EUROMED

Seminar - Séminaire

"Violence and politics in modern society"

"Violence et politique dans la société moderne"

EUROMED

The Hague, 26 September 2000, organised by Egypt and the Netherlands

La Haye, 26 septembre 2000, organisé par l'Egypte et les Pays-Bas

VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY

EUROMED

The Hague, 26/IX/2000

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b. List of participants
1. Intervento di Frank Majoor (3 p.)
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3. "Crisis and conflict in the Mediterranean region: the question of prevention?"/ Mary Bossis (9 p.)
4. "Violence and politics in modern society : the cases of Europe and the Middle East / Willem van Genugten, Ruud Peters, Mohammed el Sayed Said, Gamal Soltan (159 p.)



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PROGRAMME

VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY

26 September 2000, The Hague

26 September

9.30-10.00	Coffee
10.00-10.30	Introduction by Prof. Willem van Genugten
10.30-12.00	First session, introduced by Prof Ruud Peters: Education: the role of the media, democratisation, civil society, human rights, transparency, tolerance, equal treatment and 'unity in diversity'
12.00-14.00	Luncheon, hosted by Mr. Frank Majoor, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
14.00-15.30	Second session, introduced by Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Said: Repudiation of violence, the search for political solutions, investing in younger generations, stimulating contacts, international cooperation and conflict prevention
15.30-16.00	Tea
16.00-17.30	Third session, introduced by Dr. Roel Meijer: Linking economic, social and political development, combating unemployment and marginalisation and conflict prevention
17.30-17.45	Summary of results by Dr. Gamal Soltan
Chairmen:	Ambassador Abdel Raouf El Reedy Prof. dr. Alfred van Staden

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Violence and politics in modern society
25-27 September 2000, The Hague

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

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

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

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

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Allocution de M. Frank Majoor, Secrétaire général du ministère des Affaires étrangères, à l'occasion du séminaire Euromed "Violence et Politique dans la société moderne", La Haye, 26 septembre 2000

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

C'est pour moi un grand plaisir que de remplacer le secrétaire d'État Dick Benschop à ce déjeuner donné à l'occasion du séminaire Euromed intitulé « Violence et politique dans la société moderne. »

J'ai lu avec grand intérêt l'étude qui fait l'objet de ce séminaire et je ne doute pas que le contenu de ce livre ait donné lieu ce matin et donnera encore lieu cet après-midi à un débat animé.

Je ne pense pas que personne mette en cause l'importance de cette étude et de vos débats. Force est hélas ! de constater que la violence tient une place encore trop grande dans nos sociétés. En Europe, on a parfois l'impression que la violence est un phénomène qui se manifeste surtout de l'autre côté de la Méditerranée. Mais il s'agit là d'un préjugé.

On connaît suffisamment les conflits et les violences qui se déploient au Moyen-Orient, en Afrique du Nord, en Turquie et à Chypre. On les connaît même si bien que le simple mot de « Moyen-Orient » est souvent associé à la guerre et à la violence. Mais c'est une conception qui manque d'objectivité. Ceux qui ont voyagé en Égypte, en Israël ou en Syrie savent très bien que l'on s'y sent souvent plus en sécurité que dans maints pays d'Europe. Des événements tragiques comme ceux de Louxor en novembre 1997 – la raison de cette étude – sont plutôt l'exception que la règle. On oublie parfois qu'il y a encore dans l'Union européenne des endroits, non seulement dans des régions isolées, mais aussi et surtout dans les grandes capitales, qui sont confrontés de temps à autre au terrorisme et à d'autres formes de violence. On rencontre encore partout, y compris chez nous, la violence dans la rue, la violence raciste et xénophobe et le terrorisme. La violence ne se manifeste plus, dans sa forme la plus aiguë – la guerre et la guerre civile – au sein de l'Union européenne, mais immédiatement au-delà de ses frontières extérieures, en Europe. Ce dont nous avons repris conscience depuis les événements des dernières années dans les Balkans, c'est que la paix en Europe est loin d'être évidente.

Vous discutez aujourd'hui des différents contextes de la violence : violence sociale, violence économique, violence ethnique, violence religieuse, violence d'État. Plus importante encore est votre mission annexe : celle de trouver des solutions. Quels enseignements peut-on tirer de cette étude, quelles recommandations pouvez-vous faire aux gouvernements des 27 pays du partenariat euro-méditérranéen ?

Bien sûr, c'est à vous et non à moi que revient cette tâche. Je ne peux, en ce qui me concerne, que renvoyer à la Déclaration de Barcelone qui contient un certain nombre de principes essentiels sur lesquels reposent les sociétés pacifiques, en particulier la démocratie, le respect des droits de l'homme et la tolérance. La violence trouve ses racines dans les situations où des gens sont exclus, ignorés, opprimés ou réduits au silence. Les citoyens doivent avoir le droit et la possibilité de s'exprimer, de se faire entendre, de se savoir représentés dans la gestion des affaires publiques, même s'ils font partie d'une minorité culturelle ou ethnique, même s'ils professent une religion autre que celle de la majorité, même s'ils expriment des opinions qui n'ont pas l'heur de plaire au gouvernement.
Telles sont nos valeurs communes qui constituent les *conditions* de relations pacifiques au sein d'une société.

Toutefois ces valeurs n'offrent pas de *garanties*. Aujourd'hui encore, il y a en Europe et dans le monde, des gouvernements élus démocratiquement qui se rendent coupables de formes graves de violence. La démocratie peut parfois susciter au sein de la société des forces qui sont justement antidémocratiques. Nous retrouvons ce paradoxe dans les groupements politiques extrémistes du monde arabe et d'Israël, ainsi qu'en Europe. C'est évidemment à cause de ce paradoxe que l'UE est aux prises avec la question de l'extrémisme de droite, que cette étude analyse, à juste titre, amplement. C'est précisément là qu'apparaît la relation problématique entre la violence et la politique. L'usage de la violence par les forces d'extrême-droite – ou par qui que ce soit – est évidemment inadmissible. Mais l'extrême-droite est-elle politiquement admissible ? Il est nécessaire de résister et de répondre de façon adaptée aux manifestations des forces d'extrême-droite, mais il convient d'éviter que cela n'ait pour effet pervers de consolider ces forces.

Les conventions, conférences et déclarations internationales n'offrent pas plus de garanties que la démocratie. C'est à La Haye que se trouve le Palais de la Paix qui fut inauguré en 1913. Pourtant, un an plus tard le monde était en flammes.

Cela ne doit pas cependant inciter au cynisme. Au contraire. Les pays qui constituent aujourd'hui l'Union européenne vivent en paix depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. D'anciennes dictatures ont trouvé dans l'UE leur fondement démocratique, et l'UE espère à son tour accueillir en son sein d'ici quelques années des jeunes démocraties.

Le processus de l'intégration européenne a eu un important effet stabilisateur. L'un des objectifs du processus de Barcelone est d'instaurer une zone de paix et de stabilité dans le Bassin méditerranéen. Cela peut sembler une utopie, mais il n'est

pas besoin d'en être ou d'en rester ainsi. D'importants progrès ont été enregistrés ces dix dernières années dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient, entamé il y a 23 ans, et l'on est aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, à la veille d'une percée capitale. La guerre civile au Liban a pris fin il y a dix ans. En Turquie et en Algérie, les manifestations de violence intérieure ont diminué; des processus de réconciliation pourront les arrêter complètement. La Libye est en train de réintégrer la communauté internationale et il est à espérer qu'elle acceptera rapidement l'invitation de souscrire à la Déclaration de Barcelone et, en conséquence, d'adhérer au Partenariat. Grâce aux talents d'homme d'État d'Andreas Papandréou et d'Ismail Cem, qui comprennent très bien le désir de paix nourri par leurs concitoyens, un processus de rapprochement s'est engagé entre la Grèce et la Turquie, que nous pouvons aujourd'hui qualifier d'irréversible. C'est grâce notamment à cette initiative que grandissent les chances d'une solution de la question de Chypre. Les parties concernées s'y attellent à nouveau ces jours-ci avec le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU.

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs, il y a de l'espoir. La violence n'est pas inéluctable. Les politiques y ont certes un rôle à jouer, mais les scientifiques tout autant. En effet, aucun processus de paix n'a de chance d'être durable si l'on ne recherche pas la vérité, si l'on ne met pas à nu les racines des conflits, si l'on ne formule pas des enseignements à tirer de cette étude. C'est pour cela que vous êtes réunis aujourd'hui. Je suis impatient de connaître les résultats de vos travaux.

Permettez-moi de conclure par un mot de remerciement à l'intention de nos collègues égyptiens, l'Ambassadeur Abdel Raouf El Reedy, l'Ambassadeur Mahdi Fatallah et, en particulier, l'Ambassadeur Wafaa Bassim, qui a assuré la direction générale du projet du côté égyptien. Vous avez, ces dernières années, soutenu, stimulé et défendu le projet, avec une conviction et un engagement de tous les instants, même lorsque le projet suscitait émotions et résistance. Aussi est-ce avec plaisir que je saisis cette occasion pour vous exprimer toute mon admiration pour vos efforts et pour vous remercier cordialement de votre étroite coopération.

(2)

"Civil Protection against Natural and Man Made Disasters as a means of Conflict Prevention"

By

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Prepared for the Euromed Seminar on

"Violence and Politics in Modern Society"

The Hague, Netherlands

26/09/2000

The countries of the Mediterranean region share an affluent variety of historical experiences and a diversity of beliefs and ideals contributing to the plurality and richness of the region. It is in most of the cases this very richness and diversity that divides, but at the same time, unites the peoples of the Mediterranean. Regional security has always been the apple of discord either in the northern shores or the southern or in both. However, regional security and stability remain the prerequisites for sustainable development of the Mediterranean countries and for a balanced partnership among them. As such, situations of tension and open conflict persist in the Mediterranean undermining stability in the region and often leading to serious impediments to the development of those states and their relations with others.

Many of the tensions and conflicts, which seriously affect relations among or within states and contribute to the fact that the Mediterranean is considered one of the most trouble-borne areas, remain unresolved. The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the line of thought aiming at the increase of understanding and at the adoption of cooperation measures, in areas such as in civil protection, as a means of conflict prevention and confidence building measure among the states of the Mediterranean, providing the reasons and the practical steps for their implementation.

The Mediterranean region has a vast historical experience of destabilization. A combination of wide-ranging inter state and intra state conflicts, high and low intensity violence (mainly in the form of terrorism) have been forms of destabilization, emanating mainly from the southern shores and functioning at the sub-regional level.

Border and territorial disputes constitute the first type of conflicts. Example of such conflicts have been or still are those between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Egypt and the Sudan, Spain and Morocco and those in Western Sahara. The second type of conflicts is those of ethno-cultural rivalry and intra state

nature, such as those in Algeria, Turkey (Kurdish issue). In the same type of conflict belongs the low-intensity violence of terrorism in Algeria and in Egypt. One should also take into account the future potential prospects for conflict especially over the issue of water resources, which is possible to affect relations between Turkey, Syria, Israel and Iraq. The geopolitical situation described above illustrates the specificity of the security issues in the Mediterranean region and the difficulty in implementing the East-West mode of conflict prevention and management.

Despite the truthfulness of the aforementioned descriptions and despite the fact that these types of conflict may persist, the timing for some types of conflict prevention, nevertheless, is better now than in other occasions. The Peace Process has shown elements of resumption after an extended interruption. Improvements in relations between Greece and Turkey since summer 1999 and the European perspective of Turkey have opened new prospects and possibilities with regard to the Cyprus problem. The suspension of the embargo against Libya and the prospect of becoming a full member in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership relation in the near future, have contributed to the détente in the southern Mediterranean basin.

It goes without saying that the issue of security is of particular importance for the Mediterranean region. An issue, however, with which every reader of the area has to cope, is the problem of definitions concerning security. When talking about security issues in the Mediterranean one cannot help but notice that a major handicap is the lack of any common definition of security. A response to a security threat should not be based on an imposed formula that carries with it the risk of being perceived as intrusive in the eyes and the minds of the southern partners. It is preferable that such a response should be based on a cooperative approach that moves away from a common definition of risks and responses.

For the above reason the focus of attention should be placed on 'soft security' rather than on 'hard security'. The latter represents a territory's response to strategic

threats (arms built-up) with a view to preserving its integrity or the integrity of persons. This response is usually materialized when the conflict situation is at hand. It also has the inevitable outcome of victimizing one side so that there is little room left for cooperation and bridging gaps. The former ('soft security') involves taking account of natural, economic, political, humanitarian and social factors that frequently present a potential threat, constituting a source of instability. By nature the 'soft security' measures appear appropriate when the actual conflict is not on the front door, depend on but also attract the good will of the parties and generally present a low profile attitude. For this exact reason 'soft security' is to be used as an introductory tool for conflict prevention and as a Confidence Building Measure.

It is in the intentions of the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability to include partnership building measures, measures to enhance good neighborly relations and regional cooperation as well as preventive diplomacy measures whose materialization will constitute the groundwork for an evolving and balanced Euro-Med system of global security. But along which lines should these measures be oriented?

First and foremost, these partnership building measures should concentrate on increasing mutual familiarity and understanding across and within the Mediterranean region. The clear priority should be to expand the still fragile basis on which regional cooperation is currently posited rather than prefer activities predicated on joint or sub-regional planning for conflict prevention and crisis management especially if these include 'hard security issues'. The latter should assume a secondary level of importance applicable only –as the wording of the Charter Guidelines indicate on a voluntary and on consensual basis.

Concentrating the Partnership's energies towards positive outcomes through constructive engagement and cooperation will serve the dual purpose of establishing a stronger framework for cooperation in the widest sense (that is not just over security issues traditionally defined but across the whole spectrum of the Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership. While pre-empting precisely the kind of mistrust and mutual threat perceptions, which, for want of other channels, may eventually give rise to conflict. Crisis management as a result, should concentrate more on joint ventures geared towards shared humanitarian and social goals not mutual dispute settlement.

The area of cooperation for civil protection against natural and man made disasters provides a functional opportunity to achieve the aforementioned goals. This is because explorations on this subject respond to real rather than imagined needs. It is also the nature of this type of engagement that eliminates the risk and threat perception imposed by some 'hard security' measures. Developing early warning systems for natural disasters of the kind already foreseen in the case of the Turkish and Greek earthquakes along with contingency plans and units ready to react at short notice may not only increase the mobility of joint responses. They can also serve to promote the continuing benefits of exchanging expert advice and technical assistance across a number of sections within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership states (for example developing a Mediterranean fire, ambulance and rescue services as an end state).

One approach that is moving along these lines, and which might be developed further as a Partnership Building Measure, is the 2-year pilot project between civil protection services. This initiative was approved by the Senior Officials responsible for the political and security dialogue in October 1997, on the joint initiative of Egypt and Italy and it became operational in June 1998 as the first building block for the establishment of a Euro-Med system of civil protection. The objectives of this pilot project are to supplement bilateral and multilateral initiatives of the member states and to establish a set of concrete and operational actions. These objectives are going to be implemented through training courses, exchange of experts, networking of civil protection schools, technical assistance and awareness raising and the education of citizens. The program, however, is only the starting effort towards the right direction, as it deals with a limited number of risks and

needs to evolve and progress further in order to produce fully fledged outcomes for that matter.

In order to adopt a long-term policy of cooperation in the field of civil protection against natural and man made disasters it is of crucial importance to devise a multi functional schedule as well as rules and regulations to govern the operational details of the cooperation in the particular field. Specifically, the situation is to be dealt in four phases namely, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery, covering thus the whole range of reactions towards any individual incident or combination of a number of incidents.

Because defining things is the safest way to materialize them, cooperation in emergency situations means a situation in a given area brought about by either a dangerous natural phenomenon or by man made accidents or a combination of both. Situations like that would include earthquakes, floods, forest fires, industrial fires and accidents, transport accidents, oil spills, infectious diseases etc., which may be the cause of environmental damage, loss of human lives and serious disturbance in the normal living conditions of the population on which the situation has occurred.

As far as the areas of cooperation are concerned civil protection cooperation should involve the areas of scientific, technical, educational and training cooperation, health cooperation, environment protection cooperation and administrative cooperation.

More specifically, in the first field of cooperation, namely the scientific, technical, educational and training cooperation, it would be of particular importance to promote understanding through the organization of educational and training activities in the form of student exchange programs and seminars addressed to civil protection personnel. In addition, what deems to be indispensable is the exchange of experiences, information, scientific and technological achievements relevant to all faces of risk management, health and environment protection, as well as, the

exchange of expert and specialized man power. Furthermore, what would be more helpful and of practical nature is the carrying out of joint research projects and the organization of specialized workshops, conferences, and visits by teams of risk managers and specialists to the emergency zones.

In the field of Health Cooperation, the exchange of experiences on the system of health treatment relevant to emergency response and preparedness management in emergency situations is crucial. What is more, there is the need to provide humanitarian and pharmaceutical assistance depending on the type and the magnitude of the emergency situation. It is also important to have cooperation on the identification and combating of severe infectious epidemic diseases, water borne and consuming sources diseases epidemics as well as pesticide related ones. All these cannot be performed without the exchange of trained volunteer teams for extending health services before and after the emergency situations.

In the field of Environment Protection Cooperation, the first concern will be to cooperate for the preservation of the quality and prevention of pollution of the environment. The need for the monitoring and follow up of the climatic trends and changes and other issues of the atmospheric behavior is also very important. Because this field is dealing with floods it is crucial to establish cooperation in devising and utilizing alarm systems for flooding and overflowing of rivers and fluctuation of water level of the seas and rivers. The same should apply to the cooperation for the management of situations concerning earthquakes with the creation of seismological stations and alarm systems.

Last but not least, administrative cooperation should take place in order to determine and establish the rules and regulations concerning the method of functioning of the executive organs in emergency situations. This is deemed necessary in order to facilitate relief and rescue operations, entry and exit of equipment and support materials required by operators and the use of terminal, port, and trade facilities and services.

Concluding, it is evident that cooperation in Civil Protection against natural and man made disasters presents a wide range of possibilities for the promotion of understanding and for creating the necessary climate for building bridges and narrowing the gaps across the shores of the Mediterranean basin.

One has to admit that Civil Protection against natural and man made disasters is not a panacea for the elimination of all the perceptions of threats to security and the easing of tensions across the Mediterranean. It is however, the first step towards the right direction, as cooperation in this field can give credible answers for the good intentions and unite the peoples of the Mediterranean against common risks and threats to their security.

It is understandable of course that there remains a host of details to be determined for the better operational functioning of the above mentioned plans. However, because Civil Protection against natural and man made disasters is an issue responding to risks and threats towards which all states are sensitive and cannot always cope with the outcomes by themselves, it is easier to attract the consensus for cooperation and the determination of most of the operational details.

(3)

Crisis and Conflict in the Mediterranean Region: the question of prevention?

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It tends to become a stereotype that most conflicts have their origins in the Mediterranean region. The difficulties that seem permanent in the majority of the approaches for solution have developed a number of models of recognition to the oncoming episodes that entail violence.

I. A History of Conflict.

The instability in the area is not a recent fact. At the same time, the numerous conflicts definitely give birth to uncertainties. But the conditions created in this area are partly a result of the end of the bipolar system.

Invariably, it has been argued that the Mediterranean region has been the 'hot bed' of international change, mostly violent changes, which are justified only when they become legalized. This is usually the case either through the creation of a state, or through the expectation of the creation of a new state.

Within this context, it is quite clear that despite the chronic state of violence in Algeria, there is no apparent danger of the government collapsing and the Islamic insurgents seize control.

On the other hand, the notion of the Arabs and the Israelis solving their problems once and for all seems as a far fetched idea. The peace process which includes the majority of the countries in the region, is constantly under a distrustful tension of all the parties involved.

Violence, low intensity violence, inter-state and intra-state conflict, seems to be part of the evolution of the area, and signs of unrest lead to western phobias. Very often these phobias are over-simplified and controversial.

II. The Stereotype of Islamic Militancy.

The stereotype of the Islamic militant has become prevalent in the West especially since the late 1970's. The Islamic revolution in Iran was one of the major impetuses for this stereotype and it has been perpetuated by the continuing behaviour of Iran's theocratic government.

But there are also other events that have added to the perpetuation of this stereotype. These include, but are by no means limited to:

- the Islamic involvement in rebellions and violent conflict in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and the Kashmir province of India;
- the sectarian war in Lebanon;
- the rebellion by the Muslims in Chechnya against Russia;
- the violent Palestinian campaign against the state of Israel followed by the violent resistance of Hammas and other Islamic militant groups to the Palestinian - Israeli peace process;
- the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia;
- the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York by a small Islamic militant group; and
- the attack on US troops in Saudi Arabia, apparently by Islamic militants.

This stereotype has become prevalent in Western media, as well as in policy-making and academic circles. (Fox Jonathan, 'Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Frank Cass, London, Summer 2000, pp. 1-2) As Professor Fox has pointed out the idea of Islamic stereotype is a product of the West, which brings the issue of whether religion can be conflict prone, or if religion can lead its followers to violent acts.

However, it could be highly simplistic to approach the issue of crisis, even more the issue of conflict, in the Mediterranean region based on religion alone.

III. Violence as Strategic Tool.

Violence in most forms has been repeatedly used by all actors, either in their quest for a religious solution, or a territorial demand. At the same time, possible peaceful political developments are being filtered through the violent actions of all parties involved.

It has been noted that, violence is a major step in conflict creation, while the actors involved assume their level of extremism as the only approach to credible solutions. Collective violence is adequate -at least for some groups- in order to result in more extreme forms of violence, which will lead to a widespread conflict.

In the Mediterranean region all differences and disputes that lead to conflicts, along with the dynamic that is created, eventually lead to a certain security challenge. This fact prepares the ground, which permits a continuous suspicion for the outsiders, due to the frequent interactions of the partners involved.

It can also be easily understood that the cost involved is barely the economic drain of the sides in conflict. It is mostly the immense human loss, which is always difficult to describe.

IV. Violence in International Relations.

Violence in its immediate form is not an absolutely necessary step to use in order to achieve the final goal. In International Relations violence can be attributed by a number of different approaches.

A dispute -for example- can originate from the verbal announcements, to military dynamic shows in a number of ways. While these categories of disputes can prolong for longer periods of time, they do not necessarily produce conflict. These differences are mostly territorial and the partners involved refer to the disagreement as a security issue.

The Swedish approach to conflict is an important look to the prolonged disputes in the Mediterranean region, but the ongoing differences are easier put into words than into actions, as it follows:

> "Today, effective security policy is predicated increasingly on co-operative methods designed to prevent armed conflict and forestall new security threats such as environmental problems, organised crime, terrorism, economic breakdown and refugee problems. Security is

> nowadays based less on military deterrence and more on the assumption that states will adhere to established norms and mutually agreed restrictions. It is also based on confidence building transparency in military affairs, arms control and disarmament." (Preventing Violent Conflict, *A Swedish Action Plan*, Stockholm 1999)

Certainly major positive steps have been taken, which in a way proves the validity of the international peace process initiatives.

V. Resolution Mechanisms and Peace.

The Peace Process which can be hampered by the dispute and the differences in the Mediterranean region are substantial and crucial for world peace. Negation of violence in all its forms sounds easier to an outsider than to any person inhabiting the tension areas.

While the level of violence, or the level of conflict is equal to the amount of tension manipulated by the sides involved, conflict prevention based on consensus is neither sufficient nor complete, when is not historically proved.

All international interest to resolve ethnic conflicts, or all sorts of other differences have not been met with success equal to the amount of interest involved, while mostly indifference or animosity was the result. International interest requires a great amount of knowledge of the disputes, along with the differences involved of the sides in opposition, in order to propose political solutions viable and just so acceptable by all.

Conflicts afflict almost every region of the world and preoccupy numerous scholars and policy makers. (Ravi Bhavnani and David Backer, "Localised Ethnic Conflict and Genocide", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Sage Publications, June 2000, p. 305) The different aspects of conflict are also distinguishing the levels of the actors participating in the solution providing mechanism. The solution mechanism needs to be informative, persuasive and viable in order to provide politically acceptable means of conflict prevention and conflict solving approaches.

There are numerous cases where the peace promoting forces have proven unworthy of the trust given to them, thus creating an aura of 'fear of peace' stand to the actors

involved. Promotion of peace needs an ethical approach from the 'persuading' party or parties involved.

VI. Diplomacy of Conflict Prevention and the EU.

In cases where conflict prevention is discussed alongside preventive diplomacy the case of interest deals mostly with the political means of persuasion used to interest and convince the partners to resolve their problems in other ways than conflict.

As the Swedish Action Plan states:

> "The European Union is a peace project in its own right; its extensive network of inter-linking ties and commitments makes war between member states practically unthinkable. Moreover, its gravitational attraction on membership applicants and candidates for co-operation is beneficial influence in itself. By contributing to the development of democracy, a set of common norms and economic interdependence, this attraction offers considerable potential for conflict prevention." (Preventing Violent Conflict, *ibid*, p. 24)

Thus, the political dialogue and the economic and other agreements between the partners help immensely to avoid confrontation in other fields. The attraction that was mentioned is a basic element in the field of conflict prevention.

Inevitably conflict prevention requires mutual confidence and joint actions that lead to preventive mechanisms. The present day differences which are dealt according to the actors involved either in conflict or prolonged disputes or negative verbal statements, give ground to peaceful reasoning and eventual peaceful solutions accepted by all.

Nevertheless, the long term peace process requires a willingness to achieve co-operation. The non-EU partners that deal with similar situations, or the inter-mingled situations that involve EU and non-EU countries, complicate matters. The complication and the asymmetries, although not unfeasible to solve, produce a set of difficulties that make visible results unforeseen.

Part of the complication presents the outlook and the perception of conflict solving, that the parameters presented by the non-involved partners are not sufficient to the

receivers. At the same time, it remains an issue of importance if the produced solutions by the outsiders are utopian, or non-sufficient for the particular cases.

The produced packages of solutions deriving from the European member-states to the Mediterranean partners continue to be a guideline for further action, a guideline that mentions explicitly the establishment of areas free of weapons of mass destruction, the respect that all should offer to the rights of people who demand self-determination, and the territorial integrity of the states in question.

The differences that constitute human lives of other geographical regions must not be first questioned and then refused as not being quite understood. The differences can not be eliminated, but understood and respected. Within the differences are the national interests that constitute part of the riddle.

VII. Security Issues and Role Playing from the Actors Involved.

It has been noted that when the ambivalent actors are given roles to play in the solution projected mechanisms, they tend to be easier and workable partners. When it comes to the security process, partners tend to be mostly inclined towards their national interests than the overall peace process.

The security issue is defined according to many different approaches, but mostly is filtered by the national interests of its country. Security continues to be the most important factor in the daily life of states. Matters of culture, human rights, economy and the rest, tend to fall into a second category of interest, except when they coincide with the issue of national security, as is the water problem in the Middle East.

A meaningful approach in conflict prevention does not necessarily lead to strict legal and institutional proposals, but it will be rather helpful to inflict the partners into a long political discussion of reason and workable outcomes. Taken for granted that all wish for reason and national good, it is far fetched to push towards solving problems or speak meaningfully about partnership when security issues remain unclear.

Security issues require meaningful agreement and understanding of the needs that present the problem. When partners distrust each other in the process of finding solutions, a judicial approach can eventually be a method of reaching workable means or parameters

of agreement. The legal contribution enhances the chances of future peaceful co-operation that seem unheard of when issues of security arise. In cases of hopeful neighbourly relations, the legal and judicial approach tends to be a unique and only method to solution aspirations.

It is equally important to promote security in its different outlooks by most partners involved, especially when the lack of co-operation determines the absence of cohesion. It is a matter of interest as it is a matter of concern the fact of the different understanding of security when we deal with the Mediterranean region.

Their 'exotic' way of dealing with their inner differences seem far from the western understanding. It seems that we deal with the security as well as all other issues like culture, religion, economy etc., in a unique not comprehending way. The same applies when the differences are between an EU and a non-EU country.

VIII. Development Within the Context of Security and Human Rights.

Security issues might seem as non-comprehensible and consequently unresolved. Still the following question arises: Is the approach to the problem based on how the European partners imagine their Mediterranean counterparts?

Issues of strategic differences and luck of equilibrium in the strategic approach, contain part of the distrust that duels in the relations of the entire region. A growing awareness of the conditions that create crisis is eventually coming into focus -at least by a number of thinkers- shown healthy scepticism, while eventually leading policy making to a better and safer ground.

Nonetheless, a number of problems that arose in Western Europe and had their origins in the Mediterranean region, problems like refugees and immigrants, are not yet comprehended by the majority of the western population. In the meantime, the outflow of the countries of origin continues, overestimating the capabilities of western economies.

All these parameters leads us to consider the fact that most of these problems originate in the economic sphere of a country's development. Very often the outcome of this mental process leads us to the context of security.

On the other hand, this luck of comprehending each other does not limit itself in the economic and political fields. The clear-cut differences in the field of human rights, and the way they are understood by all involved is a matter of concern and, at the same time, a matter of misunderstanding.

There is certainly no monopoly or absolute virtue by any country which is outspoken on the issue. However, there are certain commitments which all should abide, in order to achieve minimum understanding on basic issues.

In cases where severe misunderstandings on the issue of human rights were noted, the amount of animosity and tension created, effected negatively the conflict prevention implementation. It has been also noted, that conflict prevention is not possible when cohesion is disturbed.

To name but a few, cohesion can be disturbed by the following:

- territorial and border disputes,
- ethno-cultural rivalries,
- terrorism,
- extensive military build-up,
- luck of water supply, which is rather limited in the Mediterranean area.

So, is there a model of conflict prevention, or violence illumination which can be used to abolish future tensions?

IX. Positive Initiatives Towards Conflict Prevention in the Region.

While it is not possible to prepare recipes for easy consumption, the efforts that have been taken by both parties, the European Union and the South Mediterranean countries, are perceived to be positive steps. At the same time, positive initiatives have been noted as well on a bilateral level.

It should also be mentioned, as stressed by Abdelwahad Biad that:

> "Conflict prevention and conflict management has become an important issue in the discussion of the post-Cold War security framework. In addition, they should take into account the life span or stages of the conflict: a pre-conflict situation calls for preventive action; an in-

conflict scenario requires actions towards crisis management and resolution; and a post-conflict situation needs peace-enforcement actions.' (Abdelwahad Biad, 'A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mediterranean', *Afers Internacionals, Fundacio CIDOB*, Issue No. 37, p. ..)

The steps which are considered necessary to refrain from crisis development, are in the sphere of the parties willingness to avoid crises escalation. The absence of a common definition of 'security', is not necessary to be a handicap, but rather a co-operative approach that deals directly with the issues involved.

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VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY

THE CASES OF EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY; THE CASES OF EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

An Introduction to the Study

By Willem van Genugten and Ruud Peters

1. Introduction

In the margins of the November 1997 state visit to Egypt by the Dutch Queen, Beatrix - a visit coinciding with the terrorist attack on tourists in Luxor on 17 November - the then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, and his Egyptian colleague Amr Moussa decided to commission a study on the roots and causes of violence both in European and Mediterranean countries. This introductory chapter deals with the 'Barcelona process', being the organisational framework of the project (section 2); the way the study was organised (section 3); summaries of the chapters (section 4); an overview of the recommendations made by the respective authors (section 5); and some final remarks (section 6).

2. The Framework of the Report: The 'Barcelona Process'

At the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, which took place in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995, 26 states as well as the Palestinian Authority, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission adopted the 'Barcelona Declaration', stating that, in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the states would have to co-operate in order to make the region a safe and prosperous part of the world. Their co-operation was labelled the 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership'. The partnership intended to include three areas: 1) A 'Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability'; 2) An 'Economic and Financial Partnership: Creating an Area of Shared Prosperity; and 3) A 'Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies'.[1]

The initiators to the study decided that it would have to fit specifically within the activities of the Third Chapter of the Barcelona process. Therefore it might be good to recall the intentions of the Barcelona agreement in this field. The 1995 Declaration

[1] See the Document on the European Partnership, including the 'Barcelona Declaration' as well as a Work Programme, adopted in Barcelona on 28 November 1995.

speaks about, *inter alia*, the need for a dialogue between the cultures throughout the Mediterranean region; the role the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures; the importance of social development going hand in hand with economic development; the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; the importance to encourage contacts and exchanges between young people; the need to strengthen the democratic institutions and the rule of law; the need to strengthen co-operation to prevent terrorism; and the importance of determined campaigns against racism, xenophobia and intolerance.[2]

In this report, the authors have taken the approach of the Third Chapter of the Barcelona process as a starting point, although there are - of course - many linkages to the First Chapter ('Security') as well as to the Second Chapter ('Economics'). Given the subject of the report ('Violence and Politics in Modern Society'), such linkages are present in the analytical part of several contributions as well as on the level of the recommendations the authors come up with.

3. The Design of the Study

After the initial decision to commission the study, the first author of this Introduction was asked to write its terms of reference. He did so in February 1998. The terms were discussed in two meetings within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, subsequently, on the bilateral Dutch-Egyptian level. In March 1998, after having inserted the Egyptian comments, the terms were discussed on the European as well as the Arab level. As a result of the successive 'negotiation rounds', it was decided not to focus more or less exclusively on such phenomena as terrorism - which initially triggered the study; see above -, but to concentrate on root causes of all kinds of violence, including terrorism, in modern Euro-Med societies.

Finally, in May 1998, the idea of the study was discussed within, and approved by the Euro-Med Committee. The discussion within the Committee took place on the basis of a fiche called 'Egyptian - Netherlands Proposal "Violence and Politics in Modern Society"'. As to the scope and objectives of the study, the fiche stated the following:

> It is proposed to limit the study to forms of violence within the public domain. As a working description, 'violence' is understood as a physical or psychological violation of the integrity of human beings or of goods and property. Object of the study would be both spontaneous and organized expressions of different kinds of violence. The study is meant to address the motives behind such violence, which can be described as trying to influence public opinion or political leaders to change their attitudes in cases of dispute.
> The study should not deal with violence in general, practised all over the world, nor should it be

[2] *Ibidem.* Also see the Conclusions by the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Malta, 15 and 16 April, 1997.

> merely of an academic, theoretical nature, aiming at complete understanding of this complex and non-homogeneous issue, but should concentrate on an analysis of some specific forms of violence. The examples to be chosen should be relevant for a better understanding of the phenomenon of violence in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
> The study will in the first place draw on existing sources. It will contain a description of selected cases of violence and a serious analysis of their respective root causes. Ideally, the study will lead to the formulation of recommendations.

Pending the formal approval by the Euro-Med Committee, a small research team was composed, consisting, on the Dutch side, of the two authors of this Introduction, as well as, on the Egyptian side, dr. Mohamed El Sayed Said and dr. Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan. They were asked to prepare a detailed outline for the report. After intensive electronic consultations, a meeting took place at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1998 to finalise this stage of the project. At the meeting - partly consisting of deliberations with representatives of the Dutch and the Egyptian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and partly consisting of intensive talks among the researchers themselves (including the Dutch researcher dr. Roel Meijer) - it was decided to concentrate on the following items: extreme right-wing movements; militant religious, political movements; ethnic conflicts, including separatist movements; organised social conflict and distribution of wealth; anonymous, spontaneous mass violence; and international conflicts, including territorial conflicts as well as political and strategic conflicts.

After the October meeting in the Netherlands, the researchers started organising and writing their chapters. The first results were discussed at a meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in January 1999. It was then decided not to make a separate chapter on spontaneous mass violence, but to insert this issue into the other chapters. On the basis of a thorough debate of the draft chapters - a debate which can be considered a real Euro-Arabic dialogue in the sense of the Barcelona process, i.e., critical comments in a constructive sphere of mutual understanding - it was also decided to make a few serious changes in some of the chapters, while in other cases the authors were asked to pay attention to aspects not yet elaborated upon. Given the refractory character of the issues to be dealt with - and given the fact that all the researchers had a series of other, regular tasks - it took some three months after the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting to finalise the contents of the chapters, followed by another month for editing and language check, communication with the authors about the last details, and writing this Introduction.

4. Summaries of the Five Chapters

The report consists of five core chapters. They are summarised below, followed by a separate section (5) in which an overview is given of the recommendations within the five chapters.

4.1 Social Unrest

In his chapter on *Turbulent Waves: Social Unrest in the Mediterranean*, dr. Ahmed Abdalla, an Egyptian researcher invited by the research team to write this chapter, discusses all kinds of social unrest in the Euro-Med region. In the beginning of his chapter, the author conceptualises two aspects of social unrest: motivations for and manifestations of social unrest. Among the former he lists: low levels of economic development; faulty patterns of distribution of wealth and income; increasing cost of living; high levels of unemployment; austerity measures and cuts in subsidies; marginalisation and downward mobility; and consumption expectations in a globalised economy. As to the manifestations of social unrest, he distinguishes between spontaneous and violent forms and those forms that are mediated through interest representation institutions or groups. These can be legal, conventional or illegal.

According to Abdalla, unemployment needs special attention, as a factor contributing to social unrest.

> Unemployment affects the social fabric to its roots, to the extent it causes erosion and depreciation in the lives of individuals and families. (...) The very institution of the family comes under threat. This is a nightmare especially for societies of the old world such as the Mediterranean cultures, which so deeply revere the family in all their socio-cultural creeds and constructs.

When unemployment involves large numbers of the younger members of a society - as it often does - the problem is even worse:

> The unemployed youth find themselves with their backs against the wall (...), their alienation and counter-socialisation leading them, and their societies, to chaos, criminality and violence. Despair thus becomes the mother of depreciation, a euphemism for gradual social disintegration.

This leads the author to a discussion of the important issue of massive marginalisation. According to Abdalla, even if we put aside the moral implications of having a great deal of child labour and street children, as well as highly-exploited women, 'we are still faced with the fact that, in numerical terms, with the present scale of marginalisation, we are, in effect, speaking of double marginality: of communities and nations'. Putting poverty, unemployment and marginalisation on one side of the balance, and consumption expectations on the other, one may wonder, according to Abdalla, whether the collision of these two opposites would not ignite a spark of global social unrest.

Abdalla then discusses a series of manifestations of social unrest: disciplined disputes and labour union activism; confrontational outbursts of protest; activism of students and professionals; and violence related to street riots, vandalism and terrorism. In addition, he discusses a number of political factors which are in a close inter-play with social unrest, such as, on the one hand, the power of the market, the existence of corruption

and the power of the police apparatus, and, on the other, the welfare state, participation in elections and promotion of young generations to leadership.

4.2 Right-Wing Extremism

The chapter on *Right-wing Extremism and Violence: Practice, Root Causes and Countermeasures*, by Saskia Borger and prof.dr. Willem van Genugten, opens - in section 2 - with a description of some events and tendencies that are commonly regarded to belong to right-wing extremism. They discuss, *inter alia*, the tragic case of the German city of Solingen, where, in 1993, a fire-bomb thrown by right-wing extremists killed five Turkish people. Although, according to the authors, it is difficult to develop a definition which encompasses all aspects of the phenomenon of right-wing extremism, it is in their view possible to list a number of characteristics which, if they occur together, are typical of the phenomenon. One can think of nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism, authoritarianism and populism.

After their introductory sections, Borger and Van Genugten present a typology based on the work of the German sociologist Helmut Willems, who makes a division into four types of right-wing extremism: the ideologically motivated right-wing extremist, the xenophobe or ethnocentrist, the criminal and marginalised youth, and the fellow-traveller. As the authors of the chapters say, however, it is important to keep in mind that right-wing extremism is not a 'single-issue' phenomenon.

The authors then discuss possible root causes of right-wing extremism, based on several hypotheses: is it a reaction to the multi-culturalisation of Western societies, to domestic institutional changes in advanced capitalist democracies, to authoritarian hierarchical arrangements in politics, or is right-wing extremism to be seen as a revival of the fascist and national socialist ideology? In going through these types of explanations, the authors pay special attention to the possible linkage between right-wing extremism and nazism/fascism: the 'continuity thesis'. They quote Herbert Kitschelt, author of a major study on *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, who says about this working hypothesis that it is 'so implausible that it hardly deserves restatement were it not for its importance in political rhetoric, especially among certain strands of the European Left'. Borger and Van Genugten add, however, that 'although Kitschelt gives a lot of evidence substantiating this conclusion on a highly controversial theme, it might still not be the last word on the issue'.

The authors further discuss developments triggering right-wing extremism. In that respect, they pay special attention to the role of economic crises, which form only a 'part of the story', although they can serve as catalysts, and the media. In relation to the role of the media, Borger and Van Genugten discuss, amongst other things, the way journalists report on cases of right-wing violence and what this means in terms of possible prolongation of right-wing extremist behaviour. They also discuss the positive

role the media can play in fighting right-wing extremism. The relevant section (4) ends with some remarks on the use of Internet by right wing extremists.

Finally, the authors describe a series of governmental and intergovernmental reactions to right-wing extremism. They divide the governmental reactions into four categories: starting research activities; punishing the perpetrators of right-wing extremist actions within the ordinary penal (and if necessary and possible: civil) legal system; forbidding political parties, organisations and demonstrations; creating special 'task forces'. At the end of this part of their chapter (section 5), they discuss some of the measures taken on intergovernmental levels to deal with the transnational aspects of right-wing extremism, such as the establishment of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance by the Council of Europe, and the European Observation Centre for Racism and Xenophobia by the European Union.

4.3 Ethnic Conflicts

In his chapter on *Ethnic Conflicts in the Mediterranean*, Dr. Mohamed El Sayed Said discusses the issue of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, an issue which, according to the author, 'has come as a surprise to the international system, simply because this system was far from willing to invest resources in serious and honest conflict prevention and conflict resolution'. El Sayed Said then argues that the Mediterranean is one of the world's regions that is least inflicted with ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, as to the author, some important cases of ethnic tension do exist, such as the Kurdish rebellion in and against Turkey, and the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

In the following part of his chapter (section 3), the author discusses several approaches to the understanding of ethnicity, emphasising that ethnicity is not the product of identity, and should not be caught in the language of identity. El Sayed Said warns that:

> The group may invoke descent, or language, religion, or skin colour, individually or combined in different situations, as this may serve the specific purpose or interests. It would then be a mistake to place emphasis on inherited identity bonds, as groups tend to focus only on a few such bonds as correspond to changing strains and challenges, stemming from changing circumstances or environments surrounding this group.

In other words: groups are using their common ethnic identity as long as it fits political and other goals.

Having said that, the author discusses (in section 4) the relevance of economic inequalities, as part of the coming into existence of conflicts. Such inequalities can, for instance, come to the surface in case of an ethnic division of labour. El Sayed Said:

> A situation of internal imperialism arises when different regional/cultural groups are allocated unequal ranges of labour processes, with dominant cultural groups keeping for themselves high

> value-added industries, with other (dominated or weaker) groups forced to low value-added labour processes. Hechter contends that cultural minorities incorporated in an inferior position in the division of labour will eventually develop sentiments and practices similar to national liberation movements in ex-colonial societies.

The author adds, however, that not all of these inequalities may be attributed to (the rise of) capitalism: 'Some are more entrenched in past feudal rather than capitalist economic systems.'

According to El Sayed Said, uneven regional development, coupled with (partial) separation of communities, is noticeable in many parts of the Mediterranean region. He adds, however, (in section 5) that in fact, there is evidence enough to say that inequalities in the politico-symbolic realm are even more potent causes of ethnic conflicts than inequalities in the material economic realm: 'People revolt against symbolic humiliation directed against them more fiercely than against their material exploitation.' And: 'The conflict spiral starts when the majority group takes severe (precautionary!) measures which restrict or downgrade the status or the liberties of minorities.'

El Sayed Said then applies his theoretical notions on a range of situations: Lebanon, Turkey, Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, Spain, Algeria and Israel. The title of this section (7) is typical: 'Some Manage and Some do Not'. The section is followed by a discussion on the role of the intellectuals, 'who are presumed to have been educated in the spirit of rationalism and modernity'. In fact, however, according to the author, 'the graduates of modern education are more prone to ethnic sentiments than traditional leaders', because they are more focused on 'identity and on the language of history and belonging rather than on achievement and performance'.

In a final section, the author discusses the role the international community can play in preventing or stopping ethnic strife.

4.4 Political Religious Movements

In their chapter on *The Role of Violence in Political Religious Movements*, dr. Roel Meijer and prof.dr. Ruud Peters analyse the role of violence in political religious movements by making an assessment of the Strengths and Weaknesses of these movements, and identifying the main Opportunities for and Threats to them, according to a classic SWOT analysis. They argue that violence constitutes one of the main weaknesses of political religious movements because, in almost all cases, violence has failed to bring nearer the basic goals and aims of these movements, i.e., to establish a moral society based on religious principles, and made their realisation more difficult.

The authors point out that violence has two sources. Certain religious doctrines within Islam and Judaism sanction warfare against the enemies of the communities of Muslims

and Jews respectively, and provide an ideological legitimation for the use of violence by religious political movements. However, the form and the direction this violence assumes cannot be explained by these doctrines but rather by the specific circumstances that these movements are confronted with.

The authors argue that religious political movements have become so strong during the last two decades because purely political movements have failed to fulfil their promises. In fact, one of the reasons for the eruption of violence is that religious movements have become the focus of all political, economic and social frustrations and tensions of the region, while these movements are not equipped, ideologically, organisationally and politically, to channel and voice these grievances. Their programmes are too vague and equivocal and cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for peaceful political solutions. As a result, the Strengths these movements have acquired (mass following, providing a feeling of belonging and authenticity, claiming to provide all-pervasive solutions, social harmony, etc.) due to the specific circumstances they operate in, turn into their opposite (leading to sectarian, internal, communal and political violence) and as Weaknesses undermine the Strengths of these movements.

That these movements have an ambivalent and opaque ideology and advocate the use of violence, is not only a result of factors connected with these movements themselves. Their political immaturity has its roots also in the repressive nature of the states in which they operate. Due to the prevailing lack of democracy in the Islamic world, it has been almost impossible for political religious movements to acquire responsible political attitudes and adopt viable political programmes concerning the role of religious values in society. As has become apparent during the last decade, this lack of political maturity has mostly been to the disadvantage of political religious movements themselves and has given the established elite in the Islamic world the pretext to maintain their position by clamping down on 'religious terrorism' and making the West an accomplice in their struggle against 'religious fanatics' and 'holy war'. Although there have been tactical alliances between states and Islamist movements, these existed usually only for a short period and never essentially affected the attitude of mutual distrust.

Against those who explain state repression in the Muslim world in the first place as a result of the violence used by political religious groups, Meijer and Peters argue that it was essentially state repression that pushed these movements to violence. For most states politics does not have democratic connotations, but is merely seen as a means of control. Due to a general political atmosphere dominated by undemocratic state structures, Islamist movements have failed to develop an autonomous political sphere and, therefore, democratic political institutions. They are ruled by 'the politics of morality'. This has proven to be an explosive combination that easily can lead to the use of violence. This antagonism between the state and political religious movements applies mainly to the Muslim world. In Israel, as the authors show, the situation is

completely different since the movements that have used religious violence against the Palestinians worked mostly in a strategical alliance with the state and can arguably he regarded as an extension of state power.

4.5 Interstate Conflicts

In his chapter on *Interstate Conflicts in the Euro-Med Region*, dr. Gamal Soltan states that the European success in dealing with interstate conflicts 'has elevated the salience of intrastate conflicts and soft security issues, which became the major European security concern in the post Cold War era'. According to the author, at the other side of the Mediterranean, however, the picture is radically different: '(...) the few interstate conflicts present in the region have been serious and complicated enough to pose considerable threats capable of instability all over the region.' In addition, there are a great deal of internal security threats, partly connected to poverty and developing political systems.

Having said so, the author states that it is too early to conclude that interstate conflicts can always be downplayed. According to him, thinking so might be a matter of Eurocentrism: 'Assuming that the era of interstate violent conflicts is over enhances the risk of generalising the specific experience of a certain part of the world.'

Soltan then states that there is a great deal of exaggeration concerning the novelty of patterns in types of inter- and intrastate conflicts, as well as in the argument that the end of the Cold War was a decisive factor in that. He illustrates his approach with a number of figures on such issues as the distribution of conflicts between inter- and intrastate ones, as well as the regional distribution of conflicts. He focuses on the linkages and interrelations between inter- and intrastate conflicts, arguing an intrastate conflict could be either a kind of transformed interstate conflict, or a prelude to it.

The author discusses the question of causes of conflicts, in order to show that some of such causes are prevalent in the region. He argues that causes of conflict could be tangible or intangible. Conflict over the distribution of resources, particularly territorial conflicts, is the most common form of the tangible causes of conflicts. Intangible causes of conflict, on the other hand, 'could be based on ethnic and nationalistic feelings, symbolic reasoning, or on states seeking the assertion of their regional influence and status'. The author employs recent data on military expenditures as an indicator to the persistence of interstate conflicts.

A substantive final part of this chapter focuses on the issue of conflict prevention, a concept which suffers from 'a great deal of ambiguity' and which causes 'a great deal of confusion'. According to the author, it is relevant not to speak about conflict prevention in general, but to introduce some variables - labelled by him as: scope, mode and instrument - in order to get a better insight in 'the actual experience with conflict

prevention'.

He finally provides some examples of how the conflict prevention approach could be applied to interstate conflicts in the Mediterranean.

5. Recommendations

5.1 Social Unrest

Abdalla concludes his chapter on social unrest by formulating ten recommendations ('Commandments', as he calls them). We present them in a somewhat shortened version:

- Acknowledge a 'controllable' measure of social unrest, thus broadening the scope for peaceful social protest and absorbing protest movements (e.g., legalising the illegal).
- Forge a social policy that addresses unemployment and marginalisation (New Deal, Marshall Plan, etc.).
- Acknowledge the end of the old *social contract* (more state power in return for socio-economic subsidies), and set a new role for the state as mediator, neither impartial nor 'only' provider.
- Sustain democracy as a precondition to successful mediation and as a barrier against violence.
- Integrate the integrists, i.e., absorbing the Islamists (and rationalising them) in their own *Dar-Al-Islam* of the South and *Dar-Al-Diyafa* (host countries) of the North. That is, consolidate mechanisms of cultural and political pluralism and co-operation.
- Combat corruption and Mafioso gangs and cliques within the state apparatus and in the marketplace.
- Acknowledge the grievances of the youth and promote elements of the younger generation to positions of leadership.
- Make efficiently use of the education system and the media to raise skills for bread winning, in addition to broadening knowledge and sustaining civic and humanist values.
- Broaden the intellectual and political horizon for peaceful settlement of conflicts (ethnic, nationalist, regional, etc.).
- Sustain Northern support for economic and social development in the South and expand its scope. More weight to social issues (real time-bombs) rather than to imaginary strategic interests (sometimes defusing, at a high cost, fake-bombs).

5.2 Right-Wing Extremism

Borger and Van Genugten present the following recommendations in the fight against right-wing extremism:

- Research activities can give the authorities guidelines for responding to right-wing violence. The outcome of several research projects, however, has also resulted in different explanatory theories and therefore in different recommendations. The authorities should not be paralysed by that, and should not refrain from action.
- Prosecuting violent right-wing extremists remains an important tool; it communicates the message that violent behaviour is always intolerable, whether it is (racist) right-wing violence or not.
- Deprivation of constitutional rights is a drastic legal measure. If the competent authorities decide to impose this sanction, it might lead to an increase of sympathetic feelings towards the perpetrator. On the other hand, one can say that the risk of losing their constitutional rights has indeed made prominent right-wing extremists more cautious. In other words: the deprivation of constitutional rights is, like many instruments in the field of fighting right-wing extremism, an instrument with the character of a dilemma. It should only be used on a case-by-case basis, after having weighed all the pros and cons in a concrete case.
- Prohibiting political parties, organisations and demonstrations has been even more controversial than any of the measures discussed before. With this approach, the same dilemmas come up as with deprivation of constitutional rights. One can speak of a 'Hydra syndrome' (the government being faced with Hercules' problem of fighting the seven-headed dragon who grew two new heads for every single head that was chopped off), although research does not necessarily support it. Again, one can say that the decision to forbid political parties etc. can only be taken on a case-by-case basis, also taking into consideration such aspects as the political culture of each country.
- Setting up special 'task forces' - as has been done, for instance, on the initiative of the French government, as well as in Germany and Great Britain, has obvious advantages, such as knowledge and specialisation. Their success depends, however, on continuity and efficiency.
- Intergovernmental action is bound to ensure more continuity than national actions, which in many cases have been rather ad hoc. However, one should also have an open eye for negative side-effects of an international approach. International co-operation, and with it, political compromise, can easily result in 'levelling down', that is to say: it might result in an approach based on the lowest common denominator. This could have a negative effect on countries that are relatively ahead.
- It should be kept in mind that the above-mentioned recommendations primarily deal with repressive actions against right-wing violence. In the preventive sphere, however, one can also think of a range of measures:
    - Raising public awareness through media-campaigns.
    - Establishing a governmental economic policy which takes into consideration the consequences for relatively deprived groups.
    - Developing educational possibilities for the disadvantaged.

- Establishing tolerance-creating educational programmes as well as, for instance, Internet sites.
- Stimulating all kinds of contacts between different social and racial groups.

5.3 Ethnic Conflicts

El Sayed Said's recommendations are embedded in the text of his analysis.

- The key to preventing ethnic conflicts is the recognition of the principle of equality in dignity and worth of all human individuals and communities: 'Ethnic conflicts arise because of partial or total denial of this fundamental principle (...).'
- Approaches to conflict prevention, which overlook the inter-dependence between economic and political equality, are likely to fail in securing maximum friendly relations among different communities.
- Ethnic tensions can sometimes be addressed by flexible responses to minor demands, such as the right to education in one's own language, and a denial of these simple rights 'may lead to persistent deterioration of ethnic relations to the point of civil war and separatism'.
- A solution in terms of redividing a territory 'is not very promising in a majority of cases', but 'suppression of separatist demand may not be a viable option, either'.
- Federation seems a proper solution to many ethnic conflicts, 'since it combines unity with recognition of diversity'. Although there are many problems related to the issue of federalism, 'the democratic federal solution has proved the most successful in settling ethnic conflicts'.
- What is needed, is a real democratisation of the international system, as a step towards inter-ethnic peace as well as global peace at large.

5.4 Political Religious Movements

According to Meijer and Peters, the solution for the ambivalence of the politics of political religious movements is to develop democratic structures and procedures which allow these movements to participate in politics as officially recognised political parties with bye-laws, yearly conferences, open membership lists, participation in free elections and parliamentary democracy. Although it is clear that this is not the solution to all problems and that it would have to be carefully managed, it would be a step in the right direction. Allowing political religious movements to participate in democratic politics will give them the opportunity to become real political parties which have to make compromises and have to fulfil the promises they make to their following. The sloganeering and exploitation of social and economic discontent will diminish and be channelled, especially when the leaders of these movements realise that democracy is more than 'one man, one vote, one time', and that it is not just another way of acquiring permanent power. The principle of accountability will then also apply to political religious movements.

This approach brings them to the following recommendations, addressed to political religious movements:

- Repudiation of violence as a means of achieving ideals.
- Acceptance of the idea of politics as a separate space, as a method to attain one's goals through compromises. Religion plays a role as an ethical, not an absolute, system or a panacea to all problems. In short, the more political the movement and the more democratic, the better.
- Acceptance of democratic internal procedures, i.e., election of candidates, leaders, chair persons within movements.
- Acceptance of the idea of transparency, i.e., publication of political programmes and openness in achieving political goals.
- Acceptance of parliamentary democracy and its procedures as a way to practise politics.
- Acceptance of debate as a means of reaching goals.
- Acceptance for the own movement of the idea of accountability.
- Rejection of communalism and acceptance of greater openness.
- Rejection of alliances with the state.
- Rejection of manipulation of movements by the state.

Meijer and Peters also address the state. In their view, the state carries equal responsibility for this process of open integration of political religious movements. Above all, it should stop making tactical or strategic alliances with these movements to prop up its declining legitimation and protect its interests. Non-interference, de-linking and compliance with the rules is one of the first preconditions for this policy to succeed. Alliances have in almost all cases had adverse consequences. In the Islamic world, they have led to manipulation of the assets of the political religious movements by governments for internal purposes. In Israel, the movement has even been used to pursue governmental policy and has been used as a pretext not to implement international treaties and UN resolutions. In both cases, the covert character of the alliances has led, in the past and the present, to misleading the public and members of the political religious movements who believe their leaders.

It brings them to the following recommendations, addressed to states:

- The state in the Middle East, as the other main protagonist in the political arena, bears even more responsibility for the present critical situation. The state as well must accept politics as a separate sphere, in which to reach compromises. The Arab state usually relies on 'administration' or the 'force' (the police, army, intelligence, etc.) to solve political problems.
- Rejection of those forms of politics that consist only of rhetorics, or just aim at bureaucratic control.
- Acceptance of political opposition.
- Rejection of the use of religion for political goals and for acquiring legitimacy.

- Rejection of tactical and strategic alliances with political religious movements.
- De-linking of state and political religious movements for whatever purposes these alliances have been used.
- Acceptance of parliamentary democracy and its rules of government.
- Change of power from the executive to the legislative. Acceptance of the citizens as a source of power.
- Ending repression as a means of practising politics. More specifically:
    - Ending restrictions of public speech.
    - Ending political detention of members of political religious movements.
    - Ending state violence against religious movements.
    - Ending persecution of democratic sections of the political religious movements.
    - Beginning negotiations with political religious movements concerning the procedures for democratic rules.
    - Greater stress on negotiations with radical political religious movements to find political solutions.

5.5 Interstate Conflicts

Soltan's recommendations centre around the word 'prevention'.

- The mere prevention of the eruption of violence is as such a very legitimate objective, even though it might not be sufficient in the longer run.
- Efforts of conflict prevention can be extended to such issues as internal strife, confidence building and education, which turns 'preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention into the intellectual and political bridge between conventional diplomacy, on the one hand, and peace building, on the other'.
- Among the many modes and instruments of conflict prevention, elaborated upon by the author, special attention is given to the role of third parties. 'A third party role in providing security arrangements can be instrumental in reducing the chances of aggression, a condition under which military ventures become unlikely.'
- For the sake of conflict prevention on the interstate level, a third parties role should be applied to intrastate conflicts lest state parties get implicated into them.
- Instruments for conflict prevention should be developed in comprehensive packages that include military as well as political, financial and technical means.
- Given the fact that 'the region is still in a pre-conflict prevention stage', it might be good to focus on 'soft preventive measures', such as long term policies targeting the structural causes of conflict.
- A Mediterranean centre for conflict monitoring should be established. Such a centre should bring together researchers and specialists from different Mediterranean countries to monitor regional developments, it should alarm concerned parties of potential conflict situations, and it should suggest the alternative policies that might help prevent them.

6. Final Remarks

In their respective chapters, all the authors have expressed their opinion that one should mistrust general, panacea-like solutions for the problems discussed. The solutions should be tailor-made and specific, or they should better not be tried at all. Nevertheless, one can say that, in the recommendations specifically related to the five major issues discussed in the report, some words and approaches emerge again and again. Without repeating them at length, one can say that this is the case for at least three clusters of activities. In key words:

- Education; the role of the media; democratisation; civil society; human rights; transparency; tolerance; equal treatment; 'unity in diversity'.
- Repudiation of violence; the search for peaceful solutions; investing in younger generations; stimulating contacts; international co-operation; conflict prevention.
- Linking economic, social and political development; fight against unemployment and marginalisation; conflict provention.

All these words can be seen as goals to be achieved and means to be used at the same time. It is terminology which perfectly fits into and illustrates the importance of the Barcelona process.

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TURBULENT WAVES: SOCIAL UNREST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Ahmed Abdalla

1. Introduction - The Mediterranean Divide

A concise discussion of social phenomena both in Europe and the Middle East could take place on the banks of the Mediterranean, a location with relevance to the whole Tricontinental region. In a geo-civilisational sense, the Mediterranean represents a *fluid* border zone, both in the real and metaphorical sense, between Europe and the Middle East, especially Southern Europe and the Turco-Arab Islamic Near East. Notwithstanding the terminological imprecision, this sea was the acknowledged divide between the East and the West, the North and the South of the Old World. But to transform the fluid frontier into a sharp border line or to dismantle it completely, as a result of conflicting imperial interests, wars had to be waged by culture-bearing armies (the *Blitzkrieg* of Tarek Ibn-Ziyad into Andalusia is an exemplary case). The Mediterranean thus engraved its place in history both as a military battlefield and a commercial-cultural market-place for all kinds of exchanges.

As an arena for the exchange of guns and goods, cannons and commodities, a particular psychology of fear and mistrust is associated with the inhabitants of both the Northern and Southern banks of the Mediterranean. After all, it is the sea the crossing of which was imperative to allow both the Islamic conquest of Southern Europe and the European conquest of the Arab East, the mutual fear and mistrust thus being a common denominator among the inhabitants of the sea basin. Despite propositions for co-operation and mutual prosperity, couched in the language of the Mediterranean becoming a *Lake of Peace*,[1] the inherent sentiment around the coasts of this sea remains one of a coast guard in combat position. The modern Mediterranean, with the modifications of modernity, maintains the inertia of these older times. Both forms of conquest in their opposite directions remain a *potential* with *actual,* if partial, manifestations: European conquest or colonialism being renamed neo-imperialism and hegemony, and Islamic conquest being renamed fundamentalism or migration, both with their repercussions. Future fears on both sides are enhanced by memories of violence and brutality, Algeria being the prime outspoken example, both as a former subject to French encroachment and as an object of its own fratricidal strife.

[1] See, for example, Paul Balta et al., 1992.

As far as the Southern threat is concerned, the movement towards the North is motivated mainly by the expulsive factors of the socio-political problems of the Southern countries. It is the *escapade* from poverty, unemployment and repression rather than the missionary advent of Islam, notwithstanding the vocal expressions of radical fundamentalist activists and self-appointed spokesmen. This is not to minimise the repercussions of this large-scale escape, with the barriers it threatens to install and the bridges it threatens to burn in the Mediterranean. The Asian drama of the boat-people (escaping across the seas) is being relived in the Mediterranean, not only between its South and North, but also within its Adriatic extension, i.e., within Europe. The Italian vessels which shot at the Albanian boat-people highlight the bloody human tragedy which is also manifested in the arrest and return of Moroccan boat-people by the Spanish coast guard.

When Northern countries have social problems of their own, albeit problems of comparative affluence rather than poverty, the situation is aggravated. A case in point is Spain with its ironic position as advance point for receiving the 'escapees' while retaining one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe.[2] Additionally, the metamorphosis process of transforming social problems into cultural, especially religious, ones complicates the setting and proliferates the jargon of confrontation between civilisations, especially *the West and the Rest*, and in the context of this chapter, between Europe and Islam.[3] Eventually, this turned into a polarisation process, exacerbated by both sides: by those Islamic radicals who consider Europe part of *Dar-al-Islam* to be liberated and by those Europeans who have shown hyper-sensitivity towards the scarf of a Moslem schoolgirl (or by her compatriot the Prime Minister, who failed to appoint a single Moslem minister, from amongst his 4 million fellow citizens, in his numerous cabinets). But *Providence* has extended a hand of mercy! The two goals by the golden head of Zizu (the Algerian-born French player) which secured for France the Football World Cup played a deeper role in educating the parties concerned in cultural tolerance and respect of merit. It is a lesson badly needed by both host and immigrant communities in the Mediterranean basin, upon whom a process of exportation and importation of social problems has been forced.

Migration across the Mediterranean is not auto-generated and, hence, it is not a problem *per se*. Being a function of other reasons, the search for its *raison d'être* becomes the prime task to alleviate its repercussions. Being the off-shore expression of problems at home, it stands side by side with other expressions that manifest themselves on the home front: political conflicts, civil wars and violence in general. All these categories

[2] The tension between Spain and Morocco over the two Spanish outposts of Ceuta and Melilla refers to the intersection of nationalist and social considerations. On the consolidation of the Spanish defences there, see *al-Hayat*, 14 January 1999.

[3] For arguments in support of 'cosmopolitanism' between Europeans and Muslims, see Roel Meijer et al., 1999. See also the cosmopolitan lifestyle of a Mediterranean city in the documentary *Tanger Nonstop*, by Jochen Kraus and Florian Sneider, München, 1996.

can be seen as manifestations of social unrest necessitating a reference to the point of origin. This is all the more necessary as we treat the forms of social unrest that are more closely related to the more specific arena, bread winning, rewarding and sharing.

2. Motivations of Social Unrest

Social imbalances and injustices are not in themselves sufficient reason to credit a given society with social unrest, although they lay the foundation for *social conflict* that is known to all human societies and settled by a variety of consensual and coercive ways (Kuper, 1996: 122-125). Social unrest occurs when grievances are expressed by the affected actors, either consciously or spontaneously. This subjective factor leads to social unrest in both affluent and poor societies; it is not restricted to the latter, where social conditions are bad.

Mediterranean societies, North and South, are no exception to this rule. These societies have known social unrest in varying forms and degrees because of a number of objective factors carried to the level of action by those affected. While the objective factors can be seen as *motivations* for social unrest, the subjective ones interact with the former to generate *manifestations* of social unrest. Both categories will be explored further below.

Motivations of social unrest in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere, can be summarised in the following axiomatic but nonetheless non-exhaustive list:

- Low levels of economic development.
- Faulty patterns of distribution of wealth and income.
- Increasing cost of living.
- High levels of unemployment.
- Austerity measures and cuts in subsidies.
- Marginalisation and downward mobility.
- Consumption expectations in a globalised economy.

These factors represent the seven pillars of undermining rather than consolidating the edifice of Mediterranean societies, rendering them a fragile temple awaiting Samsonian destruction. The first pillar, which relates to levels of economic development, is not applicable to European societies with their advanced industrialised economies, thus saving them from Samson (but not totally from social unrest) and delineates the crux of the Mediterranean divide as a vast and deep gap between the *affluent North* and the *indigent South* (see *Tables 1* and *2*).

Table 1

Size of the Economy of Mediterranean Countries, 1996

	Population	Land area	Population density	GNP			GNP per capita		
	Millions 1996	thousand sq. km 1995	people per sq. km 1996	$ billions 1996	Rank 1996	average annual growth % 1995-96	$ 1996	rank 1996	average annual growth % 1995-96
Algeria	29	2382	10	43.70	48	4.1	1,520	63	1.8
Egypt	59	995	60	64.30	40	5.4	1,080	73	3.5
France	58	550	110	1,533.60	4	1.4	26,270	10	10
Greece	10	129	80	120.00	30	2.4	11,460	23	2.2
Israel	6	21	280	90.30	34		15,870	20	
Italy	57	294	200	1,140.50	6	1.0	19,880	16	0.7
Lebanon	4	10	400	12.10	67	2.4	2,970	45	0.6
Libya	5	1760	3						
Morocco	27	446	60	34.90	50	12.4	1,290	67	10.4
Spain	39	499	80	563.20	10	1.7	14,350	22	1.6
Syria	15	184	80	16.80	63	3.4	1,160	71	0.6
Tunisia	9	155	60	17.60	61	1.3	1,930	56	-0.4
Turkey	63	770	80	177.50	23	6.8	2,830	47	5.8

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 1998.

Table 2

Quality of Life in Mediterranean Countries, 1998

	Life expectancy at birth		Prevalence of child malnutrition	Sanitation	Safe water	Adult illiteracy rate		Commercial energy use
	Male	Female	% of children under 5	% of population with access	% of population with access	% of people 15 and above Male	% of people 15 and above Female	kg of oil equivalent per capita
	1996	1996	1990-1996	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
Algeria	68	72	10	-	-	26	51	866
Egypt	64	67	9	11	64	36	61	596
France	74	82	-	96	100	-	-	4150
Greece	75	81	-	96	-	-	-	2266
Israel	75	79	-	100	-	-	-	3196
Italy	75	81	-	100	-	-	-	2821
Lebanon	68	71	9	-	-	10	20	1120
Libya	66	70	5	-	90	12	37	3129
Morocco	64	68	10	40	52	43	69	311
Spain	73	81	-	100	99	-	-	2639
Syria	66	71	-	78	85	14	44	1001
Tunisia	69	71	9	-	-	21	45	591
Turkey	66	71	10	94	92	8	28	1009

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators,* 1998.

In the distribution of wealth and income, some difference concerning the higher layer of the population who have a higher proportion of income in the South exists between the North and the South. This does not mean that European societies do not have imbalances in their distributive patterns (see *Table 3*). The edge they have on Southern societies is the result of the compensatory devices of social security and the welfare state, which are themselves arenas for pressure and bargaining symptomatic of social unrest.

Table 3

Distribution of Income in Mediterranean Countries, 1990s

	Survey year	Gini index*	Percentage share of income or consumption						
			Lowest 10%	Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%	Highest 10%
Algeria	1995a,b	35.3	2.8	7	11.6	16.1	22.7	42.6	26.8
Egypt	1991a,b	32	3.9	8.7	12.5	16.3	21.4	41.1	26.7
France	1987c,d	32.7	2.5	7.2	12.7	17.1	22.8	40.1	24.9
Greece									
Israel	1992c,d	35.5	2.8	6.9	11.4	16.3	22.9	42.5	26.9
Italy	1991c,d	31.2	2.9	7.6	12.9	17.3	23.2	38.9	23.7
Lebanon									
Libya									
Morocco	1990-91a,b	39.2	2.8	6.6	10.5	15	21.7	46.3	30.5
Spain	1990c,d	32.5	2.8	7.5	12.6	17	22.6	40.3	25.2
Syria									
Tunisia	1990a,b	40.2	2.3	5.9	10.4	15.3	22.1	46.3	30.7
Turkey									

* A measure of the inequality of income distribution (45 = absolute equality).
a. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population.
b. Ranked by per capita expenditure.
c. Refers to income shares by percentiles of population.
d. Ranked by per capita income.

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 1998.

As regards the cost of living and the unemployment situation, both banks of the Mediterranean have witnessed an upward trend in both categories, i.e., heightening inflation and higher cost of living together with rising levels of unemployment between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s (see *Tables 4* and *5*).

Table 4

Cost of Living in Mediterranean Countries, 1990-1995

		Consumer Price Index, 1990=100*						US State Department Cost of Living Abroad Index, Washington DC=100**
		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995
Algeria	All Items	100	126	166	200	258	335	89
	Food	100	120	151	188	265	347	-
Egypt	All Items	100	120	136	153	165	179	95
	Food	100	117	126	136	149	164	-
France	All Items	100	103	106	108	110	112	161
	Food	100	103	104	104	105	106	-
Greece	All Items	100	120	136	158	176	192	116
	Food	100	119	136	153	173	189	-
Israel	All Items	100	119	133	148	166	183	141
	Food	100	114	129	135	150	161	-
Italy	All Items	100	106	112	117	121	128	137
	Food	100	107	112	114	118	-	-
Lebanon	All Items	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Food	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	All Items	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Food	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	All Items	100	108	114	120	126	134	114
	Food	100	109	116	123	132	143	-
Spain	All Items	100	106	112	117	123	129	146
	Food	100	104	107	109	115	121	-
Syria	All Items	100	109	121	137	158	-	118
	Food	100	106	113	126	154	-	-
Tunisia	All Items	100	108	114	119	125	132	99
	Food	100	109	113	116	122	132	-
Turkey	All Items	100	166	282	469	967	1872	110
	Food	100	167	286	468	983	1938	-

Sources: United Nations, *UN Statistical Yearbook*, June, 1997; *Gale Country & World Ranking Reporter*, Detroit, 1997.

Table 5

Unemployment Rates in Mediterranean Countries, 1995-1997

	Percent Unemployed
Algeria	30
Egypt	20
France	12.4
Greece	10.1
Israel	7.5
Italy	12
Lebanon	35
Libya	-
Morocco	16
Spain	20.8
Syria	7.5
Tunisia	16.2
Turkey	12.6

Source: *Gale Country & World Ranking Reporter*, 1997. Here also figures are given for the Gaza Strip: 45%, and the West Bank: 35%. The figures for France, Italy and Spain are taken from *Employment Outlook*, OECD, June, 1998.

Unemployment as a motivator of social unrest deserves a special note, not in that it represents a direct threat to the social order, but because the reserve army of the unemployed is the weakest of all social armies and the lame duck of all fighters. The heterogeneity of the unemployed prevents unified action, like striking *en masse*, and unions represent the employed, not the unemployed. Unemployment affects the social fabric to its roots, to the extent that it causes erosion and depreciation in the lives of individuals and families. It sweeps the board, instigating and substantiating a wide variety of social problems from divorce to suicide. The very institution of the family comes under threat. This is a nightmare especially for societies of the old world such as the Mediterranean cultures, which so deeply revere the family in all their socio-cultural creeds and constructs.

When unemployment is so widespread that it involves large numbers of the younger population, the problem of *generation and socialisation* arises. The unemployed youth find themselves with their backs against the wall (becoming *Hittist* in the precise Algerian jargon), their alienation and counter-socialisation leading them, and their societies, to chaos, criminality and violence. Despair thus becomes the mother of depreciation, a euphemism for gradual social disintegration.[4]

[4] For a faithful account of Hittist life in Algeria, paving the way to social debacle (eventually to fundamentalism, violence and civil war), see the film *Bab el-Oued City*, produced in 1994 and directed, in a

Austerity measures in the framework of *Structural Adjustment Programmes*, especially those agreed upon with the IMF and the World Bank, boosted market-place mechanisms, and reduced state backing of the lower strata of the population. Regardless of the ideologically-charged arguments for and against this issue, it effectively makes life harder for the poor. Even if considered sound from a macro-economic perspective, it remains problematic as a social policy. This is reflected in the need to establish an institution like the *Social Fund for Development* to treat the side effects of structural adjustment in the Egyptian case.[5] Would the less-subsidised populace feel less disposed towards the state and express resentment towards the socio-political order? An answer was given in Egypt by the bread riots of January 1977. Similar answers were given in Morocco and Tunisia around the same time, a decade later coinciding with the first stages of implementing structural adjustment programs. The latter are being effected today in a new stage and on a larger scale. The extent to which this will provide social unrest remains to be seen. However, as contributors to a longer-term *social process* the preliminary problems are unmistakably present.

The process of massive *marginalisation* is cutting through many modern societies including Mediterranean ones in the North and, more acutely, in the South. This process is the by-product of the above-mentioned situations and trends generating social unrest, and may prove to be the prime catalyst of social unrest in the years to come, possibly even the time bomb of the 21st century. To mention an Egyptian example again, the talk of the town in Cairo is the question of what to do about *Al-Ahya Al-Ashwa'iya* (informal housing sprawls)? While by no means a demographic margin, housing more than one-third of the inhabitants of the capital, they are still seen as a social margin that must eventually be trimmed.[6] Costly designs for upgrading and eliminating, and costly confrontations between the police and the populace, marked the preliminaries to effecting such plans.

Marginality, however, is not merely an issue of housing and architecture. It could hinder progress made at the economic front even if it brings with it higher per capita levels. Figures would be rendered immaterial if the scale of poverty worsens, especially in the poorer Southern Mediterranean countries (Richards and Waterbury, 1990; Corm, 1997; Aziz Chaudhry, 1997). Marginality, too, challenges the social fabric, with so many members of the so-called societies jumping off the mainstream wagon to form communities at the margin. If we put aside the moral implications of having so much child labour,[7] increasing numbers of street children, and highly-exploited women, we

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natural setting, by Merzak Allouache.

[5] The functioning of such an institution is subject to controversy as exemplified by the many critical writings in the Egyptian press with regard to the *Social Fund for Development.*

[6] See the special dossier on Cairo in *Middle East Report*, November 1997.

[7] For more information on child labour world wide (including cases of Egypt, Morocco and some European countries), see the International Working Group on Child Labor, 1998.

are still faced with the fact that, in numerical terms, with the present scale of marginalisation, we are, in effect, speaking of double marginality: of communities and nations.

If we put all the above factors (poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, etc.) on one side, and the consumption expectations of people of all countries and classes within an increasingly globalised world, connected by satellites and electronics, on the other side, one would be forced to ask the question: would not the collision of these two opposites ignite a spark of global social unrest? If so, in what forms would this unrest manifest itself and, for our purposes, what would be the share of the countries of the Mediterranean, indeed of the whole of Europe and the Middle East, as a theatre for the historic repertoire of social unrest in the 21st century?

3. Manifestations of Social Unrest

Conflicting social interests and grievances are channelled into a number of fora for expression and pressure, known as interest representation institutions or groups. These can be legal, conventional or illegal. Social unrest is found in all three categories. There is, however, a fourth one, that is sometimes the most vocal, namely *spontaneity* that is, in some cases, accompanied by *violence.* The latter, in itself, could be considered a fifth form of expression of social interest, conflict and unrest. But not all social unrest leads to violence, and not all violence is social violence, though no violence is without a social dimension.

All the above channels are present in the Mediterranean, together with other socio-cultural institutions that play a social role, including expression of social claims. Of the latter, the extended family and the ethno-cultural affiliations, or else those groups expressive of Ibn Khaldoun's *Asabiya*, are still important carriers of social interest and mouthpieces for its representation, especially in Southern Mediterranean societies. This serves to distinguish the Northern from the Southern Mediterranean as a socio-cultural zone with a certain divide (but with a Northern, semi-Southern exception of some Adriatic societies and, not to forget, the Italian Mafia).

Another difference is the degree of *legality* acknowledged for actions of social protest and unrest. What is considered legal in the Northern Mediterranean, e.g., actions carried out by labour unions is, in many cases, considered illegal in the Southern Mediterranean, even if sponsored by nominally legal institutions.

In addition to these two major differences, the social unrest in both the Southern and the Northern Mediterranean manifests itself in the following 'channels':

- Disciplined disputes and labour union activism.
- Confrontational outbursts of protest.

- Activism of students and professionals.
- Violence: street riots, vandalism and terrorism.

Of these four channels of social unrest, the institution of the *trade union* would appear to be the most solid, thanks to its legality and its very institutionality. It is nominally true that union representation in the European North of the Mediterranean is considered the oldest routine expression of collective bargaining rather than of social unrest (Berger, 1981). Unions can even be considered shock absorbers of social unrest before it surfaces: they serve to prevent unrest before it occurs. But this impression tends to ignore three factors which blur the picture. Firstly, the bloody history which marked the establishment of unions and acknowledged their legal rights; secondly, the bumpy process of collective bargaining itself; thirdly, the weakening of unions through vast unemployment, which forces them to accept minimum working conditions of employers capitalising on the reserve army of the unemployed. More importantly, union membership is thus restricted and financial resources limited. This entails, in effect, less socio-political clout.

The same trend applies to unions in the Southern Mediterranean, but in a different setting, not only outlined by factors of underdevelopment and poverty but also by factors relating to union set-ups on this side. These unions had trouble becoming legalised. But once legalised, and in some cases as part of the bargain to secure it, some unions became so co-opted that it is doubtful whether they represent the interests of their own members. The infrastructure for co-optation was the melange of state repression, state developmental projects which partly uplifted the working classes, and lastly, the interest of the union-leading labour aristocracy which formed part of the state elite. This is exemplified by the cases of Nasserite Egypt, Baathist Syria and Algeria under the FLN (not to forget Qaddafi's Libya). Unions had more power in countries with more pluralistic traditions such as Morocco and Lebanon, or where unions played an integral role in national independence and state building like in Tunisia and Israel. In the case of more influential unions, certain expertise of union leadership was gained partly through exposure to and knowledge of union struggles in the Northern Mediterranean.

Under the new conditions of structural adjustment and privatisation, the terms of co-optation are being changed.[8] A certain degree of radicalisation is noticeable even in the case of the most co-opted, e.g., leaders of the Egyptian labour union who are currently bargaining for a Unified Labour Law securing the right to strike (hitherto forbidden) and other labour rights (Pripstein-Posusney, 1997). Despite their general weakening, official labour unions have a role to play, at least in limiting the scope of potential social unrest. The last general strike in Lebanon and the general strike in France, both of which were organised by the respective official unions in the two countries, testify to the

[8] See the special dossier 'Transition Libérale et Récomposition Syndicales', in *Monde Arabe-Maghareb-Machrek*, No. 162, October-December 1998.

continuation of union presence and influence on both banks of the Mediterranean. The Eastern bank would rank higher if we added the power of the *Histadrut* in Israel with reference to the general strike it organised in early December 1997[9] and late March 1999.

Strikes represent the highest form of expression of social grievances bordering on unrest which, in turn, is channelled into the last resort for settling a labour dispute within a disciplined, peaceful and legal framework. However, a strike usually involves tensions. The decision to go on strike is rarely welcomed by the other side, let alone the reluctance to go on strike by the striking party itself. Understandably, this is often a prelude to a potential *deluge*.

In the Southern Mediterranean, strikes are seen, especially by the authorities, as a deluge *a priori*. Their reception varies from unwelcome, negative reporting in the press, sometimes dispersion by the police with casualties,[10] to, at best, not reporting them in official statistics (see *Table 6*). Since some strikes take place outside the mandate of official unions and in violation of the ban on strikes, an issue of double legitimacy arises: locally, regarding the very legitimacy of these labour unions, and internationally, in terms of the state's commitment to ILO Labour Standards Conventions.[11]

Non-unionised strikes[12] form a second type of manifestation of social unrest, namely the *confrontational outbursts of protest*. These are to be considered a *micro* form of action since they take place at the level of an industrial unit, zone or sector. The fact that those taking part in them have shown readiness to violate the law and confront the authorities reflects the charged nature of such actions and locates them squarely under this heading. But still, they should not be considered acts of violence. Highly charged messages and protests remain a peaceful, albeit illegal, means of expression and defence of interest.

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[9] See *Keesing Record of World Events*, No. 12, 1997.

[10] One worker was killed by the police inside his machine-room during the iron and steel labour strike in the Cairo industrial zone of Helwan, in 1989.

[11] In a well-known ruling regarding the railway strike in Egypt in 1986, the court acquitted the strike leaders and pleaded with the government to legalise strikes on account of its ratification of international labour conventions.

[12] An exemplary inventory of non-unionised strikes in Egypt for the period September 1984 - June 1991 (75 in total) can be found in: Huwayda Adly Roman, Protest Movement of the Egyptian Working Class 1982-1991, in: Abdalla, 1994. For 1998, one source noted 42 labour strikes of varying characters. See Al-Ard Centre for Human Rights, 1998.

Table 6

Labour Strikes in Mediterranean Countries, 1980s-1990s

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Algeria	-	-	2290	2023	1034	493	-	-	-	-
Egypt	2	0	3	4	1	0	3	5	8	7
France	1457	1898	1781	1558	1330	1345	1361	1671	-	-
Greece	381	532	312	480	161	824	596	215	110	-
Israel	174	156	120	117	77	114	73	75	71	-
Italy	1149	1769	1297	1094	791	903	1054	861	545	791
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	198	124	208	178	364	310	323	-	-	-
Spain	1497	1193	1047	1312	1645	1360	1209	908	883	830
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	241	385	430	564	466	496	513	425	346	300
Turkey	307	156	171	458	398	98	49	36	120	38

Source: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1997.

The *macro* level of confrontational protest is reserved for those outbursts which assume a national character, occurring simultaneously in a number of metropolitan centres within national boundaries. Other than authorised sympathy marches known on both banks of the Mediterranean, which deal mainly with political subjects like anti-racism and anti-terrorism, those dealing with social issues are rarely allowed in the Southern Mediterranean. Hence, their spontaneous and riotous character whenever they break out, as substantiated by the above-mentioned examples of the bread riots in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. However, this moves them from the category of spontaneous peaceful protest to the juxtaposed category of street riots, which is, in turn, a sub-category of violence.

Unauthorised assemblies and gatherings, even if they take to the street, remain peaceful expressions as long as no deliberate acts of violence are attributed to them. But in the street, the peaceful protest has a greater chance of becoming a street riot. Confrontation with the police serves as a catalyst for such a chance specially if bullets are involved. In confrontations with the police, no difference is noticed between Northern and Southern Mediterranean actors. The difference is expected in the procedures of law enforcement and justice, to include guarantees for human rights. But this takes us to the broader arena of systemic difference between the *relatively democratic* Northern Mediterranean and the *largely autocratic* Southern Mediterranean.

However, the democratic systems of the Northern Mediterranean, indeed in all Europe (which retains its record of violating human rights),[13] do not provide an exclusive guarantee against violence. It is raging in the Basque country in Spain, in French Corsica, in Turkish Kurdistan and, even more brutally, in the Adriatic extension (we may also add the former Red Brigades in Italy). Understandably, this is violence with political, ethnic and religious connotations. Is it then any different from the Algerian violence in the South? And, if all violence has a social dimension (many perpetrators being the social underdog), is there still a difference between North and South? Perhaps there is.

The scale of the Algerian civil war cannot be comprehended without reference to certain equations:

- More poverty → less democracy.
- More unemployment → less belonging.
- More corruption → less hope.
- More repression → less belief in peaceful change.

The vicious circle of violence thus perseveres and war continues to summon its reserve army of the young who are unemployed, alienated and excluded. In the forefront of this *reactive* army stand the *active* leaders (Emirs) who capitalise on the opportunity to consolidate their doctrinal belief in violence, called *Jihad*. This provides an example of the *point de rencontre* between autocratic politics (including police brutality and systematic torture) and social deprivation, where social unrest is qualitatively transformed into political, ideological and military wars by recruiting the soldiers/terrorists from within the ranks of the socially deprived.

Reaching the extreme, as such, is not inevitable, but certainly no one is immune (Bakr, 1996). Stemming the tide depends on how problems, social and otherwise, are dealt with. Amongst these problems are those of the younger generations in the Mediterranean region and world wide.

The student movement reflects the problems and ambitions of the younger generation. Its significance emanates from a number of factors, beginning with its historic contribution to prompting changes in certain episodes. The role of the 1968 student movement in Europe is obvious at both the objective and subjective levels. Equally, the role of the student movement in the South had a clear influence on the national independence movement. Secondly, it provides a microcosm for political conflict in the society at large. Pressures for political participation in particular are reflected and felt more intensely through the student movement. In Greece, for example, the transition from the military autocracy of the 1970s to democracy began, symbolically and effectively, with the sensational martyrdom in Athens' Polytechnic (official snipers

[13] See, for example, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1998.

shooting at students). Claims to democratisation also mark student activism in the Southern Mediterranean, though hanging issues of nationalism remain their main concern (Abdalla, 1985; Bennani-Chraibi, 1994). Thirdly, the student movement, for all its political concerns, still is a provider of social unrest. In a variety of forms, in different countries of the Mediterranean North and South, events connected with students in the last two years alone substantiate this proposition. For example:

- *French* students demonstrated in public and changes promptly occurred in educational policies.
- *Turkish* students demonstrated over the issue of banning the *Hijab* for female students.
- *Moroccan* students struck over the issue of unemployment.
- *Egyptian* students struck in protest against a case of a professor raping a handicapped female student (with unprecedented violence replicated in quarrels between secondary school students in the Cairo suburb of Nasr City).

Coupled with the activism of students is the activism of the professional middle class. Student activism, in effect, provides a young mouthpiece for middle class interests, grievances and ambitions. This is an embryonic form of interest representation elaborated later by the professional trade unions representing this class. While in the Northern Mediterranean these are considered an integral part of the labour movement, in the Southern Mediterranean they are seen as distinctive of the labour (i.e., workers) movement. Whether a matter of prestige or of legal status,[14] the distinction enjoyed by these particular unions opens avenues to their playing a national political role in both co-optational and confrontational frameworks. This, in turn, sustains their ability to represent the interests of the professional middle class with high bargaining strength. It is not surprising then that political competitors in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean scramble to control these unions. Governments in Egypt and Tunisia, sensing an oppositional Islamic take-over of professional unions, have clamped down on them. Not only does the professional middle class provide the oppositional Islamic movement with leading activists, but also with its leading terrorists.[15]

Finally, while not minimising the importance of the organised labour movement, the future pattern of social unrest in this part of the world, and perhaps other parts, might be more characterised by the *activism* of the professional middle class, on the one hand, and the *vandalism* of the marginalised masses, on the other.

[14] In Egypt, professional unions are not members of the general labour union. Each professional union is regulated by a separate law approved by parliament.

[15] See the dossier on the Middle Class in the periodical *Ahwal Misriya*, Al-Ahram, No. 1, 1998.

4. Correlation of Social Unrest

Combining the motivating factors of social unrest and the forms in which it manifests itself provides us with a non-exclusive category that is inevitably juxtaposed with other categories of societal human life. One primordial form of that juxtaposition is between social unrest and the trilateral category of *culture-cult-kinship*, meaning the interplay between social unrest and factors of culture, religion, ethnicity, kinship, clan, caste, etc. Above, reference was made to the role of the extended family (to include kinship-based communities) in absorbing a segment of social tension through redistributive patterns based on, e.g., family ties. Reference was also made to the fact that the socially-deprived provide recruitment opportunities to movements, peaceful or violent, based on the politics of religion and ethnicity.

An additional complicating factor is a socio-political movement based on religious ideology which plays an active role in capitalising on social deprivation and unrest. This is the case of the Islamic movement, which is based in the Southern Mediterranean with ramifications in the Northern Mediterranean, the rest of Europe, and internationally. In addition, one can think of Christian fundamentalism in America and Europe,[16] Hindu fundamentalism in Asia and Jewish fundamentalism in the Eastern Mediterranean. The conflict between different fundamentalisms has an impact on the daily lives of people living in the battle zone (e.g., Palestinians living in Palestine and commuting to work in Israel). It might be an interesting point to ponder the extent to which conflicts of fundamentalism and nationalism *arrest* social unrest and divert its energy into other avenues. A case in point is the Palestinian authority officials accused of corruption by the Palestinian parliament but defended as *Freedom Fighters*. This was a replica of the episode of the Algerian freedom fighters who fiercely embezzled public resources, particularly oil revenues, after they took office. Corruption thus paved the way for fundamentalism, terrorism and the counter state-terrorism, competing with the non-state actors in brutality.

The Islamic movement has made its mark as a social actor on all counts: manifesting, manipulating, diverting and alleviating social unrest. Consciously and unconsciously the Islamists, through their projects of communal solidarity and service provision, have mastered a political tactic of minimisation and maximisation of social unrest. They proved successful in the ranks of the disenchanted professional middle class,[17] the students and the urban poor in the semi-rural informal housing sprawls of metropolitan centres. And by now the Islamists begin to score some successes as elected leaders in working class circles: unions, local councils and parliamentary constituencies.[18] Their

[16] For an early study on the recruitment of the youth to Christian fundamentalist associations in Italy, see Quaranta, 1978.

[17] A downward trend is noted in the case of Islamic terrorists in Egypt in the last few years. The culprits belong more and more to the lower strata of the middle class.

[18] In the run up to the parliamentary elections of 1995 in Egypt, Islamic candidates were the main contenders in the three largest industrial zones of the country. The only declared Islamic member of the

advances were hindered only by repressive measures in the Mediterranean countries of Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.[19] The Lebanese Hizbollah, with its nationalist credentials, is also a good example of such success and of the general juxtaposition between social unrest, on the one hand, and components of the trilateral category of *culture-religion-kinship*, on the other.

Politics, being a combination of thought, structure and action, also correlates with social unrest. It causes, unleashes, accentuates, alleviates and arrests social unrest. In turn, it has its multiple juxtapositions with the above trilateral category. But speaking of politics is like speaking of life. One needs to break up this unique category into its components: ideology, legitimacy, sovereignty, representation, institutions, actions, etc.

To Mediterranean states and societies, especially those on the Southern Bank in varying degrees, political factors closely linked to social unrest (i.e., those affecting its emergence, magnitude and handling) cover the following spectrum:

On the increase:
- The power of the market.
- The power of religion.
- Globalisation (market-media-politics-culture).
- The power of the bureaucratic/military complex.
- Violence and terrorism.
- Corruption.
- Gangs and the Mafia.
- Civil society and social movements.
- The power of the police apparatus.
- Fanatic ethnicity and nationalism.

On the decrease:
- State 'sovereignty' vis-à-vis the outside.
- State 'hegemony' vis-à-vis the inside.
- The welfare state.
- The influence of political parties.
- The influence of official unions.
- Participation in elections.
- Protection of human rights.
- Promotion of leadership in the younger generations.
- The sense of belonging to a collectivity (individualism and apathy).

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incumbent parliament represents the Cairo industrial zone of Helwan.

[19] Syria and Libya provide the extreme example of crushing the Islamic opposition, a course being tried also by Tunisia, while Morocco applies the melange of pluralism, repression and religious legitimacy of the throne.

- Secularism.

While each of the above items requires careful consideration (beyond the present scope) to gauge its impact on social unrest, one proposition remains solid *per se*: that there is a *social question* to be tackled, beginning with the study of its motivations, charting its manifestations, and lastly, comprehending the matrix of its correlation with other factors of culture, politics, religion, etc. (or else the compound category of *Class-Control-Cult*). This only inaugurates the preliminaries to taking and effecting decisions and policies engaging this issue. The general strikes of the last two years in France, Israel and Lebanon, and others scattered over the region, of which the last reported in November 1998 was the public protest of the young unemployed in Morocco (not to mention the social recruits of the Algerian civil war), all point to the gravity of the 'social question' in the Mediterranean world and its neighbours.

5. Conclusion - Addressing and Redressing

To reiterate a point made earlier: 'Reaching the extreme, as such, is not inevitable, but certainly no one is immune (...). Stemming the tide depends on how problems, social and otherwise, are dealt with' (section 3). In everyday language, this means it is never too late, once there is a will to act. But how do we go about addressing and redressing social unrest and the social question in general? Assuming an academic contribution can be made towards forging a policy conducive to addressing social issues through national reform and regional co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, one would venture into being as 'vernacular' as possible in suggesting the following *Ten Commandments*, in all modesty, to terminate this testimonial text:

1) Acknowledge a 'controllable' measure of social unrest, thus broadening the scope for peaceful social protest and absorbing protest movements (e.g., legalising the illegal).
2) Forge a social policy that confronts unemployment and marginalisation[20] (New Deal, Marshall Plan, etc.).
3) Acknowledge the end of the old *social contract* (cf. Roustang et al., 1996) (more state power in return for socio-economic subsidies) and set a new role for the state as *mediator*, neither impartial nor 'only' provider. This entails taking the middle ground on the continuum *L'État Gendarme* → *L'État Mediateur* → *L'État Dirigeant.*
4) Sustain democracy as a precondition to successful mediation and as a barrier against violence (with a genuine democratic deal swapping bullets for ballots and guns for seats).
5) Integrate the integrists, i.e., absorb the Islamists (and rationalising them) in their own *Dar-Al-Islam* of the South and *Dar-Al-Diyafa* (host countries) of the North. That is,

[20] See some guidelines for this in: OECD, *Towards an Employment-Centred Social Policy*, ***Employment Outlook***, June 1998. See also Defourny et al., 1998.

consolidate mechanisms of cultural and political pluralism and co-operation.[21]

6) Combat corruption and Mafioso gangs and cliques within the state apparatus and in the marketplace (to include putting a brake on international cover-ups for corrupt national governments).
7) Acknowledge the grievances of the youth and promote elements of the younger generation to positions of leadership.
8) Make efficient use of the education system and the media to raise skills for bread winning in addition to broadening knowledge and sustaining civic and humanist values.
9) Broaden the intellectual and political horizon for peaceful settlement of conflicts (ethnic, nationalist, regional, etc.). The resources expended on them can help fund a social policy to improve the plight of the unemployed and the marginalised.
10) Sustain Northern support for economic and social development in the South and expand its scope. As they address their citizens (electorates), governments of the North need to advance foreign aid as an issue of internal necessity and educate their populace in this spirit. As they address the recipients, they need to reset the agenda in appreciation of the recipients' needs. The whole global agenda needs to attach more weight to social issues[22] (real time-bombs) rather than to imaginary strategic interests (sometimes defusing, at a high cost, fake bombs). Governments of the Northern Mediterranean and the whole of the European Union, in particular, need to strengthen the weak belly of their Barcelona process, namely *social issues*.

[21] See, for example, the initiatives for Euro-Mediterranean cultural co-operation by the European Cultural Foundation (UCF) in Amsterdam.

[22] For an example of the shift of interest from Japan, see Sakai, 1998.

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RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE: PRACTICE, ROOT CAUSES AND COUNTERMEASURES

By Saskia Borger and Willem van Genugten

1. Introduction

Looking at right-wing extremism, different images come to the front: political parties such as the 'Front National' in France or the 'Republikaner' in Germany, the burning down of houses belonging to 'non-whites', and clashes between right-wing extremists and their political opponents during demonstrations. In the present chapter, first of all, an impressionist overview will be given of violent events and tendencies that are commonly seen as expressions of right-wing extremism (section 2), followed by clarifications of the concept (section 3). Section 4 then deals with explanatory hypotheses, followed by a section (5) in which governmental and intergovernmental reactions to right-wing extremist violence are summarised. Section 6 consists of an evaluation and recommendations.

2. Right-Wing Extremism in Practice: Some Violent Events and Tendencies

In this section, a description will be given of some events and tendencies which are generally considered to belong to, and to be typical of, 'right-wing extremism'. Although in this chapter the concept of 'right-wing extremism' has not yet been clarified (see section 3), it seems to be useful - especially for the reader in the Mediterranean region - to start with some information on 'right-wing extremism in practice' in order to illustrate the numerous sides of the problem under debate. The selection is based on recent literature dealing with the practice of right-wing extremism. In addition, the selection is restricted to Western European countries and Turkey, a country the right-wing practices of which are strongly interwoven with similar activities in the Western European world (see below). In the selection, no cases are reported of Mediterranean 'right-wing extremism', because no research data are available. (Applying the criteria for 'right-wing extremism', to be developed in section 3, to the Mediterranean region, one can say that right-wing extremism indeed does not exist there, at least not on a considerable scale.) Further to this, it should be kept in mind that the description is in no way meant to be exhaustive, neither as far as the selected countries are concerned, nor as to the descriptions of the situations within the countries selected. Section 2 is rather to

be seen as a bird's eye view of the phenomenon, making some pictures of main events and tendencies; it serves illustration purposes only.[1]

2.1 The Netherlands

Starting with a description of right-wing behaviour in the authors' own country, the Netherlands, one can first of all think of fights between young Moluccans and Dutch youngsters in the early 1970s, followed by serious clashes between Turkish and Dutch people in the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam in the same period. When, in 1972, riots broke out in Rotterdam, right-wing organisations were directly associated with racist violence. In 1976, in the city of Schiedam, a stabbing incident caused clashes between the Turkish and the Dutch which lasted several days. The right-wing organisation NVU (the Dutch People's Union) was associated with these incidents. Another eye-catching case was the murder, in 1983, of the 15-year-old black boy Kerwin Duijnmeijer; it caused nation-wide commotion. The murderer was a 17-year-old skinhead with openly declared right-wing extremist sympathies. In that same year, as well as the year after, a significant number of cases of arson took place with a right-wing extremist background. After a 'dip' in de second half of the 1980s, in the 1990s, there was again an increase of right-wing violence. Especially 1992 was an important year. In the beginning of that year, there were a number of violent acts in The Hague, all of which were believed to be right-wing violence: four bomb attacks, three cases of arson, three (false) bomb alerts, four cases of destruction, and some battery incidents. The attack of a mosque in the city of Amersfoort was the start of many similar attacks on mosques around the country. In addition, a new form of right-wing extremist violence emerged: sending threatening letters to foreigners. These letters were often signed with the name 'White Power' and were sent by local groups, not operating at the national level.

2.2 Germany

In the years 1959 and 1960, Germany was for the first time confronted with a wave of right-wing violence. Around the country, there were numerous incidents of destruction and plastering. This wave faded in the early 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, right-wing violence was still less commonplace, but the incidents that did occur were more serious and more often fatal. Since 1989, there has been a considerable increase of right-wing violence in Germany. In September 1991, for instance, the city of Hoyerswerda was confronted with mass violence towards asylum seekers, while in October of that same year, three members of the right-wing FAP (the Free German Labour Party) threw fire-bombs on a shelter for asylum seekers. On exactly the same day, something similar happened in the city of Bremen. In the summer of 1992, riots broke out in the city of

[1] Main sources: Van Donselaar, 1995; Kitschelt/McGann, 1995; Bjørgo, 1997; Haffmans *et al.*, www; Lee, www. See also a number of other websites, devoted to right-wing extremism in different countries, for instance, http://members.xoom.com.anti_nazi/knowyourenemy.html.

Rostock, while in November 1992, three Turkish people were killed in the city of Mölln, their house having been set on fire by two right-wing extremists. In 1993, the worst assault ever occurred in the city of Solingen. A fire-bomb killed five Turkish people. The right-wing party of the 'Republikaner' and the organisation of the DVU (German People's Union) were associated with this bombing.

2.3 Belgium

The history of right-wing violence in Belgium starts around 1980. Throughout Europe, one can say, the year 1980 was a very violent year in terms of right-wing violence. In the summer of that year, there were bomb attacks in the cities of Bologna, Paris and Antwerp. Belgian right-wing extremists played an important role in the European right-wing networks and allegedly co-directed these bombings. After 1980, right-wing violence in Belgium diminished. The early 1990s, however, showed an increase. The parties associated with this form of violence were in most cases the VMO (the Flemish Militant Order), the VB (Flemish Block) and the 'Front de la Jeunesse' (Youth Front). In 1991, a VB member circulated a pamphlet which announced the foundation of an Anti-Islamic Murder Commando (the AIMC). The commando ordered the immediate removal of foreigners and set an ultimatum. If they did not leave, the commando threatened to use violence against foreigners and 'communists'. In 1992, the founding father of the AIMC, who was also a member of the VB, sent an anonymous package, which contained a bullet and a threatening letter, to his political opponents. In that same year, two prominent VB members were present at a riot during the performance of an anti-racist song by a famous Belgian singer in Brussels. One of them was asked by the police to soothe the situation by addressing the rioting VB members. It is striking, for that matter, that prominent members of Belgian right-wing extremist parties are frequently associated with violence, on the one hand, and asked to keep situations of right-wing violence or riots under control, on the other.

2.4 Great Britain

In the 1970s, Great Britain experienced a considerable wave of right-wing violence. There were many instances of 'Paki-bashing' and other forms of racist violence. At the same time, the right-wing National Front (NF) and related organisations, like the British Movement (BM), had grown in size as well. They also developed a violent reputation. Their growth was often connected with the increase of racist violence. In July 1980, a racist murder was committed by a 17-year-old NF sympathiser. Later that year, the NF published a target-list of opponents. In January 1981, arson caused the death of 13 young black people. The police never cleared up this racist attack. Afterwards, people criticised the apparent indifference of the police. Overall, 1981 was a very violent year in Great Britain. In April, there were serious riots in Brixton, an area of South London, while in the same month, two racist murders were committed. Another racist murder took place in May, followed, in June, by four murders, while, in July 1981, again five

racist murders were committed. In the early 1980s, the violent right-wing extremists got interwoven with the skinhead scene, incidentally with terrorism and furthermore with hooliganism. In 1985 and 1986, there was again an increase of racial incidents, while since 1989 there has been a steady growth of similar events.

2.5 France

France was confronted with right-wing violence for the first time during the war in Algeria (1954-1962). The fight to retain Algeria became connected with right-wing violence in France. The terrorist 'Organisation de l'Armee Secrète' (OAS) was responsible for many assaults and even had branches in the French army. In the early 1970s, racist violence increased in France. In 1973, the murder of a bus driver by an Algerian in the city of Marseille caused a series of racial murders of Algerians and many other acts of racist violence. In the same city, ex-members of the 'Ordre Nouveau' (ON), a very violent right-wing organisation that had been prohibited just weeks before these incidents, set up a 'defence committee'. In December of that year, the Algerian consulate in Marseille was struck by a bomb attack which killed four and injured twenty people. The right-wing organisation 'Club Charles Martel' claimed responsibility for the attack. During the 1970s, right-wing violence increased and so did anti-Semitic violence. From 1975 until 1980, at least a 100 synagogues and 27 Jewish cemeteries were the object of violent actions. The right-wing 'Fédération d'Action Nationale et Européenne' (FANE) was responsible for most of the anti-Semitic incidents. On 3 October 1980, a car bomb exploded at the synagogue on the Rue Copernic in Paris. Again four people were killed, while some twenty people were injured. This assault, that was attributed to either FANE or its successor, the 'Faisceaux Nationalistes Européens' (FNE), got a good deal of international attention due to other right-wing attacks elsewhere in Europe. The biggest right-wing extremist organisation, the political party 'Front National' (FN), has also been associated with violence. In the 1980s, many FN members were associated with racial and political murders, bomb attacks and other violent incidents. In 1988, many serious racist assaults took place in Nice. The worst attack was probably the bombing of a migrant's lodging in December of that year. The nazistic 'Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen' (PNFE) was responsible for this attack. Racist and especially anti-Semitic violence reached its peak in 1990. In May of that year, the damaging of the Jewish cemetery in the city of Carpentras caused a nation-wide stir. The FN was blamed for this assault: The offenders were reportedly motivated to act as a result of the racism and anti-Semitism propagated by this party. Still, the FN denied all accusations and publicly distanced itself from violence. However, research has shown that there is indeed a connection between the FN and political and racist violence.

2.6 Turkey

In Turkey, the main propagator of right-wing extremist ideals is the MHP, the National Action Party (Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi). The members of its paramilitary youth group are commonly called 'Grey Wolves'. They have been associated with violent actions since as early as the 1960s. However, these actions have not only extended to Turkey. Due to immigration of Turkish citizens to Western European countries, the MHP and the Grey Wolves have expanded their working field to Western Europe as well. The MHP has developed itself since the late 1960s into a right-wing extremist political party which espouses a pan-Turkish ideology. (The pan-Turkish ideology calls for a united Turkish empire, which includes the Turkish people from former Soviet states like Chechenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.) In the mid-1970s, the MHP took part in coalition governments, which enabled the party to organise itself within the state machinery. After the 1980 military coup, all political parties were prohibited, including the MHP. The right-wing extremist movement reorganised itself again in the 1980s. Although a few former MHP members joined the nationalistic ANAP (Motherland Party), many of them joined the MÇP, which was later re-named MHP. In 1992, due to a splitting up within the (then) MÇP, the BBP (Büyük Birlik Partisi: the Great Unity Party) emerged. The MHP as well as the BBP can be considered right-wing parties.

2.7 Other Countries

In relation to countries like *Denmark*, *Norway* and *Sweden*, one can, finally, think of the existence of right-wing political parties such as the Fremskridtspartiet (D), the Fremskrittspartiet (N), and New Democracy (S), while as to countries like *Austria* and *Italy*, one can mention political parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (A) and the Northern League (I). As Kitschelt notes, however, it is not correct to easily lump these parties together into one category with, for instance, the French 'Front National', as has been done so often:

> The message of the Italian and Austrian new 'populist' parties to scholarly analysts of the European extreme Right, but also to political activists, is clear: do not expand the universe of New radical Right parties by including Austrian and Italian political neo-populism without closely examining the parties' appeals and their electorates. A wealth of evidence demonstrates that it would be wrong to lump the Freedom Party and the Northern League into the same group with the French National Front or the more moderate (...) rightist Scandinavian Progress parties. All of these parties may subscribe to similar racist and xenophobic symbolisms, but such appeals are integrated into rather different encompassing political programs. These programs, in turn, respond to different contexts of party competition and challenges to public authority. (Kitschelt, 1995: 200).

This brings us to the need of clarifying the concept of right-wing extremism.

3. Clarifications of the Concept of Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Violence

It is clear that the cases presented in section 2 have a lot in common, although it needs further elaboration to make clear what exactly makes them belong to 'right-wing extremism'. First of all, a further clarification of the term 'right-wing extremism' is needed.

According to some authors, right-wing extremists are nationalistic, ethnocentric or racist, favouring a high level of authoritarianism, and being critical towards the politicians who are in power (Buijs and Van Donselaar, 1994). Other authors add characteristics like cultural conservatism, the search for scapegoats, demagogy, admiration of leaders, populism and anti-communism (Van den Brink, 1994: 7). Looking at this list of 'criteria', it becomes immediately clear that right-wing extremism is not a 'single-issue phenomenon'. In the words of Tore Bjørgo: '(...) trying to define the "essence" of right-wing extremism in terms of one single core issue, value or philosophical idea is not very fruitful. Such an approach will tend to be narrow, excluding many of the movements which have significant traits in common with the "typical" extreme right' (Bjørgo, 1997: 11).

3.1 Right-Wing Extremism and Racism

One of the difficulties in formulating a manageable description of right-wing extremism is, for instance, making a distinction between right-wing extremism and racism. These terms are associated with each other, and often - on good grounds - taken together in research projects,[2] but one should not confuse the two, nor use them as synonyms. First of all, the term right-wing extremism covers more than just race issues; it also covers, for instance, (many aspects of) nationalism and authoritarianism. Secondly, right-wing extremists are not necessarily racists, although in practice they usually will be, as will be shown later on. And while it is difficult to draw a sharp line between the two, because there is, indeed, a considerable overlap, one can mention at least some additional differences. For instance, racist violence - as well as the research of racial violence - usually focuses on the victims. They are attacked not as individuals, but as representatives of groups which are, as a rule, minorities in terms of numbers as well as in terms of power. Buildings, property and institutions may also be attacked because they represent these groups or their interests (Björgo and Witte, 1993: 6). With right-wing violence, the emphasis lies much more on the perpetrator. It is not so much the object of the attack which determines whether or not some act of violence could be attributed to right-wing extremists, but rather the subject of the attack: the perpetrator him- (or her-)self and his or her motives or political ideology. 'Borderline cases' like

[2] For an example of this approach, see Bjørgo, 1997, passim.

these have led many researchers in the field of right-wing extremism to develop separate labels for a series of closely related social phenomena.

3.2 A Typology

In the sociological field, a good deal of work has been done in order to develop a typology into which all kinds of 'xenophobic violence' can be captured. Well-known is the typology developed by the German sociologist Helmut Willems, who makes a division into four types: the ideologically motivated right-wing extremist, the xenophobe or ethnocentrist, the criminal and marginalised youth, and the fellow-traveller (Bjørgo, 1997: 33). A distinction like this is often made to be sure that all kinds of phenomena are not simply labelled 'right-wing extremism'. In his 1997 dissertation on *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia,* Tore Bjørgo gives a very clear and illustrative description of Willems' classification:

> 1. *The ideologically motivated right-wing extremist* is normally a member of an extremist organisation. His readiness for violence is legitimised by ideology, and directed at particular groups of victims on the basis of political and instrumental assessments. He often plays the role of agitator and instigator in relation to less ideological youths who may carry out the actual violence. This type of activist is not distinguished by any particular 'negative' social characteristics, such as unemployment or school drop-out, but has often finished an education or apprenticeship and holds a permanent job. (...)
> 2. *The xenophobe or ethnocentrist* does not hold any firm right-wing extremist ideas or ideologies, nor is he a member of such organisations. He often belongs to youth sub-cultures such as skinheads, rockers, football hooligans or similar gangs or cliques. Although anti-foreigner sentiments and prejudices are widely held in these groups, they tend to distance themselves somewhat from right-wing extremist parties and organisations. Violence against foreigners is legitimised less by reference to ideology than by diffuse feelings of having got less than their share compared to all the goods and privileges 'foreigners' and 'asylum-seekers' are perceived to receive. In their justifications for using violence, unfair competition for jobs, flats and social security services are dominant themes. The readiness for violence is diffuse in the sense that violent acts are not part of political strategies. Violent acts are often motivated by a combination of instrumental and expressive factors. This type of perpetrator tends to have a low level of education (often dropping out of school), is commonly unemployed and experiences economic hardship. Conflicts within the family and at school are also common.
> 3. *The criminal and marginalised youth* is distinguished from the other categories of perpetrators by a more negative social background and career, and especially by having a long and often varied criminal record. This type includes a high proportion of school drop-outs and a much higher level of unemployment than with the other types. The family background is particularly problematic: Single-parent or divorced families, parental alcoholic abuse, and the use of violence as a means of discipline and communication within the family. Although they are not very ideological, anti-foreigner slogans and attitudes are common. 'Foreigners' often play the role of scapegoats for their own problems. This type of perpetrator may be characterised as particularly action-oriented, aggressive and with a high readiness for violence. But violence is not a means in a political struggle, but rather an everyday element in handling conflicts - even inside the group. Thus, violence is not directed exclusively against foreigners. Violence is seen as a normal and legitimate way of relating to others. Due to their high readiness for - and experience with - violence, and their search for action, such youths tend to be found in the first line of attack and even as initiators of violent actions.

> 4. *The fellow-traveller* (...) neither holds any particularly right-wing extremist worldviews nor exhibits any pronounced anti-foreigner attitudes. This type is *not* characterised by private problems, unemployment or dropping out of school. Persons in this category of perpetrators also tend to come from intact, and even well-off, families. They are often found in skinhead groups, loose youth gangs or cliques of friends, and strong sense of community and group solidarity play an important role in attracting them to these groups. When it comes to readiness for violence, group-dynamic aspects (conformity, pressure to show solidarity, the need to impress the others) are decisive. They do not display any fundamental readiness to violence or general hatred to foreigners on their own. They may, however, carry out acts of violence against foreigners in order to prove themselves in the eyes of others in the group, or may take part in order not to leave the others in the lurch. They are rarely initiators or the main perpetrators of violence, but are more often assistants and, by definition, supporters (Bjørgo, 1997: 33-35).

As Bjørgo adds, it is important to keep in mind that the typology presented is to be seen as a set of 'ideal types' (à la Max Weber), meaning that individual perpetrators will combine elements of several types. Bjørgo speaks of 'a dynamic process perspective rather than (...) fixed categories', and he adds: 'Both organised right-wing activists, xenophobes, criminals and fellow-travellers may be found within a single group, but the mix between the types may vary. Some of the more ideological and elitist neo-Nazi groups may have a predominance of type 1, but also strains of the other types' (Bjørgo, 1997: 35). In addition, one can say that right-wing extremism seems to come in 'waves', whereby, as the same author notes, 'a number of similar incidents tend to take place at geographically different locations within a limited time span' (Bjørgo, 1997: 253).

As to the ideologies motivating the right-wing extremist, Bjørgo speaks of such things as 'rejecting democracy and prefer to work outside the established system in order to overthrow it'; emphasising the 'own race (...) but also the own nation'; fear of 'Jewish world denomination'; being 'sympathetic to Nazism'; considering themselves 'heirs of the National Socialist Movement'; and considering violence as 'desirable and necessary, a cleansing force' (Bjørgo, 1997: 47). The same author concludes that right-wing groups 'generally relate to a double set of enemies: an external threat, usually portrayed as "foreign invaders" (i.e., immigrants, asylum seekers); and a mixture of internal enemies (anti-racists, authorities, politicians, the media, homo-sexuals, etc.) depicted as national or racial "traitors" who allegedly collaborate with the external enemy' (Bjørgo, 1997: 254). He adds, in relation to right-wing extremism in the Scandinavian context:

> During the 1970s and early 1980s, local 'communists' were usually main targets of violence and harassment from neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremists in Scandinavia. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a considerable increase in violence against foreigners. However, during the 1990s, violence, harassment and hate speech was again increasingly focused on political opponents of native origin - the so-called 'traitors'. Although the more ideologically oriented groups are generally more concerned with political opponents, even less ideological skinhead gangs appear to have been increasingly involved in violent clashes with antiracist groups rather than with attacks on 'foreigners' (Bjørgo, 1997: 254).

Looking at all these criteria and characteristics of right-wing extremism and right-wing violence, it is needless to say that, indeed, it is not an item which can be dealt with from one perspective only. In the words of Herbert Kitschelt: '(...) empirical evidence shows that the contemporary extreme Right is not a "single-issue" phenomenon that can be solely understood as a response to economic crisis or the rapid influx of non-Occidental immigrants into hitherto homogeneous Western European countries' (Kitschelt, 1995: 3). Kitschelt's remarks open the road towards explanations of right-wing extremism in general, a field in which he himself has done a great deal of work.

4. Explanatory Hypotheses

Having clarified the concept of right-wing extremism, at least to some extent, and taking into consideration the manifold warnings not to consider the issue as a single, one-sided social phenomenon, one can further discuss the possible explanations of its root causes. According to Kitschelt, over the years, three hypotheses have guided the debate on the rise of right-wing extremism:

After having developed a fourth, alternative hypothesis - in short: [In reaction to issues like the 'leftist' income redistribution] 'the New Radical Right (...) advocates free market economies and "authoritarian" hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expressions' (Kitschelt, 1995: 1-2) - and having researched the situation in a series of Western European countries, Kitschelt comes to the conclusion that none of the three hypotheses is plausible, the more so if they are taken as single-issue responses and explanations. With regard to the second hypothesis, which claims that right-wing extremism is a backlash against the multi-culturalisation of Western European societies, he states that there is no clear relationship between aggregate levels of anxiety and right-wing party performance. Although the support of these parties does indeed draw on racist resentments, it is mainly rooted in broader right-wing dispositions, like authoritarianism and market liberalism. The third hypothesis, which considers right-wing extremism to be a backlash against a political system in which the existing alternatives have become too similar, is, according to Kitschelt, just as implausible. First of all, this 'protest hypothesis' would imply that right-wing voters should not be characterised by identifiable patterns of belief and social circumstances. However, these voters are not a random sample of the overall population in European countries. Moreover, the second implication of this hypothesis would be that right-wing parties should also emerge in countries where the established major parties have converged, but where post-industrialisation and the welfare state are less far developed, such as Ireland, Portugal or Spain. Still, none of these countries has strong right-wing parties.

4.1 Linking Right-Wing Extremism to Nazism/Fascism?

The last hypothesis to be refuted by Kitschelt, which he mentions first, is the one which links the present manifestations of right-wing extremism to the old nazist and fascist ideology, elsewhere in the literature also called the 'continuity thesis' (Fennema, 1995: 94-95). Kitschelt:

> [One] hypothesis is so implausible that it hardly deserves restatement were it not for its importance in political rhetoric, especially among certain strands of the European Left. This is the claim that the contemporary Right is a *neofascist continuation of the totalitarian movements* in earlier decades of this century, particularly in Germany and Italy. There is no question that neofascist elements have entered the new extreme Right, but it is an entirely different matter whether this qualifies these parties and movements as neofascist. Our book has argued precisely the opposite: the success of extreme-rightist parties is inversely proportional to their proximity to neofascist patterns. The successful New Right does not combine authoritarianism, nationalism, and corporatist economic visions, but authoritarianism, ethnic particularism, and market liberalism. Moreover, unlike the situation in the 1920s and 1930s, the white-collar and professional middle class has by and large become unavailable to the extreme Right. Both in intellectual appeal as well as in electoral coalition, the successful contemporary extreme Right is different from the historical extreme Right, as represented by German national socialism or Italian fascism (Kitschelt, 1995: 277).

Although Kitschelt gives a lot of evidence substantiating this conclusion on a highly controversial theme, it might still not be the last word on the issue. We just mention one example: the study by Suzanne Karstedt on, *inter alia*, the question of whether the present violent right-wing and xenophobic offenders come from the centre of society as did the members and supporters of the German Nazist Party (the NSDAP) (Karstedt, 1997: 115; Frindte, Funke and Waldzus, 1996). Her conclusion is that a comparison of the biographies of violent early NSDAP members from 1923 to 1933 with comparable material from the young generation of right-wing extremists from 1978 to 1994 shows 'remarkable parallels in their biographies':

> They are disproportionately and cumulatively burdened with biographical problems, that start in the often broken homes and continue in their educational and occupational careers. Both generations come disproportionally from the working classes and are endangered by downward mobility. Typical patterns of family education are not related to right-wing extremist violence in both generations in the way that would have been expected from theory. In sum, these results point to conditions and life histories as they are generally found for aggressive offenders. (...). Early experiences with organized violence in a huge network of right-wing paramilitary organizations shaped the ideological orientations of the early NSDAP members and linked them to the specific context of violence in the Nazi party. In the young generation, the loosely coupled and more subcultural right-wing network is a decisive factor in the emergence of the 'hedonistic-expressive' forms of xenophobic violence (Karstedt, 1997: 115-116).

Still, Karstedt's and Kitschelt's remarks could be quite compatible. One could argue, in conformity with Karstedt, that the 'continuity thesis' is applicable to violent right-wing extremists when comparing their biographies with those of violent NSDAP members.

However, with regard to the other, non-violent, members of right-wing parties and the ideology of the New Right, this continuity thesis must fail. First of all, the non-violent members of the NSDAP were probably not as opposed to violence as the non-violent members of the contemporary right-wing extremists are now. The political leaders of the New Right, for instance, who in most cases do not use violence (anymore) or at least would call themselves non-violent, often distance themselves from violent incidents if these are linked with right-wing extremists. Many right-wing extremist politicians do not want to be associated with violence, especially not with the violent practices of the Nazi and fascist regimes, but they want their parties to be seen as serious, respectable political parties. Le Pen, the leader of the French 'Front National', for instance, has always furiously denied that his party has any connections with violent incidents. Although this disassociation might be only a farce, presented by right-wing parties in order to hold on to their moderate electorate and to avoid facing repressive governmental actions, it is still a very important difference between the New Right and the Nazi and fascist parties of the past. Another, still more important difference concerns the ideology. As we have seen before, Kitschelt states that, unlike the Nazi- or fascist ideology, the New Right combines authoritarianism with ethnic particularism and market liberalism.

4.2 Triggers

Apart from general explanatory hypotheses for right-wing extremism, there are other, more specific explanations for the *rise* of the phenomenon: the so-called triggers. Although many possible triggers have been presented already - the number of immigrants; reaction to a 'leftist' governmental policy; etc. -, it would go far beyond the scope of the present contribution to deal with all of them. Therefore, we selected two aspects: the triggering role of economic crises and the role of the media.

4.2.1 The Role of Economic Crises

Kitschelt notes, as we have seen, that the existence of economic crises cannot be considered as a mono-causal explanation for the existence of right-wing extremism; it is only 'part of the story'. He argues that 'economic crises (...) can serve as *catalysts* that crystallize right-wing extremism (...)' (Kitschelt, 1995: 3). A similar approach can be seen all over the research literature in relation to right extremism. The idea is elaborated upon by, amongst others, Bjørgo, who describes the issue again in well chosen, clear words:

> A struggle for access to and distribution of scarce resources - money, jobs, housing, social services, leisure activities/facilities, etc. - lies behind much xenophobia and violence against immigrants and asylum-seekers. In general public debate, one of the main arguments for a more restrictive immigration and asylum policy, presented by the anti-immigration fringe and mainstream politicians alike, focuses on the economic costs involved in taking care of and integrating large numbers of immigrants. This argument has had considerable credibility in times

> of economic crisis, and when high unemployment gives immigrants limited opportunity for achieving self-sufficiency. There is, for instance, no doubt that the more than 80,000 asylum-seekers arriving in economically depressed Sweden in 1992 represented a considerable financial burden to the country. Thus, it is argued that the resources spent on asylum-seekers would be better spent on 'our own needy groups'. Countless stories circulate - some true, many not - of how demanding foreigners are given easy access to all kinds of social services, special grants, jobs, facilities, etc. Especially among relatively deprived and marginalised groups in society, such stories may easily evoke anger, bitterness, and jealousy. The claim that foreigners are given social goods they themselves have been denied, has been a recurring theme in many of the explanations young perpetrators of violence and harassment have given to the police and the media. Some marginalised youth groups even use (the threat of) violence against immigrants as a leverage against local authorities to obtain goods they would not get otherwise (...) (Bjørgo, 1997: 267).

Economic deprivation, be it in reality or 'only' in the heads of those who feel disadvantaged, can raise all kinds of frustrations, as we have seen in, for instance, the former German Democratic Republic. Bjørgo's analysis can be considered of general value, i.e., more general than for the Scandinavian context he has researched only.

4.2.2 The Role of the Media

Another major issue these days is the role of the media. In many studies, one can find a critical discussion of the role of the media in relation to waves of right-wing extremism and right-wing violence. Although it should still be proven that there is an actual link between reporting on right-wing violence and the occurrence of new accidents - which cannot be done easily - it is generally considered that there is a relation between 'media attention' and the prolongation of right-wing behaviour. As Frank Esser and Hans Bernd Brosius note, the German federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation observed dramatic increases of xenophobic assaults after each of the four violent riots and arson attacks, described in section 2 of the present chapter (Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln and Solingen) (Esser and Brosius, 1996: 235-236). According to them, journalists in Germany have rarely been confronted with such negative consequences of their stories as in the case of coverage of right-wing violence, their work in this field being criticised 'even by journalists themselves' (Esser and Brosius, 1996: 235). They add that:

> The question of how to cover xenophobic attacks without giving undue publicity to the, mostly young offenders' motives and actions was first discussed after the highly violent riots at Hoyerswerda. The city's hostel for asylum seekers was set on fire in September 1991. Many people complained that television allowed rioters to take the floor by airing unedited footage of the event at great length without putting the violence into context. Residents living nearby were shown as supporting the offenders by openly applauding them and shouting right-wing slogans. It was claimed that it was the mass media's extensive and sensation-seeking coverage that triggered a vast number of copycat attacks in the aftermath (Esser and Brosius, 1996: 236).

The dilemma is, of course, about, on the one hand, the freedom and the need to report on issues, given the perspective of journalistic freedom as well as the role of the press in an open society, and, on the other hand, the risk of contributing to right-wing

extremism. However, this dilemma will not be dealt with in the present contribution. We have to concentrate on the role the media play.

Esser and Brosius argue carefully to what extent the media can be considered to contribute to behaviour which imitates the activities reported upon. To that end, they discuss, *inter alia*, American research from the 1970s concerning suicides, leading to the conclusion that the number of suicides increased significantly after all the publicity that was given to a series of cases: 'The more heavily the suicide stories publicized, the stronger the (...) effect was' (Esser and Brosius, 1996: 237). 'Translating' their findings into the issue of right-wing extremism, they reach the following conclusion:

> For explaining the role of television in the spread of violence against foreigners, a combination of *suggestive-imitative theory* (...) and *priming* (...) seems to be more appropriate. Suggestive-imitative theories conceive effects of media-portrayed violence with the medical concept of contagiousness. Watching violence infects recipients who are psychologically predisposed to act violently themselves. The media violence suggests aggressive behaviour as being appropriate and thus leads to a disinhibition. The suggestive effect is strongest for those people already willing to violate somebody in the way portrayed by the media (e.g. foreigners) but had so far been prevented from doing so by some kind of social pressure. (...) While suggestive-imitative theory can explain the motivational thrust of the offenders, the concept of priming can explain the effects of political coverage on the offenders. According to this concept, watching violence on television can activate associations, thoughts and other ideas related to the presented violence. Repeated exposure to such coverage causes long-term activation of violent thoughts, allowing for generalizations and associative links between different aspects of the issue and violent thoughts. Applied to right-wing violence against foreigners, priming can explain the connection between the different aspects of the issue (attacks, counteractions, political aspects, prosecution, right-wing radicalism, background information) and recipients' motivation to engage in violent behaviour (Esser and Brosius, 1996: 256-257).

Tore Bjørgo states that it is too simplistic to assert that the media *in general* help to increase racist violence and support for violent racist groups. According to him, the media can be seen as *violence-facilitating mechanisms* as well as *violence-inhibiting mechanisms*: The media can, for instance, confer status and prestige on those committing such acts, and create the expectation that there is more to follow (the 'anticipation effect'). In addition, 'they can serve to advertise the existence of the group, increase recruitment and play a crucial role in the organisation and consolidation of the group' (the 'organisation effect'). Thirdly, as to Bjørgo, media coverage 'may amplify the effect of violence by causing fear and anxiety among others besides the immediate victim' (the 'terror effect'). On the other hand - i.e., in relation to the media as *violence-inhibiting mechanisms* - one can say, as to Bjørgo, that condemnatory media coverage 'may bring the perpetrators to the seriousness of their acts, and to regret or publicly distance themselves from what they have done' (a 'punishment effect'). In addition, as Bjørgo notes, good journalism may reveal things groups wish to keep hidden (the 'disclosure effect'), while it sometimes also may contribute to 'counter-mobilisation' and even may have educational effects (Bjørgo, 1997: 218).

One of today's issues in the field of 'media and right-wing extremism', relates to the use of the Internet. Recently, a lot of data have been presented on this issue. The researchers Brieuc-Yves Cadat and Ronald Eissens, for instance, report on right-wing extremists' websites they found in Germany (50), Belgium (16), France (31), United Kingdom (23), Scandinavian countries (22), Austria (6), Spain (6) and Italy (4) (Cadat and Eissens, 1998). Other researchers, however, raise doubts as to the exact number of right-wing extremist websites (Van Donselaar, Claus and Nelissen, 1998: 80). However that may be, it is relevant that the Internet is frequently used for internal communication within right-wing political parties, for discussions on ideological issues and ideas (such as the denial of the Holocaust), for announcements on international right-wing demonstrations, for the distribution of forbidden literature, for selling forbidden articles (such as cassettes and video's), etc. (Cadat and Eissens, 1998: 7; Van Donselaar, Claus and Nelissen, 1998: chapter 4).

5. Reactions by Governments and Intergovernmental Bodies

Over the years, governments have reacted to right-wing extremist violence in many ways. The reactions can roughly be divided into four categories:

- Starting research activities.
- Punishing the perpetrators of right-wing extremist actions within the ordinary penal (and if necessary and possible: civil) legal system.
- Forbidding political parties, organisations and demonstrations.
- Creating special 'task forces'.

The following description of governmental actions - followed by some remarks on intergovernmental activities in relation to right-wing extremism - is again in no way exhaustive, and serves illustration purposes only.[3]

5.1 Research Activities

In reaction to upcoming waves of right-wing extremism, many governments started further investigations as to the root causes of the phenomenon, as well as the instruments used by the perpetrators, etc. As an example, one can think of Belgium where, in 1980, when violence increased and rumours were spread that there were connections between the government and the right-wing milieu, a parliamentary committee (the Wijninckx-Committee) was set up to research the problem and to find ways to maintain order. In the context of Great Britain, another example, one can think of the report 'Racial Attacks', made by the Home Office, which concluded that, in Great-Britain, racist violence was more common than expected. According to the Home Office, right-wing extremists did contribute to the environment where racist violence

[3] The description is based on the sources mentioned in footnote 1.

could flourish. Yet another example relates to France where, in the late 1980s, the 'Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme', that advised the government on issues of human rights, was given the new task of reporting about right-wing violence. This commission nowadays publishes these reports on a yearly basis. In Germany, as a fourth example, the 'Bundesverfassungsschutz' publishes a similar report every year. A fifth example relates to both Germany and Turkey. In 1976, after the German government had reported to the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel on right-wing violence committed by the Grey Wolves in Germany, preliminary inquiries were opened against the Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi (MHP). This resulted, *inter alia*, in the prohibition of setting up organisations abroad by this right-wing political party outside Turkey. Finally, a Dutch example of government-sponsored research activities is the so-called 'Racism and Right-Wing Extremism Monitor', an annual report, the second issue of which was published in 1998 and which covered the role of the media (Van Donselaar, Claus and Nelissen, 1998).

5.2 Penal Prosecution and Deprivation of Civil Rights

In all of the countries discussed before, one can find perpetrators of right-wing violence who have been prosecuted and sentenced within 'ordinary' legal procedures. One can think of the Dutch conviction, in 1980, of two members of the right-wing organisation NCP (National Centre Party) accused of attacking illegal immigrants, while another Dutch case relates to the alleged existence of a research paper, made by the Central Party (CP). The paper, written by the scientific department of the CP, stated that violence against foreigners could be justified as acts of self-defence. The Dutch government responded to this by prosecuting the CP for taking part in or supporting racial discrimination. In the German context, one can, for instance, think of the conviction of the two offenders of the arson attack in Mölln, in 1993; they were sentenced to imprisonment for life and 10 years in prison, respectively. In Britain, France and Belgium, there are also examples of prosecutions of right-wing extremists. For instance, members of the National Front and the British movement were convicted in 1981 and 1982 for committing racist murders, members of the French Front National were found guilty on battery charges in 1985 and, in Belgium, members of the Flemish Block were convicted for arson and threatening politicians in 1993. During the Ecevit government of 1978-1980, in Turkey, many right-wing extremists were prosecuted for their violent acts. After the coup of 1980, the new leaders decided to prosecute these extremists as well, although they were also said to have stimulated and profited from right-wing violence. Still, in order to appear neutral, the coup leaders organised a mass trial to prosecute the MHP and its members. The trial took place behind closed doors, because the military leaders were afraid that MHP leaders would reveal their connections with the army, the secret service, and other government institutions. Five members of the MHP were sentenced to death, nine of them were sentenced to lifelong imprisonment, while another 129 MHP members got milder sentences. The violent acts

of the Grey Wolves in the 1990s were not punished that severely. There are hardly any cases where the Grey Wolves have been prosecuted for their actions.

Apart from starting criminal proceedings, many Western European countries have applied other legal measures to deal with violent right-wing extremists. The French legal system opens the possibility to deprive racist offenders of their eligibility for election or the right to hold a public position. The Belgian judiciary can, under certain conditions, decide to impose 'the inability to vote'. In Germany, the legal system goes even further. By virtue of the German Constitution, the Constitutional Court can deprive anyone who has committed 'unconstitutional agitation' from his or her constitutional rights, and not just the right to vote. Another important German legal measure that can be taken with regard to violent right-wing extremists is laid down in the so-called 'Radical Resolution' which was adopted in 1972 in order to secure the loyalty of civil servants to the 'freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung', the free and democratic order. Under this resolution, anyone who develops 'verfassungsfeindliche' activities (i.e., activities which are contrary to the content and purpose of the Constitution), is not allowed to hold any public position. Any civil servant who displays these activities can be dismissed. According to the German government, the term 'verfassungsfeindliche' activities also covers right-wing violence.

5.3 Forbidding Political Parties, Organisations and Demonstrations

A rather far-reaching governmental reaction to right-wing violence has been the prohibition of political parties, organisations and demonstrations in order to prevent more violence. In November 1998, for instance, the Netherlands prohibited the right-wing political party CP'86 (the continuation of the CP after its bankruptcy in 1986). CP'86 was prohibited on the grounds of discrimination, racism and disturbing public order. In Belgium, on the other hand, political parties cannot be prohibited at all, while other organisations can only be prohibited when they qualify as private militias. This was the case with the VMO (the Flemish Militant Order) and the 'Front de la Jeunesse', which were prohibited in the mid-1980s. In the early 1970s, the French legislator adopted several legal measures to combat violence used by right-wing groups that were opposed to Algeria's independence. In 1972, the French militia legislation was altered so that organisations could be prohibited for using racist violence. In addition, violent right-wing groups that were considered to be the continuation of the fascism and nazism of the Second World War, could be prohibited on the basis of legislation concerning private militias. In 1990, after 'Carpentras', the government did not take any drastic measures to combat the increase of right-wing violence. However, directly after the incident, the government prohibited many demonstrations of the FN. Finally, in Great Britain, political parties can only be prohibited in exceptional circumstances as, for instance, in cases of Irish terrorism. Racist violence is not considered to be exceptional. The Public Order Act (POA), on the other hand, does provide for the possibility to

prohibit 'quasi-military organisations'. In 1962, Spearhead was the only British right-wing organisation ever to be prohibited on the basis of the POA.

5.4 Special 'Task Forces'

After 'Mölln', the German government decided to take more specific actions to fight right-wing violence. First of all, with regard to the intelligence service and the police, measures were taken to improve communication between the states and the federal government. Besides this, special units were formed to combat riots, to make arrests, to perform house searches, and to document facts and materials about right-wing extremists. Secondly, in order to stimulate co-ordination between the police, the public prosecutor and the intelligence service, the 'Informationsgruppe zur Beobachtung und Bekämpfung rechts-extremistischer, insbesondere fremdfeindlicher Gewalt' (IGR) was set up. Thirdly, the intelligence service was reinforced while, in 1993, the Republikaner were put under its surveillance. In the context of Great Britain, one can think of the governmental reaction to right-wing violence in the 1980s. When, in 1985 and 1986, the number of racial incidents showed a considerable growth, the government responded by setting up a special police force in London: the Organised Racial Incidents Squad (ORIS). On the national level, in 1987, the Home Office set up the interdepartmental Racial Attacks Group (RAG), while in 1995, Scotland Yard charged one of its units with tracking down violent right-wing activists. A last example relates to France. After the car bomb explosion in Paris in 1980 and due to other violent incidents in Europe, the French government decided to combat right-wing violence internationally. France then initiated co-operation between police and intelligence services of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

5.5 Intergovernmental Reactions

Right-wing extremism and right-wing violence has to some extent proven to be a transnational phenomenon. As an example, the gathering of violent right-wing activists from France, England and Germany in Brugges (Belgium) in the summer of 1980 may illustrate the connection between several right-wing extremist groups in Europe. The Grey Wolves are another good example of transnational right-wing activists, although they will, considering the hostile attitude of Western European right-wing extremists towards Turkish immigrants, never align with Western European right-wing organisations. The issue of the cross-border character of right-wing extremism is also discussed by Tore Bjørgo:

> National Socialists and some other types of right-wing extremists have for decades often maintained close relations with like-minded groups abroad. However, it is a striking trend during the 1990s that many militant nationalist movements have increasingly become *trans-national movements.* They combine their claimed struggle for the Nation with a call for loyalty to and struggle for the white - or Aryan - race. These groups frequently engage in alliances and networks. Whether they are in direct communication or simply learn from each other on the basis

> of media images, they nevertheless tend to borrow heavily stylistic and ideological elements, symbols, mythologies, and role models from kindred movements abroad (Bjørgo, 1997: 257-258).

The transnational character of the phenomenon would require a transnational, combined action. In that respect, one can think of the use of regional as well as global human rights conventions, such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (the CERD). The CERD was the first human rights instrument to be used to fight right-wing violence. In reaction to many reports, presented by states who are parties to the Convention, the supervisory Committee of independent experts these days urges Western European countries to take appropriate measures against racist violence.

On the European level, this increase of racist and right-wing violence made the Council of Europe decide to establish the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which, amongst other things, is in charge of reporting on the situation of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in each of the forty member states.[4] In 1997, the European Union established the European Observation Centre for Racism and Xenophobia.[5] The purpose of this Centre is, *inter alia*, to supply the member states with unprejudiced, reliable and - especially - comparable information on racism and xenophobia.[6] For this purpose, a European network on racism and xenophobia will be set up under the name 'Raxen'.[7] This network will also give information on right-wing violence. In order to avoid any overlap of activities of the ECRI and the EU Observation Centre, the delimitation of the activities of both institutions is currently under discussion.

6. Evaluation and Recommendations

In this final section, we will take a closer look at the effects of the above-mentioned governmental and intergovernmental reactions to right-wing violence, adding some recommendations where appropriate.

1. For many governments, starting research activities was the first step in fighting right-wing violence. As the violence increased in intensity, governments have started to perform research activities on a more frequent basis. On the whole, research has indeed given the authorities some guidelines for responding to this form of violence. In this sense, starting research activities has been a successful approach. However, due to the fact that the outcome of several research projects has resulted in different

[4] See the website of the Council of Europe: http://www.ecri.coe.fr; Van Genugten, 1999.
[5] See Regulation No. 1035/97 of 2 June 1997.
[6] Regulation No. 1035/97 of 2 June 1997, Article 2.
[7] *Ibidem*, Article 4.

explanatory theories and therefore in different recommendations depending on the line of approach of the research, the authorities who are actually faced with the problem still have to decide which recommendations they will follow; they are - eventually - the only ones who choose the arms to fight right-wing violence (Van Holsteyn, 1998: 91).

2. Perpetrators of right-wing violence have been prosecuted and sentenced with 'ordinary' legal procedures. As we saw, in Germany, for instance, the arsonists in Mölln, whose actions killed three Turks, got life sentences. However, the perpetrators of the earlier incident in Hünxe, who threw fire bombs at a shelter for asylum seekers, got milder sentences. They were charged with attempted murder, but the judge accepted the defence's plea that they had been drunk and further that throwing molotov cocktails had become so commonplace, that the habituation effect which followed justified mild sentencing. Still, this case must have been a rarity, considering the later and harsher ruling of the Mölln case. Generally speaking, governments have not been hesitant in using the ordinary 'legal' procedures, probably because it was almost the only available tool for fighting right-wing violence when it first increased in intensity throughout Europe in the early 1990s. Later on, when more time had passed to do research and to evaluate, other approaches were formulated. Still, in our opinion, prosecuting violent right-wing extremists is an important instrument; it communicates the message that violent behaviour is always intolerable, whether it is (racist) right-wing violence or not. As to this point, it is interesting to note the question of whether or not 'racist violence' should be codified as a separate criminal offence in the national Penal Code. In the mid-1990s, this discussion was held in, amongst other countries, the Netherlands and Great Britain, but it has not (yet) resulted in the amendment of the Penal Codes.[8] One important argument against formulating 'racist violence' as a separate offence was that racist violence should not be considered as being 'more intolerable' than other forms of violence.

3. As far as the deprivation of constitutional rights is concerned, one could say that, in countries where deprivation of rights is an option, the authorities have hardly made any use of it. Two major dilemmas may explain this reservedness. The first is a political-ethical dilemma; it concerns the question of whether or not it is acceptable to take away someone's constitutional rights, even though his or her activities are a possible threat to the Constitution. The second dilemma is the dilemma of the counterproductive effect. Deprivation of constitutional rights is a drastic legal measure. If the competent authorities decide to impose this sanction, it might lead to an increase of sympathetic feelings towards the perpetrator. Although this need not necessarily be the case with violent perpetrators - violence is disapproved of by

8 For the Dutch debate, see Witte, 1994; Janssens, 1995; Bolsius, 1995. For the British debate see All-party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community, 1994.

society, whether or not it is with a racist or right-wing background - the sanction could fail to have the intended (general) preventive effect. Moreover, if the deprived perpetrator is a well-known and popular right-wing extremist, the sanction could add fuel to the fire and lead to more violence by other extremists - if only to show their disapproval. Another, frequently used argument against deprivation of constitutional rights, is the claim that this sanction only extinguishes the symptom and not the cause of right-wing extremism. As Van Donselaar states, however, extinguishing the symptom does not rule out the possibility of dealing with the root-causes of right-wing extremism or right-wing violence. He refers to his own research, which has shown that the risk of losing their constitutional rights has indeed made prominent right-wing extremists more cautious (Van Donselaar, 1995: 274 and 294). Still, the question remains whether the same goes for unknown, less politically active right-wing extremists. They tend to be more violent than right-wing politicians and, at the same time, they are less likely to have their constitutional rights taken away, due to the fact that the purpose of depriving constitutional rights is basically to prevent right-wing political leaders from developing into Hitler-type leaders. Therefore, the instrument is seldom used for 'ordinary' right-wing extremists. Decisions to use it should, anyhow, only be taken on a case-by-case basis.

4. Prohibiting political parties, organisations and demonstrations has been even more controversial than any of the measures discussed before. With this approach, the same dilemmas come up as with deprivation of constitutional rights: the political-ethical dilemma and the dilemma of the counterproductive effect. According to Van Donselaar, who calls the last dilemma the 'Hydra syndrome' (the government is faced with Hercules' problem of trying to fight Hydra, the seven-headed dragon who grew two new heads for every single head that was chopped off), repressive governmental action, such as forbidding political parties, organisations or demonstrations, could have counterproductive, unwanted effects. The forbidden party or organisation could develop violent activities underground. However, as Van Donselaar states, his research does not necessarily support the Hydra syndrome. Violence and 'going underground' are more likely to cause repressive governmental action than to be the result of such action (Van Donselaar, 1995: 291). Another Dutch researcher, Fennema, states that repressive governmental action could have unwanted, counterproductive effects, as well as wanted, and therefore contradictory effects. As an example, he suggests that judicial repression could have a negative effect on the organisation of right-wing extremists, while at the same time it could have a positive effect on the political sympathy for right-wing extremism of voters who are alienated from mainstream politics. This could lead to a growing electoral support for a shrinking political organisation (Fennema, 1996: 33-34). With regard to the Hydra syndrome, Fennema states that it is quite conceivable that counterproductive effects will only occur in cases of strong repression. A high repression level can lead to public indignation, and can subsequently cause counterproductive effects (Fennema, 1996: 34). In addition, Fennema argues that the

extent to which the Hydra syndrome will occur depends on the political culture of each country. He claims that in a pacification democracy, where people are used to (small) limitations of their constitutional rights, the counterproductive effects will be weaker than in a pluralistic democracy (Fennema, 1996: 34). Again, it can be concluded that a decision to use an instrument like the prohibition of political parties can only be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the specific characteristics of the political situation in each country.

5. The fourth governmental approach, discussed in the previous section, is setting up special 'task forces'. As we have seen, already in 1980 the French government initiated co-operation between the police and intelligence services of France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. In Germany, the special police units that were formed to combat riots, make arrests, perform house searches, and document facts and materials about right-wing extremists proved to be very successful. The same can be said of the British special police force ORIS, although this force operated only in (parts of) London. The obvious advantage of special task units is their knowledge and specialisation. Their success depends, however, on continuity and efficiency.

6. How about reactions by intergovernmental bodies and through intergovernmental channels? As we have seen in the previous section, the first actual international measures were taken not that long ago. And although it is too early to report on positive effects of the work of such institutions as the ECRI and the EU Observation Centre, some advantages of dealing with right-wing violence intergovernmentally can be mentioned here. As we have seen, right-wing extremism is, to a considerable extent, a transnational phenomenon. In order to tackle this problem, international co-operation is necessary, not only to hunt down cross-border violent extremism, but also to share information and know-how. Further to this, intergovernmental action is bound to ensure more continuity than national actions, which, in many cases, have been rather ad hoc. However, some critical remarks as to an international approach should be made here too. International co-operation, and with it, political compromises, can easily result in 'levelling down', that is to say: it might result in an approach based on the lowest common denominator. This could have a negative effect on countries that are relatively ahead of other countries with regard to their system of repressive instruments to fight right-wing extremism, as, for instance, Germany is (Van Donselaar, 1995: 303). Another thing that should be kept in mind, in conformity with Fennema's remarks, is the difference in political culture. Depending on which country one is dealing with, certain approaches might be more suitable than others. As such, fighting right-wing extremism has to be tailor-made.

7. It should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned evaluations and recommendations only concern *repressive* actions against right-wing violent offenders. At the same time, however, one should think of all kinds of *preventive*

measures as well as measures aiming at taking away the root causes of right-wing extremism, in order to avoid focusing on fighting symptoms only. A range of measures are available, referred to in the present chapter and repeated here in the form of keywords only: raising public awareness through media campaigns; establishing a governmental economic policy which takes into consideration the consequences for relatively deprived groups; developing educational possibilities for the disadvantaged; establishing tolerance-creating educational programmes as well as, for instance, Internet sites; stimulating all kinds of contacts between different social and racial groups, etc.[9] If repressive actions are taken together with such measures, there might be a chance that right-wing violence will seriously diminish. Nevertheless, one should also be realistic: right-wing extremism will always find a scapegoat.

9 See, for instance, several contributions in: De Witte, 1997.

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ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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1. Introduction

How far have we advanced our understanding of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts? And how far have we advanced our ability to control and resolve these conflicts? These two questions are organically linked, since our approaches to ethnic conflicts depend on our will to engage in solving them, and our desire to allocate resources and efforts necessary to reconcile opposing communities and conflicting social interests.

The proliferation of ethnic conflicts in the post Cold War era has come as a surprise to the international community, simply because it was far from willing to invest resources in serious and honest conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Many voices have flatly announced that ethnicity is intractable because it is grounded in peoples' hearts and minds; or simply in their identity. And in this sense, it constitutes one out of many other symptoms of 'self-inflicted' immaturity. By explaining ethnicity as an irresistible force, the 'mature and developed nations' may address only the question of whether to 'intervene' or to succumb to the 'seductiveness of moral disgust' (Ignatieff, 1998).

This citation clearly reflects that the way the problem of ethnic strife is formulated is in itself a justification of the general posture taken by the dominant powers in the international system. As judged by the case of ex-Yugoslavia, the weakness and vacillations, manipulations and differences among major powers further complicated the situation and tended to prolong violence and wars. And more generally, it seems that the international system is willing to grasp only these factors of ethnic conflicts that it is willing to tackle.

From within, the tendency to explain ethnic strife by reference to subjective factors such as identity and ethno-centrism is itself a call for succumbing to the pull of secession as the only way out of violence and political decay.

In this chapter, I will argue that ethnicity is not the product of identity. Very much to the contrary, ethnicity is, in most cases, a reaction to symbolic and material violence. Identity emerges in the context of symbolic and material violence and fears. The identity discourse, as such, may supply us with only a separatist approach to ethnic conflicts. The separatist approach is never free from serious problems. On the other hand, this approach will eventually hit its ceiling in the international system. Social scientists and

politicians alike are morally obliged to produce models of ethnic conflict prevention and resolution, other than or beside separation, if the latter is unavoidable. This latter situation should be regarded as a special case that arises when all other possibilities are exhausted through serious and honest mediation. Indeed, this chapter argues that integration of communities is possible, and may eventually be the only way out of the paradoxes of ethnicity. Integration, broadly defined, should not be forced into the terminology of 'nation building'. In fact, the real key to the integration of communities is the liberation of our mind from the fetishism of the conventional state system. The cultivation of a new democratic ideal, in which the state plays an instrumental role in establishing a commonwealth for all, is the core of an alternative model of ethnic conflict prevention. I will show this by focusing on examples from the Euro-Mediterranean region.

2. Ethnicity around the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is home to some of the oldest civilisations. On its shores, old nations sustained their existence and maintained a high level of cultural continuity in time and space. In the same context, the Mediterranean basin witnessed ever cross-cutting pressures stemming from extensive interactions between civilisations. In the last fifteen centuries, the greatest influence on these interactions seemed to spring from the encounter between the world's largest two religions: Christianity and Islam. Eventually, the split between North and South Mediterranean has come to coincide, by and large, with those two religions. The regions around the Mediterranean also attracted a variety of large and small-scale migration and population movements. These and other factors have contributed to the phenomenon of ethnic and religious over-hang, in the Eastern flank, and more particularly in the North Eastern part or the small Asian plateau. In the North, the remarkable social and economic advances of Western civilisation stimulated a high level of social assimilation through nation building. On the Southern shores, the remarkable resilience of religious influence homogenised the population, and helped push to the margin certain remaining differences in language and culture.

Extraordinarily long historical processes make the Mediterranean one of the world's regions least inflicted with ethnic conflicts. However, ferments of ethnic strife continue to smoulder and occasionally flare up, in certain parts. A proper identification of specifically ethnic conflicts in the region is impeded by the difficulties facing definitions. There is indeed no universally accepted classification of violence and no universally accepted definition of ethnicity or ethnic violence as distinct from other forms of hostilities. For example, it seems that the expression usually maintains a difference between ethnic conflicts and conflicts among nations. The former is largely understood as occurring within a given state, while the latter is regarded as international. In fact, this distinction could not possibly be maintained on scientific grounds, since there seems to be no fundamental difference between ethnicity and nationalism.

Moreover, it is impossible to make this distinction in colonial situations when domestic and inter-state conflicts involve the same 'national or ethnic groupings'. The situation between Israelis and Arabs is a clear example, since this conflict is fed from within and outside the state of Israel, which itself was born, fifty years ago, at the risk of creating a flood of Palestinian refugees yearning for return to their historical homeland. And since 1967, a number of Arab states, while used to declaring solidarity with their Palestinian brothers, started to have their own cause of conflict with Israel. However, since this specific case could not possibly be covered by the category of ethnic conflict, I shall exclude it from my treatment of ethnicity around the Mediterranean.

This leaves us with a few cases of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts around the Mediterranean. In the Eastern flank, the two cases of Lebanon's sectarian war (1974-1990), and the Kurdish rebellion in and against Turkey (throughout the 1990s) satisfy our definition of ethnic conflict. Within Israel itself, ethnic strains are becoming increasingly manifest between Eastern and Western Jews. However, since violence associated with this case is minimal, I shall refer to it only when this is useful for shedding light on common features of ethnicity. The same criterion applies on sectarian 'sensitivities' within Syria.

On the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the remarkable homogeneity of populations leaves us without serious contention on the existence of ethnic conflicts. The overwhelming majority of the peoples in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco identify themselves as both Arabs and Muslims, with the remaining part either considering themselves Arab non-Muslims or Muslim non-Arabs. The two aspects of sheer difference in population traits are bounded by a powerful sense of affiliation which make non-Arab Muslims and Muslim non-Arabs more nationalistic than the average fellow citizen. However, in the last decade or two, certain strains have emerged in the relationship between majorities and religious or cultural minorities. These strains fall short of the definition of ethnicity as I shall provide it. But assuming that these strains are not eased, and that dormant tensions will escalate in the future, certain definitional parameters of ethnicity may come to hold.

On the Northern shores where nation building has continued almost unabated in the majority of countries for more than one century, ethnicity is manifested in pockets of conflict and violence. The Basque country is a case in point for the purpose of this study.

Within the Mediterranean itself, there lies the island of Cyprus, whose unity was shattered by the events in 1974 that led to the *de facto* partitioning between the Greek South and the Turkish North, along with the Turkish invasion of the latter. This particular conflict is reminiscent of the long-standing rivalry between the two major religions of the Mediterranean, as well as the legacy of the long Ottoman imperial rule

of parts of Southern Europe. For this and other reasons, the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus is regarded as a typical example of ethnicity in and around the Mediterranean.

When we broaden our perspective on the Mediterranean, it would be impossible to ignore the ethnic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, which shocked the conscience of humanity. On grounds of proximity to the Mediterranean, I shall also take account of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the whole nest of conflicts which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Within the European Union states, we find remnants of ethnic rivalries, as residuals from the feudal era, or continuing deprivation. A most persistent case is Northern Ireland. I shall not include this or other Northern European cases in my treatment because they fall into a pattern which is different in fundamental features from those in the Mediterranean region.

I shall trace these conflicts by reference to evolving theoretical explanations as they apply or fail to apply to the cases I mentioned above.

3. Ethnicity and Identity

I would like to start my treatment of ethnicity around the Mediterranean by making a sharp distinction between conventional anthropology and sociological theories of ethnicity.

In the conventional anthropological approach, ethnicity is a fundamental form of social existence. It is an absolute given of social reality, and possibly of Man's existence, since it pertains to the self-definition of groups, or simply their identity. Identity is defined in terms of ethno-centrism and prejudice, which centre on a group's culture (language, religion, norms and ethos, etc.), or somatic features. Identity, self-esteem, social and psychological sustenance of affective ties, sense of belonging, and interdependence of fate are perceived to have a value and dynamism of their own in forming group and individual consciousness and modes of affiliation.

In this perspective, ethnicity is couched in the language of identity, and the latter is regarded as given, as the internal substance of a group existence whose external appearance is called ethnicity. It is thus constituted by three factors: primordial loyalty, longing for an authentic and almost unchanged and continuous cultural experience, and frustration resulting from (perceived) interference with this goal. In his pioneering study, Geertz explains this as follows:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens', (...) or as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed givens of social existence. These congruities of blood, speech, customs, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves (...) by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz, 1963).

In this description, ethnicity is better comprehended than in Durkheim's category of mechanical solidarity. The act of identification with a group results from the immediate and intrinsic significance conferred upon the bonds themselves, i.e., ethnicity is the result of an 'irrational fixation'.

Interestingly enough, this same discourse is revived in the post-modern language. But before I come to that, it is crucial to briefly refer to the critique offered to this school of thought. The most basic critique is the denial of the absolute significance conferred on identity bonds in feeding ethnic sentiments. By freeing our thinking from romantic fascination with the identity discourse, the problem of ethnicity is radically reconstructed, by means of situational and structural concepts, as suggested early on by Gellner (1973).

It is more than obvious that people are socialised along many factors of belonging. Ethnicity is, to the opposite, distinguished by the extreme value placed on one or two elements of social existence. Ethnicity has to 're-define' this existence, by an act of violent reduction or induction. Modern sociological research has absorbed this lesson very well. Nadel declares that the definition of a 'tribe' is subjectively drawn. This definition 'hinges on a theory of cultural identity, which ignores or dismisses as immaterial existing variations, and ignores or disregards uniformities beyond its self-chosen boundaries' (Nadel, 1947). La Fontaine asserts that cultural symbols are not produced by the desire for an authentic cultural experience but by frustrations resulting from social experiences with others. They are made as abstractions from cultural realities, 'not its basic elements' (La Fontaine, 1969). Ethnicity often does not develop on its own, but emerges as a response towards the challenges of severe strains from the environment.

This explains the elusive and changing forms of ethnic posture groups may take. The group may invoke descent, or language, religion, or skin colour, individually or combined in different situations, as this may serve the specific purpose or interests. It would then be a mistake to place emphasis on inherited identity bonds, as groups tend to focus only on a few such bonds as correspond to changing strains and challenges, stemming from changing circumstances or environments surrounding this group.

This is particularly true in the Mediterranean region, which witnessed the combined, and occasionally conflicting, influences of cultural and religious continuity and ruptures, through time. On the Southern shores, the cosmopolitan traditions sustained by the Ottoman empire marked only the split between Muslims and non-Muslims, with the latter organised in the Millet system, which variously allowed them to maintain their religious identities rooted in the distant past. However, this cosmopolitan nature, loosely connected by a common religion, could have hardly concealed the variety of (ethnic) identities which conferred privileges and status on certain minority groups attached to

Turks or Caucasians, as distinct from natives. Interestingly, this distinction continued relatively long after the establishment of modern nation states. It was only in the first few decades of the 20th century that this status declined in countries such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, not to mention greater Syria. The modern state and modernisation, more generally, united Copts and Muslims in Egypt in the common bond of nationhood, after a long period in which ordinary Egyptians used to regard themselves only as Muslims. Interestingly, religious strife, during the 1980s in Egypt, was associated with a change of perspective on the part of a certain sector of society that seemed to be highly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism, which recognises only the Islamic identity.

Identity based on religion showed greater resilience in the Arab Maghreb, simply because it served as a platform for resistance against cultural assimilation by the colonial power. Accordingly, aspects of identity based on (Arab) language and culture were much less pronounced as opposed to Islam. Naturally, this added to the strength of national unity between Berber and Arab speaking sectors of the population. The Algerian society which struggled against the French cultural assimilation in the name of Islam, found itself strained by (linguistic, rather than cultural in the broad sense) differences between Arabs and Berbers, only when Arabisation became the official ideology of the independent state (Ibrahim, 1994). It is amply clear from this latter and previous examples that different features of group identities are intentionally called to action in the 'present' while they were dormant in the past.

This is also true in the Mashreq region, where recognition of 'Arab-ness' as an overarching identity, was pioneered by Christians, especially in Lebanon, in opposition to the Ottoman colonial rule, starting from late 19th century. A few decades later, some of the same sectors became involved, with the same intensity, in creating other narratives of identity and origin, as a means of opposing Arabism, for fear of losing political sectarian privileges (Abul-Husn, 1998).

In Southern European ex-dependencies of the Ottoman empire, similar and opposing narratives on origin, descent and political history bearing on claims over territories are presented to justify present 'nationalistic assertions' or assimilationist policies, regardless of their truth content or harmony with existing realities. Given the common Southern Slav origins of most inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia, it is more than clear that 'nationalistic' claims are made in the name of few, and varying differences at the risk of ignoring common features of their identities, which would have bound 'nations' together. This is why, after declaring that the Balkan is the place where great regimes and great powers of European history overlapped, Malcolm aptly states that the history of Bosnia, as such, fails to help in explaining the conflict and the roots of war (Malcolm, 1994). Interestingly, the nineteenth-century Serbian ideology, which makes of the very distant 1398 battle of Kosovo against the Ottomans a defining and spiritual event, had to reverse the fact that Albanians fought against Ottomans in this same battle. The power

of myth is thus invoked to establish demarcation lines as well as the justification for a self-proclaimed, and exclusive, right to land (Vickers, 1998).

The Kurds, on the other hand, rarely saw themselves a distinct nation, as opposed to other Muslims, under the Ottoman Empire. Forces of nationalism awakened only when they saw all other nations surrounding them rallying around banners of descent or language which automatically excluded them. The sense of indignation, generated by either exclusion or forced assimilation, by modern 'nation states', seems to be the real vehicle behind the rise of nationalism among Kurds who freely mixed and mingled with Turks (in Turkey) and Arabs (in Iraq), much more than amongst themselves, for centuries. Thus, the words of Ismet Inonu during the years of joint national resistance, 1919-1922, that 'the new state would be a homeland for Turks and Kurds', were subsequently replaced by total denial of Kurdish identity (Gunter, 1997).

The case of Cyprus is probably a very different story. The demarcation lines between Turks and Greeks are quite thick. Descent, religion and culture, and history are all aligned to make polarisation an easy possibility. However, coexistence between the two communities was generally peaceful before the events which culminated in the declaration of a separate Turkish polity and the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974.

A most interesting case could be found in ethnic splits inside Israel between Mezrahis and Ashkenazis. Oriental Jews had deserted their own original home countries in the name of Judaic identity. However, since the 1970s, they have started to proudly speak of themselves as Moroccans and other Orientals, in response to their feeling of discrimination at the hands of Western Jewish strata, who led the creation of the state of Israel. The case of Israel is also interesting in other respects. For example, religion per se was no factor in the typical mind-set of the leading force behind the establishment of Israel. They were careful, indeed, to build a secular, not a religious, state. They claimed that what drives them to rally behind the Zionist project is nationalism, not religion. However, this claim was sharply undermined by vast national differences among the migrant population of the state. This fact motivated the state elite to create a homogenous society from groups that share little in terms of culture, other than religion. In this case, a 'nation' was not only built but indeed manufactured.

4. Ethnic Inequalities

Modern sociological research on the phenomenon started to recognise this elusive nature of identity formation, deformation and re-formation. And instead of understanding ethnicity as a 'fixity', it has come to place it in the broader context of minority-majority relationships. What is meant by majority-minority relationships is not sheer numbers, but lines of discrimination and domination. On the symbolic and political levels, this

pattern holds when the state establishes its legitimacy on the basis of values and *mores* of a given community to the exclusion of other(s). In fact, gender was studied for a while with reference to majority-minority relations.

In the eyes of many sociologists, ethnicity arises when 'the somatic or cultural traits of groups are used to single them out for differential and unequal treatment' (Barth, 1969). Ethnicity, in this perspective, is grounded in inequality. Radical research programmes focused on identifying roots of inequalities in the economic system. The most transparent case of ethnicity caused by economic inequalities is that in which class divisions coincide, by and large, with ethnic lines. Ethnic differentiation is to be explained in this case by class domination and exploitation. In this case, a dominant community may not form a single class or stratum. This situation holds when the bulk of the dominated cultural or racial group is situated in the same inferior class position. The case of blacks in the United States was a typical example, for a long period. Most of the early twentieth-century Marxist literature on ethnicity couched it entirely in the language of class differentiation and exploitation. In fact, though, this model of perfect coincidence of class and ethnicity is rare and is mostly concentrated in modern migrant societies, especially in the United States and Latin America.

From the radical perspective, the law of uneven capitalist development is the root cause of ethnic stratification and domination. In this case, geographic differentiation acts as the vehicle of ethnicity, when unequal levels of development among regions coincide with communal divisions. Indeed, the majority of serious ethnic strife fits in this model, simply because spatial separation is empowering to minorities, as opposed to situations of communal diffusion and geographic mixing.

A more entrenched cause of inequalities takes place when the economy (capitalism!) develops internally on the basis of ethnic division of labour. Capitalist incorporation of societies, in this case, resembles the core-periphery relationship, which exists between North and South, at the global scale. A situation of internal imperialism arises when different regional/cultural groups are allocated unequal ranges of labour processes, with dominant cultural groups keeping for themselves high value-added industries, with other (dominated or weaker) groups forced to low value-added labour processes. Hechter contends that cultural minorities incorporated in an inferior position in the division of labour will eventually develop sentiments and practices similar to national liberation movements in ex-colonial societies. This may take place in highly industrialised societies, such as the United Kingdom, where the Celtic fringe evolved in a nationalist direction in response to its semi-colonial situation (Hechter, 1975). Casanova applied the same model to Amerindians in the U.S. More generally, empirical research conducted in developed societies links ethnic revival to 'internal colonialism', represented by economic dualism, and unequal division of labour (Casanova, 1969).

Radical models which trace ethnicity, and ethnic revolts, to economic exploitation or domination fail to take account of (sometimes more frequent) examples of ethnic revolts carried out by (cultural, regional, or racial) groups that occupy a superior position in the scale of labour processes, and who accordingly have better standards of living. On the other hand, ethnic victimisation may be launched by the poor population, who form the political majority against the richer and economically dominant cultural or racial communities. In still other cases, we can identify (ethnic) groups that have a dual social status, in the sense of entertaining superior positions in the political field while suffering from low economic status, or vice versa. Sociological research points out the high disposition towards violence associated with status inconsistency or class incongruity. These groups, when forced into a purely pacifist position, tend nevertheless to be highly prone to acute ethnic consciousness, possibly developing a ghetto-like life style or belief system.

Cases of ethnic strife on and around the Mediterranean are living examples of the impact of inequalities among cultural/racial or religious communities. However, these inequalities need not necessarily be attributed to the rise of capitalism. Some are more entrenched in past feudal rather than capitalist economic systems. For example, many historians explain the reservoir of Serbian fury which came to blow up with such brutality as shown in the Bosnian civil war of 1992-1995 by going back to the feudal age. 'The main basis of hostility', in the view of Malcolm, 'is not ethnic or religious but economic: the resentment felt by members of mainly (but not exclusively) Christian peasantry towards their Muslim landlords' (Malcolm, 1994). This class/ethnic relationship was drastically modified starting with the end of the first World War. But inequalities in social status were so stubborn that they only took different shapes in different stages. Even the socialist experiment of the Tito years was far from enough to bridge the gap between the largely urban Muslim community and the mainly peasant Serbian minority, within Bosnia itself. This class-cum-ethnic division is not seen in the relationships between larger nationalities within the former Yugoslavia, i.e., Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, as it is noticeable in smaller minorities as opposed to larger nationalities collectively. Smaller minorities generally occupy an inferior position on the scale of wealth and levels of economic development. In fact, though, unequal regional development together with the tendency of larger and more developed nationalities, especially Slovenia and Croatia, towards economic self sufficiency and autonomy, under Tito, partially explain the ease with which centrifugal forces carried the day, pushing Yugoslavia towards disintegration in the early 1990s (Crnobrnja, 1996). Interestingly, it were the more economically developed regions that initiated the wave of separation against the resistance of the less developed Serbia and Montenegro.

Uneven regional development, coupled with (partial) separation of communities, is also noticeable in Lebanon, Cyprus and Turkey. The situation in Lebanon is crystal clear: the Maronites enjoyed most of the business wealth and status occupations, while Shi'ites were concentrated in the poor peasant environment of the South, and while the majority

of the Druze population were still separated in the austere mountainous areas to the East. Interestingly, the relatively well-to-do Sunni Muslims have had the least share in the civil war, and they were generally regarded as partners with the Maronites in the wealth and political power within Lebanon.

The Palestinian refugees, the poorest and most under-privileged amongst all the inhabitants of Lebanon, bore the brunt of the conflict. A more revealing aspect of the Lebanese situation is demonstrated by the fact that the Palestinian Christian population of the 'Sabra and Shatilla' refugee camps were more harshly brutalised at the hands of Christian militias than anyone else. The plight of the refugees in 1982 is a sad testimony to the fact that religion had nothing to do with the origins of the civil war in Lebanon between 1976 and 1991. Indeed, political religious movements were born in the midst of the civil war rather than leading to it.

The economic hardships, familiar to the Turkish North - as opposed to the well-to-do and modern settings of the Greek South - are, by all means, a better explanation of frustrations that led to the declaration of a separate state in the North than the combined influence of religious and cultural differences, in Cyprus. The situation of the Kurds in Turkey is a little more complex. It is certain that uneven development which separates the South Eastern part of Turkey from the opulent North of Turkey is an important factor behind the Kurdish rebellion. However, there is no tangible difference between living standards in Kurdish and Turkish Anatolian hinterland, something that reveals a bias against agriculture and countryside at large more than ethnic-driven neglect of a given part of the country .

A certain shade of uneven development exists between predominantly Berber tribal areas, on the one hand, and the rest of Algeria, on the other. This fact is mitigated by the fact that the Berber professional class in Algeria is probably much more affluent and advantaged as compared with the rest of the population. Interestingly, opposition to Arabisation in schools and in state official work is concentrated among these urban strata, and is generally explained by fear of losing advantages in state jobs that used to be undertaken in the French language (Ibrahim, 1994). This presumption is probably sustained by the fact that Berber urban middle classes failed to secure the participation of Berber's tribesmen in the demonstrations of 1990, protesting a parliamentary decision imposing the Arabic language as the language of teaching in public schools by 1997.

5. Symbolic/Political Differentiation

By exclusively focusing on economic inequalities, the conventional wisdom of radical social thought on ethnicity may come to a dead-end when explaining violence is the issue. Applying a class conflict model on ethnicity is more confusing than enlightening. On the other hand, nothing in this model explains how the struggle against economic

inequalities could go as far as destroying all forms of life, and why separation is seen, by the people involved, as the only road to social justice, and why the dominant stratum, by initiating ethnic rebellion, should forsake advantages of exploiting the lower strata for the joy of separation. On the other hand, the sheer difference in economic realities and levels of development may not tell us anything at all on the presence of exploitative relationships, which presumably approximate ethnic rebellion to class conflict.

In fact, there is adequate evidence to prove the claim that inequalities in the politico-symbolic realm are more potent causes of ethnic dispensation as opposed to inequalities in the material economic realm. The theory of structural pluralism has led sociological scholars towards the recognition of the fundamental importance of the political domain in the formation of ethnic consciousness. Smith makes the distinction between three types of institutional or collective incorporation: sheer diversity or differences, collective segregation based on these differences, and differential incorporation of segments (Smith, 1969). According to Kuper, ethnic conflicts are more likely to occur under conditions of differential incorporation and minority rule (Kuper, 1974). The contention here is that these institutional arrangements are established and sustained in the political sphere, even when they coincide with an economic division of labour and unequal class positions.

Segregation and unequal incorporation are made in terms of the value system of a dominant group or community. The sheer fact of segregating people or weighing their values on a hierarchical scale involves a judgement on the 'worth' of people, their belief systems or other cultural characteristics. Ethnicity emerges from this context, both from the top and the bottom. At the top, the advantageous position conferred upon certain traits or characteristics is intrinsically blinding, since people tend to defend what they have got, regardless of how they came to gain it. Fury against the humiliation, implied by placing certain communities in an inferior position, seems to be 'natural'. Moral outrage, to use a term coined by Barrington Moore, will eventually burst out in violence, whenever accentuated by certain events and allowed the opportunity to gather momentum and force. This applies equally to both poor and rich communities as far as they perceive their status in the larger society or state to be inferior and that this is forced on them purposefully (Gurr, 1993). People revolt against symbolic humiliation directed against them more fiercely than against their material exploitation. This tendency seems to be a crucial manifestation of the fact that people care about ideals and beliefs as much as about material needs. Indeed, the ferocity of peoples' defence of their beliefs or sense of dignity and worth may explain, at least partly, the extreme destructiveness in which they get engaged. Rationality and lack of it is the outcome of this 'symbolic dimension' of man's existence as a social being.

All these theories, however, have failed to make the distinction between ethnic stratification (political or economic), ethnic consciousness, and ethnic rebellion or violence. In fact, inequalities as such may not explain at all the rise of ethnic

consciousness. History has seen an endless number of cases in which an exploited and dominated cultural or racial group fails to develop a consciousness of any kind, not to mention revolt.

The evolution of this form of consciousness hinges on changes in patterns of inequality or forms of exploitation. It is change, in inequality patterns and forms of differential incorporation, that induces ethnic consciousness. In a large number of cases, the political majority is behind the change in the foundation of the state or society, which causes fear on the part of weaker social groups or communities. The political majority comes to this point when it undergoes experiences requiring alternative lines of political legitimacy as opposed to previous ones. Almost all historical accounts of specific cases of ethnic conflict share reference to a crisis of legitimacy as the immediate context in which ethnicity is revived. In this perspective, the legitimacy crisis leads to serious attempts at restructuring the political formula, which involves inter-communal relations. The climate of impending and threatening political change accentuates common fears and insecurities among all parties, i.e., both political majorities and minorities.

In a large number of cases, groups that hold supreme political positions come to perceive the surrounding environment as gravely threatening and possibly degrading. Conspiracy theories tend to inflate this sense of insecurity. Typically, these theories involve minorities (or other cultural partners in a state) as instruments of threat, and history is invoked in the collective memory in highly skewed ways so as to justify the negative image of the other(s) as instruments of not only present but also past threats and calamities. Reference to sad historical experiences is a most common feature of situations leading to acute revival of ethnic consciousness and fears. In such situations, history, however distant, never dies. It becomes embedded in a culture of fear, pregnant with conspiracy theories and pessimistic expectations. The major difference lies in the period that precedes the eruption of violence, and whether recent political experiences awaken patterns memorised in a culture or push them aside.

The conflict spiral starts when the majority group takes severe (precautionary!) measures which restrict or downgrade the status or the liberties of minorities. The latter perceive these measures as omens of a new order in which their place in society and state is seriously demoted. In reaction, minorities will start to develop their own mechanisms of 'self-defence', possibly including separatist demands. The attempt of the majority group or its representative in the state to suppress these demands produces significant violence, which leaves even deeper scars in the psyche of minorities. They eventually come to be 'convinced' that violence is the only answer to their plight. And violence starts to acquire a self-propelling, and self-validating, nature.

In the context of sudden inflation of insecurity, ethnic violence erupts sometimes beyond the original will of the parties concerned. On the other hand, ethnic violence presumes the existence of organisational networks, which could be called to action

when communities are seized by fear, and the need for 'self-defence' is certified by small-scale aggression. The sheer existence of ethnic consciousness, or an ethnic situation may not in itself indicate a propensity for revolt. For any group to revolt, it has to possess independent social organisations. In numerous cases, ethnic situations are characterised not only by unequal incorporation, but also by systematic destruction of social organisations among the victimised groups. The power demonstrated by various groups in situations of ethnic violence correlates with their varying shares of solid social and political organisations, armies among them.

6. Ethnic Conflict Spiral

The typical course of events which leads to protracted ethnic conflicts includes a 'missed opportunity', as a critical turning point. The search for a negotiated solution to the dilemmas of the political situation normally starts at an early stage, and before the eruption of large-scale violence. At this stage, a measure of flexibility is more likely to bring good results. Unfortunately, the suppression of minorities' demands or a minority taking advantage of a chaotic situation, often seem to be more attractive options. The mockery of history is such that the ultimate solution which allows the restoration of peace in such conflict cases, is based on the proposals that were rejected in early negotiations before the eruption of the conflict.

Missing the opportunity of early bargaining leads to small-scale aggression which starts to proliferate, unless decidedly interrupted by a strong leadership. If the right moment for reaching a new structure of compromise and equilibrium of interests escapes the attention of politicians, the real power slips to fanatics and away from moderates. Any single event may then start large-scale violence or civil war. Normally, one party to the conflict tends to utilise the utmost power or violence to force quick results. This typically adds to the fury, and mobilisation continues unabated. Violence keeps on feeding itself. It is this feature or the 'usual' failure of domestic forces to extricate themselves from the conflict spiral that, for some, justifies the claim that the intervention of external powers is absolutely necessary to terminate violence (Maynes, 1993).

In the course of a conflict spiral, tolerance grows increasingly thin, and those who advocate it, become few and far between, unless fears, on both sides, are addressed and adequately cured by a powerful act of re-conciliation on the part of 'trust-worthy' mediators from within or outside the state. Otherwise, most ethnic conflicts are 'temporarily settled' by means of violence. However, conflicts that are 'suppressed' by means of arms rarely disappear. The remarkable feature of ethnic conflicts is their tendency to become protracted. Even when a given wave of ethnic conflict eventually subsides due to suppression and fatigue, the whole experience is 'stored' in collective memories, until circumstances allow a new opportunity for 'revenge' or for settling old

accounts. The difference between one ethnic conflict and another is the length of intervals between one wave and the next. In this sense, ethnic conflicts tend to show the signs of protracted social conflicts. They flare in waves, they have no clear end-point and they involve spontaneous feelings of the masses, and they show resistance to simple solutions.

The conflict spiral itself fuels ethnic fury, which sharpens the consciousness of minorities and consolidates the demarcation lines between various groups. At a certain point, ethnicity starts to take on a life of its own. In other words, we may not even need to search for the structural causes or roots of ethnicity, since it is, in many cases, born in the midst of violence and keeps feeding on long historical memories. This fact, in turn, usually sheds some doubt on 'peace agreements', if and when they are reached. And the fragility of peace agreements may qualify society for a prolonged paralysis or for continued crises or decay. However, the post-conflict episode needs a study in its own right. One major remark is pertinent at this point. The stability of peace in post-conflict situations depends a great deal on the wisdom and magnanimity of the leaders of the political majority, or the 'victorious' party.

7. Some Manage and Some Do Not

All previous symptoms are manifest in the Mediterranean cases of ethnic violence. The civil war in *Lebanon* could be explained by changes that de-stabilised the politico-symbolic distribution of power and the nature of the state. Before the 1970s, the political formula represented the partnership between Maronites and Sunni Muslims, to the exclusion of other religious sects. The sectarian balance was comprehended as granting Lebanon a special status, which keeps only a semblance of Arab identity without commitment to common Arab interests. However, the *modus vivendi*, formed in the context of independence, was rapidly eroding by early 1970, due to two crucial factors: the demographic changes which elevated the Muslims to the status of numeric majority (in 1980 they accounted for 57% of the population), and the flow of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon, since 1971. The latter factor made Lebanon the main fighting platform against Israel. The fragile agreement of Cairo failed to keep the internal peace. In 1975, feeling the threat of profound changes in power relations, the right wing Phalangist militias initiated a civil war. They hoped to reverse the trend towards greater Arab and Palestinian influence in Lebanon and to restore their domination of political power that seemed to them seriously threatened. The Phalangists scored better successes in mobilising the support of other non-Maronite Christians during this crisis as opposed to the crisis of 1958, simply by awakening the fear culture and by establishing comparisons with the bitter memories of sectarian violence in the second half of the 19th century. However, the war itself had the opposite effect of mobilising all Muslim sects around the Palestinians. The rise of the under-privileged Shi'ite community, in a drive to redress political and economic inequalities characteristic of 'the existing old system',

was another fundamental result (Abul-Husn, 1998). The irony of the civil war in Lebanon is located in the fact that when peace was eventually concluded in 1989, the Taif agreement failed to settle any of the major issues of contention that had led to the civil war. And while the political formula was modified in practice in favour of the Muslims, particularly the Shi'ites, the basic political and economic system of the pre-war period was simply revived (Salama, 1987).

In *Turkey*, we cannot trace the origin of the Kurdish rebellion directly to a single event that changed the politico-symbolic distribution of power. However, Turkey had been suffering a prolonged crisis that threw doubt on the very basis of the 'Kemalist' state. And with the failure of the reforms, introduced by Inonu's regime during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, army coups and ideological violence between left- and right-wing forces dominated the political scene until the coup d'etat of 1980, which violently re-asserted the exclusivist principles of the 'Kemalist' state. Having been awakened by the left-wing agitation of the 1970s, the Kurds found themselves excluded again. All reforms that promised them cultural rights and serious recognition, as an independent community, were practically blocked. It was amply clear that their aspirations were not going to be accommodated within the system. The launching of Kurdish military rebellion took place in this context of failed reforms and continued symbolic denial of their very existence. Another factor which pushed for a strong military challenge to the status quo involving the Kurds, was the power vacuum, created in Northern Iraq after the 1990s crisis. The real purpose of the military rebellion, for the Kurdish nationalist movement, was not to gain full independence but to negotiate, from a position of strength, a new political formula that would grant them basic political and human rights (Gunter, 1997). The spiral of violence awakened intense fears on both sides. For the Turkish government, the Kurdish military rebellion caused great alarm about the possibility of returning to the extended violence of the 1970s, and of a renewed questioning of the very legitimacy of the 'Kemalist' state. Indeed, we can hardly understand the extremely militant Turkish response to the Kurdish rebellion without recalling the profound fears over the very existence of the Turkish state amidst the surrounding and conflicting giants for more than a century and a half. The consistently assimilationist policies of the Turkish state, the constant frustration by the military of all promises for accommodating certain Kurdish rights and the extreme violence with which the Turkish military institution faced the Kurdish rebellion have all contributed to the growing militancy among the Kurdish population. These responses have simply wakened fears of extinction. In fact, the conflict spiral throughout the 1990s added substantially to levels of support to PKK rebellion among the Kurdish people inside and outside Turkey, as compared with the modest support it enjoyed in the 1980s.

In *Cyprus*, the Turks, who form a quarter of the population, were practically excluded in both the economic and the political dimensions of the Cypriot state after independence in 1960. They were seen as a marginal minority, which only impeded the desire of the majority for unity with Greece. Feeling the threat of transforming Cyprus into an

extension of Greece, the representatives of the Turkish community, after serious constitutional disputes with their Greek partners, withdrew from the government in 1963, and started to form a separate administrative entity in 1963. The ensuing ethnic violence accentuated mutual fears. However, the greatest influence on the ethnic relationship was produced by the military coup in Greece, which reflected coup attempts by Greek nationalists in Cyprus between 1971 and 1974, when the military actually took over power. Feeling the threat to their lives and their role in the political system, Cypriot Turks solicited the invasion by Turkey of the Northern part, where they declared an independent state. The irony of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus is represented by the fact that the Greek political majority came to endorse the 'federal solution' demanded by the Turks, which it had dismissed in 1968 (Josephi, 1997).

The case of ethnic pressure that led to the breakdown of *the former Yugoslavia* is a manifestation of the combined effect of the legitimacy crisis and the fear culture. In one perspective, the crisis of legitimacy was embedded in socialist systems. In another perspective, the case of the Balkans should be viewed more broadly as the result of the failure of liberal capitalism, the incomplete integration of agricultural and industrial workers, the narrow elite of the ruling groups under various regimes, and the missed opportunities of democratic consolidation (Kurth and Petras, 1993). In this view, the analysis based on history, long ethnic rivalries and violence is lacking validity in explaining the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia. The belief that a multi-ethnic state is by definition a remnant of a feudal empire is also dismissed. In fact, while concerns over the future were already spelled even before the passing of Tito in 1980, the real challenge, in the 1980s, was concentrated in the autonomous region of Kosovo, which only demanded elevation to an autonomous republic. The immediate causes of ethnic independence movements could be traced, in the view of this author, to the impact of the 1989 democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, which ended the totalitarian system there, and to the rise of militant Serbian nationalism. The first factor sheds new light on the crisis of the state created and maintained by Tito and his colleagues. Serbian ultra-nationalism showed itself already in dark images in the new Serbian constitution of July 1990, which ended the autonomous status for Kosovo and Vojvodina. The intention to centralise power through a new federal constitution was explicitly advocated by Serb communists. The independence movements in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina managed to triumph against a background of fears, accentuated by these trends. The failure of the collective presidency to come up with a conciliatory formula pushed the situation towards civil war which ended in plunging the country into disintegration. Hence, while the previous regime had been quite aware of the need to maintain a sense of equality among various ethnic groups at the politico-symbolic level, the crisis in the form and nature of the state, that had already emerged and expressed itself within Yugoslavia, through a creeping democratisation during the 1980s, was so badly handled that acute fears fed by past memories were quickly revived and set loose by a chain of actions and re-actions involving the ethnic distribution of power (Crnobrnja, 1996). The extraordinary nature of ethnic relationships in the former

Yugoslavia is such that the culture of fear and the struggle over politico-symbolic power were not restricted to the 'central federal' level, but extended to each and every minority. Rivalries and fears, that afflicted all communities, were most aggravated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which witnessed the most brutal episode of ethnic conflict and violence, between its three constituent communities, Muslims, Croats and Serbs, during 1992-1995.

In *Spain*, the most serious case of conflict is represented by the Basque nationalists who emerged on the scene in the late 1950s, with the founding of the ETA organisation. Since its inception, ETA has engaged in a massive terror campaign, in order to press on the central government its demand for the secession of the Basque region. However, the real growth of the separatist movement took place in the 1970s and 1980s. The association between the growth of Basque separatism and the robust democratisation of Spain under King Juan Carlos can hardly be denied. However, this association cannot be explained by a crisis in the distribution of power and symbols, but by the determination of an ideological and terrorist movement to take the fullest possible advantage of the relative fragility of the democratisation process. In a country where feudal traditions of regional autonomy are strong, it is only 'logical' that regional forces still enjoy support, as was demonstrated by the results of the 1979 elections, and throughout the 1980s (Europa World Yearbook, 1980s). The heyday of Basque nationalism and separatism was in 1990, when a resolution declaring the right of the Basque people to self-determination was approved by the Basque autonomous parliament. Since then, Basque separatism has started to dwindle.

Here, we have a course of events that seems contradictory to the conflict spiral, known in other cases of ethnic conflict. The call for total separation, as opposed to simple autonomy, started to lose support amongst the people of the Basque country themselves with the passing of time. The reasons for the growing moderation shown by the Basque community, as against the fanatic ETA underground movement, are numerous. The most important reason is the deepening of the democratic process. In this sense, democracy actually halted the crisis of the Spanish state, signs of which were already showing in the late period of the Franco regime. And contrary to the behaviour of many other governments in similar situations, the democratic central government seldom responded to terrorism by infringing the law or by undertaking indiscriminate reprisals against the people of the province. On the other hand, the democratic constitution of 1978 added to the prerogatives of the provinces. In this way, the state managed to accommodate regional and cultural needs for self-expression, including that of the Basque region. This experience stands in full contradiction with the way Serbian nationalism confronted the legitimate demands of the Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s, for example. Moreover, the Basque region has benefited substantially from the systematic growth of the Spanish economy. And above all, the grave mistake of indiscriminate killing and violence, undertaken by ETA separatists, eventually caused a growing revulsion by the Basque people themselves. The results of the elections for the

Basque parliament have shown this clearly since 1994. Public and partisan condemnation of terrorism emerged as a new line of thought among the Basque people. In addition to all this, commitment on the part of the French and other Western European governments against Basque terrorism was instrumental in undermining ETA fanaticism (Europa World Yearbook, 1998). In brief, the example given by Spain proves the intrinsic superiority of the strategy of coupling self-discipline and the consolidation of democracy, in response to the ethnic challenge at large and the challenge of separatism more specifically.

The case of the Berbers in *Algeria* is another proof of the possibility of intervening in an ethnic conflict and bringing it under control. Indeed, the important issue at stake is symbolic, since there exists no discrimination against Berbers in the political or economic spheres. The essential demand of Berber activists is the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in schools and state institutions. In spite of the apparent determination on the part of the government to exclude both French and Tamazight, the government has not pursued a suppression strategy against Berber activists. In fact, there is very little to indicate that those activists were particularly successful in mobilising popular support in the Berber hinterland. A major Berber political leader gained only 9.6% of the popular vote in the presidential elections of 1995, and the major Berber-based political party won only 19 seats in the parliamentary elections of 1997, far below the percentage of the Berber speaking population of Algeria (Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1998).

The new generations of Mizrahis are much better integrated in *Israel*, politically and economically. This has systematically reduced the alienation of oriental Jews. However, contest over cultural symbols still characterises social and cultural life. A new agenda of issues pertaining to symbols and impinging on the very nature of the secular state of Israel has come to dominate domestic Israeli politics. However, prospects of large-scale violence may not be as substantial as many Israeli observers have predicted.

8. Intellectualism and Identity

In all this, politics may play a mitigating or an intensifying role. The existence of an ethnic conflict spiral immediately suggests the latter. Observers from outside are alarmed by the ample supply of political leaders who are willing to instigate ethnic unrest. The state elite itself is sometimes willing to use ethnicity as a rallying point, sometimes awakening dormant ethnic feelings. Ethnic political action is not only a weapon of last resort, and occasionally the most potent one. It is often the basic platform and the main ideological framework for a certain set of leaders and intellectuals.

The prevention and resolution of ethnic conflicts could have rested on the wisdom of modern intellectuals, who are presumed to have been educated in a spirit of rationalism

and modernity. In fact, this expectation is sharply undermined by present experiences with ethnic violence. In fact, a new research on ethnicity, in the context of less developed societies, is based on studying the psychological and ideological make-up of the modern intelligentsia. In this view, the 'graduates of modern education' are more prone to ethnic sentiments than traditional leaders. Modern intellectuals, in multi-cultural societies, are more likely to be driven by a romantic view of the world, a desire for quick results, intolerance of others, and faith in violence as the 'birth pangs of history'. These traits lead modern intelligentsia to focus on identity and on the language of history and belonging rather than on achievement and performance (Nairn, 1977). This tendency is accentuated with the demise of universal ideologies, which promised international utopias. Interestingly, and very much to the contrary of the expectations spelled out by modernisation theorists, recent ethnic movements are, mostly, led by intellectuals. And modern intellectual leaders of ethnic movements are much more zealous in ethnic attachments, and much less compromising, than traditional community leaders who acquired their entire legitimacy from representing their communities' inherited cultural values.

The predominant roles of modern intellectuals are also common to ethnic conflicts around the Mediterranean. The Kurdish armed rebellion, in Turkey, is led by left-wing intellectuals. In fact, these modern left-wing intellectuals are competing for leadership with traditional chiefs, even in the austere pastural areas of Kurds in Northern Iraq. The same background characterised the Basque separatist movement in Spain. In the case of Lebanon, the new generation of right-wing Maronites was keen to co-ordinate positions with their Church leaders. An opposite model is seen in the case of the Berbers in Algeria, where traditional sentiments seem to be unsympathetic to the agitation launched by the modern intellectual and political class that speak in their name. One of the most enigmatic features of ethnic strife, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, is that ethnic movements are led by previous communists who used to profess an internationalist ideology. This seems to be consistent with new trends shown by Marxist forces world-wide. Only in Israel we notice that traditionalist religious leaders of oriental Jewish communities have assumed the leadership.

9. Prevention and Resolution

As is indicated in this study, the key to preventing ethnic conflicts is the principle of equality in dignity and worth of all human individuals and communities. Ethnic conflicts arise because of partial or total denial of this fundamental principle, which forms the core foundation of the international human rights system (Birmingham, 1995). Moreover, it is equally important to promote to the utmost the right to equal development of opportunities among different communities inhabiting the same state. In absence of equal political rights and emphasis on equal symbolic worth and dignity, it is often impossible to actively remedy economic imbalances between regions or linguistic,

cultural or religious communities. Approaches to conflict prevention, which overlook the inter-dependence between economic and political equality, is likely to fail in securing maximum friendly relations among different communities. Some states may justify systematic denial or undermining of political/symbolic equality by asserting equal economic opportunities. Some others may do the opposite by arguing that state responsibilities should stop at securing political equality, leaving to market forces the task of economic development and distribution of economic opportunities. In both cases, ethnic feelings are destined to flourish, in due time and when the accumulation of anger or despair, economic or political, reaches the point of explosion.

As demonstrated in the above brief review of the Mediterranean cases, ethnic tensions could simply be addressed by flexible responses to minor demands such as the right to education in one's own language. However, the denial of these simple rights, contained in the 1992 UN Declaration on the rights of minorities, and generally considered as minimum standards of decent human treatment of minorities, may lead to persistent deterioration of ethnic relations to the point of civil war and separatism. The fact that communities have already moved from simple legitimate demands for fundamental rights within the same state to the call for separation indicates that conflict prevention has not worked, and that we should likewise move to conflict resolution.

Here, we face the gap between normative standards in relation to the essential rights of minorities and responsibilities of states in securing these rights, on the one hand, and these standards that should apply to the demand for separation, on the other. While the former are adequately clear, the latter are shrouded in ambiguities.

Two approaches are suggested. The first strives to formulate a coherent and unified approach to separatism, while the other argues the need for a case-by-case strategy for conflict resolution. The first approach is faced with the problematic issue of which principles and standards should be consistently pursued.

When levels of tensions between communities peak, separation of combatants into independent political realms may seem justified, as an approach to conflict termination or resolution, if it were not for the extreme difficulties involved in it. In the overwhelming majority of cases, there seems to be no easy way for partitioning territories between various communities. Even when we rule out objections stemming from 'nationalist-cum-statist' claims, normally represented by armies, bureaucracies and statesmen, it is often impossible to fairly settle competing claims over land, either because of ethnic over-hang, or due to complex historical circumstances surrounding the validation of these claims (Steiner, 1987). And even when partition of land is 'forced' one way or another, many communities will continue to harbour hopes for 'restoring grandfathers' lands', and to pursue irredentist policies, after separation. Due to this phenomenon, conflicts may not end or subside within a reasonable time frame. Accordingly, separation is not a very promising way out of conflicts in the majority of

cases. But suppression of separatist demand may not be a viable option, either. Some have therefore suggested a scheme for approaching separatist demands, on a case-by-case basis. One such scheme states that 'groups should be allowed to secede when the alternative is to be subject to oppression, when their territorial demands are legitimate, when the resulting unit is viable and when distributional consequences are not excessive' (Steiner, 1998). These criteria involve many judgements that are certain to cause differences and bias.

The best pragmatic basis for a coherent approach to conflict, which also allows for variations, is the notion of federalism, or as Eide calls it 'pluralism in oneness' (Eide, 1994). A federation seems a proper solution to many ethnic conflicts, since it combines unity with recognition of diversity. By allowing self-expression, and accommodating the needs for an autonomous politico-symbolic realm, the federal solution seems the most viable exit from protracted ethnic conflict. However, ascendance to federalism is impeded by many circumstances. First and foremost, majority groups often fear that federalism may only be used as a prelude to separation. Secondly, fears on the status, security and welfare of sectors of the population that belong to the majority group but live in regions dominated, numerically, by minorities, are quite commonly used to deny autonomy to the latter. And given a climate filled with stereotypes, theories of conspiracy, and fears, federalism is often viewed by dominant groups and statesmen as an attempt to weaken the state. Even when the dominant majorities consent in principle to granting varying degrees of autonomy to their minorities, disagreements on the territorial and functional division of power between the centre and the autonomous regions or provinces tend to torpedo final settlements. Also given an uneven distribution of natural resources, the federal solution is frequently feared for its consequences for the distribution of national wealth. Moreover, since federations normally allocate armed forces to the centre, it is possible to curtail autonomy, especially when accords are negotiated in bad faith and under international pressure.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the democratic federal solution has proved the most successful in settling ethnic conflicts. It approximates the best 'pragmatic solution of contests between rights'. As such, it should be used by the international community as a basic platform for conflict resolution. Only in order to prevent further bloodshed, and end civil and protracted wars, separation may be taken as a serious alternative. A complementary approach that may serve as a post-conflict potential is economic co-operation agreements that may facilitate long-term integration. All these approaches, however, depend for their viability and success on the will shown by the international system for making conflict prevention and conflict resolution a common responsibility of mankind.

10. The Role of the International Community

In many instances, the prevention and resolution of ethnic conflict cannot be generated from within, except through massive human losses. Hope for peace hinges, in these situations, on the honest mediation of external actors, including the international community in its totality. Mediation may not work at all, unless coupled with the credible threat, or actual use, of force. This, in turn, brings us to the issue of legitimate use of force within the international context, which is vested in the United Nations.

In retrospect, there is no straightforward conclusion on the role of the international community in ethnic conflicts since the creation of the United Nations. It seems, however, that this role was more negative than positive (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997). In the Cold War period, the general rule of thumb was such that direct or indirect intervention in a situation of conflict by either superpower was met by an opposite move on the part of the other. Two general consequences of this practice proved to have enormous implications for international peace and security. On the one hand, the gate of ethnic conflict and separatism was wide open. The system has indeed encouraged ethnicity and ethnic violence since those willing to either suppress their minorities or, on the contrary, to place their bids for separation on the power of arms, could expect support from either side of global rivalry. On the other hand, the attitude of the international community, as embodied in the United Nations, towards ethnic issues, lost coherence and was filled with inconsistency. Certain demands for separation were approved, while certain others were denied.

The role of the international community at the present is somewhat ambivalent, as is scandalously demonstrated by the plight of Bosnia. There is indeed no doubt at all that the hesitance and vacillations of the system, due to the failure of big powers to come up with a coherent and common position and to stand by it with determination and commitment, have contributed to the disastrous course of events and the devastating consequences of the war in Bosnia. The situation in Kosovo, which was at the root of the whole conflict in the former Yugoslavia, is not different. In the view of a major American political scientist, it is the 'reservoir of disillusionment and sense of betrayal (on the part of the international system) that explains the growing support among Albanians for the militant separatist Kosovo liberation army' (Caplan, 1998).

The failure of the international system to articulate a coherent policy toward ethnic conflicts may be explained by the nature of the system in the post Cold War era. Simply put, the system has become uni-polar, but more aloof and distant from real international problems, unless interests of big powers are directly involved. A mix of hegemony and a crisis of leadership is infecting the system with ineptitude and paralysis, especially when solutions to international problems demand sizeable investment of material and moral resources. Ethnic conflicts are generally ignored unless they touch on the serious interests of big powers. Otherwise, these conflicts are regarded as irrational 'self-

inflicted damage', where little could be done to prevent it. From the vantage point of the international system, however, the 'challenge of ethnicity is competing with the nuclear challenge to international peace and security' (Maynes, 1993).

The democratisation of the international system is the proper answer to the challenge of proliferating ethnic conflicts. And global participation should constitute a crucial aspect of the struggle for inter-ethnic peace and for global peace at large.

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THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN POLITICAL RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

By Roel Meijer and Ruud Peters

1. Introduction

In Western political systems, the express combination of politics and religion is looked upon with suspicion. Nevertheless, there are political parties who claim that they derive their inspiration from Christian notions. For them, however, this is not the exclusive source of legitimacy and, with the exception of some very small and insignificant parties, their aim is not to create an exclusively Christian Biblical state. The Middle East, in this respect, is different. Here we find a type of political movements which aims at establishing states based on religious ideas.

In this chapter, we will deal with the role of violence in religious movements and its ideological, sociological and economic background. The role of violence is situated within a classic SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) analysis of political religious movements. This type of analysis is usually made for business firms, but is also applicable to political movements. The first part of the chapter will deal with the assets (Strengths) of political religious movements: their ideological attraction, mobilisational capabilities, organisational strength, basic integration in society, etc., which give these movements different options to choose their tactics and strategies from. Many of these assets are inherently part of these movements, others depend on historical, political and economic situations that have arisen during the past decades and have enhanced the role these movements can play in the Middle East. Basically equivocation and ambivalence are the strong points of political religious movements. The role of violence will be analysed within this context.

The second part of the chapter will deal with the liabilities (Weaknesses) of political religious movements. It will show that the same elements which work in favour of these movements can turn against them. After demonstrating the ideological legitimation of violence in Islam and in Judaism, the second part will show how the assets of these movements, mentioned above, can lead to communal strife, internal dissent and splits, and political revolutionary upheavals. The main argument is that political religious movements are not well equipped to adopt a political role on account of their ideological vagueness and their character as anti-political movements. Basically, they are not able to control expressions of violence which they have ideologically supported, and eventually, in most cases, this violence will turn against them.

The third part of the chapter will focus on how the special combination of Strengths and Weaknesses of these movements have led to alliances with the state and how they have had adverse consequences for both the state and the movement. A distinction is made between three forms of alliances: short term tactical alliances, long term strategic alliances and finally cross border regional and international alliances. In the last part of the chapter, a SWOT analysis of Opportunities and Threats of religious political movements is made. It will demonstrate that the state is a basic Threat to the movement as a whole. Democracy constitutes the main Opportunity for the future of political religious movements.

2. Assets of Political Religious Movements

2.1 The Advantages of Populism

One of the most important assets of political religious movements is that they do not define their political goals carefully. The main goal of political religious movements is to mobilise their following against moral corruption from which they argue all the evils of society derive, whether they are economic underdevelopment, political repression or social inequality and deprivation. The solution they propose is both simple and appealing: as long as everyone lives a virtuous life according to religious moral values, politics will be superfluous. Therefore, one will look in vain for sophisticated methods to control political power. If political programmes exist, these are often covert, as broad and vague as possible, in order not to disturb the internal harmony and unity on which political religious movements are based.

The vagueness as well as the all-encompassing character of the ideology of the Islamist movement are apparent in statements made by the first leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna (died in 1949), who called the Brotherhood in 1935 'A Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic club, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea' (Mitchell, 1969: 14).

Political religious movements in the Middle East, especially the Islamist movement, have as their main political aim to act as the moral and spiritual conscience of political parties and politicians, who by profession sully their hands. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood presented itself as the alternative, perfect, harmonious society and tried to play a role as 'civil protector' even after the military had taken over in 1952 (Mitchell, 1969: 110). According to modern critics such as Olivier Roy, this attitude towards politics of the Brotherhood epitomises the inability of Islamist politics to separate religious, legal and political spheres and reserve an autonomous space for politics as such, with its own rules, its positive laws and own values (Roy, 1994: 13).

The basic mistrust of politics of the Brotherhood has directly enhanced the populist character of the Islamist movement which denies internal divisions and rejects political debate as *fitna*. Islamic society, according to most Islamist leaders, has no need of representatives of the people or laws that regulate the peaceful solution of differences of interests and opinion in society. Leaders and followers are one and the leaders do not have to be controlled (Addi,1992; 1995: 101), or if they are forced to account for themselves then only through vague institutions as the Shura Council (Consultative Council). Not surprisingly, the success of Islamist movements owes much to the charisma of its leaders (Goldberg, 1981: 87). Even those scholars more sympathetic to the Islamist trend, such as Eickelman and Piscatori, agree that the politics of the Islamist movement mostly deals with symbols and values and less with solution of interests and conflicts (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 11). Only recently have democratic notions been elaborated theoretically (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991; Krämer, 1997).

The same arguments apply to Jewish religious movements. Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), established in 1974, also subsumes politics under religion and keeps its overall goals vague. Gush Emunim's messianistic enthusiasm of redemption has resulted in an extreme equivocation concerning three critical political issues: the Palestinians, democracy and the rule of law (Sprinzak, 1999: 154-155). In practice, Gush Emunim judged all pragmatic or moral considerations according to one messianistic criterion: will the matter at hand delay or hasten the process of complete redemption of the Jewish people? (Aran, 1991: 292).

2.2 Authenticity and Identity versus Politics

Another important asset of political religious movements is that they focus on the issue of identity and the search for authenticity (Esposito and Voll, 1996). The Islamist movement grew in the 1970s and 1980s out of the conviction that secular and 'imported' Western ideologies and models of development had failed. Not just political and economic independence but cultural independence as well was regarded as a precondition for development and equality with the rest of the world (Burgat, 1988, 1995; Meijer, 1989). In this sense, the Islamist movement regards itself as the third phase of the nationalist struggle of achieving independence and regaining its cultural authenticity from colonial and Western domination. It has managed to portray itself as the only remaining credible alternative to all other ideologies - secular nationalism, socialism, communism - which have failed to achieve their goals because they were alien.

In addition, as opposed to most worldy secular political movements with their limited goals of human welfare, religious movements are able to tap deep psychological and social feelings of human existence. By mobilising these feelings, they can spur their following on to far greater levels of commitment, sacrifice and martyrdom than their

opponents. In this respect, they resemble nationalist movements which also demand sacrifices of life because the identity and existence of their adherents are dependent on the well-being of their community (Smith, 1991, 1995, 1997).

Analogous to the Islamist movement, Gush Emunim and the Jewish right wing have succeeded in claiming to represent the next step in the evolution to redemption and liberation of the Jewish people of which secular Zionism constituted the first step. The movement had its origins in the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva led by Rabbi Abraham Kook (died in 1935), the first chief rabbi of Jewish settlement in Palestine, and his son Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook (died in 1982), the mentor of Gush Emunim. According to the Kookist doctrine, Zionism and Israel are part of a divine plan and represent sacred expressions of messianic redemption (Don Yehiya, 1994: 267). The call for a cultural revolution accompanied Gush Emunim's claim to be the saviour of the nation. As opposed to 'Westoxication', it offered 'Torah Zionism' and 'Zionism of redemption' (Aran, 1991: 277).

2.3 Tapping Widespread Social and Economic Dissatisfaction

Political religious movements have also been highly successful in mobilising social and economic dissatisfaction during the last two decades. The failure of the more secular oriented governments which acquired power during the 1950s and 1960s to deliver on their promises to provide a life of dignity has created a huge reservoir of discontent for oppositional groups to play on (Tessler, 1997). The massive problems the Middle East has been facing during the last two decades in terms of population growth, unemployment, rapid urbanisation, rural pauperisation, and a general decline of income, have led to widespread discontent especially among the Arab youth. Their anger is directed against the Arab regimes which have suffered a dramatic decline of legitimacy. Disillusionment with their prospects for the future have led to regular widespread riots from Morocco to Jordan. Structural adjustment programmes of the IMF, privatisation and other measures by the IMF, although necessary economically, usually in the short run only enhance the problems of unemployment.

The fact that the Islamist movement was the first and foremost victim of repression by secular nationalist movements such as the FLN (Front Libération National) in Algeria, Nasserism in Egypt and the Ba'th in Syria and Iraq and that the Islamist movement never was responsible for the economic disastrous policies of the present regimes, has enhanced their appeal as the only alternative. The politically untarnished aspect of the Islamist movement, in combination with the vagueness of its ideology and the economic and social malaise in the region, has made it an extremely potent force which can mobilise all sorts of interests and grievances which do not necessarily have to have a religious base.

2.4 Strong Internal Solidarity and Control

Political religious movements also derive their strength from the strong feelings of solidarity they instil in their following. Because the ultimate goal is to enhance and maintain religiously sanctioned morality or achieve messianistic redemption rather than limited secular political goals, political religious movements usually exert far-reaching control over the individual adherents' private life, which is subsumed under communal imperatives.

For example, the Muslim Brotherhood became a close knit organisation in which individuals' lives were strongly controlled by the organisation after its reorganisation into a 'family system' (*usra*) at the end of the 1930s. Hierarchically and centrally led, it exerted a power few secular movements could compete with. When it re-emerged in the 1970s, the Egyptian government did not allow it to organise itself to the same degree as before, but its radical offshoots resembled sects in their control of their members and the all-powerful role of the religious and secular guide, the *amir* (Ibrahim, 1980, 1996).

In contrast, the Gush Emunim seemed to have been less well organised, exerting its influence on its members through its strict moral and social control. As such, Gush Emunim and its successors were, however, more than just a movement, they were a whole culture as well as a self-sustaining community with shared behavioural norms, encompassing all aspects of life (Aran, 1991: 303).

2.5 Organisational Integration in Society

Another explanation for the strength of political religious movements derives from the fact that they are, to a large extent, integrated into society through the existence and widespread network of officially sanctioned pre-existing religious institutions. Whether they are churches, mosques, or Talmud schools (*yeshivot*), they are part of the religious life of society, and these networks can be used by political religious movements to spread their ideas, activities and networks throughout society. These institutions are very difficult for authorities to suppress and provide a sanctioned space for the organisation of their activities.

In the absence of an independent organisational structure, socialisation and recruitment within the religious Zionist camp were carried out by institutions, especially the religious Zionist educational system led by the nationalist *yeshivot* which originated in the Mercaz Harav yeshiva of the ideological founder of the Gush Emunim, Rabbi Abraham Kook (Don Yehiya, 1995: 286).

In the Islamic world, it is well known that mosques function as the institutional background and backbone of the Islamist movement. The *ahli* mosques (privately

owned mosques in contrast to state run mosques) are the recruitment centres for members and the place where they congregate and organise their activities. Despite efforts of the state to control all the mosques, their numbers are too vast and the financial means of the authorities too restricted to control all the activities in mosques throughout the country. Each wave of confiscation of mosques is followed by a new wave of building independent mosques.

Moreover, religious institutions allow political religious movements to show their benevolent character. The provision of social welfare, health services, and educational practices through officially sanctioned religious institutions have allowed political religious movements the means to attract adherents and propagate their ideas and ideals through example. The potential danger of the establishment of a religious infrastructure as a state-within-a-state is usually not recognised by the authorities until an incident occurs that shows the political ambitions of the movement.

This does not mean that all or even a majority of these types of activities are run by political religious movements (Clark, 1995; Sullivan, 1995). Most of these institutions are under the aegis of the quietist section of religious movements which is opposed to politics: in Egypt by religious NGOs and in Israel by the ultra-orthodox. But even if these activities are not directly under the subservience of political religious movements, their impact on the increasing religiosity of society can enhance the general atmosphere conducive to more expansively inclined political religious movements. Their separate but integrated spaces in society constitute an important basis for the power of the political religious movements and their political content can be vary, depending on the circumstances.

2.6 Social Integration into Society

The ambivalence of political religious movements towards the society they operate in allows them to be half dependent on and half independent from that society. Gush Emunim, for example, worked separately from the establishment but competed with it, aspiring to lead it (Aran, 1991: 303).

The same applies to members of the Islamist movement, especially its moderate wing in Egypt (Bayat, 1998). The older generation of the Muslim Brotherhood almost everywhere belongs to the respected members of the community who play important roles as business men, lawyers and shopkeepers. Many of the younger generation were recruited on the campuses of universities and their leaders became active members and leaders of professional organisations in the 1980s. During this time, the younger generation started to make inroads into Egypt's associational life (Zaki, 1994: 43-45). Especially the elite associations of the free professions were their focus of attention (Rosefsky Wickham, 1997: 122-130). Their victory in the 1992 elections of the Lawyers Syndicate provoked the government to stop their progress and clamp down on these

organisations. The same trend of taking over professional organisations is apparent in other countries. In Jordan, the Islamists control the Journalists' and Engineers' Syndicate (Milton-Edwards, 1996), in Palestine, Hamas has achieved a comparable series of victories during the past years. Among the middle classes, the moderate Islamist has been most successful in winning adherents.

2.7 Flexibility of Tactics and Strategies

This finally leads us to the main reasons for the strength of religious political movements: their flexibility in choosing the means of attaining their goals of establishing a religious society and a religious state. All the above-mentioned assets of the movement (integration in society, ideological claims to authenticity, psychological support of existing communal feelings, and reformulation of prevalent ideals and values, the negation of internal social differences and differences of interests, etc.) provide political religious movements with tremendous advantages. These assets give them the edge over other political movements by providing them with a larger choice of options.

The first option for political religious movements is the gradualist, quietist strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people through education and social welfare. This strategy is directed at the conversion of individuals and establishing a religious society before acquiring political power and taking over the state, which will take place automatically.

The second option is to adopt an overt political stance by becoming a pressure group in order to achieve the goal of implementing an Islamic constitution, as was the case with the Islamist movement in the Sudan in the 1950s and 1960s, or retaining the Occupied Territories, as is the case with the Jewish political movements. The next step on this road is to take part in the political process through party politics, a step which, as we have seen, is against the grain of religious movements - with their distrust of politics and their basic communal and populist attitude. However, this step has been taken in some countries when the opportunity arose in the 1980s, for example, by the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan in 1989 and 1993, the National Islamic Front (NIF) in the Sudan in 1986, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in Algeria in 1990 and 1991, and the Muslim Brotherhood in coalition with legalised political parties in Egypt in 1984 and 1987. If this direction is taken, the stakes of the game are greatly raised because the chances of confrontation with the state due to the ambivalent character of the movement are high. In Israel, the political religious movement has been able to exert decisive influence on politics through political parties.

The final option is to seek a direct violent confrontation with the state, by trying to overthrow the state and implement a religious society from above. This last option, naturally, carries the greatest risks, because the whole project of the political religious movement and all its previous efforts to establish a religious infrastructure (education,

health, social welfare, networks) and expand it, is put into jeopardy. Although political religious movements do have a proneness to violence which can easily be legitimised, this option is usually used with great care in countries in which the political religious movement has acquired considerable stakes because it can bring down the wrath of the government, destroying the results of years or even decades of efforts, arresting its most promising leaders and imprisoning its members, with the result that whole project is set back decades.

3. Liabilities of Political Religious Movements

If many of the characteristics of the political religious movements work in their favour, they also contain liabilities (Weaknesses) which undermine those advantages (Strengths). Political religious movements, certainly in unstable political situations, economic disparity and cultural upheaval, contain the seeds of their dissolution on account of their own contradictions. The main disadvantages and liabilities of the movements stem from their legitimation of violence. Violence, however, has provoked heated debates and internal conflicts because, in the end, only a very small minority is willing to take a road that can lead to loss of life of large members of its own community.

3.1 Islamic Legitimation of Violence

The moral supremacy political religious movements derive from having a God-given truth allows for a certain degree of intolerance towards those who do not hold the same faith. It also can lead to a strong condemnation of dissension and difference of opinion within the community of the faithful on essential matters relating to religion and politics. The negation of an autonomous space to politics by political religious movements makes it difficult to make compromises and accept internal dissent. As violence against 'infidels' and 'deviants' has been religiously sanctioned in holy texts, it is easier to use violence against enemies of the faith. In classical Islam, the use of violence was only sanctioned against unbelievers. Revolt against the unjust ruler was condemned as leading to *fitna* (strife). In the attempt to expand the territory of Islam it has been justified to wage a war of *jihad* against the infidel (Peters, 1979).

Modern Islamist movements have used the doctrine of *jihad* against Western colonial powers and especially against Zionism which occupied Muslim territory. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood openly propagated *jihad* against the British occupier in the struggle along the Suez Canal in 1951 and against Zionists during Palestinian revolt in 1936-39 and again during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 (Greshoni, 1986). The armed units of the Brotherhood, the Battalions (*Kat'ib*), were organised especially for this purpose (Mitchell, 1969: 58). Contemporary Islamist movements, such as the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad have legitimised the use of violence on the same

grounds against Israel (Legrain, 1991, 1994, 1997). Especially in its use against military targets, violence is widely accepted in principle. Whether it is wise to do so, considering the political fall-out and the long term consequences for the Islamist movement, is another matter. Hizbollah largely derives its popularity and its support among large sections of the Lebanese population outside the Shi'ite community through its religiously sanctioned struggle against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon (Ranstorp 1998; Norton, 1998; Kramer, 1993). However, even these acts of violence have given rise to conscientious internal debates between religious scholars and have not been easily accepted (Kramer, 1993).

More controversial is the use of violence against internal enemies. Taking foreign hostages in Lebanon by Hizbollah at the beginning of the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war was regarded as highly dubious in religious terms (Kramer, 1993). But far more hotly contested is violence aimed against fellow Muslims, which can only be legitimised by declaring them infidels (*takfir*). Since the strengthening of the legitimation of the principle of *takfir* by Sayyid Qutb in his work of the 1960s, considered the major watershed in Islamist doctrine, a pandora's box of violence has been opened which has led to the severe theoretical clashes and a general ideological crisis in the Muslim world. Eventually these debates laid the modern theoretical foundations for the split between moderates, on the one hand, whose goal is to Islamise the morals of society gradually and peacefully, and radicals or revolutionaries, on the other hand, who are in favour of sudden change by seizing political power violently and imposing an Islamic society forcefully from above (Kepel, 1986; Peters, 1986). For the first time, the assassination of Muslim opponents and governments as well as full-scale civil war could be legitimised on Islamic grounds.

The radical current has given rise to violent movements which wage war against the state, such as the GIA (Groupements islamiques armés) and MIA (Mouvement islamique armé) in Algeria and the Munazzamat al-Jihad and the Gama'at al-Islamiyya in Egypt, as well as numerous other less well-known groups in almost every Muslim country in the Middle East. Another ideological sub-species of the radical movement has been to retreat (*hijra*) from un-Islamic (*jahiliyya*) with the intention to conquer it when the time is ripe and the movement is strong (Ibrahim, 1980; Kepel, 1986). Although the second form does not in principle pursue violent means to achieve its goals but rather tries to avoid violence, it did lead to the violent confrontation with the Egyptian state and the death of a minister taken hostage. Not surprisingly, these more sectarian and violent groups also perpetrate violence against each other, claiming the monopoly over truth.

The romantic view of the mujahidin who struggled for the 'cause of God' (*fi sabil Allah*) acquired a new meaning during the Afghan war which erupted when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979. It gave *jihad* a new dimension as a guerrilla war, as well as providing it with a training ground for an international network of recruits

from all over the Islamic world who were later to prove their expertise in their home countries (Rubin, 1997). Bouyali's guerrilla in Algeria in the 1980s against the government had the same romantic resonance among the young and deprived who were looking for new ideals and models of resistance and identity (Labat, 1995: 90-94). The international dimension of the Islamic struggle was apparent from the popularity of Afghan baggy trousers during the Algerian civil war after 1992.

3.2 Jewish Legitimation of Violence

As in the case of Muslim violence, Jewish religious violence was at a certain point in time also directed against the own state. In the case of Gush Emunim, violence against the state, however, was restricted because even the secular state was given an essential role to play in leading the Jews to redemption by conquering all the land of Biblical Israel. Peaceful opposition against the state was more easily legitimised as members of the movement regarded themselves as possessing a higher authority and a deeper understanding of the nation than the leaders of the established political parties (Aran, 1991: 281). In their view, Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Gaza are subject only to religious imperatives. When opposition against the state did erupt, after Camp David, it first took on the form of civil disobedience and extra-parliamentary tactics: hunger strikes, demonstrations, and direct clashes with the government at the Yamit settlement in the Sinai (Sprinzak, 1999: 175).

Violence was mostly directed against Palestinians and adopted the form of vigilante violence. It evolved naturally out of the ideology of Eretz Israel of Gush Emunim that did not recognise Palestinians as a nation and did not grant them collective rights to the land which was regarded as given to the Jews. A vigilante movement never sees itself in a state of principled conflict, either with the government or with the prevailing concept of the law. Rather, the vigilante state of mind is characterised by a profound conviction that the government, or some other agencies, have failed to enforce the law or to establish order in an area under its jurisdiction. Backed by the fundamental norm of self-defence and speaking in the name of what they believe to be the valid law of the land, vigilantes in effect enforce the law and execute justice. Due process is thus the least of their concerns. The Gush Emunim started with vandalism against the Arab population ending in wounding and killing (Sprinzak, 1993: 474). The ultimate use of violence was sanctioned during the Intifada when the Yesha Council of Rabbis ruled that shooting Palestinian attackers was legitimate.

Organisations using violent methods both against the state and the Palestinians were limited and consisted of several individuals such as the Jewish underground which adhered to notions of active redemption and revolutionary messianic violence (Sprinzak, 1999: 167-169). In the early 1980s, this organisation launched a plan to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock situated on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in the hope of facilitating the coming of the Messiah (Sprinzak, 1993: 475).

Violence has been heavily debated within the Jewish nationalist religious movement, especially the Rabbis, whose religiously legitimising role has been important. Significantly, the Temple Mount Operation plan was shelved because none of the rabbis consulted approved of the idea (Don Yehiya,1994: 283). Later attacks on Palestinian mayors (1981) and the Islamic College in Hebron (1983), also committed by members of the underground, were, however, sanctioned by Rabbis of the Kiryat Arba settlement (Sprinzak, 1999: 171).

Rabbinical debates in the 1980s on the legitimacy of using violence centred around the question of whether a person has the right to violate the laws of the state or to exercise force in resisting their implementation when they contravene the principle of Eretz Israel or the unlimited right to settle anywhere on that land (Don Yehiya, 1994: 275). The extremists in this debate were prepared to risk their lives and utilise all means short of bloodshed to resist the state in the case of evacuation of the settlements. Moderates, on the other hand, argued that efforts should focus on propaganda and persuasion. They severely criticised the extremists, such as the pursuers of the Temple Mount Operation, because they tried to impose their will on the state and its institutions. Moderates made a distinction between permissible and forbidden acts, illegal acts being permitted on condition that they do not arouse the hostility of the public and do not involve violence and deviation from the laws of morality, or force the government and public into a situation in which choices are forced upon them (Don Yehiya, 1994: 279-280).

Open violence was only propagated by the right wing and forbidden the Kach Party, which sanctioned and even hallowed the use of violence. Its violence was mostly directed against Gentiles and was justified out of a sense of revenge for crimes committed against the Jews in the past. The leader of Kach Party, Meir Kahane, who was assassinated in New York in 1990, believed that all violence against non-Jews was justified. His influence on those groups which have resisted the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 has been tremendous. Then, for the first time the call was heard for a massive rebellion against the state which, in the eyes of the religious right, was unlawful and did not have the authority to give away land. In a desperate attempt to sabotage the peace process and change the course of history through a dramatic act of bringing about a catastrophic redemption, Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 Palestinians praying at the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron in 1994. Later, in protest against plans to dismantle the settlement of Tel Rumaida, in the centre of Hebron, several Rabbis called upon soldiers to disobey army orders. Finally, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin could take place because the Rabbi Yesha's Council permitted it on Halakhic grounds, arguing that he had to be stopped from committing or facilitating bloodshed (*din rodef*) and from providing Gentiles with Jewish property or information that might harm the Jews (*din moser*). *Din rodef* is the only case in which the Halakha allows Jews to kill another Jew without a trial. The massive resistance of Rabbis and settlers against the peace process

provided the background for the assassination of premier Rabin on November 4, 1995, by Yigal Amir (Sprinzak, 1999: 243-254).

3.3 Enhancing Communal Strife

Apart from the ideological legitimation of violence, violence also ensues from factors inherent to political religious movements and the special circumstances in which they operate in the Middle East. For instance, the asset of communalism which enhances the internal feelings of solidarity, political cohesion, and sacrifice, at the same time can also lead to ethnic strife with other groups. In Egypt, sectarian strife (*al-fitna al-ta'ifiyya*) between Muslims and Copts is the direct result of the Islamic resurgence in the 1970s and the downgrading of Copts as secondary citizens (Heikal, 1983). The Islamists insisted that the discriminatory provisions of the *shari'a* be applied and argued that violence was permitted against them whenever they acted in conflict with certain restrictions imposed upon them by the shari'a, such as the prohibition of carrying arms. Although the present violence in Upper-Eypt between Muslims and Copts seems to have many origins, the rise of the radical Islamist movement has exacerbated the relations between the two religious communities. Likewise, in Algeria, the rise of the FIS at the beginning of the 1990s has led to increasing tensions between Arabs and Berbers who fear the process of Arabisation which has accompanied the process of Islamisation. In the Sudan, the adoption of an Islamic constitution in 1983 and the coming to power of the NIF in 1989 has led to a further deterioration of relations with the Christian south. And in Israel, relations between secular Jews, Christian denominations, and political religious Jews have become severely strained on account of the growing influence of the latter in politics. In general, the increased sense of communality has stimulated intolerance, leading to outbursts of violence.

An example of increased communal violence as a result of the rise of political religious movements is the violence perpetrated by Jewish radical religious movements. After the Camp David Accords the Movement to Stop Withdrawal from the Sinai formed the background for series of terrorist attacks against Arab institutions and Palestinians mayors. A new phase in Jewish-Arab violence in the West Bank was opened with the Intifada in 1987, the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories which drew more Gush Emumin activists into the cycle of violence. The Intifada has strengthened ethnic loyalties and xenophobic tendencies among many Jews that led them to support any programme which is anti-Arab (Liebman, 1993: 74). The settlers thereafter shifted their focus of confrontation with the Israeli government to confrontation with the neighbouring Arab population (Aran, 1991: 285). Settler vigilantism became the order of the day and was sanctioned by the movement's Rabbis on religious grounds, leading to the killings of Palestinians in the al-Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron (Usher, 1995).

The search for identity and authenticity, which enhances communal feeling and can be benign, also limits or cuts off relations with the outside world. In the case of the Islamist

movement, the secular or Christian West is regarded as the major source of corruption and threat of indigenous, communal values. The stress on identity threatening aspects of international relations can lead to nativist tendencies. Gush Emunim and other Jewish political religious movements, regard other nations of the world as avowed enemies of Israel, who persecute the Jewish people and plot its destruction (Don Yehiya, 1993: 271). Particularism favours militant policies because it internalises negative images of foreign nations, cultures and religions. This applies to all political religious movements, whether Christian, Jewish or Muslim.

3.4 Liability of Dissent and Internal Strife

If the vagueness of the political programme of political religious movements is able to tap the general aversion to politics and is regarded as a Strength, it will also turn against itself, for sooner or later, if the movement does not limit itself completely to the quietist option, it becomes involved in politics and has to make political choices. At a certain stage, contradictory economic and political interests will erupt and destroy the facade of internal harmony so essential for the success of the movement. In Islamist movements, due to a lack of attention to procedures, a lack of democratic traditions and stress on maintaining unity, internal democracy is mostly completely lacking and internal debates are suppressed.

The history of Islamist movements is rife with splits and infighting. The immediate effect of their ambivalence is that they have been continuously plagued by infighting and defections on the issue of the official political line and direction (Mitchell, 1969: 39). This happened with the Muslim Brotherhood for the first time in 1939 when a major dispute ensued as a result of Hasan al-Banna's relations with conservative politicians (Mitchell, 1969: 18). It erupted again in 1947 over the relations with the Wafd party (Mitchell, 1969: 53-54) and gained in power and ferocity under Hasan al-Banna's successor, Hasan al-Hudaybi, whose legitimacy as General Guide was disputed. As recently as the 1990s, members of the younger generation have split off from the Muslim Brotherhood to establish their own political party, al-Wasat, because they refused to succumb to the general rule of 'listening and obeying' (*sam' wa ta'a*) which was still the rule in the Brotherhood (Meijer, 1997).

Ideological vagueness also poses other organisational and political problems which endanger the organisation. Whereas, on the one hand, an organisation like the Muslim Brotherhood before 1954 could tolerate different currents and sections to function within the movement as long as they accepted the authority of the leader, on the other hand, this tolerance allowed the existence of sections which pursued violent means. The Special Section of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated judge Khazindar, set fire to public buildings and bombed Jewish possessions in the 1940s. The existence of the armed wing jeopardised the whole movement when it assassinated prime-minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948 and attempted the assassination of Nasser in 1954. It provided the

authorities with ample reason to ban the movement in its entirety. Only by rejecting violence in principle in the 1970s could the Brotherhood gain a semi-legal status. By then, the ambiguity of the movement was so common that it could be used by the state whenever it wanted to discredit the movement by pointing to its violent past.

3.5 The Dangers of Sectarian Violence

Internal violence, however, is more in evidence with the smaller sectarian religious organisations which control their members much more strongly than the larger organisations. Violence in their case is mostly defensive and directed towards the own group to ensure cohesion. For example, in Egypt in the 1970s, the Society of Muslims of Shukri Mustafa, acted like a sect. Its members, of whom total commitment was demanded, were indoctrinated and re-socialised by severing all their ties with the outside world (Ibrahim, 1980). All those members who did not swear allegiance to the Society of Muslims were excommunicated and considered *kuffar*, unbelievers, punishable by death (Kepel, 1986).

This type of sectarian internal violence occurs in Jewish religious groups mostly among the ultra-orthodox. Most of the violence of the Haredim, the oldest religious segment of Israel's Jews, whose roots go back to the traditional eastern European Jewish ghetto, is exercised in self-defence and is directed against other Haredim within the ultra-orthodox society. Those who do not conform to the strict norms imposed by the rabbis are exposed to legitimate violent sanctions. Many acts of violence take place on the basis of hearsay. Chastity Guards see to it that members of the Haredi community live according to its rules. As long as Haredi violence is conducted within ultra-orthodox community, as most of it is, it rarely gets more than scant attention in the secular community (Sprinzak, 1993: 466). The Haredim rarely attack others in order to directly expand their sphere of influence or power. Exceptions are violence used against archaeological digs which are conducted in Jewish cemeteries, and the building of roads through or adjacent to ultra-orthodox neighbourhoods that are not closed on Shabbath (Sprinzak, 1999: 87-112).

3.6 The Pitfalls of the Politics of Discontent

The enormous potential which political religious movements have acquired of mobilising the dissatisfaction with existing economic, political and cultural situations in the Middle East has put an enormous responsibility in their hands that most are unable to handle. Some religious political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which have experienced the consequences of this responsibility in the past, are weary of using its full potential and have mostly limited their following to the middle classes of Cairo and northern Egypt and the culturally and geographically hegemonic sections of society (Fandy, 1994). Their capitalist and conservative political bias as well as their deal with the Mubarak government in the 1980s has also limited their scope and power of

mobilising the really discontented. Rather its function was to dampen and potential radical movements such as the Jama'at al-Islamiyya of the universities, thereby confirming the split between moderates and radicals which had been established since Sayyid Qutb (Auda, 1994).

In Algeria, where the movement grew in a very short time and almost conquered political power through the communal elections of 1990 and the parliamentary elections of 1991, the strength of the FIS derived largely from its ability to mobilise the general discontent with the government and all those sections and groups of society that were not enthusiastic Islamists but rather hated the existing political system and the FLN government. The results were disastrous. Although the FIS was able to contain the violent tendency and reign in all the different currents of the Algerian Islamist movement - conservatives, militants, activists, guerrilla fighters, and those who accepted a multi-party system, as well as all those with different economic and social backgrounds and interests - it was impossible to contain the diversity of interests once the military cancelled the last elections. The result was that the movement split into moderates and radicals when violence gained the upper hand.

The only movement that has been successful in mobilising as well as containing social and economic discontent is Hizbollah in Lebanon. Hizbollah has been able to attract its following among different sections of the Shi'ite population by organising social welfare services for the deprived members of the community of Beirut and Southern Lebanon, giving room for militancy by directing its violent actions against an external enemy, and pursuing greater integration of the Shi'ite community into Lebanon as a whole by participating in the general elections in 1992 and 1996. In this way violence and radicalism, originating in social deprivation of the community, has been contained and has not turned against the organisation itself (Ranstorp, 1998; Norton, 1998). For Hizbollah this challenge was of course much easier than for the FIS as it applied to a much smaller community over a longer period and not a nation as whole.

3.7 The Drawbacks of the Politics of Ambivalence

Finally, the very fact of having so many options of pursuing political goals, without rejecting completely, ideologically and politically, the violent option, has laid Islamist and Jewish political religious movements open to the accusation of being untrustworthy in their intentions. Governments have continuously been able to pose the question of whether these movements are revolutionary, militant, subversive, aiming to topple the government, or quiescent, benevolent and moral supports of existing society on account of their propagation of conservative social and cultural morals. Are distinctions between quiescent, political and violent movements really that important, or can they move effortlessly back and forth between their options, showing at each opportunity the face they would like to portray? Although the state is the first to pose these questions, it is as

much to blame for the ambivalence of political religious movements and hypocritically denounces these movements when it seems fit.

4. Relations with the State

4.1 Introduction: Mutual Distrust

On account of the above-mentioned special mixture of assets and liabilities of political religious movements, it stands to reason that the relations between them and the state are highly ambivalent. In fact, the ambivalence of ideological content (rejecting politics but practising it) and the equivocation of political means (the many choices between means to achieve power) is carried over to the relationship with the state. In its turn, the state in the Arab countries has heightened the ambivalence of the relationship by using political religious movements for its own highly divergent and mixed purposes, alternately stressing the benevolent non-political social side of these movements or their violent side, depending on the stage of their relationship. Considering the totalitarian and repressive character of most states in the Middle East, it is no wonder that the Islamist movement keeps its options open.

Basically neither side, even at the height of co-operation, trusts the other: the state does not have faith in a movement that lays claim to moral superiority, and projects itself as the saviour of the nation and the protector of its conscience; a movement whose authority derives directly from heaven and therefore explicitly or implicitly withholds recognition of the state and denies its legitimacy and the sanctity of its secular laws. On the other hand, political religious movements do not trust the state as long as its policy is based on power politics and repression. They realise that the only reason why the state is inclined to make a deal is to prolong its power.

In practice, both parties use their highly ambivalent and unstable relationship for their own purposes. However, sooner or later, as Richard Mitchell already observed, both parties will clash on account of the incompatibility of their styles and interests. In answer to the inevitable accusation of political corruption and wheeling and dealing of state leaders who do not sanction their politics on religious law, the state will accuse political religious movements, like the Islamic movement with its slogan 'Islam is the Solution', of hypocritical obfuscation of their political and economic interests, hiding their true intentions behind a religious facade and acting as 'peddlers in religion' (*tujjar al-din*), or if they are Marxist inclined, spreading a 'false consciousness'. For the state it is easy to find reasons to repress the Islamist movement as there is enough historical and contemporary material proving their involvement in violence. For instance, the eruption of violence in Algeria after 1992 has helped the Egyptian government to justify the repression of the peacefully inclined Muslim Brotherhood, the coup d'état in 1989 by the NIF in the Sudan has 'proven' that the Islamist movement's ultimate goals is to

gain power by any means, even though it took part in the parliamentary elections of 1986.

Apart from these confrontations, political religious movements and the state will also clash on account of the opposing economic and political interests. Except in the case of Israel where political religious movements have been integrated into the state, most Middle Eastern states have been separate from the Islamist movements and have therefore other personnel and other interests than the leaders and members of the Islamist movement. Even if ideological differences are not that great, differences of interest will endanger the co-operation. As most channels for solving the opposing interests are closed, the clash of interests will lead to repression, civil war or, on rare occasions, a victory of the political religious movement.

4.2 Tactical Alliances

The most common policy the state adopts towards political religious movements is to use them as temporary allies against the state's direct political opponents. Different forms of alliances have occurred, depending on the strength of the state, its legitimacy and the nature of its allies.

The alliance will be tactical and temporary when the state has lost its legitimacy, but has retained its repressive power and is looking for an ally against its mostly secular liberal or left-wing enemies. This was the case in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s, when the Palace believed it could use the Muslim Brotherhood against the Wafd party and the communists. It occurred again during the 1970s when president Sadat cast the movement in the same role vis à vis his leftist and Nasserist opponents (Awda, 1994). In both cases, the policy backfired and had adverse consequences for both parties: when in 1948 the government discovered that the Brotherhood was more independent than it deemed prudent, they clashed, ultimately leaving a prime minister and Hasan al-Banna dead and the Brotherhood banned (Mitchell, 1969). Sought again as allies by the military in 1952 in order to establish their power, a new struggle arose, leading to the second banning of the Brotherhood. In the third round, after the release of the Brothers in the 1970s, Sadat clashed head on with the Islamist movement after he signed the peace treaty with Israel and realised that the movement had become a much more serious opponent than his former secular foes. Sadat's assassination in October 1981 seems to have been the outcome of his contradictory political, economic, and foreign policy of stimulating economic opening (*infitah*), establishing relations with the West and promoting himself as the 'president believer'. Ever since, the official policy was aimed at outdoing the Islamist movement by stimulating an official and 'soft' Islamisation of society. President Mubarak at first tried to integrate the 'moderates' and persecute the radical currents as a way to split and weaken the movement as a whole. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to participate in the parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987 in which it won an important number of seats in coalitions with other parties.

When Mubarak's policy failed in the 1990s, the old method of repression was applied and the state put an end to the promising democratic experiments of the 1980s which had stimulated new notions of Islamic democracy (Krämer, 1997). Typically, when the Egyptian government clamped down on the Brotherhood during the elections of 1995, it played on the ambivalent character of the Brotherhood, accusing it of being a 'terrorist' organisation which had not lost its former violent traits (Meijer, 1997).

Given the region's negative experiences with tactical alliances, it seems all the more surprising that the Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid pursued the same policy with the FIS. The outcome of the Algerian experiment was even more negative, leading to a civil war with heavy civilian casualties, which was the result of the fact that the Algerian state was in a much weaker position than its Egyptian counterpart (Kepel, 1995). Not only was it completely discredited on account of its corruption and mismanagement of the economy and its repressive politics, the Algerian state was also highly faction-ridden between those in favour of a complete overhaul of the state who supported a far-reaching liberalisation of the economy and IMF measures, and those in favour of retaining the FLN state (Roberts, 1994b). Chadli Bendjedid wanted to force the issue after the 1988 food riots by using the FIS against his rivals by allowing the FIS to become a legal party and to take part in the municipal elections of 1990 in the hope that it would weaken the FLN and force an opening. When he was unable to contain the FIS during the elections of 1991, he was pushed aside by the military. The result was the emergence of the violent option, which had now gained credibility as the only option left to remove the corrupt state (Roberts, 1994a).

If, in Egypt, the Islamist movement has paid the price of the tactical alliance and in Algeria all the parties involved lost out, in the case of the Sudan, the Islamist movement has succeeded in turning the tactical alliance to its advantage. The reason why the Sudanese Islamist movement succeeded where others failed, is that the Sudanese state under Nimeiry in the 1970s was even weaker than the other states in the Middle East. Suffering from the same lack of legitimacy to which all secular post-colonial states were subject, it invited the oppositional groups in 1977 to join the National Reconciliation. Only Hasan al-Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood made a long term alliance with the government, on condition that it would be allowed to freely expand its activities (Sidahmed, 1997). Between 1977 and the downfall of Nimeiry in 1985, the NIF was able to infiltrate the bureaucracy and the military and gain a majority among the student movement. In this way, it laid the basis for its military coup d'état in 1989, after having taken part in the elections of 1986 in which it temporarily put on a democratic face (Sidahmed, 1996). Before taking over power, it had built a strong position in the economy and in civil society (Hasan, 1990).

Perhaps the most cynical tactical alliance was the alliance between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. As the main opponent of the PLO, the Muslim Brotherhood was considered by the Israeli authorities to be suitable for

subsidies and support, a policy that was maintained during the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank until the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987. This policy was reversed when the Brotherhood founded Hamas, which turned against the occupation and pursued an armed struggle for liberation of Palestinian territory (Milton-Edwards, 1997; Usher, 1995).

Not every government has been inclined to make either a tactical or a strategic alliance. Syria and Tunisia are examples of a direct confrontation between the state and the Islamic movement. In Syria, the fact that the government was led by the Alawite minority, that the Muslim Brotherhood had been taken over by an irresponsible radical wing, and that the movement was limited to the Sunni minority and therefore was not able to mobilise the whole population against the regime - which retained its unity - led to disastrous long term results for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Banned since the bloodbath in Hama in 1982, in which between 5000 and 20,000 people died, the Brotherhood has not been able to practice any of its strategic options in Syria (Lobmeyer, 1995; Hinnebusch, 1996; Mayer, 1983).

4.3 Strategic Alliances

Are strategic alliances more successful than tactical alliances? The first important strategic alliance was established between the Hashemites and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the second between the Israeli state, especially the Likud governments, and the Gush Emunim and other radical political religious movements. Despite the mutual distrust that lingers between the partners and prevents a complete unity of purpose, these alliances are far more durable because they are based on mutual interests which reinforce each other.

In Jordan, the alliance goes all the way back to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1947 when King Abdallah welcomed the new conservative force as an ally against Palestinian and especially pan-Arab radicalism (al-Tahla, 1996). The difference with the Egyptian monarchy was that the Hashemites trusted and allowed the Brotherhood far more leeway and power than in Egypt in exchange for active support against its radical enemies who wanted to dissolve the Jordanian state. While in 1957 all political parties were suppressed, the Brotherhood, in a typical example of strategic flexibility, was allowed to continue its existence as a social welfare organisation registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. As a result, the Brotherhood has succeeded more than anywhere else in the Arab world in penetrating state agencies and taking the opportunity to build its vast infrastructure of schools, mosques and health care centres (Milton-Edwards, 1996). That King Hussein even supported the Brotherhood against the Syrian regime in its struggle with its Islamist opposition in the beginning of the 1980s demonstrates the extent and depth of the alliance (Satloff, 1986). Not surprisingly, when elections were held for the first time in 1989, the Islamists won 35 of the 80 seats in parliament and it adopted the principles of multi-party and

democratic system in the 1980s to a far greater degree than anywhere else in the Arab world (Robinson, 1997). The strategic alliance, which had lasted for more than forty years, however, ran into trouble when Jordan signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The Brotherhood, which had even established a separate political party in 1992, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), boycotted the elections in 1997.

The most important long term strategic alliance in the region exists in Israel between the Likud governments and Gush Emunim specifically and movements belonging to religious Zionism in general. This relationship is incomparable to any other relationship between the state and political religious movements in the region, because although the movement is extra-establishment or anti-establishment and poses a challenge to the centre, it essentially expresses the innermost impulses and inclinations of the establishment itself, constituting a cross section of Israel's central complex of ideas and values (Aran, 1991: 290). As such, the movement functions partly as an extended arm of the state; it implements policies of the Israeli state which it cannot acknowledge to the international community without being ostracised. Only after premier Netanyahu was elected prime minister in May 1996 has the special relationship been officially recognised and become standard policy, with dire consequences for Israel's international standing.

From the very outset, Gush Emunim's success depended on the sympathy and co-operation of non-religious Jews. These secularists were not influenced by Gush Emunim's religious programme or religious vision, only the coincidence of their goals and those of the religious nationalists was important (Liebman, 1984: 74). Ideological affiliation was limited to the Likud Party and its first leader, Menachim Begin, who used to refer to Gush Emunim as 'my dear children'. In the 1970s and 1980s, Gush Emunim became the kibbutz movement of the entire Israeli right, the exemplary pioneering elite that sets the standards of nationalism and patriotism (Aran, 1991: 301).

Despite these close relations with the establishment, both eye each other with distrust and ambivalence. Prime minister Begin admired Gush Emunim, but insisted on maintaining the initiative, control and credit for himself. In sum, one hand of the government gave to the movement generously and encouraged it, while the other admonished it. During the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, religious right's relations with the administration became institutionalised and it became an integral part of the Israeli political system (Aran, 1991: 280). The alliance between sections of the establishment and the religious right concerned the settlements, security and other values of pioneer Zionism.

Institutionalisation of religious Zionism adopted several forms. Religious leaders and activists are on the government payroll as rabbis, teachers, students, soldiers and civil servants of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, and even as functionaries of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Ironically, anti-establishment

activism is essentially financed by the government itself. The government provides members of the religious right with the economic base and the necessary free time, not to mention the legitimisation, for their religio-political activism (Aran, 1991: 283). The religious right has proper headquarters, with a permanent staff, representatives abroad, and personalities identified with the movement can be found in various parliamentary factions, such a Tehiya, Morasha, and the National Religious Party (Liebman, 1984: 73). Several Ministries have special sections for settlers and the IDF has established an organic unit of settlers. In the 1980s, the institutionalisation of settlements through the establishment of the Council of Settlements has led to routinisation and incorporation partly of the religious right. For nearly twenty-five years, the religious right has played a decisive role in determining the agenda of public debate in Israel. In the 1990s, it successfully prevented the withdrawal from major parts of the West Bank and succeeded in maintaining its footholds in Hebron.

Another part of the unofficial support system of the religious right has been provided by the army and the military government of the occupied territories. Many of the Jewish residents of the West Bank are in fact soldiers 'on extended leave', mainly Talmudic students combining military service with Talmudic study (Sprinzak, 1993). Hundreds of settlers were transferred to their regular army units to the West Bank, where in addition to securing their settlements, they were to secure cultivated fields, access to roads, and commercial general community facilities. They had armoured personnel carriers and large quantities of military equipment, including sophisticated weapons, have been stored in the settlements under the complete control of local commanders.

Although the developments leading to the death of prime minister Rabin have strained the relationship between the state and the religious right, since Netanyahu's election the relationship has been very close. Groups further to the right than the former Gush Emunim have been able to frustrate and eventually undermine the peace process, as the reluctance to give back any territory under Netanyahu has made clear. The influence within the government of the interests of the religious right has made the two movements almost inseparable.

4.4 Regional and International Alliances

Tactical alliances also occur between governments which finance and support Islamist movements in all kinds of ways in foreign countries. The best example of this type of support is provided by the Saudi Arabian government which has supported the Islamist revival throughout the Muslim world since the 1970s as a way to oppose the left, communism, and the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The clearest examples are its support of the Egyptian Islamic movements on the campuses when they tried to defeat the Nasserist and left wing movements. But support also extended to Algerian, Sudanese, Yemeni, Pakistani, and especially Afghan movements in the 1980s. To what extent this influence has been decisive is unclear. But it is obvious that this support has

made a difference and that the Islamist movement has received a financial boost from the Gulf which used them for its geo-strategic interests. The most recent example is, of course, the Taliban in Afghanistan which is supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Other nations involved in support of political religious movements outside their borders are: Syria and Iran in the case of Hizbollah; Sudan under Hasan al-Turabi in the case of several movements among which Hamas, through its agency of the Islamic Congress; Libya in the Phillipines. Outside the Middle East, the United States as a superpower has also been involved in setting up international alliances with Islamist groups. As in the case of Israel with Hamas, the involvement of the United States with the Afghan mujahidin has been everything but felicitous.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, we will give an overview of the main arguments of the chapter in the form of an analysis of the Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats of political religious movements. The purpose is to systematically show how strengths of these movements can turn into weaknesses and how they lead to violence. In addition, the SWOT analysis will demonstrate how the relations with the state have enhanced the violent character of the movements. Finally, under the category 'Opportunities', we will show how a process of democratisation can lead to the abolition of violence and the basic factors which support violence.

5.1 Strengths

We have argued that the basic strengths of political religious movements are:

The politics of anti-politics/populism

a) Populism and the anti-political attitude of political religious movements have greatly enhanced the strength of these movements.
b) Vagueness and the undefined character of their political programme has furthered their cause.
c) Claims to moral superiority, presenting themselves as the harmonious, perfect alternative society, and the unity of people and leaders have also enhanced their following.
d) Messianistic ideologies have contributed to their rise.

Authenticity and identity

a) Islamist and Jewish religious political movements succeed in claiming to be the only authentic movements which preserve the cultural and religious identities of the communities.

b) Historically, they represent themselves as the last stage of political and cultural evolution to redemption and salvation and therefore supersede previous nationalist and left-wing forces, an argument which has credibility when all previous political currents have failed.
c) They play on xenophobic feelings towards the outside world.
d) They tap deep psychological and social feeling of human existence.

Mobilising widespread social and economic dissatisfaction

a) Political religious movements have been highly successful in tapping widespread social and economic feelings of dissatisfaction, due to the fact that all Arab regimes are responsible for disastrous economic policies in the past few decades and no other credible opposition exists.
b) These movements have been repressed during the heyday of nationalist regimes and therefore have not been implicated in their negative economic policies.

Strong internal solidarity

Part of the strength of political religious movements can be explained by their usually strong and far-reaching internal control over their members.

Organisational integration into society

a) Political religious movements have the advantage of being able to use pre-existing legal religious institutions (mosques, churches, Talmud schools). They are able to recruit, educate and socialise their members through these channels.
b) They have gained enormous good-will in society at large by providing educational, health and welfare services through these channels, a task the state can no longer fulfil. Through these activities, Islamist and Jewish political religious movements have been able to build up impressive networks of educational, health and organisational infrastructure.
c) Basically political religious movements benefit from the strengthening of civil society and the crisis the state is in.

Social integration into society

Members of political religious movements are able to penetrate civil society to a large extent through winning election of professional organisations and fulfilling important social functions in society. Members of the political religious movements form a large part of civil society.

Flexibility of tactics and strategies

Political religious movements, in contrast to secular political movements, have a range of tactic and strategic options on account of the above-mentioned characteristics. Integrated into society, they can use the infrastructure to enhance their position in civil society, they can participate in a parliamentary system or use violence. Unfortunately,

violence has been enhanced due to several factors, among which are the strengths of political religious movements.

5.2 Weaknesses

As opposed to the strengths of political religious movements, we have shown that these can also become their weaknesses. However, the basic flaw of political religious movements rests in their legitimation of violence.

Legitimation of violence
A basic weakness of political religious movements is that they legitimise violence. Although mostly violence is directed towards other religious communities, recently it has also become more common and ideologically legitimised to use violence against deviant members of the own community. It has been argued in this chapter that, within the context of the Middle East's political constellation, violence against the state has backfired in most cases and has severely hampered the overall goal of political religious movements to establish a moral community or religious society. This applies to both Islamist and Jewish religious political movements. Only in rare cases, where violence is directed against other communities and has the support or the sanction of the state, has violence been effective, as is the case with Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Jewish settlers in Israel.

Communal strife
Strong feelings of community, authenticity, and religious superiority can turn into communalism, particularism, xenophobia, and racism, and therefore violence against other religious or ethnic groups. Political religious movements in all cases have furthered this type of violence and conflict, whether in Israel (against Palestinians), Algeria (against Berbers), in Egypt (against Copts), or in Syria (against Alawites).

Dissent and internal strife
Because political religious movements are hardly ever democratic organisations, internal strife has led to bitter and often violent internal conflicts.

Sectarian violence
In the case of radical currents within Islamist and Jewish political religious movements, internal conflicts have led to sectarian violence against members of other organisations or deviant members of the own organisation.

Pitfalls of the politics of discontent
As the only oppositional force with credibility, Islamist movements have been able to mobilise forces that have basically economic and social grievances and support the Islamist movement for its resistance against the government. This following can prove to be a liability when it forces the movement to take radical stances, leading to direct

violent confrontation with the state and the dissolution of the movement and the infrastructure it has built up. Even if the violence of radical currents is not sanctioned by moderate currents, they can experience the fall-out from the state.

Drawbacks of the many tactic and strategic options
If the range of options political religious movements can choose from are numerous, they can also turn negative, by enhancing the ambivalent character of political religious movements. The fact that most movements have vague programmes, are populist and base their politics on morals instead of political ideas, enhances their ambivalent character.

5.3 Threats

The state
a) The basic threat to political religious movements comes from the state. Political religious movements pose a challenge to the state by underlining their lack of legitimacy, their incompetence, their weakness towards the West, their failure to implement useful reforms and create employment, and in general present a hopeful future. Above all, they pose a challenge to the state on account of their moral superiority and their God-given programme.
b) As the state needs political religious movements to enhance its standing and gain support, we have shown it has made tactical and strategic alliances with political religious movements. In the end these alliances mostly fail and will lead to violence (legal and extra-legal) against political religious movements.

5.4 Opportunities

Democratisation
The basic opportunity for political religious movements to survive and flourish in the present context is to adopt a programme of democratisation. As has been shown, direct confrontation with the state leads to further bloodshed and eventually to the destruction of the economic, social and political infrastructure of political religious movements. Democratisation can also ameliorate the weaknesses mentioned above from which political religious movements suffer:
a) Democratisation will lead to a clarification of the programmes of political religious move-ments.
b) Democratisation will lead to greater clarity of tactics and strategies of the political religious movements and put an end to their ambivalent en equivocal character on which the state plays.
c) Democratisation will lead to clearer and more democratic internal structures and end internal dissent and internal sectarian strife. Internal democratic structures will also dispel suspicions about the politics and aims of the movement which are now formulated behind closed doors.

d) Democratisation will lead to a more specific following and will force political religious movements to present their own economic and social programmes which cater for specific social groups, are realistic and not messianistic.
e) Democratisation will end the making of covert tactical and strategic alliances with states.

6. Recommendations

In general, the solution for the ambivalence of the politics of political religious movements is to develop democratic structures and procedures which allow these movements to participate in politics as officially recognised political parties with bye-laws, yearly conferences, open membership lists, participation in free elections and parliamentary democracy. Although it is clear that this is not the solution to all problems and that it would have to be carefully managed, it would be a step in the right direction. Allowing political religious movements to participate in democratic politics will give them the opportunity to become real political parties which have to make compromises and have to fulfil the promises they make to their following. The prospects of sloganeering and feeding off social and economic discontent will diminish and will be channelled and eventually penalised, when it is made clear that democracy is more than 'one man, one vote, one time' and is not just another way of acquiring permanent power. The principle of accountability also applies to political religious movements. Violence should in principle be rejected and religious legitimation of violence proscribed.

The model for this development are the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, which represent sections of the population which are religious, usually conservative and who want to maintain religious values. But as these parties are first and foremost political movements, and take part in political procedures and processes which do not allow absolute solutions, they have learned to compromise and limit religion to ethics rather than becoming whole and final systems - however vague - i.e. they have become mature and have developed political institutions which carry responsibility for the statements they make and are accountable for the policies they pursue.

From its side, the state carries equal responsibility for this process of open integration of political religious movements. Above all, it should stop making tactical or strategic alliances with these movements to prop up its declining legitimation and protect its interests. Non-interference, de-linking and compliance with the rules is one of the first preconditions for this policy to succeed. Alliances have in almost all cases had adverse consequences. In the Islamic world, they have led to manipulation of the assets of the political religious movements by governments for internal purposes. In Israel, the movement has even been used to pursue governmental policy and has been used as a

pretext not to implement international treaties and UN resolutions. In both cases, the covert character of the alliances has led, in the past and the present, to misleading the public and members of the political religious movements who believe their leaders.

Recommendations for political religious movements:

- Repudiation of violence as a means of achieving ideals.
- Acceptance of the idea of politics as a separate space, as a method to attain one's goals through compromises. Religion plays a role as an ethical, not an absolute, system or a panacea to all problems. In short, the more political the movement and the more democratic, the better.
- Acceptance of democratic internal procedures, i.e., election of candidates, leaders, chair persons within movements.
- Acceptance of the idea of transparency, i.e., publication of political programmes and openness in achieving political goals.
- Acceptance of parliamentary democracy and its procedures as a way to practise politics.
- Acceptance of debate as a means of reaching goals.
- Acceptance for the own movement of the idea of accountability.
- Rejection of communalism and acceptance of greater openness.
- Rejection of alliances with the state. Rejection of manipulation of movements by the state.

Recommendations concerning the state:

- The state in the Middle East, as the other main protagonist in the political arena, bears even more responsibility for the present critical situation. The state as well must accept politics as a separate sphere, in which to reach compromises. The Arab state usually relies on 'administration' or the 'force' (the police, army, intelligence, etc.) to solve political problems.
- Rejection of those forms of politics that consist only of rhetorics, or just aim at bureaucratic control.
- Acceptance of political opposition.
- Rejection of the use of religion for political goals and for acquiring legitimacy.
- Rejection of tactical and strategic alliances with political religious movements.
- De-linking of state and political religious movements for whatever purposes these alliances have been used.
- Acceptance of parliamentary democracy and its rules of government.
- Change of power from the executive to the legislative. Acceptance of the citizens as a source of power.
- Ending repression as a means of practising politics. More specifically:
    - Ending restrictions of public speech.
    - Ending political detention of members of political religious movements.
    - Ending state violence against religious movements.

- Ending persecution of democratic sections of the political religious movements.
- Beginning negotiations with political religious movements concerning the procedures for democratic rules.
- Greater stress on negotiations with radical political religious movements to find political solutions.

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INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN THE EURO-MED REGION

By Gamal Soltan

1. Defining the Euro-Med Region

Although Europe and the Mediterranean have been interacting economically, culturally and politically for centuries, the Euro-Med as a region is a recent construct that has a great deal of uniqueness and many peculiarities. It is 'a region in the making' by design and by the will of its state parties. The Euro-Med region is the envisioned product of the process that culminated in November 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed.

Two distinctive regions could be identified in the wider Euro-Med: Europe and the Mediterranean. Europe has been a strategically cohesive region for decades, or even centuries. The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is a mosaic of a number of sub-regions, which lack coherence and conformity. While Europe is evolving toward an integrated whole, the Mediterranean is only little more than a geographic reality. On the institutional level, Europe enjoys the most sophisticated and advanced integrative institutional structure known in the world, while the Mediterranean suffers from the lack of functioning structures.

There are more points of difference between Europe and the Mediterranean. Within the context of this chapter, the disparities between the two regions are important only to the extent to which they influence the security and strategic considerations in the region. One of the ultimate goals of the Euro-Med partnership process is the building of an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, a variant of regional security. In the past, regional security was experienced in regions qualitatively different from the Euro-Med. The European experience, the most advanced in this regard, is very illustrative. It goes back to the Cold War era. Two major features have characterised the Europe of that epoch. First, security threats of the hard type, i.e., military threats, were the major security concern of all the states in the region. Second, security threats have, more or less, equally impacted all members of the region. The above-mentioned characteristics provided the region with a great deal of strategic conformity, sufficient to provide for a focus for efforts to achieve security on the regional level and through regional approaches. The end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of interstate violence in Europe. The ramifications of the break-up of Yugoslavia are the only European concern that could remotely approach the danger of interstate conflict in Europe.

The European success in handling interstate conflicts has elevated the salience of intrastate conflicts and soft security issues, which became the major European security concern in the post Cold War era. While Europe has developed quite advanced machinery capable of handling interstate conflicts, the European record regarding issues of soft security and intrastate conflicts is not that impressive. The Euro-Med is among the instruments that Europe has designed to handle challenges of a soft security nature.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, the picture seems radically different. Hard security concerns vary considerably across the Southern Mediterranean region. Only a handful of Southern Mediterranean countries have ever faced serious security challenges of the hard type. However, the few interstate conflicts present in the region have been serious and complicated enough to pose considerable threats capable of creating instability all over the region. Though not the only one, the conflict(s) between Israel and Arab states is (are) the most important interstate conflict(s) in the region. While the Arab-Israeli conflict provides a focus for security concerns in the region, it overshadows other security concerns so that it makes them appear less serious than they really are. The crisis between Syria and Turkey that took place in the autumn of 1998, and which brought these countries to the brink of war, has shown how other conflicts could be extremely serious as well.

Internal security threats, however, are a concern for all Southern Mediterranean countries. The security challenges associated with poverty and developing political systems are common in the Southern Mediterranean. Except for the marginal co-operation in fighting the criminal aspects of the much deeper political problems, such as the problem of terrorism, regional security frameworks in the South only have little use.

From a strategic perspective, the Mediterranean, let alone Europe, does not make up a single strategic region. Four sub-regions can be identified in the Mediterranean: North Africa, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans. Although each of these regions is distinct from the others, there is still much room for overlapping between them, so that strategic developments in each of them largely affect the others. This was a critical component of the rationale behind the Barcelona process, according to which the original focus on North Africa was dropped in favour of a larger Euro-Med partnership (Gillespie, 1997: 3).

Moreover, security concerns in the Euro-Med cannot be confined to the Euro-Med region, no matter how arbitrarily defined. The security concerns of the EU countries extend as far to the East as the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The Southern Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, have security concerns that go far beyond the Mediterranean. Hunter (1998) has listed five geographical contexts that overlap to make up the Mediterranean: the Balkan Peninsula; the triangle of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus; the Caucasus; the Middle East; and the Southern Mediterranean or North Africa. In addition, to emphasise the fragmented

nature of the Mediterranean, Hunter's concept of the Mediterranean suggests that developments in non-Mediterranean regions, such as the Caucasus, are of a great concern to the Mediterranean. The security of a number of Southern Mediterranean countries is strongly connected to the security of the Persian Gulf region, including Iraq (Chubin, 1982). The fact that the Mediterranean Sea lane protection, in 1984-1988 and 1991, was an integral part of the enforcement operations in the Persian Gulf testifies to this reality (Pugh, 1997: 4-5).

Due to Egypt's dependence on the water of the Nile river, the security of Egypt, a major Southern Mediterranean country, is strongly influenced by the security of the Sudan and a number of East and Central African countries. Also, the security of the Mediterranean is, to a great extent, connected to the security of the Red Sea. During the Iran-Iraq war, and probably as one of its repercussions, navigation lanes in the Red Sea were mined so that navigation to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal was endangered. Also, a great deal of the security arrangements between Egypt and Israel since the 1979 peace treaty covers the Red Sea.

The interconnections between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the security of the Persian Gulf are particularly essential. The role Israel played, or in fact did not play, in the Gulf War is indicative in that regard. By the same token, convening the Madrid peace conference shortly after the end of the Gulf War is more evidence of the interconnections between the two regions. The influence the two regions exercise on each other in formulating foreign powers' policies toward the region testifies to the same reality (Farouk-Sluglett, 1994).

It could be said, then, that the Mediterranean is not only fragmented, but also its sub-regional components are, sometimes, more connected to neighbouring non-Mediterranean regions than to the Mediterranean itself. The Mediterranean lacks a centre of gravity that can bring its components closer together, another important difference between the Mediterranean and Europe. Geography, trade, industrialisation and economic development intensified interaction among European countries. They created processes that provided a centre of gravity that brought Europe closer. Neither the Southern Mediterranean nor the Euro-Med has known such a trend yet.

The Euro-Med region is still rather a proposal. The Barcelona Declaration, the document that launched the Euro-Med process, has hardly gotten off the ground. If it were to succeed, it would provide not only a structure for the Euro-Med region, but particularly for its Mediterranean component as well.

2. Interstate Conflicts in the Post Cold War Era

Violent conflicts of today's world are mainly intrastate. This notion became part of the conventional wisdom of the post Cold War era. The saliency of intrastate conflicts in the current era made this type of conflict attract tremendous attention, both politically and scholarly, at the expense of interstate conflicts.

The current peaceful relations between states should not be a source of complacency, or rather illusion. The prevalent attitude towards interstate conflicts is very much similar to the attitude toward them at the turn of the century or in the post World War I period. Nevertheless, the twentieth century proved to be the most violent in human history. It is premature to conclude that interstate violence is over. The hypothesis of this chapter is that violent conflicts among states are, first, still possible and, second, even when they are suppressed, they are expressed in different forms, i.e., in intrastate conflicts. It could be said then that many of today's intrastate conflicts are transformed interstate conflicts.

There are reasons to believe that downplaying the importance and risks of interstate conflicts in today's world could be a premature conclusion. Such a tendency implies signs of Eurocentrism. It is mainly in Europe where intrastate conflicts took over the importance of interstate conflicts. Moreover, it is only in Europe where the end of the Cold War has resulted in an increase in the sheer number of conflicts in the continent. During the Cold War era, there have been no interstate violent conflicts in Europe. There has been, rather, a deep security concern lest the Superpowers rivalry turn violent. In addition to this concern, there have been only a few intrastate violent conflicts, primarily in Western Europe, such as the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. In the post Cold War period, risks of interstate conflicts radically diminished, while a number of intrastate conflicts erupted, this time in the former communist countries. Therefore, it could be argued that the current Western concern over intrastate conflicts is not due to the mere number of such conflicts, it is rather due to the changing security environment, which caused the weight of intrastate conflicts to increase.

Assuming that the era of interstate violent conflicts is over enhances the risk of generalising the specific experience of a certain part of the world. The fact that the developed countries of the North have become capable of avoiding violence while handling their relations does not mean that countries of other regions became capable of getting to the same level. The fact that all interstate conflicts of the post World War era have taken place in the developing areas indicate that the developing world is still new to peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution. It also indicates that the current state of affairs regarding interstate conflicts in developing areas is still far from being final.

Major wars have become obsolete, but only in the North Western corner of the world. This fact is reflected in the NATO defence strategy, where the role of nuclear weapons has diminished. The US' spending on nuclear and strategic weapons has diminished

from around 24% of the total defence budget in the mid 1960s to less than 3% today (Slocombe, 1997: 23). Meanwhile, total US military expenditures have declined by about 35% between 1985 and 1998 (IISS, 1998: 16). This means that, while the US has reduced spending on weaponry systems needed to fight against another advanced industrialised country, a similar reduction in the field of conventional weapons did not take place. While the US became less occupied by nuclear threat, it became more obsessed by being better equipped to fight conventional wars emerging from the developed corner of the world.

The American strategy since the end of the Gulf War is to be ready to fight two regional wars at the same time, something the Americans did not believe they would need in the past. Such a US policy indicates that, at least in certain circles, interstate conflicts became more expected than, or at least still as expected as, they had been in the past.

The arrangements and developments that reduced the chances of war in Europe are absent in other parts of the world. They are even absent regarding some of the countries capable of launching major wars, such as China and Russia. The conflicts over Taiwan and the Crimean Peninsula could be causes of major wars in which some of the major world powers could be implicated (Mandelbaum, 1999: 31).

Such arrangements are certainly absent in many other countries capable only of launching war on a much smaller scale (Mandelbaum, 1999). Wars of that kind might be less costly in terms of property and human life, but they can be very serious in terms of the disruption they might cause to many aspects of global affairs. The Gulf War, for example, has disrupted the energy markets, tourism and aviation industries, and trade relations in different parts of the world. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced war technology make a conventional military confrontation between medium powers more than just an imaginary threat.

It is argued here that both inter- and intrastate conflicts in the developing world follow patterns that are different from those identified in the developed world. A number of differences could be identified in that regard:

1. Deep changes in the security environment, similar to the changes that occurred in Europe, did not take place in other parts of the world.
2. Although there has been a decline in the number of interstate conflicts in the developing areas, the overall trend of intrastate conflicts replacing interstate conflicts is not as clear-cut as has been the case in the developed world.
3. In the developing areas, there has been a trend for the number of conflicts, whether inter- or intrastate, to decline in the years before the end of the Cold War. Such a trend is demonstrated in *Figure 1*.
4. As also shown in *Figure 1*, the number of interstate conflicts has been, for most of the time, lower than the number of intrastate conflicts. Therefore, the saliency of intrastate conflicts seen in Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War is not in itself a

new phenomenon. Rather, the end of the Cold War has changed patterns of conflict in the continent to look more similar to their counterparts in other parts of the world.

Figure 1 also shows that there has been a steep decline in the number of interstate conflicts even prior to the end of the Cold War. This could be interpreted as emphasising the authenticity of that trend, rather than as having been caused by the Cold War coming to an end. In other words, it emphasises the fact that conflicts develop according to their own dynamics even when they are influenced by changes of the international system.

I would argue, then, that there is a great deal of exaggeration concerning the novelty of the current patterns in international conflicts. There is also a great deal of exaggeration pointing to the end of the Cold War as a turning point in these patterns. Explanations other than, or in addition to, the end of the Cold War are still needed.

Figure 1



Source: Compiled from Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 274-278.

Two mistaken assumptions are implicit in the claim that interstate war has become obsolete in the post Cold War world. The first assumption is that regional conflicts have no life of their own and that they are a mere function of the rivalry between the

superpowers. This assumption proved wrong during the Cold War, particularly in the Middle East, and there is no reason for it to regain validity now.

The second assumption is a theoretical one. For many, international politics, particularly international conflicts, are a function of systemic variables, i.e., the power structure of the international political system. The systemic approach to international politics has been challenged by a large number of competing approaches. At best, it can provide only a partial explanation for international conflicts. Since violence is a very complex phenomenon, only a synthesis of multiple approaches can provide a reliable explanation, and help in making a prediction.

Arguing that interstate wars are becoming obsolete is not only based on empirical evidence. It is also based on theoretical assumptions derived from the Clausewitzian framework. Clausewitz' widely-accepted analysis of war is principally a kind of cost-benefit analysis that is derived from the Western traditions of rationalism. For a Clausewitzian theorist, a war should not be fought unless the gains it should bring exceed its costs. The proponents of 'the end of interstate conflicts' correctly argue that the costs of modern interstate war definitely exceed whatever gains it can bring. Hence, applying the Clausewitzian model justifies pronouncing interstate violence to be over.

Though impressive and convincing, Clausewitz's analysis fails to consider the cultural aspects of war and violent behaviour (Keegan, 1994). Culture attaches value to tangible and intangible objects, sometimes, in idiosyncratic ways that can defy what is thought to be the universal principles of rationalism. It determines the way through which people make calculations about gains and losses. In some cases, these calculations could deviate from the Western standards of rationalism.

War is only one of the foreign policy instruments used to achieve national interests. It is the application of violence, in its maximum form, towards the goal of achieving foreign policy goals. This formulation of the relationship between national interest, on the one hand, and foreign policy and war, on the other, is derived from the premises of the realist-rational school as to foreign policy. This school, however, has been bombarded with criticism from a number of alternative approaches (Soltan, 1995).

For groups, nations and states, war has multiple functions. Achieving national interest in the strict rational definition is not the only thinkable and practical objective of war. War can be fought for things that are intangible. War for the national or group honour and status, an ideological cause or regime survival are not rare events (Holsti, 1991). Some of these issues could be extremely puzzling for outsiders. For instance, what is honour, how valuable is it, is it more valuable than human lives and property, and how would it be preserved or retained, are questions that have only subjective answers. When similar issues are at stake, a balance of power or deterrence might not be of great help.

Reducing the threat of interstate war in the developed world has a number of corollaries. Among these is changing the nature and qualities of leadership. Experience and vision in socio-economic issues have become more important than experience in foreign policy and defence affairs. Similar signs are lacking in the Southern Mediterranean. The military background of most leaders in the South is an obvious fact. This is not only because officers impose themselves on politics. In a democracy, such as Israel, a military background is a qualifying factor for political leadership. The prevalence of the classical mind-set of power politics in the region is overwhelming. It is primarily due to the fact that the problems that dominated the region during the Cold War have not been solved yet. *Figure 2* gives an overview of conflicts in the period 1989-1996.

Figure 2

Regional Distribution, Number and Types of Major Armed Conflict, 1989-1996



Source: Compiled from *SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997: 21.

The developments of recent years in the region make many states strongly believe in military might as the means to protect their vital interests and security. The Gulf states,

including Iran, have learnt this lesson the hard way (Kemp, 1995). The stalled Middle East peace process, in the eyes of many, is due to the imbalance of military power between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Correcting the imbalances is the lesson many derive from this situation.

Peace, or at least the absence of war, between states is a function of a number of variables. The classical Kantian vision of the three pillars of peace is still relevant. He suggested that peace in international relations require republic constitutions, a commercial spirit, and international law. Modern research has shown that the modern equivalent of these three pillars, i.e., liberal democracy, economic interdependence and networks of international organisations, are strongly associated with peace (Russett, Oneal and Davis, 1998). The current long peace in Europe supports this theory. None of these peace pillars is available in the non-European Mediterranean. Thus, the state of peace, or rather the state of no war, prevalent now in the region, lacks the prerequisites of sustainability.

When these prerequisites are lacking, a wide range of possibilities opens up. Interstate violence could break out under a large number of conditions and for many reasons. The power transition theory suggests that war could erupt as a result of two factors: opportunity and willingness (Organski and Kugler, 1980). Later scholars have defined willingness in terms of dissatisfaction with the status quo and readiness to build up the power necessary to challenge it (Lemke and Werner, 1996). The Southern Mediterranean is rich in reasons for dissatisfaction with the status quo, and in the pressure to challenge it. Lemke and Werner have also defined opportunity in terms of power parity, because under the condition of power parity the chances of winning and losing are almost even, and both the challenger and the challenged have reasons to believe that they can win a war. However, power parity might not be a condition for the eruption of war. States desperate to change the status quo might be willing to take the risk of initiating a war, or at least a crisis that could lead to war, even when their power is inferior to the opponent. Regardless of the outcomes, fighting in itself might be sufficient to achieve certain goals for a state or a ruling elite. The case of the 1973 war in the Middle East helps make this point.

Violent conflicts among states have become rare events, to the extent that the year 1997 did not witness the eruption of any violent conflict between states. However, this does not mean that interstate conflicts have become obsolete. The complete disappearance of such conflicts is not yet a sustainable trend. In the year 1998, two interstate conflicts took place: the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the conflict between Iraq and the US. In addition, the two main rivals of South Asia turned nuclear, which raised the concern of the whole world.

Moreover, a China Wall-like distinction between inter- and intrastate conflicts is, to a degree, artificial. The distinction between inter- and intrastate conflict is a useful and

valid one. However, we should avoid running the risk of failing to recognise the interconnections between these two types of conflict. Four mechanisms and processes are identified here in that regard.

1. Intrastate conflicts could spill over, so that state actors might become involved in them. This should be considered a serious possibility even if the conflict is not to be transformed into an open interstate military confrontation. The changing tides of intrastate conflicts create both threats and opportunities for neighbouring states. Thus, they introduce elements of instability to regional systems, which regional actors are likely to try to correct or take advantage of. A minor act of interference would gradually grow and dramatically change the nature of the original intrastate conflict. Once regional powers interfere in a domestic conflict, interference gains a life of its own, and gradually becomes independent of its original domestic trigger. Typically, external interfering actors have more power at their disposal than the original domestic parties to the conflict, so that they can overshadow the interests and choices of domestic rivals. The more domestic actors lose independence to interfering actors, the higher the likelihood of the conflict being transformed into an interstate conflict.

Certain new trends associated with intrastate conflicts raise the possibility of state actors being involved in intrastate conflicts. Terrorism is one important phenomenon in that regard. The rise of several world-wide terrorist networks, the terrorist groups' tendency not to limit their aggression to their direct foes, and their readiness to strike at what they believe to be supporters of their domestic rivals, all these factors make terrorism one additional mechanism of the internationalisation of domestic conflicts. Also, intrastate conflicts of an ethnic nature are likely to implicate neighbouring states especially in the cases where ethnic groups stretch across international borders. This is one of the very familiar mechanisms capable of transforming intrastate into interstate conflicts and vice versa. The tension between Greece and Turkey, Greece and Albania, Romania and Hungary, Albania and FYROM (Macedonia), and the Baltic Republics and Russia are well known cases in that regard. Because of the fairly homogeneous population of the Southern Mediterranean, this trend is more European, especially in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, rather than a Southern Mediterranean.

2. *Intrastate conflict can be a manifestation of interstate conflicts.* Domestic factors are, as a rule, the main and most important causes of intrastate conflicts. Without downplaying the importance of domestic factors, however, the role of external factors in intrastate conflicts could be crucial in determining the course of conflict. Some intrastate conflicts cannot be explained without referring to interstate disputes. The civil war in Lebanon, 1975-1990, the Cyprus crisis, the conflict in Afghanistan, and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo are examples of this trend. In these cases, as well as many others, while domestic factors trigger the conflict, external factors contribute more to the continuation of the conflict, which turns to be a case of war by

proxy. In cases like these, solving the domestic conflict is less likely unless its external aspects are addressed.

3. *The presence of unsolved interstate conflicts could contribute to the escalation of intrastate conflicts.* The strategies of rivals involved in intrastate conflicts tend to be affected by the regional and international conditions surrounding the relevant conflict. The mere presence of an unresolved interstate conflict in the regional vicinity creates a possibility of external support, which domestic rivals could tap. If such a possibility were to materialise, rivals would be more likely to pursue a hawkish strategy and be less willing to compromise. For instance, the availability of external support radicalised the strategies of the Kurdish rebel movements in both Turkey and Iraq. Similar trends emerged with the Cypriot Turks and earlier with the radical Greek Cypriots.

4. *Unresolved interstate conflicts could contribute to the escalation and prolonging of intrastate conflicts.* It is not unusual for fairly simple intrastate conflicts to get more complicated as a result of the interference of external actors. Regional rivals are likely to take advantage of a nascent intrastate conflict in an attempt to consolidate their positions in regional and international politics.

Therefore, even if intrastate conflicts are much more frequent in today's world, this is not enough reason to downplay the seriousness of interstate conflicts. Without ignoring the noble motivations and concerns about the suffering usually caused by intrastate conflicts, recent experience shows that among the reasons for which an intrastate conflict is addressed is its potential impact on relations between states. This has been particularly the case regarding the conflicts in the Balkans.

3. Interstate Conflicts in the Mediterranean

As has been discussed earlier, the end of the Cold War is likely to have reduced the chance of an eruption of interstate war without necessarily solving interstate conflicts. The local and regional causes of interstate conflicts are capable of defying the pressures and changes of the international system until a settlement is reached.

The factors that contributed to the decline of interstate conflicts world-wide, especially in the North Western corner of the world, are not that prevalent in the Southern Mediterranean, particularly in the Middle East. According to Mandelbaum, 'the misalignment between state and nation, the desire of a group of people to change the jurisdiction in which it lives, can be, and often has been, a cause of war' (Mandelbaum, 1999: 29). Plenty of such causes can be found in the Southern Mediterranean. Kemp describes the situation in the Middle East as

> [A] dangerous neighbourhood. There are dozens of unresolved conflicts, some dating back thousands of years. Most of the countries face multiple threats to their security: many international boundaries remain in dispute; and improvements in power projection capabilities have made it more difficult to isolate the various conflicts into restricted geographical areas (...). Each of the key countries has reason to be nervous about its security, and in the last resort none feels it can rely on the international community or a new world order for protection (Kemp, 1991: 15).

Although violence at the interstate level in the region has been kept at a minimum since the end of the Gulf War, even the current low level of violence in the region has a harmful effect on European interests. Such a damage is not confined to the immediate European interests in the region, but also hurts European relations with the United States because of the divergent policies pursued by them in the region (Gordon, 1998).

Our definition of interstate conflict should be modified to allow for the inclusion of conflicts that are not necessarily, or have not been recently, armed. Interstate disputes that have considerable reasons and chances of turning violent should be included in our analysis of interstate conflicts. There are three reasons for such a proposal:

1. While the likelihood of the eruption of interstate military confrontation has been radically reduced, there is no reason to believe that it has been eliminated. Should a conflict between states turn violent, the resulting death and destruction would be horrifying. Therefore, a conflict between states, even if it were not violent for the time being, should be considered in our analysis and effort to prevent deadly conflicts.
2. The absence of violence in interstate conflicts has not always been an outcome of accepted political settlement which can rule out a renewal or breakout of armed confrontation. On many of the fronts that have been quiet for years, the deep causes of conflict are far from being resolved. If it were not for the lack of the conducive conditions, military confrontation on these fronts could have occurred more often. But conditions could change in no time, and the quiet fronts could be transformed. This is particularly a viable scenario because a mentality of power politics is still dominating the political culture in many parts of the world, particularly in the Euro-Med region.
3. The Euro-Med region is seeking not only to avoid armed conflicts, but also and mainly, to reach a higher level of regional integration. There is a wide array of obstacles to regional integration. While armed conflicts are definitely an obstacle, conflicts, in general, play a significant role in hindering proceeding with plans of regional integration. Solving pending political issues is a prerequisite for achieving the sought integration.

Two major sources of conflict can be identified in the Mediterranean: tangible and intangible causes. *Table 1* lists conflicts based on their causes.

Table 1

Tangible and Intangible Causes of Conflict in the Mediterranean

Tangible **(territorial)**	**Intangible** **(ethnic, nationalistic, symbolic, status, ideological)**
Cyprus-Turkey*	Cyprus-Turkey*
Greece-Turkey*	Greece-FYROM
Lebanon-Israel*	Greece-Turkey*
Palestine-Israel*	Lebanon-Israel*
Serbia-neighbours*	Palestine-Israel*
Syria-Israel*	Serbia-neighbours*
Turkey-Syria*	Syria-Israel*
Western Sahara	Turkey-Syria*

* Conflict appears in both columns.

Although states might dispute tangible resources, such as water resources, tangible causes of conflict are mainly territorial. Territorial conflicts in the region are reminiscent of the dissolution of empires and multinational states, particularly the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A similar result came out of the process of de-colonisation, where the arbitrary boundaries drawn by the colonial powers caused a number of territorial disputes among states in the region. Territorial disputes could take one of the following forms:

1. Classic territorial disputes, such as the conflict between Greece and Turkey over a number of islands in the Aegean Sea.
2. Separatism, where minorities seek the right to self-determination to form their own state, for example the Turkish minority of Cyprus.
3. Irredentism, where restoring control over territories, currently subject to foreign governments, is sought, such as the Syrian claims to the Alexandretta district now belonging to Turkey.

Irredentism and classic territorial disputes have a lot in common. However, irredentism implies more nationalistic and ethnic feelings than just the legal, historical and strategic reasoning usually characterising traditional border disputes.

Intangible causes of conflict, on the other hand, form a larger group of causes of conflict. The concerned parties are motivated by feelings, emotions and perceptions rather than by the desire to achieve certain gains. Interstate conflicts fuelled by intangible causes have much in common with intrastate ethnic conflicts. Intangible causes of conflict could be based on ethnic and nationalistic feelings, symbolic reasoning, or on states seeking the assertion of their regional influence and status. *Table 1* shows that most conflicts in the Mediterranean are fuelled by these types of causes. This shows how the different types and causes of conflicts are inter-linked. The Southern Mediterranean is best viewed as a web of intersecting conflicts linking the state/locality with both the regional and international levels (Cottam, 1989). It also shows the intensity of the potential interstate conflict situations in the region.

The seriousness and originality of interstate disputes in the Euro-Med region is derived from a number of sources: their interrelations with intrastate conflict, the highly valued issues at stake for the peoples involved, and from the tense atmosphere surrounding most of these conflicts. A number of indicators could be used to indicate the seriousness of these conflicts: military expenditures, incidences of armed tension, and the escalation of certain intrastate conflicts. The three indicators, as has been shown, are inter-linked.

Military expenditures have declined in the post Cold War period world-wide. *Table 2* clearly presents this trend that has developed in the Euro-Med region. The table clearly shows that there is a trend for military expenses in the Euro-Med region to decline. However, a careful reading of the table also shows the presence of some important exceptions. There are a number of countries in which military expenses as a percentage of the GDP have increased between 1985 and 1997. These include Albania, Armenia, FYROM, Moldova, Slovenia, Cyprus and Algeria. The table also shows that, in a number of countries, per capita defence expenditures have increased, including in some of the countries where military expenditures as a percentage of the GDP have decreased. These include Norway, Turkey, Ireland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, FYROM, Moldova, Slovenia, Ukraine, Cyprus, Algeria, Israel, Lebanon and Morocco. *Table 3* lists these countries.

Table 2

Military Expenditures in Europe and the Middle East

Defence Expenditure % of GDP			Defence Expenditure US$ per capita			Defence Expenditure US$M			Country
97	96	85	97	96	85	97	96	85	
1.6	1,8	3.0	373	430	595	3,769	4,333	5,863	Belgium
1.7	1.9	2.2	538	603	582	2,816	3,152	2,978	Denmark
3.0	3.3	4.0	708	812	843	41,545	47,401	46,522	France
1.6	1.8	3.2	412	491	662	33,416	39,828	50,220	Germany
4.6	4.7	7.0	526	543	334	5,552	5,700	3,317	Greece
1.9	2.1	2.3	377	414	428	21,837	23,947	24,471	Italy
0.8	0.9	0.9	313	353	248	129	145	91	Luxembourg
1.9	2.2	3.1	442	517	585	6,888	8,022	8,470	Netherlands
2.6	2.8	3.1	259	269	171	2,559	2,657	1,746	Portugal
1.4	1.7	2.4	196	225	278	7,671	8,802	10,731	Spain
2.8	3.0	5.2	611	604	803	35,736	35,266	45,408	United Kingdom
n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Iceland
2.3	2.6	3.1	760	859	719	3,336	3,754	2,948	Norway
4.2	4.3	4.5	131	125	65	8,110	7,674	3,269	Turkey
1.0	1.1	1.8	210	209	128	767	757	456	Ireland
0.8	1.0	1.2	222	262	243	1,786	2,098	1,839	Austria
1.7	2.0	2.8	381	440	436	1,956	2,255	2,139	Finland
2.4	3.0	3.3	619	737	544	5,481	6,501	4,546	Sweden
3.4	3.3	14.0	41	45	276	339	273	2,331	Bulgaria
2.2	2.7	n.a.	96	114	n.a.	987	1,176	n.a.	Czech Republic
2,5	2.5	n.a.	81	75	n.a.	119	110	n.a.	Estonia
1.4	1.6	7.2	66	70	317	666	713	3,380	Hungary
4.6	4.5	n.a.	63	56	n.a.	156	139	n.a.	Latvia
4.4	4.3	n.a.	36	34	n.a.	135	128	n.a.	Lithuania
2.3	3.4	8.1	79	97	220	3,073	3,730	8,202	Poland
2.3	2.3	4.5	35	33	87	793	762	1,987	Romania
2.1	2.4	n.a.	77	87	n.a.	414	469	n.a.	Slovakia
6.7	6.7	5.3	26	29	91	94	103	269	Albania
8.9	7.7	n.a	37	33	n.a.	138	125	n.a.	Armenia
4.0	5.3	n.a.	19	18	n.a.	146	133	n.a.	Azerbaijan
2.9	4.1	n.a.	37	48	n.a.	381	501	n.a	Belarus
10.2	9.2	n.a.	58	54	n.a.	132	122	n.a	FYROM
2.9	3.3	n.a	20	21	n.a.	109	110	n.a	Georgia
4.4	4.2	n.a.	12	11	n.a	53	48	n.a.	Moldova
5.8	6.5	n.a.	435	502	n.a.	64,000	73,990	n.a.	Russia
1.7	1.4	n.a.	154	115	n.a.	310	231	n.a.	Slovenia
2.7	2.8	n.a	26	25	n.a	1,324	1,286	n.a.	Ukraine
0.9	1.0	1.4	82	92	64	31	34	23	Malta
5.0	5.0	n.a.	74	58	n.a.	327	255	n.a.	Bosnia-Herzegovina
5.7	6.8	n.a	244	278	n.a.	1,147	1,308	n.a.	Croatia
5.8	5.8	3.6	594	580	186	505	487	124	Cyprus

1.5	1.8	2.1	544	662	426	3,837	4,672	2,749	Switzerland
7.8	8.7	3.8	140	142	204	1.489	1,502	4,759	FRY (Serbia-Montenegro
4.6	4.0	1.7	73	65	62	2,114	1,840	1,357	Algeria
4.3	4.5	7.2	45	46	76	2,743	2,742	3,679	Egypt
n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Gaza and Jericho
11.5	11.8	21.2	1,917	1,943	1,700	11,143	11,202	7,196	Israel
6.4	6.4	15.9	105	101	245	469	461	857	Jordan
4.5	3.7	9.0	163	121	107	676	494	285	Lebanon
4.7	5.1	6.2	215	237	511	1,250	1,327	1,923	Libya
4.2	3.8	5.4	48	51	42	1,386	1,431	913	Morocco
6.3	6.4	16.4	145	144	472	2,217	2,132	4,961	Syria
1.8	2.0	5.0	35	44	83	334	406	594	Tunisia

Abbreviations: GDP: Gross National Product; n.a.: not available; US$M: .. x million US $.

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998/1999*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

The data in *Table 3* show that the general trend of military expenses to decrease is not clear-cut. The burden of defence has increased on both indicators for three countries: FYROM, Cyprus and Algeria. The three countries face serious security challenges. In two cases, the faced security threats are posed by interstate conflicts. FYROM has been kept safe from the spill-over effect of the conflict in the Balkans thanks to the peace-keeping troops that have been deployed there since 1994. The continuing conflict in the Balkans keeps the pressure on FYROM. Also, the veto exercised by China in the Security Council in February 1999 against renewing the mandate of the UN peace-keeping forces in FYROM raises serious challenges to the security of the young republic. Moreover, the crisis in Kosovo and the flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees to FYROM and Albania pose a threat of the Kosovo conflict spreading to neighbouring countries. The concern in FYROM is the impact of receiving thousands of refugees of a certain ethnic background on the ethnic and demographic fabric of its society. The delicate demographic balance in FYROM and other countries in the Balkan raises the crisk of intrastate conflicts, which shows how inter- and intrastate conflicts are intertwined.

Table 3

Countries in Europe and the Middle East where Military Expenses have Increased

Increase of military expenses as a percentage of GDP	Increase of per capita military expenses	Increase of both per capita and % GDP military expenses
Albania	Norway	FYROM
Armenia	Turkey	Cyprus
Moldova	Ireland	Algeria
Slovenia	Sweden	
	Estonia	
	Latvia	
	Lithuania	
	Moldova	
	Slovenia	
	Ukraine	
	Israel	
	Lebanon	
	Greece	
	Morocco	

Cyprus faces a dual problem: the reunification of the divided country-island and handling the risks of being caught in the middle in the conflict between Greece and Turkey. The intermingling between the intra- and interstate aspects of the conflict in Cyprus are self-evident. The heightened tension between the three countries increases the security challenges facing Cyprus. The recent dispute over deploying Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles in Cyprus is a classic example of both the security dilemma and the impact of the arms race on conflicts.

Interstate conflict and violence are among the factors that slow down the integration in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Med region. Conflict resolution and prevention are necessary prerequisites for the region to be able to proceed toward the implementation of the Euro-Med project of regional integration. Also, the strategic and political overlapping between the Euro-Med and the neighbouring regions requires extending efforts of conflict prevention and resolution to adjacent regions.

4. A Conflict Prevention Approach

Attempts to prevent or avoid the outbreak of armed conflicts is not a new endeavour in conducting the relations between human groups. Even when dominance is sought by a certain group, it is preferable to dominate others without resorting to the actual use of military power. For centuries, one of the principal goals underlying the development of

diplomatic traditions has been to convey messages that make others behave in a way that is preferable to the message's conveyor without the actual use of violence (Nicolson, 1969). However, it is not unusual for diplomacy to fail and for armed conflicts to erupt, a sign of either the inevitability of conflict or the lack of the necessary tools of conflict prevention.

Since conflict, rather than conflict prevention, was the prevalent mode of interaction in the relations between states, diplomacy and the science/art of foreign policy in general have long focused on conflict resolution. Without abandoning conflict resolution, diplomats and political scientists are now leaning toward focusing on conflict prevention. This shift can be explained by the rising cost of conflict and by the high levels of interdependence in international relations, which make conflict in a certain region a concern for non-involved actors, whether in the same region or in other regions.

Historically, the concept of preventive diplomacy was coined by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld at the height of the Cold War (Lund, 1996: 398 (note 11)). In its current connotation, this concept has been developed in the European context, particularly in the framework, and based on the experience, of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and its successor, the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Garthoff, 1994: 590-596). Such an experience has shadowed following discussions and developments of the concept.

In the OSCE experience, the long peace that was established in Europe in the post World War II era was the major factor against which these concepts were developed. Two pillars have contributed to the prolonged peace in Europe. The first of these is the balance of nuclear terror between the US and the former USSR, which made interstate armed conflicts in Europe, for the first time, impossible for any rational actor. The second pillar is the human capacity, both individually and collectively, to learn from past experience, which made armed conflict unthinkable.

The prevalence of peace in Europe for such an extended period of time created a certain mind-set that excludes violence from the means of handling disputes between European states. But since it was impossible to eradicate conflict altogether, it was necessary to develop means to tackle conflicts before they turn violent. The strategic understanding, even between rivals, that was developed concerning the impossibility of war, due to the above-mentioned conditions, was the major factor that made moving toward conflict prevention possible. In other regional systems where such strategic understanding is not yet developed, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy are still facing a great deal of obstacles and resistance. This is the case in the Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. In other words, it is the environment surrounding the conflict, not the conflict itself, that determines whether a conflict is amenable to applying methods of conflict prevention.

In spite of efforts by a number of distinguished scholars, the concepts of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are still suffering from a great deal of ambiguity and cause much confusion (Reychler, 1994 and Norkus, 1996). Kriesberg (1994: 165) uses the term 'prevention' to refer to three kinds of activities: 1. forms of socialisation and education; 2. constructing super-ordinate goals between adversaries; and 3. bilateral and multilateral linkages. On the other hand, he refers to activities that aim at the immediate prevention of the conflict as the 'limiting escalation' approach. The myriad of activities and purposes covered by conflict prevention might be the cause of the noticed ambiguity and confusion, since focusing on any part of this myriad, as a means of defining the concept, is certainly relevant but not necessarily sufficient.

Dealing with preventive diplomacy in the present world as if it were a completely new breed of diplomacy that is different from traditional power politics, implies a two-fold mistake. First, it is mistaken since it fails to consider the past success in conflict prevention in certain regions at a certain time even before the modern concepts of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy were known (Lund , 1996). Considering such experiences, is necessary to learn more about the instruments of conflict prevention and its chances of success. The second mistake is derived from the fact that recent experience of conflict prevention has been developed in the European context, firstly within the framework of power politics, and secondly under the peculiar conditions of the balance of nuclear terror. It is a mistake to deal with conflict in the non-Western world as if it were ready for the replication of the European experience. Applying Europe-based experience of conflict prevention to the non-Western world should be open to all possible alternatives, ranging from the need of such experience for minor adjustment, to the inapplicability of such experience altogether.

Certain assumptions are underlying the concept of conflict prevention. Efforts in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention assume that conflict can be avoided by targeting the cognitive processes of the parties involved, a process through which perceptions of the other and of the issues at stake can be changed (Ben-Dor and Dewitt, 1994: 5). It is also assumed that conflicts can be avoided through innovative arrangements and compromises that can satisfy many of the interests of the parties involved, particularly those derived from the antagonists' need not to slip into a military confrontation, at least at that particular moment.

Preventive diplomacy should not be confused with pacifism and peace movements, which conceive of armed conflicts as a social misfortune that can be eliminated if the proper scientific methods are applied (Marullo and Hlavacek, 1992). For conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, there is neither a need to turn the elimination of violence between states into an ideology, nor to make assumptions about human nature and the ultimate causes of violence, as those made by the peace movements (Adams et al., 1992, and Kriesberg, 1992). Though targeting the ultimate causes of conflict is one of the strategies pursued in conflict prevention, the latter cannot be confined to working

only on that level. Rather, the mere prevention of the eruption of violence is a very legitimate objective for conflict prevention. In other words, conflict prevention is a more modest and humble approach than the conflict *'provention'* approach suggested and developed by scholars like John Burton (Burton 1990). While for the peace activists, and also for the conflict *proventionists*, the goal is to eliminate the deeper causes of the conflict, the mere delaying of the eruption of violence should be considered a success for conflict prevention. Also, while, for peace activists and conflict *proventionists,* deterrence and punitive measures are considered old-fashioned means of power politics that should be abandoned if genuine peace is to be achieved, such means are not excluded in the exercise of preventive diplomacy (Lund, 1996).

This, however, does not mean that conflict prevention is just another variation of the traditional diplomacy of power politics. Two differences can be identified between the two approaches. On the normative level, for preventive diplomacy, power in its broad meaning, is a means to the settlement of conflicts, and the mere avoidance of violence in itself is a goal that is worth pursuing. On the practical level, until we reach the point where humans turn into peace-loving creatures who never consider violence as one of the means to achieve their objectives and who are capable of jointly facing the common threats resulting from population increase, environmental degradation and poverty, some of the basic traditional tools of power politics will be necessary, but only for the sake of the prevention of armed conflicts. Another difference between applying the traditional means of diplomacy within the context of traditional power politics, on the one hand, and within the context of conflict prevention, on the other hand, is associating traditional means of power politics with elements of co-operation and reward, that can, though only partly, satisfy the interest of rivals. In the practice of conflict prevention, the traditional means of diplomacy are applied to achieve some of the common interests of the parties to the conflict. In other words, in the context of conflict prevention, traditional tools of diplomacy and power politics are used not in a mere coercive modality, but rather in combination with rapprochement and reconciliation.

Conflict prevention is another kind of diplomatic activism, that can, and should, employ and apply different kinds of traditional diplomatic tools in addition to developing new ones. In the comparison he made between traditional conflict resolution and the nascent conflict prevention, Norkus (1996) showed that both conflict prevention and conflict resolution apply almost the same ways and means, even though for different goals and in different ways. These include the use of coercive means, something which he considers a dilemma (Norkus, 1996: 12). This dilemma is derived from the contradiction between the rising, and hoped for, culture of peace, on the one hand, and the use of coercive measures, on the other hand. However, this dilemma is not, in itself, genuine. It is, rather, derived from the genuine security dilemma present in the real world, which preventive diplomacy, for the sake of effectiveness, cannot ignore or escape.

Modes of conflict prevention can be seen as other types of diplomacy. The situational approach to conflict prevention, to be discussed later, can be seen as a conflict management strategy. Coercive means to conflict prevention are at the same time means of deterrence, conflict management, and crisis management. Reconciliatory means, especially when targeting the environmental aspects of a conflict, can also be considered as conflict resolution strategies. Emphasising the overlap between different types of diplomatic effort is important to show that preventive diplomacy should not be conceived of separately from other types of diplomacy.

Such a conception of preventive diplomacy might be criticised for blurring the differences between concepts (Lund, 1996: 383). However, there is still some advantage to such a conception. It is most important to direct attention to the usefulness of classic concepts and instruments of diplomacy in the realm of conflict prevention and to the contribution such concepts and tools can bring to it. This is particularly important in certain regions where conditions are not yet conducive to applying the more advanced formulas of conflict prevention. Lund (1996: 384) refers to intentions as another distinction between the traditional use of diplomatic means and their use in the realm of conflict prevention. Whether such tools and their implements actually play a role in preventing conflict depends on whether the parties act deliberately to keep latent or manifest disputes from worsening in those particular instances when tensions are rising and violence is quite possible.

Even though it might be difficult to judge the intentions of political actors, Lund's suggestion provides us with an additional criterion toward the study of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. However, at the same time, there is more to conflict prevention than just traditional diplomacy and power politics. Efforts of conflict prevention can be extended to cover issues never thought of by conventional diplomacy, for example, internal strife, confidence building and education. This turns preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention into the intellectual and political bridge between conventional diplomacy, on the one hand, and peace building, on the other. It is also the bridge between negative peace, i.e., the absence of war and violence, and positive peace, i.e., the elimination of the deep causes of the conflict. In other words, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention bridge the gap between the traditional security studies and the nascent science of peace.

At the height of the Cold War, the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld used the concept of conflict prevention to refer to diplomatic efforts that sought to keep regional conflicts from triggering confrontation between the two superpowers (Lund, 1996: 398 (note no. 10)). Confining the meaning of conflict prevention to the realm of relations between states, particularly between major powers, was mainly derived from the classical distinction between inter- and intrastate conflicts. Such a distinction finds its theoretical justification in the realist school that considered the state as the only actor in international politics, and assumed that a state's international behaviour will always

be the same as long as the state's position in the international power structure remains the same (Morgenthau, 1948).

Approaches to conflict prevention can be classified along a number of variables: scope, mode and instrument, as follows:

1. *Scope*: The scope of conflict prevention is a function of the depth of the conflict prevention effort. In this regard, two approaches of conflict prevention could be applied: the situation-oriented approach and the environment- oriented approach. The situation-oriented approach is the one that targets a certain situation in an ongoing conflict. The environment-oriented approach, on the other hand, seeks to change the surrounding environment of a certain conflict as a means to reduce the risk of the eruption, escalation, or spread of violence. Including the environment-oriented approaches into scopes of conflict prevention suggests that the latter should not be confined to 'short term, problem-oriented and contingency-specific operations, or the so-called "damage limitation" track of an overall security strategy or policy' (De Nooy, 1996).

2. *Mode*: Conflicts may be prevented through either coercive or conciliatory approaches. The coercive approach includes all efforts to prevent the eruption of a conflict through threatening the use of force in order to punish the party that resorts to violence. The conciliatory approach includes efforts to satisfy the needs of the involved parties, even partly, as a means to prevent conflict. It also includes rewarding parties for not resorting to violence.

3. *Instrument*: Conflict prevention can be applied through the initiative of any third party interested in preventing the conflict. This is what we call an ad hoc approach to conflict prevention. It can also be applied through established institutions, regional or international, bilateral or multilateral. Such institutions can be either those specialised in conflict prevention or general institutions that have the capacity and mandate to intervene in order to prevent the eruption of a conflict. We call this the institutional approach to conflict prevention.

In reality, the distinction between these different approaches and modes of conflict prevention is not that clear cut. A great deal of overlap between the different modes and approaches can be found in the real world. The proposed classification, however, is useful for the sake of studying the actual experience with conflict prevention. The interrelationships between the different approaches to conflict prevention can be presented in a matrix, like the one represented in *Table 4*.

Table 4

Strategies of Conflict Prevention

	Situational		**Environmental**	
	Coercion	Conciliation	Coercion	Conciliation
Ad hoc	Skirmish	No war no peace	Deterrence	Gradual settlement
Institutionalised	War	Truce	Alliance building	Peace

Historical experience in general, including that of the Southern Mediterranean, shows that the best method for conflict prevention is establishing security measures that function both as a deterrent for potential aggressors and as a guarantee for security for the different parties. For such security arrangements to function in a proper way, they have to be fairly balanced and impartial to avoid alienating any of the parties concerned. Security arrangements that are biased and one-sided are likely to create feelings of injustice; and although they might avert the eruption of interstate conflict for some time, they are likely to cause other kinds of conflict, in addition to the possible future renewal of the original one.

The nature of Southern Mediterranean politics might cause the region to defy some of the classical approaches to conflict prevention and confidence building. For example, some scholars argue that military build-up in the region serves not only the cause of national defence, but also some internal security purposes, and also the purpose of political competition for prestige, status and influence between the different regional powers (Mustafa, 1995). This suggests that problems such as an arms race are not just a function of interstate rivalry. Hence, applying measures such as arms control and disarmament as means toward conflict prevention to the region, should be done with great care and only with modest expectations.

The role of third parties is extremely important in this regard. Third parties can play multiple roles. Most important of these is providing the credible belief that a third party will certainly intervene against violations of the arrangements agreed upon. Conflict is much less likely to erupt when the intervention of third parties to the rescue of the target party is guaranteed (Gartner and Siverson, 1996). In other words, a third party role in providing for security arrangements can be instrumental in reducing the chances of aggression, a condition under which military ventures become unlikely. Therefore, well-tailored credible security arrangements are the best means to conflict prevention in the region.

Even in intrastate conflicts, the role of third parties is quite essential. Although the success record of intervention attempts in intrastate conflict is, at best, modest, it is rather the strategy of the intervening party and not the nature of the conflict that determines the outcomes of an intervention (Regan, 1996). Third party intervention should not necessarily be through military means. Political, financial and technical instruments might be equally important, and even more effective, especially as to the complicated conflicts of the Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.

Under the current conditions, the region does not seem ripe for applying conflict prevention measures similar to those that have been applied in Europe. In the light of the European experience, the region is still in a pre-conflict prevention stage. This being the case, it might be more effective to focus on soft preventive measures. These include long-term policies that aim at addressing the structural causes of the conflict. In this regard, the socio-economic approach developed within the framework of the Euro-Med partnership (EMP) seems suitable. However, some additional measures might be introduced in order to gradually develop the culture and institutions of conflict prevention. Putting such norms and institutions in place to be present when the region is ready to take advantage of them is quite necessary and helpful. Training courses in conflict prevention, joint research projects, and publicising the European experience with conflict prevention, all these might be useful in that direction.

One project that would be helpful in that regard is the establishment of a centre for conflict monitoring. The proposed centre should bring researchers and specialists from different Mediterranean countries to monitor regional developments, warn concerned parties of potential conflict situations, and to suggest the alternative policies that might help preventing them. For some time, the work of such a centre might be a mere intellectual exercise. However, on the longer run, it can provide policy makers with valuable policy alternatives and repertoires of actions, which can be used in handling real conflict situations.

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