonious retreat of US forces once the going got rough.

This applies, of course, only to military intervention. To threaten intervention by military force is often used as an instrument to stop humanitarian disasters. If unsuccessful, intervention by military means may or may not follow. When states take that step, however, the motive is less to help the persecuted than to protect their own credibility.

8. One may deplore this. Instead one should welcome it. Governments are committed to safeguard the well-being of their citizens, not to endanger it by sending soldiers into harm's way. State interests, not moral outrage, provide a more reliable basis for effective humanitarian intervention. This will permit and even further such interventions because state security in a globalized world will imply much less protection against an attack from an enemy but the maintenance and furtherance of stability, predictability, and order – all of which are increasingly threatened by humanitarian disasters. The challenge to democratic governments is to educate their publics accordingly. They have scarcely begun the task.

9. This interpretation of humanitarian intervention has important consequences for the legitimacy and legality of such intervention. If the interests of states are involved, intervention is not altruistic but self-serving. A major humanitarian disaster is often a security threat. And even the most traditional schools of international law hold that states are entitled to defend themselves against threats to their security. It may be more convenient to obtain a mandate from the UN Security Council to meet such threats, but such mandate is not required for self-defence.

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8

XVIII Conferência Internacional de Lisboa  
**O Multilateralismo no Século XXI**

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian , 14 - 15 de Dezembro de 2000

***Identidade, Valores e Integração***

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**O Caso da Europa – Identidade Múltipla**

– Resumo –

**Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins**  
Ministro da Presidência, Lisboa

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## O CASO DA EUROPA – IDENTIDADE MÚLTIPLA

Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, Ministro da Presidência, Lisboa

*"L'Europe n'est plus qu'une nation composée de plusieurs" - Montesquieu, Réflexions sur la monarchie universelle en Europe, 1727, I, XVIII.*

*"...il y aura entre les peuples européens ce qui fait le lien et la base de toute association politique: conformité d'institutions, union d'intérêts, rapport de maximes, communauté de morale et d'instruction publique". - Saint-Simon, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 1814, II, V.*

O tema europeu está, de novo, na ordem do dia. Depois de Maastricht e de Amesterdão, voltou a debater-se, agora em Nice, o quadro institucional da União, considerando que as virtualidades das instituições europeias dependem não só dos equilíbrios que forem alcançados, mas também da eficiência que for possível obter na defesa e na salvaguarda dos interesses e valores comuns. Quem quiser classificar a União Europeia segundo os tipos tradicionais das organizações de direito público terá, aliás, as maiores dificuldades. Muitos têm falado de um objecto político não identificado, mas verdadeiramente o que temos é a coexistência de características diferenciadas e complexas que concedem uma originalidade absoluta a esta "democracia supranacional". Temos, assim, que a União não segue modelos preexistentes, do mesmo modo que não traduz um modelo exportável ou repetível *ipsis verbis*. Não se define como um Estado federal, porque a partilha de soberanias em que assenta dá prevalência à legitimidade originária dos Estados e povos membros da União. Também não se caracteriza como Confederação, ainda que dela se possa aproximar, uma vez que enfatiza o equilíbrio entre a legitimidade originária dos Estados, bem traduzida no princípio da subsidiariedade, e a limitação dos objectivos comuns. Ora, nas Confederações há uma associação de Estados, com a criação de órgãos comuns para o prosseguimento de determinadas competências internacionais, normalmente na lógica evolutiva da criação de um novo Estado de natureza federal – no qual os Estados federados deixam de ter personalidade internacional.

A União Europeia não se limita a ser uma mera organização internacional de escopo limitado, uma vez que envolve, desde a sua génese, uma legitimidade supranacional. No entanto, como entidade supranacional, possui uma dinâmica claramente orientada para a existência de uma federação de Estados e povos independentes, que não é sinónimo de Estado federal, dotada de instituições e de políticas comuns, que prosseguem objectivos pré-definidos de interesse comum. A história das instituições europeias, a sua génese e desenvolvimento ilustram bem a consolidação desta mesma realidade. Neste sentido, importa distinguir uma orientação democrática federal, assente na soberania originária dos Estados, na subsidiariedade e na cidadania activa, no âmbito dos Estados de direito, de um lado, da criação de um Estado federal ou de um Super Estado europeu, de outro,

que não está no horizonte da construção europeia e do conceito de democracia supranacional, de que nos tem falado Mário Telò.

O modo de organização da Europa no pós-guerra constitui uma resposta *sui generis* às exigências da evolução da economia e da sociedade contemporâneas, desde a abertura de fronteiras até à coexistência de elementos característicos das sociedades industrial e pós-industrial, passando pela emergência de uma organização social e política em rede e pela proliferação de centros de racionalidade infra e supra estaduais. A sociedade da informação, a economia do conhecimento, a inovação científica e técnica, a ligação entre humanismo e tecnologia – tudo isso determina que a organização europeia se constitua em referência para uma mundialização civilizada, assente na cidadania, na emancipação humana e na solidariedade.

Com efeito, o Estado-nação tem-se transformado, abrindo-se, rompendo com a lógica proteccionista, e lançando a criação de espaços políticos regionais, que não devem confundir-se com "fortalezas" fechadas, sob pena de porem em causa a lógica democrática do "desenvolvimento partilhado". Não existe, pois, um "modelo" de integração regional e a experiência europeia demonstra-o. com clareza, a cada passo. Há, sim, várias soluções adequadas às diferentes situações – numa tipologia que vai desde a *zona de comércio livre*, que deixa sem alteração as pautas aduaneiras de cada país, à *integração completa*, com políticas comuns em mercado único, passando pela *união aduaneira*, com pauta aduaneira exterior comum, pelo *mercado comum*, com liberalização da circulação de factores de produção e um mínimo de coordenação de políticas, e pela *união económica*, com harmonização de políticas monetária, fiscal, anticíclica e social.


A *democracia supranacional* europeia é, assim, uma realidade com características próprias e irrepetíveis. E os conceitos de "integração aberta", de "desenvolvimento partilhado" e de "identidade múltipla" devem ser aprofundados, através da salvaguarda de uma composição equilibrada dos interesses comuns, do respeito das regras de concorrência, do favorecimento de factores de integração e de coesão social e económica, da eficiência e da transparência das instituições, da participação e do controlo dos cidadãos e da garantia de uma dupla legitimidade, envolvendo Estados e cidadãos. Num mundo de "polaridades difusas", a integração aberta entra, deste modo, na agenda política, suscitando a troca de experiências e o enriquecimento mútuo. E a pluralidade de pertenças pode, assim, funcionar quer num mesmo espaço quer entre diferentes espaços integrados que se relacionam entre si. Na *integração aberta* assumem, desta forma, especial importância e significado: a defesa da democracia e o primado do direito e dos direitos fundamentais, o pluralismo e a coesão, o que pressupõe a referência ao "capital social", isto é, à consideração da confiança e da solidez nas relações sociais e nos vínculos comunitários. A confiança e a coesão fazem parte integrante do modo de organização da União Europeia. Não se trata de um modelo, mas de um *método* – no qual se integram quer a cultura de direitos e de deveres de cidadania e a democracia política, social e económica, quer a partilha de soberanias e a coesão, na perspectiva da regulação dos conflitos e das diferenças.


A pluralidade de pertenças e a identidade múltipla constituem, pois, factores de referência indispensável quando falamos do método europeu. A história europeia é incompatível com qualquer ilusão uniformizadora. A diversidade cultural conduz ao enriquecimento mútuo. Desde as raízes greco-latinas ao diálogo entre religiões e culturas, passando pela evolução do pensamento no sentido da tolerância e do respeito pelo outro – a identidade europeia, longe de ser unívoca e limitada, caracteriza-se por uma pluralidade de elementos e de factores. Com muitas referências relevantes – Homero e Sócrates, Virgílio e Cícero, Agostinho de Hipona e Francisco de Assis, Descartes e Pascal, Rembrandt e Vermeer, Galileu e Espinosa, Montesquieu e Rousseau, Leibniz e Kant, Goethe e Stendhal, Tchaikovski e Tolstoi, Schonberg e Thomas Mann, Einstein e Popper, Picasso e Stravinski – não é difícil de perceber como é complicado definir a *identidade múltipla* europeia. Eis porque a diversidade e a complementaridade são duas faces da mesma moeda e marcas fundamentais. É neste sentido que as instituições comuns são chamadas a representar não só as diferenças, mas também as intersecções. As regulação dos conflitos e a existência de factores de coesão merecem especial atenção. Daí a necessidade de ligar ao método de integração e de democracia supranacional, não só os conceitos de liberdade e de sociedade aberta, mas também os de coesão e de confiança, o que obriga a referirmos o valor em si da integração e da reciprocidade que ele pressupõe.

E se falámos de "capital social" referimo-nos, segundo Robert Putnam e Thad Williamson, às redes existentes dentro das sociedades e às regras de reciprocidade e confiança que aquelas engendram. O *capital social* tem efeitos sobre a sociedade, que vão desde o bom funcionamento das instituições políticas até ao estado de espírito dos cidadãos. A sua evolução, negativa ou positiva, é tão importante como a do produto físico ou financeiro. Daí que a *identidade múltipla* europeia exija condições práticas de coesão e de reciprocidade, bem como do interesse dos cidadãos pelos assuntos públicos e pela reflexão política e cívica. Não se trata de dar prioridade à expansão económica como objectivo absoluto, mas de encarar a relação entre a economia e a sociedade à luz de uma melhor organização e da reciprocidade nas relações interpessoais. E assim a "democracia supranacional" aprofunda o seu método, melhorando a vida das instituições e o funcionamento dos instrumentos de regulação. Deste modo, a UE, em vez de pretender ver repetido o seu modelo noutras latitudes, de modo passivo, procura, sim, ligar, pelo método, a universalidade do respeito dos princípios democráticos e dos direitos fundamentais à criação de espaços alargados de coesão e de confiança.

Depois do Tratado de Amesterdão, muito se falou dos *restos*, que importava arrumar. Houve que fazer as operações aritméticas indispensáveis a encontrar novos equilíbrios entre Estados e instituições. Compreende-se que essa preocupação tenha existido, em nome da legitimação da União perante os cidadãos dos diferentes Estados. No entanto, o que fica patente neste debate é, por um lado, o carácter pragmático da construção europeia e, por outro, o peso da legitimidade dos Estados nacionais. Não podendo esquecer-se a evolução desde o mercado comum à União Económica e Monetária, a verdade é que o essencial da experiência europeia tem a ver com a *componente política*. A economia constitui

o catalisador, o pólo de atracção, que tem natural sequência na definição dos interesses vitais comuns – mas estes são políticos e cívicos. Eis o que se revela universalizável no *método* europeu: a importância do respeito do primado da lei e dos direitos fundamentais, a economia aberta, a força da legitimidade democrática e a coesão económica e social. E devemos insistir na ideia de *método* e não de *modelo*. As circunstâncias históricas e culturais da Europa dão aos objectivos políticos uma especial ênfase – mas essas circunstâncias não podem fazer esquecer que a integração regional e o "desenvolvimento partilhado" exigem que haja interlocutores supranacionais aptos regular e a civilizar a mundialização e a torná-la compatível com a salvaguarda do capital social e da coesão, com a confiança e com a cidadania. A identidade múltipla garantirá, assim, que as transformações e as mudanças não comprometem a liberdade, a autonomia individual e a solidariedade cívica.





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**Panel on Africa**  
***The Nature of Violent Conflict***

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**How can Wars be Stopped in Africa?**

– Summary –  
Introductory remarks

**Gabriel de Bellescize**

Ambassador at large for the enhancement of African peace-keeping capabilities,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

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## HOW CAN WARS BE STOPPED IN AFRICA?

Gabriel de Bellescize, Ambassador at large for the enhancement of African peace-keeping capabilities, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

I am very grateful to the Institute of Strategic and International Studies to give me a chance to speak about: "How can wars be stopped in Africa?". I would like, if I may, to expand the subject and talk also about: "How can wars be prevented in Africa?". It is much better to avoid a war, to prevent a conflict, if it is at all possible, rather than to have to stop it once it has started.

Most people who have to deal with Africa in different countries, within the European Union, like Portugal or France for example, share the same view: it is our common interest to deal with African countries which are prosperous, highly developed. And there is no prosperity without peace. Wars, violent conflicts of all kinds are against our common interest. They should be stopped and, if possible, prevented.

The idea of a mutually beneficial partnership between a rich Europe and an Africa which should be in the process of becoming rich has inspired the efforts which have been made, in the last half century, for the development of Africa. We like to speak about countries which are indeed moving forward. There is a genuine wish to see an Africa which would be developing and, to begin with, an Africa without wars.

As we all know, there are in Africa contrasting realities but the situation is not as good as we would like. Too many conflicts are still raging. Too many seem to be in the making.

In the present phase, nearly half a century after independence, there is a growing feeling that Africans themselves should be able to prevent or to solve their own conflicts. This is an attitude which is, to a large extent, shared by the Africans and by their partners.

There is an obvious ambiguity in such an attitude. It may simply indicate, from the partners, a lack of interest, an aid fatigue. There is a competition between Africa and Eastern Europe for European aid and Eastern Europe is frequently considered more important.

At the same time, there is a genuine feeling that the solution of African conflicts has to be found in Africa more than anywhere else, that the outside world may help to a certain extent but only within limits and if the Africans themselves are willing to play their part. The time for solutions imposed by the outside world is behind us.

Most people accept that Africans need support in their own efforts to prevent or solve their conflicts. The key word is "partnership".

The partners have fairly precise ideas about what should be done. There is a real consensus, quite impressive, not always comfortable for the Africans who still feel under pressure. At the same time we see that the real world is different from what we would like it to be.

The key approach is: consolidation of the nation-states in their present borders, regional and subregional cooperation and economic integration, prevention and solution of conflicts through co-ordinated efforts of the local actors and of the international community.

African countries have been carved out artificially, as we all know. The States, which were created, were not nations. There was no feeling of belonging together. Conflicts have erupted about borders, as in the recent case of the war between Ethiopia and Erythrea.

A consolidation process of the borders has taken place. When there are still uncertainties, as for example between Nigeria and Cameroon about the Bakassi peninsula, the differences should be solved through bilateral negotiations or via the International Court of Justice if needed. No major conflict is looming about borders in Africa and this is a positive element.

When the States feel secure within their own borders, it is easier for them to take part in a process of regional or subregional integration.

Most conflicts are, to start with, internal conflicts which eventually spill over the borders and affect the neighbours, who are bound to intervene.

The recipe to prevent these conflicts as advocated by most members of the international community, is well known: democracy, good governance and equitable distribution of wealth.

This is not only the political correctness of the moment. Most tensions come from the fact that a great number of people, or a certain group of people, are too poor, have not their minimum share of power and income.

The aid programmes have been going on for a long time and have not been too successful. They are constantly being renegotiated, improved, discussed.

If there is one weakness in all these programmes, is perhaps that we have not worked hard enough to face what Achille Mbembe, in his book "De la post colonie" calls "the challenge of productivity". African countries cannot base their development on the export of primary commodities, cotton, gold, oil. They need to create a lot of jobs and need to attract investment, local as well as foreign. They need added value: instead of exporting cotton, export T-shirts; instead of logs, furniture; instead of silver, necklaces. There is this big European market just near Africa. There are other markets beyond. And together we have not made enough efforts to make sure that Africans get to know these markets well, learn how to benefit from them. Much remains to be done in this respect and the development of an informal economy, albeit useful for the survival of many people, does not help to foster the development needed to appease the tensions and prevent new ones.

Economic integration at the subregional level is vital but it must be done in a manner which prevents a concentration of economic activity in specific areas. Landlocked countries may well suffer from regional integration instead of benefiting from it. If most jobs are created in specific regions only this is a recipe for disaster.

When a conflict erupts a solution must first be looked for in the framework of the nation-state with a role for the neighbours. The roots of the conflicts are, in most cases, local and the solutions have also to be negotiated locally. There are, for example, problems of access to land or water and these problems can only be dealt with locally and nationally. The neighbours have to contribute to the solution of the problem, which never stops at the border.

As an example, I would like to mention the conflict which took place in Northern Mali. Local ethnic groups were not benefiting enough from the fact that they were members of the Malian nation. Their problems were practical ones and solutions could only be found locally. The national leaders of Mali, President Amadou Toumani Touré, Président Konaré, were wise enough to look for negotiated solutions. The traditional leaders of different groups played a great part. Reconciliation meetings were organised where very practical issues were discussed.

Algeria, as a mediator, pushed hard towards a solution. Other neighbours, like Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, played a constructive role.

The role of the international community as such remained limited. It was mainly UNDP and the European aid programme, which helped to meet post-conflict demands, financing reinsertion programmes for former soldiers.

This example of conflict solution can be considered as a model. If a major intervention of the international community, with multinational forces, can be avoided, it is much better.

The international community can help implement a solution but this solution, to a large extent, has to result from local or regional negotiations. Only they can go really to the roots of the difficulties which have created the conflict and can find lasting solutions.

If there is a real willingness among the interested parties to work hard to bring peace, then the intervention of the international community can be useful. The Security Council gives legitimacy to an intervention under Chapter VI, or more frequently now under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A joint effort by the UN and by regional or subregional organisations working together is, in most cases, the best solution to bring back peace.

The international community must contribute to create an environment favourable to peace. The issue of weapons is very important. Conflicts in Africa are made more violent and harder to solve by the constant flow of weapons coming from other parts of the world. The European Union has adopted restrictive guidelines on the export of weapons and supports the moratorium on small arms adopted by ECOWAS.

We must continue our efforts to make peace more rewarding and to diminish the benefits which can be drawn from long-lasting conflicts and from all the illegal trafficking that they can generate, for example in diamonds, gold or other commodities. It is not an easy endeavour and we should not be too complacent about the first results.


In certain cases specific sanctions or embargos can be useful. But the limits of such policies are quite clear. We must avoid situations where sanctions seem to be going on forever, without much result.

When on going negotiations between regional actors have a chance of success, foreign partners should support them and avoid complicating them for purposes which are not in the best interest of Africa.

A recent initiative now being discussed, the Millenium Africa Recovery Plan, launched by Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, with the support of the European Union, the United States and Japan raises new hopes for the future of the continent. It is typical of the partnership which seems to be the best solution. The initiative comes from African countries. The support comes from different partners working together in harmony. The emphasis is placed on debt relief, private investment, creation of jobs in a stable political environment.

A lot remains to be done. Beyond pessimism or undue optimism we have the feeling that we know the direction in which Africa should proceed. Foreign partners must do better but the main effort has clearly to be done by the Africans themselves, by African elites finding their own way towards a progress which would benefit everybody in Africa.





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**Panel on Africa**  
***The Role of International Cooperation***

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– Summary –  
Introductory remarks

**Stephen Morrison**  
Director, Africa Program,  
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

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## THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

J. Stephen Morrison, Director, Africa Program Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

### Introduction

In early July, the CSIS Africa Program launched a review of U.S. Africa policy. Managed by Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Director of the CSIS Africa Program, the project aims to examine major policy initiatives in the Clinton years and evolving challenges in Africa, summarise and explain policy outcomes, and advise the incoming next administration on feasible approaches to impending, critical policy decisions in Africa. It is organised into six Working Groups: peace operations, chaired by Professors Jendayi Frazer and Jeffrey Herbst; crisis diplomacy, chaired by Professor Terrence Lyons; critical relations with South Africa and Nigeria, chaired by Amb. Princeton Lyman and Professor Gwen Mikell; HIV/AIDS, chaired by Dr. J. Stephen Morrison; U.S. economic interests, chaired by Professor Peter Lewis, and humanitarian action, chaired by Victor Tanner and Nan Borton.

Throughout, the project has operated on a non-partisan, broadly inclusionary basis. The project benefited from the exceptional commitment of its Working Group chairs and the extensive participation of congressional staff (both Democratic and Republican), senior diplomats and other Executive Branch officials, representatives of the Bush and Gore presidential campaigns, the corporate sector, non-governmental groups and university-based policy experts. In aggregate, 30 Working Group sessions were held involving over 115 individuals. Numerous side consultations on specific policies also took place between July and December.

Below is a preview of major findings of the CSIS review: a summary of evolving U.S. interests in Africa, and an outline of the composite recommendations of the Working Groups.

### What are U.S. interests and how have they changed?

Enduring U.S. national interests in Africa, though not strategic, remains highly important. They are grounded in historical linkages between the continent and America's 30 million African Americans. They reside in Africa's supply of 15% of America's petroleum requirements. They emanate from American values and goals that continue to be central to global U.S. foreign policy: democracy and respect of human rights; alleviation of human suffering; strengthening of market economies within an expanding global economic community, and combating the transnational security threats posed by crime, terrorism, money laundering – and global infectious diseases.

These interests have inspired the Clinton Administration's multiple policy initiatives and high-level engagement in Africa. They are also tied to the bipartisan Congressional coalitions and diverse interest groups that have endorsed expanded debt relief, new trade and investment policies, heightened support to combat HIV/AIDS, and strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities.

In the 1990s, U.S. interests in Africa were reshaped by four dramatic developments:

- First, the **continent declined** and is today at risk of further setbacks. At the same time **U.S. bilateral influence waned** in the post-Cold War era.

Africa's economic marginality has worsened – the majority of the continent's citizens survive on less than \$1 per day, an inherently unstable reality. Armed intrastate and interstate conflicts have proliferated, several states have failed, and a substantial number of weak states may experience sudden breakdowns that will be difficult to predict reliably or later reverse, and which could impose new, heavy costs. There is today a risk of further disengagement by Africa from the global economy, backlash, and a turn to criminal channels. Debt relief, increasingly, has become the continental rallying cry to revitalise Africa's viability and win more favourable global trading terms.

In comparative, global terms, Africa's decline sets it apart conspicuously and presents an urgent, expansive long-term agenda. At the same time, U.S. bilateral influence has dropped, even while Africa's profile in U.S. foreign policy has been elevated in the 1990s. Diplomatic capacities in Washington and key U.S. embassies have been hollowed out and material resources have diminished. In combination, these realities force us to confront the central question: how are we to bridge the gap between means and ends and overcome mounting scepticism that U.S. national interests can be effectively advanced in Africa?

- Second, **U.S. energy stakes** in Africa increased significantly in the 1990s – from important to very important. In the coming years, these interests will only further deepen.

Over 15% of America's oil now comes from Central and West Africa. In the coming years this non-Gulf source of oil will exceed 20% and U.S. investment in the energy sector will more than double. These trends will tie U.S. interests ever more tightly to Angola, Nigeria, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea, unsteady states with weak institutions, a legacy of corruption and internal conflict. In the case of Angola and Nigeria, their military and political leadership will also continue to play a crucial security role in their respective regions.

- Third, **recent genocide, war crimes and other atrocities** – and the threat of recurrent episodes – place U.S. policy interests in Africa in a new global context.

The legacy of U.S. inaction in the face of the 1994 Rwanda genocide now combines with controversy surrounding U.S. policy towards the RUF in Sierra Leone, mounting allegations of genocide and war crimes in Sudan, and awareness that in the coming years atrocities could recur suddenly in the Great Lakes and West Africa.

How to respond preemptively and effectively to this threat remains complex and highly problematic. More certain is that to ignore or underestimate the threat until it is too late to do anything meaningful is to put at serious risk the next administration's standing – among the American people, in Africa, and among the worldwide community now mobilised around issues of genocide and ending impunity.

- Fourth, **the HIV/AIDS pandemic** also places Africa in a new global context. It will inexorably dominate U.S. foreign policy stakes in Africa – and beyond.

In the next decade, HIV/AIDS may kill one quarter of the continent's population, reduce national economies by one third, gravely strain African states and generate new forms of continental instability and transnational security threats. Our experience in combating HIV/AIDS in Africa will shape U.S. approaches in Asia, the Caribbean, and other areas where the pandemic will surge in its next phase. Today, U.S. national interests in combating HIV/AIDS in Africa have become global interests.

### **Crosscutting themes and recommendations**

Several priority advisories emerge across the six Working Groups. In combination, they outline a rationale for future high-level U.S. engagement in Africa:

- **Be realistic, tough-minded and candid** - about U.S. interests and capacities, expectations of partners, and benchmarks for progress.

Prospects for quick, high returns are low. Odds of embarrassing near-term setbacks are high. Achievable benchmarks should be laid out overtly. Progress should be measured over the medium and long term – and openly sold as such.

U.S. credibility is not enhanced; indeed it is damaged, by striking a pose at high levels with inadequate follow-up. Rhetoric needs to be carefully aligned with commitments of political will and resources. Under-resourced initiatives should not be pursued.

- **Be selective, set priorities, consolidate efforts.**

Top priorities should include HIV/AIDS, strengthening relations with South Africa and Nigeria, and concentrating crisis diplomacy on Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and advancement of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Algiers Accord. Other important goals are: to build adequate readiness and quick response when opportunities to promote peace or threats of genocide appear in chronic crisis areas; expand debt relief; deepen trade and investment opportunities; elaborate a



coherent U.S. energy policy; and support bilateral and international efforts to end impunity and build the rule of law.

- **Rebuild U.S. diplomatic capacities and better organise the administration's internal workings.**

U.S. diplomatic capacities in Washington and in key embassies in Africa have declined, far worse than for any other region of the world. To be effective, these capacities must be guaranteed, and where deficient, systematically restored – both in Washington and our embassies, especially Abuja, Pretoria, Harare, Khartoum, Abidjan, Kinshasa, Addis Ababa, Samara and Nairobi. This can only be achieved through exceptional efforts.

It is essential to clarify U.S. policy goals and ensure institutional coherence and leadership in key policy areas across agencies, including USAID, which often has a tenuous link to U.S. foreign policy goals. Peace operations, HIV/AIDS and humanitarian action are policy areas where considerable progress can be realised, if there is a concerted high-level effort to better focus the internal workings and available resources of the next administration.

- **Forge a robust compact with Congress.**

The U.S. cannot achieve meaningful results on the cheap. Indeed, under resourced initiatives frequently backfire. If congressional support is not nurtured aggressively and on a sustained basis – at the leadership level – the next administration will not be in a position to cover the gap between ambitions and resources. A promising Congressional bipartisan consensus exists in key issue areas – HIV/AIDS, trade and investment, debt relief, select support to UN peacekeeping and strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities. The next administration should – and can – build out from that base to win increased resource commitments in these select priority areas.

- **Build strategic collaboration with European allies, South Africa, Nigeria and the United Nations.**

New, dynamic international coalitions will be essential to an effective U.S. policy – and not easy to erect. Transatlantic alliances withered in the 1990s, in a period when the individual bilateral influence of major Western powers declined. These alliances can be restored with an updated focus if such a goal is a high-level priority. The same is true for moving beyond mutual wariness and halting diplomatic and security cooperation with South Africa and Nigeria and for recognising and acting upon the centrality of the UN to restoring security, battling HIV/AIDS, and achieving effective humanitarian action.





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***Regionalism and regulation of globalisation***

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**Lessons from the Asian Crisis and the ASEAN Experience**

– Summary –  
Introductory remarks

**Dewi Fortuna Anwar**

Associate Director for Research, The Habibie Center, Jakarta

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## **THE ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN THE REGULATION OF GLOBALISATION: LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE**

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and Associate Director for Research at The Habibie Center, Jakarta

### **1. Importance of regionalism in the regulation of globalism in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific**

- \$ ASEAN has been an important and relatively effective collective bargaining tool for its members in dealing with other countries, other regional organizations and in multilateral fora on various issues.
- \$ ASEAN provides a learning process in trade-liberalization for its members as these countries prepare for trade-liberalization at the supra-regional level (APEC) and at the global level.
- \$ Closer economic integration in ASEAN is designed to make the region a more attractive investment destination for international capital in the face of growing competition from other countries and regions such as China, Latin America and Eastern Europe.
- \$ Regionalism in Southeast Asia is not intended as an inward-looking bloc and a counter to globalism, but rather as a tool for empowering members to deal with global challenges and to profit from opportunities provided by globalization.
- \$ The principle of "open regionalism" is enforced further in APEC, which groups economies from both sides of the Pacific. Regionalism is regarded as a "building bloc", not a "stumbling bloc" for globalism.
- \$ Besides promoting trade and economic/technical cooperation among the members, APEC was specifically aimed at ensuring the success of multilateralism under GATT/WTO which at one time seemed to be threatened by growing protectionism in the EU.

### **2. Positive and Negative impacts of globalism on ASEAN countries**

- \$ ASEAN countries have both benefited enormously and suffered greatly from the onslaught of globalization.
- \$ Positive gains include rapid pace of modernization and economic development due to world-wide trade expansion, inflow of foreign-direct investment and wider availability of capital in general through the capital market, as well as revolution in transportation, communication and information technology.
- \$ Negative impacts of globalization are most obvious after the onset of financial

crisis, which in Indonesia has led to a full-scale economic crisis which in turns led to social and political upheaval. Debt crisis and outflow of capital in Thailand immediately spread like wildfire to other countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia.

### **3. Helplessness of ASEAN in the face of the financial crisis**

- \$ The countries worst hit by the crisis are in the ASEAN region, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, but also the Philippines and Malaysia.
- \$ Limited financial capacity of member countries. The two most affluent countries and least affected by the crisis, Singapore and Brunei, are also the two smallest members.
- \$ As an organization ASEAN is not equipped to deal with such a crisis. No regional mechanism then available to provide early warning for impending monetary crisis or once the crisis occurs for effectively helping members to deal with it.
- \$ ASEAN members have simply by-passed the organization in their pursuit for solutions. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have turned to the IMF, while Malaysia has followed its own way by imposing capital control and pegging its currency.
- \$ The crisis has greatly weakened ASEAN: exposed fragility of structure and its limited capacity for collective action; more fractious relations between member-states; lack of leadership from Indonesia.

### **4. Irrelevance of APEC in dealing with the Asian Crisis**

- \$ No attempt was made by APEC to help deal with the financial crisis as the focus of APEC have mostly been on trade liberalization and on economic and technical cooperation.
- \$ Differences in approach by key APEC members for dealing with the crisis. Japan wanted to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) but this was strongly opposed by the United States. The US supported the harsh measures applied by the IMF for the crisis-hit economies even if they directly contributed to social upheaval and political turbulence.
- \$ Growing division in APEC between proponents for faster and wide-ranging trade-liberalization (the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries of APEC) and those who want to protect their more vulnerable markets e.g. in agriculture and fishery (Japan, China and the ASEAN countries).

### **5. New regional initiative in the aftermath of the Asian crisis**

- \$ Despite the weaknesses of both ASEAN and APEC, which are both structural and cultural in nature and impede further integration, these two organizations will

remain viable and important. ASEAN is important primarily for political and security reasons so that economic considerations, while not unimportant, are not critical to ASEAN's viability. The prospect for larger economic gains through closer and freer trade-relations among the APEC countries will ensure that APEC does not remain dormant for too long.

- \$ The inability of ASEAN and APEC to respond effectively to the crisis has directly led to the launching of a new regionalism known as the **ASEAN+3**, consisting of the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea.
- \$ Earlier proposal by Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, to form an East Asian Economic Grouping, floundered because of the opposition of the U.S. which objected to being left out and lack of support from Japan and other ASEAN countries which did not want to offend the U.S.
- \$ Establishment of Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 has directly contributed to closer relations between ASEAN and East Asian countries. ASEM was established as a counterbalance to APEC and American dominance.
- \$ ASEAN+3 has mostly focused on monetary cooperation, areas not specifically covered by ASEAN or APEC, to prevent the recurrence of the recent financial crisis. Major participating agencies are the Economic Departments, Finance Departments and Central Banks of the concerned countries.
- \$ In May 2000 ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers signed a currency swap agreement. Idea for an Asian Monetary Fund has gained more support. Possibility for adopting a common currency in the distant future has also been discussed, something that would have been inconceivable earlier.
- \$ ASEAN+3 is not only aimed at making the members better prepared for any future financial crisis and better able to deal with the crisis at the regional level, but also to reduce the members' overt dependence on global institutions such as the IMF, which is regarded as being too dominated by the U.S., and totally lacking in sympathy and understanding of the myriad problems faced by the crisis-hit economies.
- \$ Common dissatisfaction with the U.S. and the American-dominated global order is an important glue that binds the ASEAN+3 countries together.

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