


Halki
International Seminars 2000
FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION



**The Mediterranean
& the Middle East:
Looking Ahead**

**Halki - Greece
September 13 - 18, 2000**

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
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THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST: LOOKING AHEAD

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Halki, 13-18/IX/2000

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "The role of international organisations in the Mediterranean"/ Roberto Aliboni
 - 2. "A critical analysis of Jordan's experience with the WTO"/ Rateb Sweis
 - 3. "NATO's Mediterranean policy"/ Thanos Dokos
 - 4. "The Barcelona process needs to be revitalised"/ Eberhard Rhein
 - 5. Intervento di Hadjar Ammar
 - 6. "A tolerable security architecture for the Balkans and Greek-Turkish relations: is there a special role for the G7/8?"/ Theodore A. Couloumbis
 - 7. "Critical rethinking in foreign policy: Greek-Turkish relations in the post-cold war era"/ Ayten Gundogdu
 - 8. "Hizbullah's future after the Israeli withdrawal?"/ Haltham Muzahem



Halki International Seminars

FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION **2000**

SESSION 00.2

The Mediterranean & the Middle East: Looking Ahead

A seminar organised by

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Halki – Greece

September 13-18, 2000

Programme

With Special Thanks to:

The Kokkalis Foundation, Athens
The Dodecanese Prefecture, Rhodes
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The Soros Foundation – Kazakhstan
The Western European Union- Institute for Security Studies, Paris

WEDNESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER

- 19:30 **Seminar Registration** (Halki Hotel)
20:00 **Welcoming Addresses – Seminar Orientation - Introductions**
 Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for*
 European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens
- 20:30 Dinner at a tavern at the Halki Port

THURSDAY 14 SEPTEMBER

09:30-13:30 The Greater Middle East in the 21st Century: New Challenges & New Strategies

- Chair: Amb. Dionysios **LELOS**, *Director, Arab and Middle Eastern Countries*
 Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens
- Speakers: Prof. Shai **FELDMAN**, *Director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel*
 Aviv University
 Dr. Eberhard **RHEIN**, *Senior Advisor, European Policy Centre,*
 Brussels
 Dr. Ali **AL-SHAMALI**, *Director, Arab Research Center, Kuwait*
 Amb. Ozdem **SANBERK**, *Director General, TESEV, Istanbul*

17:00 – 20:00 The Role of International Organizations in the Mediterranean

- Chair: Dr. Willem **VAN EEKELN**, *Senator, Netherlands Senate, The Hague*
- Speakers: Dr. Roberto **ALIBONI**, *Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali*
 (IAI), Rome
 Ms. Waffa **BASSIM**, *Deputy Assistant to the Minister of Foreign*
 Affairs, Cairo
 Prof. Rateb **SWEIS**, *Deputy Dean, Higher Education and Training,*
 Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Amman
 Ms. Marina **VRAILA**, *Political Division, Western European Union,*
 Brussels
 Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for*
 European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

FRIDAY 15 SEPTEMBER

09:00 – 13:30 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Five Years after Barcelona: A First Assessment

- Chair: Dr. Ioannis **BOURLOYANNIS-TSANGARIDIS**, *Ambassador (ret.), Athens*
- Speakers: Dr. Eberhard **RHEIN**, *Senior Advisor, European Policy Centre,*
 Brussels
 Mr. Hadjar **AMMAR**, *Researcher, Political Science & International*
 Relations Department, Batna University, Algiers

17:30 – 20:30 **Eastern Mediterranean**
Greece – Turkey: Have the two countries moved beyond
“Earthquake Diplomacy”? Relations within the context of the EU

- Chair: Dr. Achilleas **MITSOS**, General Director, EU Research & Development, European Commission, Brussels
- Speakers: Prof. Theodore **COULOMBIS**, University of Athens; Director General, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens
Amb. Ozdem **SANBERK**, Director General, TESEV, Istanbul
Ms. Neyla **ARNAS**, Special Advisor, Office of European Security and Political Affairs, State Department, Washington DC
Prof. Yannis **VALINAKIS**, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens
Prof. Ahmet **EVIN**, Dean of Arts and Sciences, Sabanci University, Istanbul

SATURDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

09:00-13:30 **The Arab- Israeli Conflict: A Step Closer to Peace?**
Negotiations between Israel and Syria

- Chair: Dr. Eberhard **RHEIN**, Senior Advisor, The European Policy Centre, Brussels
- Speakers: Dr. Nasser **HADIAN - JAZY**, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran
Mr. Mordechay **CRISTAL**, Prime Minister's Office; Negotiation Management Center, Jerusalem
Dr. Riald **MALKI**, Director, Panorama Center, Ramallah
Dr. Joshua **TEITELBAUM**, Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

- 17:30-20:00 **Working Group Sessions**
Each working group will have a moderator and a rapporteur. The aim of the working groups is to discuss in greater detail the issues at hand and to draw up an agenda for further action.

WORKING GROUP I:

The next steps in Greek – Turkish Relations: Ideas and Proposals

- Moderator: Prof. Benjamin **BROOME**, Arizona State University
- Rapporteur: Mr. Philippos **SAVIDES**, PhD Candidate, University of Utah

WORKING GROUP II:

The Peace Process between Palestinians and Israelis

Moderator: Dr. Ted **FEIFER**, Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington D.C.

Discussion Papers: Prof. Mohammad **NAIRAB**, Head, Palestine National Center for Strategic and Security Studies; University of Gaza
Mr. Mordechai **CRISTAL**, Prime Minister's Office; Negotiation Management Center, Jerusalem

Rapporteur: Ms. Michelle **PACE**, PhD Candidate, University of Portsmouth

SUNDAY 17 SEPTEMBER

09:30-13:30 Working Group I (continued)
Working Group II (continued)

18:00-20:00 **Roundtable discussion: The Eastern Mediterranean in 2001: A zone of co-operation or a region of conflict?**

Chair: Dr. Roberto **ALIBONI**, Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Speakers: **Presentation of reports from WG I & II**
Mr. Philippos **SAVIDES**, PhD Candidate, University of Utah
Ms. Michelle **PACE**, PhD Candidate, University of Portsmouth
Discussion

Closing Remarks

Prof. Theodore **COULOMBIS**, University of Athens; Director General, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

20:00 Farewell Reception

MONDAY 18 SEPTEMBER

07:30 Luggage should be packed and assembled either in the Halki Hotel lobby, or at the accommodations' entrance, to be collected and loaded on the boat

08:00 Departure from Halki to Kamiros Skala Port in Rhodes and from there to Rhodes airport by bus.

Last updated: 15/9/2000

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Last Updated 12.9.00

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, International Affairs Institute - IAI, Rome

Halki International Seminar, session 2, September 13-18, 2000
"The Mediterranean and the Middle East: Looking Ahead"
organised by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy -
ELIAMEP

The inter-regional character of the Mediterranean area

The Mediterranean is a place where many different political and cultural entities happen to get in touch with one another. In some respects it may be regarded as a region in itself, in particular because of the environment and a number of dwindling premodern, subcultural similarities. In general, though, it can hardly be regarded as a regional entity, i.e. endowed with a significant inner coherence. There is no doubt, that what characterises the Mediterranean area is its quintessential inter-regional structure.

If we look at the initiatives to institutionalise inter-Mediterranean relations in the last few decades, we see that they are in fact of both regional and inter-regional character. In the functional realm, a clear example of Mediterranean regional organisation is the "Blue Plan", set out within the framework of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) with a view to manage common environmental resources relating to the sea. An example referring to the political realm can be drawn from the Cold War, namely the Mediterranean component of the Non-Aligned Movement. At that time, within that Movement there was a Mediterranean feeling shared by Southern European as well as Third World countries belonging to the area. Such common feeling was motivated by the perception of a cultural and political oppression enforced by imperialist quarters (like the USA and NATO). This gave way to the search for a Mediterranean region de-linked from Western dominance.

A similar claim is referred to globalisation, as of today. The important difference, however, is that today's European Mediterranean countries have been "Europeanised", either as long-standing members of the EU or because they are deeply involved in the European security framework, as for Balkan countries. In this sense, talking about a all-Mediterranean regional trend against globalisation would be a mistake. As a matter of fact, there is no "Mediterranean" grouping against globalisation in regional, inter-regional or international organisations (though there are streams of anti-globalisation opinion in Southern and Northern Europe).

In fact, the end of the East-West confrontation can be regarded as a watershed between the idea of the Mediterranean as a region and that of the Mediterranean as a

web of inter-regional relations. For sure, in Southern Europe the idea of some Mediterranean solidarity may have survived here and there, but it is politically irrelevant. On the other hand, as of today there is only one working Mediterranean political organisation, the Mediterranean Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation. This Forum being a grouping of Mediterranean countries with a loose ancillary task with respect to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), all the other Mediterranean working organisations have an inter-regional character. A number of intergovernmental and private networks or organisations (including those dealing with environment) refer to the Mediterranean region, but none of them has a political significance or task. In the political field, today's Mediterranean institutional set-up is substantially inter-regional.

There is no doubt that the inter-regional approach makes more sense and helps governments to organise in a more rational way some kind of badly needed co-operation among the different regions gravitating towards the Mediterranean basin. In fact, the inter-regional approach reflects the reality of regional differentiation across the Mediterranean and thus it makes possible to deal with the product of such differentiation, namely the political and security fragmentation of what is assumed to be the Mediterranean "region".

The fragmentation of the Mediterranean is due to at least four most important factors:

- first, its already noticed character of place where areas having their political and cultural "centres" elsewhere (more often than not, well beyond the rims lying on the basin) get in contact: the Mediterranean basin is a "frontier" and not a "centre" in itself;
- second, the fact that, partly as a consequence of what has been just said, the Mediterranean countries do not constitute what the theory of international relations defines as a "security complex"; in fact, they have different security agendas; this difference between agendas is very striking in the Mediterranean area, South-South security being affected by factors which have nothing to do with factors affecting North-South security; no doubt, this differentiation among Mediterranean security agendas has been accentuated by the end of the Cold War;
- third, the fact that, because of its global relevance (both economically and politically), the Mediterranean area is highly "penetrated" in both its marine and territorial dimensions, i.e. as a strategic waterway as well as a strategic location requiring substantial deployments of military forces and armaments.
- fourth, the fact that there are great economic gaps between countries in the North and the South of the basin, furthermore in the framework of very differentiated political and institutional regimes.

It must be pointed out that a greater rationality in dealing with such fragmented reality is not only predicated on the adoption of an inter-regional approach, but also on that of concomitant initiatives geared to solidify the structures of the individual regions relating to the Mediterranean (the most important such initiative being the Middle East Peace Process, MEPP, in particular its multilateral track). It could be added that reinforcing regional structures, so as to make the varying regions around the Mediterranean Sea more homogeneous, is very important for inter-regional co-operation to succeed in further stages.

With the end of the Cold War, these two principal political orientations - the inter-regional approach and the strengthening of Southern regions adjoining the Mediterranean - have been espoused by the various actors involved with the area. In fact, they have initiated two relevant sets of institutional policies, one concerning the relations between the Western and European alliances and the Mediterranean countries, like the EMP and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and another one relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area, like the MEPP, the MENA Economic Summits and, more recently, the Eizenstad process (which regards primarily the Maghreb countries).

Table 1 (attachment 1) lists the most important international organisations concerned with the Mediterranean area in the narrower and broader definitions just pointed out in the above. Much has been written on these organisations (see the essential bibliography provided in attachment 2), so that the paper doesn't deal with the illustration and analysis of the individual organisations involved. Rather, it focus on commenting the broad institutional structure of the area, seeking to identify its main trends. Some conclusions on the role of the Mediterranean institutional frameworks is drawn in the last section.

Trends relating to Mediterranean institutions

A high death-rate - Two out of the ten initiatives listed in table 1 are fully working and alive, namely the EMP and the Mediterranean Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation.

Three more initiatives, the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension, do work but their profile and/or operational capability appear rather low. NATO's operative profile has somehow improved in the last two years. Still, its Dialogue continues to be perceived as void, monotonous and somewhat irrelevant by Southern Partners. On the other hand, with the inclusion in the EU of the WEU, the latter has entered a transition in which, among other things, the future of the WEU Mediterranean activities has to be redefined in the framework of the emerging EU Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).

The recent Eizenstat initiative promises an American support to the Maghreb countries (including Libya and Mauritania) contingent to the acceptance by the latter of a globalisation agenda similar to that unsuccessfully fostered in the region by the MENA Economic Summits. This initiative has got very mixed reactions from the countries concerned and, for the time being, doesn't seem to have any impact worth mentioning.

The four initiatives left are just sleeping, when they are not defunct. According to the rule of diplomacy, nobody has closed nor will close them. Still, there is no doubt that they have run into crisis one after another and that, as of today, are not working: the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Western Mediterranean "Five plus Five Group", the MEPP and the MENA Economic Summits (which were rather strictly linked to the MEPP).

As already pointed out, between the two actually-working institutions there is an ancillary relationship: the Mediterranean Forum being a kind of club bringing together European and non-European members of the EMP sharing a Mediterranean location.

The Forum is hardly operating any project of its own. It is a group trading political and security points of view relating to the EMP agenda. It was promoted by Egypt at a time this country was afraid of being cut off by an apparently emerging privileged relationship between the EU and the Maghreb countries. Subsequently, the EU initiated the EMP and the Forum became obsolete. Still, the members decided to retain this kind of regional Mediterranean circle as a kind of political signal to the wider inter-regional EMP circle. In this sense the Forum is the only remnant of the idea of a special Mediterranean solidarity involving both European and non-European countries. In its ancillary relationship with the EMP, the Forum may play a helpful role and contribute to reinforce the EMP itself. With all its shortcomings, the EMP remains today the most relevant and important institution dealing with inter-Mediterranean relations.

From what has been said, one first conclusion is that there is a fairly high death-rate among Mediterranean institutions, accompanied by a certain weakness of those concerned by security in a narrower and military sense, a point which will be resumed later on.

The high death-rate seems correlated, however, to a rather high birth-rate. This may mean that there are political, social and economic conditions demanding for an urgent and badly needed co-operation, but also obstacles and conditions of fragmentation that render co-operation fragile and difficult to be kept alive.

A strong holistic character - The two institutions that actually work have both a holistic or multidimensional approach (this approach being only theoretical for the Forum given its non operational character). In fact, they deal with political and security relations as well as economic development, cultural and social relations. They reach out to sectoral fields of co-operation as important as the struggle to internationally organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.

The same approach used to characterise the "Five plus Five" Group (which definitely belongs to the branch of the species evolution that has brought the EMP about). To some extent, the same was true with the Euro-Arab Dialogue. A holistic approach was also characterising the multilateral track of the MEPP.

The other initiatives have some more specific task. The OSCE Mediterranean activities, the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue and that carried out by NATO are concerned by security only, on the narrower sense of military security or in the broader sense of the possible use of military instruments in a co-operative security perspective.

If the MENA Economic Summits are taken into consideration independently of the MEPP, they could be regarded as the only initiative, among those considered by this paper, specialising in economic co-operation, i.e. adopting a non-holistic approach. However, it would be wrong to consider the MENA Economic Summits in isolation. They were, no doubt, linked in an organic way to the MEPP multilateral track. As a matter of fact, an organisation that is at the same time only Mediterranean (in a broad sense) and only economic in its character is hardly there. What is there, but clearly outside the institutional framework considered by this paper, is a set of branches or agendas in the UN and in the International Economic Organisations, like the Department dealing with the MENA in the World Bank or the already quoted "Blue Plan" in the UNEP.

Generally speaking the holistic approach is featuring contemporary regionalism everywhere. For example, it is a prominent aspect in the experiences of regional integration presently taking place in Latin America, like the Mercosur. In inter-Mediterranean relations, however, the holistic approach looks even more inherent than elsewhere to political and economic conditions prevailing in the area, in other words to the "political economy" of the area.

With particular reference to the North-South dimension, two such conditions can be stressed, some of them already pointed out in the above general comments: (a) the political and economic fragmentation of the area and the consequent inter-regional nature of relations in the Mediterranean area, in particular the fact that political regimes, cultural orientations and levels of development are very diverse; (b) armed conflicts in the area are generally terminated (i.e. they are not necessarily solved but can hardly re-enter a stage of open violence) and have shifted from inter-state to intra-state relations. Consequently, in the Mediterranean area security depends less on international than domestic factors, that is less on international disputes and external military threats than social, cultural, economic, ethnic factors. For sure, there are military threats, like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Still, they are perceived as risks that can translate into inter-state threats only if inter-regional co-operation fails to stabilise local situations by taking care of those social, economic, cultural, ethnic factors which trigger proliferation and other such risks.

For this reasons, a holistic, multidimensional approach fits well with Mediterranean institutions of international co-operation or, to say the least, it makes the adoption of "umbrella" institutions or networks more especially convenient.

Relevance of a civilian notion of security - A corollary of what has been just said is the relevance to inter-Mediterranean, in particular Euro-Mediterranean relations of a security notion more linked to social and civilian than military factors; in any case, of a notion of comprehensive rather than narrow security. One consequence of this relevance is that Mediterranean institutions, beside short-term instruments of crisis management and diplomacy, must be endowed with middle-long term instruments to manage systemic and structural factors. In this sense, at least in principle, the EMP looks like the most fitting institutions to deal with inter-regional co-operation in the Mediterranean area and, if not misguided, it should result more resilient than security-oriented organisations proper.

A strong external presence - The upper section of table 1 shows in a rather clear way that Mediterranean or even Euro-Mediterranean initiatives proper are a minority. Most of the initiatives concerning the area (seven on ten) bring about a more or less important presence of actors which do not belong to the Mediterranean area in a narrow sense nor to geographically adjoining areas. In the case of European and transatlantic Dialogues (NATO, OSCE, WEU) with the Mediterranean area, the latter is aggregated as a more or less collateral appendix. In the case of the MEPP and the MENA Economic Summits, the presence of external actors is more evident and the Mediterranean (in a broad sense) plays a central role.

The importance of external actors' presence is usual in areas prone to political and economic conflicts and with a global relevance. In these areas, large international "coalitions" use to emerge with the aim of preventing, managing and solving such conflicts. Historically, this is nothing new to the Mediterranean. Today, this tendency remains strong for at least two reasons: (a) solid - as already pointed out- with respect

to many cultural and environmental factors, the Mediterranean is not a "centre" politically but a kind of cross-road where even very distant countries may get in touch. For example, the Dialogues of the European and transatlantic institutions (NATO, OSCE, WEU) with the Southern Mediterranean countries bring in actors as distant as the USA and Canada (not to talk about the Mediterraneanisation of Northern Europe due to the EMP); (b) furthermore, the "global" role the Mediterranean area used to play in the Cold War era as the Southern Flank of NATO is not over in the geopolitical vision of the United States, though its significance has changed. In fact, according to Brzezinskiⁱⁱ, with Western Europe and the group of states at the far-eastern rim of the Asiatic continent (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.), the Middle Eastern/Mediterranean expanse is the third area the USA have to be able to control to prevent in the Euro-Asiatic continent any change adverse to their power and that of the West.

This situation brings about the conclusion that the initiatives regarding the Mediterranean area can hardly avoid a high level of "internationalisation" or "penetration" from outside. External influences in the Mediterranean are obvious and legitimate.

This conclusion provides an important corollary, i.e. that the Euro-Mediterranean initiatives should be open with respect to external influences and deal with them as with opportunities rather than liabilities. In particular, unlike Russia and the Balkans, the Middle Eastern-Mediterranean area triggers strong differences between the EU or Western Europe and the United States. This competition may result detrimental to co-operation and institutionalisation in the area.

Between an open and a closed Mediterranean space - Whether the Mediterranean is regarded as an open or closed space is thus important in the transatlantic perspective. This question is relevant from a cultural and economic point of view rather than security's. As far as security is concerned, there are disagreements between the two sides of the North Atlantic Ocean and even institutional competition, but at the end of the day there is a strong strategic convergence and this convergence is substantially working. Contradictions have a greater impact when it comes to economic interests and, to a lesser extent, cultural ones. In this sense, there is a contest in the Mediterranean between the forces that push for the globalisation of local economies and those looking at globalisation with suspicion and strong reluctance, when they are not strongly opposing it.

There is no doubt that co-operation in the regional dimension of the MEPP has been perceived and promoted by the USA and the EU according to different ways and concepts. In the Regional Economic Development Working Group of the MEPP (REDWG), the EU ("gavel-holder" of the Group) has tried to direct MEPP regional co-operation by anticipating a privileged and strong link with the Union itself, that is a Mediterranean inter-regional or Euro-Mediterranean co-operation. To that purpose, the EU has tried to introduce in the Group instruments and visions consistent with its aim of privileged inter-regional co-operation. The USA have countered this trend, not without success. Since the inception of the REDWG, they have tried to encourage a regional co-operation in the MENA areas more linked to globalisation than to EU regionalism and to the World Bank than to Brussels. The EU has acted in the REDWG having in mind the implementation of its strategy of Euro-Mediterranean "networking". Washington has tried to set up networks going beyond the areas in

question. This resulted very clearly in the process of the MENA Economic Summits, in particular with reference to the US proposal of instituting a development bank (Menabank) for the MENA area, that was opposed not only by the Arabs but also by the EU. The US Eizenstat initiative is now developing in the same line of thought.

On the other hand, it would be wrong and simplistic to look at this differences as the opposition between a EU strategy of exclusion versus an American strategy of global opening. The development strategy adopted by the EMP is undoubtedly based on the philosophy of the "Washington consensus". It aims at achieving a situation of "open" regionalism, albeit with some graduality.

As a matter of fact, one can hardly say that there is a transatlantic difference concerning the task of integrating the international economy globally. Rather, it can be said that the EU/EMP regionalist way is trying to protect a sphere of political autonomy, though it sticks fundamentally to the American promotion of globalisation. In sum, the opposition has a political significance. This is confirmed by the fact that one of the most important objective of the EMP for both Arab and European partners is the strengthening of their respective political identity. For the Arabs, the EMP is politically relevant to the extent it creates an alternative to the overwhelming US hegemony in their region. For the European, the EMP may become an important nursery contributing to the growing up of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CESDP.

The transatlantic entanglement has a great impact on Mediterranean institutions. It gives way to differences, less economic than political, which may undermine the success of these institutions and the attainment of their strategic tasks of development and stabilisation. Co-operation in the transatlantic circle may be an important precondition for the Mediterranean inter-regional institutions to achieve effective co-operation.

Conclusions: the role of international institutions in the Mediterranean

One has to distinguish between what role Mediterranean institutions have played after the end of the Cold War and what role they should be expected to play in next future accounting for the experience accumulated in that period of time. Results so far have been ambivalent and, to a considerable extent, unsatisfactory. Mediterranean institutions need to be better focused and more effective.

Mediterranean institutions were revived at the end of the 1980s with the ambition of taking advantage of the end of the East-West confrontation to transform the area from one of violent conflicts with global omplications to one prone to stability and co-operation. With respect to this goal, there emerged three tiers of challenges:

- *the incongruity of the notion of Mediterranean*; the latter has been regarded as a region in itself, whereas it is a composite area with different security agendas and different political and cultural settings; while the notion of "Mediterranean policy" can well describe the policies of a country or an alliance towards the area, it cannot indicate a common policy of different contries as the rationale for common Mediterranean institutions; by clearly distinguishing a Northern and Southern side of the area, the Euro-Mediterranean format has been the first significant rationalisation of the inter-regional policy-approach to be held towards the Mediterranean;

- *the role of distant and external actors*; that the Mediterranean area is "penetrated" can well be a cause of displeasure for the advocates of the Mediterranean as a region, culturally and politically homogeneous, to be de-linked from international capitalism or globalisation; as a matter of fact, in view of the inherent inter-regional structure of the area (which by the way reflects today's shift from the exaltation of a "Mediterranean" identity to that of a plurality of more traditional ethnic-religious identities), one can wonder whether in the event the concept of "penetration" makes sense, for the composite nature of the area entails by definition external presences; in other words, one can hardly escape the strong global component that is embedded in the Mediterranean politics; consequently, the Mediterranean actors, the EU, Turkey, Israel and the Arabs, all allied with the United States, must find the way to make this common alliance a factor of unity and synergy in their policies towards the area rather than looking at Washington as an intruder when coming to the Mediterranean; for sure, it is as justified as necessary that they uphold a margin of political autonomy in the area with respect to Washington; there could be, however, a functional distinction of issues and respective roles in the area, for example between hard and soft security, cultural and economic co-operation and so forthⁱⁱⁱ;
- *the military dimension in the notion of Mediterranean security*; the approach to the issue of security in the Mediterranean area has been strongly influenced by history and has much resented of Cold War experiences; it has also been affected by the inherent mix of global and regional or local factors which characterises security in this "frontier" or "penetrated" area; in the last five years the holistic approach of the EU, as applied to the EMP, with its emphasis on non-military factors and stability (rather narrow security) has clearly emerged as the security approach that fits with Mediterranean fragmentation and specific requirements.

These precious experiences are already at work. They have had a considerable impact on the role of Mediterranean institutions and contributed to reshape the latter. If these experiences and changes are taken into account, it is possible to set out the main lines of what the role of Mediterranean institutions could be in next future, that is next agenda for increasing co-operation in the area and improving its systemic structure:

- the main focus should be the building of confidence as a precondition for structured political co-operation; confidence in the context of the Mediterranean doesn't correspond to the most familiar CSCE/OSCE notion; confidence in the Mediterranean refers to the necessity of establishing more primordial conditions of cohabitation and co-operation, which are just not there, as precursors to operational and structural measures and policies of arms limitation or disarmament, when they will become possible;

in this perspective, three principal aims should be pursued: (a) the resolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict and the establishment in the Middle East (as distinct from the Mediterranean) of the kind of security co-operation that the ACRS had begun to pursue before it was suspended; the creation of a kind of CSCME (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East) as a precondition for the establishment of an inter-regional security organisation bringing together the Middle East and Europe (the CSCME and the OSCE?); (b) the implementation of Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs); (c) a successful agenda of economic growth and liberalisation;

- it must be clearly recognised and stipulated that the Mediterranean institutions are not committed to pursue collective security on inter-regional basis, this task remaining strictly in the hands of the UN and the Security Council; it must also be recognised that political conditions prevailing in the area do not allow, as of today, for a consensus on the assignment of collective security tasks to security organisations from regions other than the ones in need of interventions (in other words, a task could be assigned to NATO in relation to the necessity of intervening in Europe, but not in an Arab country); the role of Mediterranean institutions for the time being must be confined to create the premises for the implementation of a full-fledged co-operative security zone, starting with the application of simple measures of co-operative security, like military seminars, training, etc. directed at modifying the basic conflict culture that prevails today in the basin; this change is a first unavoidable step to begin organising a co-operative security zone proper;
- the establishment of a common human dimension, entailing the common adoption of Copenhagen-like principles should be strongly encouraged, though present conditions are not conducive to an early implementation of this task and, perhaps, previous tasks have to be first consolidated in order to make it possible to set up a common platform for human rights and democracy.

ⁱ Ole Wøever, Barry Buzan, "An Inter-Regional Analysis: NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Theory of Security Complexes", in S. Behrendt, C.-P. Hanelt (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate - Europe and the Middle East*, Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 2000, pp. 55-106.

ⁱⁱ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Great Chessboard*, Basic Books, New York, 1997.

ⁱⁱⁱ This functional division of tasks has been argued very persuasively by Ian O. Lesser, "The Changing Mediterranean Security Environment. A Transatlantic Perspective", in George Joffé (ed.), *Perspectives on Development. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, Frank Cass, London, 1999, pp. 212-228.

Attachment 1: Tav. 1 - Mediterranean international organisations and their membership

membership	FORUM	EMP	WEU Dialogue	NATO Dialogue	OSCE Mediterranean Dimension	MEPP multilateral track	MENA Economic Summits ⁶	Eizenstadt Initiative	5+5	Euro-Arab Dialogue
Med countries (non-EU & EU)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
non Med EU countries		X	X	X	X	X	X			X
non-EU European countries & extra-Euro-Med countries ¹			X	X	X	X	X	X		
non-EU Med countries ¹	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria		Algeria	Algeria	Algeria
		PNA				PNA				PNA
	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt				Egypt
		Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan				Jordan
		Lebanon								Lebanon
								Libya	Libya	Libya
	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco		Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia		Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia
		Syria								Syria
		Israel	Israel	Israel	Israel	Israel				
		Cyprus			Cyprus					
	Malta	Malta			Malta				Malta	
	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey				
Med EU countries	France	France	France	France	France	France			France	France
	Greece	Greece	Greece	Greece	Greece	Greece				Greece
	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy			Italy	Italy
	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal			Portugal	Portugal
	Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain			Spain	Spain
non Med EU countries		Austria	Austria		Austria	Austria				Austria
		Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium				Belgium
		Danemark	Danemark	Danemark	Danemark	Danemark				Danemark
		Finland	Finland		Finland	Finland				Finland
		Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany				Germany
		Luxemburg	Luxemburg	Luxemburg	Luxemburg	Luxemburg				Luxemburg
		Ireland	Ireland		Ireland	Ireland				Ireland
		Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands				Netherlands
		UK	UK	UK	UK	UK				UK
		Sweden	Sweden		Sweden	Sweden				Sweden
non EU European countries			Iceland	Iceland	Iceland					
			Norway others ¹	Norway	Norway others ²	Norway others ⁴				
extra-Euro-Med countries ¹			Mauritania	Mauritania		Mauritania		Mauritania	Mauritania	Mauritania
					others ³	others ⁵				others ⁷
				Canada	Canada	Canada				

				USA	USA	USA		USA		
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¹ Associated partner countries: Bulgaria, Czec Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Associated countries Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Observers: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. The ten countries left are full members (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK)

² Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czec Rep., Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Holy See, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Monaco, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro).

³ Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; South Korea and Japan, with the status of partners for cooperation.

⁴ Hungary, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, plus the EU and EFTA.

⁵ Arab countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Other countries: China, Japan, India, South Korea. International Organizations: World Bank, IAEA, UN/UNDP.

⁶ The MENA Economic Summits' membership has varied very much from the first (61 participants) through the fourth summit (60), in general, it is close to the multilateral track of the MEPP.

⁷ The other members of the Arab League, i.e. the members of the GCC;Gibuti, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen.

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A Critical Analysis Of Jordan's Experience with the WTO

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Abstract

A Critical Analysis Of Jordan's Experience with the WTO

By Dr. Rateb Sweis

Recently, the world economy has been undergoing a number of fundamental changes such as globalization and growing market interdependence among nations. This situation creates a need for closer cooperation among countries. At the center of globalization is the World Trade Organization (WTO) – the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system.

This paper is concerned with the effect of the WTO membership on the Jordanian economy and the need to inform and train the various Jordanian economic and social institutions about the requirements of the WTO. The available WTO-related materials and publications were used as tools to aid in the preparation of this paper.

Based upon an analysis of this case, it is determined that a sound but not conclusive case can be made for Jordan's accession to the WTO. It seems that the accession is adequate to achieve meaningful stimulation of the Jordanian economy. However, the stimulation might not be specifically targeted to small indigenous industries. Furthermore, the agreement does not provide specific measures to safeguard against market volatility, which is often considered a disincentive to long-term investment in capital and productivity-enhancing investments.

Finally to develop a meaningful and complete understanding of this subject, one needs more preliminary information and past data on single-country experience with WTO.

A Critical Analysis of Jordan's Experience with the WTO

Key Words: *Jordan, Globalization, WTO, Indigenous Industries, Foreign Investments, Exports, Economic Growth, and Construction Activity.*

Introduction

As we approach the new millennium, the world economy is undergoing a number of fundamental changes. The international markets are growing rapidly and capital mobility has increased tremendously. World trade continues to grow and companies are turning global. This situation creates a need for closer cooperation among nations in a world of growing market interdependence, globalization and liberalization.

At the center of globalization is the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO is defined as the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system (Hindawi, 1999). It is the outcome of the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 whereby trade relations between countries evolve through debate, negotiations and adjudication. The Uruguay Round was the last of a series of rounds, which began by the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

This paper seeks to answer two questions: (a) what are the requirements for Jordan's accession to the WTO? And (b) if these requirements are met, will the effect on Jordan's indigenous industries be sufficiently large and its impacts significant enough to warrant the initiation of public policies to promote WTO-related awareness programs for the Jordanian institutions? The first section of this paper presents an overview of the WTO agreement. The requirements for Jordan's accession to the WTO are presented in the second section. Section Three discusses the major impacts of WTO membership on the Jordanian economy emphasizing its role in attracting foreign investments, creating an environment conducive to long-term economic growth and promoting construction activity. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section Four.

Section One

World Trade Organization Agreements

On April 15 1994, the WTO was established by the Marrakesh Declaration to provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members. The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. The WTO multilateral trading system is based on two major principles: (a) Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) meaning that countries can not normally discriminate between their trading partners and (b) National Treatment whereby imported and locally-produced materials should be treated equally. In other words, others should be given the same treatment as one's own nationals.

Functions of the WTO

According to Article Three of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO, 1995), the WTO shall serve the following functions:

- (a) The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation and further the objectives and shall provide the framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
- (b) The WTO shall provide the forum for regulations among its members concerning their multilateral trade relations.
- (c) The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the settlement of disputes.
- (d) The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.

- (e) With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and its affiliated agencies.

Major Agreements of the WTO

Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods

This agreement includes: (a) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), (b) Agreement on Agriculture, (c) Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, (d) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, (e) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, (f) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, (g) Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, (h) Agreement on Rules of Origin, (i) Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, (j) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and (k) Agreement on Safeguards.

General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)

This agreement applies to members affecting trade in services. The general obligations and disciplines for members are (WTO 1994):

- (a) Most-Favored-Nation Treatment.
- (b) Transparency.
- (c) Disclosure of Confidential Information.
- (d) Increasing Participation of Developing Countries.
- (e) Economic Integration.
- (f) Labor Markets Integration Agreement.
- (g) Domestic Regulations.

- (h) Recognition.
- (i) Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers.
- (j) Business Practices.
- (k) Emergency Safeguard Measures.
- (l) Payments and Transfers.
- (m) Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments.
- (n) Government Procurements.
- (o) General Exceptions.
- (p) Subsidies.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

The purpose of this agreement is to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade and promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. TRIPS articles include but are not limited to (WTO 1994):

- (a) Copyright and Related Rights.
- (b) Trademarks.
- (c) Geographic Indicators.
- (d) Industrial Designs.
- (e) Patents.
- (f) Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits.
- (g) Protection of Undisclosed Information.
- (h) Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses.

Section Two

How to Join the WTO: The Accession Process

In order to join the WTO, a country must submit an application, which goes through four stages:

- (a) The government applying for membership must submit a memorandum describing all aspects of its trade on economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements. The memorandum is examined by the working party dealing with the country's application.
- (b) During this stage, bilateral talks begin between the prospective new member and individual countries. The purpose of the negotiation is to allow the prospective new member to work out with the rest of the members individually what it has to offer in terms of tariff rates and specific market access commitments.
- (c) Once the bilateral market access negotiations are complete, the working party produces a draft membership treaty ("Protocol of Accession") and a list of the joining member's commitments.
- (d) The WTO Council of Ministerial Conference votes on the protocol and list of commitment. If a two-thirds majority of WTO members vote in favor, the applicant is free to accede to the organization.

For the past five years, Jordan has been working towards joining WTO by attempting to conform to the WTO agreements (UNCTAD 1996). According to the WTO, significant legal and policy reform has been implemented and Jordan became a member of the WTO in April 2000. Jordan reformed its foreign trade regime by amending many of its existing laws, enacting many new laws, and changing many of its trade policies.

Section Three

Major Impacts of WTO Membership on the Jordanian Economy

The development of industrial stimulus policies in Jordan has been heavily influenced by the policies of the International Monetary Fund (Sweis, 1999). Such policies are aimed largely at the fiscal stability of the country, but they have significant impacts on the latitude available to small developing countries for adopting stimulus packages. Creating tax incentives, credit easing, or the establishment of any form of protectionism for indigenous industries runs counter to the International Monetary Fund liberalization policies. Mandating participation of indigenous firms on governmental or internationally financed projects would also be discouraged if such mandates raised the cost of the project.

In assessing approaches to encourage indigenous industries in Jordan, the dilemma posed by globalization is clear. The liberalization of trade and the free flow of capital, when coupled with greater political stability will certainly stimulate industrial activity. With this greater activity comes greater competition at a time when small indigenous firms cannot compete. In a recent International Monetary Fund position paper, it was stated that:

"Increased trade, capital and labor movement, and technological progress have enabled greater specialization and the dispersion of specialized production processes to geographically distant locations."

Although the observation was made with respect to manufacturing, it is appropriate to other industries.

Currently, the WTO has 139 member nations including 8 Arab countries (Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates). Furthermore, 33 other countries including (Saudi Arabia and Sudan) are negotiating accession. Members of the WTO account for about 90% of total world trade in goods and services and Jordan is currently doing 83% of its foreign trade with countries that are WTO members (WTO, 1999). It is therefore imperative that Jordan cannot remain

isolated from the WTO activities. By doing so, Jordan might risk having serious negative economic consequences on its economy both in the medium and long term. The following section provides, in some detail, analysis of the major impacts that may result from Jordan's membership to the WTO.

Foreign Investment Attraction

Today, the world economy is undergoing a number of fundamental changes. Capital has achieved a great degree of mobility. The international financial markets are not only closely interconnected but also are growing exponentially. Countries that are unable to participate in the expansion of world trade or attract significant amounts of private investment run the risk of being marginalized by the global economy and those countries that can manage to establish a better investment environment will have higher potential to attract investment.

When investors make decisions to invest in a specific country, a number of key factors are evaluated:

- (a). Are trade and investment rules in line with internationally accepted rules and principles?
- (b). Is the investment environment stable, predictable and attractive?
- (c). Does the country's products and services have open access to the outside world?
- (d). Does the country respect intellectual property rights?

Developing countries, in general, possess many characteristics, such as low standards of living, political instability, unemployment and underemployment, and low levels of productivity. Furthermore, the fluctuating demand, tied to political and economic volatility (Moavenzadeh, 1984), makes it extremely difficult to forecast economic performance. These phenomena, along with financial and other business risks, hinder the flow of foreign investment into the country.

By conforming to the various agreements of WTO (GATT, GATS and TRIPS), the government of Jordan will be creating an environment that is attractive, protective of intellectual property rights and open to the markets of 139 soon to be 172 countries around the world (WTO, 2000).

The Impact on Exports

As noted in earlier sections, a WTO member should grant non-discriminatory Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment to products imported from another WTO country. Currently, Jordan has no say over how other countries treat its exports and other countries may impose import duties, quotas and internal taxes on Jordanian exports thereby making Jordanian goods and services non-competitive in the international markets. Jordan's accession to the WTO provides an effective tool for Jordan to secure advantages and fair treatment for its exports in at least 90% of the world markets. However, Jordan must not ignore or minimize the fact that it needs to bring up the quality of its products and services to the levels of other member countries, if it is to compete effectively in the international markets. Therefore the Jordanian industries should encounter some short-term difficulties in adapting to the new WTO system of trade.

Participation of Indigenous Industries in Total Expected Economic Growth

In both developed and developing countries, the construction industry plays a major role in the economy by contributing significantly to the Gross Domestic Product, employing a sizable portion of the working population, accounting for about half of the capital formation, and interacting strongly with other sectors of the economy (Hillibrandt, 1984). Thus, a healthy construction industry is considered both a result of, and a prerequisite for, economic development. Adding to the importance of the construction industry is its pivotal role in infrastructure development. Infrastructure can be the foundation of both economic and social development but often becomes instead a bottleneck to economic expansion in developing countries (World Bank, 1993). In this section, we shall evaluate the past performance of the indigenous construction industry as a leading sector in the Jordanian economy.

Next, we shall look at the participation of the Jordanian indigenous construction companies as a percent of total construction activity in the past. Figure 1 shows the five-year rates of growth of construction over the period from 1980 to 1994.




Figure.1. Growth of the Jordanian Construction Industry (1980-1994)

Past periods of expansion in construction activity in Jordan lead to the conclusion that indigenous construction activity may not grow in a proportional rate to overall growth. If the total construction activity in Jordan is examined between 1990 and 1995 (encompassing the last cycle of expansion and contraction), a number of observations are relevant to the assessment of the participation of Jordan's indigenous construction industry in any new growth cycle. Figure 2 shows the total activity carried out by indigenous firms. In 1990 and 1991, the foreign share of the total market was quite small 1%. This percentage grew to 14% in 1993. Foreign market share follows the trend in public sector construction much more closely than private sector activity. Figure 3 shows the foreign construction activity relative to public sector financed construction.




Figure.2 Total, Indigenous, and Joint Venture Construction Activity in Jordan for the Period 1990-199




Figure.3. Share of Foreign Construction Firms in Total Public Sector Contracts for the Period 1990-1994

Although the data is sketchy, some conclusions can be drawn. The first observation is that the market as a whole is highly volatile, growing by 300% in two years, only to contract to almost half within the next two years. This volatility is not conducive to long-term investment in equipment or any fixed investment by indigenous firms that operate only in Jordan, are generally smaller and have limited access to capital markets.

The public sector market, while not as volatile as the private sector, seems prone to favor foreign firms during periods of expansion. From 1991 to 1993, public sector activity expanded by JD150 million; foreign construction firm activity expanded by JD 90 million. When the public sector activity contracted

sharply in 1994 by JD 140 million, foreign construction contracted by nearly JD 90 million. The low level of joint venture activity throughout this period (as presented in Figure 2) would lead to the conclusion that public sector contracts are prime targets for foreign firms and that the government has not developed an approach, at least during this period, to use public sector contracts to assist either in the long-run expansion of indigenous firms or in reducing the volatility of the construction activity levels.

The percentage of public sector activity to total construction ranged from 20% to almost 30% over this period. If the 1990-1994 period, market share with respect to public sector/private sector and indigenous/foreign market sizes remains valid, 75% of total growth would occur in the private sector, and indigenous companies would absorb this growth. It would be expected that this activity would encompass smaller, less complex jobs requiring lower amounts of capital equipment. Public sector activity, representing perhaps 25% of the growth, would be subject to foreign participation.

The actual level of foreign participation would depend on a variety of factors:

- (a) The complexity of the public sector work.
- (b) The enforcement of joint venture regulations in Jordan.
- (c) The capacity or willingness of the indigenous construction firms to embark on longer-term capital expansion plans, as well as their access to capital.

Other Impacts

It is likely that Jordanian production and exports will increase by virtue of its accession to the WTO thereby, implying increases in corporate income which could be used to further corporate investment. Furthermore, the projected increases in corporate revenues are likely to strengthen the fiscal revenue base.

Foreign investors would probably no longer need tax incentives to invest in Jordan thus leading to an additional increase in fiscal revenues (WTO, 1999)

While there is great potential for the expansion of the country's fiscal revenues, the negative impact of tariff reduction and, ultimately the removal of most restrictions on trade, might offset the projected increase in fiscal revenues. In addition, projected increases in private sector investment are not necessarily channeled to the small indigenous firms. The more general economic problem is that Jordan – like many developing countries – faces the unpredictability of future events and the possibility of critical developments in its socio-political environment. Thus, while accession to the WTO might create a great potential for the expansion of economic activity in the country, the continuing perception of instability may provide a difficult environment for the mostly small indigenous companies without the implementation of government policies stimulating such expansion.

One of the most notable aspects of Jordan's accession to the WTO is that Jordan will have access to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). DSB, in turn, will facilitate trade resolutions to any trade disputes that Jordan may have with its trading partners. This system of dispute settlement is, supposedly, far more superior than resolving trade disputes on a bilateral basis, especially with a more powerful trading country.

Section Four

Conclusion

Based upon analysis in Section Three for justifying Jordan's accession to the WTO, a sound, but not conclusive, case can be made. The expected benefits are high. The WTO plays an essential role in international trade development that is critical to the sustainable development of any country. WTO agreements promote the utilization of a broad spectrum of skilled and unskilled labor available in member countries. In countries such as Jordan, the forecast of overall economic growth due, in part, to improving political climate, will provide opportunities for the growth of its export sector - if Jordan is in a position to take advantage of such opportunities.

From the discussion carried out in section Three, it seems clear that accession to the WTO is adequate to achieve meaningful stimulation of the Jordanian economy. Based upon the analysis of the Jordanian case, two shortcomings to the accession process may be identified:

- (a) Many of the agreements may have the impact of stimulating overall industrial activity but are not necessarily targeted to the indigenous industries.
- (b) The agreements do little to reduce the overall market volatility for indigenous firms. Such volatility is particularly high in developing countries and is a disincentive to long-term investments in capital equipment or productivity-enhancing investments.

In assessing the efficacy of the methodology employed in this paper, it should be emphasized that the objective of the methodology was to shed light on the issue of Jordan's accession to the WTO; it was not meant to create a precise estimate as might be derived from a fully-specified economic or physical model.

The limitation of this paper stems from a number of considerations:

(a) The World Trade Organization is a relatively new phenomenon. More preliminary information and past data on single country experience with WTO is needed if we are to develop a more complete understanding of this subject.

(b) In the present study, a general assessment was made with regard to the articles of the WTO agreement. In order to effectively evaluate the agreement's effect on the stimulation of the economy of Jordan, the characterization of the industry in Jordan should include: firm size, past activity levels, linkages with other sectors, information on market segmentation, pricing policies, and productivity measures. Without such information, assessing the reaction to any stimulus policies aimed at the indigenous industry is difficult.

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NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE

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It is the official position of the EU, NATO and the WEU that security and stability in Europe are closely linked to events in the Mediterranean basin. Despite the alarmist predictions of some analysts, which are becoming fashionable because of events in Kosovo, there is no direct military threat (in the form of "clash of civilisations") from the South towards the North, in the Mediterranean region. Terrorism, religious extremism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat first and foremost to the southern Mediterranean states and to a much lesser extent to NATO and the West. Furthermore, most security challenges and problems in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature and therefore cannot be dealt with by military means. Indeed, the multi-dimensional character of the security environment in the Mediterranean suggests a need for a comprehensive vision of security and a holistic problem-solving approach.

A number of systemic, institutional and domestic constraints hinder the development of a comprehensive security regime. Several preconditions must be met for a successful European or NATO effort to build confidence and ensure stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region. I will mention three prerequisites, but there are many more.

First, the Mediterranean region possesses its own specific dynamics and security challenges. The European model of cooperative security, with all its conditionalities, can be proposed to, but not imposed upon the Mediterranean region. Although some elements of NATO's PfP initiative, which was quite successful in Central and Eastern Europe, may be applicable to the Mediterranean, the relative heterogeneity of the region would require specifically tailored solutions.

Second, topics for cooperation should be acceptable to the partners and workable in practice. No progress can be achieved without the active participation and contribution of NATO's Mediterranean partners.

Third, we lack a uniform and commonly accepted definition of security on the two sides of the Mediterranean. The absence of a common

political vocabulary and approach to security hinders the progress of a security dialogue with the Mediterranean countries and often contributes to misperceptions and misunderstandings on both sides.

We must ascertain the capabilities of each country and organisation in order to achieve the most efficient division of labour. The best means of preventing many future crises in the Mediterranean is to address their root causes before the situation reaches the crisis stage. Because most of the problems are of a socio-economic nature, the European Union is the best actor to deal with these problems and ensure that they do not escalate into major crises requiring military action. The EU approach is quite efficient because it is comprehensive, while NATO, by nature, cannot deal with socio-economic problems.

NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is not taking place in a vacuum, but will be influenced to a large extent by developments taking place within the framework of two other important initiatives: the European Union's Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process;

I will move now to recommendations. I think there are a number of measures and initiatives that NATO and the West could undertake to improve the prospects for security and stability in the Mediterranean and its relations with the countries in that region. The following list is certainly not comprehensive.

I shall list six points that address political issues. First, the alliance needs an outreach programme for the countries along the Mediterranean. While these countries are unlikely to become NATO members, their security will increasingly impinge on broader Alliance interests.¹

Second, NATO suffers from a serious image problem in the Mediterranean Initiative countries. The general public views NATO as a Cold War institution in search of a new enemy.²

Third, if NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is to succeed, NATO will have to devote greater financial resources to it.

Fourth, the Alliance should deepen its activities with partners, and expand the scope of the initiative geographically. Otherwise, it will inadvertently draw a new dividing line. However, it can be argued that

¹ Asmus, R., Larrabee, S., Lesser, I. «Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks». *NATO Review*, No. 3, May 1996, p. 31.

² The misperceptions between the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries (as demonstrated, for instance, by Arab reactions to EUROFOR & EUROMARFOR) are a constraining factor. The Arab public opinion is suspicious about arrangements between NATO and military regimes in the South of the Mediterranean.

expanding the dialogue's membership without the necessary preconditions might create serious problems and inhibit further progress. And this is a problem we will need to solve.

Fifth, there are several initiatives under way, including the Mediterranean Dialogues of NATO³ and the Western European Union, the OSCE Initiative and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The number of initiatives raises the issue of cooperation between organisations. Antagonism and overlap between those organisations may be unavoidable, but should be kept to a minimum. Better coordination is essential if Euro-Atlantic initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The fact, however, that there is no hierarchical order among the initiatives makes coordination even more difficult.

Finally, the spread of Islamic movements in the Arab and the Muslim world is an undeniable fact. The West should seek to understand the political culture of Islam and cease to demonize the religion.

I conclude with five suggestions about military matters. First, the alliance must continue to prepare itself for potential military setbacks while ensuring that its actions do not appear hostile ensuring. This dilemma will likely increase as NATO's planning for non-Article 5 operations matures.⁴

Second, NATO should be prepared to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, without, however, exaggerating this threat. NATO should avoid the impression that it is searching for a new "*raison d'être*"; some might conclude that the alliance was trying to replace the old Soviet menace with a new combination of Islamic fundamentalism and weapons of mass destruction. This could unnecessarily antagonise and isolate the Islamic or the Arab world and become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Third, offensive counter-proliferation action presents significant political and military problems and should be seen as an option of last resort. Defensive measures, such as theatre missile defenses are more

³ On NATO's Mediterranean Initiative see for instance: Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", *NATO Review*, no.1, Spring 1998; Larrabee, Green, Lesser & Zanini, "NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Policy Issues and Dilemmas", Santa Monica, RAND, 1998; Alberto Bin, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: The Contribution of the Atlantic Alliance".

⁴ It is argued that if in fact such missions do become a priority for the Alliance, the «procurement of systems by member states to facilitate regional intervention will be required, possibly giving the Alliance an offensive posture in the eyes of some Mediterranean countries». Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, *Southern Region Workshop on TMD, Counter-Proliferation Planning and Security Collaboration in the New Era*, November 1995, p. ix.

feasible both politically and militarily although they may be less efficient and have a high economic cost.

Fourth, we should not underestimate the threat of terrorism involving the use weapons of mass destruction. Actually, I feel that terrorism constitutes a more serious risk to Western states, including the United States, than a ballistic missiles attack by a rogue state. Our best chance to prevent such incidents is to work with the states in the region.

Fifth, the South European states' relations with countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the former Soviet Republics should continue to address essential political, economic, social and development issues, rather than focus purely on military security matters.

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Honorary Secretary
13-13 Sept. 2000

THE BARCELONA PROCESS NEEDS TO BE REVITALISED

(Rev. 1)

Unjustified pessimism about the achievements

Five years after the Barcelona Declaration (November 1995) the jubilation and high hopes in a better future in the MED have given way to a rather pessimistic mood.

On both sides of the MED:

In the south, people do not perceive much of the prosperity, peace and stability which had been hailed at Barcelona as the grand objectives to be obtained thanks to the Barcelona process.

In the North, the political drive, maintained by five successive Presidencies (GR, D, F, ES, I) between 1994 and 1996, has been overtaken by other priorities (enlargement, Balkans, constitutional reform).

The political stakes are no longer well perceived; bureaucratic and excessively cumbersome procedures have taken the upper hand, as so often when the initial enthusiasm has vanished.

Two main reasons explain the frustration:

- the initial expectations have been far too high, especially in the south.
It appears in retrospect that too many people in the south have been made believe that a beautiful piece of political rhetoric like the Barcelona Declaration (which was the result of six months' patient diplomatic effort and persuasion, and consequently a compromise text) would produce miracles.
- implementation proved to be much harder than originally foreseen, again more so in the south than in the north.
The slow pace of implementation in turn led to a slackening of the initial political commitment in the process: This is true for the north as well as for the south. The politicians in charge simply do not care about the 'nitty gritty' of the follow up process.

Add to this that those responsible for the follow up seem to have lost sight of what was to be the essence of the Barcelona process.

This was to be expected in view of the long shopping list of objectives and actions contained in the Barcelona Declaration ... and of the new financial means offered by MEDA. Everybody wanted to get something out of MEDA and the Barcelona process. So, instead of focusing scarce human and financial resources on the key objectives too much energy was absorbed and dissipated in side tracks. Too many meetings, often without sufficient preparation, too many talk shops, too many resolutions, too many projects of all sorts....with far too little manpower deployed on either side.

It is therefore important to restate the strategic objectives which the EU Commission had in mind when it launched its communication in October 1994 which was the starting point of the Barcelona process.

These objectives were simple: improve the socio-economic situation in the south in view of stabilising the 'southern front' and putting a lid on the growing potential of illegal immigration from the south.

Improvement of the socio-economic situation would require often radical reforms in the economic and political realm. In order to underpin the necessary reform process the EU suggested a triple strategy composed of free trade, financial assistance and policy dialogue with each individual country around the MED.

In this approach, peace and more democracy would result, though slowly, from the improvements to be expected on the economic front.

So would closer cooperation between the countries in the south and east of the MED.

The EU never had the ambition of solving the ME conflict through the Barcelona process.

It was implicit in this approach that the EU contribution to the reform process and to an improved socio-economic situation in the south was bound to be limited to that of a - rather weak - outside catalyst: what impact could be expected from a marginal financial assistance amounting to < 1% of the combined GDP of all MED countries and from the conclusion of Association agreements with each of the MED countries obliging them to dismantle their protection against the EU over a time span of some 12 years (in the hope of making their industries viable and more competitive)?

Three main achievements since Barcelona

Three main achievements, at least, can be credited to the Barcelona process during the past five years.

- a heightened awareness of the need for reforms;

Today, the wind of change is blowing throughout the MED. Whatever the country, the political or the economic regime, the leadership has become clearly aware of the need for improving economic performance and thus meeting the challenges of globalisation, and ultimately satisfying the growing expectations of their population.

Reforms are therefore no longer taboo; they are only a matter of 'when' and 'how'. How to overcome the many political and technical difficulties and reconcile reforms with the desire of the political leadership to maintain full control over the country turns out to be the conundrum in the MED, as in any other 'transition countries'.

- the beginning of a reform process;

All countries in the south have launched some reforms, mostly in the economic sphere, in some cases also in the political sphere. Progress has, however, been very uneven from one country to the other.

Those countries which like Cyprus, Israel, Malta, Turkey and Tunisia had already for a long time, sometimes for more than 20 years, been engaged in opening up their economies and societies to the outside world, thanks *inter alia* to a clear long-term vision of their political leadership (access to the world market, upgrading of the economy, emphasis on education and technology etc.) and to agreements negotiated with the EU, have already been able to reap some visible fruits from their reform process.

Others have a much poorer record of reforms and improvements on their home front. They still have to go a long way, paved with serious difficulties, before their populations can hope to reap some fruits.

- progress towards European - Mediterranean free trade;

By the beginning of 1996 the EU had **completed** free trade with four MED countries, Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey, representing about half of its total trade with the MED.

By the beginning of 2000, free trade agreements with four more MED countries, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Palestine have been signed with whom free trade will be completed at the horizon of 2010.

With Egypt signature signature is expected before the end of 2000.

Thus, negotiations with only three countries of the Barcelona group remain to be finalised, i. e. Algeria, Lebanon and Syria.

And, of course, Libya still has to join the process which should hopefully be the case relatively soon.

Moreover, there is a beginning of intra - Mediterranean free trade, through bilateral agreements concluded between several MED countries, e. g. Israel, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt.

This movement is bound to accelerate and to become comprehensive, as free trade between the EU and individual MED countries approaches completion within the coming 10-15 years.

Thus, five years after Barcelona the Mediterranean and the EU find themselves on track towards the establishment of a vast Euro-Med free trade area, even if the Barcelona target date of 2010 will be missed by a few years.

There is no doubt that this will be hailed one day as a major contribution to prosperity and peace in the region, comparable to the parallel movement taking place in the Western hemisphere with the extension of the all-American free trade.

But free trade is never an end in itself but only a means for making the productive machinery of a country more effective and pushing through overdue economic reforms (customs administration, tax system, privatisation of industry and the banking sector, trade legislation, fighting petty corruption etc.)

An objective assessment of the results achieved during the first five years after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration turns out to be much more positive than the prevailing sentiment frustration would indicate.

The Barcelona Declaration was extraordinarily ambitious in its objectives - peace, prosperity, political stability and democracy? Could any one really have believed, in 1995, believe that it would produce tangible results in all those complex areas within just five years?

Whatever the complaints and dissatisfaction, no country has so far threatened to quit; this demonstrates that every partner is gaining more from belonging to the 'EURO-MED CLUB' than from being outside. One may criticise the absence of commitment on both sides, the many superficial, sometimes sterile discussions in multilateral meetings dealing with security issues, water, environment, transport etc. Still, they have contributed to a better understanding among leaders from the north and the south; they have allowed Palestinians, Syrians and Israelis etc. to engage in a more rational discourse and to better appreciate their respective arguments.

Thus, it appears that EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP is, for the time being and for the foreseeable future, 'the only game in town'.

More political commitment and focus on the 'essentials' are needed

This does not mean to say the Barcelona process should not be made more effective. The forthcoming high-level meeting of the 'Barcelona countries' Marseilles in November should be seized as an opportunity for taking stock and agreeing on a few meaningful improvements.

Five priorities should be singled out making the Barcelona process more meaningful.

- concentrate on accelerating economic development in each of the partner countries in the south;
- give a boost to the revival of the AMU which has been in a state of lethargy ever since it has been established in 1989;
- accelerate the implementation of free trade among the countries of the south;
- obtain a political commitment from the EU to substantially increase MEDA funding for the years 2007-12;
- facilitate the granting of visa for citizens from the MED who have to be in regular contact with the civil society in the EU, e. g. professors, students, researchers, businessmen, doctors, civil servants.

First, acceleration of the socio-economic development in the south is a must, for both sides. In order to achieve it, all countries in the south will have to implement major economic and political reforms (privatisation, modernisation of the tax system, introduction of a basic system of social security, radical improvements of education, science and research, establishing a functioning judiciary, modernising business, company and commercial law, streamlining the financial sector etc.)

In order to help the countries focus on these reforms, the EU should form '**association partnerships**' which would establish precise targets for specific reforms, the time frame and the actions to be taken by the government, business associations, the EU Commission etc.

The EU role would be that of an outside consultant and monitor: the responsibility for the substance and implementation of the reforms must lie with each country itself.

The EU experience with the 'accession partnerships' should be taken as a model to be adapted to the conditions in the MED.

Last and most important, the major part of the future MEDA funding should serve to underpin these 'association partnerships'.

Second, the failure of the Maghreb countries to go ahead with their imperative long-term integration process has been an important factor for the poor economic performance of Algeria during the last 10-15 years. Algeria and Morocco would unquestionably have progressed faster without their borders being closed for the last five years.

The EU has remained a passive observer of the deterioration of relations

within the Maghreb, to the point that it is being accused of pursuing a policy of '*divide and rule*'. If the EU is seriously concerned about its southern neighbours it can no longer afford to close its eyes about the rift between two neighbourly countries in its proximity.

A rapprochement among the Maghreb and an effective revitalisation of AMU would make the Barcelona process immensely more meaningful for the population in the Maghreb and enhance the feeling of security in the north. Moreover, EU business would stand to gain in terms of new investment and export opportunities to a more integrated Maghreb with its 80 million people.

It is up to the parties concerned to define the rules of engagement which are required in order to obtain the most positive results in the shortest possible time.

Third, free trade *within* the MED is a political corollary of free trade with the EU. It is inconceivable for any MED country to open its market to competition from the EU while maintaining trade restrictions and import against their neighbours.

Free trade among the southern countries should be more easily and faster to implement than with the EU.

It is therefore urgent to induce those countries which have signed free trade agreements with the EU to conclude among themselves similar agreements and thereby to help create a true EURO-MED FREE TRADE AREA.

An unequivocal commitment by the southern countries to establish free trade among themselves, by say 2007, and by the EU to grant complete cumulation of origin would be a milestone on the way towards a more effective Euro-Med partnership. It would make the MED more attractive for private foreign capital and thereby give a boost to their economic development.

Fourth, the EU financial support of the Barcelona process is insufficient.

MEDA II funding will at best reach the level of MEDA I, i. e. some one billion EURO per year in the form of grants. This has led to disappointment in the south which rightly considers itself as disadvantaged compared to the countries of Eastern Europe..

It appears quasi impossible to raise the stakes for the period 2000-06; the Berlin compromise will not be unravelled. But it should be possible to obtain a political commitment from the EU to substantially raise the MEDA III funding during the years 2007-12. This will do a lot to boost the morale in the south.

Fifth, an effective partnership between the two sides of the MED must enable people to travel freely, ideally without visa, between the two shores.

The EU has become - excessively - concerned about illegal immigration from the Maghreb and, to a lesser degree, from the Machrik.

It must be possible to define rules of procedures which facilitate travel without incurring an undue risk of extra illegal immigration. selected categories of people.

Both sides should therefore urgently sit down in order to work out and implement simplified visa procedures (multiple entry, longer validity, no fees) for selected categories of people.

The Marseilles MED conference in November should therefore decide to convene an expert group on this sensitive subject which should submit recommendations for action before April 30, 2001.

This would be registered by the EU' s partners in the south as a great step forward in making the partnership more meaningful to the people.

Brussels, 10 July 2000

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Introduction

Je dois signaler l'extrême difficulté de dresser une 1^{re} évaluation du processus de Barcelone. Les méthodes et les instruments de l'évaluation de tout projet collectif posent toujours de sérieux problèmes.

Dans ce cas, j'insiste sur la nécessité d'éviter l'évaluation moyennant des approches quantitatives, la vision et les attentes de chaque partenaire vis-à-vis les résultats de ce processus, sont des variables importantes, pour réussir à dresser une évaluation.

I- La globalisation : un nouveau cadre d'analyse, une nouvelle approche conceptuelle :

Dans un monde changeant, où les transformations deviennent plus puissantes et plus fréquentes, une variété de phénomènes est combinée au cours des 15 dernières années pour composer ce que nous pouvons caractériser de «globalisation.» Celle-ci, est devenu le cadre idéal pour toute analyse ou interprétation de la politique mondiale.

Les processus de transformation économiques, technologiques, politiques, et systémiques, sont les aspects les plus visibles de l'accélération du processus de la globalisation-régionalisation.

Dans la sphère économique, l'échec de l'économie dirigée dans l'ex-bloc socialiste, à mener à l'émergence d'une vraie économie mondiale du libre marché, et par conséquence une interdépendance accrue entre différents acteurs économiques au niveau global. Les retombées d'une telle globalisation, sont de nature à mettre en danger la stabilité et la sécurité dans une dimension multi-niveau (global-regional-local), car l'accroissement de la tendance vers l'intégration économique globale est à la fois une désorganisation sociale et en même temps une

hostilité culturelle résultats d'un accroissement de la mobilité du travail qui transforme la composition raciale, religieuse et linguistique de la majorité des sociétés¹.

C'est dans ce sens que les nouvelles tendances des politiques de sécurisation tendent vers le multilatéralisme en matière de coopération notamment la coopération économique, dans le moment où le « succès économique croise les deux chemins. C'est une sabre de double face dans le sens que la sécurité et l'insécurité toutes les deux sont une fonction de la prospérité ² ».

-Diffusion globale de la technologie:

La globalisation technologique se manifeste par l'accélération du processus de la révolution dans la technologie des communications « toujours dans sa phase initiale, elle pourra probablement produire des transformations tectoniques dans la société mondiale qui pourra mener inévitablement à de graves tensions »³, sociopolitiques menaçant l'ordre mondial actuel.

La Large onde mondiale de la démocratie:

L'économie du marché libre mène éventuellement au politique du marché libre reste à tester (vérifier)⁴, mais, certainement, il pose à plat les fondations socio-économiques de la démocratie ou du pluralisme politique. En matière de sécurité, les libéraux, considèrent que l'interdépendance économique avec l'extension du pluralisme politique, crient des obstacles et découragent, les recours aux guerres ⁵, les conflits et les tensions, car selon eux, généralement, les démocraties ne se battent pas entre elles.

-changement structurel du système international:

Parmi, les changements les plus marquants, la multiplication des acteurs dans la vie politique mondiale. Le rôle de l'Etat providence et protecteur est en danger. L'Etat-nation devient de plus en plus concurrencé par d'autres acteurs infra/supra-étatiques. Cette concurrence est de nature extérieure en même temps qu'intérieure. L'Etat donc est «submergé » puis remplacé par des Etats-région, ou Méga-Etats, dans un espace mondial " dé-territorialisé " .

Ce changement structurel de nature politique, avait comme conséquence, l'émergence d'un sous-système fragmenté, "le social International " ⁶ considéré comme le théâtre privilégié des nouvelles dynamiques de perturbation, notamment, les facteurs infra-nationaux et sub-Etatiques.

La combinaison des différents aspects des processus globaux de la mondialisation, met en cause la notion géopolitique de "Frontière". Après avoir été menacée par une éventuelle perméabilité ou déstabilisation, elle devient de plus en plus géo-culturelle et ethnique ⁷.

Dans un contexte d'un "social international", ou même (social mondial), la frontière, s'appelle: la "fracture sociale", "barrière psychologique", "écart d'intégration", "haine ethnique" ⁸etc... Les ~~transitions~~
~~tensions~~ entre les villes, les banlieues, minorités constituent un complexe 'historico-social'

Le plus important, pour nous, ce sont les conséquences de ces processus sur les besoins de sécurité et les perceptions des menaces. Désormais, la globalisation a donné un nouveau contenu pour la "notion

d'ennemi" globalement dépolitisé, en signalant le divorce des nations et la décolonisation des empires ⁹.

II-La Méditerranée impliquée dans un nouveau contexte de sécurité régionale

1. Un nouveau contexte pour la sécurité régionale

Après, les grands bouleversements survenant sur la scène planétaire, la dimension stratégique Est-Ouest de la Méditerranée ¹⁰ devient plus relative que jamais, alors, l'Europe a commencé depuis le début des années 90 à reformuler sa vision vis-à-vis ses riverains du Sud, car l'intérêt grandissant de la référence méditerranéenne du nouveau système de sécurité, caractérisé par l'existence d'une interdépendance Euro-Med dans la gestion, la résolution et la prévention des conflits et crises devient une réalité. Cette accentuation du phénomène de l'interdépendance stratégique/sécuritaire¹¹, est due aux différentes transformations ayant affectés l'ordre stratégique/sécuritaire méditerranéen après la guerre froide. La méditerranée, l'unité stratégique dominée par la présence militaire ¹² Atlantique et par l'antagonisme idéologique Est-Ouest passe à une fragmentation conflictuelle ¹³ (inter-intra) étatique. Les questions stratégiques traditionnelles de nature militaire deviennent des risques, problèmes, dangers et menaces à la sécurité dans son aspect amilitaire. Le système de sécurité Européen, depuis 4 décennies (1947-1987), été fondé sur une base essentiellement militaire ¹⁴, malgré que la menace communiste était de nature globale (menace contre les valeurs politiques, les doctrines économiques, principes de libéralisme politique et économique)..

La survie et l'adaptation des structures et institutions de sécurité Européennes, trouvent leur légitimation dans la création d'un nouveau ennemi. Il s'agit, donc, de ce qu'on appelle "Les Nouvelles Menaces du Sud"¹⁵ puis, simplement "les menaces du Sud"¹⁶ car ces menaces ne sont pas vraiment, nouvelles mais elles réapparaissent.

On assiste alors à un déplacement réel de la menace de l'Est de l'Europe vers le sud de la Méditerranée (les pays, sociétés du Sud).

2. Dans la Méditerranée, l'Europe est seule menacée : Un Sud contre le Nord.

Si le système bi-polaire nous a offert un cadre théorique et un appareillage conceptuel relativement simple, compréhensible et prévisible¹⁷ le nouvel ordre mondial, basé sur une dimension et dynamiques sociales, a rendu l'analyse et la compréhension de ces menaces du Sud une tâche très complexe et difficile.

Malgré ça, l'activité théorique n'a jamais cessé de proposer des approches théoriques, concernant la nouvelle notion de la menace¹⁸, malgré les difficultés persistantes au niveau de leur identification et quantification¹⁹ d'une manière identique, à cause de la diversification de leur nature, source et aspect structurel.

On parle souvent de menaces d'instabilité politiques, menaces de nature sub-nationales, menaces transnationales, menaces globales²⁰, etc...

La Méditerranée en générale, la Méditerranée Occidentale en particulier, devient le théâtre où se combinent une série indéterminée et indéfinie d'interactions complexes entre différents acteurs menaçants.

L'existence des systèmes démographiques, politiques, économiques opposés entre les sociétés des deux rives, a laissé, la Méditerranée se trouve face trois problèmes majeurs :

- Les flux migratoires (Sud-Nord).
- L'interdépendance énergétique.
- L'Islamisme , et le Nationalisme.

La menace du Sud est une construction mentale élaborée (préparée) dans les centres d'analyse spécialisés, puis diffusée par des discours académiques et politiques vers les sociétés (élites et opinion publique) du Sud.

La menace du Sud, en terme du radicalisme Islamiste, n'est pas nouvelle, l'activisme islamiste a commencé depuis la révolution islamique en Iran 1979, au Liban 1983 ²¹ puis en Egypte et enfin en Algérie.

La menace du Sud en terme de flux migratoire ne date pas de l'après guerre froide, c'est un phénomène qui n'a débuté ni dans les années 90, ni même dans les années 80, c'est un vieux phénomène.

Le caractère multidimensionnel de l'environnement sécuritaire en Méditerranée est partiellement dû à l'accroissement des intérêts et préoccupations des nations, des O.I, ou des autres acteurs non gouvernementaux dans la région ²². La multiplication des initiatives et de projets régionaux, sont dans une grande partie, des réponses aux questions posées par ce nouveau paysage sécuritaire. Ces questions comme on l'a signalé auparavant sont "les menaces du Sud" qui nécessitent une nouvelle approche de sécurisation, voir de gestion et de maîtrise des conditions de sécurité qui doivent doter cette fois-ci d'instruments multi-sectoriels, allant de l'économie au politique et au

socioculturel. Il s'agit d'une approche multilatérale pour une sécurité régionale. Cette nouvelle stratégie basée sur le couplage (Multilatéralisme et sécurité régionale), trouve ses raisons dans :

- Les diversifications de la perception des menaces à la sécurité après les différentes transformations dans la politique mondiale.
- Le glissement sémantique de la "Défense à la sécurité" et le déplacement de la menace vers le Sud.
- Le changement dans le monde de sécurité a compliqué le rôle, des appareils et organisations à caractère sécuritaire.

Donc, les problèmes de la sécurité au niveau de la région méditerranéenne, doivent être abordés dans un cadre multilatéral et coopératif. Pratiquement de multiples aspects de coopération (inter-intra) régionale ont vu le jour. Le processus de paix au moyen orient, les initiatives méditerranéennes de (U.E.O) de l'OECE et de l'OTAN, et enfin le processus de Barcelone ²³ dont, les fins ne peuvent être dissociées du contexte politico-sécuritaire mondiale de l'après guerre froide ²⁴ caractérisé par la guerre du golf avec ses retombées psychologiques dans le monde arabo-musulman, le conflit dans l'ex -Yougoslavie et la crise Algérienne et sa portée déstabilisatrice dans la sous-région Maghrébine. Dans ce sens, le partenariat Euro-Med est l'aspect opérationnel de la révision de la politique méditerranéenne de l'U.E sous l'effet grandissant des besoins de la sécurité.

III. Le partenariat Euro-Med 5 ans après Barcelone : un bilan mitigé

1. PEM : Un mécanisme élémentaire de sécurité, pour un nouveau *Containement* global :

Pour l'U.E, l'émergence d'un nouveau paysage de sécurité régionale dans la Méditerranée, nécessitait une reformulation de ses rapports avec les PTMs, donc, une nouvelle stratégie pour la gestion de "la Marche Méditerranéenne" ²⁸ fondue sur une conceptualisation nouvelle de la sécurité. Cette nouvelle stratégie s'appelait cette fois-ci "Le partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen " structuré autour de (03) volets :

Politique et sécurité, économique et financier et social et humain. Une simple lecture entre les lignes du texte de la déclaration et les autres documents de (Barcelone 2,3), puis Euromed Report (20 juin 2000) concernant la Stratégie commune de l'UE à l'égard de la région Méditerranéenne nous mène à conclure que chaque volet correspond à un type précis de menace du sud. Alors, la globalité du projet 'Européen' reflète le caractère global des nouvelles menaces. La preuve, avant juste la conférence de Barcelone I, le président du Parlement Européen, Mr Klaus Hansch, disait: "Il n'y a aucun dilemme dans les priorités de l'UE, soit nous exportons la stabilité, soit nous importons l'instabilité " ²⁹ .

C'est, claire, l'Europe reste toujours obnubilée par le dilemme de sa sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne. Si la méditerranée (précisément en Grèce et en Turquie) était le lieu de la première application de la stratégie de *containment* énoncée par la doctrine Truman en 1947, contre l'avancée du péril rouge, la Méditerranée d'après guerre froide (la Méditerranée Occidentale) devient de nouveau le lieu d'une nouvelle

stratégie européenne, un nouveau *containment* énoncé par l'UE contre la montée d'un péril inédit (le péril vert ?) comment ?.

- Le projet du partenariat, est une opération entièrement européenne , dans sa préparation³⁰, mais aussi dans ses moyens, ses instruments et ses grandes orientations de réalisation. L'UE se présente alors comme le facteur producteur d'un projet régional qui vise à renforcer son rôle et garantir sa sécurité dans son sens le plus large.
- Le processus du Partenariat est conçu comme une réponse Européenne bien réfléchie et à long terme aux nouvelles questions posées à la sécurité de l'UE.

Pour conclure, le PEM est un projet européen dont la zone de libre échange Euro-med (2010) est conçue comme un marché des démocraties libérales de point de vue politique, un grand marché de sécurité de point de vue sécuritaire/stratégique.

Les soit-disant volets de ce partenariat, ne sont que des instruments de la mise en pratique de cette stratégie ayant comme finalité le bien être et la sécurité humaine de l'individu européen. Le concept sécuritaire/stratégique a fait du partenariat un acte essentiellement sécuritaire, ce rôle centrale du partenariat renforce l'idée que l'environnement du complexe de sécurité nécessite des approches coopératives ³¹ mais en cas de l'absence d'un partenaire puissant et stable, le partenariat devient un projet diktat.

2.Barcelone un cadre pour la résolution des problèmes mais pas une solution.

La position prise auparavant est un résultat d'une lecture attentive du texte de la déclaration de Barcelone I. Le premier volet concernant les questions politique et de sécurité me paraît comme une reprise d'une

litanie ³² très connue dans les recommandations de l'ONU à l'occasion des différentes conférences comme celle du Caire sur la population ou celle sur l'environnement et le développement durable.

Donc, ce premier volet a été basé sur des termes et concepts ne répondant pas aux enjeux et défis de la sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne. C'est pour cette raison que les européens ont proposé un pacte de paix et de stabilité en méditerranée sous pression de certains milieux et cercles de prise de décision politique au niveau des instances communautaires. La nouvelle charte pour la paix et la stabilité dans la Méditerranée ne se diffère pas assez par rapport au vieux pacte proposé. Ce déséquilibre dans la structuration des textes et l'articulation des concepts ont créé une certaine vigilance envers les intentions de l'UE car celle-ci (UE) ne cherche qu'imposer son projet de sécurité ³³ dont la crédibilité du résultat de tel projet reste toujours très limitée ³⁴, dans l'esprit des décideurs, des élites comme chez l'opinion publique des sociétés de sud.

Le processus de Barcelone (B1-2-3) est une application de l'approche du couplage multilateralisme et sécurité régionale' en prévoyant l'instabilité politique et insécurité et espérant les apaiser moyennant des instruments économique (ZLEEM) et le dialogue culturel.

L'UE croit que la prospérité économique mènera au libéralisme politique et que l'interdépendance complexe (tous domaines confondus) aboutira à éradiquer les tensions entre les sociétés des deux rives.

Cette approche Etatiste est loin d'être la meilleure solution, car le développement est une priorité pour les sociétés du sud, il est un objectif alors, il est instrument pour les européens.

Dans les domaines de la sécurité, la future charte euro-med pour la paix et la stabilité, connaît de sérieuses difficultés à cause des tensions permanentes entre les parties du conflit Israélo-Arabé. S'ajoute au blocage économique et sécuritaire, le blocage né des positions des gouvernement des pays du sud, l'ouverture politique et économique nécessite une certaine préservation des équilibres socioéconomiques³¹ nationaux hors la préservation de ceux-ci n'est pas garantie ce qui mettra la stabilité de ces systèmes en place en danger.

IV. Pour un vrai partenariat Euro-Med : une perspective Algérienne

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide et l'avancée positive du processus de paix au moyen orient, couronné par la signature d'accord Israélo-palestinien du 13 septembre 1993. (37) la volonté du rapprochement de l'Europe devient plus affirmé. Or les positions maghrébines n'ont jamais été ; identiques, elles oscillaient généralement, entre la réserve traditionnelle(38), de l'Algérie la position plus nuancée de la Tunisie, en affirmant sa volonté pour un éventuel ancrage à l'Europe et la demande marocaine d'adhésion à l'UE.

Mais ce qui pose plus de questions à l'UE, c'est la problématique Algérienne, réclamant sa spécificité. Les évolutions récentes survenant sur la scène politique Algérienne menant à croire qu'un aboutissement d'un accord UE - Algérie est dans une phase très avancée.

Après 05 ans un pays comme l'Algérie n'a pas encore signé l'accord. Le cas Algérien me paraît une variable essentielle dans toute tentative d'évaluation du processus du partenariat Euro-Med.

Pour une voie de sortie, je propose une série d'idées, elles sont parfois d'ordre conceptuel, d'autre part, elles sont d'ordre politique.

1. Propositions pratiques

Pour commencer, sur le plan politique et sécurité la position algérienne était claire dans sa vision des problèmes de la sécurité, dans sa dimension globale. Néanmoins, l'approche globale sur la lutte anti-terroriste n'implique pas uniquement l'éradication du phénomène mais également l'analyse des causes qui l'ont engendré et leur traitement adéquat sur les plans économiques et sociaux.

Lors de la troisième thématique inter parlementaire à Ljubjana (Slovénie). Les parlementaires Algériens ont proposé l'organisation d'un sommet mondiale sur le phénomène du terrorisme et l'adaptation de certaine mesure comme :

- le renforcement des informations et des échanges (expériences, savoir faire, etc...), Au niveau d'un centre méditerranéen de données
- La lutte contre les sources d'approvisionnement en armes
- Entraide judiciaire et policière
- Ratification des douze conventions de lutte contre le terrorisme.

Sur le plan économique, l'Algérie a dénoncé catégoriquement toutes politiques ou tendances mercantiliste du partenariat économique et financier. Sa contribution aux différents sommets des conseils économiques et sociaux entre dans la voix pour la réalisation développement durable et d'une prospérité partagée.

Sur le plan Sociale et humain, l'Algérie pose une grande question à ses partenaires européens concernant le paradoxe du troisième volée. Libre circulation des marchandises, des capitaux, des idées et des images, mais pas celle des personnes ? Dans ce sens l'Algérie a insisté fortement à éviter de :

- Lier le phénomène migratoire avec le besoin de la sécurité européenne.
- Recourir uniquement aux experts, rapporteurs et analystes du pied du Nord.

Globalement le nouveau contexte mondial impose une double tâche à notre regroupement régional : il faut, d'un côté mettre au point des structures et des mesures régionales afin de régler efficacement la foule de problème nouveau qu'oppose l'interdépendance complexe croissante.

2. Méditerranée : Une lutte entre Nations pas entre Nations.

Lipschutz disait : (...) *There are not only struggles over security among nations, but also, struggles among notions. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources, but also to authority to articulate new definitions and discourses as well.* ³⁹

Les théories et concepts élaborés jusqu'à présent dans le domaine de la coopération et de la sécurité régionale sont au profil des nations et des Etats du Nord. Car basé sur une vision positiviste et empirique du monde fondements de la logique réaliste n'ont pas jusqu'à présent - questionné l'ordre régional actuel c'est une volonté de préserver le statu quo régional.

La promotion de ces concepts endure l'état actuel des choses et ne mène au aucun cas à l'instauration de nouveaux rapports entre les sociétés et les nations des deux rives dans le cadre du processus de Barcelone. Dans ce cas, les intellectuels et chercheurs méditerranéens sont responsables en cas de ne pas avoir la volonté de revendiquer des positions philosophiques critiques et anti-statu quo afin de jeter les bases

solides d'un nouvel ordre méditerranéen, moins réaliste, mais plus alternatif, moins Etatique et plus humain.

Si, l'approche critique est développée pour se servir d'alternative conceptuelle et politique à l'approche dominante du réalisme et du néo-réalisme de l'outre atlantique elle pourra être en même temps un instrument théorique pour maître face à l'hégémonie conceptuelle Européenne.

Construire en commun un nouveau régionalisme méditerranéen fondu sur une société civile régionale, comme alternative à l'actuel régionalisme Etatique, considéré comme un mécanisme élémentaire de sécurité ³⁸ dans la conception réaliste de la politique mondiale.

Ce que les pays européens considèrent comme « Menaces du Sud » ne sont à mon avis que des problèmes socio-économiques et démographiques, sur lesquels peuvent se greffer des situations d'instabilité politique et sécuritaire avec des retombées négatives sur les sociétés du Nord.

Ni le bilatéralisme ni le multilatéralisme, ont contribué comme formes de relations pour la structuration des rapports euromeds afin de construire une 'région' de paix, de co-prospérité et de stabilité. C'est dans cette perspective que nous proposons *le nouveau multilatéralisme* en tant qu'alternative pour une structuration équilibrée et juste des rapports euromed.

L'Etatisme et le centrisme politico-administratif de la vie politique des sociétés du Sud, l'eurocentrisme marcantiliste et réaliste des Etats du Nord, ces deux facteurs déterminants étaient à l'origine de l'état actuel de la situation dans la 'région' méditerranéenne. Donc la

transformation partielle des aspects, des principes et de fondement structurant de l'ordre méditerranéen devient une nécessité Sudiste.

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UNPUBLISHED PAPER NOT READY FOR QUOTATION

A tolerable security architecture for the Balkans and Greek-Turkish relations: Is there a special role for the G-7/8?

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I. Toward a global geopolitical and geoeconomic concert of powers

Most analysts/commentators have accepted the notion that our planet has crossed the threshold of the post-Cold War era. But what kind of profile is this successor era assuming? Is our planet on the way to developing a new "world order" based on premises of respect for the territorial integrity of states, enhancement and consolidation of democratic institutions, the protection of the human rights of all the citizens of all states, and institutionalization of structures and processes for the peaceful settlement of international and intrastate disputes?¹ Or, are we moving toward a period of disorder, disorientation, fluidity, ethnic separatism and escalating economic protectionism, all resulting in higher frequency and intensity of local conflicts? Will the so-called "limited wars" which have been taking place in the troubled South of our planet, with the Middle East (and Sub-Saharan Africa) occupying the apex of a pyramid of global conflict, continue to plague much of humankind?²

¹ For initial assessments echoing George Bush's early optimistic visions, see: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). See also, Steven Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (winter 1990/1991), pp. 7-57; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The New Global Order: The power of Principle in a Pluralistic World", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 6 (1992), pp. 21-42; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 131-146; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the 21st Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security", *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61.

² See for example, John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; John J. Mearshimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 266, No. 1 (July 1990), pp. 35-50; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (New York: Scribner, 1993); Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273, No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 44-76; and John J. Mearshimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49.

In a world where a number of states still possess awesome military capabilities (including weapons of nuclear mass destruction) there is no rational substitute for a system of global order, enjoying the backing of major centers of military and *economic* power, which can provide for adequate institutional mechanisms for the peaceful and tolerably just settlement of disputes. The destabilizing vacuum that has been created by the rapid disintegration of Cold War bipolarity must not be allowed to drift into global anarchy and chaos (there was, despite its dangers, an inherent stability to a bipolar system which was premised on the mutually deterring balance of nuclear terror).

The new architecture of global security should, therefore, be based on an implicit, if not explicit, consensus on fundamental premises shared by the World's major and multidimensional centers of power. Needless to say, a great power consensus on the rules of the international game cannot survive unless it is shared by a considerable number of small and intermediate (in terms of power) states.

If we were to assume the perpetuation of what appears to be a global great power consensus (as reflected in relatively veto-free decisions taken at the UN Security Council in the last ten years, through the energization of legitimizing mechanisms such as the G-7/8 and through a series of interlocking international institutions of economic and political cooperation) the prognosis for a relatively orderly world polity could be pronounced as cautiously optimistic.³

In the rapidly integrating global economy, the impact of major centers of economic power (the G-7) will continue to be reflected through institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation. The careful widening of this system to include Russia (G8) and even China (G-9) will reflect, if done prudently and realistically, the structural imperatives of globalization. Further, the activities of Multinational Corporations and Multinational Banks will continue strengthening patterns of economic interdependence that will certainly reduce the likelihood of conflict among entities that could be likened to "economic Siamese twins". Regional integration trends will also multiply in number and importance (following the EU prototype) with evolving organisations such as NAFTA, ASEAN, Mercosur, OPEC, Gulf Cooperation Council, Black Sea Cooperation, et.al.

In the narrow security / political field, NATO will probably occupy the apex of the new Euroatlantic security order. However, this great post-war regional security organization will have to seriously reorient its purposes in order to adapt to post-Cold War circumstances. NATO's central function (with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc) will be to maintain and manage the historic partnership between a North American and a European pillar on each side of the Atlantic.⁴ The Atlantic Alliance can and should shift progressively to the

³ The early phases of the Kosovo-Yugoslav bombardment in the Spring of 1999 came close to destroying the implicit consensus of the early and mid 1990s. The eventual settlement, however, involving the active participation of Russia, the EU and the U.N. in the negotiation and implementation phases, appears to have returned the pendulum to a consensual position.

⁴ On this important topic see S. Victor Papacosma and Pierre-Henri Laurent, eds., *NATO and the European Union: Confronting the Challenges of European Security and Enlargement* (Kent, Ohio: The Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center, 1999).

status of a grand organizational experiment whose main-function will be to prevent the gradual drifting apart of its two strong pillars and to preserve conditions of Euro-American interdependence based on premises of equality and partnership thus forming a stable core around which global security can be structured for generations to come⁵.

NATO, with two powerful and equal defence pillars that operate on assumptions of partnership, interdependence, mutuality of interests and common cultural and economic values, will be able to serve as a stable Euroatlantic platform contributing systematically to spill-over integrative processes in other parts of the planet that can be modelled upon tried, tested and successful institutional experiments that have created nearly unbreakable bonds among the states of the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Following the logic of institutional complementarity (concentric, overlapping, adjacent), NATO, as a security producing structure, is likely to be enhanced by the projected acceleration of the process of integration taking place within the European Union (EU). This Union of fifteen (currently) European States will invariably emerge as a complex but unified entity not only in the economic but also in the political and security dimensions. The EU, following the absorption of WEU for purposes of EU-wide planning and implementation of common security and defense policies, will most probably have a substantively integrated character by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The birth of the "Euro" as the common currency of eleven (soon to be twelve) member states is likely also to generate a multiplier effect in the unification process.

It must be clearly understood, however, that a solitary global island of stability (a two-pillared Euro-Atlantic Community), surrounded by a sea of disorder, will be doomed to a sorry fate sliding, ultimately, to global confrontation between "haves" and "have-nots" employing – after continuing proliferation – weapons of mass destruction. Today, therefore, the crucial challenge facing humankind calls for the establishment of a set of complementary and overlapping security structures in areas of potential conflict such as Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Mediterranean, Africa, and Central and Latin America.

The institutional vacuum that has been created by the disestablishment of East European international organizations (such as the Warsaw pact and CMEA) is more than likely going to be filled, at least partially, by parallel sets of association agreements between the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the EU. However, with democratization proceeding at various rates of speed in the erstwhile Socialist Camp, there are a number of new problems (chief among them the challenge of ethnic-autonomist movements) that could easily cross the threshold of armed conflict.⁶ The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appears to be slated for a role beyond standard-setting and confidence-building to include conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-making.

⁵ Needless to say, the Euro Atlantic partnership will complement (rather than hinder) much needed enhancement in the relations of Europe and the United States with major global actors in Asia, such as Japan, China and India.

⁶ On this question, see the thought-provoking article by Pascal Boniface, "The Proliferation of States," *The Washington Quarterly*, 21:3, pp. 111-127.

The Gulf War (and Saddam Hussein's subsequent intransigence) has sharpened the sensitivities of global, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean powers regarding the need to develop *ad hoc* as well as long-lived institutional mechanisms for the settlement of unresolved disputes such as the Arab-Israeli and the Palestinian, as well as long-simmering crises of states threatened by partitionist movements throughout the planet. The institutional patterns of the North (especially OSCE) can hopefully be modified for application to regional settings such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Africa and Central and South America. The disappointing record of conflict management in the Yugoslav civil/constitutional conflagration, however, has been a harsh reminder of the unpreparedness of global and regional institutions to prevent/control complicated intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts.⁷

Finally, ascending the institutional ladder, we must not lose sight of the great potential for peace-keeping still available to the United Nations through the reinforced role of the Security Council and the Secretariat. Once again, we must point out the remarkable cohesiveness and staying power demonstrated by a coalition of diverse powers operating under the legitimizing umbrella of the United Nations Security Council which was brought to bear in order to reverse a clearcut case of aggression-occupation-annexation perpetrated in 1990 by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

At this point, however, we should hasten to point the relatively antiquated structure of the U.N. Security Council and, especially, its permanent (veto-holding) members. The main criticism of the Security Council's structure, fifty-five years after the end of World War II, is that its permanent members comprise only the victors of the great war. Clearly, there are two strategies available to address this problem of the need to reflect contemporary political and economic reality in the United Nations.

The first strategy involves adding Japan to the group of permanent members. But as we know, this highly needed step opens the door to additional applicants for permanent membership such as Italy, Brazil, Canada South Africa, the EU (in place of Britain and France) and so forth. The second strategy is the strengthening – defacto – of a global "economic security council" that has adopted the modest title of the Group of Seven (G-7) which has been recently functioning also as a Group of Eight (with the addition of Russia).

If adequately institutionalized, the Group of Eight (in fact the Group of Nine, if one chooses to invite China) can develop itself as a complement – not a competing alternative – to the UN Security Council. Its makeup, interestingly, escapes the rusty logic of "winners" and "losers" of world War II for it brings together both sides. The United States, Canada, Britain, France and Russia represent the former. Germany, Italy and Japan represent the latter.

The G-7/8/9, therefore, can augment the processes of North-South relations well into the 21st Century and can act as a global "collective

⁷ The jury is still out on the final assessment of NATO's recent intervention in Kosovo. This author has likened the experience to a "stress test" or a "cat scan" on the state of health of Europe's security architecture. For a very severe critique of the Clinton-Albright handling of the Kosovo question see Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's war Against Yugoslavia, *Foreign Affairs* (New York, September/October 1999, pp. 2-8).

legitimization" agency for conflict prevention strategies (trade, and investment packages) as well as conflict management ones (peace-keeping and peace-making, elections and human rights monitoring and humanitarian assistance and, on occasion, international intervention.

Sections IV and V of this paper present a viable strategy leading to tension reduction and, eventually, reconciliation in Cyprus and the Aegean. A mechanism engaging the G-8, which would seriously augment the role of the U.N. Secretary General, could very well offer facilitation along the contours outlined in this paper. But beyond Cyprus and/or the Aegean, the G-8 framework lends itself to wider applications in conflict resolution (especially in the role of objective fact finding) in various parts of the world.

If we accept the problematique outlined so far, we should expect that the conflicts of the 21st century will continue surfacing in the global South but will also spill over (especially in the sensitive areas of refugee movements, illegal migration and international terrorism) into the vulnerable and porous North. It would make sense for the major powers of the stable pole of the planet (the United States, the EU, Japan and -despite their difficulties- Russia and China) to address *in concert* the challenges of the South with collectively authorized preventive measures including (peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and development assistance etc).⁸

II. The Balkans: Doomed to perpetual conflict?

In the 1980s, it had been fashionable for scholars/practitioners such as Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick to differentiate clearly between authoritarian regimes (e.g. Latin American and Southern European variety military dictatorships) and totalitarian regimes (e.g. communist systems such as those of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Caribbean). They viewed the former as less objectionable than the latter, despite their equally atrocious human rights records, because authoritarian regimes were considered reversible (in that under certain conditions they could evolve to democracy) while totalitarian regimes were pronounced permanent and irreversible. The post-perestroika collapse of European communist regimes exploded in the face of the Kirkpatrick/Kissinger thesis but has not necessarily destroyed its reasoning.

A number of political scientists have been asking themselves whether the processes of transition to and consolidation of democratic institutions experienced by Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey could be considered as models for partial emulation by post-communist societies⁹.

Before proceeding to respond to this question, we should define for working purposes the concepts of transition and consolidation. Transition to democracy is normally a brief span of time involving the constitutional

⁸ See the Carnegie Commission report on "Preventing Deadly Conflict," Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997).

⁹ See, for example, Houchang E. Chelabi and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies*, Vol. 3 of Essays in honor of Juan J. Linz (Boulder, Colorado: Praeger, 1995).

specification and the establishment of institutions which are designed to safeguard the separation of powers, the development and functioning of two or more political parties, the holding of regular elections (at least every four/five years), the functioning of representative parliamentary bodies, the protection of human rights and freedoms, and the development and operation of a genuine and pluralist press and other mass media.

The concept of consolidation of democracy is of special relevance to post-communist countries that are currently undergoing the difficult task of transition to democracy as well as to market economy. Democratic institutions may be considered to have been *consolidated* when at least three important preconditions are satisfied: First, the development of consensus among the political parties and groupings in a given country concerning the structure and the characteristics of democracy (e.g. presidential republic, parliamentary republic or constitutional monarchy). Second the successful rotation in power between parties and/or coalitions of the Right and the Left without military intervention and/or civil conflict. Third, the maintenance of an inter-party agreement regarding the external orientation (strategy) of a country. In the case of Greece, for example, the choice in the late 1970s was made, and was subsequently accepted by the whole spectrum of its political forces, that the country ought to seek membership in the European Community and maintain membership in NATO over the alternative option (vocally promoted in the 1970s by the Socialist and Communist parties) that Greece should have opted for a non-aligned/neutral status.

Based on the discussion so far, we can propose two working hypotheses regarding the path toward democracy followed by post-communist countries in Southeastern Europe (excluding from consideration for the time being three constituent states of former Yugoslavia, i.e. Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia)¹⁰

(a) Four post-communist countries, Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Romania, are well into the stage of their transition phase, but we cannot, unfortunately, speak at this time about consolidated democratic institutions in any of the four. In all four cases, however, the rotation in power between Right and Left has moved these countries one notch closer to consolidation.

(b) The transition and consolidation processes in metacommunist countries, unlike the case of transition/consolidation of southern European states, have faced the special and difficult to overcome problem of drastic and **simultaneous** changes taking place not only in the political system but also in the economic system. Resurrecting perhaps some old Marxist dialectics, we can appreciate how economic transition difficulties can spill over and complicate political developments. In sum, the creation of a civil society which is the *sine qua non* of every consolidated, pluralist democracy, presupposes the substantive functioning of a free market mechanism not only on the level of trade and consumption but also on the level of production which, in turn, calls for effective privatization campaigns.

The major threat facing post-communist regimes in Southeastern Europe stems from extreme nationalism (chauvinism) and its Siamese twin,

¹⁰ Slovenia is assumed to have successfully crossed both transition and consolidation thresholds.

populism. The ideological vacuum that was created in the wake of the collapse of communism in Europe has been filled in the past few years by new or recycled politicians that have often resorted to romantic, atavistic and attention-catching strategies. In their attempts to mobilize the disoriented masses, they have employed simplistic and divisive slogans. By waving the flags of ethnic separatism and irredentism these post-communist elites resurrected anachronistic visions regarding a "greater" Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, "Macedonia" and so forth.

These new politicians, by employing Manichean tactics and subdividing peoples and governments into angels and devils, have fed the fires and passions of political polarisation. Polarisation, in turn, blows up the bridges of consensus on fundamental questions of regime-type and external orientation, leading finally to internal conflicts (coups, revolutions and civil wars) as well as intervention by foreign, antagonistic (regional or global) centers of power. The first victim of uncontrolled polarisation is democracy itself. The wars in former Yugoslavia, especially the tragic butchery in Bosnia, was a recent example of the fate of a people without long democratic traditions undergoing acute economic crisis and being at the mercy of imprudent and populist politicians.

It behoves post-communist political leaderships in the Balkans to avoid the fate of Bosnia or Kosovo and, worse still, the potential of a wider war that might begin in places such as Montenegro, Vojvodina or elsewhere and escalate to involve countries such as Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, FYROM, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.¹¹

It is the duty of the European Union and NATO (whose member states by and large enjoy consolidated democratic institutions) to continue safeguarding the peace agreements in Bosnia and Kosovo ending all speculation about falling dominoes leading to another great European war. The advanced world's duty, further, is to promote democracy wherever social and economic conditions permit its growth and sustainability. This obligation is rendered imperative by what we might call the "democratic paradox". It has been argued, for instance, by careful social scientists such as Rudolph Rummel¹², that the incidence of war had been lowest among democracies and virtually non-existent between what Rummel calls "libertarian" states (i.e. free-enterprise-oriented constitutional democracies). The paradox today is that we have been witnessing the rise of internal and international conflict taking place *simultaneously* with the transition to democracy in regions of former Yugoslavia, in parts of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Should this phenomenon, correlating democracy and conflict, be permitted to continue for long, the very reputation and legitimacy of democratic institutions will be seriously tarnished.

The solid foundations upon which a strong edifice of Southeast European peace and co-operation can be erected include respect for the inviolability of international boundaries, the consolidation of democratic institutions, comprehensive and demonstrated protection of the human rights of all citizens in each state (without discrimination against minorities on the

¹¹ A more timely diplomatic/economic intervention by the international community in Kosovo could have spared the region its latest bloody conflict.

¹² R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27-81.

basis of language, religion or other preferences) and a free-market economy (together with the mutually advantageous networks of interdependence the free market entails).

Peace and transnational co-operation will be cemented further as programs of economic aid, technical assistance, free trade and investment become linked with the peaceful and democratic behavior of recipients. The EU's, NATO's, OSCE's contact group's and G-7/8 strategies of "preventive diplomacy" should, therefore, emphasise rewards (not only sanctions) which will contribute to the development and consolidation of an arc of peace and co-operation in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a strategy will isolate disorienting conceptions/slogans that allude to the development of an "Islamic arc" and an "Orthodox arc" in the Balkan region¹³. Alliances, based on religious affinity and other exclusivist premises, would surely lead to the revival of bloody ethnic/religious conflicts and the self marginalization of those involved. The task for consolidated democracies in the post-Cold War era is to pronounce a new doctrine of "containment" where the object to be contained in the place of communism will be chauvinism and its ethnic-cleansing variants.

The nations and the peoples of Southeastern Europe in the post-Cold War period can resist the siren-songs of a bygone era. They can avoid nationalist and irredentist claims at the expense of their neighbours, and must shy away from policies of subregional alliances, spheres of influence, revanchist campaigns, preemptive probes and disproportionate reprisals – all of which are remnants of a glorious but also self-destructive past.

We should not forget that it took two world wars, and scores of millions of dead, for conditions to ripen and permit traditional European rivals (such as the French and the Germans) to move forward with the remarkable experiment of European integration that has gradually given birth to the European Union. In the post-Cold War Balkans we have already suffered the tragedies of carnage and destruction in Bosnia and Kosovo. In addition to offering our hopes and prayers, we should try to support leaders who are cautious and prudent so that the Cassandra prophecy about the Balkans becoming once again the powder keg of Europe will not become self fulfilling¹⁴.

III. Greek foreign policy priorities in the Post-Cold war era

In the twenty-two years that have elapsed since the Greek Colonels' coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Greek and Cypriot governments have managed to keep the issue of Cyprus alive by employing strictly economic and political leverage on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots while avoiding recourse to the threat and employment of military power.

¹³ For gloom and doom scenarios regarding the Balkans, with strong recommendations that this conflict-prone region be left alone to cope with its self-made and inevitable conflicts, see Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

¹⁴ For a powerful chronicle of mediating efforts that led to the Dayton Peace accords in 1995, see Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, (New York: Random House, 1998).

Turkey, given its apparent military superiority in the Cyprus region, has insisted on perpetuating the post-1974 partition, being the only country to have recognized the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (which unilaterally declared its independence in the Fall of 1983). Since then, the Turkish-Cypriot population has been prevented from reintegrating itself into the mainstream of a unified and prosperous Cypriot economy.

Third parties (e.g. the United States, Great Britain, Germany and – substantively – Russia), gauging, at times overestimating, the strategic and commercial importance of Turkey, have adopted a stance of benign neutrality on the Cyprus question, urging both sides to move quickly and decisively toward a mutually acceptable settlement of their prickly dispute.

In the view of this author, the negotiating position of Greece and Cyprus vis-à-vis Turkey has been enhanced since 1990 for (at least) the following three reasons:

a. The end of the Cold War has led to the gradual decline of Turkey's strategic importance in the security calculus of the US, EU and NATO. Simultaneously, the continuing peace process in the Middle East (including the re-starting of Israeli-Syrian negotiations) will also reduce the putative role of Turkey as a vital Middle Eastern balancer.

b. Following the healing of the wounds left by the Greek civil war (1946-49) and the reintegration of Greece's left (communist and socialist) into the political process after the restoration of democracy in 1974, there has been a convergence, in terms of domestic and foreign policy orientations, in the positions of Greece's major political parties (Center-Left and Center-Right).

c. The new European option of Cyprus, and its policy of seeking accession to the EU, has brought Cyprus closer to matching Western security interests. It should be remembered that in the 1960-90 period, Cyprus had openly identified its UN-focused foreign policy with the non-aligned movement.

Today, Greece and Cyprus are proposing a framework for the settlement of the Cyprus question which does not challenge the interests and objectives of Great Britain and the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, given that the ultimate settlement package includes Cypriot membership in the EU and an increased role for NATO (Cyprus accession to NATO, being the desired objective and a NATO post-settlement implementation force, being the minimum).

Free of Cold War servitudes (which among other things included a fundamental divergence of orientations, i.e. a Euro-Atlantic membership for Greece and a non-aligned orientation for Cyprus) the two governments can easily follow a well orchestrated and diplomatically energetic foreign policy that will be founded on two pillars: The first pillar, strictly defensive, is designed to maintain a state of sufficiency in the balance of Greek-Turkish forces in the Aegean, Thrace and Cyprus¹⁵. This entails a, strictly deterrent, mission for the Greek and Cypriot armed forces designed to safeguard Greece's territorial integrity in the Aegean and Thrace and – in the case of

¹⁵ Government of Cyprus' efforts to add to its defense capabilities are designed to nudge the island toward a process of mutually agreed arms reductions and, ultimately, demilitarization. Turkey retains an unquestioned military superiority in the Cyprus region, especially in terms of naval and air capabilities.

Cyprus – to discourage any further extension of the Turkish armed forces beyond the so-called green line (i.e. the line separating the occupied territories in the North from the rest of Cyprus). In sum, the first pillar involves a defense policy of two countries that want to avoid war without losing in peace.

The second pillar covers the political/economic/diplomatic range of activity and it calls for flexibility, imagination and energy, combining the use of politico-economic instruments of leverage on Turkey (and on the Turkish Cypriot Community in Cyprus) with a comprehensive and long-term set of proposals calling for mutually acceptable settlements in Cyprus and the Aegean. Abandoning single-issue, reactive policies of the past, Greece and Cyprus can take the initiative by identifying viable and mutually reassuring avenues of tension reduction and conflict resolution in a multilateral framework provided by the EU and NATO and by the U.N. Security Council augmented by the Security Council's informal geo-economic extension, the G-8.

Since 1974 and the turbulent events in Cyprus that triggered the collapse of the military dictatorship, Greek foreign policy (in deeds if not always in words) has been a synthesis of power and prudence. Despite occasional bursts of emotional and populist rhetoric – especially in pre-election periods – the Greek governments, whether formed by New Democracy or Pasok, have adopted a cautious and pragmatic set of external policies.

The fundamental premises, of what has been a consensual approach to external challenges and opportunities, can be summarised as follows:

a) Greece is classified in the category of politically and economically developed states which have forged, since World War II, linkages of political and economic interdependence in accordance with the general principles of democracy and market economy. Accession to the European Community (Union) in 1981 has been the center of gravity of a Greek strategy of continuing integration within a European region. Europe is viewed in Greece as an enlightened space which has abandoned since 1945 the *modus operandi* of formulating "national interests" in terms of territorial expansion, irredentism, spheres of influence, unbridled ethnocentrism, economic protectionism, mercantilism and colonialism.

b) Greece's integration into a zone of global stability (EU, WEU, NATO, OSCE, etal.) reinforces its already consolidated democratic institutions and contributes to diplomatic deterrence and the resultant safeguarding of the country's territorial integrity. Naturally, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces remain at the inner core of the country's military deterrence mechanisms.

c) Greece – after 1974 – is perceived as facing a major revisionist challenge from neighbouring Turkey. This challenge calls for the maintenance of an adequate balance of military power sufficient to deter Turkey's employment of military force as an instrument of policy vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus. Simultaneously, the country favours mutually balanced arms reduction regimes (involving especially offensive weapons).

d) In the case of the Balkans, Greece has spearheaded policies of multilateral and multifunctional co-operation, even during the confining period of Cold War bipolarity. These initiatives were an end in themselves, but they

were also designed to improve Greece's bargaining power vis-a-vis Turkey by avoiding the creation of a multi-front diplomatic (and potentially military) confrontation. Unfortunately, Greek policies with respect to FYROM in the 1992-1995 period almost managed to derail the country from this prudent course. However, the renormalization of relations with Albania (early in 1995), and the growing chances of a lasting settlement (following the Interim Agreement in the Fall of 1995) of Greece-FYROM relations have opened new vistas of beneficial co-operation. The continuation of excellent political and commercial contacts with Bulgaria and Romania and the rapidly improving relations with the remaining new states of former Yugoslavia, are restoring Greece to its former course of an active peace contributor to the Balkans.

e) In sum, as a consolidated democracy with an advanced economy, Greece has every reason to remain a *status quo* power and to avoid atavistic temptations (nationalist and irredentist) that have so brutally affected regions of former Yugoslavia and particularly Bosnia.

Together with its partners in the European Union and NATO, Greece will likely contribute to the reconstruction of war-torn former Yugoslavia by participating in peace-building projects, offering humanitarian assistance to refugees, promoting principles and practices of inviolability of frontiers coupled with the protection of human rights of minorities, and emphasising the comparative advantage of economic interdependence. Active participation in peace-keeping and observation missions in Albania and Kosovo in the 1997-to the present period is reflecting Greece's equidistant (vis-à-vis parties in dispute) and multilateralist policies in the Balkans.

IV. Identifying a viable strategy of Conflict Resolution in Cyprus and the Aegean

A successful strategy of peace and mutually advantageous co-operation in the Balkans is certain to ameliorate the troubled Greek-Turkish relationship once Greek and Turkish elites realise that a war between their two countries would be catastrophic and that the perpetuation of high levels of tension in diplomatic relations ultimately hurts the multilateral nexus of relationships of both.

Greece and Turkey have been involved in the past twenty-two years in a costly and protracted diplomatic and economic cold war reaching at times the brink of outright warfare.

With the peace process in full swing in critical areas such as the Middle East, Northern Ireland, South Africa and cautiously, even in the western Balkans, it is imperative to address the complicated issues separating Greece and Turkey with the aim of devising tactics and strategies toward tension reduction and reconciliation. Needless to say the international community can play a highly constructive and facilitative role during the whole enterprise.

If we were to move forward with a set of peace and reconciliation objectives we should accept two major premises: The first premise is that a Greek-Turkish war is unthinkable and unwinnable because, to begin with, it would isolate both belligerents from their Western institutional affiliations. Even if, after the first battles, one of the two countries were to secure marginal territorial gains at the expense of the other, a chain of revanchist conflicts

would surely follow classifying both Greece and Turkey as high risk zones with a devastating impact on their economies and societies.

The second premise is that perpetuating the current Cold War atmosphere does not serve the interests of either Greece or Turkey. Among other costs, both countries are being obliged to maintain disproportionately high military expenditures (on the average around 5% of their GNPs) at the expense of vital economic stabilisation and development programs.

A climate of reconciliation, co-operation and friendship *cannot* be restored as long as the Cyprus question remains unresolved. A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem would exclude *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) and *taksim* (partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish segments). A historic compromise, therefore, calls for *independence* in the form of a federal, bizonal and bicommunal state as specified in the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) summit agreements.

The federal state of Cyprus that will emerge after settlement, will be given an excellent chance to survive and prosper if at the time of its genesis it were to become *simultaneously* a member of the European Union and – if deemed acceptable – NATO. EU membership, together with genuine collective guarantees¹⁶, demilitarisation (except for the British sovereign base areas), and a NATO-commanded multinational implementation force (until mutual confidence is securely established), will allow the troubled Cypriots to forge a long-lived unity based on all rights, duties and freedoms that democracy entails. Understandably, the accession of Cyprus to EU can not remain subject to an implicit veto of the more intransigent side after a reasonable time period elapses.

Shifting to the Aegean area, we can project a rapid process of reconciliation following a Cyprus settlement¹⁷. For this to happen, both sides need to abandon maximalist aspirations and accept what is feasible (and mutually acceptable), rather than what is deemed individually desirable.

A much needed historic compromise between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean must rest on two general and two operational principles of foreign policy. The first general principle involves the mutual denunciation of the use of force by both Greece and Turkey. The second general principle provides that the Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean will follow the road of peaceful settlement involving time-tested methods such as bilateral negotiations and – in case of deadlocks – conciliation, good offices, mediation, arbitration and adjudication. The two operational principles apply to Turkey and Greece respectively. For the benefit of Turkey, it must be understood that the Aegean will not be transformed into a "Greek lake". For the benefit of Greece, it must be also understood that the Aegean will not be *partitioned* or *subdivided* in a fashion that *enclaves* Greek territories (the eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands) into a Turkish zone of functional responsibility.

Following a potential grand settlement, both Greece and Turkey will increase significantly their trade, tourism, investment and joint ventures at

¹⁶ It is worth exploring whether the guarantor regime in Cyprus could involve the G-7 or G-8, in addition to Greece and Turkey

¹⁷ It should be emphasized, however, that the on-going process of tension-reduction and low-politics talks involving Greece and Turkey can have a salutary effect in terms of the intercommunal talks under the aegis of the UN Secretary General.

home and abroad. Greece will, also, abandon its policy of "linkage" vis-à-vis Turkey's accession strategy to the European Union and will, in fact, seek to facilitate Turkish entry. Simply, a European Turkey will be for Greece a much easier neighbour to live with than an isolated and militaristic Turkey.

V. Beyond Helsinki: The Dawn of a New Era?

The decision by the fifteen member-states of the European Union to grant Turkey candidate status for EU accession (Helsinki Summit meeting, 10-12-1999) can be characterised as very positive given that it designates the criteria and the conditions for the future EU accession process of the neighbouring country. Nevertheless, it is still premature to talk about the dawn of a new era for Greek-Turkish relations.

Following Helsinki, we can forecast the acceleration of the "step by step" strategy for the normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, Helsinki offers mutual benefits for all parties involved, as recent experience has taught us, particularly in the Middle East peace process. In short there are no clear "winners" and "losers". Collective benefits can be summarised as follows:

1. Greece's foreign policy profile has been significantly enhanced since it has rid itself of the "syndrome of 1 against 14", which had bedeviled the country for some years. Athens' consent to the Turkish candidacy has upgraded Greek relations with fellow members in the EU and NATO. Helsinki has also safeguarded the accession of Cyprus to the EU by disengaging the accession process from an inelastic requirement of settlement prior to accession. Furthermore, the EU Council's decision, following on previous Council decisions, has established the legal framework for peaceful resolution of Greek-Turkish differences, with a mandatory culmination of the peace process at the International Court of Justice.
2. Turkey's decision to accept the Council's offer has given a positive response to that country's existential question regarding its identity. The EU has decisively engaged Turkey in a process of democratisation as specified by the "road map" for the development of its relations with the Union. The gradual EU accession process of Turkey will hopefully lead to the solidification of democracy, the civilian control of the military, the respect of human rights and the reduction of tension with neighbouring countries. Economic benefits for Turkey will also be considerable as this country sheds some of the statist practices of the past and improves its competitive stance, given its relatively low wage economy.
3. The European Union has gained through the reduction of tension between an EU member-state and Turkey. The normalisation of relations entails significant and mutually beneficial economic benefits in the large Turkish market for all EU members, including Greece.
4. The United States and NATO have also benefited, given that Helsinki pre-empted and gradually abolishes the possibility of a destructive conflict between two significant NATO allies. Moreover, the evolving peace process between Israel and all its neighbours, as well as the gradual stability and reconstruction process in the wounded Balkans, are gradually moving the locus of relations in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean from geopolitics to geoeconomics.

In sum, without excluding the possibility of a relapse (of tension) in Greek-Turkish relations, one can be cautiously optimistic about the future. It makes total sense for the international Community – especially the G-8 – to offer its significant peace-enhancement presence helping the “lock on peace” that the parties appear, finally, to pursue with sincerity of purpose.

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**Critical Rethinking in Foreign Policy:
Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era**

by

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1. Introduction

On August 17, the Marmara region of Turkey was hit by a devastating earthquake which led to the death of thousands of people. There was a rush of humanitarian aid from all over the world. Greece was among the first countries to send condolences and rescue teams to Turkey. On September 7, Greece was also hit by an earthquake; this time it was Turkey who was among the first countries to send condolences and rescue teams to Greece. From this time on, the two countries, who were deemed to be "historical enemies" and who came to the brink of war very recently in the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996, started to behave in ways which were unexpected of them. The motives behind this significant change constitute a very challenging field of inquiry for students of international relations, especially for those whose specific field of interest is Greek-Turkish relations.

One of the central arguments about the Greek-Turkish rapprochement has been that it was a product of what is usually called "civic diplomacy", "people's diplomacy" or "seismic diplomacy" initiated after the earthquakes between the peoples of both countries. According to this argument, the peoples of the two countries showed their preference for friendship and peace, and the political leaders just followed after the "public's wish" in their diplomatic initiatives that gained pace in the post-quake period.

Although it is impossible to dismiss the role of the earthquakes in the positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations, there are some serious challenges to the argument of "earthquake diplomacy". First of all, despite their emphasis on the role of "people's diplomacy", the foreign ministers of both countries acknowledge the fact that the cooperation between Turkish and Greek states indeed preceded the earthquakes: Turkish foreign minister Cem argues that the cooperation started back in June 1999, two months before the earthquake.¹ Papandreou, on the other hand takes the cooperation back to the Kosovo operation in which both countries were involved as NATO allies. He emphasizes the point that for the first time, Turkish military planes flew over Greece carrying humanitarian aid to Kosovo.²

A further proof of the diplomatic initiatives preceding the earthquakes is the exchange of letters between Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and his Greek counterpart Papandreou. The exchange of letters takes place in May-June 1999, just before the earthquakes. In these letters it is possible to see that many of the areas of cooperation (from combating terrorism to economic cooperation) which were brought under focus during the post-quake period were indeed discussed between the two foreign ministers before the earthquakes.

Apart from the rhetorical expressions of a transformation in Greek-Turkish relations predating the earthquakes, we can also give examples of changing practices. Among these practices suggesting for a transformation in Greek-Turkish relations we can cite the signing of Madrid Declaration in 1997, decisions for establishing a task force called SEEBRIG (Southeastern European Brigade) for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the Balkans (1998), and military cooperation during NATO's Kosovo operation (just after the Ocalan incident).

After this overview of the early rhetorical and behavioral expressions of changes in Greek-Turkish relations, it is possible to argue that the argument of "earthquake diplomacy" fails to comprehend the real dynamics of change in Greek-Turkish relations. In the analysis below, I

¹ "Back in June 1999, we had already initiated, as two Ministers, a process of consultation and joint work on our bilateral issues, which was later expedited by the immense solidarity between our two peoples during the tragic earthquakes of last summer. On both shores of the Aegean, Greeks and Turks discovered that they care for each other much more than what was generally presumed."

-- Speech Delivered by FM Ismail Cem at the East-West Institute On the Occasion of Presentation of "The Statesman of the Year" Award - 2 May 2000

<<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bi/05.htm>> [03.06.2000]

² Interview with George Papandreou, "Resolving Old Enmities", *Newsweek*, Newsweek International, February 21, 2000. <<http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/dept/vw/a16398-2000feb14.htm>> [05.03.2000]

will try to develop a constructivist framework inspired by the work of Alexander Wendt in understanding the changes predating the earthquakes. In this framework the main emphasis will be on the interaction of structure and agents: I will try to go over the structural changes and strategic practices of actors in response to these changes.

2. Constructivist Framework

2a. Structural Context

The most significant structural change influencing the Greek-Turkish relations is the end of the Cold War and the dramatic events following it: For both Turkey and Greece, the end of the Cold War, and especially the disintegration of Yugoslavia meant the collapse of a secure regional environment. It is impossible to define a structure just in materialistic terms, such as the distribution of weapons. Not only for Turkey and Greece, but for all the actors involved, the Cold War provided a structure interwoven with common meanings, experiences, and understandings which would help them to make sense of the world around them, and define their identities and interests accordingly. The end of the Cold War deprived many of the actors on the world scene of this conceptual framework. This deprivation resulted in a sense of disorientation for the actors involved; and thus emerged the need for redefining roles and identities in a world where the old paradigms of "security" have collapsed.

This sense of loss and disorientation led to many fluctuations in foreign policy, and these fluctuations were all part of a new social learning process in Greek-Turkish relations. In their analysis of Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, Couloumbis and Veremis argue that the main problem for Greece has been "a strong amount of lag in adjusting its [our] self-definition to current circumstances", and they call this lag in readjustment "rear-view mirror self-perception" (Couloumbis and Veremis 2000). A similar argument can be made for Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It was obvious that the world was dramatically changed, and the actors on stage lacked the necessary conceptual frameworks to redefine their roles.

During this difficult period of readjustment in the post-Cold War era, we see significant examples of strategic disorientation both in Greece and Turkey. At first, war in the Balkans led to the rise of a strongly nationalist discourse in Greek political culture. Greece failed to

led to the rise of a strongly nationalist discourse in Greek political culture. Greece failed to pursue a coherent Balkan policy, and rather than becoming a stabilizing power in the region, became intricately involved in the Balkan conflict with the 'Macedonian question'. Similarly, Turkey's frustration in its relations with Europe resulted in aberrations from the mainstream Turkish foreign policy doctrine; among those aberrations we can cite what became to be perceived as the neo-Ottomanist and pan-Turkist aspirations in foreign policy. The end of the Cold War made it possible for some to imagine a "Turkish world extending from Adriatic to China". These types of claims were associated with expansionism by Greece, and thus, had negative effects on Greek-Turkish relations and resulted in an increase in Greek sense of insecurity.

The fluctuations in foreign policies of both countries indicate an uncertainty in strategic orientation which was a natural result of the dramatic changes in the international structure. For both countries, Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 marks the culmination of this strategic disorientation in foreign policy, and an example for the lag in readjusting self-definitions in a changing world. It is important to note that the Imia-Kardak incident coincides with a domestic turbulence in both countries. What is much more important is the actors' beliefs in how the Western powers perceive this domestic turbulence since in international relations the perceptions of significant others is extremely influential on the definition of state interests and state identity. As Alexander Wendt argues, "actors learn to see themselves as a reflection of how they are appraised by significant Others" (Wendt 1999: 341). The end of the senior Papandreou era in Greece and the rise of fundamentalist Islam in Turkey led to the various suspicions in the West about the future of both countries. Imia-Kardak crisis can be seen as a response of two countries to the Western powers or the "significant" Others who are perceiving them as sites of uncertainty, instability and weakness; on the part of Greece and Turkey, this response can be interpreted as a means of reassertion of political power not only inside, but also outside the borders of the country. The failure of this attempt of reassertion was one of the strongest motives behind the process of "critical self-examination" in foreign policies of both countries.

Some have argued that the Imia-Kardak crisis had strengthened the negative perceptions and hostile feelings in both Greece and Turkey, and thus led to an increase in security dilemma (see Ayman 1998). However, it is also possible to argue that this crisis created the first motives toward a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. The crisis can indeed be

strong pressure from US and EU (especially on Athens) who compelled Simitis' government to abandon Greece's long-held policy of 'no talks with Turkey'. It is also important to note that the Imia-Kardak crisis led to an increase in the "civic diplomacy" or "second-track diplomacy" well before the explosive one triggered by the earthquakes. Ironically, then, this crisis, with its influence on the initiation of a dialogue between two countries, marks not only the culmination of a conflict, but also the initiation of more positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations.

2b. Critical Rethinking

The initial changes in foreign policy cannot be limited to external pressures, though their role should not be underestimated. In both countries, it is possible to observe the initial stages of a critical rethinking or self-reflection in foreign policy. According to Wendt, there are four main strategic practices in the transformation of roles and interests through critical self-reflection (Wendt 1992: 420-422). The first is the breakdown of consensus about identity commitments. In case of Greece and Turkey, the identity commitments are centered on the belief that the nation is encircled by enemies. Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign policy has been defined by what has come to be named as "Sevres Syndrome" or the feeling of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state. This led to a feeling of suspicion, especially toward the neighboring countries. A similar feeling of "encirclement" can be seen in Greece; as Tsoulakis states, "the image which most Greeks have of their country is that of a fort being surrounded by real and potential enemies" (Tsoulakis 1996: 26).

The end of the Cold War and disintegration of Yugoslavia left Turkey and Greece with two options: they would either insist on their commitments to an identity defined on the basis of a feeling of encirclement, and try to survive the turbulence of the post-Cold War on their own, i.e. by maintaining their commitments to an institution of self-help; or they would choose cooperation to establish a security region which would be inconceivable if one of them was excluded from the security scheme.

Kosovo crisis seems to be the critical point for both parties, but especially for Greece, in acknowledging the post-Cold War reality that it is impossible to be secure in such a turbulent region by maintaining the institution of self-help. As George Papandreou puts it, "the

harrowing war in Kosovo brought home to the Greek people the importance and necessity of good, neighbourly relations. Fear and suspicion have long since given way to a policy of regional cooperation, based on mutual understanding and common interests (...) Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, cooperation, and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined, foreign policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey"³ Thus, it is possible to conceive Kosovo crisis as a moment of enlightenment for both Greece and Turkey, but more for Greece than Turkey, during which they come to perceive that the security of the one depends on the security of the other. Furthermore, it is very important to understand the influence of NATO's Kosovo operation on Greek-Turkish relations: Kosovo operation is very critical in the sense that it provided Greece and Turkey with a superordinate goal; studies in cognitive psychology have shown us that cooperation for such a superordinate goal makes it possible for all the actors involved not only to go beyond their egoistic interests, but also to overcome their prejudices against each other (Kowert 1998: 106). The military cooperation of Greece and Turkey during the Kosovo operation can be considered as such an endeavor to attain a superordinate goal which is beyond the self-interests of both actors and which moves the two actors closer to each other.

As we have mentioned above, the post-Cold War security requirements led to the breakdown of consensus about identity commitments in both Turkey and Greece, and opened the site of foreign policy for alternative self-definitions. Breakdown of consensus made the second stage of critical rethinking possible. As Wendt maintains, this is a process of "denaturalization" of the reified ideas and structures, or a process of critical self-examination rather than "problem-solving" (Wendt 1992: 420). Turkey and Greece are going through this process of "demystification" of reified conflictual structures which are taken for granted. They are demystifying what is taken to be "natural" – i.e. being "historical enemies". Although some people are suspicious of this process because of the existing problems which are still unresolved, it might be more proper to think that only after this kind of a critical self-examination and demystification of the Other by establishing mutual trust through confidence building measures, it will be possible to think of "solutions" meeting the needs of both. In short, "problem-solving" process cannot start before this process of demystification.

³ "Revision in Greek Foreign Policy" – Western Policy Center, January 2000
<http://www.papandreu.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html> [05.03.2000]

The third step is “*altercasting*” in which one of the actors tries to induce the other to take on a new identity by treating the other as *if* it already had that identity. Wendt derives this from the mirror theory of identity-formation, in which the identity of the other is determined by your own practices; if you change your practices, then the other will change its conception of itself. (Wendt 1992: 421).

This seems to be the strategy followed by Greece at the Helsinki Summit. On the basis of the idea of altercasting, or mirror-image theory, it is possible to argue that in changing her own practices through a removal of veto to Turkey’s candidacy, and indeed giving a full support to Turkey’s future membership in EU, Greece was changing how Turkey was conceiving herself. This strategy represented a significant shift from classical Greek policy.⁴ It can be argued that Greece, after a critical self-examination, perceived that her security and interests lie not in a “clash of civilizations” with an alienated and adverse Turkey, but rather in entering into a dialogue with a “European Turkey”.

The fourth stage in the intentional transformation of roles and interests is the reciprocation by the Other. Unilateral initiatives or self-binding commitments involved in “altercasting” are not enough to transform competitive identities; the self-binding practices of the Self has to be rewarded by the Other to institutionalize a positive identification (Wendt 1992: 422). This stage seems to be one of the most difficult stages if we look at the Greek-Turkish relations. As the recent debates show, Greece is expecting an act of reciprocation from Turkey in response to her removal of veto at Helsinki Summit. This has been made clear by the statements of defense and foreign ministers. In a recent statement Greek Defense Minister Tsohatzopoulos argued that “there is no prospect for Turkey’s accession to the European Union if the neighboring country does not contribute and make concessions on Cyprus”⁵, and Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou once more reminded that the Cyprus issue is a problem that Turkey is obliged to face from the time it was officially named as a candidate country seeking entry into the EU.⁶ Turkey, on the other hand, seems to be more ready to reciprocate

⁴ As George Papandreou states, “Helsinki was simply a culmination of the new phase in Greek foreign policy. What instigated this fundamental change in our foreign policy? Three major elements can be credited: political forces engulfing the region in the post-Cold War period, new realities of the ‘globalized’ world, and a re-evaluation of Greece’s national interests.”

“Revision in Greek Foreign Policy” – Western Policy Center, January 2000
<http://www.papandreou.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html> [05.03.2000]

⁵ Athens News Agency, *Daily News Bulletin*, 2 August 2000.

⁶ Athens News Agency, *Daily News Bulletin*, 4 September 2000.

regarding issues other than Cyprus. The debate about the abolition of the Aegean Army⁷ or Cem's reference to ICJ⁸ for the solution of the Aegean problems show that Turkey is more ready to reciprocate regarding the issues in the Aegean. To repeat once more, this last step which seems to be very hard for Turkey to take is critical in determining the future of Greek-Turkish relations and relations of both countries with EU.

3. Conclusion

After this overview of the structural context in the post-Cold War era and the strategic practices of the actors involved, it is important to note once more that the recent rapprochement cannot be explained only by reference to "civic" or "earthquake diplomacy". Having said that, it is also important not to underestimate the positive effects of the earthquakes on Greek-Turkish relations. As Richard Clogg once noted, it would be impossible to think of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement without a change in popular attitudes, reciprocal stereotypes and mutual fears (quoted in Gürel 1993: 162) Considering the importance of the popular attitudes and domestic support in foreign policy making, the mobilization of public opinion in both countries through media in the post-quake era and the legitimization of the changing foreign policy practices in the eyes of the people are very important. Without this kind of a public support, the political elites, worried about the reactions of their constituencies, would not be able to act freely in accordance with the principles of their newly shaping foreign policies.

⁷ *Sabah*, 22 May 2000.

⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, 31 July 2000.

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Hizbullah's Future After the Israeli withdrawal?

By Haitham Muzahem

Since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000 the future of Hizbullah has become the key issue that haunts scholars, politicians and academicians as well as decision-makers in both Israel and the Western countries.

This anxiety stems in part from the vagueness of Hizb'Allah political leaders when they are requested to clarify their future goals after the liberation of the Lebanese territories.

Also, this anxiety is due to Hizbullah's use of Islamic ideological language that raises the issues of the liberation of Palestine and the sacred "Quds" also raises questions as to what this means in defining their future actions.

Before embarking on discussing the future of the Military organization of Hizbullah and its political and intellectual course of action, it is necessary to provide a background of Hizbullah's religious and political attitude towards the conflict with Israel and UN Resolution 425 which had called upon a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanese lands occupied in 1978.

Hizbullah's Attitude Towards Israel and UN Resolution 425

Hizbullah announced its attitude towards Israel in the "Open Letter" (Al-Rissalah Al-maftuhah) in Feb. 1985, when they declared "that this aggressive Zionist entity is illegitimate in its initiation, formation, and it is founded on usurped land at the expense of an Islamic people".

The same letter emphasized: "It is compulsory to fight Israel so as to retrieve the usurped rights for its people, and to eliminate Israel's existence from the world." So much so, Hizbullah did not recognize any ceasefire agreement or peace treaty. Also, it condemned all compromise peace settlements which recognized Israel and any land for peace negotiations because such attitudes were "a treason to the Palestinian Muslim blood and the sanctified Palestinian cause"(1).

This radical attitude was borrowed from the Arab and the Palestinian

national discourse, but it was tinged it with Islamic flavor through its strong linkage with the Islamic doctrine declared by Imam Ayatollah Khomeini(2), who is seen by Hizbullah, as the vice-regent of the Waley-Al-faqih (jurist ruler) who is the leader of the Islamic nation and its legitimate (3).

Following this religious discourse which calls for the continuation of Jihad against Israel until it is wiped from the face of the globe and the liberation of Palestine as well as Jerusalem. It also rejected all international resolutions that recognized Israel such as the Truce Agreement Resolution between Israel and Lebanon in 1949, the Resolutions 425 and 426 since both implicitly recognized the Zionist entity and obstructed Jihad and resistance.

Also Hizbullah condemned the activities of the UNIFIL and considered it "colluding and unacceptable". It also announced: "It will treat it as an invading Zionist force..." , since its mission requires the implementation of 425, which implies that preserving the northern border of the Zionist entity through monitoring the truce agreement(4).

Hizbullah's radical attitude especially regarding 425 and UNIFIL led to a conflict with the Shi'it "Amal Movement" which rejected the status quo before 1982. (PLO activities concentrated in South Lebanon, as had known "Fath land", which caused the Israeli invasion).

From Amal's perspective, the Liberation of Palestine is not solely a Lebanese responsibility, but the responsibility of all Arabs and Muslims. They felt the Lebanese resistance should restrict its activities to the occupied Lebanese land. Also, they felt the international borders with Israel should not be violated by the launching Kaychuka rockets so as not to provide the pretext for Israel to continue its occupation and aggression against Lebanon(5).

Hizbullah campaign against 425 and the UNIFIL in August 1986(6) deepened the gap between the Hizbullah and Amal and led to military clashes between them in the South and in the Suburbs of Beirut in April-May 1988.

Besides the intellectual and political differences between Amal and Hizbullah, as well as the dispute in their visions towards the Arab/Israeli

conflict, Both , however, have restricted their guerrillas to fight Israel within the Lebanese territories (7). The main differences between them have stemmed from the power conflict within the Lebanese Shi'it Sect, and their attachments to Syria and Iran, who have both exercised leverage within the resistance against Israel. (8).

As for the early controversy between Amal and Hizbullah since 1985 concerning the future of the Lebanese resistance and the conflict with Israel after its withdrawal from Lebanon, it could be linked to announced intention of withdrawal during the Israeli cabinet led by Shimon Peres at the time, to end its involvement in Lebanon and evacuation of forces after the escalation of acts of Resistance, namely the suicide attacks which forced her to withdraw in 1985 from Beirut, Mountain and most of the South and Western Bekaa to the region called "Security Zone".

Due to the civil war, Israel endeavored in the absence of the Lebanese authority to find a local Lebanese authority to maintain unofficial security and guarantees in Southern Lebanon in order to prevent any rocket attacks on its northern border. Since the collaborator Antoine Lahd's militia (SLA) failed to accomplish such a mission, Israel estimated that the rising power of Amal and its control in some regions evacuated by the Israeli Army, the required substitute.

This alternative failed for two reasons: the rising power of Hizbullah and the failure of Amal to decide the military confrontation with it (9). The second is the Syrian rejection to any type of communications, be implicit or explicit, with Israel or security arrangement between Amal and Israel (10).

As a result of Iran and Syria's negotiations with Hizbullah and Amal, the clashes were suspended, but they broke out sporadically in 1988-1990. These happened despite the Second Damascus Agreement signed in Damascus to end the conflict in 1989. (11)

The development of Hizbullah Attitude towards resolution 425

Hizbullah's attitude towards 425 can be divided into two main phases: the first phase before Ta'if Agreement, the phase of rejection and

condemnation which spanned 1982-1990. The second is the phase of adaptation with 425 content which began with the Damascus Agreement II signed with Amal in 1990, a period that coincided with the implementation of Ta'if 1989 which ended the civil war in Lebanon, dissolution of military militias, unification of state's institutions and the deployment of the Lebanese army in most Lebanese territories.

Despite Hizbullah's opposition to the Ta'if agreement (12), it accepted its practical effects, and it began to adapt to it, particularly concerning the role of the Lebanese resistance in the liberation of the Lebanese occupied lands. This role was according to the political vision of the Lebanese state based on 425 Resolution, the 'Truce Agreement and the Ta'if.

Also, this second phase (1990-1998) witnessed numerous regional, national and international developments. On the international level, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the New World Order. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the initiation of the Arab-Israel peace process based on Madrid formula in 1991 brought change to the region. In Lebanon, the end of the war as well as the restoration of state after the termination of General Michael Aoun's mutiny and the dissolution of the Lebanese Forces Militia brought new developments.

These transformations, particularly with the involvement of both Syria and Lebanon in the negotiations settlement with Israel, and the disarming of the militias, motivated Hizbullah leadership to review its political discourse and adopt realpolitik approach. These changes were made in order to match such transformations starting from the coexistence of state apparatus and its security forces, through the participation of Hizbullah in the Lebanese Parliament in 1992 (one of the Lebanese institutional system), ending with its commitment of military activities in the scope of the Lebanese lands, meaning that the restriction of its military resistance to the liberation of the Lebanese occupied lands (13).

Practically, Hizbullah proved its political flexibility and its speed in adapting to the new developments (14), particularly after its acceptance of July Understanding in 1993 with Israel, due to Syrian/American communications. Hizbullah committed not to rocket North Israel with Katiousha as opposed to Israel's commitment not to attack Lebanese civilians which they violated in the ensuing of Grapes of Wrath Israeli military attack in April 1996 which was intended to demolish the July Understanding and

destroy the infrastructure of "Islamic resistance", or to at least suspend its military activities.

Israel failed to accomplish its objectives, and a new understanding was reached in 1996 called "April Understanding" by both the Lebanese and Israeli government through the shuttle visits by the US former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. This understanding emphasized the essence of July Understanding and led to the formation of the Monitoring Committee to observe the applications of its terms (15).

The attitude of Hizbullah on the essence of the above mentioned Understanding and its commitment to abide by its terms with some reservation on these related to implicit recognition of Israel with its borders (16), formed a recognition of the de facto situation (Israel with her borders) and its commitment not to attack it through launching Katiousha rockets, despite this illegitimate existence of this entity.

If we juxtapose Hizbullah Realpolitik with its pure ideology concerning the struggle with Israel and the International Resolutions related to the truce with her, it is easy to understand the shift in Hizbullah vision towards the conflict with Israel and its absorption in the rules of the game (Balance of power) governing the regional conflict under the pretext of necessity and regional mounting pressures (17).

Thus far, responding to Lebanonization and Realpolitik requirements imposed by the new developments, Hizbullah considered the Israeli unconditional implementation of 425 Resolution, without signing any peace treaty or security arrangements a realization of its goals and victory of its political vision (18).

Accordingly, Hizbullah welcomed such a unilateral unconditional withdrawal, being a flagrant victory for Hizbullah, Lebanon, Arabs and Muslims combined. It is the crowning achievement of its patient military activities as claimed by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah (19).

Contrary to Israeli claims that Hizbullah didn't favor an Israeli withdrawal since the existence of the occupying forces was the role justification of its existence, Hizbullah condensed its military activities and encouraged the Lebanese masses to enter the occupied lands and fight against the occupying forces, a procedure which accelerated not

only the withdrawal date in May 2000, but also the collapse of militia collaborators (Southern Lebanon Army) and the release of the detained Lebanese from Khiam prison(20). Furthermore, Hizbullah formed a new reality through deploying its units in the formerly occupied lands when the Lebanese army didn't enter the ex-occupied zone before the deployment of the UNIFIL.

What is next after the Israeli withdrawal?

I think that there are three prospective scenarios of Hizbullah's action in the near horizon after the Israeli withdrawal:

A-The first scenario is that Hizbullah will continue its military activities and resistance against Israel due to continuous Israeli occupation of some Lebanese lands including Shebaa Farms and Israel's continuing detention of Hizbullah's leaders(e.g. Sheikh Abdelkarim Obeid and Mustapha Dirani). More often Hizbullah's leaders have expressed such alternative before and after Israeli withdrawal(21). Furthermore, the "Islamic Resistance" (the military arm of Hizbullah) bombarded the Israeli position in Shebaa Farms in May 2000 so as to emphasize that these areas have entered into its military activities' framework(22).

Despite the non-military activities by Hizbullah against Israeli forces in Shebaa Farms or against the civil compounds in North Israel(23), this alternative still exists, in absence of peace, as long as Israel refuses to release the Lebanese detainees and rejects to the withdrawal from Shebaa farms(24) on hand and the continuation of her occupation of Syrian Golan on other hand.

B-The Second Scenario: In this scenario Hizbullah abides implicitly by the Truce Agreement signed by both Israel and Lebanon but maintains its resistant arm and continues with the Lebanese government in maintaining their demands that Israel release the detainees and withdraw from Shebaa farms through diplomatic means. This alternative which dominated nowadays is widely accepted by international, regional and local parties since it furnishes relative stability and quietude on the Lebanese-Israeli borders and diffuses a new war erupting which would transcend the Lebanese area.

C- The last and third Scenario: This is reflected in the resumption of the

Syrian -Israeli negotiations to achieve a final comprehensive and just peace between Syria and Lebanon and Israel, i.e. the complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Shiba Farms and the release of all Lebanese detainees. Undoubtedly, this is the only alternative which results in the demilitarizing of Hizbullah by the Lebanese government supported by Syria, and the deployment of the Lebanese army on the Israeli - Lebanese borders as well as establishing joint security arrangements. Axiomatically, this alternative will not prevent Hizbullah in resuming its political, social and cultural activities, and its hostile cultural, civil and political campaigns against the normalization with Israel even if restrictions are imposed on its activities to domesticate it(25).

Accordingly, the elaboration on the military future of Hizbullah nowadays is useless because Hizbullah's attitude is in unprecedented perfect conformity with both the Lebanese and Syrian governments. There is a consensus between these three parties on depriving Israel of any security arrangements related to suspension of military activity before a comprehensive and just peace, as long as Israel continues its occupation to tiny spots of the Lebanese and syrian lands(26).

Despite Hizbullah, based on its Islamic ideology rejecting Israel entity and its legitimacy even on any piece of Palestinian land, does not recognize the legitimacy of the international border between Lebanon and Israel, its Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had emphasized in the early April 2000 that his party will be bound by what the Lebanese government decides whether the Israeli withdrawal was to the international border or not(27). I believe that this message divides into two dimensions: The first is directed to the Lebanese general public (namely in the South) that Hizbullah will not exceed the demands of the Lebanese government's concerning its total sovereignty on both land and water, the release of Lebanese detainees from Israeli prisons and compensation for the casualties related to Israeli aggressions up to the Palestinian refugees rights. As for the second dimension -in my viewpoint- it is external and directed to both Israel, the US, UN, and world public opinion that Hizbullah is bound by the rules of the conflict between Syria/Lebanon and Israel. In other words, this message could be read that the solution key lies in the comprehensive solution and the unity the Syrian/Lebanese attitude, not in the unilateral withdrawal.

Furthemore, it was very remarkable that the electoral programm of Hizbullah

has claimed only the sovereignty on both Lebanese land and water , particularly the liberation of Shebaa firms, and the resistance of normalization with Israel as well as the Palestinian refugees rights to return to their land. Despite Hizbullah called to generalize its Islamic Movement experience to other Arab peoples, namely the Palestinian people, But the programm didn't contain any mention of the Liberation of palestine or of its military role towards this goal.(28).

The Future of Hizbullah after the settlement

This side of the article is based on the third alternative scenario mentioned above, i.e. a comprehensive settlement between Syria/Lebanon and Israel which ends the state of war and hostilities and guarantees security and stability on the shared borders. I will try to explore Hizbullah's opportunities and prospective horizons after the settlement and the transformation of the whole party of military resistance into political and social roles in the Lebanese arena.

It is difficult to explore Hizbullah's future orientation without elaborating on its relations with the three governments it interacts with:Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian. There is also a need to better understanding its political and intellectual program in Lebanon and the region, as well as, the study of Hizbullah's capacity to adapt to the factual settlement with Israel, i.e. its demilitarization and its transformation into a full political and civil organization.

Firstly: The Relation of Hizbullah with the Lebanese and Syrian regimes

Hizbullah's relation with the Lebanese government had witnessed distinctive developments. It begin with complete hostility and non recognition legitimacy of the Lebanese regime by Hizbullah during the 1980s, then the incorporation of Hizbullah into the fabric of the de facto regime after the implementation of Ta'if in 1990. Finally Hizbullah participated in the Lebanese parliament in its two sessions of 1992,1996 and 2000,despite its opposition to the government and tense relations between both in the 1990s(29).

Currently there is a strong alliance between the Lebanese government led by the current Lebanese president Emile Lahoud,which is strongly connected

with the alliance between Hizbullah/Iran and Syria against the Israel and the pioneering role of Hizbullah in resisting the Israeli occupation(30). Thus far, the future positive/negative developments of these relations depend on the alliance continuation on one hand and the development of the struggle and settlement with Israel on the other.

Since the Lebanese regime in its consensus democracy between numerous sects arid with its political multi-partyism admitted to the existence of Hizbullah as a political Islamic party in the Lebanese parliament, provinces and local municipalities and civil institutions (to be added to its military existence), it is able to admit the continuation of its political role, given the termination of its military role after the termination of the Israeli occupation and perhaps later after the signature of peace agreement between Lebanon/Syria and Israel.

But the relation between Hizbullah and the Lebanese regime will continue to be subject to regional and international impacts. Meanwhile, the alliance between Hizbullah and Syria is expected to continue even in case of a peace settlement because Hizbullah needs regional political coverage to preserve its role and political status on one hand, and Damascus's preservation of its major allies in Lebanon so as to guarantee its security and influence on the other.

It is evident that Arab regimes, that prevent Islamic fundamentalist movements from public political activities and democratic participation lead these movements to conduct subterranean clandestine activities and violence. Therefore, it is irrational to push Hizbullah after it has transformed from a radical subterranean military and security organization to a moderate, realistic, and public political party into secrecy and extremism again by suppressing and downsizing it. In a country drawling of democracy and individual freedoms, Hizbullah has earned a place in the political process.

Second: Hizbullah Relation with Iran

Undoubtedly, Hizbullah will continue in maintaining its relation with Iran even after its transformation into a pure political party that conforms to the Lebanese laws. This can be done through two mechanisms: The first lies in the religious, intellectual and jurisprudentially linkage called the " Jurist Ruler"(waley al-Faqih), manifested in the guidance of

the Islamic republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini(31). This linkage is permissible unless it violates the Lebanese laws, and it is restricted to religious, intellectual and cultural linkage.

As for the second linkage, it is the political linkage with the Iranian government. Hizbullah has emphasized through the years its independent political decisions, and it is not subject to any Iranian commands in this regard. Furthermore, the new reform orientation of Iran under the current president Mohammed Khatami, motivated Hizbullah to adopt a similar approach on the road of an "open door policy" (Infitah), democracy and improvement of relationships with both Arab and western worlds.

I also believe that the Iranian government policy of détente abroad accelerated the Lebanonization of Hizbullah(32). This orientation will continue in the future through reduction of financial support or even its complete suspension, or granting it complete independence to decide on its own as currently claimed by its leaders(33).

Hence, the dissociation of Hizbullah from Iran is a gradual process and it needs time and that is linked with political developments among which one is the Arab-Israel conflict. However, this does not amount to cutting off the relationship since there are religious, intellectual, jurisprudence and financial connections (one-fifth "al_khomss" and the poor due "al_zakat") as well as the humanitarian support and finance of charitable Islamic institutions.

Third: Political and Intellectual Program of Hizbullah

Hizbullah in its political and intellectual discourse calls for two main objectives:

1. Adoption of Islam as a comprehensive life system
2. Fighting against corruption and tyranny in the world, particularly the Israeli usurpation of Arab lands and Western as well as American hegemony on the Arab and Islamic world(34).

Though the first objective includes the call for the establishment of an Islamic system applying Shari'a, Hizbullah announced that it will not coerce people in Lebanon to adopt such an Islamic approach, without concealing its desire that an Islamic regime could be chosen by the majority of Lebanese(35).

Currently, Hizbullah waived its call for an "Islamic Republic in Lebanon", substituting it with rescinding the political sectarianism", being an emblem advanced by most of Lebanese and political parties. But this emblem is in complete contradiction with the first since annulment of political confessionalism (related to state positions and bureaucracy) means first of all the relinquishment of religious confessionalism (with regard to Islamic Shari'a application in a multiconfessional country).

Since Hizbullah conceives the impossibility of establishing an "Islamic Republic" in Lebanon, at least in the near future, and thus considers its current goal is to reform the Lebanese system and render it just and more equitable namely through the abolition of political confessionalism and the achievement of equal development(36).

Thus far, Hizbullah has made the abolition of political confessionalism the core objective among its other religious and economic objectives which include social justice, equal development, support of the oppressed and deprived and fighting against governmental corruption and unjust economic policies.

Despite Hizbullah's seriousness in this endeavor to achieve the above just goals, it showed inclination towards compromise with the government during the period (1992- 2000). It entered in the three sessions of legislative elections(1992,1996,2000) on the regime lists and coordinated with feudalist and corruption forces under the pretext of regional and national necessity and Resistance preservation. But these pragmatic alliances have lose Hizbullah some of its credibility as a party of change and reform(37).

Hence, the political-intellectual program of Hizbullah as a transformative party has not crystallized yet due to its concentration on military resistance against Israeli occupation coupled with serious compromises on the internal reforms and change. Furthermore there is no substantial distinction between Hizbullah and other parties describing themselves "change forces" except that of Hizbullah's Islamic ideology.

As for the confrontation of the US hegemony in the region and Israeli occupation of Palestine, it represents a far-reached goal, given the incapacity of Hizbullah in any settlement to transcend the publicity and cultural as well as propaganda campaign against Israel and the normalization process. Hizbullah have played a big role in creating the

committee of resistance to normalization with Israel in 1997.

I believe that in the phase of peaceful settlement, the absence of an effective, internal transcript and uncrystalized political program, all will form a major challenge to Hizbullah compared with other political forces and programs being more effective or at least similar to Hizbullah's and that is expected to lose its competitive edge in terms of being popular assets resulted from its heroic resistance, sacrifice, and support of the deprived, the poor as well as its staying away from governmental corruption and "exploitive share system".

Lebanonization of Hizbullah

Hizbullah has gone far in the Lebanonization process; but it needs more steps to complete such orientation, most important of which are:

1-Transformation into a multi-confessional Lebanese party, not restricted to Shi'ites who believe in the "viceregency of the Jurist"(Wilayat al_faqih) doctrine, which renders Hizbullah a doctrinally and confessionally distinctive party far from being a people's party leading the transformation and reforms process in the Lebanese regime as it did in championing the resistance movements against Israeli occupation.

Sensitizing such a problem, Hizbullah launched "The Lebanese Resistance Companies" (Saraya Al-muqawama Al-lubnania) as a resistant unit from out of Hizbullah's cadre so as to contribute those yearn to fight Israel from all other religion sects and different political and intellectual streams.

This experiment probably remains isolated but it expresses the weak point haunting Hizbullah as a national resistance. But its Lebanese and legitimate nature is not recognized due to its appellation "The Islamic Resistance" and also due to its connection with the Shi'ites, Iran and the "viceregency of Jurist".

Although it is not possible to require of the leaders of Hizbullah and its elements to abandon their religious and intellectual indoctrination, similarly not convincing others to adopt Hizbullah's beliefs, it is possible to transform Hizbullah into a new party with new framework and with official recognition observing the specificities of the Lebanese/ Arab environment, reconciling the general principles of Islam (avoiding the Shi'ite particularism) and modern reforms programs so as to include members

from all sects, at least from all Muslim sects.

Hopefully, Hizbullah may benefit from the Iranian reforms experiment launched by the president Mohammad Khatimi , in terms of pluralism, individual freedoms, "open-door policy", transparency, civilization dialogue and the detente with the external world.

Indubitably, the organizational experiment of Hizbullah will require later the development of structural organization so as to be more rarefied, transparent, democratic and decentralized in its civil political activities unlike its former structure justified by the situational security and military conflict with Israeli occupation, new experiment and deficiency in numerous leadership cadres.

Footnotes

*Haitham Muzahem is a Lebanese researcher and journalist . His anticipated book entitled "Israeli labor party: 1968-1999" will be published in the near future.

1. "Al-Rissalah Al-maftuhah"(The Open letter issued of Hizbollah) on Feb. 16, 1985, pp. 28-29; Haitham Muzahem, "425 Resolution, Hizb'Allah and Syria: Confrontation policy in Southern Lebanon" ,"Shu'un Al_Awsat"(Middle East affairs-in Arabic), Issue 80, January. 1999; pp.46-50.
2. See the Imam Khomeini's attitude from Israel in" The Imam Leader Confronting Zionism"(Anthology of public speech- Tehran: Islamic Information and Guidance Ministry, 1404 Hejira), pp. 40-46.
3. The open Letter, Op.cite, p.7.
4. The Open Letter, p. 36: Wadah Shararah, "The state of Hizb'Allah: Lebanon An Islamic Society" (Dawlat HizbAllah: Lubnan Mujtama'an isalmian),(Beirut: Al -Nahar Publisher, 1996), p. 347, 359.; Marius Deeb, "Militants Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology", (Occasional papers series, November 1986, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington D.C. : George Town University), p. 17.
5. Concerning Amal Movement's Stance, see: Augustus Richard Norton,"Amal and the Shi'a : Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon ", (University of texas,1987); Chibli Mallat, "Shi'it Thought from the South of Lebanon" , (Paper on Lebanon, April 1998, Center for Lebanese Studies Oxford), pp. 35-36. Stephen C. Pelletiere
" Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied

(Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Instituted Territories, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Nov 1994), p.30.

6. Marius Deeb, Op.cit., p. 17.

7. Chibli Mallat, Op.cit., p. 36.

8. Graham Usher, "Hizb'Allah, Syria and the Lebanese Election," Journal of Palestine studies (Winter 1997): 62-63; Harik, Op.cit., pp.254-255.

9.A.R. Northorn, Op.cit., pp.194-200

10. Mallat, Op.cit., p.35; Deeb, op. Cit., p/17.

11. Hassan Fadlallah, The Third Alternative(Al-Khayar Al-Akhar) (Beirut: El -Hadi Publish 1994), pp

12. See The Attitude of Hizb'Allah from Ta'if in the "Taif Document: A Study in Essence" (Prepared by the Committee of Analysis and studies in the Political bureau of Hizb'Allah, 1989).

13. See Haitham Muzahem: "Hisb'Allah and the problem of reconciliation between Realism and Ideology", "Shu'un Al_Awsat"(Middle East affairs-in Arabic), Issue 59, January 1997, pp. 61-68.

14. Ibid., pp.65-67; Norton, Op.cit., pp.153-155.

15. Concerning both July Understanding of 1993 and April Understanding 1996, see "Al- Safir" Newspaper, 28 July 1998 and 27 April 1998 and 27 April 1996.; Harik, op.cit.,pp.256,261.

16. See the Secretary General of Hizb'Allah to "Al- Safir" Newspaper 27 April 1998.

17. Haitham Muzahem, Op.cit., pp.67-68.

18. Norton quoted the Chairman of the Political office of Hizb'Allah the Deputy, Mohammad Ra'ad: "Certainly, Hizb'Allah will benefit from the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on two counts: the popular base built by Hizbollah and the pioneering role played by it in the armed resistance", Norton, Op.cit., p. 154.

19. Nasrallah's declaration to al-Nahar Newspaper 3 April 1998.

20. See the Lebanese newspapers during April, May 2000, Particularly Issues numbers 22,23,24,25,26,-51 /2000.

21. The secretary genral of Hizb'Allah, Hassan Nasrallah's address in 15 April 2000 in commomeration of "Ashourah" transmitted by the Lebanese newspapers in 16-17 April 2000.

22. Nasrallah's Public Speech in the Lebanese newspapers 23 May 2000.

23. World Press and Newws agencies, and Lebanese mass media reported in 28-29 May 2000 pictures and news related to Hizb'Allah forbidding the Lebanese youth from infiltrating borders through Fatima's gate:

Thereafter, Hizb'Allah closed the Gate with sandbags barriers. It captured

the attention of observes that both Hizb'Allah's fighters stood eyeball to eyeball with the Israeli soldiers lining up in parallel with the international borders without any military clashes!!

24. The Israeli pretext being that these areas are Syrian and occupied in the 1967 war, and accordingly subject to Security Council Resolution 242, not 425. Israeli forces have evacuated two positions in Shibaa Farms on the ground that these are the only Lebanese areas while the remainder is Syrian's, so much so, it is comprehensively implemented 425. See Israeli political elites' speeches in the Arab press and international news agencies in 28,29,30 May 2000.

25. Ra'ad's article in "Islamic Movements in confrontation with Reconciliation" (a research paper. Beirut: Strategic Studies Center for Research and documentation, 1995).

26. Cf. Nassrallah's Speech 15 April 2000; the Lebanese President, Emile Lahoud's memorandum to the General secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan published its summary in the Lebanese newspapers, 6 April 2000.

27. See Lebanese news papers in 3 April 2000.

28. See the Hizbullah's electoral program in the Lebanese newspapers (16/8/2000). Ironically, the dissent ex-General secretary of Hizbullah Sheikh Sobhi al-Tufayli has accused the current leadership of Hizbullah of involving in a deal with Israelis to not attack them through the borders after their withdrawal from Lebanon. Such deal was reported by Israeli and Swedish papers in June 2000.

29. Muzahem, "Hizbullah and the problem of Reconciliation" op.cit; pp. 65-66.

30. Muzahem, "425 Resolution, Hizbullah", Op.cit., pp. 51-53.

31. Muzahem, Op.cit., "Hizb'Allah and the problem of Reconciliation", pp. 61-62, 65.

32. Muzahem, "425 Resolution", Op.cit., pp. 51, 57; Salem Mashkour, "Conclusion and Reforms Negotiation intra the Lebanese Hizbullah" in al-Nahar Newspaper 30 May 1998.

33. Deputy of the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sheikh Nailim Qasim, in interview with al-Safir 10 June 1996.

34. Open Letter, Op.cit.,

35. Nailim Qasim, Op.cit.

36. Deputy Mohammad Fenaysh (also a member in the Politbureau of Hizbullah) "Hizbullah's vision -on current Realism" 1-2, "al-Hayat newspaper", 17-18 April 1992.

37. Hizbullah's alliances during the legislative elections in August-

September 2000 were very confused and not understood. Its alliance with Amal movement in South and Bekaa was understood being the pretext of keeping the resistance and avoiding a new internal Shi'it war between the both parties. But the Hizbullah's implicit alliance with ex-PM Rafic Hariri in Beirut province was contradiction of the Hizbullah participation in the Talal Arslan's list hostile to the list of Durzi leader Walid Junblat and the allies of Hariri in Baabda province. Futhemore, Hizbullah has waived his past refuse to participate in an electoral list with the ex-leader of Lebanese forces Elie Houbeka who is seen by Hizbullah as the responsible of Sabra/Shatila massacres in 1982, as well as its alliance with Phalangist Nader Sukar, who was been a famous advisor of Samir Gaagaa the prisoned leader of Lebanese Forces.

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