



**Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Project**

**Workshop I / Concepts and Models of Security in the EMP Countries**

**Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID) & International Affairs Institute (IAI)**

**Amman - November 5 – 6, 2000**

<b>iai</b> ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
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
**CONCEPTS AND MODELS OF SECURITY IN THE EMP COUNTRIES  
EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION PROJECT : WORKSHOP I**

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID)

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Amman, 5-6/XI/2000

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
  - 1. " Concepts and models of security in the Euro-Mediterranean countries"/ Kamel Abu Jaber
  - 2. "Perceptions of security in the Euro-Med north-south dimension: the northern perspective"/ Roberto Aliboni (IAI0012)
  - 3. "Perceptions of security in the Euro-Med : the southern perspective"/ Abdel Jawad Soltan
  - 4. "Concepts and models of security in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership area"/ Fred Tanner
  - 5. " A south Mediterranean model of security"/ Abderraouf Ounaies



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Project

Workshop I / Concepts and Models of  
Security in the EMP Countries

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID) &  
International Affairs Institute (IAI)  
Amman - November 5 - 6, 2000

**Speaker:** Dr. Roberto Aliboni,  
Director of Studies, International  
Affairs Institute / Italy

**Commentator:**  
Dr. Mohammed Khair Mustafa  
Jordan

**(10:30 – 11:00)**  
Perceptions of Security in the EMP  
Countries with Respect to the (South-North)  
Dimension of the Partnership

**Speaker:** Dr. Abdel Jawad Soltan,  
Al-Ahram Center for Political and  
Strategic Studies / Egypt

**Commentator:**  
Prof. Dr. Gunter Meyer  
Germany

**(11:00 – 13:00)** Open Discussion

**13:00** Lunch at Amra Hotel

**20:00** Dinner at Sultan Ibrahim  
Restaurant-Um Utheina

*(meeting at Amra Hotel lobby at 19:40)*

**Monday, November 6<sup>th</sup>, 2000**

**9:00 - 12:00 Theme Two:**  
Analysis of the Different Models of Security:  
Sustainability and Fitness with Respect to the  
EMP Framework

**(9:00 – 9:30)** Different Models of Security in  
the EMP Countries / European  
View Point

**Speaker:** Prof. Fred Tanner,  
Deputy Director for Academic  
Affairs, Geneva Center for  
Security Policy / Switzerland

**Commentator:**  
Prof. Mohammed El Sayed Selim  
Egypt

**(9:30 – 10:00)**  
Different Models of Security in the EMP  
Countries / Non-European View Point

**Speaker:** Amb. Rt. Dr. Abderraouf  
Ounaies,  
University of Tunis/ Tunisia

**Commentator:**  
Prof. Wamid Nathmy / Iraq

**Open Discussion**

**12:00 – 13:00**

**Conclusions and Closing Session:**

***Chairperson:***

**H.E. Prof. Kamel Abu Jaber**

***General Rapporteurs:***

**Dr. Mazen Gharaibeh**

**&**

**Dr. Roberto Aliboni**

**13:00 Lunch at Amra Hotel**

**19:00 Reception at the Residence of  
H.E the Ambassador of Italy to  
Jordan**

**List of Contacts:**

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*Workshop I*  
*Concepts and Models of Security*  
*November (5-6), 2000*  
*Amman – Jordan*  
*List of Foreign Participants*

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Tel.</b>	<b>Fax</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Prof. Roberto Aliboni	Director of Studies	International Affairs Institute		39-06-322-4360/363	Rome	Speaker
Dr. Jamal Abdel Jawad Soltan		Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies	202-3941-842	20-2-578-6037	Egypt	Speaker
Prof. Fred Tanner	Deputy Director	Academic Affairs, Geneva Center for Security Policy		41-22-744-440	Geneva	Speaker
Prof. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim	Director	Center for Asian Studies, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University	202-572-80-55	202-569-2735	Egypt	Commentator
Dr. Charles Tripp	Head of Department of Political Studies	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London	44-20-7898-474-44-20-7898-4720	44-20-78984759	London	



Name	Profession	Organization	Tel.	Fax	Country	Notes
Dr. Mohammed Ennaji		University of Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdullah	56-40-8-44		Morocco	
Mr. Patrick Johansson		Uppsala University	46-18-471-10-000	46-18-695-102	Sweden	
Amb. Dr. Abderrraouf Ounaies	Retired , Ambassador of Tunisia		216-1-764-924	2161-864-055	Tunisia	
Prof. Kosta Gouliamos	Director	Cyprus Research Center		357-2-667-816	Cyprus	Speaker
Prof. Wamid Nathmy	Prof. of Political Science	Baghdad University	964-177-66-489	96-41-776-3592	Iraq	Commentator
Prof. Dr. Gunter Meyer	Director	Center for Research on the Arab World	49-6131-3922701	49-6131-39-24736	Germany	Commentator

**Workshop 1**  
**Concepts and Models of Security**  
**November (5-6), 2000**

**Amman – Jordan**  
**Administrative List of Jordanians Participants**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Tel.</b>	<b>Fax.</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Dr. Atef Odeibat		Department of Social Sciences, Yarmouk University		02-274-725	Jordan	
Mr. Abdel Hamid Shishani						
H.E. Mr. Nabil Talhouni	Director	European and American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	46-44-361	46-44-673		
Col. Khaled Obeidat	Colonel	Jordanian Army			Jordan	
Dr. Mohammed Khair Mustafa					Jordan	
General Mohammed Shiyyab			5337302	5686800	Jordan	
Prof. Kamel Abu Jaber	President	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	593-44-00	593-44-11	Jordan	
HRH Princess Wijdan Ali	Vice President	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	593-44-00	593-44-11	Jordan	
Dr. Mazen Gharaibeh	Executive Director of the Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Center Project	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	593-44-00-	593-44-11	Jordan	

Major Mohammed Hwaiian	Public Security					
Mrs. Raghda Qandour		Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	593-44-00	593-44-11	Jordan	
Dr. Rateb Sweis	Assistant Dean of Higher Studies and Training	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	593-44-00	593-44-11		
Major Abdallah Abdallat	Public Security					

## Concepts and Models of Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Countries

Amman - November (5-6), 2000

During the past two days we have all listened to four papers representing personal view points regarding perceptions and models of security from a Northern and a Southern perspectives. Those views do not necessarily represent a consensus or the official viewpoints of either the Northern or the Southern Partners of the Euro-Med.

In these papers, it was noted that there are variations in the models and perceptions of security between the North and the South. The papers and the valued discussions that took place in this workshop will help us to identify and understand these variations.

The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Project will relate and will consider these papers and discussions as part of the accumulated knowledge base that will serve the expansion of common understanding and action within the Euro-Med partners.

Our project set forth the Early Warning (EW) capacity building with a view to make it possible to take preventive action when and if action is required. It remains to be seen if a capacity for Early Warning is relevant in a Euro-Med framework.

To answer this a number of factors will be taken into consideration; those factors that have emerged in this workshop:

- It is noted that a more flexible format is necessary, so as to include countries and trends not comprised in the Euro/Med Partnership (EMP), still significant to its development.

- Due to existing perceptions, there are limitations on political will and cooperation in the EMP framework, particularly at the official level;
- With regards to avenues of future cooperation within the EMP countries, it is noted that such cooperation must be functional and limited to specific tasks, with a view to attenuate security dilemmas in a context of cooperative security.

While waiting for conditions to permit wider political cooperation between the EMP partners, the above-mentioned factors can be taken into consideration. It is seen that Early Warning can be implemented in Conflict Avoidance and Prevention, People to People relations format, as illustrated by HRH Prince El Hassan Bin Talal, during an audience over the deliberations of the ~~Seminar~~ *Workshop*.

In this sense the exercise envisaged by the JID and IAI, in the fram-work of this project, should first of all be trusted to a network of think tanks and NGO's, while remaining open to official quarters, thus working as a CBM. The project must also be gradual in its application, starting form the monitoring of a group of countries and tackling the question of asymmetries in the area at a later stage. This framework must be formulated in a "thoughtful memorandum" addressed to the EMP Senior Officials, also to the League of Arab States and the Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers.

I thank you all for your positive contributions to this ~~seminar~~ *Workshop*.

**PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE EURO-MED**  
**NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION:**  
**THE NORTHERN PERSPECTIVE**

Paper prepared for the workshop on:  
Concepts and Models of Security in the Euro – Mediterranean  
- Partner Countries

The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy  
November (5-6), 2000  
Amman - Jordan

**Dr. Roberto Aliboni**  
Director of Studies  
International Affairs Institute  
Rome - Italy

## PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE EURO-MED NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION: THE NORTHERN PERSPECTIVE

*Roberto Aliboni*<sup>1</sup>

workshop on "Perceptions and Concepts of Security in the EMP Countries"  
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy-JID and International Affairs Institute-IAI  
Amman, 5-6 November 2000

The Southern Mediterranean World is viewed as an anarchic and underdeveloped world. It is a world ridden with various forms of domestic instability, controlled by authoritarian regimes lacking legitimacy, engulfed with deep economic deformities, and crises, and lacking democracy.

Mohammed El-Sayed Selim<sup>2</sup>

The area currently encompassed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) reflects fairly well the broad Western perception of the new strategic situation established by the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Council described this situation very aptly in the strategic concept it approved in Rome in 1991, though it wanted to refer primarily to the European East: "Risks to Alliance security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes ... The tensions that may result ... could lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts"<sup>3</sup>.

As a matter of fact, no state in the Mediterranean areas comprised in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is regarded as being capable to conduct a full military attack on the European Union (EU) countries and, in fact, no such threat is minimally perceived or even taken into consideration in the Northern part of the Euro-Med area. The national security of the EU countries or that of their alliances, from a military point of view, is not in question, nor any armed conflict is expected.

In contrast, the North perceives a set of risks and challenges emanating from Southern political, social and economic conditions of instability, both in the domestic and inter-state arenas. The effects of this instability are regarded in the North as factors that can affect in a negative way the democratic regimes, the social order, and the economic affluence that characterise today's EU nations. In other words: EU security in a broader rather than military sense.

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<sup>1</sup> Director of Studies, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

<sup>2</sup> "Southern Mediterranean Perceptions of Security Co-operation and the Role of NATO", in H.G. Brauch, A. Marquina, A. Biad (eds.), *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century*, MacMillan Press & St. Martin Press, London & New York, 2000, pp. 129-146; p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> See Part I, point 10 of "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991", in *NATO Handbook*, Brussels 1995.

This paper discusses, first of all, the factors of Southern instability perceived by the Northern members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It takes into consideration two arguments: (a) the intra- and inter-state factors that generate instability in Southern Mediterranean areas and, in the EU perceptions, constitute sources of risk for the EU stability; (b) the spill-over effects from such Southern instability that - once again, in the EU's eyes - affect European stability. In its last section, the paper draws some conclusions.

### Sources of risk

A number of principal factors are regarded by the West as causes - either structural or proximate - of instability in the Southern Mediterranean area. The shaky foundations and performances of the regional economies are among them along with their social implications. This paper, however, refers to three basic political factors: (a) the unsteady legitimacy of political regimes; (b) the relevance of systemic oppositions to the authority of the secular state and international order; and (c) the unresolved and fresh conflict in the area. These factors concern mostly the Arab states, though some of them involve Israel and Turkey as well.

*(a) the unsteady legitimacy of political regimes* - The Arab states cannot be regarded as weak states, in the sense of states undermined by serious structural flaws or fault-lines, though the states in the Levant may be closer to such weakness because of the peculiar legacy of both colonisation and decolonisation<sup>4</sup>. In fact, the end of the Cold War, while exposing such weakness in the former Soviet Union and in Western Balkans, has witnessed a remarkable stability on the part of the Middle Eastern and North African states. In contrast, these states feature a weak legitimacy of their political regimes. This weak legitimacy of the Arab states is laid on the continued importance of their need for authenticity - be it pan-Arab or Islamic - with respect to other political discourses.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim<sup>5</sup> notes that legitimacy, in the form of an "implicit social contract, forged by the elites in the 1950s, had been predicated on a 'trade-off' between genuine political participation and palpable improvement in the quality of life of the citizens as well as the heady excitement of Arab nationalism. In other words, political freedom was sacrificed on the high altar of Arab nationalism". Having failed to establish a powerful pan-Arab state subsequently, the Arab regimes have grown discredited. After the end of the Cold War, there were attempts by the same regimes to guide transitions towards democracy to reset the foundations of their legitimacy. However, these attempts proved broadly unsuccessful.

In fact, incumbent regimes face objective domestic situations that do not ease a transition to democracy. Their problem is not to compromise with relevant liberal oppositions in order to shift the foundations of legitimacy by moving to the establishment of some forms of democracy. The real and relevant opposition does not come from those who ask for the establishment of democracy in view of the non

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<sup>4</sup> R. Aliboni, P. Miggiano, *Conflict and Its Sources in the Near East and North Africa. A Conflict Prevention Perspective*, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Papers No. 81, 1999, Cairo.

<sup>5</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites and Democratization in the Arab World", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 292-305; quotation at p. 293.



execution of the contract (liberal are almost not there<sup>6</sup>), but from those who insist for the contract to be fulfilled (as of today, more in an Islamic than nationalist framework, though). In this context, if the governments dropped authenticity and moved to establish more democratic institutions, they would encounter serious opposition and almost no support and would hardly be able to survive. Thus, the regimes are hostages to their early legitimacy. As they are unable or unwilling to deliver in terms of this legitimacy and have no alternative base of consensus altogether, all they retain is a tormented and weak power which do not allow for political reform, bold foreign policies and quick economic innovation. As seen by the EU point of view, weak incumbent governments are a first important source of instability.

*(b) the relevance of systemic oppositions to state's authority and international order* - Today's significant oppositions to Arab governments - and related concerns - come from religious rather than nationalist quarters, however. In the 1990s, Western and EU perceptions with respect to Islamism have oscillated and so have policies. There was a wide debate about political Islam and what to do with it, where two main positions do emerged.

On one hand, after the 1990-91 Gulf War, Western perceptions of Islamism and its impact became acute as a result of domestic reactions stirred by this War in most Arab countries, in particular in Egypt, in occupied Palestine and in Algeria. The apparent expansion and strength of political Islam emerged as a major concern for at least two reasons; because, for one thing, it was perceived as a threat to Arab governments currently engaged in the Middle East process and, for the other, it was more easily associated to Islamic presence in Europe in view of the large Algerian community in France, increasing immigration in Europe and the participation of veterans from the Afghani wars to military operations in the Western Balkans. These developments appeared to confer to Islamism a more palpable global dimension and make its impact beyond MENA borders more likely.

Perceptions of such international Islamicist projection combined with emerging ideas in Western countries about the enhanced role cultural and identitarian factors were expected to play in post-Cold War international relations and the clashes these factors would bring about. In this framework, NATO, a little hastily, went so far as to identify Islamism and Islam as the new global threat to the West after the end of Communism.

On the other hand, the raise of political Islam was regarded as an aspect of the need for the MENA polities to introduce political reform and pluralism. In a sense, this view was in tune with the typical democratic triumphalism that was prevailing in the West as a consequence of the end of Communism. The argument was that, provided they renounced violence and accepted the rules of the democratic game (most of all, the alternance to power), Islamist parties and groupings had to be considered legitimate oppositions and be integrated in national political processes within the framework of democratic reforms. The inherent systemic character of Islamicist oppositions to the kind of Westphalian-like and secular states that have gradually

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<sup>6</sup> Paul E. Salem, "Arab Political Currents, Arab-European Relations and Mediterraneanism", in L. Guazzone (ed.), *The Middle East in Global Change*, MacMillan Press & St. Martin's Press, London, New York, 1997, pp. 23-42.

grown up in the MENA after the French Revolution, was broadly trivialised by stressing the unacceptability of "culturalist" interpretations<sup>7</sup>.

This point of view has been strongly supported by Western non-governmental organisations (e.g. the St. Egidio Community in Italy) as well as academic circles and has strongly influenced official Western policies. Developments in Algeria have been - particularly for Europe - a most important test of such views and policies. Islamist leaders, considered as terrorists by - to stick to the case - the Algerian government, were given political asylum in European countries and in the United States. In general, the distrust towards the authoritarian and illegitimate character of the Algerian military regime overweighed concerns over Islamicist violence. The use of violence by the Algerian state was regarded as state-terrorism, to the extent it was exercised by a poorly legitimated incumbent power, so that Islamicist violence (though not their terrorism) was rather regarded as a legitimate resistance. This state of affairs continued approximately up to mid-nineties. The expulsion of a number of Algerian leaders from the United States and Europe coincided with a change in Western governmental policies.

Today, MENA terrorism is being reconsidered by Western governments. The change is partly due to economic interests (definitely in the Algerian case) but also to a more realistic appreciation of the adverse domestic impact of Islamicist violence and religious political opposition on allied regional governments and the propagation of such violence to near European countries as well as farther as the United States. This is not to say that there is a complete convergence among the Northern and Southern countries concerned. However, at least at the governmental level, the Western and European perspective has substantially changed. Political Islam is regarded as an important factor of instability in the MENA countries, though not necessarily a factor of terrorism, with negative implications for the West and the EU. In the end, while the apocalyptic and very poorly-articulated view of political Islam as a total and global risk has not been accepted, the basic orientation on which that view was laid is presently shaping Western and European perceptions and policy-making.

In Israel, political stability is assured by long-standing democratic institutions. Still, it is being undermined for causes and in a context that differ from the Arab countries but have similar effects. In a recent analysis, the post-1967-War dissolution of the "Ben-Gurionist" strategic antagonism with the adjoining regional countries has given way to a search for political solutions that have, in turn, stirred the rise of an Israeli ethno-nationalism strenuously opposing such solutions on the basis of forms of ideological exclusivism and religious extremism that were alien to early Zionism. Ethno-nationalist trends have been compounded by social changes in the Israeli fabric stemming from modernisation, growing income inequalities and immigration of Jewish communities socially deprived with respect to the existing Israeli elite. Mark Heller points out that "the most notable consequence of these social changes was the emergence of a coalition between the forces of Land Israel-focused ethno-nationalists, stimulated by a sense of national deprivation, and sub-group identities (especially among North-African voters), encouraged by a sense of relative communitarian

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<sup>7</sup> Shireen T. Hunter, "The Rise of Islamist Movements and the Western Response: Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Interests?", in L. Guazzone (ed.), *The Islamist Dilemma*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1995, pp. 317-350.

deprivation''<sup>8</sup>. These trends have given way to political fragmentation, on one hand, and Jewish domestic terrorism and violence, on the other.

These trends are similar to those prevailing in the Arab world. In particular, it must be noted that, beside the use of terrorism and the spreading of violence, the most important political outcome is the emergence of weak governments, based on fragmented coalitions. Successive Israeli governments, both on the ethno-nationalist and democratic sides, have been strongly conditioned and weakened by the smallest parties in their respective coalitions. Such conditioning comes, more often than not, from religious parties, to which the early Israeli secular state is gradually yielding, in the same way early Arab secular states do with a view to mollify religious oppositions. The weakening of the secular character of MENA secular states as well as that of governments and regimes is in itself a cause of instability, domestically and internationally. By the way, it is definitely one of the most important motives of the inconclusive outcome of the Middle East peace process.

(c) *unresolved and fresh violent conflict in the area* - The average public opinion in Europe - and more broadly speaking, in the West - perceives the MENA area as a conflict-ridden area. This perception, though, doesn't account in general of changes in the character of conflict that have derived from the end of the East-West confrontation. In fact, reference is still made to a region affected by instability stemming most of all from inter-state conflict waged by conventional warfare. In contrast, instability, as of today, is coming from intra-state conflict, where lower violence prevails in the form of terrorism, guerrilla and insurgency and threats stems from non conventional factors in the form of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) proliferation.

In fact, the end of the Cold War has strongly curtailed the military capabilities of a number of Southern Mediterranean countries and changed their strategic and political perspective. One consequence of such curtailment, coupled by worsening economic conditions, has been a trend towards acquiring WMD, as weapons with a perceived most effective expenditure/impact ratio. Another important consequence of changes in the political/strategic perspective, has been that the most relevant conflicts in the area - in particular, the Western Sahara and Arab-Israeli conflicts - have militarily declined and entered negotiations. The situation that prevails today in the area is one where major conflicts are not resolved or completely resolved as yet, still they are terminated, in the sense that political and military conditions are likely to prevent them from re-erupting as inter-state armed conflict. The terminated (i.e. politically unresolved) character of major Southern Mediterranean conflicts<sup>9</sup> has, to a considerable extent, shifted violence from the international to the domestic arena. In fact, as we have already seen, the peace processes the governments have been compelled into by changes in the international context, have raised strong domestic opposition from nationalist as well as religious quarters and contributed to weaken their legitimacy. As a result, while inter-state conflict is suppressed, domestic violent conflict have increased, in the form of political turmoil, terrorism, guerrilla, and insurgency, according to cases.

It must be noted that the increase of domestic conflict in the MENA does not compare

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<sup>8</sup> *Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 335, London; p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> Aliboni, Miggiano, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

with the developments that took place in the European East as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the Soviet "empire". While domestic conflicts in the European East, particularly in the Caucasus and the Western Balkans, have been triggered by the collapse of state structures, in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East these structures have not collapsed at all, so that conflict has not assumed the same disruptive character as in the European East. Even in the worst such domestic Southern Mediterranean conflicts, i.e. the Islamist attack to the Algerian state, the latter upheld a relatively high degree of what Baker and Weller call "sustainable security"<sup>10</sup> and proved capable to survive by repressing Islamicist violence. The case of sustainable security has resulted even more clearly in the opposition between the Turkish state and the PKK. One important implication of this solidity of the state is the relatively low relevance of domestic turmoil in terms of international security (contrary to what happened in the European East), i.e. in terms of secessionist or irredentist trends.

In conclusion, the current character of conflict in the MENA area is more intra-state than inter-state and what is contested is more government than territory (to use SIPRI's concepts<sup>11</sup>). Though it is diverse from the more traditional situation ordinarily perceived by public opinion, such conflict configuration is perceived in the West and in the EU as a source of instability, beside those mentioned earlier. First, the instability deriving from domestic conflict compounds the factors that presently contribute to weaken governments and regimes, in particular they ability to proceed to gradual political reform and contribute to international order and stability.

Second, that major conflicts are terminated and violence has shifted towards domestic arenas does not mean that the Mediterranean as a whole is free of international tensions, crises and more or less latent conflicts<sup>12</sup>. It may well be that the existing geopolitical configuration will continue to prevent inter-state conflict from erupting. Still, domestic conflict weakens governments' ability to come to terms with unresolved inter-state conflict and such inability fatally translates into more domestic conflict, low-violence in international relations and hostile relations between regional states. All in all, both terminated and domestic conflict give the area a character of accentuated instability.

### **The outcome of instability: spill-over effects**

- What is, in the eyes of the West and Europe, the outcome of these instability sources (that add to socio-economic factors that have not been taken into consideration in this paper)? The two great alliances of the West, NATO and the EU, have provided similar responses to this question.

The updated NATO's "strategic concept" approved at the 1999 North Atlantic Council gathering in Washington D.C.<sup>13</sup> summarises members' vision and perceptions with respect to the character and fundamentals of their security and the vital interests

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<sup>10</sup> I.e. the ability of the state to perform basic functions (e.g. police and justice) effectively enough as to prevent it from collapsing; see P. Baker, A. Weller, *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners*, The Fund For Peace, Washington D.C., 1998.

<sup>11</sup> See, in the series of annual reports, M. Sollenberg (ed.), *States in Armed Conflict 1995*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Report No. 43, Uppsala, 1996.

<sup>12</sup> Laura Guazzone, "Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January-March, pp. 83-102, 2000.

<sup>13</sup> See NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999 ([www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999p99-065e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999p99-065e.htm))

that could be affected by external instability. This vision is referred to the broad international environment. However, the southern and south-eastern approaches to Europe are more specifically alluded to by the emphasis of the document on proximity. Paragraph 20 in the updated strategic concept deserves a full quotation<sup>14</sup>:

Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the long term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

Further to this general statement, paragraph 24 in the same document lists risks specifically perceived by the Alliance. Beside risks (as "the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance" and "proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery") that may translate into military threats to the Alliance and thus give way to defensive responses on the basis of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, the updated strategic concepts points out the existence of emerging risks "of a wider nature" concerning interests that are perceived as vital to the Alliance. These risks include "acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and ... the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance". The emergence of these risks allows for opening consultation inside the Alliance and give way to action, if it needs to, under Art. 4 of the Treaty (something the European allies were not willing to accept during the Cold War).

As far as the EU is concerned, European perceptions were very neatly expressed in the words of a distinguished German official of the EU Commission, who played a prominent role in bringing about the Barcelona Declaration: "Europe wishes to see as its southern rim a group of countries that will not: be at war with each other; be destabilised by socio-political conflicts; export terrorism or drugs to Europe; threaten Europe's social stability by continued or even sharply increased flows of illegal immigration".<sup>15</sup> With respect to its southern approaches, these perceptions - similar to those expressed by NATO - have given way to the EU's EMP initiative, where they are fully reflected, from WMD proliferation through illegal immigration.

EU concerns are even more clearly illustrated by the last draft of the Euro-Med

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<sup>14</sup> It must be underscore here that the analysis of the strategic concept encompasses varying areas - like the Balkans and the Caucasus - further to MENA's; for this reason it differs from the analysis given in the first section of this paper: for example, it contemplates the "dissolution of states" which in contrast, as argued in the above, has nothing to do with MENA areas.

<sup>15</sup> Eberhardt Rhein, "Europe and the Mediterranean: A Newly Emerging Geographic Area?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp. 79-86.

Charter for Peace and Stability, the document that Euro-Med parties have negotiated in the last years with the purpose of attaining a more focused concept of shared security than the Barcelona Declaration managed to do. The draft of the Charter emphasises the so-called "new transnational risks"<sup>16</sup>, i.e. "terrorism", "organised crime and any kind of trafficking, especially regarding women and children. drugs, money laundering, cybercrime and illegal migration"<sup>17</sup>.

Differences between NATO and the EU are, however, significant and have to be noted. They concern objectives, institutional frameworks, and policy-responses.

Two main possible tiers of adverse effects are perceived to come from Southern instabilities: on one hand, effects on Western and European broad "vital" national interests, in a mostly external perspective; on the other, a number of spill-over effects that reach out and affect internal settings and domestic order, particularly as European and EU countries are concerned. While challenges to external vital interests are a main concern to NATO, the EU is principally concerned by challenges to internal order and stability.

These two different perspectives entail different policy responses. NATO provides essentially military responses. These military responses entail the use of military instruments for military purposes proper (defence, pre-emption, combat, etc.) or the purpose of security co-operation (military training, peace support operations, etc.). The EU has provided so far responses of essentially economic and civilian character. Currently, it is developing a military capability for the purpose of security co-operation (the Common European Security and Defence Policy). However, in the Barcelona process, as it was renegotiated in the Euro-Med Charter, there is no doubt that civilian purposes will by far continue to prevail. Consequently, EU policy responses in the EMP framework will continue to focus on developmental and "soft security" co-operation.

A final difference between NATO and the EU regards the institutional framework: while NATO is the alliance of a Western group of countries, the EMP - though stemming from a EU initiative - is a shared framework for co-operation between Northern and Southern countries across the Mediterranean basin. Although NATO and the EU came to conceive of a similar list of risks, it must not be overlooked that EU/EMP's list reflects a considerable degree of consensus among the Northern and Southern parties, whereas NATO's list is a unilateral statement. Consequently, while action is taken by NATO on the basis of its own decisions, the EMP must share decisions in order to take eventually action. The existence of the EMP is for the EU (as well as its southern Partners) an important guarantee against misperceptions and mistaken action.

What matters here is less policy responses and decision-making than objectives. In terms of objectives what singles out EU basic perception towards its southern approaches, in particular the EMP areas, is that risks relating to vital interests and the external environment (like WMD proliferation or oil supply disruptions) are almost ignored or, in any case, given much less importance than in NATO and the United

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<sup>16</sup> Alessandro Politi, *European Security: the New Transnational Risks*, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Chaillot Papers No. 29, October 1997.

<sup>17</sup> Quotation is made from the last draft of the Charter discussed by the Senior Officials of the EMP before the 14-14 November 2000 summit in Marseilles.

States<sup>18</sup>. In contrast, perceptions concentrates on spill-over effects, which are perceived as factors intruding in the political, social and economic order that, especially after the end of the Cold War, has grown so important in defining the identity and aspirations of the EU countries and citizens.

Such perceived intrusions generate concerns. These concerns, in turn, trigger two kinds of significantly different responses. One kind of response is rejection of evils that are assumed to come from outside and to be brought in by alien people. This response can be called "conservative" (or even "backlash"). The other kind of response - that can be defined as "open" (or "innovative") - is acceptance but, at the same time, difficulty to act in order to include effective and timely change in European politics and societies. The most common response in the EU today is the second one. This response needs to be given at three levels: the states, the EU (i.e. the common policies relating to the so-called EU "common space of freedom, security and justice" which is intended to define and regulate personal statutes of individuals, be they citizens or immigrants, in the whole of the Union), and the special frameworks for co-operation to which the EU countries are parties, the EMP being the one concerning EU more immediate southern approaches.

This threefold response is very difficult to provide, for it requires a change in EU members' long-standing perceptions and customs that, at the same time, has to be translated into shared common solutions at the EU level.

Let's now consider EU perceptions with respect to (a) the kind of most commonly perceived spill-over effects, as listed by the Barcelona Declaration in its third chapter and - now in more detail - by the Euro-Med Charter and (b) the case of immigration from the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Spill-over effects like terrorism, international crime the different kinds of trafficking receive obviously a universal negative consideration. Immigration, in contrast, is the typical issue that gives way to the opposition between "conservative" and "open" views we have just talked about. What characterises the conservative view on immigration is that it emphasises its links with other transnational risks like terrorism and crime.

Immigration is not a threat to employment, though unemployment is currently fairly high in Western Europe. With a European demographic growth approaching zero (particularly in Southern Europe) and a very poor propensity by young Europeans to accept menial jobs and mobility, immigrants are in fact almost badly needed economically. Still, the perception that immigrants take over jobs is also diffuse as part of a wider perception of intrusion. This misperception, like others, comes from the fact that Western Europe, when coming to the crux of the matter, is poorly prepared to accept immigration (or more immigration) because of political and, most of all, cultural reasons. As we have pointed out, those open to change face a situation difficult to overcome.

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<sup>18</sup> On this point see the paper this author has presented to the meeting of experts organised by the Institut des Etudes Politiques Méditerranéens, *EU Security Towards the Mediterranean. The Role of Southern Europe*, Monaco, July 17-18, 2000 (mimeo) and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The United States and the Mediterranean*, paper presented at the conference organised by the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais in Oporto, 22-23 June 1998 (mimeo), p. 13.

Situations are varying from country to country, because of very different legal, historical, political and cultural legacies towards immigration and citizenship. While in Great Britain and other Northern European countries there is an articulated relationship between communities and the state, which allows for the presence of even numerous immigrants' groups and a relatively high degree of cultural-political autonomy of the latter, in Southern Europe and in Germany this same relationship is definitely less flexible. This lack of flexibility makes relations with culturally assertive communities, like Muslim ones, very difficult, for these communities either don't accept assimilation (a mainly French solution) or (like in Germany, Spain and Italy) just feel discriminated and marginalised because, as well as they may be treated (but definitely this is not always the case), they don't get the identitarian recognition they wish.

As a result of difficulties in accommodating a growing migration from the Mediterranean and other numerous areas (among which the Balkans play a political role definitely more important than that played by Mediterranean peoples), in Europe xenophobia and racism are increasing and giving way to organised political movements. Besides exacerbating tensions stemming from migration anyway, these developments put strains on the democratic character of the European polities.

This is a first important risk perceived today in Europe by concerned democratic people and leaderships (those bringing in innovative views). At the beginning of the nineties, the EU Commission had explicitly warned about such risk and consequently advocated the necessity of a more articulated and important European Mediterranean policy.

A second perceived risk comes from political links between immigrated groups, notably Muslims, and respective sending countries. European inability and unwillingness to integrate immigrated people, increasingly turning into xenophobic and racist criminal attacks to individuals and groups or mistreatments, is resented by Muslim and Arab public opinion in sending countries as an evidence of a wider and fundamental European-Christian hostility towards Islam and Arabs. In this respect, it is linked to early European hesitations to intervene in Bosnia to defend Muslims. This alleged European hostility stirs in Muslim communities a sense of danger and reinforces their spontaneous identitarian assertiveness. Islamist activism is diffuse in Europe as a form of defence and identitarian assertiveness backed by substantive relations with religious-political organisations at home. In this way, migration brings the Islamist movements' anti-Western hostility inside Europe and tends to exacerbate difficulties in international relations.

To a large extent, immigration is a source of conflict and instability just because the European states are unable to agree on common policies. Joint policies to regulate immigration are now operated within the Schengen agreement (which provides for free movements of European citizens among a number of EU member states). Efforts to come to joint policies in immigration and related issues (asylum, citizenship) have started within the third pillar of the Amsterdam treaty, where difficulties are raising, however, from the very mixed institutional character of this pillar between intergovernmental and communitarian competencies. For these reasons, EU policies with respect to immigrated people are either weak or non existent. The immigration-relating risks Europeans are perceiving are thus largely due to European policy-inertia.



To some extent, the link between migration and Islamicist anti-Western attitude we have just talked about, explains also European perceptions of entanglements between immigration and terrorism. Immigration, in fact, brings about an environment in which terrorists are able to move with relative ease. While MENA terrorism is a new development in the United States, Europe is not new to terrorism coming from these regions. Sometime Europe is no more than a logistic base or a battlefield, like in the Munich Olympic games or the "Mikonos" affair. In other cases, Europe is more or less directly involved for its past colonial links (as in the case of France with current Algerian terrorism) or because it is regarded as a more or less direct player with respect to Islamists' domestic and international interests.

Finally, immigration and terrorism may link up with international criminality. Though an evil in itself, illegal immigration is more and more becoming a business managed by international criminality, functionally or operationally associated with other kinds of traffics, like drugs and armaments. Illegal traffic organised by international criminal gangs are another effects of instability. Intra-state and inter-state conflict as well as terrorism start the vicious circles of drugs and displaced persons trafficking in order to finance arms transfers. The unfinished cycle of conflict in the Balkans and in Northern Iraq-South-eastern Anatolia have shown the strict and formidable intermingling of criminality, conflicts and migrations.

These developments generate sheer rejection, xenophobia and racism in diffuse segments of European people. In contrast they are generating a painful and difficult process of middle- long-term innovation and change in the most responsible segments of European societies and governments. What is at stake is not only international co-operation and good-neighbourly relations with the Mediterranean, the Middle Eastern and the South-eastern European states, but first of all the survival and reinforcement of the democratic identity the Europeans are so proud of.

## **Conclusions**

This paper identifies the political sources of instability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as they are perceived by the West and, more particularly, the Europeans. It discusses three basic such political sources: (a) the unsteady legitimacy of political regimes; (b) the relevance of systemic oppositions to the authority of the secular state and international order; and (c) the unresolved and fresh conflict in the area.

The outcomes of these instabilities are perceived by the West and EU as risks for their assumed vital interests, as listed by the 1999 NATO updated strategic concept, as well as for a set of spill-over effects, mostly regarding soft-security issues like - to quote the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - "terrorism ... organised crime and any kind of trafficking, especially regarding women and children. drugs, money laundering, cybercrime and illegal migration". While, in a global context, the EU states perceive risks to vital interests and envisage military or military-related responses from NATO, in regional contexts like the EMP, they perceive essentially non-military risks and look for civilian and developmental responses.

EU responses to these intrusive perceptions are either conservative or innovative. The case of immigration is illustrative and paradigmatic. While conservative responses bring about rejection, xenophobia and racism, innovative responses looks for integration and inclusion, but have to deal with very difficult tasks. The EMP initiative is one such innovative responses. Its implementation, however, entails the

very hard challenge of changing long-standing EU national attitudes and policies with respect to complex challenges like immigration, while preparing shared common solutions within the Union. The accomplishment of this task will require a long while, with respect to challenges that demands, in contrast, for quick responses.

For this reason, co-operation in the EMP will not be as easy and prompt as it would be wished. It is however, the right path to walk on.

European perceptions may appear exaggerated or mistaken in Southern Mediterranean eyes, as it is witnessed by Prof. Selim's passage quoted at the top of this paper. Still, they are realities that must be unveiled and investigated if they have to be changed and overcome.

**PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE EURO-MED**  
**THE SOUTHERN DIMENTION**

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# **PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE EURO-MED NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION: THE SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE**

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Perceptions of security are functions of perceptions of threat, where perceptions of security are developed to respond to certain perceptions of threat. However, perceptions of security are not merely perceptions of threat transposed. Rather, they are the concepts formulated to address the conceived threats within the possible means and circumstances. In other words, the difference between threat and security is much more than the latter being the opposite of the former. While people enjoy free hand developing their perceptions of threat, they do not have the same freedom formulating their perceptions of security. It is the security dilemma, where absolute security is not attainable, looked at from a different angle.

Addressing perceptions of security in the EMP is a difficult job considering the wide range of variations among the countries and groups of countries making up the Euro Mediterranean region. While it is possible, with only limited difficulty, to study the perceptions of security in the northern banks of the Mediterranean, it is much difficult to do the same with the Southern countries. Variations among the non-European EMP's partners do not allow a subject titled 'the Southern Mediterranean perceptions of security' to make much sense. For the sake of simplicity, talking about the Southern Mediterranean countries in this paper means only the Arab partners in the EMP, unless otherwise is explicitly mentioned.

## Determinants of Perceptions of Security

### in the Southern Mediterranean Countries

Few observations should be made at the outset of this section, as follows.

1. Focusing on the Arab members of the EMP does not take heterogeneity off the scene in the Southern Mediterranean. Although all Arab countries are members in the League of Arab States, the League is not by any means a decision making body that coordinate the policies of Arab states. It is rather a forum, where the common concerns of member countries are discussed. The resolutions of the Arab League have moral power rather than being binding to the member states. Among the causes of such a trend is the weak institutional structure of the Arab League. Another cause is that most of the common concerns addressed within the Arab League are derived from the ideology of Pan Arabism, rather than from the interests of the member states. Particularly at the time being, Pan Arabism is the ideology of the system of Arab states, especially the Arab League, but not the ideology of any particular Arab government. Therefore, each Arab government has its own concepts of security. Within this highly fragmented reality, two groups of countries could be identified: the Mashreq and Maghreb countries, where greater deal of similarity is found within each group.
2. The limitation of addressing issues of threat and security in the context of the EMP should be recognized. The EMP is exclusively designed to address issues of soft security (Tanner, 1996, p. 57). But soft security issues do not exhaust the security concerns of the countries members to the EMP. In fact, the

incomprehensive nature of the EMP in the field of security could cause a lot of disruption for the whole process. Some of the parties to the EMP can't leave their hard security concerns outside the EMP just for the sake of the success of the EuroMed partnership. This is particularly true for most of the Mashreq countries.

3. The political and security concerns of Arab members in the EMP have not much to do with their partner, i.e., the EU. Arab countries do not conceive Europe as a threat. Therefore, the rising security relations between Arab countries and the EU within the EMP are not geared toward addressing the mutual security concerns. This situation is radically different from the experience of many other security organizations, such as the Helsinki process and the CSCE, where the mutual security concerns across the rift that divided Europe, East and West, were addressed. While the EU countries go to the EMP to address what they conceive as security threats stemming from the Southern Mediterranean, the Southern countries head toward the EMP seeking a lift in dealing with their southern in-house threats. Arab countries, generally speaking, do not conceive the political and security dimensions of the EMP independent of their political and security concerns in the MENA region. These are, after all, their main concerns. They go to the EMP arena with the purpose of attaining assets that could help them deal with their principal MENA-based concerns.
4. There is still, however, a major difference between the Mashreq and Maghreb countries in that regard. While the political and security concerns the Maghreb countries bring to the EMP are mainly intrastate, the Mashreq countries bring to the EMP

interstate type of political and security concerns. The latter concerns are centered on the Arab Israeli conflict, which proved to be a major obstacle to cooperation across the Mediterranean. This could be the reason for the observed readiness among the Maghreb countries to proceed faster with the Barcelona process. The Maghreb countries' perceptions of threat and security are in congruence with their European counterparts and the EMP, where the focus is on soft security issues and intrastate conflicts. While the Mashreq countries are not less inflicted with intrastate conflicts and in-house based threats, the Arab Israeli conflict overwhelmingly dominates their security agenda and lays other security concerns on the back burner. The Mashreq countries' focus on interstate rivalries and issues of hard security does not match the soft security orientation of the EMP. This lacking of congruence causes considerable frustration among the Mashreq countries. Frequently, such frustration is brought to the EMP and causes frequent lapses in the process.

5. Recognizing the common features and characteristics among the countries of the Mashreq and Maghreb groups, there is still a large room for differentiation among the countries of each of the two groups. A number of factors determine the specific trends prevailing in each country. Among these are history, domestic power structures and overall policy choices. Few hypotheses could be made in that regard.

The higher the cost of past colonialism on the country, the higher the focus it makes on interstate rivalries and hard security issues.

The higher the cost of past colonialism on the country, the higher the suspicions it has toward the foreign parties.

Peoples and governments in countries that had harsh experience with colonialism are more likely to subscribe to conflict-laden worldviews.

Peoples and governments in countries that were ruled by radical regimes in the postcolonial era are more likely to focus on interstate rivalries and hard security issues.

Peoples and governments in countries that were ruled by radical regimes in the postcolonial era are more likely to be suspicious regarding foreign parties.

Peoples and governments in countries that were ruled by radical regimes in the postcolonial era are more likely to subscribe to conflict-laden worldviews.

The higher the country's involvement in the Arab Israeli conflict, the higher the focus it makes on hard security issues, and the higher the focus it makes on conflict rather than cooperation, and the higher the suspicions it has toward foreign parties.

6. It is difficult, sometimes, for countries of the southern Mediterranean to differentiate between Europe and the US. The multiple intersections between different Western institutions that bring both Europe and the US together make such distinction a hard job. The Leading role the US plays in the Myriad of Western institutions makes such a distinction even harder. It is not unusual for Arab political activists and intellectuals to aggregate the US and Europe in one bundle under the rubric of 'The West'. The suspicions Arabs have toward the US for its biased Middle East policy inflict considerable damage to Arabs' perception of the EMP.



7. There are a number of competing perceptions of threat and security within the southern Mediterranean countries. These competing perceptions correspond to different ideological trends, each of which has his own interpretation of the regional and national reality and his vision for the desired future. Ibrahim (1996) has identified four visions for the future Arab Middle East: Islamist, Pan Arabist, liberal and leftist Marxist. Interestingly, the ruling elite in most Arab countries does not subscribe to any of these ideological trends. Arab ruling elites rather subscribe to variations of what can be called a 'nationalist statist ideology'. This situation suggests a considerable level of lack of national consensus vis a' vis perceptions of threat and security. Although most of the discussion in this paper focuses on the perceptions adopted by the legitimate government, other perceptions should not be completely discarded. This is particularly important since a great deal of governmental policies and perceptions are formulated a) to minimize the influence of the counter visions and perceptions, and b) to accommodate these visions and perceptions too. In his discussion of the Middle East peace process, Khouri (1998, p. 339), has warned that unless the deepening sense of alienation among the proponents of counter visions and attitudes is addressed "the entire peace process might collapse in maelstrom of warfare and terror". The current violent developments in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza proved Khouri right, and his analysis for the Middle East peace process is highly relevant to the EMP with only minor adjustment.

8. Related to the previous observation, internal stability, or rather regime survival, is a major security concern for Arab

governments. Regime survival constitutes an indivisible part of perceptions of security prevalent in the region. Two main mutually reinforcing factors contribute to this trend: a) the absence of democratic polities, and b) the tension between the rival types of collective identities prevalent in the region, on the one hand, and the state system present in it, on the other hand. A great deal of the security concerns and decisions made by governments in the South, including perceptions and decisions toward the EMP, is derived from their domestic political concerns.

### **Security Concerns in the Arab Mediterranean Countries**

The aforementioned observations in mind, security concerns in the Arab Mediterranean countries could be delineated as follows.

#### **a. Not to jeopardize the essential security interest in the MENA region itself**

As has been explained earlier, Arab countries, particularly in the Mashreq, are very much concerned with their political and security concerns stemming from the MENA region. Although the EMP is expected to facilitate the handling of some of these essential security concerns, particularly the soft security ones, the hard security concerns left out of the EMP process are serious enough not to be ignored. These are the security concerns related to the unfinished business of the Middle East peace process, the introduction of WMD to the Middle East, and the lack of working regional security regimes. Arab Middle Eastern countries are concerned about the risk of tradeoff between

making progress on soft security concerns in the one hand and perpetuating the unaccepted status quo vis à vis hard security issues on the other hand.

Arab concerns in that regard are not baseless. The EMP approach to Mediterranean security focuses on conflict prevention and confidence building rather than conflict resolution. Conflict prevention measures are primarily status quo oriented, while Arab countries conceive the same status quo as unacceptable. In particular, the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, depriving the Palestinian people of the right to exercise their right to self determination, and the Israeli arsenal of nuclear weapons are the main aspects of the current regional situation that Arabs seek changing. Arabs are concerned that engaging in conflict prevention and confidence building prior to reaching a just solution for the hanging problems would legitimize the status quo and jeopardize the chances of changing the status quo into a more acceptable reality.

The EMP seeks confidence and partnership building between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean. The irony is that the lack of confidence among the southern countries derails the chances of building partnership across the Mediterranean. While this dilemma accentuates the importance of the indivisibility of security and security arrangements in the Mediterranean, it does not lend itself to easy solutions, neither it suggest a clear way out.

#### **b. Maintaining independence**

Arab Middle Eastern countries have demonstrated a great deal of interest in maintaining their national independence. In the current international system, the concerns of Arab governments are not about colonialism and imperialism in the conventional meaning of the terms. They are not either about economic imperialism. The concerns of Arab governments are centered around the intrusion of globalization on national sovereignty.

The forces of globalization are likely to reduce the power of governments on domestic affairs. The uniform economic and political reform proposals suggested by globalization hit a nerve in Arab politics. This, on the one hand, is seen as an indirect approach through which the developed center of the international system would penetrate national societies and politics. On the other hand, these developments would threaten the existing power structures in national politics. Arab governments demonstrate their readiness to resist these two types of intrusion. In fact, approaches to resist the two types of foreign intrusion are mutually reinforcing. Domestic reform is resisted since it might lead to facilitating foreign influence. At the same time, foreign influence is resisted not to risk the current domestic power structures.

What worries Arabs most, governments and people alike, is the increasing international acceptance and legitimacy of military intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries. Protection of human rights is perceived by Arabs as a mere pretext to justify foreign intervention. Arabs look with a great deal of suspicions to the increasing efforts to enhance the interventionist capacity of Western countries. By the same token, they see with suspicion the decreasing role of the UN in deciding whether and where to interfere (Gad, 2000). In the Arab World, the highly popular double standard argument underlies Arab attitude toward international intervention. With the incapable international community vis à vis Israeli reluctance to concede the Palestinian and Arab rights in mind, the human interventionist argument does have much credibility among Arabs.

**c. Accelerating economic and social development.**

Arab governments recognize the importance of improving the economic and social conditions of their peoples. This goal seems to have a great priority in most Arab countries. From a security point of view, this goal is twofold. On the one hand, improving the economic and social conditions of the

peoples of the Middle East became a must to maintain domestic stability and peace within the respected country. Arab governments pay great attention to achievements in the socioeconomic field in order to enhance their legitimacy and to compensate for the much slower progress they achieved in the area of political reform. In the Arab World, signs of political discontent are usually attributed to socioeconomic reasons.

On the other hand, Arab governments and public alike rightly tend to conceive socioeconomic development as a national security priority. Socioeconomic progress is sought to meet the challenges of the underdevelopment-based vulnerabilities. Arab governments and peoples became increasingly aware of this fact since the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

**d. Maintaining links with the fastly changing world.**

Arab countries demonstrate awareness of the importance of linking with the foreign world. For long, foreign countries have been sources for financial assistance, investment, technology, education, and modernizing ideas and ideologies. Linking with the outside world has two valuable mechanisms Arab governments want to maintain: allowing the flow of resources and ideas from the developed world into the society and the economy, and assuming a fairly active role in regional and international politics. In fact the two mechanisms of linking are mutually reinforcing. Economic and social development is essential to enhance the status of Arab states in regional and international arenas. This is particularly true in the age of globalization, where countries' prestige and status are measured by socioeconomic and technological rather than military achievements.

In the past, it was possible to score on the foreign policy front without much of a relation with what is taking place in the domestic front. At the present, achievements on the domestic front are detrimental for achievements

on the foreign policy front and vice versa. Moreover, domestic achievements acquired more importance in determining the success of foreign policy.

In addition to reaping the benefits of openness, Arab governments are increasingly worried about the price of closeness and isolation. From a political and security vantage point, Arab governments increasingly worry about the disadvantages of marginalization in world affairs. Similar to the experience of the countries of the former Soviet Block, Arab countries that went through periods of closeness and isolation have experienced considerable loss. Currently, even in the countries in which barriers against the outside world were erected for political, security and ideological reasons, increasing measures of openness are currently introduced. The rapid globalization associated with the rapid economic and technological change force Arab regimes to open up their countries.

Active foreign policy, on the other hand, is instrumental in raising the resources needed to further modernize and improve the domestic socioeconomic conditions. For long, Arab governments have been good at employing their foreign policy activism to raise the resources they need for domestic purposes. This approach usually took the form of collecting rent in exchange for providing political support or allowing access to their valuable geostrategic location. This formula perfectly fitted the bipolar international system of the cold war era. But in the monopolar system of globalization, this formula is no longer as efficient (Aly, 2000). There is increasing awareness in the Arab World of the necessity of changing the modalities of Arab foreign policy activism. However, the right formula that best fit the age of globalization and monopolar international system is yet to be developed.

## Conclusion

The aforementioned interpretation of the security concerns and perceptions in the MENA region is applicable to all countries in the MENA region but for different degrees. The degree to which each country subscribes to a certain concern or perception is a function of the balance between the social and political forces within that country, its political legacy and its geostrategic location.

It is reasonable to assume that Arab governments anticipate the enhancement of their security as a result of joining the EMP. This should be the case since Arab states have voluntarily joined the EMP, and particularly since the role of a number of Arab Mediterranean governments had been instrumental in launching the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (Selim, 1995). However, this assumption seems in contradiction with the slow progress of the Barcelona process, which some observers tend to attribute to the reluctance of Arab countries.

Explaining this apparent contradiction is essential toward delineating threat and security concern of the southern Mediterranean countries. Two forces, which work against each other, influence the Arab Mediterranean countries' policies. The first of these forces is the power of openness and globalization. The second is the conservative force of isolation and protectionism. While the former force pushes toward a higher level of integration in regional and international globalized structures, the latter pushes for curbing the magnitude of interactions with the foreign world. The forces of globalization are the forces of change, while the forces of conservative protectionism seek maintaining the status quo. The ideological rationale underlying the forces of globalization is a worldview that allows a larger room for cooperation in world politics. On the other hand, suspicion and conflict dominate the worldview underlying conservative protectionism.

Countries in the MENA region are torn apart between these two forces. While acknowledging the benefits and virtues of cooperation and openness, elites and masses in the MENA region can't ignore the risks they should face in the open world. In other words, the main stream in the MENA region' politics can't afford ignoring the process of openness and integration on the world level lest being left out in the dark and cold of marginalization. However they are hesitant and reluctant to join the globalized world lest losing control and get entangled in complexities, which they can't handle. Future foreign policy choices in the MENA region are hinging upon the extent of which MENA countries can raise their capacity to handle the complexities of the current world system. Enhancing the capacity of the MENA countries in that regard is essential toward solving the current tension between the forces of openness and isolation.



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## CONCEPTS AND MODELS OF SECURITY IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AREA

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*Revised version*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

It is true that on a general level of analysis, Mediterranean security is not challenged by existential military threats. But, the unexpected breakouts of deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians painfully show that the conceptualisation of security cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership area (EMP) needs to account for the complex and multifaceted security relations in the region. To what extent the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security will be able to cope with this formidable task remains unclear at this point in time.<sup>1</sup>

This study will forward a number of concepts of security cooperation that should take into account the cross-cultural divide, the differences in value and belief-systems and the socio-political construct of Mediterranean states. It will base its suggestions on the realist and liberal paradigms that remain today the dominant theories of conflict and cooperation. Several concepts deriving from the logic of these theories have direct applications to the Mediterranean region. The suggested models of cooperation represent stepping stones towards a security partnership based on a convergence of security interests. Such a security partnership may remain limited to functional co-operation or it may in time expand towards a pluralistic security community.

This first part of this paper will examine options of functional cooperation that are insensitive to the nature of domestic political regimes of EMP states. They include regional cooperation driven by high priority issues on both sides, such as terrorism or migration. Also part of the functionalist approach are conflict prevention and conflict management, defence communication networks, and co-operation in peace operations.

With the globalisation of politics, the weakening of state sovereignty and the Westphalia system at large, new concepts of co-operation have emerged that draw from the liberal school of thought about democratic peace. This study will, thus, present in its second

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<sup>1</sup> For a comprehensive examination of the problems and prospects of the Charter, see Roberto Aliboni, "Political Dialogue and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, January - March 2000.

part two of these concepts and then discuss their relevance to the Mediterranean security co-operation. They are human security and the concept of civil-military relations.

## **2. CONTENDING THEORIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE EMP AREA**

Security co-operation draws today from the two dominant theories of international relations: realism and liberalism. These are the guiding sources of inspiration about security, conflict and cooperation that are relevant for the regional scope defined by the EMP. This section will present these schools of thought and then expand on two operational concepts that deal with the problematic of transition from a classical antagonistic security complex to a security partnership. These are the concepts of common security and the security dilemma.

### **2.1. Realism**

Realism is based on the notion of a strong state that is the sole relevant security actor in the international arena. The realist concept is based on notions such as anarchy, self-help and power balancing. Advocates of the realist school argue that the end of the Cold War did not change the anarchic structure of the international system.<sup>2</sup> The absence of a global authority or effective world government even after the end of the cold war will make sure that states are constantly exposed to the "security dilemma". This dilemma results from a sense of vulnerability and insecurity that has the propensity to lead to the pre-emptive use of force. Power, including military might, continues to play a dominant factor in relations among states.

In contrast to the liberal school of thought, the realists reject the notion of democratic peace and the peace-promoting effects of interdependence and integration. Thus, according to realist thought, stability and by implication security of regions such as the Mediterranean, is most likely to occur in the presence of a hegemonic power or through balance of power politics that counteract the effects of anarchy. However, the realist school does not escape the effects of globalisation and increased interdependence, and its protagonists had to acknowledge that with the end of the Cold War the use of force has greatly lost its utility in international politics.

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<sup>2</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No 1 (summer 2000), pp. 5-41.

In the Mediterranean region, “realist” concerns, such as the secure access to the oil and gas regions in the Gulf and North Africa still mark the vision of many policy-makers in the North. Also, in the Near East, many countries still perceive themselves primarily in military terms and co-operation is more about mitigating the effects of the security dilemma rather than about maximising collective gains. But, the realists have difficulties to validate their arguments that the balance of power politics is the organising concept of the post-Cold War Mediterranean region.

Even though this study does not subscribe to the basic confines of realism as a main source of explanation of war and peace, it will use some of its concepts for the purpose of illustrating dilemmas of security co-operation in the Mediterranean. These notions are built around the “security dilemma”, that is not just a “structural consequence” of international anarchy, but that is linked to uncomfortable regional dependencies and perceptions of vulnerability.

One deriving theoretical concept of realism is the Huntington thesis of the clash of civilisation. As much as the thesis seems relevant to the Mediterranean, because of its cultural fault lines, it is irrelevant due to the weakness of its main thesis that conflicts will occur among civilisations. Recent scholarly work has demonstrated that conflicts occur primarily within cultural sphere and not between cultural spheres.<sup>3</sup>

The merits of Huntington’s writings on this theme are that they are provocative and stimulated more research into issue-areas related to culture, religion, identity, and modernism in the globalising world. In some areas of the Mediterranean, religious militancy may be one of the guiding elements for security policy.

## **2.2. Liberal schools of thought**

Liberals subscribe to the argument that the lack of international authority can be overcome through co-operation and by the expansion of liberal democracies. The liberal school is concerned about the preservation of both “peace abroad and liberty at home”.<sup>4</sup> For liberalism, the domestic fabric of states matters; it thereby creates a close relationship between domestic rule and international conduct. Institutions matter and peace has a chance through the promotion of liberal trade and the empowerment of civil society.

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<sup>3</sup> Dan Smith, “Trends and Causes of Conflict”, *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, July 2000.

<sup>4</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism”, in Hoffmann, S., *World Disorders*, Langham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 72

In this sense, it is in the interests of liberal policymakers to promote exchange and interdependence, if necessary with the help of institutions. The liberal logic on institutionalism finds a fertile ground in the Mediterranean. The region is institutionally very fragmented and more or less void of pan-Mediterranean regimes of co-operation.<sup>5</sup>

Interdependence promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states that, in turn, contribute to mutual understanding. Growing economic interdependence should lead to fewer conflicts. But, interdependence is not a panacea: the correlation between interdependence and war occurrence has not been validated sufficiently by scholars. For example, an increased interdependence may not be symmetrical and Southern Mediterranean states may pay a much higher price for trade liberalisation than the North.<sup>6</sup>

In the liberal view, today, the role of the state as the sole security actor in the international arena is challenged by the rise of a trans-national society. This society is made up of legitimate and illegal actors: both challenging the exclusivity of the state in many areas of domestic politics and international relations, including those of security. In short, the relationship between the state and non-state actors has to be reassessed everywhere today, including the Mediterranean region. For the liberals, the state has already lost its monopoly as the sole guardian of internal affairs and as the sole actor in the international arena. As a consequence for security models and concepts of co-operation, the analysis of security has become less state-centric and more "human".

### **2.3 Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practise: The Role of Threat Assessments**

The bridging between theory and practise is a difficult undertaking. The utility and applicability of the realist and liberal schools on the Mediterranean certainly confirms this observation. The Mediterranean continues to be a fragmented region with different security concerns in the different sub-regions. The Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean the security dilemma still governs relations among states. The Al-Aqsa intifada clearly shows that relations among the various actors are seen often in military and even existential terms. The deadly violence in Palestine is not just an Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab problem. The

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<sup>5</sup> Calleya explains this phenomenon by the dynamics of regionalism, see S. Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press, 1997.

<sup>6</sup> For this argument, see George Joffe, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona," *Middle East Programme Briefing*, London: RIIA, no. 44, May 1998.

potential of conflict escalation can involve countries such as Iran and, possibly even the United States.

In the Maghreb, the security issues are primarily of internal nature. First and foremost, socio-economic problems, such as poverty, unemployment and rapid population growth represent structural conflict potentials. Furthermore, the different style of governance by these states raises the question of legitimacy, regime security rather than national security and the role of the armed forces in domestic politics. The Algerian civil war, the struggle over the Western Sahara and the unpredictability of the Gadaffi regime oversee these more domestic concerns on a regional level.

The Northern parts of the Mediterranean in, turn, perceives security today primarily in terms of risks and challenges coming from South. The main issues are flows of illegal migrants or refugees, drug trafficking, energy security, organised crime and spillover risks of extremist movements from South. The only North-South issue that could be seen in military terms is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Western, and particularly US analysts have however, often overrated this development, especially what North Africa is concerned.<sup>7</sup>

The divisive issues in the assessment of Mediterranean security are centred on question regarding the role of the use of force in security building. The South is still apprehensive over the North's legacy of colonial interventionism in the Southern Mediterranean region. Thus, the use of force by NATO in Kosovo, for instance, is often construed as a possible precursor of Western interventionism in the South. This is one of the reasons why even soft military cooperation continues to be restrained in Euro-Med area.

In view of these diverse security parameters and multi-level perceptions of risks and threats, what theoretical underpinning will be the most appropriate for prescribing policies of cooperation in the region? The diversity of threat assessment posits a comprehensive approach to security cooperation and the cooperative models should be able to address both hard and soft security issues. Furthermore, given the different views on the role of the use of force and on questions such as good governance and regime legitimacy, the cooperative models should allow a fine-tuned step by step approach.

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<sup>7</sup> See, for instance, Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure, Santa Monica: Rand, 1996.

In the Mashrek, the struggle is primarily over the control of territory and will therefore lend itself primarily to prescriptions deriving from realist school. Here hard security cooperation could be achieved in an incremental way, but it is clear that such cooperation will depend on progress of the broader political agenda that is linked to the Israeli-Arab Peace process. In the Maghreb, the economic underdevelopment and poverty cannot be addressed by Cold War type of security models. It requires assistance and sustainable engagement from the North. The limits of such cooperation may be found in the northern insistence on inserting liberal values in the cooperative arrangements. These values, such as human rights, democratic control of the armed forces and good governance may be threatening the survival of governing regimes in these countries. At the same time, the North clearly is determined, at least rhetorically, to promote liberal values as a means to promote democratic peace in the region. The following models should show how these dilemmas could be addressed on conceptual and programmatic levels and how limited cooperation could eventually lead to more security of all parties involved both North and South.

#### **2.4. The Concept of Common Security**

The concept of common security has emerged towards the end of the Cold War as an alternative to the collective security concepts built around regional alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Driven by liberal protagonists, the main innovation of the common security concept was the explicit understanding that the security of states is based on common values and not on common threats. This concept was embraced both by the East and the West, albeit in various degrees and in different fashions: Mikhail Gorbachev pushed the concept of the "Common European House", the West finally succeeded in implanting the concept of a liberal version of the Common Security Concept in the CSCE process.<sup>8</sup>

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe observed that the "realist" threats to European societies have diminished. It officially linked security with democracy and argued that the European states "are determined to co-operate in defending democratic institutions against activities which violate the independence, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of the

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<sup>8</sup> Charter of Paris for a New Europe, CSCE Summit in Paris, 1990, 19 - 21 November 1990.

participating States”.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the Charter recognises the reduction of potential for inter-state conflicts, but it does not any redirect the threat assessment to the sub-state level.

A Brookings study outlined in 1992, the conceptual ramifications of co-operative security.<sup>10</sup> It developed its security concept as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, but it still operated under the assumption that the main scenario of conflict would be a major inter-state war. Its innovation rests on the understanding that catalytic conflict can be prevented not only by deterrence but also by co-operative prevention: It suggested to displace “the centrepiece of security planning from preparing to counter threats to preventing such threats from arising.”<sup>11</sup>

The co-operative concept was able to bring to the fore a number of concepts and notions that were discussed during the Cold War without avail. They included activities that are very much relevant to today’s Mediterranean region: “Defensive configuration of conventional forces”, “restraints on military investments and proliferation” and “transparency”. As concrete steps, the Brookings study suggested the following measures:

- Greater military-to-military contacts and planning dialogue,
- Common warning and intelligence functions,
- Arms registration, and
- Combining proliferation control regimes.<sup>12</sup>

The common security concept has transformed itself in the 1990s because of the prevalence of civil wars and the occurrence of hot wars on the European continent. The concept has now a much more proactive connotation, that also includes crisis management and peace building efforts in war-torn societies. Proposals in this study on conflict prevention, peace building and human security do reflect this trend.

## **2.5. The Concept of the Security Dilemma**

The security dilemma directly results from a sense of vulnerability that, in turn, is the product of international anarchy. There exists an inherent danger that this dilemma fuels incentives for unilateral actions, in the worst case the pre-emptive use of force. It is responsible for the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbrunner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1992.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, pp. 59-63.



continued arms race and the militarisation of politics in the Mediterranean region. The security dilemma is a “structural” consequence of the current international system and can therefore only be addressed by system change, for example through the process of integration. As in the Mediterranean such a system change is currently not in the cards, the second best solution is to address the effects of the security dilemma, such as the sense of vulnerability.

The concept of the security dilemma still accounts for the fact, that the relationship among several states in the Mediterranean region is militarised, i.e. the leadership perceive their relationship primarily in military terms. Such militarised relationships lead to the balancing of relationships based on deterrence and the sustenance of a demand of arms build-up and modernisation of the armed forces.

The sense of vulnerability and insecurity in the region is very much linked to cognitive questions such as perceptions, images and identities. Furthermore, high information costs especially in the security and defence areas add to the opaqueness of the situation.

One major sense of vulnerability in the region is the fear of intervention. Such fears are based on the legacy of colonialism and the from more recent interventionist policies of the North in Iraq or in Kosovo. Also, in some camps, the liberal paradigm of democratic peace is perceived as interventionist. It is often associated with the same line of arguments condemning cultural imperialism, the false promise of modernism and the corrupting effects of globalisation upon local culture. It would be essential to find a wide acceptance in the Mediterranean of the fact that political liberalism is not synonymous of Wilsonionism—i.e. a unilateral and if necessary forceful projection of domestic value systems on a world scale. Rather, it is the presumption that regional co-operative security and partnerships are, in final account, not compatible with domestic injustice and authoritarianism. Or, as Stanley Hoffmann puts it, political liberalism is “an expression of revulsion against illegitimate violence: that of tyrants at home and of aggressors abroad.”<sup>13</sup>

The above arguments highlight the need for further clarification of what the relationship is in the Mediterranean between liberal democracies and peace. The EMP should invest more efforts in the attempt to create a common understanding of the broad notions of security, peace and pluralism and their internal and external ramifications. It will require a sustained investment in a cross-cultural exchange on questions related to security, vulnerability, good governance and human rights. According to Krause such cross-cultural

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<sup>13</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 71.

security building efforts may involve a process of mutual education and dialogue, and ultimately of transformation of perceptions and Weltanschauungen.<sup>14</sup>

To address the “hard” side of the Security Dilemma requires a “hard security approach” to Mediterranean co-operation. This would be primarily in the field of arms control, disarmament and militarily significant confidence-building measures. In the current volatile political situation of the Mediterranean, especially the Near East, hard or structural arms control would be difficult to sustain. The experience of ACRS has shown that even in times of relative tranquillity the prospects for arms co-operation in the region are very limited. This is due to the military asymmetries in the region, especially on the level of weapons of mass destruction, but also to the general mistrust against the concept of arms control at large. Realistic options of cooperation in this field are confined to deal regionally with pre-existing global arrangements (UN Arms Register, CTBM, NPT, etc) and to prepare an arms control toolbox for better periods to come.<sup>15</sup>

The effects of the security dilemma could be mitigated however, by creating more transparency and mutual trust among the various states in the region, without necessarily engaging in structural arms control. There are numerous with the help of unilateral constraints, military-to-military contacts, and seminar diplomacy. Furthermore, the creation of a normative system on confidence and security-building measures (CSBM) could represent a first step by states in the region to jointly address the effects of the security dilemma.

### **3. FUNCTIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

The functional co-operation model draws from both the realist and the liberal traditions. It has a realist connotation in the sense that functional security co-operation is insensitive to the political regimes of the co-operating states in the region. The functionality derives from the convergence of state interests to deal with issues that are high on their respective policy agendas. Furthermore, functional cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention and peace

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<sup>14</sup> Keith Krause, “Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview” in Krause K. (ed.), *Culture and Security*, London: Frank Cass.1999, p. 2.

operations rests on a growing track record of bilateral and multilateral cooperation outside the EMP framework.

### **3.1. Co-operation driven by high priority issues**

The liberal dimension of functional security co-operation stems from the fact that the subjects of co-operation are primarily of trans-national nature. Examples are:

- terrorism
- drug trafficking and
- migration.

The functional co-operation over these questions takes place in the Mediterranean on a bilateral and a multilateral level. The bilateral co-operation is primarily between Southern European and North African states.<sup>16</sup> The prevailing multilateral framework of such co-operation is currently the EMP: the Barcelona Committee of Senior Officials has agreed to hold working sessions on topics such as terrorism, drug trafficking and migration. The problem with the Barcelona setting is that the EU members do not always have a coherent approach to these questions. This is not very conducive for making much progress; also it is confusing to the Mediterranean Partner states.

But this deficiency does not invalidate the utility of the functional co-operation model for the Mediterranean. One important advantage is that it can drive the institution building in the Mediterranean. Such common institutions or regimes induce reciprocal trust. In this perspective the process of co-operation is as important as is the substance of negotiation. According to the literature dealing with the construction of "Security Communities", institution building is also instrumental for promoting a certain "we-feeling" and convergence in the perception of security.<sup>17</sup> In the long-term, it will be important to develop institutions for functional co-operation that are not necessarily linked to the Barcelona Committee. They could be stand-alone organs, such as round-tables, that would operate under the umbrella of the Barcelona Process.

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<sup>15</sup> Fred Tanner, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitation and Confidence-Building after Malta", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 32, no. 2, 1997, pp. 3-25.

<sup>16</sup> See Roberto Aliboni, "EU Security Towards the Mediterranean: The Role of Southern Europe", paper presented at the Institut des Etudes Politiques Méditerranéens, Monaco, July 17-18, 2000.

### 3.2. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management

The new development with a European civilian and military crisis management capability in the framework of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) is most likely to affect the role of the EU in the Mediterranean region in general and in the Barcelona Process in particular. The European states are in the process of creating security tools that cover the full spectrum of conflict prevention, non-military crisis management, military conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. These crisis management capabilities take on even more importance in the Mediterranean region with the EU extension towards Malta, Cyprus and eventually also Turkey. As a consequence of these developments, the following observations have to be made:

1. The Southern partner states need to be assured that the EU headline force projection capabilities will not make Europe more interventionist in the region. The Petersberg Declaration placed no geographical limits to the crisis management missions. Nor did the NATO strategic concept of 1999. These facts could be construed easily as quite unsettling for Southern Mediterranean states, particularly in light of Nato's self-empowered intervention in Kosovo. There still lingers a Southern perception stemming from the Cold War period of NATO being "a military instrument of the West to suppress national liberation movements".<sup>18</sup> The risk exists that the liberal drive in the Mediterranean may be perceived as a Wilsonian-type of interventionism in the region. Furthermore, transition to democratic system carries risks, as the Algerian tragedy has brutally evidenced. Cross-cultural differences reflect not only differences in specific policy issues, "but also often reflect more fundamental differences concerning motivations, events and their contexts that result from different philosophical, ethical or cultural traditions."<sup>19</sup> The reassurance of the partner states would necessitate a series of sustainable activities that would range from seminar diplomacy to military visits all the way to the active involvement of Partner states in contingency planning in civilian and military Petersberg tasks.

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<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

<sup>18</sup> Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, "Southern Mediterranean Perception of Security Co-operation and the Role of NATO", paper presented to the ISA meeting in Vienna, September 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Keith Krause, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

2. Conflict prevention and crisis management only makes sense in the region if the Southern partners are involved in such activities. To satisfy the requirements of equity and reciprocity it will be important to offer the Mediterranean Partner states access to common decision-making and implementation procedures of crisis management. For this purpose, there is a need to work out "pre-existing agreements" that would enable Barcelona Partner states to participate in consultation and co-ordination mechanisms on civilian and military aspects of crisis management. In addition, they should be entitled to participate in the ad hoc committee of contributors to the Petersberg operation. In short, partner states should have the same rights and privileges as EU candidates and non-EU European states when it comes to Petersberg operations in the Mediterranean region.
3. The understanding of conflict represents an essential prerequisite for devising common policies of preventive diplomacy, early warning and the conflict management. According to Jentleson, the problem with early warning is not the absence of timely information but "flawed analysis" of the likelihood of escalation of conflict and or the risk/costs of inaction.<sup>20</sup> As to the analytical skills, the EMP would require a unit of analysis that could provide in-depth analysis on conflict-prone issues-areas in the Mediterranean. In the long-term, such an unit could be linked to the Defence Communication Network and the EMP institution that would have some decision-making authority in the domain of conflict prevention and crisis management. To what extent these units and mechanism would be linked to the EU Crisis Management Procedures will be subject to negotiations.

### **3.3. Co-operation in Peace operations and Peace building**

The co-operation in peace operations is closely associated with EMP co-operation that could unfold in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. Peace operations and peace building could represent essential parts of Petersberg missions. In the 1990s, a number of Mediterranean partner states have substantially increased their involvement in peace operations,<sup>21</sup> the most outstanding contributions coming from Jordan, Turkey and Egypt.

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<sup>20</sup> Bruce Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, Lanham, MD.:Rowman&Littlefield, 2000, p. 324.

<sup>21</sup> For a comprehensive survey of peace-keeping activities of Euro-Med states, see C. Echeverria, Co-operation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces, Chaillot Papers, 35 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1999); for specific proposals see Fred Tanner, "Joint Actions for Peace-building in the Mediterranean", The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, October-December 1999, pp. 75-90.

Jordan's contributions to peace keeping have a high profile in Europe, with their commitments to peace missions in Bosnia and Croatia (military units) and Georgia and Macedonia (military observers).

Moreover, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey are involved in the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR peace restoration missions. This has implied close military co-operation with NATO, because the operations run on the basis of a combined joint task force (CJTF) with a unity of command and a clear division of labour.

Arab participation in IFOR/SFOR has been important for a number of reasons. For many soldiers of the Arab contributing states, it is the first time away from home. In addition to numerous other benefits, it helps these soldiers gain insight into civil-military relations. In post-conflict Bosnia, the peace forces are closely involved in institution building and election monitoring. Furthermore, under the unity of command system, these units work very closely with militaries from other countries.<sup>22</sup> Jordanian and Moroccan contingents are also participating at the NATO-led KFOR operation in Kosovo.

The following suggestions would allow to work out an EMP-specific dimension for peace operations in the Mediterranean. Given the involvement of various Partner states in current operation in NATO or UN-frameworks, it would make sense if a politico-military framework could be established within the EMP. This is also relevant because the greater Mediterranean region holds the largest share of peace operations worldwide.

***a) Joint peacekeeping training***

Joint training is a widespread activity today for UN and other peace operations. Such training could include classroom activities, language training and field exercises. The training would not have to be at one central venue, but could take place in various countries. The training should, however, correspond to certain standards, that could be worked out by a joint Barcelona committee.

***b) Joint force planning and exercises for peacekeeping purposes***

Joint force planning for peace operations including the stand-by arrangements for UN missions. It would also be possible to work out common rules of engagements for humanitarian operations or post-conflict missions. This could include the preparation of non-

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<sup>22</sup> The Jordanian and Moroccan units, for instance, were integrated into the French-led division; SFOR Informer (Sarajevo) no. 24, November 1997.

military operations that require military support, especially in the field of emergency assistance, disaster relief and post-conflict rehabilitation missions. Finally, there would be the need to initiate a common planning and review process with regard to peace operations.

### ***c) Creation of a Euro-Med Battalion***

The participation of a number of Partner states in peace operation in Europe is already a reality. Egyptian, Jordanian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Algerian and Turkish forces and observers have been part of the missions in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo. The Creation of a Euro-Med Battalion is thus not a far-fetched proposal and would be feasible without the presence of an institutional framework. It would follow the example of similar initiatives in the Baltic states (Baltic battalion), Scandinavia (Nordic battalion), and Central Europe (CENTCOOM), and South-eastern Europe (Multinational Force South Eastern Europe).

### **3.4. Defence Communication Network**

Given the continued opaqueness of the Mediterranean region, it is important to reduce the information costs in the broad domain of security and defence. This mitigation of the effects of the security dilemma could be done with the help of a security or defence communication network. The creation of such a network would represent a first step towards a common transparency policy.

This communication network could be followed-up by a Euro-Med Defence Internet Forum, similar to the Internet Forum for Euro-Med diplomats, that was launched at the Malta Ministerial Summit in 1997. Such a Defence network could be linked to the national staff colleges and security studies institutes similar to the PfP Consortium homepage, that today hosts most PfP Partner institutions. The Euro-Med Defence Forum could contain official national defence documents, unclassified military publications and training manuals, calendar and agenda of meetings.

Egypt or Jordan could be countries that could host such a network. They have the technological base, the know-how and the political culture for running such a network on a sustained basis. In this context it is important to note that ACRS designated Egypt to host a communication network. In 1998 the Egyptian Army inaugurated a new Center for Military Information. The Center provides through Internet news and information about the Egyptian Armed Forces.

#### **4. DEVELOPING A PLURALISTIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP**

Concepts of functional security cooperation, as presented in the above section, are politically more easily applicable than concepts of pluralistic security cooperation that promote a value-based cooperation with the involvement of non-state actors. Such models will be presented in this section with the concepts on human security and civil-military relations.

##### **4.1 Human Security**

With the end of the Cold War, security has become less state-centric. Foreign policy initiatives from countries such as Canada, Norway and Switzerland promote multilateral soft security co-operation as a way to engage other states in humanitarian and developmental concerns that are closely related to security.

The concept of human security is based on the presumption that state actors are prepared to engage in security questions of individuals and vulnerable groups regardless of their geographic location and citizenship. Pushed by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Axworthy, the concept relies on the following principles:

- Security goals should be focused around human security and not state security;
- Soft power is the currency of international politics;
- Military force is a declining utility in international politics; and
- Non-governmental organisations and civil society play a key role in human security.<sup>23</sup>

The activities and co-operative engagements that fall under the concept of human security target to promote legal protection of individuals and vulnerable groups with the help of conventions in the following issue-areas:

- Small arms
- Child soldiers (children's right)
- Anti-personnel landmines
- Peace building with special focus on vulnerable groups such as women and children, refugees and internally displaced persons.

The concept of human security and its language has also been adopted by the UN. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan refers in his Annual Report to human security in the following

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<sup>23</sup> These principles are part of a broad set offered in a counterfactual approach by Hampson and Oliver, see Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit diplomacy", *International Journal*, Summer 1998, p. 380.



way: "Gross abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian populations, international terrorism, the AIDS, pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and environmental disasters present a direct threat to human security, forcing us to adopt a much more co-ordinated approach to a range of issues."<sup>24</sup> Also the UN Security Council acknowledged the growing importance of human security as a model in international security. In its Resolution 1296 (2000) the Council expressed the continued need to protect civilians during conflicts, war and peace building. It stresses the importance of adherence to the various international instruments, including the Geneva Conventions and their protocols.<sup>25</sup>

The concept of human security thrived on issues such as landmines and small arms. It epitomised the shift away of the security concept from an exclusive stress on territorial security. The concept can be proposed for the EMP for a number of reasons. First, the Barcelona Declaration already promoted the respect to the Inhuman Weapons Convention (CCW), an integrate part of the human security cluster. Second, the weapons such as small arms and landmines are destabilising several sub-regions of the Mediterranean. Small arms and their control have again emerged as an issue during the recent clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians. In this context, Jordan announced to hold a seminar on small arms in the context of Nato's Mediterranean Dialogue.<sup>26</sup>

There is also greater leeway for the EMP with regard to landmines. Many partner states have already made commitments under the Ottawa Process or through unilateral statements on national moratoria.<sup>27</sup> The Barcelona Partnership could play the role as facilitator, co-ordinator and focal point for mine action in the Mediterranean, providing assistance to those Euro-Med countries wishing to create their own Mine Action Centres. Given the interconnection between mine action and post-conflict rehabilitation, the Partnership could promote mine awareness programmes in the framework of economic reconstruction the adequate financial support from sponsor countries and institutions.

Finally, the human security concept encourages the promotion of civilian expertise in security and defence analysis. For this purpose, it is important to break-up the quasi-monopoly of defence expertise of the Ministries of Defence in the region. It will require a

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<sup>24</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fifth session, Supplement No. 1 (A/55/1).

<sup>25</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 1296 (2000), adopted at its 4130<sup>th</sup> meeting, on 19 April 2000.

<sup>26</sup> Presentation of Jordanian representative at the PMSC meeting, Geneva, 16 October 2000.

<sup>27</sup> See study by Elvira Sanchez Mateos, The Antipersonnel Landmines Issue in the Mediterranean, EuroMeSCo Papers, April 2000.

programmatic, sustained and well-financed approach. Universities and institutes should be supported in their development of curricula on security studies. Such curricula should include courses dealing with issue-areas such as national and international security, arms control, crisis management, civil-military relations, security sector transformation, peace support and peace building.

## **4.2. Civil-Military Relations**

### ***a) Democratic control of armed forces***

The study of civil-military relations draws from the liberal concepts pursuing democratic peace on the assumption that domestic democratic rule of law and civilian control of the armed forces will induce a more compromising conduct at home and abroad. Each country must establish its own structures, practices and legal methods to ensure that national military establishments remain subordinate to the will of the societies they serve. Parliaments should play a key role in exercising civilian control over military forces, defence budget allocations and procurement policies. This will require the parliamentarians or their staff to acquire the necessary skills in this field and to carry out such responsibilities.

Sooner or later the EMP should introduce the notion of democratic control of armed forces into its agenda of cooperation. This could be done with the help of a code of conduct. As a model, there is the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of security.<sup>28</sup> Such codes are also in the process of being developed by regional groups outside Europe. West African states, for example, are currently in the process of developing a code of conduct on civil-military relations for the West African region.<sup>29</sup>

What does the concept of civil-military relations embrace? Marco Carnovale proposes five thematic clusters:

- First, a constitutional and legislative structure with clearly defined responsibilities and appropriate checks and balances among state institutions;
- Second, clearly defined civilian control over the Ministry of Defence and the military establishment, with civilian officials of a government having key roles in both;

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<sup>28</sup> See text as adopted by OSCE Budapest Summit, 1994; [www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm](http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm)

<sup>29</sup> "Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Curbing the Flow of Arms," *UNIDIR Newsletter*, 32/96

- Third, substantive and detailed, not just perfunctory, parliamentary oversight over security policy and spending; a parliament limited to a rubber-stamp role betrays poor democratic control of defence;
- Fourth, sufficient transparency of decision-making to allow for a thorough public scrutiny of defence matters. While there are obvious requirements for secrecy in defence programmes, these should not be pushed beyond what is strictly necessary, and must not undermine democratic accountability;
- Fifth, an informed national debate on security, in which a special role is played by civilian experts in government, media, political parties, and by independent sources of advice and critical assessment, such as research institutes.<sup>30</sup>

#### **b) *Civil-Military relations in civilian emergency preparations***

Civil-Military relations in civilian emergency preparations is a rapidly growing field of interest for states, regional, international and non-state organisations involved in civilian emergency preparations. This is due to the acceptance that national as well as international organisations are entitled and sometimes required to assist third countries in situations of emergencies. The co-operation concentrates on the role of organisations such as OCHA in natural disasters response, the use of military assets for natural disasters, but also on specific questions such as the role of telecommunications in emergencies, information management and data processing. The military are asked to support civilian actors in such emergencies for the purpose of:

- Support in response to natural, technological or environmental disasters,
- Support in maintaining public services and utilities,
- Support for regional or international crisis response,
- Security and protection responsibilities, and
- Logistical support with the help of airlift, port operations, transportation, engineering, site preparation and infrastructure repairs.

The preparations of such civil-military operations are extensive and need to be carried out in close co-ordination with organisations such as OCHA, UNHCR and also NGOs. In the EMP setting, such preparation could be planned and implemented in conjunction with the Euro-

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<sup>30</sup> Marco Carnovale, "NATO partners and allies: Civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces", *NATO Review*, No 2, march 1997, vol 45.

Med disaster relief system as well as in the context of an EMP association with Petersberg tasks.

### **c) Security sector reform**

The co-operative approach to security sectors is a relatively new phenomenon. It springs from the growing interest of the development community into the relationship between development and security. Countries with dysfunctional security sectors are today much less likely to receive foreign assistance, both from other countries or international organisations. The concept of security sector reform is closely linked to the shift away from state-centric security policy.

Many Mediterranean states betray a bloated and an unregulated military sector that thrives on the detriment of basic societal needs, such as education, health, clean water and infrastructure developments. The need to improve defence resource management is linked to questions how future defence structures should look like in relation to other domestic security actors such as the police, internal security forces, border troops, presidential guards, etc.

The know-how for such reform can be transferred through training activities and seminars that could be attached to a Barcelona institution. The training in security sector reform does not have to be run by military only, on the contrary, it is essential that representatives from the development community would be able to make their contributions as well. In final account, the security sector reform problems are not "fundamentally about the military, but about questions of governance more generally within states".<sup>31</sup>

## **5. CONCLUSION**

The Mediterranean is neither a war zone nor is it a zone of democratic peace. Concepts such as the security dilemma are as relevant to the region as are those prescribing interdependence, common and human security. The EMP has the challenging task to provide—possibly with the help of the Charter for Peace and Security-- a framework of pan-Mediterranean security cooperation accommodating both the realist and liberal logic of security.

The deadly conflicts in the Near East, combined with parochialism both in the North and the South will make the implementation of security models difficult on a pan-Mediterranean level. Thus, it is essential for the EMP to accept that any co-operative activities

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<sup>31</sup> Dylan Hendrickson, "A Review of Security-Sector Reform," Working Paper, Nr. 1., Centre for Defence Studies, September 1999, p.26

should be voluntary, based on the model of the “coalition of the willing”. This would presuppose the acceptance of an opting-in mechanism in the multilateral EMP framework.

The implementation of the primarily liberal concepts presented in this study may encounter opposition by Mediterranean countries with weak institutions, weak tradition of law and order, and unequal distributions of wealth. The question will inevitably be asked whether such concepts really address the concerns of the governments in the region: the application of some of the suggested concepts may produce incompatibilities with local ethos, traditions and political cultures.

But, regardless of whether EMP cooperation remains on a purely functional and somewhat superficial level or whether it will eventually permeate into a pluralistic realm: notions such as human security, security sector reform or peace building do represent benign vehicles of co-operation allowing states to engage in areas that go beyond the realist paradigm. The successful implementation of such concepts will depend, therefore, not only on the political will of states, but also on mutual trust, as well as the skills and expertise of state and non-state actors. This is why cross-cultural security building efforts will have to rely heavily on information exchange, dialogue and on civilian capacity building among representatives of both governments and civil society.

## PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS OF SECURITY IN THE EMP COUNTRIES

Amman, 5 – 6 November 2000

### A SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF SECURITY

Ambassador A.A.Ounaies ( Tunisia )

War, invasion, antagonism and extremism, have long been the lot of the Mediterranean. The end of the Cold War and the consequences of the second Gulf War have brought a *qualitative change*. Both the Madrid and the Barcelona processes have signaled the most promising hopes for the entire region. Nevertheless, while both processes are developing, the lopsided international environment is far from helping the Mediterranean Parties to reach a common rationale :

A- Enforcement of international legality is poor, erratic and obviously paralysed ;

B- A major role is assumed by the UN in all crises with the exception of the palestinian issue ;

C- In spite of the policy of curbing the arm race in the region, as stated after the Gulf War and supported by the agreed instruments for transparency and control regimes, huge amounts of advanced conventional arms are transfered to the region ;

D- The United States, being the Co-Sponsor of the Peace Process, is the strategic ally of one party to the Negotiations - Israel - providing it with automatic financial aid, sharing with it sophisticated military technology, and assuring it military qualitative edge as well as political immunity for its abuse and violation of international legality ;

E- By the same token, regimes of sanctions, either bilateral or international, extend to other second-tier countries – Libya and Irak, not to speak of Iran and Sudan. The contrast is quite clear : the new political and security set up is developing while heavy pressure is being applied on only one side of the table.

On the whole, have the external powers restored a sense of hope in the peoples of the region ? Have they helped the Parties share the same rationale, the same sense of causality for their misfortunes ? Have they generated an equal sense of restraint in them ?

The swift developments in the Yugoslav conflict are opening renewed avenues for political action and dynamics in the region. The intervention in Kosovo on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1999 has added a new parameter to the regional security background. It is now recognized that unacceptable violations of law and human rights in Europe will be thwarted by NATO and the European Union, if necessary, by military means. Should this dynamics be restricted to the exclusive European theatre ?

Obviously, resuming direct negotiations in the Middle East is indeed indispensable, provided that the sponsors stand loyally by the terms of reference and act accordingly. An active balanced sponsorship, involving the European Union, is essential to the credibility and dynamics of a renewed format of negotiations. On the other hand, the concurrent activation of the Barcelona Process, with a special role entrusted to the European Union, and a substantive security framework under the guarantees of the European and Euro-Atlantic Institutions would provide stronger political commitment to the security and stability of the region.

The Barcelona process consists of the 15 members of the EU and the 12 Third Mediterranean Countries. Among the 12, the three European Partners – Malta, Cyprus and Turkey – all candidates to full membership to the EU, are also members of the OSCE, of the Helsinki Act, the Paris Charter and the other Acts of the new pan-European structure. Actually, all the European members of the Barcelona Process are bound by the same Charter and are members of the same institutions which operate according to an established periodicity and with specific structures in the field of security, cooperation and human rights. The model of *collective security* underlying the WEU and the NATO treaties has been enriched by further broad systems of community or close cooperation (political, economic, monetary... etc) leading to stronger regional structures and implying the renouncement, by the member countries, of a degree of sovereignty in the service of the Community. They have also in common a democratic praxis deeply rooted in secularity and in a political and ethical philosophy based on equality, free from chauvinism and prompt to denounce and quell the upsurge of extremism and discriminatory attitudes. These are social systems where democratic guarantees relate essentially to the watchful eye of civil society, to the vigilance of the media and to the concern of an impartial judicial system.

The southern partners, the 9 non European Mediterranean parties, constitute a special political area. From a geo-strategic viewpoint, this area is reminiscent of the European scene before Helsinki : a typical Cold War polarization, rigid structures and policies in a bloc logic, divided and separate economies through a boycott system, an exacerbated perception of threats and a tragic controversy over self-determination rights. During the last nine years, as in the pre-Helsinki period, the regional actors have entered into a process of negotiation covering a large spectrum of issues, with the aim of shaping a cooperation and security system free from tensions and threats and built on commonly respected principles.

The comparison, however, cannot be taken further. For Europe, the lengthy process which led to the Helsinki Act on 1st August 1975, was the outcome of a real stabilization of the European region, i.e. the admission and recognition of all by all, within fixed and respected boundaries, in spite of the coexistence of radically different political systems. The stabilization of Europe rested on two pillars :

- The stability of the political map and the commitment not to alter it by violence or war ;
- The balance of power and the shared conviction that any attempt against a party will be thwarted. The balance of power provided the guarantee for the respect of the Helsinki commitments and their consequences in all fields.

The sequence inaugurated by the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact opened the way to a new conceptualization of Europe's future, from détente to partnership and enlargement. Henceforth, a logic of integration became possible with the end of confrontation, the easing of tension and the shared vision based on conciliation and convergence.

The Mediterranean region is characterized by a large gap in military capabilities as well as asymmetrical relations in terms of wealth, resources, population and relationship with external actors. For some countries, these discrepancies mean the difference between a state living in fear of its survival and one that does not. This may have been true for Europe before World War II. In the Mediterranean, it is still the case. This fact highlights how the security dilemma is acutely felt. When each side tries to maximize its own security through unilateral steps and the acquisition of ever more advanced weaponry, this causes others to feel increasingly insecure. They, in turn, take actions that are designed to increase their own security, and the cycle repeats itself with the result that no state's security is actually enhanced. All states end up feeling less secure in an atmosphere of ever-increasing regional military capabilities.

The option of *collective security* binding the member states of both the Arab Common Defense Treaty ( 13 april 1950) and the Arab Maghreb Union Treaty (17 february 1989) did not mature further into broader regional structures. Thus, the effectiveness of the collective security did not fully materialize in the current history of the concerned states. The problem is further compounded in that the resources devoted to military spending are diverted from economic and social development, leading to an erosion of security on another level. (*Collective security* implies that a group of states have identified a threat and are pooling their defence resources to deal with it so that an attack on any member of a regime is interpreted as an attack on them all)

As a whole, the Mediterranean region is also beset by multiple and overlapping conflicts at the national, subregional and regional levels. Many of these conflicts have multiple causes and effects which extend from the internal security of the states to their relations with each other and outside powers. The Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in its Israeli-Palestinian dimension, is the one on which much attention is presently focused. There are, however, many other conflicts in the region. The number of people killed or displaced in the past 50 years and the amount of money spent by the states demonstrate that a fundamental change in thinking must underly any future approach to global security in the Mediterranean.

## 1 - COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Addressing the entire region, the concept of comprehensive security seems the most adequate. It refers to the idea that the security of individuals and nations encompasses more than the relative military balance between the countries and their potential military adversaries. Concentration on the military component hides the fact that a vast range of other factors also affects the security of nations, many of which are only peripherally military in nature.

Moreover, for many countries a line must be drawn between security of a state from external attack and security from internal challenges. Individual security from want or the kind of capricious violence which accompanies a corrupt or failed regime at the local level can have a spillover impact on wider national and regional security if it induces a segment of the population to act against the established order out of anger or hopelessness. Although many states faced with such a challenge will rely on their military apparatus to deal with it, there are no military challenges to security.

Therefore, two basic and interrelated issues beyond military security must be addressed : *social cohesion* within states and the region as a whole ; and the growing *demographic problem* and its related impact on the resources and environment of the region. Both issues highlight the importance of developmental, social and economic factors in the security of the region, alongside strictly political and military considerations. These « soft security » issues may lead to conflict if they are not handled wisely and in a manner in which all recognize that they can adversely affect the neighbours and bring them into conflict with evolving international norms.

Comprehensive security requires the distinction between actual threats to regional security (issues which have reached the point where conflict or unrest which will affect regional security is possible) and risks (issues which may develop into threats if left unattended). At a minimum, a regional security regime must provide mechanisms which will allow the states of the region to deal with the threats and prevent them from developing into wider conflict. However a more fully developed regional security regime would also provide the countries of the region with ways to cooperatively address the risks.



The security of the region can be threatened by several risk factors, the most obvious being widespread suffering and needs, which involves the second issue, demographic growth and scarcity of resource. There are also other more intangible challenges, such as the widespread feeling in some states that the elite has become distant from the cultural or religious traditions which many still associate with the basic ground for cohesion of the nation and its people.

A regional approach to security must be comprehensive to the extent that it recognizes these pressures and makes provision for them. This does not necessarily mean direct intervention into the internal affairs of states, but rather creating an environment in which such internal tensions, when identified, do not lead to a threat to basic regional security. This can be addressed through mutual awareness and recognition that these issues will affect their security in fundamental ways. A regional security regime should recognize equal importance to inter-state security and to intra- state issues critical to the security of the region. As such, the comprehensive security must complement efforts to address these wider issues, as well as play a role at the point where risks become threats.

## 2 – COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Addressing the South-Mediterranean area, a number of international initiatives were tried, during the present decade, to lay new foundations for peace, security and cooperation. The basic concept of these processes is transcending confrontation, building up a regional order free from polarization and geared towards a global partnership. These initiatives are :

- The main Peace Process launched in October 1991 ;
- The Economic Summits since October 1994 ;
- The NATO, WEU and OSCE Dialogues with many regional Parties ;
- The Barcelona Process since November 1995.

The European Union and the other Institutions, through their member states, are a component of these processes in so far as the members as well as the Commission sit within the multilateral bodies leading the negotiations and the Dialogues and directly take part in the evolution of their conceptual and operational dimensions.

The global process succeeded, within nine years, in clarifying the hard core issues and to change the internal regional relations ; no doubt, a new regional order became not only reasonable but attainable. The nature of the conflict is no longer an issue of coexistence : the mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was formalised ; a second peace treaty was concluded and signed ; the occupying military forces in Lebanon have been withdrawn. Many constitutive elements of the future region are agreed upon or conceptually taking shape : the Guidelines, Statement of Principles and Codes of Conduct could develop into a regional charter ; re-directing the economies towards a more integrated market ; acquiring common Institutions of cooperation and communication ; creating Regional Security Centers entrusted with control and verification competence ; higher coordination organs, including Summits with a definite periodicity.

In addition, the participating Mashrek Parties have all submitted their views on the « Long term objectives of regional security ». These contributions have helped clarify the problematics of the security environment by the very members of the core sub-region. For the first time, they have adopted a single regional perspective, not exclusive but inclusive. This confirms the potential emergence of *a region* and the premises of a cooperation extending to *common security*. Thus the notion of cooperative security is gaining credence.

Has this progress helped overcome the confrontational structure ? A fundamental alternative still prevails : if irreconcilable entities were to remain, we could only aspire to the settlement of the political and territorial disputes on the basis of détente and conflict prevention, in a logic of adjustment, i.e. an organised coexistence. On the other hand, if the geo-political structure makes it possible to overcome the current polarization and promote the conciliation and the emergence of « one region », then the establishment of regional security along the lines of the *cooperative security model* becomes conceivable, that is a logic of integration.

Within the global negotiation, the pattern of *cooperative security*, based on the conciliation of interests and an understanding on the long term objectives, was precisely at the core of the Peace Process. The option of cooperative security is adequate for the region where, precisely, threats are diverse and complex and the level of armament is the highest in the world. By its nature, the cooperative security pattern provides guarantees all round for all Parties and against all threats emanating from states. It is designed to make sure that an organised aggression can neither be launched nor proceed on a large scale. It aims at setting up commonly agreed upon measures to prevent war and particularly to hinder the gathering of the means of a possible aggression. The elimination of the basic ingredients of an organized aggression allows the states, which would otherwise feel threatened, to reduce or even remove their need to undertake counter-preparations. Of course, the system rests on an extensive cooperation pursued on an equal footing and on the basis of complete reciprocity : transparency, verification, contradictory debate, warning procedures, appeals, periodic updates ...etc.

The instrumental value of this model is promising in two ways : in clearing and normalising the arab-israeli as well as the inter-arab scenes. The perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the key security factor for the whole region and it has nurtured vicious effects within civil society. The redemptive effect of the settlement will promote a double détente which will create an entirely new perspective for the pan-regional inter-relations, similar to the European dynamics after the end of the East-West polarization. The new strategic structure will generate a deep change within the inter-state relations as well as amongst their peoples. The settlement of the main conflict is at the same time the laboratory and the key of these dynamics.

The range of inter-arab conflicts determine, just as much, the military postures and, consequently, the answers and the commitments of the Parties. Let us admit that the initial strategy of the global negotiation is essentially directed towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that its ultimate objective is the security of the political entities subjected to this main threat. If the endeavour proves successful, the regional security shaped to meet the constraints of the Arab-Israeli conflict would also mitigate the effects of the other inter-arab conflicts, since the cooperative security pattern is global and addresses all other potential threats whatever their source and target.

This system could only develop and prove efficient if the security pattern is strengthened by relevant political decisions. The major challenge lies precisely in that the initial political entities are not completed. The actors must decide at one and the same time what they have *to do* and what they have *to be*. They have to decide, prior to the security models, about their respective status, overcoming sectarian attitudes and admitting the common law of rationality, normalcy and modernity. This does mean the admission of common values of our time and the common rules of international legality.

The nine year long global negotiations have ended up in a political stalemate : despite the virtues and potential of the cooperative security pattern which has evolved in a set of rather promising and constructive achievements, the process has finally stalled, as a result of three basic israeli requisites : the colonial policy, the denial of equal rights for the peoples of the region and a special status with regard to nuclear power.

The Israeli representatives in the Peace Process hold that they are not ready to endorse the principle of equal rights for the peoples of the region and namely the principle of self-determination. On the other hand, while the negotiations were going on, the israeli policy of building and expanding colonial settlements continued unabated, refuelling tensions and violence. With Syria, Israel was equally claiming parts of the occupied syrian territory and sovereignty over the waterbeds. North Africa has experienced colonial rule under which foreign intruders expel the natives from their land and homes and occupy them as part of the strategy designed by the rulers. The new settlers enjoy military, economic and technical facilities which help them radically transform the economic and political set up. Very soon, the settlers claim political rights and sovereignty over the land. Though legally null and void, this process has repeated itself to the point of political blindness. The ultimate solution in the Golan and the Palestinian territories could not be different from other historic precedents in Asia and Africa.

Finally, two main differences blocked the adoption of the Steering Group « Guidelines » and the ACRS « Statement of principles » : the equal status for the peoples of the region and the equal status in the field of nuclear armament and delivery systems. Obviously, the status of Israel is the crux of the matter. This policy implies that Israel's neighbours should acknowledge a special status for Israel and that, only by paying this price, a regional peace and security system will be possible in the region. In other words, the paralysis in the Arms Control and Regional Security track does not stem from its inner technicalities. Rather, it stems up-stream from the nature of the israeli status.

These examples bear witness to the fact that the Israeli-claimed status is not only aimed at the spoliation of the Palestinian people, or at taking over parts of the neighbours' land, but rather at achieving regional supremacy. Whatever its justification, a special status is morally offending, politically unrealistic and diplomatically untenable in our international environment. The Camp David summit of last july did not record any change in the Israeli requisites.

It is a self contradiction to set a system of colonial rule and a discriminatory status of the peoples concerned, and to pledge building up with them a regional security regime, with the objective of securing such system. In essence, discrimination and domination generate rejection. Indeed, the claim for dignity is a powerful motivation in human history. Oppressed peoples resist. They resist through revolt as long as there is hope and, when all hope is lost, through martyrdom, which is the expression of absolute despair. Revolt and martyrdom are expressions of the same rejection and the same quest.

However, the regional parties should continue to explore ideas inherent in the creation of a regional security regime as these ideas may further the process of rationality, normalcy and peace. The exploration of such ideas may also prove helpful in dealing with the many other security concerns of the region which exist besides the arab-israeli conflict. The elements of such regime can develop in the Euro-Mediterranean background, under the broad concept of comprehensive security. Let us explore the components of such regime.

### 3 – ELEMENTS OF A MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY REGIME

#### A – Guiding principles

The Barcelona Declaration underlines the following principles : (I quote) « The Participants undertake to :

- respect the equal rights of peoples and their rights to self determination ;
- respect the territorial integrity and the unity of each of the other partners ;
- respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms ;
- settle their disputes by peaceful means, renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force ;
- pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological and their delivery systems... » (unquote)

Further elaboration of these principles into a set of Guiding principles can have a considerable impact on regional policy. It is important to stress the respect of international legality, since it helps generate reliability and better predictability, leading to an atmosphere of relaxation and improved openness and receptivity. Deliberate rejection of international legality can only generate suspicion, provide grounds for war and justify counter-strategies and defensive attitudes. Uneven parties could only become true and genuine partners through their common respect of international legality which provides equal international guarantees for all.

The guiding principles are not just a set of norms but also terms of reference for outlining the general limits of acceptable conduct in the settlement of disputes and for reminding those who deliberately oppose them to abide by their commitments.

#### B – Institutionalization of the regime

The initial phase of a regional security regime should feature minimal institutionalization and be based primarily on informal, political arrangements. The Asia-Pacific Forum has rather favored opportunities for quiet dialogue within the set of guiding norms. On the other hand, track two dialogues, such as unofficial, academic workshops in which officials take part in their private capacities together with academics and others, have played a critical role in the Asia-Pacific region as well as in the Madrid Peace Process. This is a way to stimulate the necessary people-to-people contacts in the region and promote a culture of peace and wider understanding.

Nevertheless a modest *Regional Security Centre*, with large competence on security, conflict prevention and environment may help the participants in early-warning, mediation and technical assessment functions for a large spectrum of issues, extending from environment and water to establishment of a Zone free from WMD. It could develop a broad expertise on Mediterranean sensitive issues and confer credibility to the building up of a region common awareness. Many issues of strategic importance are not being dealt with today in a cooperative fashion, which seeks to minimize the chances of conflict and preserve common security.

#### C – The Soft Security

The issues of soft security in the southern Mediterranean region have a hard edge. Of all the problems faced by the region over the long term, the developmental, economic and social issues are most likely to cause civil unrest, arms races and wars.

These problems exist simultaneously on many levels and are intertwined. They can be either immediate threats to regional security or long term risks to it. The questions of political reform, social unrest, extremism, rapid demographic growth, environmental degradation and economic fairness are hardly ever to evolve in isolation from each other and are bound up with both the internal and external policies of states. Agreeing to a regional approach for dealing with them, implies that all participants admit the necessary awareness of the risks for the security of all. Considering that no nation in the region can deal with these issues on its own, and that some traditional approaches do not work in the medium to long term, the establishment of many regional programmes are required to assist in the difficult transitions which lie ahead.

Since the institutional approach is not favoured on a large scale, sub-regional groupings can help initiate or improve specific programmes with lighter systems of assistance, co-financing and follow up. The renewal of the 5 + 5 Dialogue, with its 8 sectorial Working Groups focussing on the western Mediterranean sub-region could be the suitable format. A twin initiative in the Eastern Basin could provide the right format for the Mashrek sub-region, either stressing on the particulars of the concerned area ( for example Migration in the West, Refugees in the East ... ) In support of these sub-regional initiatives, part of the fundings allocated to the Euro-Med process should be devoted to the regional soft security programmes.

#### D – Confidence Building Measures

Any measure which provides or adds to the sense of security from threat or attack is helpful in that it lays the ground for a regional security regime. Over time, the implementation in good faith of various specific measures has the potential to create a whole which is larger than its components. If successful, such a process gradually leads to a situation whereby regional elites and peoples begin to alter their views on each other.

CSBMs exist on many levels, military to military including cooperation in non combat areas such as humanitarian actions, as well as political and societal levels. It is important for all sides to tone down the suspicious and aggressive rhetoric and seek better understanding of the constraints and priorities of each other. The most encouraging initiatives for the last five years were the respective Dialogues between the NATO, WEU and OSCE and some south Mediterranean countries. Developing these Dialogues into multilateral programmes would be an important step forward. Improving their format and composition would also help build up stronger basis for common confidence and security. The Dialogues should adopt an open multilateral format and include all the willing South Mediterranean partners.

Another possible initiative would be transcending the bilateral format of the Political and Security Dialogue into a periodic multilateral Consultation on security issues under the auspices of the Secretary General / High Commissioner Mr Javier Solana. The objective of establishing a common area of peace and stability could only end up with such a Council.

#### E – Weapons of Mass Destruction

The parties to the Peace Process have all accepted the notion that the MENA region should be a WMD free zone (WMDFZ). This is a key objective of any future regional security regime and one to which all Mediterranean countries should dedicate themselves. The African members of the region are all members of the African Nuclear Free Zone ( Pelindaba Treaty).

The key task in the creation of a regional WMDFZ is not to eliminate a particular WMD programme of any given state in the region but to devise a comprehensive system of security whereby all states believe that they can give up the option of such weapons without endangering their security. This will require the development of a security regime within which the states of the region take significant steps to address the pressures which have led to the development of such weapons in the first place. This agenda is much broader than weapons of mass destruction. The role of the European Partners in this objective, together with some extra-regional powers, could be decisive in many ways, not only in providing further security assurances beyond those which already exist in the international non proliferation agreements, but also in asserting that neither special status nor special arrangements for particular countries are acceptable.

The creation of a WMDFZ is intimately bound up with broader political and security issues in the region. It also illustrates the fact that no progress is possible on any issue of the arms control agenda, least of all such a fundamental security question as a WMDFZ, without the progressive development of an atmosphere of trust and reconciliation which is the motivating force behind the broader objectives of a regional security regime.

These and the related issues such as \* the zonal definition, \* the membership to the existing global arrangements for the prohibition of WMD, \* the verification regime, \* the peaceful use of nuclear power and \* access to technology for legitimate purposes by the regional participants, are to be included in the agenda of the potential Regional Security Center.

#### F – Conventional Arms control

Conventional weapons have caused far more death and damage in the Mediterranean region and consumed a much greater proportion of its military budgets than WMD. While weapons of mass destruction are easily identifiable, carry a social and political stigma, and can have a relatively limited source of supply and few military purposes, conventional weapons are multifaceted in their roles and ubiquitous in their supply. They are also not the subject of international treaties in an international system which recognizes the inherent right of states to provide for their self defence. The South Mediterranean countries spend a disproportionate share of their limited wealth on conventional weaponry. One of the fundamental objectives of any regional security regime must be to assist them to reduce such spending so that resources can be spent on more productive avenues of social and economic development. The region simply cannot afford to sustain its current levels of spending on conventional weaponry.

Unlike the case of WMD, however, conventional weapons are bought because of perceived threats closer home. Whether this perception is justified is not easy to determine, but it is a definite trend in basic terms. Thus, while any arms control approach to WMD in the region will have to take place simultaneously on a regional scale, it is possible to envisage the approach to the problem of conventional arms reductions as essentially sub-regional, with some broad regional issues addressed in an umbrella agreement.

Pressures to purchase weapons will be eased in proportion to the extent to which broader security fears are reduced. Inasmuch as it can serve as a vehicle for such an easing of tensions in the region, a future security regime will make its greatest contribution to conventional arms control in the short to medium term. A regional security regime has the potential to reduce the flow of weapons into and around the region.

A second step could be enhanced dialogue between regional military establishments so as fears are lessened through the exchange of views on threat perceptions and military planning. Fundamentally, there is a need for the states of the region to begin to talk to each other about what conventional weapons they believe they need and why. In the medium term, such discussions could lay the foundation for much greater restraint in the acquisition of conventional weapons by the states of every sub-region.

The first stages of this process could be accomplished within the Regional Security Centre, through initiatives associated with CBMs on such issues as military restructuring, doctrines, force deployments, the general state of readiness... etc. The ACRS Working Group agenda has introduced the same approach during the last year of its activities.

### G – Missile Control

The introduction of ballistic missiles into the region is having a particularly destabilizing impact, regardless of whether they are armed with conventional warheads or used as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. Because of their increasing ranges, short flight times and the great difficulty of defending against them, missiles tend to raise the level of tension inherent in any crisis. The time required to properly assess the other side's intentions is dramatically shortened and the likelihood of mistakes increases. The trend towards acquisition of anti-ballistic missiles is even more disturbing. This will further complicate regional defence planning and certainly cost much more than the states of the region already spend on weapons.

The reasons for possessing long-range missiles overlap and include bilateral, regional and extra-regional security problems. Some countries may claim the existence of long range strike aircrafts in the close periphery or scientific legitimate reasons (space-launch capability) to justify possession of such technologies. By nature, the missile problem should be joined with the issue of the WMD and follow the same protocols. However, discussions can begin on how to establish a regime for the elimination of ballistic missiles from the region.

### CONCLUSION

Since the first World War, the Mediterranean failed in its many attempts to establish an order based on exclusion or dominance. Decolonization, regional wars and repeated crises are the living proof that dominance, exclusion or occupation are not sustainable : throughout history, the restoration of the old nations has always proved irresistible.

The Mediterranean has given birth to many nations which fought their way into existence and lived their time of grandeur. Whatever the fate and present size of these nations, they have resisted the trials of time and put forward their indestructible will and right to live as nations. Based on ethnic, religious or cultural ground, these nations claim a specific identity and intractable rights to land and culture and to the free exercise of sovereignty. Ultimately, the Euro-Mediterranean vision is building up a modern regional order, based on inclusiveness, on non-domination and on the respect of nations and their differences.

The modern history of Western Europe brings to mind a threefold lesson :

- \* On the one hand, the European integration process was, from 1957 onwards, an alternative to the colonial experience. After fully divesting themselves from colonial policy, the European powers found in the process of European integration, a pattern of cooperation, growth and security which offered them incomparable ground for power and stability, entitling them to rise to higher ambition.

\* On the other hand, the European powers waged wars and went through lengthy military occupation, as well as through resistance and national liberation. These nations know what resistance is. They know the virtues and limits of martyrdom and terrorism because they paid a bitter price for their national liberation, for their freedom and dignity. They went through many trying phases of violence and they do value the real meaning of a Nation's rights and obligations.

\* Finally, the former European colonial powers have achieved, with the South-Mediterranean countries, an impressive historical transition from decolonization to a system of multilateral relationship through Cooperation, Association and Partnership. This pattern of modern relations was always based on equality, complementarity and vision.

These teachings should not be ignored in the building up of our region. The European example brings to mind, in particular, the fact that colonial rule, in whatever form it appears – hegemony, settlement or annexation – has in today's world, ceased to be of value, whether it be political, economic or in the field of security. It also reminds us that democracy is not an ad hoc recipe concocted by the user, but is rather a coherent and rigorous system, based on the universal values of equality and non discrimination. Finally, as far as the foundations of our common region are concerned, the European Union has firmly asserted its frank adherence to the equality and dignity of the Participants and to their equal rights. This is far more than a commitment, it is indeed the spirit of a civilisation.

Ambassador A.A. Ounaies – Amman, November 6 th, 2000