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
FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT

SWP

STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK (SWP)
CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK (CPN)

WHAT IS EFFECTIVE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION?
LEARNING AND APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE

CPN Annual Conference 1999/2000

8-9 November 1999

SWP, Ebenhausen

WHAT IS EFFECTIVE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION?
LEARNING AND APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCES
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)-Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)
Ebenhausen, 8-9/XI/1999

a. Agenda
1. "Improving conflict prevention by learning from experience: context, issues, approaches and findings"/ Michael Lund
2. "Preventing potential conflicts: assessing the impact of light and deep conflict prevention in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans"/ Hugh Miall
3. "An evaluation of international efforts in Burundi"/ Luc Reychler
4. "Improving capacities and procedures for formulating and implementing effective conflict prevention strategies : an overview of recent donor initiatives"/ Manuela Leonhardt
5. "Conflict prognostication. Pt. 1, Bridging the gap from early warning to early response"/ L. van de Goor, S. Verstegen

STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK (SWP)
CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK* (CPN)

CPN Annual Conference 1999/2000

8-9 November 1999 at Ebenhausen

What is Effective in Conflict Prevention?
Learning and Applying the Lessons from Recent Experience

Agenda

Monday, 8 November 1999

until 13:30	Arrival at Ebenhausen Lunch at the SWP (if desired)
14:00 - 14:15	**Welcome and Introduction** *Reinhardt Rummel and Michael Lund*

14:15 - 16:00   **SESSION 1:   DEFINING THE ISSUES IN PREVENTION ASSESSMENT**

Chair:
Luc van de Goor,
Netherlands Institute for International Relations
Clingendael

"An Overview of the Context, Issues, and Challenges"
Michael Lund,
Creative Associates International, Inc.

Commentators:
Norbert Gresch,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence
Policy, European Parliament
Emery Brusset
Channel Research Ltd.

Why is evaluation of preventive interventions becoming important? What are the main methodological, organisational, and process issues involved? What have we learned so far? What is the current state of the art? What approaches are being taken?

16:00 - 16:30   Coffee Break

| 16:30 - 18:15 | SESSION 2: | PREVENTING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS: KEY INGREDIENTS IN RECENT CASES |

Chair:
Espen Barth Eide,
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

"Findings from Several Eastern European and Balkans Cases"
Hugh Miall,
Richardson Institute, Lancaster University

Commentators:
Peter Billing, ECHO
Ettore Greco, Institute for International Affairs (IAI)

What have been the most important domestic and international factors that have prevented post-Cold War national-level political disputes from escalating into the use of violence or armed force? What have been the role and impacts, beneficial and/or harmful, of the policies and engagements of the European Union and other major actors in influencing the course of these emerging situations?

| 18:30 | Bus Transfer to the Hotel |
| 20:00 | Dinner at the Hotel |

Tuesday, 9 November 1999

| 8:40 | Transfer to SWP |
| 9:00 - 10:45 | SESSION 3: | WHEN GOVERNMENTAL AND NGO ACTORS TRY TO MANAGE AN ESCALATING CONFLICT: EVALUATING THEIR PERFORMANCE |

Chair:
Stefan Mair, SWP

"An Evaluation of International Efforts in Burundi"
Luc Reychler, Leuven University

Commentators:
N.N.
Andreas Mehler, Institute for African Affairs

How can EU and other international conflict prevention/management efforts in a country best be evaluated for their impacts in preventing or containing violence and achieving peacebuilding? What range of conflict and peace impacts should be investigated and how can they be measured? How can evidence of impacts be gathered and analysed? How can international and domestic policymakers improve the effectiveness of their conflict prevention/management activities? How can the methodology and process for carrying out evaluations of these and other interventions be improved?

| 10:45 - 11:15 | Coffee Break |

11:15 - 13:00	SESSION 4:	APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE: IMPROVING CAPACITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR FORMULATING AND IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES

Chair:
David Nyheim, FEWER

"Findings and Lessons from a Survey of Major Donors"
Manuela Leonhardt, International Alert

Commentators:
Peter Meyer, European Commission
Cynthia Gaigals, Saferworld

What are the current organisational, conceptual, procedural and data-gathering capabilities of the European Union (EU) and other major international actors for evaluating the impacts of activities they fund or carry out which are aimed at or affect conflict prevention and management in developing countries? What are the strengths and weaknesses of participatory methods .in achieving valid findings regarding donors' interventions impacts, in alleviating evaluation methodological and implementation problems, and in achieving the most effective conflict prevention management interventions?

13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00	Departure of Participants

Michael Lund

Improving Conflict Prevention by Learning from Experience: Context, Issues, Approaches and Findings

CPN Annual Conference 1999
Draft Conference Paper - Do not quote

31 October 1999

CONTEXT: CONFLICT PREVENTION REACHES ADOLESCENCE

It has been seven years since Agenda for Peace called for"preventive diplomacy" toward conflicts such as in Yugoslavia. It is five years since the horrendous ethnic atrocities in Rwanda started the UN and some governments to do a bit of soul-searching about the conflict implications of their activities in developing countries. The human suffering, huge financial costs for humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, and other reasons that first led to the post-Cold war international interest in conflict prevention -- preventing violent conflicts before they start or containing initial outbreaks -- continue to provide a rationale for this fledgling policy movement, if it can be called that. Every half-year or so, another major crisis follows upon an earlier one, like East Timor followed after Kosovo, which erupted in the same year as the wars in the DRC and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

To be sure, the UN, EU, and other major international actors are far from having established a regular policy of monitoring potential genocides or other violent conflicts, and acting early if it is feasible wherever they threaten to cause major human suffering. To the contrary, for those in the small but growing professional circles who are involved in conflict prevention as students, researchers or practitioners, the adoption and implementation of the imminently sensible idea of prevention seems maddeningly slow and perplexingly equivocal, especially as persuasive evidence of its value and do-ability accumulates. Setting aside the repeated failures to act in a robust way toward crises before they escalate, basic conceptual blindspots and muddled definitions persist, not only in the media but often at the highest policy levels:

- The tendency to ignore the vastly different practical implications of incipient stages of potentially violent political disputes, on the one hand, and violent stages of armed and militarized conflicts, on the other.

- Equating humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions on behalf of crisis mitigation with conflict or crisis prevention, which is aimed at obviating such remedial actions.

- The automatic assumption of older fields such as track-two conflict resolution, human rights, development, democracy-building, and so on that they, too, have been doing conflict prevention all along (an indication of its growing"popularity"), even though the ways those fields pursue their main goals may be as harmful as it is helpful in preventing particular violent conflicts, depending on the conditions within the particular case.

In this connection, a curious note was the recent suggestion by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, apparently prompted by Kosovo and East Timor, that the international community should be prepared to support more and more such expensive and sometimes destructive crisis interventions, rather than try to spend less on alleviating crises and more in

preventing them. It is possible there is a built-in compulsion or vested political interest within major international entities, despite all their qualms about multilateral cooperation, to pursue only the most costly and difficult military interventions, and bypass the more timely ones with fewer difficulties, controversy and cost? The continued hesitation to devote major attention and resources to conflict prevention may be due to such an ingrained habit, or to being pushed off the agenda by other worthy but competing issues, to a mental lag among many policymakers that has kept them from internalizing the meaning and value of prevention, to their lack of exposure to its payoffs in particular places, or to clearly contradictory vested interests that block the way. But does it make logical sense to attribute the current problem to lack of political will, when it is not clear they really been asked to act preventively, rather than reactively? It is not self-evident whether any nucleus exists inside the major bureaucratic systems that has been urging top decision makers to do anything very significant in potential crisis spots that are of peripheral importance. No clear loci exist so far for the responsibility in most of the leading organizations. Within those entities as in the public sphere of the international community as a whole, conflict prevention is still a matter of voluntary charity, not specific responsibility.

To clarify the conceptual matter, conflict prevention includes any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to strengthen the capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviate the underlying problems that produce them, including forestalling the spread of active hostilities into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have not occurred recently and where recent largely terminated conflicts could recur. Depending on how they are applied, it can include the particular methods and means of any policy sector, whether labeled prevention or not (e.g., sanctions, conditional aid, mediation, structural adjustment, democratic institution-building, etc.), and they might be carried out at the global, regional, national or local levels by any governmental or non-governmental actor.

In any case, the basic argument and message of conflict prevention still has not"stuck" in many critical policy quarters and levels, despite all the talk and activity in this field since the early 1990's. The quantity of policy doctrine, earmarked organizations and offices, specific decision procedures, public hearings, policy debates, appropriations, program regulations, field manuals, and other infrastructure of the kind that is commonplace for other post-Cold War policy concerns such as humanitarianism, terrorism, development, democracy, peacekeeping, and arms control still far outweighs those found so far in conflict prevention.

Indeed, in view of the rigorously calculated data the Carnegie Commission assembled to compare the costs of prevention to those of mid-conflict peace enforcement (e.g., Kosovo) or post-conflict intervention, one could argue that the inefficiencies in the failure to use available means and resources to more concertedly address conflict prevention is such a huge waste of public funds that it rises to the level of scandal. This squandering might be a ripe issue for opposition politicians who wish to challenge incumbent governments. The idea that prevention should be used instead of bloodshed and bombs might appeal to a sizable portion of the public, were they to know about its cost-effectiveness.

Having noted all this, the significant incremental progress in the field should be recognized and built upon. Not only is conflict prevention now expressed frequently in the official statements and policy agendas of the UN, the EU, many regional bodies and governments. Not only have many intergovernmental and NGO international conferences been held on the subject. Not only are case-studies of success and failures and other research being produced. But a number of concrete efforts to prevent particular violent conflicts before they might start have been made in the Baltics, in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. Although the only office that is dedicated exclusively to conflict prevention is the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the OSCE, the UN, OSCE, EU, and many regional bodies (e.g., OAU) and subregional bodies (e.g., SADC) all have created rudimentary early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms and used them to a limited extent; several NGO's are forwarding early warning reports with response recommendations to decisionmaking bodies (e.g., CPN, FEWER); and the concepts and steps of early warning and conflict response are slowly being infused into regular programme operations through practical analytical tools and training programs by the European Commission, the UN and other bodies. There is also growing investigation of how the different policy sectors that are advocated on their own terms, such as economic development, environmental programs, arms control, human rights, humanitarian relief, democracy, and rule of law, can also be targeted more precisely to prevent violent conflicts.

Finally, in terms of the overall climate, it does seem that as each new crisis hits the headlines, there is less heard about how such conflicts are inevitable tragedies. Instead, more doubts and concerns seem to be publicly voiced that perhaps the calamity could have been avoided, and they ask what went wrong. More broadly, there are some signs that an implicit international norm may be slowly achieving articulation. Both UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and U.S. President Clinton publicly acknowledged in 1998 that their respective organizations could have acted earlier to prevent the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Potentially embarrassing Parliamentary official public inquiries have been made in France

and Belgium into the roles that their governments may have played in neglecting or worsening that horrendous human calamity. Thus, there seems to be somewhat more acceptance, albeit dimly so far, of the principle that, if violent conflicts are not inevitable and can be prevented with reasonable effort, international actors are bound to act to do what is possible wherever situations may lead to massive violence.

In short, the field is making scant progress at the level of top official activity and public awareness, and somewhat more progress incrementally at the middle and field levels..

THE CURRENT PHASE

Significant further movement requires more political pressure from important constituencies and more energetic leadership at the top on the major bodies concerned (including the large NGO organizations in humanitarianism, human rights, and so on). Some of the relevant forces have not been heard from on this subject, such as legislatures who hold governments' purse strings. But another of the elements that may be limiting movement is the lack of solid knowledge and ready-to-use guidelines in the hands of decisionmakers about what approaches to preventing conflicts are effective, ineffective, or harmful, and under what conditions.

The reason we might say prevention has reached adolescence is that it is looked upon fondly for its promise and yet old enough to do some damage and to know better. The conventional wisdom in the last few years has been that"the problem is not early warning but lack of political will to get action." Some of the factors behind the lack of political will were noted above. But there is also now a dawning realization that the problem in conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding is not merely getting action but implementing effective actions. In both potential- and post-conflict interventions as well, policymakers and field-level practitioners are beginning to be expected, not simply to launch initiatives and run programs and projects, but also to be accountable for getting more tangible results in achieving the ultimate goal of a sustainable peace, using the limited international resources that are available and being spent.

Certain recent events and trends have stimulated this pressure for more accountability and greater attention to evaluation of what is cost-effective:

* Increasing recognition that actions by international community are often part of the causation of conflict and can worsen the situation. We speak here not only of arms sales or harsh structural adjustment programs, but even about those actions that are deliberately aimed at conflict prevention or assumed to have such effects. It is becoming

recognized, for example, that promoting majoritarian elections in highly divided societies can increase the risks of violent backlash by factions who see themselves losing.[1]

- Reversals of international post-conflict missions that were at one time celebrated as successes (e.g., Angola, Cambodia).

- Instances where it is now widely accepted that policy errors were made by taking certain ostensibly preventive or peacebuilding actions, such as conferring diplomatic recognition on seceding entities without guaranteeing their security (Croatia in 1991), and lack of application of existing aid conditionalities in Rwanda.

- Increasing questioning of whether humanitarian aid often has adverse effects on conflicts, such as in the maintaining of the Hutu Interhamwe militants in the refugee camps of eastern Zaire from 1994 to 1997, after their exodus from Rwanda.

- The findings of recent program evaluations contracted by funding agencies and foundations who are concerned whether their money is being well-spent. Their findings in some instances are revealing the limitations of frequently used and well-meaning initiatives such as NGO 'track two' diplomacy, human rights promotion, development aid, and other measures -- when they are not explicitly attuned to the most significant sources and manifestations of conflicts in specific settings.

- Scattered findings emerging from the empirical studies of both early warning and conflict prevention that been published over the past four years that suggest that international preventive interventions that is half-hearted may be worse than no action at all, since it is interpreted by determined repressors as a litmus test of what they can get away with.

These developments are beginning to shift the direction and tone of the prevention discussion from viewing the problem only as inaction to viewing it also as ineffective action. It is becoming more evident that it is not sufficient merely to press for just any preventive response ("Do something, quick!"). The UN and other international actors not

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[1] See Ben Reilly, "Voting is Good, Except When It Guarantees War," Washington Post, Sunday, October 17, 1999, Page B2. One might make a strong case that a certain pattern has become evident in the international responses to pre-massacre Burundi, 1993; Kosovo, 1992-98; and East Timor, 1999. The international community's implicit political championing of a minority's rights, such as through honoring unofficial referendums, and denouncing the human rights violations of their oppressors, thus demonizing the perpetrators, can become violence precipitation instead of violence prevention. It may simply put the vulnerable minority at greater risk by provoking the more powerful local faction to pre-empt the direction of political change militarily, while making no provision for protecting the weaker side from the forces of this violence.

only need to respond toward incipient conflict situations more promptly; they also must respond more intelligently. This means launching particular responses that are actually likely to be effective once implemented, and that are implementable. The recent policy errors have occurred in places with potential conflict where international actors are already present and carrying out programs, not places where they have yet to arrive. Thus, international preventive failures has involved not only acts of <u>omission</u>, but acts of <u>commission</u>. The current challenge in conflict prevention is no longer simply <u>whether</u> action is taken, but <u>which</u> action is taken. What is now required is not simply political <u>will</u> but political <u>wisdom</u>.

Yet, further acceptance and exploration of conflict prevention need not await more definitive results from research. Sufficient, persuasive evidence already exists to get serious about making more investment in preventive actions, procedures and organization. Prevention still does not receive the political and public priority it ought to have, and more vigorous and targeted advocacy of the value of prevention and to establishing the organizational and political apparatuses to do it is essential to moving the field forward. The point is rather that just more publicity and politicking alone does not necessarily lead to better policy. The popularization of awareness of conflicts and of the promise of conflict prevention may in fact worsen policy choices -- unless it is accompanied by a simultaneous emphasis on solid analysis of various policies' likely consequences. Analysis alone will not change the existing priorities but it can build up a basis for sound policy for the time when further advocacy gets more dramatic results. And presumably, a higher political priority would include more attention to analysis as well as action.

In the meantime, it is incumbent on the specialist community that so far has pursued the field to bring the existing evidence forward and to do further and more rigorous research on crucial practical questions of what works and what doesn't, why, and how do we find out these things. The methods of program evaluation and performance monitoring research that have been long used in other fields of international and domestic policy need to be harnessed to the improvement of conflict prevention policy.

ISSUES, APPROACHES AND FINDINGS

The remainder of this paper hopes to contribute to the international process of strengthening the effectiveness of current and future prevention efforts. It does this through addressing some of the main analytical issues arising when evaluating such efforts more systematically. It also treats briefly the questions of where to locate prevention evaluations and how to create international and local organizational capacities through which reliable

evaluations can be brought to the attention of decisionmakers at all relevant levels so as to inform their choices and implementation responsibilities. The following sections:

- identify major analytical and organizational issues that arise when doing assessments of preventive efforts;

- describe differing approaches that recent studies have taken to these issues, and indicate some of their strengths and weaknesses;

- present sample findings from the different approaches.2

ANALYTICAL ISSUES

Certain definitional and methodological issues need to be faced if evaluations are to be based rigorously on consistent rules of inquiry and reliable and relevant data. These issues arise at any level where the locus of responsibility for evaluation design and implementation may lie:

- What preventive activities should be the focus?

- What prevention impacts are to be measured?

- How do we know that our conclusions are valid?

What Preventive Activities Should be the Focus?

To assess the impact of any form of collective action, including prevention activity, and to compare it with others in order to identify possible patterns, requires a precise notion of what is being assessed. This focus must have a certain unity, internal nature, and boundaries that distinguish it from other actions and from the environment in which it arises and on which it may impact. Defining an action as having a discrete character and a beginning and an end is somewhat artificial but useful for the purpose of studying how it behaves. And conflict prevention like other policy fields does organize and mobilize governmental and non-governmental actors and resources in various more or less deliberate and ordered ways so as to achieve explicit objectives, and these units or categories of activity can be usefully delineated as integral wholes for the purpose of evaluating their impacts.

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[2] The paper draws on materials that have focused mainly on post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. However, these conflicts often involve various extra-territorial forces and actors that internationalize intra-state wars, such as seen dramatically in the recent conflict in the DRC.

But this does not settle yet the question of which units of such activities should be analyzed. Prevention activities can be divided up and categorized in several ways. What kinds of preventive"efforts,""action,""activities," or"intervention" — to use general, inclusive terms for the moment -- are to be the focus for analysis? Although words like"policy,""programme,""project,""initiative" or policy"instrument" are frequently used, they carry no commonly accepted meanings, so they require a stipulated definition. There is no accepted unit of preventive action that should be analyzed. In the age of Internet learning, these terms need to be generic if they are to be used for cross-cultural as well as cross-case lesson-drawing.

The basic choices in picking a unit for analysis have to do with a) the <u>vertical level</u> in the global system — global, regional, national or local -- at which they operate and would be expected to have impacts; and b) the <u>horizontal breadth</u> at any of these levels, meaning whether one or more types of interventions are examined at any one level.

Evaluation can and has looked at conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities carried out at the global, regional, national and local levels. Concrete examples of preventive actions at these respective levels would be an international criminal court, a regional embargo on arms traffic or trade, a national debate, and a rural village development project. Various types of practitioners work at these different levels, such as policy planners, country-level desk officers, country-level program and project administrators and NGO"chiefs of party," and rural community project implementers. So they will naturally tend to take an interest in evaluations that focus on the units and results at their particular levels.

At each of these levels, the scope for a study can include one type of distinct programme, project, or initiative (whatever term is used), such as those in the examples, or it could span across several types applied at that level. It would thus vary in terms of the"reach" it encompasses -- functionally across policy sectors, geographically across a given territory, and demographically across a society and population. Within each such type at any level, there may be several kinds of sub-activities that are carried out and can be evaluated. The possibilities can be visualized below.

Table 1.

Possible Units of Preventive Activity to Evaluate

Level	Distinct types of intervention			
	1	2	3	4
Global	✓			

Regional	✓			
National	✓			
Local	✓			

Internal and External Sources of Prevention

Within the national and local levels, it is important to include in the analysis indigenous factors, i.e., factors such as the presence or absence of a democratic tradition that are not directly affected by external forces. We should not assume that the question of prevention effectiveness encompasses only the activities of external actors who come to the scene from outside a given conflict arena. The outbreak of potential violent conflicts may be determined as much by the localized proclivities for either violence or peaceful resolution of tensions or by what internal actors do or not do, as it is by whether various external actors do something and whether what they do is effective.[3] A familiar example would be the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1992. Although in retrospect we know some of the domestic political dynamics that explain why the divorce was peaceful (e.g., the insulated negotiations between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar), in 1990 and 1991, that situation was on some lists of the potentially most explosive ethnic conflicts in Central Europe. Thus, it is crucial to define the fundamental research problem as not merely"What external preventive efforts are effective?" but rather:"What internal and external factors prevent conflicts?"[4] A particular situation of potential conflict holds within it a certain set

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[3] Contrary to a common impression, many social tensions and political disputes that could escalate -- in fact, probably the vast preponderance (cf. Laitin and Ferejohn, 199) -- are managed internally so as to keep them from becoming violent. There is probably no general penchant for violence. To the contrary, the usual bias is likely for stability and peace; violent conflicts are the exception to the rule.

[4] Reframing the question this way may be confusing at first. The prevailing semantics in doing diagnosis in order to come up with policy prescriptions looks first for various "causes" of a conflict. These are usually assumed to be local in origin. ("Early warnings" are simply the specific expressions and indicators of various causes of conflicts.) It then looks at what external actions might be recommended. This often presumes that preventive remedies are external. But instead of viewing the local situation as mainly the source of the problem and the external actions as mainly the source of the solution, a more accurate perspective treats both internal and external factors as possibly part of the problem and part of the solution, depending on the individual case. Just as the search for the causes of violent conflicts must be pursued internationally as well as locally, so must the causes of conflict prevention be looked for locally as well as internationally. This more open perspective not only yields the most comprehensive and balanced diagnosis of a conflict situation, and of prescriptions of what might be done about it, from an analytical point of view. Knowing about the internal capacity or incapacity for prevention has the practical value of helping to gauge the urgency of specific situations and the extent that external action may even be necessary at all. That is, it provides a vulnerability assessment or risk assessment. It also can identify positive trends and actors that external and internal actors might choose to reinforce, i.e., a needs or opportunity assessment. The field could benefit

of external and internal conditions that will vary in terms of their tendency toward violent or peaceful relations. A complete catalogue of the determinants of the likely trajectory of a particular vulnerable situation could sort them in terms of whether they are causes or remedies and whether they are external (exogenous) or internal (endogenous). The following table gives some recent examples.[5]

Table II.

Sources of the Determinants Of Whether Potentially Violent Situations Escalate into Violence or Follow a Peaceful Course (Examples from Yugoslavia, 1990-1992)

	Possible Causes of Violence	**Possible Remedies for Violence**
External factors	EU recognition of Croatian independence, early 1992.	EU offer of economic aid if inter-republican disputes are resolved peacefully, 1991.
Internal factors	Croatian and Serbian Republics leaders' public tendencies to incite ethnic groups' fears and nationalist ambitions, 1990-92.	Macedonian electorate's rejection of nationalist parties' appeals in Parliamentary elections, late 1991.

In examining a given situation, what is needed is an assessment of all the key causal variables or dimensions -- both internal and external -- that are known from rigorous research on many cases to tell whether the situation is likely to take one course or another. In any given situation, depending on the particular values of these several variables, i.e., their magnitude or character in each situation, the trajectory would likely incline toward more conflict or more peace, or something in between (i.e., conflict escalation, suppression, postponement or resolution).

Commonly Used Units of Analysis

Global and Regional Level. A few studies have tried to evaluate the effects on preventing violent conflicts within states or between states of organizations, treaties, norms, and other influences that operate at the supra-national global or regional levels in relation mainly to states. For example, one preventive strategy that has attracted considerable interest of late, perhaps because of the activities of the OSCE and the policies of enlargement of NATO

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from a documented list of "early opportunities" as much as from authoritative early warnings.

[5] Because regional factors and actors that are close to a conflict arena may impinge significantly on the conflict parties, we can consider them part of the internal situation, rather than as external.

and the EU, is the offer of prospective membership in multilateral organizations in order to encourage states to behave properly toward their own citizens and toward other states.

Obvious individual examples can be cited of this policy's apparent success, such as the integration of former enemies within the EU and NATO (Schneider and Weitzman, 1996; 15). An analysis of the Visegrad experiment, the Central European Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation, argues that the various efforts by Western European states to foster such post-Cold War subregional economic and security organizations among Eastern European states has provided a useful provisional influence in the region that supplements the incentive provided by their expectations of eventually joining Europe itself (Bonvicini, 1996; 9).

The scattered studies that look at a large number of cases to measure overall trends appear to corroborate the notion that participation in multilateral organizations can elicit more peaceful behavior by states. To illustrate, the many states that were integrated into postal unions from 1816 and 1990, were more likely than other states to be constrained from belligerent actions. Indeed, these economic organizations were a more significant pacifying force than the security alliances of the same period (Schneider and Krause, 1993; 14-15). From 1970 to 1993, the Soviet Union and Russia were increasingly induced to comply with family reintegration and Jewish emigration norms and agreements through its participation in the CSCE conferences that developed these human rights norms (Gubin, 199). Similar effects on states' behavior were found in the cases of the offer of EU membership to Central and Eastern Europe, the pursuit by the People's Republic of China of membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), and the effort to join the UN and other organizations by the Republic of China (ROC) (Shambaugh 1996; 21,31).

National Level: Instruments. The most common unit of analysis employed in the prevention literature is interventions applied at the national level. These are looked at both individually and in the sets of interventions that may comprise a multi-faceted, multilateral effort in a country.

To the extensive literature on mediation, negotiations, and sanctions are being added studies that address the utility of less-known tools that are increasingly being used for prevention. The list of generic instruments potentially usable could include such diverse ones as: preventive deployment, cross-lines local development projects, political conditionality in aid, social safety nets, democracy-institution building, judicial war crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, official negotiations, non-official"track-two" dialogues, elections, election observation/assistance, national conferences or civil society forums, humanitarian relief, human rights observers, problem-solving workshops,

police reform, special envoys, and many others in the potential prevention"toolbox" (e.g., Cortright, 1997; Esman, forthcoming, 1998; Lund, et. al, 1997, 1998; Lund, 1997; Ross, 199 ; Rothman, forthcoming; Vayrinen, 1997; Vayrinen, et. al. 1999, 178-218; Reilly, et. al. 1998). These studies draw evidence from one or more actual applications of a type of intervention.

Illustration: Political Conditionality. This donor instrument makes aid or trade available depending on the recipient's record with respect to human rights, democratization, or other objectives of"good governance." By deterring or stopping human rights violations, reducing corruption, increasing transparency in governmental processes, and reducing military spending, for example, this instrument might reduce various institutional and policy sources of potential violence. Specifically, donors offer to provide aid or trade or threaten to decrease or eliminate aid them as positive or negative inducements to pressure centralized or authoritarian governments to refrain from human rights abuses and to relax their grip on national politics.

Considerable research supports the view that under certain conditions, political conditionality has had significant effects in eliciting desired changes in recipient governments, as shown by a number of individual instances when conditions were applied and governments changed their policies (e.g., Ball, 1999 ; DeFeyter). In Malawi and Kenya in the early 1990's, for example, heavy-handed treatment of diplomats and their own citizens lead to threatened aid cutoffs and other international pressures, and these induced Presidents Hastings Banda and Daniel Arap-Moi, respectively, to announce new elections and take other steps to open up participation in their governments (Ball, 1993). Particular actions against significant violations of norms can also have a wider demonstration effect by discouraging similar actions elsewhere (Nelson and Eglinton, 2). But while some efforts have succeeded, others have had mixed results or ultimately failed. The push for elections in Kenya in 1992, for example, may have enabled its long-standing president to become further entrenched (Ball, Stokke). Thus, how common positive outcomes are is disputed.

Conditioning aid can have unintended negative effects, especially a fixed, standard policy that cuts aid whenever a criterion is violated. Cuts can backfire if recalcitrant regimes muster sufficient domestic opposition to expel donors, as occurred in Indonesia and Zaire (Stokke, 52). This not only breaks off contact and narrows the opportunities for dialogue and influence with a regime, but might encourage it to increase its objectionable practices. External pressure for political reform that is too strong can diminish the credibility and legitimacy of new democratic procedures (Nelson, 1993) or displace indigenous initiatives to promote democracy (Stokke). Cuts may punish civilians for the behavior of political and military leaders. And because political liberalization is a long process with many possible

setbacks, repeatedly raising or lowering aid in response to political ups and downs makes it difficult to administer an effective ongoing program of economic development.

But no instrument or other intervention is going to be either simply effective or ineffective. A valuable aspect of this instrument research is its identification of the generic contexts and conditions in which success or failure is likely to obtain. For example, political conditionality is likely to be effective to the extent that certain conditions are present, such as the following (Waller, Stokke, Skogly, DeFeyter, Nelson, Baldwin, 312, 317):

- solid support for the measures from domestic constituencies.

- significant political support for the changes within the affected regime, so it is divided or ambivalent and external pressure can help to tip the balance;

- the focus of the donor's action is a clearly definable behavior like blatant anti-democratic moves, such as military coups or aborted or fraudulent elections, a crack-down on civic associations or opposition parties. It is easier to reverse specific time-bound acts and behaviors that are clear violations of certain norms, such as overthrow of an elected government, compared to achieving larger, vaguer, more complex, and ongoing institutional changes such as democratization.

- clear specification of the actions that are expected from the recipient country;

- concerted action by multiple donors, suggesting that multilateral institutions that are heavily influenced by major donors, such as the World Bank, may be better vehicles than

- few trade, investment, or security interests in the affected country compete with the need to pressure the government;

- donors also provide aid to help finance the reforms.

- substitutes for the aid cannot be obtained from other sources.

National Level: Multi-Instrument Missions . Another growing genre involves case-studies of one or more places when governmental or non-governmental actors undertook several kinds of initiatives in intra-state conflicts at early-stages that were perceived to be vulnerable to violence, such as have arisen recently over issues of secession and autonomy, control of governments, democratization, and central government policies (e.g. Congo-Brazzaville after its election violent demonstrations in 1993). Most of these focus on recent failures in prevention, or"missed opportunities," such as Rwanda (e.g. Adelman and Suhrke, 1996, Suhrke, 1998), Bosnia (Woodward, 1995), and Burundi (Lund, Rubin, and Hara, 1998). But some look at apparently successful prevention, or"seized opportunities"

(Hurlburt, Lund, Mazarr, and Zartman and Vogeli in Jentleson, ed., forthcoming in 1999; Lund in Alker, Gurr, and Rupesinghe, forthcoming in 2000). A consensus seems to be that successful international preventive interventions have usually involved early and vigorous attention to several leading facets or"fronts" of a conflict. For example, this means not only fostering elite political dialogue to achieve power-sharing, but also deterrence or other methods of securing public order, as well as supporting significant inter-communal reconciliation. Illustration: International Prevention in Macedonia, 1992-1998 From 1992 to 1998, Macedonia witnessed one of the most robust, multi-faceted and multi-actored instances of concerted international preventive action in a situation that was perceived to be threatened by instability but not yet in crisis.6 Several different kinds of initiatives, including preventive deployment, official negotiations, informal political dialogues, and civil society projects were initiated with regard to the four main external and internal threats – Serbia, Macedonia-Greece relations, internal ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian relations, and Kosovo -- that were posed to the new country's democratic integrity. These efforts are widely assumed to demonstrate a"successful" case.

A close examination of the range of military, diplomatic, and NGO instruments that was brought into play by the UN, OSCE, the EU, the U.S. government and several major NGO's over this period, and reasonable inferences about their likely impacts based on their theories of practice, produces a generally positive but also multi-layered and sobering conclusion, in which specific strong points as well as deficits were noted.

Specifically, military and diplomatic instruments were largely successful in terms of dampening down periodic incidents of low-level street violence and rising public tensions, as well as in fostering political negotiations and settlements among most of the antagonists. Vis-à-vis the top political and governmental leaders and a possible military incursions from the north, for example, the UNPREDEP preventive military deployment helped to create a secure environment for national politics to be carried on between the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities. UNPREDEP and the OSCE have both been unusually involved in the domestic and level local politics of a more or less willing sovereign state, even if often informally and behind the scenes. The temptation to undertake political violence to achieve group aims was displaced by legitimate channels for political struggle, including non-violent street demonstrations. Only in Kosovo, where the conflicting parties were not seriously engaged, did prevention largely fail.

At the same time, the preventive diplomacy inside Macedonia and Kosovo also seems to have had an unintended King Midas-like effect. By so explicitly acknowledging the

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6 This summary is derived from Lund, 1999 forthcoming.

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Albanian ethnic groups' grievances, third parties raised their political expectations and increased the incentives to continue their nationalist political causes through ethnic mobilization. But little was done to create the economic conditions and broader political environment that could undercut or circumvent the tendencies of elites to ethnicize all domestic and foreign policy issues.

The volumes containing several of these case studies seek to generalize from them in order to draw useful policy conclusions and to pose hypotheses for further testing (Miall, 1992; Munuera, 1994; Van Evera, 1995; Lund in Alker, et. al., forthcoming in 2000; Walleensteen, 1997; Bloomfield, 1997). Based on both these multi-case research projects and individual cases, Table III synthesizes many of the dimensions or variables that appear fairly consistently to be critical determinants of violent or peaceful outcomes of emerging national conflicts – including internal as well as external factors.[7]

Table III

Key Variables that Determine the Trajectory of Potentially Violent National Conflicts

Political tensions and issues will be addressed peacefully rather than escalate into significant violence, depending on whether:

Internal Factors

- Past relations between the politically significant groups have been peaceful in the recent past, rather than violent.

- Regional actors adjacent or close to the immediate arena of conflict such as neighboring states, domestic actors, or refugee communities remain neutral to an emerging conflict or actively promote its peaceful resolution, rather than supporting one side or another politically or militarily.

- Moderate leaders from each of the contending communities are in positions of authority and in regular contact as they carry out the public's business, and they show some evidence of progress.
External Factors

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[7] The findings are stated in terms of positive factors that contribute to violent conflict prevention. We focus on intra-state situations which have not seen violent conflict in the immediate past, as against immediate post-conflict situations. (For details, see Lund, 1996; Wallensteen, 1998; Jentleson, 1999; Varyrinen, et. al., 1999; Rubin, forthcoming in 2000)

- External action is taken before significant use of violence occurs rather than following it.

- Early action is robust in terms of the positive or negative inducements exerted on the potentially conflicting parties, rather than half-hearted and equivocal.

- Early action is concerted and consistent among the major external actors, rather than ambiguous or contradictory.

- Early action addresses the fears and insecurities of the dominant parties to a conflict, as well as promoting the interests of the weaker parties.

- The action deters or contains the possible sources that can trigger immediate violence, as well as addressing the political disputes at hand and other medium term or long term sources of conflict.

- Support and protection is provided to the established central political processes and governmental institutions, as long as they incorporate and engage the leaders of the main contending constituencies in rough proportion to their distribution in the population in give-and-take politicking over public policy and constitutional issues, rather than supporting exclusionary governmental structures or constructing alternative opposition institutions.

The dispersed diasporas of the parties to a conflict that may reside in major third party countries are not highly mobilized behind their respective countrymen's cause, or they support peaceful means of resolution, rather than lobbying their current governments in partisan ways or aiding and abetting coercive or violent ways to pursue it.

Multiple, structured cases. As revealed by this medium-sized list, comparing several cases using a common framework of plausible factors as guiding hypotheses avoids the misleading practice of selectively generalizing what are supposed policy"lessons" from what may be merely idiosyncratic features of a single case. Single cases also generate"too many" explanatory factors, whereas comparison can boil those down to which of them appear consistently.[8]

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[8] The more cases the better, but not just any case-study format will do. Both the instrument evaluations and whole country case-studies use the method of case-study analysis known as "structured, focused comparison," developed by Alexander George, Robert Yin, Martha Derthick, and others. Experience-based comparisons of several cases using a common framework are superior to the more typical approach to "lesson-learning" that is common in policy circles. The latter tend to look at one case and offer broader generalizations for imagined future cases, even though they do not take explicit account of the associated conditions in the one case that help explain its particular outcome. When lessons are thus drawn following no methodical rules of evidence, they are likely to be biased by the needs

An especially policy-relevant multi-case method is the close systematic comparison of similar pairs or sets. That is, very similar settings are chosen for comparison where potential conflicts escalated into violence in one or more cases, but did not escalate in the other case(s) (e.g., a forthcoming comparison of cross-border kin-group conflicts in Hungary-Slovakia, Macedonia, and Kosovo in Lund, 1996, forthcoming in Alker, et. al., 2000). These similar pairs with differing conflict outcomes allow the researcher to eliminate the commonalties across the cases as the causes of whatever the conflict outcome was. Instead, the method exposes the differences between the cases that were associated with the different outcomes and thus may explain them.

Local Level. Despite the proliferation of grass-roots projects of various kinds undertaken often by NGO's, and wide reliance on them by governments, few rigorous studies of NGO methods for preventing local conflicts have been done so far (Heinrich, 1997). But interest in evaluating the effectiveness of NGO and other projects is rising among the foundations and development donors who are faced with choosing where to put their limited resources (Ross, 1996; Conradi, 1998).

What preventive impacts should be measured in judging whether a preventive intervention is effective?

Relation to Conflict and Peace. The diplomatic and other interactive instruments that are explicitly aimed at conflict prevention can judge their performance in terms of criteria such as whether incipient violence is contained or dispute settlements are reached. But many other non-interactive programs and projects currently in the toolbox that may have actual or potential conflict prevention implications (e.g., infrastructure development projects, democracy-building programs) are not however specifically intended or designed to affect the forces that shape the level of conflict or peace in a country. Few efforts now being carried out in developing countries have a mandate that specifically mentions conflict prevention or peace building. Most are aimed at other goals such as civil society-building poverty reduction, democratization, conventional economic development, rule of law, good governance, economic reform, or human rights. They have other primary goals which may or may not address the most significant factors in a country that are driving it toward a

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of the analyst's agency or individual point of view, rather than informed by a wider examination of pertinent variables that arises from the application of a policy and the context in which it was applied. Because it provides little basis for judging *why* and *where* some option "X" is likely to be effective, this informal approach can lead to mistaken inferences, serious policy errors, and sometimes great harm. At the same time, the qualitative, non-statistical nature of this comparative method lends itself to accounting for individual variations among cases, and normally speaks a non-statistical language that is conducive for communicating findings to policymakers

violent conflict, such as militias in training. At best, they may be secondarily justified as doing that indirectly, but not directly and explicitly. They may not even be targeted at strengthening the specific local capacities that are most needed for peaceful resolution of differences, such as by sustaining a political dialogue between a powerful repressive government and a fledgling opposition. In fact, in some circumstances, pursuit of these goals may have an opposite destabilizing effect. Assisting a country to hold an election, for example, though it may be regarded as advancing democracy, has often contributed by its timing to provoking major violent conflicts or a coup d'etat (e.g., in Congo Brazzaville, Cambodia, Burundi).

Consequently, setting appropriate performance criteria for evaluating these policies' impacts with regard to various aspects of conflict and peace must take into account that there may be only a remote connection -- by deliberate design -- between what they are officially intended to do (e.g., monitor and report human rights violations), and any evident effects on conflict and peace. Such "indirect" preventive measures can be evaluated with regard to whether the explicit sectoral goals that they set for themselves have been achieved, but without further analysis, it is harder to measure whether there is a meaningful causal connection to known sources and dynamics of conflict and peace. Thus, the challenge of assessing impacts on peace or conflict thus is like that faced by those who had to apply environmental impact or gender-sensitivity criteria to policy sectors with other concerns. Table IV lists some of these cross-cutting criteria.

Although the definition of conflict prevention includes capacity-building as well as violence prevention, most of the case-studies measure success by whether a conflict erupts into violence or not. But prevention effectiveness or ineffectiveness needs to be judged in relation to several indirect and structural as well as direct and interactive antecedents of violence as well as desired conditions for peacebuilding. But some country-level retrospective case-studies look at a number of types of possible impacts that might flow from the several instruments that may be found operating. These impacts include, for example, whether mutually suspicious ethnic groups are being equally served and incorporated together in development and social service programs. These broader gauged assessments that can produce multi-leveled conclusions. The Macedonia study illustrates the application of an evaluative approach that differentiates between various kinds of possible impacts on conflict at different levels (Lund, in Jentelson, forthcoming, 1999).

Table IV

Illustrative Criteria for Evaluating Peace and Conflict Impacts. (based on major fronts in which national conflicts are waged)

Did the application(s) of the instrument:

Security

- deter the outbreak or perpetration of specific possibly imminent acts of violence?

- keep actual low-level eruptions of occasional violence from escalating?

- protect vulnerable groups from likely attacks of violence?

- ease the sense of threat, fear and anxieties expressed by various groups toward one another?

Political Relations and Policy Decisionmaking

- engage opposed top-level political actors in new contacts and communications?

- enter new substantive ideas and options into debate and dialogue that are seriously considered or adopted as compromise solutions of outstanding disputes?

- help the parties leaders reach agreements on specific disputes and public policy issues?

- change the perceptions and attitudes that the leaderships groups held toward one another?

- soften the stridency and tone of public debate and statements?

Institutions and Mechanisms

- create new informal venues and channels through which disputes and issues can be addressed by the protagonists?

- set up or strengthen formal institutions and procedures that encompass broad segments of the population in democratic forms of decision-making?

- help build autonomous spheres of social power that are active outside the official organizations of both government and opposition political parties and organizations (civil society)?

Distribution of Resources and Participation Capacities

- stimulate active, salient efforts to address structural disparities among the main groups at odds, by achieving more equitable distributions among them of basic material and economic needs, such as income, educational opportunities, housing, health services?.

- upgrade the skills and understanding of those significant organized groups who are promoting conflict prevention and reconciliation processes so they can be more effective advocates or implementers of these goals?

Inter-Communal Relations

- provide new programs or projects that engage middle-level and grass-roots members of conflicting groups in non-political activities that serve their common interests?

- change certain ongoing daily policies and practices that had alienated groups from each another?

- reduce everyday tensions and distrust between interacting groups with conflicting interests?

<u>Scale of Effort</u>. A crucial methodological issue is how to judge the value of single initiatives in a country with respect to relation to the large political, military and public opinion forces that largely govern the basic course of a whole national conflict. Unless a project or even a national level programme entails the infusion of huge amounts of resources, launches overwhelming coercive force, or mobilizes a powerful expression of popular sentiment in a particular national conflict arena, it is unlikely it alone or even several initiatives will discernibly change the direction of a conflict or a country's capacities for peace. To paraphrase a comment made at a recent conference by an NGO staffer whose organization operates in an African country that is currently somewhat unstable:

> "We evaluated all our projects and they were doing well. But the country was steadily deteriorating."

For example, aid programs to support political parties and legal reform in Russia were found to have little discernible effect because of the unfavorable political climate for introducing new independent political parties and because of the lack of resources available for new party activities such as training (GAO, 1997). To make a substantial difference, especially in a large country, such programs and projects either have to operate widely, and thus their costs would be high, or their coverage of the population and the needs they address are likely to be limited.

Yet, just because particular efforts seem to have no discernible effect on a larger political environment, that does not mean the projects are necessarily unproductive. Hence, it is important to identify specific appropriate criteria for impact on conflicts and peace that are proportional to a particular initiative's performance potential, and by which they can be appropriately judged -- short of the unrealistic standard of having obvious dramatic effects on the course of a country's conflict. The challenge is finding appropriate criteria that lie in between simply operational project or program objectives, on the one hand, and possibly unrealistic measures of impact on the larger dynamics and course of a conflict, on the other. Such criteria should be neither so demanding, in view of the scope and resources required for an effect, that no projects would be found to be adequate (e.g., Did the fighting stop? Was a peace agreement reached?). Nor should the standard be set so modestly that all activities will be found to have some useful effects, thus making evaluation meaningless (e.g., How many school children were involved in the program?).

Defining proportional criteria requires identifying a given initiative's expected scope of influence on phenomena related directly or indirectly to conflict sources and manifestations, in view of its resource levels, the particular level at which it operates, and the geographic scope of its coverage.

But this does not eliminate the problem of evaluating performance. The problem remains of judging the aggregated impact on a whole conflict of whatever battery of initiatives in a country setting is operating. Because no one initiative or actor alone is likely to be able to alter the course of conflicts, it is generally recognized that what is needed is combinations and mutually supportive interactions of many actors' efforts that contribute to an overall peace process -- thus, the rising mantra of the need for multi-actor"coordination" and"coherence" that adds up to an overall conflict prevention strategy for a given setting.

The task is more complicated when several interventions have been applied more or less in tandem. Here it may be difficult to distinguish the impacts on a conflict from among several interventions that may have been applied (as well as from other non-intervention factors). The"inside-out" option would be to simply apply the same tests above to the several interventions involved, one by one. The"outside-in" approach of matching method, however, starts from a different direction.

Matching Method. To avoid the problem of the separate treatments being successful but the patient dying, a macro-evaluation method that could be useful involves comparing the sets of intervention responses applied to a conflict to the various kinds of causes and offsetting peace capabilities in a given conflict.

that they embody, what Marc Ross calls their"theories of practice". Each of these operative theories constitutes a certain combination of goals, resources and other elements that are intended to work together. The most important elements are an intervention's:

- Primary (immediate) and secondary (long-term) objectives

- Targeted problem (its point of entry into the situation, such as the local actors' attitudes or behavior, institutions, practices, or conditions that a tool aims to affect, and at different levels of society)

- Mode of influence used on the target to achieve the objectives:"soft" and"hard"approaches, carrots, sticks, and other inducements

- International and local implementer(s) that use the resources in performing tasks to reach the objectives (the"delivery system").

- Sponsoring organization that initiates and/or funds the intervention.

Thus, the analyst can first, see whether such a theory of intervention even existed in the plans of the sponsors and it was actually carried out, and second, compare the strategy inherent in an intervention with the impact it was believed to have, in order to see if the intervention had at least the logical potential to realize those results.

2 Do the conflict protagonists believe there was an impact? As Miall points out, one element that is missing from simply observing an intervention-impact sequence is whether the key actors in the conflict situation interpreted the supposed cause as a reason for the impact. Thus, one's inference can be bolstered if the local actors who were the agents of the impact interpreted the meaning of the intervention as a reason for doing certain things that led to the impact. This requires, if practically possible, asking these agents or close observers of the agents whether they felt influenced in the expected ways.

3 Is the causal link plausible in view of other known knowledge? The assumed chain of events can be examined to see if it is consistent with existing social science or other generally accepted knowledge of relevant phenomena.

4 Were the impacts realized where the intervention was not applied? If possible, comparisons can be made between similar situations, within the same conflict arena or outside it, but where the intervention was not applied. Although an actual experiment cannot usually be performed in real life and obviously toward past events, the methods of quasi-experimental research can be used to identify the near-equivalents of"control

groups" to see if differing impacts or no impacts were achieved where there were differing or no interventions.

PROCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Who Should Conduct Evaluations?

Each of the previous analytical and methodological issues arises in some way regardless of who carries out an evaluation and where, although the approach taken to these issues may differ depending on the local of responsibility. Thus, a further crucial issue being increasingly raised is often roughly stated as whether conflict prevention interventions should be evaluated in a"top-down" manner or in a"bottom-up, participatory" manner.

The former connotes outside analysts making the crucial design choices and drawing the study's conclusions: defining the units of analysis, gathering data from outside or inside the conflict situation to identify the sources of conflict, measuring the results of interventions, and interpreting the findings to draw cause-effect conclusions. Most (but not all) of the case-studies referred to above were done in this way by"outsiders."

The argument for outside evaluation points to the value of having some objective distance from the immediate disputes and emotions that are in the air so as to be able to objective and to consider a range of causal factors. Another is being better able to avoid arriving at a host of local factors of greatly varying importance by applying cross-case empirical theory to pinpoint key causal factors and intervention-impact relationships, perhaps by testing hypotheses drawn from several cases. A third may be greater access to a greater range of interventions. The latter two are not necessarily inherent limitations of a local perspective, however, but functions of current capacity. The two major downsides of the outsider approach is lacking sufficient contextual knowledge to ascertain how local actors in a country setting interpreted the conditions and these meanings led to certain consequences. It also fails to involve the local"stakeholders."

The participatory approach means that local actors from the conflict situation who are more or less involved in, or in a position to closely observe, a conflict situation undertake each of the above research tasks. A strength for evaluation that aspires to influence policy and the course of a conflict is that those local actors who are ultimately expected to respond to the conclusions of a study by implementing changes in local practices to reduce the conflict are much more likely to do so with respect to an evaluation whose design and implementation they have been involved in and they have ownership of. A commonly heard but less persuasive argument is"only" local actors can"really" understand the situation, since this by

definition provides no public test of validity and is often a disguised argument for a particular interpretation.

Of course, one need not choose between the extreme of all external design and implementation or all internal design and implementation. Some possibilities lying in between include:

- external design and internal interpretation, or vice-versa

- joint external-internal design and interpretation

Is There Organizational Capacity for Applying Past Lessons to Inform Subsequent Policy or Practice?

Obviously, a critical ultimate question is whether the findings that result from systematic intervention evaluations will be transmitted to those appropriate policymakers at various levels who have the ability to do something about the lessons, or at least consider the pro's and con's of taking various actions. (Unless research conclusions are incorporated into actual organizational practice in some degree and form, we cannot truly call these lessons learned!) The question is not whether existing analyses lead to particular responses. In democracies many other political and other factors legitimately shape any given policy decisions. The more serious question for effective, accountable democracies is whether the existing institutional and political capacities of any of the governments, inter-governmental organizations, NGO's, or other actors permit them even to make use of available evaluation studies in order to guide in some sense what they decide to do or not do.

Early Warning/Opportunity Capacity. This first part of this question refers to whether these entities have ways to comprehensively and systematically gather and interpret information about potential emerging conflicts, such as early warning data. As noted in the introduction, some progress has been made by the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the OAU, as well as by the governments of the U.S.. The multitude of early warning and conflict analysis projects are being developed in NGO's and academic institutes already comprises a small industry of early warning specialists who variously employ quantitative and qualitative data and look at multiple and individual cases (for a survey of approaches to early warning, see the very useful but somewhat misleadingly titled book, Preventive Measures, 1999, edited by John Davies).

Early Response Capacity. More to the point, this capacity issue refers also to whether these entities have any means to systematically analyze not only early warning indicators but also a range of possible options they might use to respond to these warnings, including reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the options as interventions, as well as their

political pro's and con's. It also includes the political and bureaucratic motivation to activate such procedures in order to make reasonably appropriate choices and to actually carry them out.

A few descriptive surveys have been done of the existing institutional capacities for early warning and preventive action of certain major potential conflict preventing actors, such as the OSCE and the European Union (e.g., Clingendael, 199 , Saferworld, ? International Alert ?). The emphasis in some of these studies is on an organization's current procedures and units devoted to gathering and interpreting conflict information and early warning data. Some also describe the formal decisionmaking process through which preventive responses are supposed to be considered and to describing some of the major instruments that may be available to the actors. A few also give examples of how such instruments have been applied in this or that conflict situation (See e.g., Hopmann, 1999 on the OSCE and the office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities). But few in-depth empirical studies have been done of the actual processes whereby particular entities interpreted emerging conflict situations, defined their interests in relation to it, considered one or more options as ways to respond, and decided to take action of some sort or did not.[9] Graduate students seeking thesis topics, take note!

CONCLUSION: TAKING THE NEXT STEPS

Conflict prevention is now beginning to be taken more seriously but it is operating without systematic policy guidelines and had made some unfortunate errors. It is essential that more rigorous evaluative research be done based on the recent experience, using a range of impact criteria that are appropriate to the level at which particular preventive interventions operate and the appropriate scale of impacts they can be expected to accomplish. The available research to date is finding that, notwithstanding that each case or application is unique in its situational details, yet suggestive patterns are revealed. Certain identifiable internal and external ingredients are essential for success having to do with local favorable and unfavorable conditions, when third parties get involved, to what extent, through what policy techniques. And that differing types of interventions are effective under certain conditions. The reasons a country or inter-state relationship will follow non-violent or

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[9] Perhaps the closest to this type of in-depth study is Susan Woodward's book on the Yugoslavian wars of secession, Balkan Tragedy, 199 , which includes considerable analysis of the actions taken by the UN, the EU and other third parties. One section of Lund, in Jentelson, ed., (forthcoming 2000), used interviews to examine whether early warning or other considerations influenced U.S. decisionmakers to get involved in Macedonia. Other studies in the Jentleson volume also deal with that question. Such points are touched on also in the Lund, et. al. case-study of Burundi, 1998.

violent modes of handling political disputes are not unfathomable or random, but arise from identifiable elements. These retrospective lessons can be codified and translated into practical guidelines for decisionmakers at every relevant level, and used prospectively to diagnose potential conflict situations and plan coherent multi-faceted strategies. But more energy needs to be invested in convening multilateral venues that make possible the doing of joint diagnostic and prescriptive exercises, using common frameworks and vocabularies and informed by existing knowledge.

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
Hugh Miall

Preventing Potential Conflicts: Assessing the Impact of 'Light' and 'Deep' Conflict Prevention in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans

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INTRODUCTION

How can we assess the impact of conflict prevention measures on actual conflicts, such as those in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans? Is it possible to know when a violent conflict has been prevented? If so, is it feasible to disentangle the impact of particular policy measures and particular actors?

These questions have assumed importance as the interest of the international community in effective conflict prevention grows, but they raise difficult issues of interpretation and epistemology. This can be illustrated by taking an example of what is generally recognised to have been one of the most effective and successful conflict prevention interventions, namely the actions of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities in Estonia in 1993-4.

In 1993 the citizens of Narva voted by an overwhelming majority to secede from Estonia. They were almost all Russians who had been dismayed to become second-class citizens in what they saw as their own country. The Estonian government declared that the referendum was illegal and threatened to use force if necessary to prevent the break-up of Estonia. Russian vigilante groups began to arm themselves and the Russian President warned that he would intervene if necessary to protect the rights of Russian-speakers. At a point where it appeared that this deadlock could lead to the outbreak of fighting, High Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel interceded. After meeting with representatives of the Narva city council and the Estonian government, he suggested that the Narva city council should regard the referendum as a declaration of aspiration without immediate effect. At the same time he suggested to the Estonian government that they abandon their threat to use force against the city. These suggestions were adopted and a violent outbreak did not take place.

Max van der Stoel has been justly praised for his even-handed, constructive and responsible action. But how can we be sure that his intervention averted a violent conflict? In order to know that a preventive measure, P, prevented an event, E, we have to know that

(a) E would have occurred in the absence of P

(b) E did not occur following the presence of P; and moreover

(c) The presence of P is the agent, the explanation, for the non-occurrence of E.

In order to attribute the non-occurrence of armed conflict to the presence of the High Commissioner, therefore, we need to know that an armed conflict would have occurred otherwise, that the non-occurrence of armed conflict could not be attributed to other

preventive factors, and that the intervention of the High Commissioner not only preceded the de-escalation of the conflict but was sufficient to explain it.

These are demanding requirements. Even in retrospect, historians have great difficulty in agreeing how particular wars have been caused and how much importance to place on a particular causal factor. This is because in history causes operate together and in combination. The effect of an antecedent is dependent on other background conditions.

Historians weigh the evidence and make the best judgement they can to explain the course of events. Similar judgements are necessary for assessing conflict prevention, but with the difficulty that one is dealing with counter-factuals and relating causal sequences between events and non-events is more difficult.

The difficulty is that events in history are not linked by predictable linear effects. Rather, history is made up of events which are connected by *meaning*, by the purposes and thoughts of those who act in history. Violent conflicts often arise from the juxtaposition of previously unrelated chains of events. It is this juxtaposition which often gives the occurrence of war its surprising and dramatic quality. At the same time, what matters most is not the juxtaposition of events on their own, but the meaning these events have in the minds of those responsible for taking decisions. We cannot properly explain a chain of events unless we understand the connections between them made in the mental world of the participants. To understand why a particular chain of events either occurred or did not occur, we have to enter the mental world of the participants. A close assessment of a particular conflict prevention intervention therefore requires, in principle, at least as careful a process of interviewing participants, weighing events and examining documents, as does the establishment of the origins of a particular conflict.

Moreover, events in history may well have multiple potential causes. In his discussion of war origins, Joseph Nye distinguishes between immediate triggering factors, underlying sources of tension and deeper structural conditions which shape events.[1]

Removing a trigger event may not necessarily prevent the outcome. Events may well have multiple potential causes, so that preventing them requires more than removing particular triggers. To take a famous example, if Archduke Franz Joseph's driver had not taken the wrong turning on his route out of Sarajevo on 29 June 1914, the Bosnian conspirator Princip would not have shot him and the assassination could not have triggered the First World War. But most historians judge that a major European war would still have taken

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[1] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to theory and history. New York: HarperCollins, 1993.

place given the war-proneness inherent in the state policies and the polarisation of the international system at the time. Prevention of war would have required not only the non-occurrence of the trigger sequence but also changes in the underlying and structural causes.

Wars are, in the words of A.J.P. Taylor, 'a fatal combination of general and specific causes'. Europe in 1914 was like a room full of kegs of gunpowder, and a single spark was fatal. Had there been no gunpowder, the spark would have been harmless. Had there been no spark, the gunpowder would not have exploded. But if sparks are a possibility, it is sensible to remove the gunpowder.

For this reason, conflict prevention must be concerned with both immediate trigger events and deeper underlying factors. We can distinguish between 'light' (diplomatic and crisis interventions) and 'deep' interventions which aim to address root causes of violence, for example by influencing governance, development or political participation. Light conflict prevention prevents war-prone situations becoming violent, deep conflict prevention prevents situations becoming war-prone.

In order to assess the impact of conflict prevention measures, we have to be concerned with the combined effect of both light and deep conflict prevention, and the effects of measures in combination on the situation. The effectiveness of a particular light measure, such as a Long Duration Mission, depends on the context: in a situation where other factors are working to reduce conflict, it might make a crucial difference; in a war-prone situation where there is no effective deep prevention it is likely to be brushed away. It is therefore likely to be difficult to judge the effectiveness of particular policy instruments in isolation.

The European Union, and the western European states in general, have influenced states in central and eastern Europe and the Balkans at both the 'light' and the 'deep' levels. At the light level (also called 'direct conflict prevention')[2] the EU has pursued conflict prevention through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, made diplomatic interventions, imposed economic sanctions, supported OSCE Missions, and in a few cases have contributed military forces to prevent armed conflict. The EU has also contributed to 'deep' conflict prevention, although not necessarily with this as the primary intention, through its measures to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, its support for economic infrastructure and economic development, its promotion of human rights and its penumbra

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[2] Wallensteen, Peter. "Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflict." In Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, ed. Peter Wallensteen, 9-38. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1998.

of agreements ranging from the Europe to Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and the Stability Pact.[3]

Notwithstanding the commitments the EU has made recently to conflict prevention as a policy goal, we should not forget that most of its interventions have not been primarily driven by this purpose. The EU and its member states have wider aims, influenced partly by collective commitments and partly by the individual interests and foreign policy dispositions of particular states. The well known differences between these dispositions has at times made a co-ordinated policy on particular conflicts difficult to sustain. Moreover, the impact of western Europe on central and eastern Europe following the end of the cold war is part of a larger historical process that overshadows the development of conflict prevention policies, while influencing their outcome. A significant part of this process has been the attempt to rapidly extend to eastern Europe the economic and political forms that have given Western Europe its political stability and economic success, thereby aiming to include eastern Europe in the system of global governance and liberal peace which Western Europeans espouse as their model of world order. This transition process has had unanticipated effects, which have in some cases contributed to the genesis of violent conflicts. The efforts of east European national to create states based on the self-determination of ethnic groups, and the rise of a form of post-communist governance which is democratic in form but undemocratic in substance, are examples of these effects.[4] In assessing the impact of conflict prevention policies, therefore, it is also important to bear in mind the reality that external intervenors may contribute to conflicts as well as mitigate or prevent them. In assessing deep conflict prevention measures it is important to take into account the negative as well as the positive results of intervening deeply in other societies.

CONFLICTS THAT DO NOT COME TO THE BOIL

A glance at one of the many maps of potential conflict areas in central and eastern Europe which were given wide currency at the beginning of the nineties will indicate the obvious fact that many conflicts that were considered to be potential sources of armed conflict have not, in fact, come to the boil. Annex 1 shows a map prepared by the author of what were seen as 60 current and emergent conflicts in 1991-2, juxtaposed with data about the ethnic heterogeneity of central and east European states.[5] The majority of the potential ethno-nationalist conflicts identified have not in fact resulted in violent conflicts since then. It is

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[3] Rummel, Reinhardt. Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention. London: SaferWorld and International Alert, 1 Glyn St., 1996.

[4] Schöpflin, George. Politics in Eastern Europe. London: Blackwell, 1994.

[5] Miall, Hugh. New Conflicts in Europe. Oxford: Oxford Research Group, Current Decisions Report No. 10, July 1992.

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also the case in the former Soviet Union that, notwithstanding the significant number of violent conflicts that have occurred around the periphery, the number of outbreaks has been considerably less than the number of potential political or ethnic conflicts identified for example in the well-known map published in <u>Moscow News</u> in 1991.[6] In most regions, the category of potentially violent political or ethnic conflicts is likely to be larger than the number of violent political conflicts, low intensity conflicts and high intensity conflicts.

It is likely that in the majority of cases these conflicts were contained not as a result of deliberate conflict prevention policies, but because the dynamics of the conflict formation were inherently less intense. In some cases the level of grievance may have remained at level that people could tolerate, in others parties may have calculated that they had less to gain by pursuing the conflict by violent than by other means; in others again existing procedures within societies for accommodation and allocation of resources have contained disputes at a political level.

Key factors for the assessment of conflict prevention therefore are the *proneness of a conflict to violence*, that is the causal or generative factors of conflict, and the *domestic conflict regulation capacity of the society*, which together with external conflict prevention measures constitute the *preventors* or factors preventing violent conflict. Any assessment of the effectiveness of a particular conflict prevention measure has to take account of the particular combination of conflict generating and conflict preventing factors present in a given case. If there is uncertainty about the relative weight of the preventors and the generators of conflict, it will not be possible to tell from the absence of violence whether the prevention of conflict should be attributed to the strength of the preventors or the weakness of the generators.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PREVENTORS: INDICATORS AND THEORIES

In order to avoid these epistemological difficulties, it is desirable to choose other indicators of impact of conflict prevention policy besides the non-occurrence of violence. In particular, if deep conflict prevention is regarded as preventing situations from becoming violence-prone, then indicators of violence proneness (not only of the outbreak of violence) are required.

The literature on early warning and conflict prevention is beginning to explore such multiple indicators. For example, PIOOM has identified 408 variables as indicators of conflict proneness, taking account of both deep and light generators and preventors: 138

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[6] 'A map of unrest in the Soviet Union', Moscow News, 17 March 1991.

'General Facilitating Predisposing Conditions', 165 'Specific Facilitating Proximate Situational Circumstances', 58 'General Inhibiting Predisposing Conditions' and 47 'Specific Proximate Inhibiting Situational Circumstances'.[7] They include factors such as 'high degree of popular discontent with regime', 'violence-prone group begins to mobilise', 'social economic or political discrimination of subordinate groups', 'sharp competition among ethnic groups for resources', etc. These are used to assess whether current conflicts are escalating or de-escalating and to identify states with potential violent conflicts. Similarly Gurr's Minorities at Risk project identifies a set of indicators of state repression and ethnic group mobilisation and spillover from neighbouring states to assess the proneness to violent conflict arising from minority grievances.[8] Esty's state failure project similarly identifies indicators of state failure in variables such as infant mortality, degree of democratic governance and openness to international trade.[9]

These studies are aimed at picking out conflict proneness in a population of cases. Another complementary group of studies examines dynamic indicators of conflict proneness over time in particular cases, such as Harff's project examining accelerators and decelerators in the genesis of genocides[10] and conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus.[11] Such methods are based on the coding of events such as threats, factional struggle, kin group unrest and government suppression. These quantitative indicators may give a crude measure of the overall proneness to violence of a conflict, although they do not capture the meaning of events to participants nor much about the resulting motives and decisions.

It is also possible to construct a set of qualitative indicators relevant to central and east European and Balkan states, such as human rights performance, quality of democratic governance, independence of media, quality of development of civil society, independence of the judiciary, degree of professionalisation or politicisation of local government, and so on. Although these indicators are not by themselves signifiers of violence, they do signify something about proneness to violence. Kaldor and Vejvoda have published one such

[7] Schmid, Alex P., 'Indicator Development: Issues in Forecasting Conflict Escalation', in Davies, John L. and Gurr, Robert T., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, 39-55.

[8] Gurr, Ted Robert. Minorities at Risk. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

[9] Esty, Daniel C. et. al. "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning." In Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, ed. John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, 27-38. Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

[10] Harff, Barbara. "Early Warning of Humanitarian Crisis: Sequential Models and the Role of Accelerators." In Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, ed. John L. Davies and Robert T. Gurr, 70-8. Boulder and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

[11] Davies, John L., Barbara Harff, and Anne L. Speca. "Dynamic Data for Conflict Early Warning." In Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, ed. John L. Davies and Robert T. Gurr, 79-94. Boulder and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

analysis[12], and the European Commission itself monitors a range of indicators in potential applicant countries as a means of testing readiness for membership of the EU. Using standard evaluative methods it is possible to relate the impact of specific deep conflict prevention policy measures to such indicators: for example, by assessing the contribution of external intervention by NGOs to the degree of development of civil society in a country, or evaluating the contribution of support by the Council of Europe for training programmes in local government to the professionalisation of local government.

What is needed, then, is a theoretical framework that relates deep preventors and conflict proneness to the occurrence or non-occurrence of violent conflict, ideally capturing the interaction between internal and external preventors and underlying and immediate generating factors. Such a framework cannot be found in indicators but may be located in theories of conflict genesis. Conflict theories have been developed for many years and although most of them are more useful as templates for thinking than as exact models, they can be used to buttress standard methods of political and historical interpretation in the identification and exploration of conflict dynamics.

The method of assessing conflict prevention impact proposed here, therefore, is first to assess the impact of preventive actions on variables indicating conflict proneness, and second to cast these variables within a theoretically informed interpretation of the dynamics of conflict.

We can illustrate a first approach to this method by taking Edward Azar's conflict theory as a framework. Azar's theory of protracted social conflicts was developed primarily with reference to developing countries but translates well enough to the experience of east European societies in transition.

Azar identified 'protracted social conflicts' as a new type of conflict 'distinct from traditional disputes over territory, economic resources or east-west rivalry' which 'revolves around questions of communal identity.'[13] He distinguished his theory of 'protracted social conflicts' from previous theories which tended to assume a sharp distinction between internal and international conflict, which saw conflict as a cycle in which violence was sharply distinct from preceding and succeeding phases of peace, and which focused on overt and violent conflict rather than the latent, covert or non-violent stages. In contrast,

> 'many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped part of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources

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[12] Kaldor, Mary, and Ivan Vejvoda. "Building democracy in central and eastern Europe." International Affairs 73 (1997): 59-82.

[13] Azar, 'The analysis and management of protracted social conflict' in Vokan, J., J. Montville and D. Julius (eds.). The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, vol 2, p. 93. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and ending points'.[14]

Azar's theory of the factors responsible for the genesis and maintenance of 'protracted social conflicts' is shown diagrammatically in Annex 2. Diagram 1.1 emphasises four main clusters of variables in their genesis: (1) the 'communal content' where the identity group is seen as the main conflict party (2) the deprivation of people's needs for security, development and political participation (3) governance and the role of the state as a critical factor in the ability to meet or frustrate these basic needs (4) international linkages, in particular political and economic dependence on regional or international markets, financial institutions and power-holders, since modern states are porous and external influences play a large role in internal conflicts. Diagram 1.2 indicates some of the main variables for maintaining a conflict in being or for leading to outcomes. Here crucial factors are the strategies chosen by states and communal actors, the patterns of interactions among contestants and the fluctuations in intensity, spillover and outcomes that result. Azar draws on other theories of conflict in the literature which emphasise dynamic processes of conflict formation and transformation, the increase or decrease in numbers of actors and issue, interaction between the core issues, inter-party perceptions and attitudes, and patterns of behaviour.[15]

While Azar's theory omits conflict prevention measures it is clear that deep conflict prevention can engage with the variables in Diagram 1.1 at the level of influencing security, development and participation and at the level of international political and economic linkages. In Diagram 1.2, light conflict prevention measures may be directed at influencing the strategies by either the state or communal groups, the pattern of interaction between parties and the perception of feasible outcomes.

To illustrate the application of this approach the next part of the paper examines the dynamics of recent conflicts in central and eastern Europe and the Balkans and attempts to identify some of the key domestic and external ingredients in conflict prevention.

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[14] Azar, Edward E. "Protracted international conflicts: ten propositions." In International conflict resolution: theory and practice, ed. Edward E. Azar and John Burton. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1986, p.6.
[15] For example Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means. London: Sage, 1996; Vayrynen, Raimo (ed.). New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation. London: Sage, 1991.

CASE STUDIES

1. ESTONIA

The citizenship conflicts in the Baltic States offer a clear example of positive conflict prevention. The secession of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia might well have given rise to armed conflicts, both between the new states and Russia and between the Baltic and Russian citizens in the Baltic States. Estonia and Latvia are engaged in building new states in which only 62 per cent and 54 per cent respectively of the population are ethnic Estonians and Latvians.

On the Baltic side, there were bitter memories of the Soviet regime, which had extinguished the Baltic nations in the 1940s and introduced large numbers of Russian workers with special privileges. "Occupiers and Colonizers Should Go Home!", read the placards at demonstrations in Estonia. On the Russian side, most of the Russian-speakers had lived in the Baltic States for many years or had been born there, and had nowhere else to go. Their sudden decline in economic and social status and their exclusion from participation created clear conditions, in Azar's model, for a protracted conflict.

Nationalist groups in Russia were prepared to play on the grievances of the Russian-speakers in the Baltic States and other newly independent republics as part of a struggle for power within Russia (Melvin 1995). The issue of Russians outside Russia had been growing steadily more important in domestic politics. Though Yeltsin had initially supported the Baltic independence movements and recognised the Baltic States as President of the Russian Federation, his government's reliance on international organisations to defend the human rights of Russian speakers in the 'near abroad' was heavily attacked. By 1992 his government had declared that the 'honour and dignity' of Russians living in the 'near abroad' was a Russian national interest.

In Estonia, the first post-independence government took an accommodating position, adopting a proposal for citizenship based on residence in Estonia in 1990. But after the attempted coup in Russia in 1991, a more nationalist government came to power, which adopted a Law on Aliens restricting citizenship to the descendants of those who had been citizens in 1941. This measure threatened to disenfranchise most non-Estonians, and render them stateless. It provoked a crisis within Estonia, and in Estonian-Russian relations. The Russian community in Narva warned of mass unrest and armed opposition, while Yeltsin warned that 'the Russian side has means at its disposal to remind Estonia' about 'geopolitical and demographic realities.' Extremists on both sides became active, with Russian nationalists calling for armed intervention, and Estonian nationalists calling for immediate repatriation of non-citizens.

The intervention of the OSCE High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, over the threatened secession of Narva has already been mentioned. He also held talks with all sides, and was regarded with trust.[16] He was supported by an OSCE long-duration mission based in three cities, which held extensive consultations with a wide range of parties. Western governments, the OSCE and the Council of Europe called for amendments to the Law, and the EC called for consultation and restraint. In response, President Meri submitted the Law on Aliens to the OSCE and the Council of Europe for comments, and he forwarded the proposed amendments to the Estonian parliament. He also set up a Round Table to promote dialogue between the ethnic groups, and made it clear that there was no intention of expelling non-citizens. He went on to co-opt members of the Russian elite by granting citizenship to industrial and political leaders, and allowed non-Estonians to vote in local elections. These de-escalatory steps proved sufficient to defuse the crisis. The local elections were held in October 1993 and resulted in significant representation for Russian parties. The old communist leaders in Narva were also ousted. The Russian-speakers remained divided, but the majority of them saw their best hopes for the future in participating in the Estonian economy which had better prospects of development and trade with the West than that of Russia. The Russian-speaking elite became heavily involved in the privatisation process and therefore derived benefits from Estonia's transition and opening to the West. After the modified Law on Aliens was adopted, attention gradually shifted from citizenship to economic issues. In November 1993 the Russian government agreed to withdraw its troops from Estonia by August 1994, and the Estonian government agreed to amend the Law on Aliens to grant residency rights to retired Soviet officers..

The conflict has continued even though potential violence was averted in 1993. Large numbers of Russian speakers have taken Russian citizenship, and unemployment among Russian-speakers remains high. In 1998 President Meri promulgated a new law requiring

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[16] The High Commissioner for National Minorities consulted with NGOs and academic experts in conflict management before his intervention in Estonia. It is difficult to assess to what extent the HCNM's approach was in turn influenced by advice from these and other sources. Certainly the general climate of understanding about political mediation and minority rights that was developing in Western Europe had its influence through the person of the HCNM, and others. The recommendations of the Conflict Management Group at Harvard reflected American NGO thinking on mediation at the time. They urged an impartial and non-coercive approach, with more emphasis on establishing a framework within which constructive engagement between minority and government could take place, rather than proposing substantive recommendations; the HCNM should commit himself to an ongoing process, in which he would develop good personal relations with the parties, acting as a facilitator; he could spell out to parties the implications of unilateral actions and outline options which would incorporate the interests of both parties; the dialogue should be conceived as the start of a long-term process between the parties, and it should address the root causes of the dispute. Conflict Management Group. "Methods and Strategies in Conflict Prevention: Report of an Expert Consultation in connection with the activities of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities." Cambridge, Mass.: Conflict Management Group, 20 University Road, Cambridge, 1993.

members of local governments to have competence in Estonia, reversing the earlier more accommodating policy. While violence has been averted, Western governments have failed to persuade the Latvian government to abandon its insistence on language tests which have the effect of restricting Latvian citizenship to Latvians. The HCNM and Western governments have made further representations to the government of Estonia on this issue and tensions between the two communities remain significant.

In this case the impact of 'light' prevention was effective, as the HCNM's intervention in Narva combined with the moderation of the Law on Aliens through EU and OSCE pressure to alter the policy of the Estonian government. Whether a serious armed conflict would have developed in the absence of these interventions is uncertain. Russian reluctance to engage in armed conflict with the West might well then have prevented a wider conflict. On the other hand a local armed conflict seemed a distinct possibility. The EU and the OSCE were able to exercise influence on both the Estonian government (through the inducement of possible EU membership) and the Russian-speakers (through their choice for access to Western markets), and to some degree on the government of Russia. In terms of Azar's model, therefore, the EU had an unusual degree of leverage. These contextual factors combined with effective diplomacy to prevent the situation from escalating to violence.

LATVIA

In Latvia, a similar crisis over citizenship quotas blew up in 1994, and also became serious as the Russian government refused to withdraw its troops from the country. The Latvian government appeared even more determined than Estonia to construct a state in which the native Latvians would have a significant majority. The elections of June 1993 excluded a third of the residents, and brought to power a centre-right coalition of Latvian Way and the Farmers Union, which supported a policy of slow and gradual naturalisation of the non-Latvian population. The Latvian government was less receptive than the Estonian government had been to the HCNM's recommendations, and when the draft law on naturalisation was set to the Council of Europe and the CSCE for comments in November 1993, the government was still insisting on quotas. Meanwhile the Russian government had been gradually scaling down their troops and in April negotiated a set of agreements with Latvia that covered the final details of the troop withdrawal and the compromise over the radar station at Skrunde. This had required the personal intervention of President Clinton.

Despite western pressure, the Latvian government passed its naturalisation law in June 1994. The CSCE and the Council of Europe condemned the Latvian law and Western

diplomats suggested that Latvia had spoilt its chances of eventually joining the EU or NATO.

In the interim, and especially after the December elections, the issue of Russians abroad had become much more prominent in the Russian debate. The moderate forces in Russian politics adopted some of the language of the nationalists and Yeltsin declared in his New Year's message that 'those people of Russia who are outside Russia's borders are inseparable from us.' At the G7 meeting in Naples, Yeltsin again refused to continue the final withdrawal of troops. In July, however, during Clinton's visit to Riga, Clinton put more pressure on the Latvian government, saying in public, 'Never deny to others the justice and equality you fought so hard for and earned yourselves.' At the same time, the US Senate voted to suspend aid to Russia until the troops left. Eventually in late July Latvia bowed to international pressure and gave up the quotas. A few days later the Russian and Latvian governments reached a final accord on the withdrawal of troops.

In contrast with the Estonian case, the HCNM and the OSCE, and EU governments, initially failed substantially to deflect Riga from its course. It required US pressure and a small scale crisis to settle the issue. The decisive factors were the Russian reluctance to take the crisis into an armed confrontation, the Latvian government's dependence on its new Western friends, and the appreciation by the Russian-speaking community that they would be better off in an independent Latvia than in Russia or the former Soviet Union.[17]

ALBANIA

The Albanian case illustrates how it is possible to identify deep-rooted sources of instability and potential conflicts in a country, and yet how hard it sometimes is to predict the juxtaposition of events that leads to violence. The author was commissioned to write a report on the sources of potential internal conflict in Albania in 1995. It was evident then that Albania had many cleavages of conflict and a very weak conflict prevention capacity. But the particular combination of circumstances that led to the partial state collapse in 1997 were difficult to anticipate. The EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe were involved in a number of programmes which might be classified as 'deep conflict prevention', although these were insufficient to the scale of Albania's problems. At the level of diplomatic intervention, the initial response during the period of Berisha's increasingly authoritarian government was inadequate. Nevertheless, following the armed rebellion, European states (and an NGO) intervened with considerable effect to forestall

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[17] A poll in April 1995 indicated that only 30 per cent of Russian-speakers thought they would be better off if still within the Soviet Union. Economist, 17 August 1996.

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the development of the political crisis and create conditions which ended the uprising. Although Albania has remained anarchic, and the northern part of the territory remained partly outside the government's control, the intervention of the former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky as OSCE Chair in Office, and the deployment of Operation Alba, was very successful, and may be considered as effective light intervention in the sense that it prevented the further development of a violent protracted social conflict in Albania.

Albania had many peculiar characteristics which accounted for this turbulence. Its history of very late modernisation, isolation from the world economy, underdevelopment and clan politics made for particular difficulties in the post-communist transition. It had experienced the most abrupt transition from a Stalinist regime to a multi-party market economy of any east European state. The economic boom which followed the sweeping election victory of the Democratic Party in 1992 gave the impression of a remarkable recovery: Albania experienced the highest rate of growth of any east European country, albeit from the lowest base. Berisha established a position for his party on the centre-right and won the approval of the ruling parties in Britain, Germany and the United States. He was seen as a moderniser, an economic liberal, a bulwark against stability and a factor of stability in the region. The reality was that Albania had serious problems of governance and economic development; but for too long the West's investment in Berisha as the man to modernise Albania blinded policy-makers to the growing problems of his regime.

In 1995 the author identified three dimensions of internal conflict in Albania.[18]

The first was the political polarisation between the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party. Socialist leaders including party leader Fatos Nano were tried and imprisoned, and Socialists were evicted from their jobs in the civil service and police and replaced by Democratic Party nominees, especially northerners from Berisha's own region. Nevertheless, the Socialists remained strong, and their prospects of returning to power appeared promising as Berisha lost popularity in 1993-4. Berisha responded by silencing his critics in the media, using the courts against the opposition and using increasingly violent language against the Socialists. There was therefore a possible risk of violence associated with the elections due in 1996.

The second dimension of potential conflict was the economic turmoil of the transition, and the stratification that resulted. State industry had collapsed and most of Albania's mines and factories had closed. In the countryside, where two-thirds of the population lived, the

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[18] Miall. Hugh. Progress and constraints in the transition process in Albania: a special focus on the relation between development and conflict. London: International Alert and the Hague, SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation), 1995.

chaotic circumstances of decollectivisation enriched the families who secured the land where they lived at no cost, but impoverished many others, and large numbers of landless peasants drifted into shanty towns, creating tensions with former residents. An enormous number of disputes developed over the ownership of land, and the introduction of a market in land in 1995, before the land titles had been fully certificated, exacerbated these disputes. The breakdown of the state sector and of social provision meant that many formerly secure state employees saw their incomes sharply reduced. As a result a new stratification developed between winners and losers from the transition.

The third issue was the question of different identity groups. Here the main apparent source of conflict was between the 'Tosk' Albanians in the south and the 'Ghegs' in the north, with clear differences in dialect, economic status and political affiliations between the two groups. The fact that the Socialist were best represented in the 'Tosk' south, and the Democrats in the towns and the 'Gheg' north where Berisha had his heartland, made this a possible cleavage of conflict. The issue of the Greek minority in the south, which had grievances over education, and linked to nationalist Greek territorial claims on Albania, was also significant. Finally, the mixed religious affiliations of the Albanians suggested the possibility of a potential conflict between identity groups on religious grounds, although in the Albanian case these differences were not so closely identified with communal identity as in Bosnia further north.

Clearly Albania was full of conflicts. But it was not clear at the time that these would culminate in a protracted social conflict - nor did they. Many of the conflicts (for example land conflicts) were dispersed at the level of the individual village and there was not a clear common cleavage between religious identity groups and the political parties. Notwithstanding the existence of religious and ethnic differences, Albania was remarkable for the continuation of an Ottoman-style tolerant coexistence between these groups. It turned out to be the political-regional cleavage that was the most significant. Applying Azar's model, therefore, it was easy to point to widespread deprivation of economic needs, security and participation, but these did not clearly coincide with communal or identity divisions. The country was so fragmented that there were no clearly defined large groups with wide support around which a protracted social conflict could coalesce.

What was clearly necessary was an enhancement in Albania's very weak capacity to manage its own conflicts. The EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE and NGOs did make a number of steps towards 'deep conflict prevention'. For example, the EU offered economic development assistance, and Greece and Italy made investments in the small business sector. The American Bar Association ran a programme to support the judiciary, and the Soros Foundation supported the independent media and a cross-party Union of Mayors. The Council of Europe developed a training programme in human rights at the

Police Academy. These measures were all commendable but they were carried out at a technical support level and to address the underlying political issue, that the state in the form of Berisha's government intended to retain control of the broadcast media, the judiciary and local government. On the Greek minority issue, the HCNM made a valuable intervention, and a Greek-Albanian intergovernmental accord and the departure of many ethnic Greeks to work in Greece eased matters. But it was difficult for outsiders to create an effective conflict prevention capacity from scratch. The concepts of independent media, independent judiciary, an independent civil service and a professional local government were at odds with Albania's political culture, and the criticisms of Berisha's autocratic style by those actually responsible for these programmes did not communicate themselves to the top political level in Western Europe and the United States, where Berisha retained support. The West failed to intervene when Berisha put the Court of Cassation, the Albanian Supreme Court, under threat, and the Council of Europe took the unhappy decision to admit Albania shortly after Berisha had sacked two judges. Berisha was even able to influence new electoral laws which barred certain categories of the opposition (such as persons named in state security files) from standing for parliament without significant international alarm. It seemed that Berisha's political usefulness to the West, his moderation over Kosovo, his willingness to provide air-bases for US planes operating in Bosnia and above all his acceptable political colour prevented an early manifestation of concern over the deterioration in the quality of democratic governance.

This failure to warn may have encouraged Berisha to think he could get away with his flagrant conduct of the 1996 elections. However, the report of the OSCE Monitoring Mission, which found the elections had been neither fair nor free, marked a reversal in US and European policy. The EU put a trade and Cupertino agreement with Albania on hold and Washington demanded that Berisha should work with the OSCE to resolve the situation by calling fresh elections.

It was the unexpected combination of the 'stealing of the election' with the collapse of the pyramid schemes in January 1997 that created the conditions for internal conflict. Berisha had taken all power into his own hands, so it was against Berisha that the people rose. The rebellion was not instigated or channelled by the political parties, but a spontaneous expression of frustration and anger by poor people who had lost all their money. It was strongest in the south, but the police, who were Berisha's appointees, failed to support him. The power vacuum that developed created the conditions a potentially serious conflict.

The United States and the European states expressed serious concern, but there was little enthusiasm for intervention. Hans van Mierlo, the Dutch Foreign Minister and President of the European Union, visited Tirana on 7 March, but a meeting of EU officials failed to agree on a solution. Chancellor Kohl ruled out intervention by German forces, and the

United States, still smarting from Somalia, was in no mood to send troops. In the event it was the OSCE that emerged as the main instrument for a western mediation effort, capable of providing direction at a time when the EU was divided, drawing in the United States, and producing in Franz Vranitzky an authoritative figure to co-ordinate the position of the West.

Vranitzky's talks with the political parties led to an inter-party agreement on a Government of National Reconciliation (9 March) and a plan for fresh elections under international monitoring in June. Finally, as Berisha lost control in Tirana, he was forced to call for western intervention and to appoint a Socialist prime minister. Italy and Greece, fearful of a new wave of refugees, were the main organisers of the multi-national Operation Alba, which succeeded in establishing order in Albania and holding a space for the calling of new elections. Vranitzky returned to Tirana again in May to deal with a crisis over the electoral laws, but in due course the elections took place and Berisha was defeated in a clear result.

If no intervention had been made, it seems likely that the violence would have continued and perhaps intensified, sucking in other sources of conflict. By intervening at an early stage, the OSCE and Operation Alba can therefore be judged to have prevented what might have well have developed into a more significant and protracted conflict. The deeper problems of political polarisation, economic deprivation and weak governance remained. Albania's political system was still very shaky and the new government was weak, unable to control the entire country. As the conflict in neighbouring Kosovo intensified, the Gheg-dominated areas in Berisha's region became a training and base area for KLA fighters. Nevertheless, Albania avoided a larger conflict, and the potential spillover and interaction of the conflicts in Albania and Kosovo were largely contained.

CONCLUSION

Since violent conflicts arise from a combination of systemic context, underlying factors, and trigger sequences, a combination of 'deep' and 'light' prevention measures is needed to address their dynamics.

It is difficult to assess the impact of external prevention measures on the incidence of violence, since there is usually uncertainty about the relative importance of the factors generating conflict, the domestic preventive factors and external impact. However, it is possible to assess the impact of preventive measures on some indicators of violence proneness. Theoretical frameworks from conflict analysis, such as Azar's theory, offer some insight into how indicators of violence-proneness contribute to or diminish the likelihood of a violent conflict spiral.

The primary factor influencing the outcome of conflict in most cases is the dynamics between the primary parties, and the domestic capacity for accommodating conflict. Nevertheless external interventions can be important at times of crisis, and can influence the preventive capacity of domestic systems.

External conflict prevention measures are dependent for their effectiveness on contextual conditions, and their impact cannot be easily be distinguished from the effects of domestic conflict prevention capacity. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the impact of a particular policy measure, or a particular actor, in isolation.[19] However, conflict prevention measures may contribute to a complex set of conditions which triggers either a malign spiral towards conflict escalation, polarisation and violence, or a benign spiral towards accommodation, de-escalation, and avoidance of violence. Examples of such positive and negative spirals can be seen in the experience of central and east European and Balkan societies in the 1990s.

Where the European Union has been able to offer the promise of immediate economic benefits, potential membership and access to western markets, the potential influence it has on both governments and opposition groups has been a significant factor in conflict prevention. Thus, in the Baltic States, the Russian-speakers have had a strong incentive not to secede, and to accommodate themselves to the Baltic States, which in turn have had to make some concessions to Western sensitivities about their treatment of their minorities. In Slovakia, notwithstanding the significant tensions between the Hungarian minority and the Slovak government, conflicts have not developed to the point of violence; and the close links between the Hungarian government and the EU and the OSCE have been one of the positive factors that have allowed the development of the issue to be muted. In Bulgaria and Romania, which have also experienced significant political tensions over minority issues, violence has largely been avoided through the political system, with representatives of minority groups sometimes sharing power with governing coalitions. Here too, the factor of potential EU and NATO membership has made governments reluctant to indulge in overtly discriminatory policies. Where this factor has not been present, and where domestic capacity to manage conflict has been weak, efforts to prevent conflict have had a

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[19] For similar reasons it is difficult clearly to explain the reasons for the 'liberal peace' at the international level. A range of explanations are available, including the presence of security communities, democratic governance, economic interdependence, transnational transactions, strong states, and membership of common institutions. Sorensen, Georg, 'IR Theory After the Cold War,' Review of International Studies (Vol.24, December, 1998), pp. 83-100; Deutsch, K., et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Holsti, Kalevi, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Keohane, Robert., and J. Nye, Power and interdependence (Harvard: Harper Collins, 1986).

more slender basis. In the case of Albania Operation Alba was an effective 'light' intervention which may have averted a more protracted conflict, although the deeper sources of instability in Albania remain. In Kosovo, the West sacrificed the interests of conflict prevention to the higher priority issue of securing a peace in Bosnia. 'Light' conflict prevention was too weak and too late, and the eventual effort to impose a settlement at Rambouillet went disastrously wrong. In this conflict there had been almost no basis for external actors to take 'deep' preventive measures. Perhaps a greater measure of recognition of the non-violent campaign of Rugova or the opposition in Serbia might have helped to restrain the development of violence, although this is a difficult judgement to make. In Macedonia, the decisive factor in sustaining inter-ethnic peace has been the presence of Albanian parties in the Macedonian government. Western support, such as the visits of the HCNM, the deployment of UNPREDEP, and the work of non-governmental and international organisations to sponsor bridge-building between the communities have had an ancillary role, they have failed to have a strong effect on the continuing distrust between the ethnic communities. This has grown more intense since the war in Kosovo.

If one abandons the attempt to identify with precision the impact of particular policy interventions but instead concentrates on the conditions which favour benign or malign spirals, it appears that it may be possible to identify combinations of conditions which have helped to reduce proneness to violent conflict. It would be useful to test these conclusions by post-hoc studies of the varying East European cases, using indicators of conflict preventors and generators within a specially developed theoretical framework.

MACEDONIA

Macedonia is a much more difficult case to assess. A potential large-scale violent conflict has not broken out but the ethnic tensions between the Albanian and Slav Macedonian communities have remained close to and at times at the point of violence. Macedonia has seen a relatively heavy investment in conflict prevention measures by international organizations, the United States and European governments, and by non-governmental organizations. Despite these efforts and the success attributed to UNPREDEP, Macedonia is once again a tinderbox following the war in Kosovo.

When Macedonia emerged out of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and began its democratic transition, there were good reasons to fear for its stability. The new state failed to secure international recognition for eighteen months after its independence, faced potential threats from all its neighbours, and contained a heterogeneous ethnic mix with the two largest ethnic communities sharply divided by language, culture, religion and tradition. Macedonians and Albanians had lived alongside one another for many years, but they lived as separate communities with little social interaction. The expression of Albanian national demands in Yugoslavia in the early 1980s had been thwarted by the Macedonian communist authorities, and Albanian national names and symbols had been banned. The issue of ethnic group status was then turned into a constitutional issue by the definition of the republic as 'the national state of the Macedonian nation'. As the new state established itself the stage was set for a competition over the status of both groups. For the Albanians the issues were access to education, control of local government, participation in government, access to economic opportunities, and equality of treatment. For the Slav Macedonians, insecure in their fragile new state, the issue was whether the Albanian community would show loyalty to the state, especially after the referendum on autonomy in January 1992.[1] Two elements of Azar's model of ethnic conflict generation were therefore present: strongly divided communal identity, and concerns over access, acceptance and security needs.

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[1] Mickey, Robert W., and Adam Smith Albion. "Ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia." In Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue, ed. Ian Cuthbertson and Jane Liebowitz. Prague: Institute for East-West Studies, 1993.

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There were, however, a number of positive factors in the Macedonian case which militated against an internal conflict. The Albanians and Slav Macedonians had no previous history of fighting. The Albanian minority, although its size was contested, was not so large as to pose an enormous threat to the Macedonian state. The Albanians were better off in Macedonia than either the Albanians in Albania or the Albanians in Kosovo, and so had incentives to remain and make what they could of the new state. Above all, Azar's mediating variable of governance turned out to be a factor for stability, as the governing coalition became dependent on the support of the Albanian deputies in parliament. Moreover, the international community, after its initially unhelpful posture over the recognition crisis, became not only a positive factor in mitigating conflict, but practically the protector of the fledgling state.[2]

The threats were perceived to come from both external and internal sources. Externally, Macedonia was endangered at first by the Greek embargo, and later, it was thought, by the threat of military intervention from Yugoslavia. The risk of spillover from the ethnic conflict in Kosovo exercised the international community and this was thought to be capable of destroying the fragile political balance between the main ethnic groups in Macedonia.

The course of the potential conflict can be divided into several phases. The first phase, from 1991-2, clearly established the internal and external dangers to which Macedonia was exposed. The ethnically divided political parties set out sharply different expectations of the new state. A pattern of political parties developed with moderate and nationalist parties on both sides of the ethnic cleavage. In many situations this pattern leads to ethnic out-bidding with competition between moderates and extremists for support within each ethnic community, which often destroys political moderation. In the Macedonian case, however, the nationalist parties were kept in the opposition by the governing coalition. But a significant risk remained that ethnically charged

[2] Lund, Michael. "Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1996: Containment Becomes Nation-Building." In Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized and Lessons Learned, ed. Bruce Jentleson: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.

incidents might trigger a pattern of escalation into violence. The new citizenship law of October 1992 angered the Albanians. In November 1992 rioting by Albanians in Bit Pazar, Skopje, led to several deaths and fears of imminent conflict. Externally Greece orchestrated its campaign against Macedonia taking the name, while Serbian disapproval of Macedonia's 'secession' remained strong and was expressed in border incidents up to 1994. In response to these dangers, policy-makers in the United States and Europe took the view that Macedonia needed help, and the policy of prevention was born. In September 1992 the CSCE established a Monitoring Mission and in January 1993 the UN deployed a small preventive force, later named UNPREDEP.

A second phase may be dated from 1993 to 1998, when the moderate governing coalition remained in control and was supported by the international community. During this period external intervention made a clear contribution to the international stability of Macedonia. Although the EU was unable to bring the Greek campaign to an end, United States pressure, exercised by Richard Holbrooke in 1995, produced a compromise. The EU-funded census helped to reduce the charged issue of the size of the Albanian community. The deployment of UNPREDEP placed an international guarantee on Macedonia's territorial integrity. While it appears in retrospect that there was never any real military threat to Macedonia from the FRY, the force did have an important role in giving both the government and the Albanian minority a sense of security. Its presence was eventually seen to have most impact internally. In particular, it checked what might otherwise have become a tendency to strengthen the (Slav Macedonian) army or recruit an Albanian militia.

A second way in which external help was significant was through giving some confidence in the economy. A consortium of European banks bought a controlling share in the biggest Macedonian bank and helped to carry through banking reform. The IMF approved a $72bn structural adjustment facility in 1997. European banks gave specific help for infrastructure projects in transport and telecommunications. These measures helped to stabilise what would otherwise have been an extremely vulnerable economy. However, average incomes remained low and unemployment high. With

trade damaged by sanctions on FRY, the real economy remained very fragile. Although international finance gave Macedonia a vital reprieve, it remained weak and dependent, and inter-ethnic relations remained vulnerable to economic shocks.

A third and more direct impact on Macedonia's potential for conflict was made through the efforts of the OSCE Long Duration Mission, the regular inter-ethnic dialogues supported by UNPREDEP, the OSCE and the Presidency, and at grass-roots level the various initiatives and projects for inter-ethnic relations sponsored by Search for Common Ground, the Soros Foundation and other NGOs. Such activities undoubtely helped to foster a moderate constituency on both sides, and to maintain a dialogue. This was important in maintaining a degree of inter-ethnic cooperation at the highest level. The representatives of the international community provided effectively an additional layer of governance, which was valuable especially for 'fire-fighting' in the case of potentially dangerous incidents. For example, the HCNM intervened in the issue of the Albanian 'university' in Tetovo that had led to rioting in 1995 and 1996, proposing a compromise on teacher training in the Albanian language that was accepted in 1997, although disputes over its implementation soon arose. He also advocated enhanced local self-government in Albanian-speaking areas in the light of the violent skirmishes over the flying of an Albanian flag over municipal buildings in Tetovo in 1997.

These and similar interventions appear to have provided a 'breathing-space' after incidents of particular tension (a more detailed examination supported by interviews is necessary for a full assessment). But they failed to lay the grounds for tension to rest. The Macedonian and Albanian parties were unwilling to agree on the fundamental issues of status, access and autonomy that divided them. The Albanians upheld their demand for a bi-national state and the Slav Macedonians remained unwilling to make fundamental concessions in education and local government. The government pursued an 'ostrich tactic', at times avoiding difficult issues rather than seeking to resolve them.

The crucial factor in preventing violent conflict during this period, 1993-98, appears to have been the domestic political coalition between Albanian and Slav Macedonian parties. This gave both sides an incentive to paper over the cracks and avoid the

escalation of tensions. Without this coalition the international efforts would have had much less purchase: it was crucial, for example, that President Gligorov invited the UN to establish a deployment force and hosted a high-level round table. But the Slav Macedonian and Albanian parties failed to find long-term solutions to the predicament of the divided state. The government's ethnic policy remained unclear, at times moderate, at other times repressive. It strove to avoid violence but at the same time refused to concede measures that might have accommodated the Albanian community. For its part, the Albanian PDP, which concentrated on issues affecting the Albanian community and frequently walking out of parliament, failed to persuade the Slav Macedonian community that it was determined to make a shared state work. Hence, while there was a common interest in violence avoidance, there was a common inability to resolve or address the underlying conflicts of the communities. The international community provided an umbrella of 'light' preventive measures, but was unable to create the 'deep' changes, especially in the form of cross-ethnic institutions and businesses, that were needed to bridge the two communities and create a space for a civic Macedonian future.[3]

The ethnic situation grew more polarised and the nationalist elements were strengthened. This led to the remarkable result of the 1998 elections, in which the Macedonian nationalists (VMRO-DPMNE) and the more radical Albanian party (the DPA) ousted the previous government and yet retained the cross-ethnic coalition together with the newly formed civic party Democratic Alternative (DA).

The Macedonian situation is now in its third phase, with tensions rising sharply. The most significant development was the war in Kosovo and the resulting refugee crisis in Macedonia. The consequences for Macedonia were dramatic. First, it led to a further polarisation between the communities, with the Albanian community openly supporting the KLA and NATO, while the Slav Macedonian community opposed the NATO bombing. The fears of the Slav Macedonians of the Albanian community's secession were heightened by KLA operations, or suspected operations, in Macedonia, while the

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[3] The international community had made a significant contribution to the framing of the Macedonian constitution, which was a long-term influence on the pattern of governance.

treatment of the Albanian refugees by Macedonian security forces increased the Albanian community's disenchantment with the government. Second, the nature of the international protection for Macedonia altered as the prime attention shifted to the needs of the war in Kosovo. A crucial change was the withdrawal of UNPREDEP, forced by China's veto, and its replacement by NATO. Sharp tensions arose between NATO and the Macedonian governments, exemplified by the strains arising from the incident in which a Macedonian minister was killed because of a NATO vehicle. Third, the end of President Gligorov's term of office and the fragility of the new government coalition threatened to undermine the previously established capacity for high-level fire-fighting. Fourth, the destruction of the Yugoslav economy in the war had a sharp economic impact on the Slav Macedonian community, who suffered greater relative losses than the Albanian community as they were more dependent on the larger-scale enterprises and trade with Serbia. Fifth, and perhaps most dangerously, the incentives to the Albanian community to stay in Macedonia appeared to be changing, with an independent Albanian-dominated Kosovo, under international protection, offering a strong pull on the loyalties of the Macedonian Albanian community.

In conclusion, the Macedonian case offers an example of successful conflict prevention, in the sense that potential conflict was averted for several years after 1993. The crucial factor was the inter-ethnic political coalition, supported by the fact that the Albanian community had an incentive to try to make the Macedonian state work. International intervention contributed to sustaining the relative peace in Macedonia by providing a degree of international security for the fragile state (through UNPREDEP), by providing financial and economic support, and by fire-fighting on occasions when tensions escalated. However, despite efforts to negotiate an improved relationship between the communities, neither the domestic political parties nor the international community were able to turn this situation of violence-avoidance into a longer-term basis for positive cooperation in creating a shared state. The strains resulting from this failure were greatly exacerbated by the changed situation created by the outbreak of the war in Kosovo. This threatened to undo the combination of domestic and international measures that contributed to accommodating differences and containing violence in Macedonia to date.

Luc Reychler

An Evaluation of International Efforts in Burundi

CPN Annual Conference 1999
Draft Conference Paper - Do not quote

2 November 1999

An evaluation of the international efforts in Burundi

A preliminary paper

Luc Reychler

Center of peace research and strategic studies (CPRS) University of Leuven

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An evaluation of international efforts in Burundi.

Luc Reychler

1. Conflict impact assessment

Governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict-ridden areas will soon be requested to submit a conflict impact assessment. This demand is the result of the awareness that sustainable economic and political development is only possible in an environment characterized by sustainable peace. A second reason is the growing demand for a more cost-effective peace and development policy.

CIAS assesses the impact of the interventions on the conflict dynamics and the peace building process before, during and after the implementation. The aim is to raise the peace building value and to reduce the negative side effects. The assessment can be done at three levels. At the overall policy-level one looks at the impact of all efforts on the chances of establishing a sustainable peace in the country of the region. At the sector level, one assesses the impact of all the

interventions focusing on a particular sector in the peace building process, for example on the legal system, the economic society or on the democratic transition. At the project level, one studies the impact of a particular project on the peace building process.

Despite the self-evident appeal of CIAS one is still confronted by some problems that inhibit an effective organization of impact assessment. The first type of problems is of a political nature. Some people claim that CIAS is impossible, because conflicts are too complex. Others are worried about the time consuming nature of the assessment. Still others are afraid that the chances of successful fundraising could be reduced when one has also to indicate the possible negative effects of their projects. And finally some politicians and administrators don't like the fact that CIAS requires from them much more transparency about their policies and thereby reduces the impression management. The second type of problems is a conceptual nature. There is no fixed formula for the transformation a conflict-ridden area to a peace zone. Politicians, administrators and NGO's tend to cut the peace building process into different parts and forget about the overall peace architecture. Peace building requires: (1) envisioning a clear and compelling future, (2) a comprehensive needs assessment, (3) the development of a coherent peace building plan, which synergizes the efforts required in different domains, levels, time –frames and layers of the conflict, (4) an effective implementation of the plan, and (5) support of the owners of the conflict and stake-holders. Finally, there are intelligence related problems. The development of a lean impact assessment system requires access to reliable information. Many times, governmental and non-governmental organizations are not ready to share information about the country and the projects. The fact that information is perceived as power and the competitiveness of NGO's inhibits the sharing of intelligence. When one involves local people in conflict-ridden areas, one is also confronted with the problem of preference falsification. In a situation where trust is skin deep, people will give their public and not their private opinion.

2. Burundi: a test case.

2.1. it is a tough conflict. We choose Burundi, because it is one of the most difficult types of ethnic conflicts to resolve. It is a complex asymmetric conflict (demographic and power) between predominantly two ethnic groups with a long history of violence. It is a conflict that cannot be reduced to an ethnic conflict. From the discussions it became clear that there are several lines of tension (see exhibit 1). It is also a conflict in which different types of violence are mutually reinforcing each other (armed, structural, psychological and cultural violence). It is a conflict in which the conflicting groups have a selective memory of a history of genocidal violence.

Neglected regions

Men   Urban areas

                                  Diaspora

Political class

HUTUS ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ TUTSIS

Burundians in Burundi   People

Rural areas   Women

Privileged regions

2.2. Research method

The aim of our research was to make an overall assessment of the impact of the external interventions of the last five in Burundi on the chances of establishing a sustainable peace. The method of assessment used was based on three assumptions. The normative assumption was that a good assessment requires a clear definition of the kind of peace on wants to establish. The achievement of a

sustainable peace was considered to be a realistic and compelling goal. A sustainable peace can be defined as an environment characterized by: the absence of physical violence, the elimination of unacceptable political-, economic-, and cultural forms of discrimination, a high level of internal and external support and the propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts[1]. This definition of peace corresponds to a great extent to the concept of structural stability used in the European Commission. The theoretical assumption underlying the study is that the realization of this kind of peace is possible when several preconditions are established. The essential requirements for the creation of sustainable peace could be clustered in 4 + 2 groups.

1. An effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation at different levels,

2. Peace enhancing structures (relating to political democratization, social free market system, restorative justice, education-information, refugees)

3. Integrative moral political climate (expectation of mutual benefits from future cooperation, multiple loyalties, reconciliation of past, present and future, dismantling senti-mental walls).

4. Objective and subjective security.

5. Regional cooperation.

6. Leadership.

The empirical assumption is that several data sources need to be used for making an effective impact assessment. In the study, we relied on existing documentation /information / analyses; field experience (observation of peace negotiations in Arusha); and depth interviews with external experts (18) and a representative sample of Burundians (34). Some of the Burundians interviewed were living in Burundi; most however were from the Burundian Diaspora living in Belgium. A team consisting of Tatien Musabyimana, a Rwandan and Stefaan Calmeyn, a Belgian interviewed them. Our Center for Peace research was perceived as impartial and seemed to have established a great deal of trust in

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[1] Luc Reychler. Democratic Peace building: The devil is in the transition. Leuven University Press. 1999.

the Diaspora Community. The depth interviews lasted from one to four hours. They started with an open question about the future of Burundi, but than each of the pre-conditions for a sustainable peace were discussed into detail. The interviewees were also invited to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaire aimed at a better understanding and comparison of their perceptions of the democratic transition process, the moral-political climate, the political commitment of the Burundians, etc. The research process consisted of four phases: (1) gathering of the data, (2) analysis and synthesis of the findings, and (3) round table meeting at the university with 15 Burundian participants for evaluating and amending the report, and (4) the writing of the final report[2].

3. Comprehensive needs assessment.

A systematic assessment was made of major preconditions for realizing a sustainable peace.

3.1 Effective communication, consultation and negotiation (CCN) at different levels.

Despite the fact that there are peace-negotiations and that significant progress has been made four major obstacles were identified. First, there was the problem of inclusion and exclusion. It concerns the undemocratic representation of the delegations; the exclusion of radicals and the geographically biased composition of the delegations in Arusha. 45% originates from the province of Bururi. Second, there is the lingering problem of confidence and trust. Some were convinced that the government was participating in the Arusha negotiations to get rid of the sanctions; that it gave priority to the internal negotiations or the setting up of an effective partenariat among the politicians

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[2] The final report will be published by Harmattan, France: Luc Reychler, Tatien Masubyimana and Stefaan Calmeyn, Burundi: le défi de la paix.

living in Burundi. Others believe that time is in their favor and that the negotiations are exercises in impression-management. A third problem relates to the perception of the mediator Nyerere as partial or impartial. Finally, there are several senti-mental walls[3] that are standing in the way of progress In the questionnaire we asked our interlocutors also some specific questions about the negotiation climate. These questions related to: the war weariness of the Burundians; the perception of the will to negotiate; their expectations about success; patience or impatience, the necessary time to get an agreement, and their own will to invest in the peace process. The war weariness is very high (4.1 on a scale from 1 to 5). Their perception of the will to negotiate seriously was not strong (3 on a scale from 1 to 5). The optimism-pessimism scale tilted in favor of optimism (3.6 on a scale from 1 to 5). On impatience –patience scale, the average response was 3.7. Most of the interviewees expected that Burundi could achieve peace within 6-10 years. They were ready to invest in the peace process a lot (on a scale from 1 to five 3.7). These data could be interpreted as positive indicators of the peace process. Despite the above-mentioned problems, the negotiations seem to move forward. Different commissions are now exploring ways and means (a) to establish a democratic environment, (b) to provide peace and security for all, (c) to rehabilitate the refugees and internally displaced persons, and (d) to implement the agreements, which will result from the peace negotiations.

3.2. The establishment of peace enhancing structures

Under this heading we researched five issues areas: the democratic transition, the socio-economic environment, the legal system, the education-information setting, and the handling of refugees.

A. Democratization

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[3] The term sent-mental wall refers to perceptions, attitudes and feelings that stand in the way of a constructive approach of conflicts.

The results show that Burundi still has to go a long way to establish the building blocks of democracy. On a scale varying from 1 to 5 all the building blocks scored very low. In terms of priority Burundians gave high priority to then rule of law and the respect of human rights. The organization of free and fair elections came in the third place. Next came inclusive leadership and good governance.

	1	2	3	4	5
Free and fair elections					
Separation of powers					
Transparence and accountability					
Appropriate decentralization					
Rule of law					
Appropriate power-sharing					
Human rights					
Civil society					
Good governance					
Inclusive citizenship and participation					

Exhibit 2: Democratic profile Burundi

B. The judicial system

All our interlocutors complained of a loss of values, of impunity and of a politically biased legal system. The deterioration of the moral climate seems to be linked to the decline of the traditional ' Ubushingantahe' institution, which regulated the life and the cohesion of communities on the basis of a healthy justice. The election of its members was based on their moral integrity. The new

Ubushingantahe has lost its autonomy and is infused by the power holders. There is no truth commission or a system of justice that is trusted by the people.

C. Social free market system.

Burundi remains at the bottom of the international economic ladder. All the indicators converge in the same direction. The internal insecurity and the monopoly position of the political –military –economic class inhibit the development of an economic society. This frustrating economic situation has been aggravated by the overpopulation. The preconditions for the development of a social free market are absent.

D. Education and information system

The system of education is poor and is characterized by exclusion and discrimination. The ethnically biased educational system makes it difficult to create a more representative legal-, the administrative, the security- and the socio-economic system. With the exception of impartial and externally funded radios, the media are also not an integrative force. Journalists who try to offer independent voice risk to be brutalized. Most of the interviewees perceived the media as not a very constructive tool. On a scale from 1 (supporting the peace process) to 5 (spreading hate) the media got a score of 3.6. One of the consequences of this situation is the predominance of rumor. Most of the interviewees considered the prevalence of ' rumors' as a means of communication as one of the greatest problems in Burundi.

E. Refugee policy.

The problem of the refugees and internally dislocated people remains one of most difficult issues to resolve. The level of frustration among the refugees about their inability to return to their country is perceived as very high.

3.3 Reconciliation and the creation of an integrative moral-political climate.

In this part we looked at several components of an integrative moral-political climate, such as the expectation of mutual benefits as a consequence of cooperation, the replacement of exclusive loyalties with multiple –loyalties, a healing of the past, and the dismantling of the senti-mental wall which divide the conflicting groups. To a great extent the moral political climate in Burundi is characterized by a defeatist attitude towards the future, by exclusive nationalism, by a frame of mind and heart that is not ready for reconciliation and by several senti-mental walls standing of overcoming the past and imaging a sustainable peace. The attachment of the Burundians is strongest towards their ethnic group. Also important are their bindings with the neighborhood, the region and the country. Their religious attachments are much weaker, and far away seems to be the near abroad and Africa as a whole. There are several senti-mental. The two strongest are the feelings of insecurity and the mutual distrust (see exhibit 3).


Exhibit 3: Senti-mental walls.

Looking at a list of possible options for resolving the conflict the status quo ante (free installation on the national territory) and regional integration are considered favorably. This is not the case for the creation of Hutu- and Tutsi lands. On a scale from 1 to 5 the first option received a score of 4.1; the second 3.2 and the last 1.5.

3.4. Objective and subjective security.

4. Impact assessment of external interventions.

The aim here was to map all the external interventions in the last five years. This proved to be more difficult than expected and required much more time than foreseen in the budget[4]. The problem is that there is no clearinghouse or data bank where one can find an overview, on a yearly basis, of governmental and non-governmental interventions with respect to the different components of peace building. The lack of an overview of all the activities makes it difficult to assess the relative impact of the overall peace building process of particular actors, such as the European Union or Belgium. With respect to each of the components of peace building we tried to gather as much information as possible, but we did not succeed in getting an exhaustive overview of all the external initiatives for each sector.

4.1. Effective communication, consultation and negotiation . (CCN). M.Lund, R.Rubin and F.Hara mapped many different efforts[5]. The efforts could be divided in Track I, Track II and Field diplomacy. The European Community supported the Negotiations in Arusha and nominated Aldo Ajello as her special envoy in the Great Lakes region. There were several initiatives taken by NGO's

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[4] The budget allowed us to pay a full-time researcher for six months.
[5] M.Lund, R.Rubin and F.Hara, Learning from Burundi's failed democratic transition. in R.Rubin (Ed.) Cases ans trategies for preventive action, 1998, The Century Foundation Press ; F.Hara. La diplomatie parallèle ou la non-indifférence : le gas du Burundi. dand Politique Africaine. no68. décembre 1997.pp.78-

to facilitate communication, consultation and negotiation between the conflict parties. Other NGO's focused more on the middle and local levels of the Burundian society. On the whole the efforts of the international community in this sector was evaluated positively. The external efforts to facilitate peace negotiations have been more convergent that divergent. There however a feeling that the international community has been more occupied by other conflicts and that Burundi is not been given a priority status in terms of conflict prevention. Several concrete suggestions were made to improve the CCN problem.

- Pay more attention to the exclusion-inclusion problem in the peace negotiations
- Facilitate better CCN at the middle and local levels.
- Ta prevent a waste of energy and useless competition, the international community (governmental and intergovernmental) should develop a common foreign policy.
- The CCN efforts should be expanded to the regional level.

4.2. Peace enhancing structures

4.2.1. A consolidated democracy.

The international community has focused most of the attention on electoral assistance, the functioning of the parliament and its members, and the design of a legitimate political system appropriate political system. The experience of 1993 showed that the democratic transition needs more than some electoral monitoring and assistance. The democratization efforts should focus on all the building blocks of democracy. Several concrete suggestions were made to improve the facilitation of the democratic transition:

- Create genuine and representative institutions in all domains of the Burundian society

- Aim at democratization in all sectors of the political, economic, social and cultural life.

- Before the organization of fair and free elections one should agree upon an appropriate power-sharing system.

- Consider the costs and benefits of (a) the risks of resistance to change of the old power elites and (b) reasonable compensations.

- Eliminate gender discrimination in all legal and socio-administrative systems and assure leadership positions for women in the democratic peace building process.

- See the democracy as a process and not as an end in itself.

4.2.2 A legitimate legal system

The international community has paid considerable attention to the strengthening of the legal system. It has done this by: (1) the creation of an commission to inquire into the killing of president Ndadaye and the following violence; (2) by training programs aiming at the strengthening of the rule of law, and (3) the assistance from foreign layers. The following suggestions were made to strengthen the rule of law in Burundi:

- Improve the effectiveness of the legal system by a better training of its personnel and the creation of a selection and promotion system based on merits. .

- Make the legal system more representative and incorporate more Hutus.

- Develop a justice system that is both retributive and restorative, especially by the creation of truth and reconciliation commission.

- Burundi can learn from similar experiences abroad.

- Make the constitution and law accessible to the people by a translation of these texts in Kirundi.

- Provide sufficient technical and financial aid to the justice system.

4.2.3 Economic development and social free market system.

Neither the external, nor the internal environment has facilitated economic growth, the reduction of discrimination, and an economic society. The embargo has certainly not improved this dreadful socio-economic situation. The following suggestions were made to improve the economic situation.

- Create conditions for the development of an independent economic society. This implies not entrepreneurial skills but also changes in the law.
- Develop a more sophisticated conditionality policy that takes into account the positive and negative consequences.
- Fight for a more equitable economic world order.
- Stimulate regional economic cooperation.

4.2.4 Education and media.

The international community has not much invested in the education system after the independence of Burundi. The educational system is well functioning and does prepare the Burundians for solving their problems. With respect to the media efforts have been undertaken to increase the level of professionalism and create multi-ethnic radio channels. The following suggestions to improve the educational and media landscape were being made:

- Find a mechanism that guarantees equal opportunity for all.
- Start a debate about social utility of what is thought at school and at the university and about their responsibility to generate creative solutions for the problems of Burundi.
- Establish a system of educational exchange and cooperation with foreign educational centers.
- Stimulate a plurality of ideas and visions and neutralize the monopolistic position of the University of Burundi by creating other independent institutions for higher learning.

- Stimulate in the social sciences the creation of courses and applied research about conflict management and democratic peace building.
- Improve the reliability of the information and communication system by an effective press law.
- Set up an effective anti-rumor system.
- Remind the international press about her responsibility and the consequences of different information policies.

4.2.5 Humanitarian aid and refugee rehabilitation

The efforts of the international community have succeeded in improving the miserable living conditions of the refugees and the internally displaced persons, but have not been very successful in their repatriation. The following suggestions were made:

- Voluntary repatriation of all refuges, dismantlement of de internal camps and integration of all in the socio-economic life of the country.
- Exploration of alternative solutions for the integration of refugees who would like to stay in the host country.
- Active involvement of the international community in the successful realization of all these programs.

4.3   An integrative moral-political climate

The moral political climate has been an area was the efforts of the international community have been minimal. The political psychology is a very important dimension in the transformation of a protracted conflict. When the conflicting groups cannot imagine a better future as a consequence of cooperation, the chances of peace building are very low. A successful transition requires external and internal leaders, who have the courage to lead for tomorrow, who can raise hope and motivate others to support others to make Burundi a democratic,

affluent and secure place to live. The following suggestions were made to enhance the political-psychological climate.

- Dismantle the senti-mental walls by creating mutually benefiting activities for Hutus and Tutsis.
- Allow people to mourn together, but also at the level of each community.
- Invite the international community to support initiatives the rebuild interethnic communication and consultation.
- Demand from the external community a more objective and thorough diagnosis of the situation, and make use of the expertise of the Burundian Diaspora.

4.4. Objective and subjective security

The traumatic experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia have considerably reduced the chances of direct military intervention in Burundi. The security initiatives have been limited confidence building initiatives by the representatives of international organization (OAU, UN, EU) and the installation of OAU monitors. Suggestions were formulated to:

- Demobilize the armed groups in the perspective of the creation of a national army and helping the ones who will have no future in the army to be reintegrated in the society.
- Democratize the different institutions in charge of internal and external security.
- Differentiate the missions of these different corps.
- Create a regional security community.

Some general observations

During the round table organized in February 1999 some observations about the role of the international community stood out:

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- The international community seems to be at the same time present and absent in Burundi. She is present when weapons are sold , but absent to deal when the consequences.

- The policies of different countries vis à vis Burundi seem to be less interested by the national interests than by lobbies which seem to be more interested in their own interests , than in the interests of Burundi. Even NGO's and humanitarian organizations have become pressure groups. The actions of these lobbies are nourished and relayed by the journalists and ' experts'. Sometimes good initiatives or activities are neutralized by the harmful propaganda of these lobbies. Therefore it is of utmost importance that such actions are the subject of objective analysis. Among the examples mentioned are: the genocide question, the democracy in Burundi, The use of the term ' Umushingantahe, and the elections of 1993 as a ethnic census.

- The Burundians, as many other developing countries, are hostage to international pressures when they have to solve their own problems. They don't have much freedom. They have to adopt the solutions prescribed by Brussels, Paris or elsewhere; even anti-democratic solutions to stabilize the region.

- They perceive the international community as not very effective in helping the country in the peace building process. The great number of players, the different and sometimes opposite interests , and the contradictory interventions (positive and negative) do add up to an effective common peace building policy.

5. Conclusion and suggestions

When looking back at the exercise a series of strengths and weaknesses can de identified. Let's start with looking at the strengths. First, the study provided a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the peace building needs of the country. Second, the results were approved by a politically representative sample of the Burundian Diaspora living in Belgium. They considered the study

as comprehensive and unbiased. This gives the study some credit as a base for designing a more coherent peace policy for Burundi. Third, the study provides also an assessment of the overall impact of the external community on the conflict in Burundi. It indicates sectors where the interventions were effective; others were the impact has been weak, ands some blind spots. Fourth it provides also some concrete suggestions for solving problems in the different sectors. The Diaspora Burundians involved in the study were enthusiastic about the process and suggested to continue the round table meetings. The purpose would be to generate solutions for the many concrete problems that need to be overcome. There are also several weaknesses that need to be tackled to improve conflict impact assessment studies. The first weakness is the heavy methodology. It took us more than a year to complete the study. This was caused by (a) the fact that there was still lot's of conceptual work to do, such as the development of checklists to assess the needs in different sectors, (b) the lack of a data –bank in which we could find an overview, on a yearly basis, of all the activities of different governmental and non-governmental actors in Burundi, (c) the identification and engagement of external experts and of Burundians in the assessment process. To get the private and not the public opinion of the participants requires confidence building and thus time. The time for doing a CIAS at the policy level could and should be reduced to three to four months, if the above-mentioned data bank would be available. The checklists used in the Burundi study need some improvement but could be used to study other countries. Time could also be saved by the use of questionnaires and scales. The second problem, which has been mentioned earlier, is the scatterbrained international community. Without accurate and reliable data on the input of the external actors, the problem of assessing the output will remain problematical. The third weakness of today's conflict impact assessment is the lack of effective assessment at the sector level. The macro level assessment needs to be complemented by more detailed sector assessments, for example of the democratic transition, or of the creation of a legitimate justice system, or of the development of an economic society. A fourth weakness of this study is that it is

a non-recurrent study. An empirical study the impact of external intervention would have more validity, if such assessments would be made every year of the involvement.

The following suggestions could be made to develop a more effective conflict impact assessment:

- There is clearly a need for a lighter / leaner methodology. If not, it will not be used. One can expect lots of resistance of the practitioners.

- Someone should take the responsibility for creating a data bank with information about external interventions in conflict areas.

- CIAS should not be used as a tool for sanctioning, but as a learning tool. If it is used as a tool for sanctioning, people will be demotivated and invest a lot in impression-management.

- The use of CIAS should be included in a code of conduct for NGO's involved in conflict areas. It would raise their legitimacy status, but also them to design more effective policies and projects.

- Conflict impact assessments should be done on a regular basis. Once a year for an overall policy or macro level assessment.

- Not only the local recipients, but also the Diaspora should be involved.

- Finally, the international community should invest in R&D. There is not only the need to develop lighter but effective assessment tools, but also to acquire a better insight the peace architecture and the peace building process.

Manuela Leonhardt

Improving Capacities and Procedures for Formulating and Implementing Effective Conflict Prevention Strategies

An Overview of Recent Donor Initiatives

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1. Introduction

Over the last years, aid agencies have increasingly recognised that they can play a more proactive role in the many conflicts regions of the post-Cold War world. Critical reviews of donor performance in past crisis situations have played an important part in bringing about this new awareness. It is sufficient to mention the seminal role of the *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (1996). Responding to these insights - as well as to the increasing challenge violent conflicts represent to development world-wide - many donors are now making conflict prevention one of their priorities and are developing structures and processes to translate this commitment into practice. I find it important to mention this fundamental policy shift right at the beginning of this paper to show that donors do learn from evaluations of their work. It is, however, not necessarily the single evaluation that affects an agency's policy, but rather a body of knowledge about good practice and past failures that finally leads to changes in policy and institutional practice.

I have been asked to outline the institutional capacities international donors have developed to respond to the challenges of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work and how far they have been able to learn from relevant evaluations. Before setting out to address this question, I would like to outline the scope and perspective of this study. This paper limits itself to the contribution of development and humanitarian assistance to peace processes in the developing world. Little attention has been paid to other foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy, trade, and military intervention and to possible synergies or interference between these instruments. When discussing the institutional capacities required for successful peace work, it is useful to briefly review the ways in which aid can contribute to preventing violence and promoting peace. Aid can play a role in the following three areas:

a) *Working towards structural stability:* In countries at risk of violent conflict, aid can help reduce poverty and contribute to more social justice, create structures for the non-violent resolution of social conflicts, dry up illicit and war economies, and promote personal security and reconciliation. These are contributions to conflict prevention in a long-term perspective.

b) *Building the social foundations for sustainable peace:* During war-peace transitions, aid can play an important role in supporting people's participation in the peace process, providing spaces for dialogue and trust-building, creating accountable security forces, and ensuring that a wide segment of the population benefits from the "peace dividend". Such groundwork is crucial for the sustainability of politically negotiated peace accords.

c) *Addressing localised conflicts:* Aid agencies have been involved in resolving inter-community conflicts (e.g. cattle-rustling in Kenya) by targeting the material root causes of conflict, supporting locally appropriate forms of conflict management, and gearing their work towards building relationships and trust.

In this paper, I would like to make the case for two propositions, which emerge both from our donor survey and the experiences of International Alert and others engaged in peaceful conflict transformation.

1. *Mainstreaming a conflict prevention perspective:* Conflict needs to be mainstreamed into all donor activities in conflict-affected regions. In this way, their potential to contribute to peace can be fully used and harmful side-effects of their work avoided. Mainstreaming conflict will also allow donors to learn from their experiences more systematically.

2. *Sustaining peace processes:* Conflict prevention and peacebuilding work is first of all about long-term, participatory processes. Donors need to strengthen their capacity to sustain such processes, which do not fit into usual project frameworks. To promote learning from these experiences, frameworks for ongoing monitoring and reflection are more important than single ex-post evaluations.

II. Research Methodology

I now wish to briefly introduce the empirical material, on which this paper draws. There are two main sources of information. The section on donor capacities is based on a survey of major donors, which International Alert has carried out over the past months in order to identify good practice in mainstreaming a conflict prevention perspective into development co-operation. The survey included (i) the collection and review of policy documents relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a broad sense; (ii) the examination of relevant planning instruments; (iii) expert interviews with policy makers and desk officers using a standardised aide memoire; (iv) an evaluation review of relevant donor programmes.

The survey mainly focuses on European bi- and multilateral donors and includes the EC, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, UK, Germany, Austria, Norway, Canada and UNDP. It has given us a fairly good overview of how these organisations have presently institutionalised conflict prevention in their work. In reviewing the evaluations, we tried to establish a link between donor performance in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and the policies and ways of working of the given donor. The review goes back to the early 1990s to include some of the key learning experiences of the international donor community such as the Somalia and Rwanda crises. The evaluations were selected according to regional criteria to reflect the range of assistance provided to countries that are affected by violent conflict. Particularly well-documented countries are South Africa, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. There are also good evaluations available on Central America, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Cambodia. In terms of sectors, we were particularly interested in conflict-relevant programmes such as humanitarian assistance, assistance to refugees, rehabilitation and post-conflict reconstruction, democracy, human rights, security sector reform, and programmes involving an aspect of natural resource management, human resources or community development. The bulk of these evaluations refer to conflict or post-conflict evaluations. There is hardly any documentation of the role of aid in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict.

Section two on participatory approaches to planning and evaluation for peacebuilding mainly relies on NGO consultations in the UK and in Kenya, which International Alert held in the course of initiating a pilot project on Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment.

III. Evaluation Review: Need for Clear Peace Objectives and Better Capacity to Support Process

To begin with, I will briefly present the main results of the evaluation review and then continue to show how donors are responding to this growing body of knowledge about conflict prevention work. The evaluations highlight the following areas, in which donor capacity and performance could be improved to realise the full potential of development aid for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

1. Clear Policy Guidelines

Peacebuilding is not yet widely recognised as a cross-cutting development objective, but rather perceived as a positive side effect. Setting clear peacebuilding objectives for all forms of aid in conflict-affected situations can add value to traditional development work and bring enormous efficiency gains. The use of peacebuilding criteria would also enhance the quality of project evaluations and thus promote learning from past experience. Peace should not only be regarded as the absence of violence, but also encompass co-operation, reconciliation and development. At the policy level, provisions need to be made to sustain a long-term perspective, which is crucial for the success of such efforts.

2. Strategic Framework for Action

Rehabilitation and development programmes can only make a substantial contribution to peace processes when they are planned and implemented in a coherent way. "Country strategies" or "strategic conceptual frameworks" can be useful instruments in this context. From the various evaluations, the following elements of a good country strategy can be gleaned:

(i) A *long-term orientation* to support complex peace processes. An integrated *transition strategy* is needed that links *crisis response to development* and sets the signposts for long-term recovery. "Quick impact" solutions such as infrastructure rehabilitation or the distribution of agricultural tool kits need to be integrated into long-term pro-grammes for maximum sustainability. Priority should be given to social investment, which is fundamental to recovery and long-term development.

(ii) Coherence and *co-ordination*: Representing the result of wide consultations, a country strategy should outline the roles of the external (and internal) actors based on the prin-ciples of comparative advantage and ensure maximum synergy among development, trade, political and military instruments.

(iii) Given the apparent urgency of the problems, *local capacity building and participation* are often not given priority. However, it is crucial to involve communities and local administrations in the decision-making and implementation process to achieve a sense of ownership. Local administrative and management capacities are also crucial to sustain development after the foreign agencies have pulled out.

3. Institutional Capacity

(i) Some evaluations note that the development of a targeted and comprehensive approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding is often hampered by the lack of institutional structures to integrate and co-ordinate different policy instruments (military, trade, policy dialogue, development aid, humanitarian assistance), both within and between donors and other agencies. Task forces for conflict-prone regions are suggested as a useful way of achieving inter- and intra-agency co-ordination.

(ii) *Information, knowledge and skills*: In order to react to situations of conflict in a more timely manner and with more appropriate instruments, evaluators recommend that donor agencies facilitate the flow of information between the field and the country delegations and headquarters. This is particularly important for early warning. More could also be done to improve conflict analysis capacity within organisations, and to train staff in conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills. Peacebuilding advisors can be instrumental in mainstreaming conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives within programmes.

(iii) *Suitability of instruments*: The instruments (e.g. budget lines), which are used for conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, should be regularly monitored to ascertain their suitability and efficiency.

(iv) *Decision-making and project management:* Many evaluations argue that delays in the release of funds are particularly damaging in politically unstable situations. Sometimes, more attention is paid to pre-project controls than to effective implementation and impact. The procedures for project appraisal and approval need to be streamlined to guarantee the efficient implementation of peacebuilding activities. On the other hand, they should be able to provide co-ordination and real guidance for the implementing agency. This is necessary in order to avoid duplication or the dispersal of resources over large geographical areas, to help avert negative side effects due to lack of co-ordination, and to maximise synergies between different activities. Reporting requirements should give equal importance to programme content as to financial accountability.

(v) *Communication:* Many donors face problems in maintaining regular communications with projects. This due both to the strong fragmentation of funding as to the poor reporting practices of some implementing agencies. Therefore, donors often miss opportunities to learn from past experience.

(vi) *Short-term perspectives:* Many evaluators have remarked that donors set extremely short time horizons for the implementing agencies, which are inappropriate to the long-term task of peacebuilding. Donors should try to redress this problem by enhancing their own long-term planning capacity. Many agencies also experience high levels of staff turnover due to the low level of incentives provided for long-term engagement in difficult environments. This affects their capacity to build an institutional memory and draw on past experience.

4. Local Knowledge and Priority Areas

Peacebuilding projects need to be based on an intimate knowledge of local conditions and thorough needs assessment. To ensure sustainability, they should be planned and implemented with a maximum participation of local communities within the framework of national government structures and development plans. Priority areas for supporting sustainable peace are *security sector reform* and *demilitarisation, social-economic integration,* support for *legitimate and pluralistic political institutions,* and the *building of local capacity.*

IV. Building Donor Capacities for Peacebuilding

I will now outline how donors are building capacities to respond more adequately to the challenge of building peace. In doing that, I will broadly follow the main issues brought up in the evaluations.

1. Clear Policy Guidelines

Many donors are now laying down their commitment to conflict prevention in comprehensive policy papers, which spell out the donors' "working theories" about the nature of conflict and the most appropriate manner to address it. Among the most developed policy papers are the EC Communication from the Commission to the Council "The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peacebuilding, conflict prevention and beyond" (1996), the DFID policy statements "Conflict reduction and humanitarian assistance" (1999) and "Poverty and the security sector" (1999), and the SIDA "Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace-Building" (1999). These papers provide strongly needed policy frameworks, but still require further translation into the agency's structures and processes to be of full operational use.

As part of the process of preparing these guidelines, many donors have engaged in or commissioned significant policy research. Multilaterally funded policy research include the work of the WIDER institute in Stockholm on the economic root causes of violent conflict, the research by the UNRISD War-Torn-Societies Project on participatory processes in post-conflict transitions, and - on a smaller scale - the action research of the Local Capacities for Peace Project on avoiding negative side effects of aid on conflict. Notable among national efforts is the research project initiated by the German Ministry for Economic Co-operation on the impact of its development assistance on the dynamics of conflict.

2. Strategic Framework for Action

Making a meaningful contribution to peace requires timely and reliable information about the conflict and its dynamics. This information then needs to be translated into realistic action plans, which outline a coherent strategy towards the conflict. It is probably in this strategic area that donors are advancing most at the moment.

Several donors have established close ties with universities and peace research institutes, whom they commission to conduct in-depth research on particular countries in conflict. Finnish researchers, for example, have just completed a thorough study of the Congo Crisis for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kennes et al. 1999). In Sweden, a similar study on the conflict in Angola has been undertaken. The strength of these research projects is that they are undertaken by independent researchers, whose perspective may differ from those of the

embassies and ministries. Participants in these projects said that they found the discussions and learning taking place during the research process at least as valuable as the final result.

A few donors are currently establishing internal early warning systems, which monitor the political developments in certain high-risk regions. Within the EC, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) is currently developing early warning mechanisms for natural disaster, which will also be of relevance to conflict situations. Most advanced among the European donors is probably the Swiss Direction for Development Co-operation, which has developed both an external and an internal conflict monitoring system. While both of them are indicator-based, the internal system is more geared towards integrating "atmospheric" and intangible types of information, while the external system, undertaken by the Swiss Peace Foundation, rather provides "hard data". An important side effect of the internal monitoring system is to encourage field staff to think about conflict in a more systematic manner and train them in techniques of conflict analysis.

Other donors are working on models and frameworks for the periodic review of conflict situations in relation to strategic planning. Such "strategic conflict analyses" focus on the macro-factors of conflict and point out entry points for conflict prevention initiatives. Such a framework is currently being developed for the European Commission under the title of "Conflict Impact Assessments" (CIAS). The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned research on a "conflict prognosis model", modelled upon existing frameworks for human rights reporting for the use of embassies. The World Bank "watching brief" assumes a similar function. As the World Bank is not operational in countries with open conflict, it is used to follow conflict developments and build a knowledge base to facilitate effective and timely World Bank intervention once the conflict is coming to an end.

The main challenge is to translate such strategic conflict analysis into a forward-looking strategic action plan, which reflects a coherent and co-ordinated approach to conflict prevention. Some donors are currently outlining the place for such a document, although little practical experience exists by now on how to draw up such a plan. Within DFID, e.g., the "country strategy papers", which are prepared every two or three years, are the most important policy instruments on the country-level. For countries affected by violent conflict, DFID is currently thinking about introducing the preparation of a "conflict brief" into the consultation process proceeding the preparation of the country strategy. This document would provide critical background information on the conflict, which could then be integrated into the measures envisaged in the country strategy. The German Ministry of Economic Co-operation is taking a slightly different approach. It is currently engaged in a research project on crisis analysis in development co-operation, which aims to develop conflict indicators for conflict early warning and monitoring. It is planned to integrate these

indicators into the analytical and planning instruments routinely used in German development co-operation.

3. Institutional Capacity

In terms of building the institutional capacities to support peace processes, donors are gradually progressing. Nearly every European donor agency now has a specialised Conflict Unit or employs at least a Conflict Advisor. These persons or units are mainly engaged in policy work and sometimes administer a specialised conflict prevention budget. The concentration of all responsibility for conflict issues within a specialised unit has not always proven very productive, however. Effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes require a closer co-operation between the Conflict Unit and regional and sectoral departments. Mainstreaming conflict would mean here to integrate more conflict advisors into the operational parts of the agency. Some donors are even trying to achieve interministerial co-ordination to achieve more coherence between different foreign policy instruments. Within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, country-specific task forces achieve co-ordination between the foreign policy and development branches in the area of peacebuilding.

Enhanced funding arrangements and procedures are another crucial way of supporting peace work. Peacebuilding needs to more flexible funding than traditional sectors to allow swift reaction to upcoming opportunities. The funders should also factor in an increased rate of "failures" as peacebuilding work needs to take higher risks. Many donors have recognised these needs and created peacebuilding funds with flexible decision-making mechanisms and speedy disbursement procedures. In some organisations with a particularly high degree of bureaucracy, however, these funds have attracted "predators" which try to divert these flexible moneys for other purposes. A largely unresolved problem in financial terms is the long-term character of peace processes and the near impossibility to prove "success". Traditional project-oriented funding mechanisms are extremely inappropriate to sustain peacebuilding work as they require the artificial framing of complex processes as discrete project activities, which should lead to tangible outcomes. Funding timeframes are often much too short to allow the development of meaningful relationships between peacebuilding organisations and its local partners. In volatile war-peace situations, disruptions created by the expiry of project funding are even more harmful than in other circumstances. To overcome this problem, SIDA has developed an understanding with its core NGO partners that combines an assured multi-year commitment from SIDA with the yearly renovation of project funding.

4. Project Appraisal

It was a major achievement of the discussion on "Do No Harm" that donors increasingly want to know about the potential impact of a proposed project on the dynamics of conflict and peace in an unstable region. Approaches to answer this question have largely been discussed under the heading of "conflict impact assessment". At the moment, a number of donors are undertaking work on different policy tools that can help them to better appraise projects in areas at risk of violent conflict. These tools range from funding guidelines, project appraisal and evaluation criteria, and conflict-specific additions to the Logical Framework to full-blown screening procedures.

An important tool for donors to request information about the potential conflict impact of a planned project are the guidelines for project submissions (for internal use) and the funding guidelines (for external funding proposals). The DFID Office Instructions for project submissions of July 1997, for example, explicitly mention the need to appraise a project's contribution to conflict reduction and peacebuilding as well as to consider the overall impact of violent conflict on the project site. SIDA is currently working towards integrating conflict issues into its guidelines for NGO funding proposals. These guidelines are seen as an important tool to help improve communication between the donor and the implementing agency. Starting from the other end of the process, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considering to integrate conflict as a fourth item into its project appraisal and evaluation criteria, which by now include poverty, environment, and gender. This process is not an easy one, however, as there is much resistance against introducing another appraisal procedure into already cumbersome bureaucratic processes. Previous experiences with a criteria approach (e.g. for gender and environment) have also shown that it may either lead to unnecessary resource-intensive screening procedures or - more frequently - to "ticking boxes" without thorough analysis.

For this reason, many donors have realised that there is a need for operationalising such general guidelines on the programme and project level. A first starting point is the Logframe, which has now become the standard project planning and management tool. The Swedish approach, for example, is to strengthen the Logframe, which already includes an analysis of the target groups, problems, objectives, and an assessment of enabling requirements in the project environment. It is suggested to repeat the Logframe analysis with a special focus on conflict, if serious concerns about conflict arise from the first analysis. Another way is to require the preparation of a special conflict analysis to integrate into the "assumptions" section of the Logframe.

Conflict Impact Assessment is another and largely complementary approach. Its aim is to assess the complex relationship between a proposed development intervention and

(potential) violent conflict. Conflict Impact Assessment offers a systematic method to analyse a conflict situation and position a proposed or ongoing project within it. Discussions and research on Conflict Impact Assessment have been going on in several donor fora over the past 18 months. In June 1999, CIDA presented an overview over different approaches and elements for Conflict Impact Assessment to the donor working group on post-conflict reconstruction. In terms of an operational formulation of Conflict Impact Assessment for the programme and project level, DFID is one of the most advanced donors. It has now completed a period of internal consultation on a graded screening system for projects in conflict-prone regions and is initiating trials of these tools in four pilot countries (DFID 1999c).

5. Monitoring and Evaluation

Our evaluation review showed that conflict had been part of the evaluation criteria in only about 10% of all cases. However, as there are more and more projects, which explicitly seek to promote the reduction of violence, the protection of human rights or the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, there is a slight increase in evaluations focusing on the conflict impact of development assistance in the last years (e.g. APT UK 1998, COWI 1997). Responding to this trend, more attention is now paid to the question of how to evaluate the performance of projects aimed at conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This question has become salient both on the donor as on the field level. This workshop itself will give important input into this discussion. In 1998, CIDA published a useful research paper on "performance indicators for peacebuilding" (Laprise 1998), while on the other end of the spectrum the National Council of Churches - Kenya (NCCK) has recently convened a grassroots workshop on how to evaluate peacebuilding work (NPI-A 1999). The prerequisite for conflict-conscious evaluations, however, is that conflict prevention had been a project objective at all. While more and more donors are integrating conflict into the TOR for mid-term and end-of-project evaluations, the process of giving peace objectives to new initiatives is still progressing slowly.

As in many other areas, long-term assessments of the conflict impact of development assistance are rarely undertaken, so that this important body of knowledge is largely missing.

7. Documentation of Good Practice and Institutional Learning

"Good practice" is the condensation of the experience organisations have gained in a certain policy area. Good practice guides are usually recognised as excellent tools to promote policies since they are full of practical advice and examples of how to proceed in

difficult circumstances. The most important European effort to establish good practice in the area of development and conflict is the ambitious "Practitioners' Manual", which is currently being prepared for the European Commission. This manual will provide guidance for choosing aid instruments to address specific conflict conditions and offer an analysis of past experience with these measures including "do's and don'ts".

Desk officers and field staff usually possess rich practical experience in operating in conflict-affected regions, which is rarely systematised and reflected upon. Much of this experience is even lost due to high staff turnover at the field level. In an effort to main-stream conflict awareness into their organisations, both SIDA and DFID have developed participative training programmes. External experts provide theoretical input and act as a sounding board for the participants reflecting on their professional experience. It has proven useful to invite entire regional departments to a conflict prevention seminar, as this stimulates problem-oriented discussions, which are often taken far beyond the seminar itself.

8. Local Knowledge

In order to be effective, conflict prevention measures do not only need to correspond to the political and economic circumstances, but equally to the cultural and social conditions within the country. In certain circumstances, it may be very appropriate to build conflict prevention or resolution measures on traditional ways of conflict management. These ways are often poorly understood, however. These questions have attracted relatively little interest from donors, although they play an important role in the everyday work of field staff.

Donors are dealing with this challenge in different ways. There is a preference for funding agencies with long-term local experience, as it is assumed that they have built sufficient local knowledge and cultural sensitivity. This assumption is rarely tested, however. Another step has been to devolve authority for funding decisions to embassies and country representations as they are closer to local realities and therefore better able to judge the appropriateness of proposed interventions. In the case of the Danish Transitional Assistance to South Africa, for example, the Dutch embassy could allocate 10% of the substantial budget of 750 million DKK. This contributed markedly to the flexibility, creativity and courage, with which the whole programme was undertaken.

There have also been efforts to strengthen local capacities for social and cultural analysis and to translate them into policy recommendations. Sweden, for example, has provided support to social science research centres in Central America, which played an important role in formulating new visions for the future of their war-torn societies. Finland is cur-

rently proposing the establishment of an African Peace Academy, which would provide Africans with the opportunity to share and reflect on their diverse experiences with conflict and its resolution and explore African ways of conflict management.

V. Participatory Approaches

Until now, this paper has adopted a donor perspective and treated conflict prevention and peacebuilding as external interventions in rather a top-down perspective. International Alert and many actors engaged in conflict transformation have learned, however, that just and sustainable peace can only be achieved with the consent and participation of those most affected by conflict. This is what IA has called the "primacy of people in transforming conflicts", which is the first guiding principle in our Code of Conduct (1998). Therefore, peacebuilding means "empowering people to make peace" by supporting local efforts and capacities. In terms of humanitarian and development aid, this principle implies supporting people in creating the conditions for lasting peace and the non-violent resolution of social conflicts.

Recognising the primacy of people in peace processes has a number of practical consequences for donor capacities. I will particularly look at the area of information management and transparency and accountability.

1. Gathering and Interpreting Information

Participation is also than the application of "participatory methods". Only making use of such methods without a real willingness to listen and to act can create unfulfilled expectations and endanger the relationship with the "beneficiaries".

Each development initiative is based on some kind of situation analysis, which is then interpreted and worked into a strategic plan aimed at addressing certain key problems. There is already a broad pool of experience with participatory approaches to situation analysis, needs assessment, participatory appraisal and planning on the project level, which I do not need to repeat here. Many organisations have found that people themselves usually bring up the issue of violent conflict and how it affects their lives, if the appraisal and planning meetings are characterised by an atmosphere of openness and trust. Additionally, people can often indicate strategic entry points to address the problem of violence.

A newer and still less explored area concerns the scaling up of participatory processes to the level of macro-policy making. The UNDP National Long-Term Perspectives Studies and the Long-Term Studies of the Carter Centre are among those few initiatives, which have attempted to initiate national consultation processes on long-term visions for a country's future. Similar experiences of the War Torn Societies Project have shown that such country-wide stakeholder consultations can play an important role at critical war-peace transitions. They can help formulate a peace agenda and promote social dialogue and reconciliation, which are critical underpinnings of political negotiations.

2. Transparency and Accountability

As any other form of development assistance, initiatives with a conflict prevention per-spective need to be transparent and accountable not only towards donors, but also towards stakeholders. Monitoring and evaluation are traditionally used as the principal tools to inform project staff, donors, and still to a lesser degree partners and stakeholders about the project, its progress and impact. Existing M&E frameworks, however, do not take enough account of the specific character of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. Putting it briefly, peace work is centred on participative processes rather than on outputs, is a long-term path dotted with small successes and even more setbacks, and gives priority to (re-)building trust and relationships (NPI-A 1999). Therefore, ways need to be found to over-come the inappropriate time-frames and project approach of conventional evaluations. In peacebuilding, "projects" exist only as administrative categories, while in fact they consist of a series of activities geared at supporting a long-term process. It is also extremely diffi-cult to relate certain activities to distinct outcomes, and sometimes it is deemed more important to sustain the process than to prematurely insist on concrete outcomes. Moreo-ver, peace work relies on building trust, which also includes confidentiality. A delicate balance needs to be struck between the needs for transparency and loyalty to partners.

This has a number of implications for developing approaches to monitoring and evaluation that are adequate to the task at hand and truly reflect stakeholder participation. Firstly, given the process orientation of peace work, more attention should be paid to monitoring than to evaluation. Monitoring is important to keep track of the peace process, to register changes in the peace environment and respond proactively to them, and to perceive short-comings of the project at an early stage and address them. Secondly, monitoring (and evaluation) of conflict prevention activities should strongly integrate the "peace workers", that is the staff, partners and local groups involved in the project. Considering the intan-gibility of peace processes, their knowledge and participation is indispensable to gain an understanding of the real constraints of the process, rationales for decision-making and progress achieved. In this sense, monitoring should be a learning tool that is "owned" by all participants rather than an instrument of judgement and control from outside. Thirdly, the complexity of peacebuilding activities can best be captured by using two sets of indica-tors: process indicators and outcome indicators. Process indicators document the peace process, new initiatives and adaptations, and the learning taking place. Outcome indicators, on the other hand, measure the activities' impact and whether change has been achieved. Both sets of indicators are best used when they are defined and monitored by the people closest to the processes in question. The peace workers' expertise is indispensable in establishing process indicators and monitoring them in the course of their daily work. Actual progress towards less violence in terms of outcome indicators can best be measured

when local people are asked to define indicators of conflict and its effects on their lives at the very beginning of the engagement and then assess them regularly. These data can be supplemented by more structural and macro-indicators to provide a full picture of the peace process.

Participatory approaches should not be used naively in situations of high social tensions. In conflict situations, people may be under strong pressure to comply with the demands of certain armed groups and therefore not be able to freely express their opinions in open meetings and even interviews. This makes it even easier for influential individuals to manipulate the outcomes of consultation sessions. Lastly, if meetings and consultations are set up in an insensitive way, they may provide space for conflict to come out into the open in an unmanageable way (cf. Hallam 1998).

VI. Policy Recommendations

This brief review of recent initiatives and experiences in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding highlights the following areas, in which more work still needs to be done.

Firstly, conflict has not yet been sufficiently mainstreamed into all development activities taking place in areas affected by violent conflict. Without clear policy guidelines and project objectives, many opportunities are lost to gear project activities towards promoting social justice and cohesion. If the peace relevance of development activities is not explicitly recognised, it will also not be monitored or evaluated, which also means that precious opportunities for learning are foregone.

Secondly, donors have not yet been able to address the challenge of managing peace processes satisfactorily. The tasks involve collecting timely and relevant information, establishing frameworks for conflict analysis (e.g. conflict impact assessment), and creating structures and procedures that can support largely intangible long-term processes. To promote institutional learning, more effort should be made retain experienced staff at the field level, to enhance staff training in conflict issues, to document good practice and make this knowledge more readily available to other organisations while retaining the necessary confidentiality.

Thirdly, there is still more scope to promote people's participation in and ownership of donor-supported peace processes. It is important to strengthen people's voices in planning and reviewing peacebuilding activities and establish participatory monitoring and learning systems.

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Appendix

Table 1: Mainstreaming conflict prevention and peacebuilding among major donors

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
OECD/DAC	Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development	"Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century", 1998	n/a	n/a
European Commission	DG I, DG Ia, DG Ib, DG VIII ECHO Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (from 1999) Quality Support Group Conflict Prevention Network	"The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa", 1996 "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development", 1996 "Democratisation, Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance", 1998 "Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution", 1998	Inter-Service Consultations (RELEX) Logical Framework/Project Cycle Conflict Impact Assessment Practitioner's Manual Early Warning methodologies Training programme "Conflict Prevention in Africa"	Regional Aid Policy Frameworks (Lomé, PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, ALA) Specialised budget lines (e.g. rehabilitation, refugees) ECHO emergency assistance

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
World Bank	Post-Conflict Unit Global Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Network Operations Evaluation Department World Bank Institute	"Articles of Agreement", amended 1989 "Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank", 1998	Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) Eligibility Criteria for Post-Conflict Assistance Performance Indicators Watching Brief Process Transitional Support Strategy Process (TSS) Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Conflict Assessment Impact Analysis (CAIA) Evaluation Research Staff training	IBRD Loans IDA Credits Learning and Innovation Loans Post-Conflict Fund Japanese Post-Conflict Fund Trust Funds
OSCE	Conflict Prevention Centre *HCNM* (handwritten) *ODIHR* (handwritten) *Technical body* (handwritten) *– Helsinki II Summit* (handwritten)	Helsinki Final Act (1975) Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) Document-Charter on European Security (1996)	n/a	Fact-finding and rapporteur missions Long-term missions Ad hoc steering groups Mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes Peacekeeping operations
Belgian Administration for Development Co-operation (Belgium)	Department for Evaluation and Policy Development, Conflict and Peace Unit	n/a	Country Strategy Paper Internal Coordination Meetings Conflict Impact Assessment (in preparation)	Post-Conflict Fund Advocacy Work on Light Weapons and Arms Trade

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
DFAIT/CIDA (Canada)	Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (DFAIT) International Humanitarian Assistance Division (CIDA) Pearson Institute Peacekeeping Centre	"Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Frame-work", 1999	Policy Framework Regional Strategy Country Planning Strategic Document Risk/Conflict Analysis Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment	Bi- and multilateral program-mes Partnership programmes (NGOs) Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Peacebuilding Fund (CIDA) Peacebuilding Program (DFAIT) Peacekeeping Missions
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark)	Intra-Governmental Committee on Peace Issues Peace and Stability Secretariat	in preparation	Sector programmes Logical Framework Project Appraisal Criteria Planning Guidelines Poverty Assessment	Development Assistance Peace and Stability Fund Assistance to Eastern Europe and the FSU (esp. Baltics) Peacekeeping Missions
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Finland)	Department for Development Co-operation, Department for Political Affairs/Security Policy Advisor for Conflict Issues and Democracy	"Finland's Policy on Relations with Developing Countries", Oct. 1998	Country Strategy Guidelines for Programme Design, Monitoring and Evaluation, 1998 TOR for Evaluations Research cooperation with Finnish universities	Target Country Programmes Humanitarian Assistance (special funds for conflict prevention) Democracy Funds Peacekeeping Missions.
Ministry for Economic Co-operation (Germany)	Conflict Prevention Advisor	in preparation	Crisis analysis in development co-operation (Framework), 1998 Pilot evaluation of "Impact of Development Co-operation in Crisis Situations", 1999	Country Programmes Sectoral Programmes

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands)	Directorate for Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Mana-gement. Division for Conflict Prevention and Management	"Poverty Framework"	Country Task Forces Country Policy Frameworks "Conflict Prognosis Model" Project Appraisal and Evaluation Criteria	Conflict Prevention Fund (within Humanitarian Assistan-ce budget) Peace Aid (flexible, high-risk) Sector/Programme Funding
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Norway)		"Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance", Jan. 1999 Democracy-Building in Peace Processes (forthcoming)		Peacebuilding focus within Humanitarian Assistance Advocacy work on small arms and anti-personnel mine ban convention
SIDA (Sweden)	Division for Humanitarian Assistance, Dept. for Co-operation with NGO and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for Conflict Manage-ment	"Strategy for Conflict Mana-gement and Peace-Building", 1999 "Justice and Peace. SIDA's Programme for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights", 1997	Project Appraisal Criteria Conflict Analysis (macro) Impact Analysis (LogFrame) Conflict Prevention Evaluation Criteria (in preparation)	Conflict prevention part of humanitarian budget Staff training
Fed. Dept. of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)	Political Direction, Section for Peace Policy Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	"Beyond the Relief-Development Continuum", 1997 "Report of the Federal Council on Swiss Foreign Policy in the 1990s"	Working Group "Conflict Prevention and Conflict Mediation" Country Strategy Conflict Monitoring and Analysis Tools (FAST, EPUM)	Contingency Management System Target Country Programmes Budget line for peace promoting activities
DfID (UK)	Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Section	"Conflict reduction and humanitarian assistance", 1999 "Poverty and the security sector", 1999	Country Strategy Paper Conflict Impact Assessment (in preparation)	Regional Programmes CHAD Budget Staff Training

(Source: own interviews, Ball 1999, Costy 1999)

CONFLICT PROGNOSTICATION

PART I

Bridging the Gap from Early Warning to Early Response

DRAFT – DO NOT QUOTE

L. van de Goor

S. Verstegen

Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'

The Hague, November 1999

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List of Abbreviations

BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CEWP	Conflict Early Warning Project
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CODW	Causes of Conflict in the Third World
CPAF	Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework
DFAIT	(Canada) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DHA	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
EWNET	Early Warning/Response Network
EWS	Early Warning System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAST	Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
GEDS	Global Event-Data System
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System (UN)
KEDS	Kansas Event Data System
LIVA	Life Integrity Violations Analysis
MAR	Minorities At Risk Project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD-DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORCI	Office for Research and Collection of Information (UN)
OSCE	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PANDA	Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action
PIOOM	Interdisciplinary Program of Research on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

I. Introduction

Research Rationale

This report is part of the Conflict Policy Research Project (CPRP) as conducted by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' on the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The overall goal of the CPRP is to study the current situation with regard to (Dutch) conflict prevention policies and focuses on the development of an adequate policy mix to guide future interventions in conflict-ridden societies. This implies a further integration of theory and policy within the departments that primarily coordinate direct conflict-related interventions, as well as the sensitization of more broader policy areas for their possible impact on conflict situations in Third World countries.

This report is part I of a two-part study on conflict prognostication in the policy practice of development cooperation. Part I substantiates the theoretic rationale for the development of a conflict and policy assessment framework (CPAF) in an attempt to bridge the gap from early warning to early response. It is a follow-up on the mid-term report "Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment" (February 1999) that included a first stocktaking of the international research on anticipating and preventing the outbreak of violent conflict and identified key options to decide upon the character and focal points for a newly to develop assessment framework for use in the policy practice. The objective of the stocktaking on early warning and conflict prognostication was not only to develop an insight in the issues at play when designing such a framework for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but foremost to build on the existing knowledge in the field. It was explicitly expressed not to duplicate efforts, but instead to identify theoretic and practical understanding that is in line with the character of the desired framework: a relatively simple assessment on conflictive situations in Third World countries, that integrates theory and practice, and for the purpose of formulating timely, effective, and truly *preventive* (re)actions. Hence, the intent of Part I of the study on conflict prognostication is to place this effort at developing a CPAF within the wider context of on-going early warning research. Part II—the report "A Framework for Conflict and Policy Assessment"—will include the operationalization of the (here only in general terms proposed) conflict and policy assessment framework.

New challenges

Due to the absence of ideological differences in the 'New World order', high expectations arose for policy and decision-makers to be able to prevent conflicts. Conflict prevention thus has become a high-ranking item on the current international agenda. Early warning is in this regard often appreciated as a special *tool* in strategies of preparedness and prevention. Ideally, it involves the collection and analysis of data through uniform, systematized procedures and according to a proper scientific methodology. When the data point to a high probability of impending crisis, the warnings should be transmitted to political decision-makers who then should respond adequately.[1] The concept of early warning, then, is not new. Early warning systems already exist in other fields, e.g. meteorology, natural disasters and refugee movement. The relative success of these models set high hopes for application of early warning in the field of conflict prevention. These early warning models, however, differ of those on conflict insofar that the phenomenon to warn upon in conflict early warning models involves—at least to a larger degree than in other fields—human decisions, thoughts and behavior. This puts additional demands and constraints on the modeling effort. Moreover, conflict early warning in itself is more controversial since it touches upon issues of state-sovereignty—which is less the case in forecasting for the sole purpose of improving emergency assistance (Schmeidl, 1999).

Hence, although policy documents often refer to the need for conflict prevention and the development of early warning systems, the concepts are not 'trouble-free', at the theoretic nor at the practical level. Theoreticians as well as practitioners have multiple interpretations of the central concepts 'conflict', 'early warning', 'early response', and 'prevention'. Moreover, a wide variety of theoretic assumptions and methodological starting points is used, leading to the general observation in our stocktaking of early warning models that the main difference in the models and systems is a result of varying objectives, indicators, sources, and practical methodology. In fact, on both the theoretical and the practical level it is not clear what to expect from an early warning system and how to link it to preventive actions. Moreover, the observation that organizations differ in their *capacity* to respond to warnings is generally passed over. It nevertheless appears of crucial importance to realize that the various actors that (wish to) operate in the area of 'conflict prevention' all have their particular range of instruments to undertake preventive actions. In order

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[1] See also K. van Walraven (1998) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention; Limitations and Possibilities*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

to avoid highly ambitious designs, a conflict prognostication[2] framework should focus on the institution considered responsible for undertaking action.

Before elaborating on the actual design of a CPAF, the following paragraph will discuss the main issues with regard to the application of early warning concepts. Paragraph 2, then, delineates the central concepts, and shortly addresses issues of trying to find a balance between theory and practice, warning and response. Paragraph 3 will provide an overview of early warning models, which will be followed by comments on their practical use, in particular in the light of the criteria for a CPAF as described in paragraph 2. In this regard, paragraph 4 provides a mid-term conclusion on what elements of current early warning attempts are of relevance when developing a conflict and policy assessment framework. It is, hence, a first indication of the approach and design we think most appropriate for such a framework. The argument will be elaborated upon in paragraph 5, which is more precise in indicating efforts that are deemed of interest to continue the conflict prognostication research upon. Finally, paragraph 6 will give a summary and recommendations for the development of a CPAF.

II. Application of Early Warning Concepts

Delineating the central concepts
Conflict early warning models appear to comprise a continuation of research on the causes of conflict, as they aim for assessing risks of conflict escalation. The difference with this type of research, however, is the translation of the findings of such research into a standardized analytical model. By *model*, we refer to the identification of a clear set of indicators to analyze within a pre-specified *framework*.[3] In such models, the indicators should provide an assessment of the conflict potential and the chances of escalation into violent conflict. Here *conflict* is approached in such a way as to signify only violent conflict and thus exclude those disputes that do not have a violent character. Conflicts ideal-typically involve a life cycle in which certain variables may bring a

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[2] In order to avoid confusion as a result of multiple use of the term early warning—sometimes referring to information sharing, in other cases to both data collection and analysis of the information, to combined efforts of information gathering, analytical capacity and the development of policy options, and, fourth, to preventive action as an integral part of early warning (Adelman 1998)—we here opt for using the term 'conflict prognostication' when referring to the process of anticipating a conflict escalation process.

[3] Here we use the term model for the more limited element of 'theoretic content', i.e. the specific indicators to monitor. These should be adapted over time as insights into causes and dynamics of conflict enhance. The term framework is used for the broader effort that not only includes this theoretic model, but also a systematization/standardization of approach, including a matrix of policy instruments. It is the latter that we here aim for.

dispute into a violent phase or a violent conflict back to the stage of non-violent interaction.[4] Although levels of violence may naturally oscillate, conflict is essentially defined in terms of a process involving, among others, a dispute or pre-hostilities phase, a violent phase and a post-hostilities phase. Since it is here attempted to develop a framework for timely and truly preventive interventions, the focus will be on pre-escalatory situations and low-intensity phases in protracted conflicts (hence excluding the violent peeks). The form in which conflicts manifest themselves, however, varies widely, depending on the causes and the actors involved, resulting in specific dynamics and outcomes.[5] The fact that conflicts can differ from secession to state collapse, from violent repression to genocide, from intrastate to interstate, or from socioeconomic to political-military dimensions, makes anticipating possible conflicts not a matter of precise prediction and timing.

A Needs Assessment: juggling theory and practice, warning and response

It is frequently stated that "we already know what the causes of conflict are", and that "we know the indicators to monitor". This would imply that early warning is only a matter of information gathering and warning signaling to decision-makers. It should however be fully realized that causal relationships in the chain of events or decisions leading to conflict are not always clear-cut.[6] Consequently, the development of a framework for operational conflict and policy assessment first and foremost asks for (theoretical) knowledge on the causes and dynamics of conflict. Such analysis, further, needs to include operational responses. A conflict prognostication model should therefore build upon the following keywords: understanding, anticipation and intervention. Understanding refers to the 'root' causes and conditions. Anticipation refers to recognizing patterns of events and actions leading to potential crisis. Both understanding and anticipation should result in indicating potential moments and fields for intervention. Ideally, such a framework should consist of operational standards. This would help structure the usual reporting from desk officers and field personnel, and enhance the capacity to identify and prioritize options for operational responses. The same standardization of the analysis approach, then, should also apply to the policy

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[4] K. van Walraven (1998: 4) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention; Limitations and Possibilities*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

[5] R. Doom and K. Vlassenroot (1997) "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention; Minerva's Wisdom?" in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a008.htm

[6] See the findings of the Clingendael research on causes of conflict in Central America, South Asia, and West Africa. P. Douma, G. Frerks, L. van de Goor (1999) *Causes of Conflict in the Third World; Synthesis Report*, The Hague: Clingendael.

intervention instruments and combinations of instruments.[7] 'Having the tools' is not enough. Preventive action is just as much about knowing how to do the right thing, as it is about garnering political will—an issue that is often 'blamed' for the warning-response gap. However, it is not the *lack* of political will that is here considered to be the main issue, but instead the inability to translate political will into timely and effective action.

Parameters for a CPAF

Conflict and policy assessments for the policy practice, then, should address early warnings as well as early actions. The framework should not only be reliable and valid, but should also address the main question of what to do with the alarms and how to mobilize effectively when an alarm is deemed credible. The basis then should be to create an institutional and policy framework capable and ready to react.[8] It should do so on the basis of a better understanding of the conflict situation, and relating this information to the goals set in order to make decision-making more rational and effective. Hence, the conflict and policy assessment framework is an instrument with various applications. It is expected to

- define the mission;
- analyze and monitor the situation;
- identify options based on the policy tools available;
- identify tasks that need to be accomplished in an operation;
- function as a communication tool, as a way to formalize communication.

The crucial question, then, is which elements to include in the analysis of such a goal-oriented, practical instrument. It is first of all important to include the capacity of an organisation for conflict preventive measures. Further, the analysis should suggest operationally and logistically realistic responses that are related to current priorities in conflict preventive policies. In this regard, Cockell (1997) speaks of, respectively, "strategic targeting" and a "process link".

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[7] This is not to say that we here argue to formulate standard policy responses. Instead, each conflict asks for case-specific interventions, based on a specific set of (and combination of) instruments. The framework for analysis however can, to a certain degree, be standardized.

[8] We have approached the concept of conflict prevention as an integrated effort at anticipating the outbreak of conflict, and acting upon a warning of high-risk conflict escalation. With regard to the latter, we however have to limit ourselves to addressing the question of what intervention is possible and preferable at what moment in time in the conflict life cycle. It is another issue whether it is politically feasible and desirable for policy-makers to act upon this information. This involves policy and political decisions at various levels, and serving different goals.

III. Research Undertaken

This chapter will give a condensed overview of undertaken research on designing early warning models.[9] It is not intended to judge the models on scientific criteria, to verify or falsify the methodology, the theoretic assumptions, or the indicators. Since the central research question in this report is examining the possibility for developing a 'model' to adequately translate warnings into policy, the key interest in this overview is the identification of leads as regards:

- how to develop dynamic conflict profiles that explain indicators of instability;
- how to relate these profiles to priorities of conflict prevention policy;
- suggestions for operationally and logistically realistic responses.

Due to the diversity in types of crises to be anticipated, the purpose of the study, and the sources and the particular analytical skills available to theoreticians and practitioners, multiple models can be identified. Hence, the models we investigated not only differ in the definition of conflict, but also in the methodology used. This is a reflection of their objective, but complicates even standard comparison between the models. As a result of this diversity and the observation that many efforts are work-in-progress, the here proposed categorization of efforts is conducted in a somewhat arbitrary way, based on the central point of reference: to what extent do they contain operational or policy-relevant components? Hence the division 'theoretic models' and 'practical efforts in a policy setting'. The term theoretic models refers to principally retrospective empirical efforts, whereas the practical efforts are of a more prospective nature and concerned with operational guidelines.

A. Theoretic Models

When discussing theoretic and primarily academic efforts at early warning modeling, a typology introduced by Gurr and Harff (1994) is quite useful. Their typology focuses on the central preoccupation of modeling efforts: the methodology used to come to reliable and valid warnings.[10]

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[9] See appendix I and II for a more extended overview of the models.

[10] Another interesting approach of narrowing down the different methods is by distinguishing between objectivistic and subjectivistic conflict models: first, *objectivistic conflict models* contend that conflicts arise as a result of a contrast in interests that are not actor-connected, but embodied in the social structure in which the chances of development are unequal for various population groups, generates latent conflicts. Second, *subjectivistic approaches* define conflict as the presence of two or more irreconcilable aims of actors. This approach, then, is purely actor-oriented. Whereas conflict itself comprises three components (contrasting aims, conflict attitudes and conflict behaviour), conflicts only exist when the behaviour of the actors involved is hostile. The chosen model has clear implications for the conflict prevention strategy chosen: Whereas the objectivistic approach claims that strategy must be geared towards structural changes so that the causes of the contradiction are removed once and for all, the subjectivistic approach argues that

This in itself is a reflection of various underlying objectives: understanding the root causes of conflict, explaining the dynamics of conflict escalation, predicting conflict escalation, or rather apprehending the causes and dynamics of conflict in order to respond.[11] The various theoretic efforts can then be categorized as follows (see figure 1 for an overview of the theoretic models and their dimensions):

Type A: *Correlation models*[12]: A first approach focuses on structural indicators and causality, arguing that, in order to come to valid and reliable early warning, substantially more attention is needed to identify the connections among conflict phenomena. Although it has only been possible to test the strength of postulated sets of causal relations among variables with hindsight, we may start to understand *why* conflicts occur by identifying the relative weight of structural indicators. Gurr's risk assessment model for communal conflict (related to the Minorities at Risk Project) is exemplary for this causal model of conditions, as is the State Failure Project; this project, which is commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence, is an extensive statistical effort in finding correlation between conflict factors. The PIOOM manual on human rights monitoring is another example of an extensive effort to gain a better understanding of the root causes of fundamental human rights violations.

Type B: *Sequential models*: To move from these long-term risk assessments to shorter-term early warnings, a model is suggested to study in what sequences these phenomena have most commonly occurred in the past. Sequential models, then, try to track more precisely when tense and high-risk situations—as indicated by structural conditions—are likely to erupt into crisis, thus adding time-sensitivity to risk assessments. So-called accelerators visualize this time-sensitivity. Analysis of these accelerators enables tracking the flow and sequence of events that can trigger a conflict. The sequential models thus also look at the dynamics of the conflict process by making a clear distinction between background conditions, intervening conditions and accelerators. They are, therefore, suited to tracking crisis situations as they evolve over time, and assessing the likelihood that particular events will (not) lead to conflict. In the words of Gurr and Harff: "...if most of the

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efforts must be made to reconcile the conflicting aims which exist among the various actors (see e.g. Reychler 1995: 145-146; Doom and Vlassenroot 1997).

[11] See also Reychler (1995: 164-214). He comes to a division of five types of research methods: descriptive analysis (e.g. event databanks, cluster analysis), explanatory analysis (focusing on the why of conflicts, by formulating and testing hypotheses), prognostic analysis (explorative research, for which the sources and methods are found in the previous two types of analysis), prescriptive or strategic analysis (to demonstrate ways how to realize the goals set), and normative analysis (to evaluate the situation on efficiency and efficacy).

[12] The terminology and typology comes from a special issue of *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1) on Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, edited by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff (1994).

background and intervening conditions are present in a crisis situation, the occurrence of accelerating events are likely to worsen the situation" (Gurr and Harff, 1994: 5).

Type C: *Conjunctural models*: This type of models aims at explaining complex patterns or thresholds, and tries to specify alternative sequences or scenarios of events, based on combinations of conditions. Exemplary of this type of models is the pattern-matching approach of Brecke's 'Conflict and Early Warning Project' (CEWP), the cluster analysis of Schrodt and Gerner, and the 'Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action' (PANDA) of Bond. Here, the aim no longer is to understand the why and how of conflict escalation, but to focus specifically on the intensification of the conflict situation. These event-related data approaches are strongly dependent on media coverage.[13]

Type D: *Response models*: A somewhat contrasting approach to the development of explanatory-predictive models is by emphasizing how these models are put to policy use, irrespective of testing, in order to anticipate on alternative responses. This argument is for example made by Helen Fein, whose Life Integrity Violations Approach (LIVA) is based on the idea of a 'good enough model'[14]. The logic behind this model is that in order to demonstrate the value of the early warning system you should not test the model. Rather, one should evaluate the response to intervention, since one is dealing with an interactive system that is emerging dynamically from warning and response. Hence, "...the objective of an EWS is to disconfirm expectations by the interventions or interactions it triggers" (Fein, 1994: 32). Cause-effect relationships need to be identified to such an extent for the user to be confident that a given policy activity will likely reinforce or offset any given combination of factors. In order to intervene effectively, the importance of good analysis remains. The approach is significant in the attempt to come to policy-

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[13] The related problems and limitations of working with data event systems nevertheless have to be kept in mind. Lack of interest by the media and the international community in general, difficult geographical conditions, or the deliberate concealment of events are only some of the factors that will influence the findings of the approach. Moreover, as Krummenacher and Schmeidl (s.a.) observe, "while it is true that most major conflictive events draw the attention of media (human suffering sells), smaller events signaling conflict-escalation may not be reported at all. In addition, cooperative interaction, unless it is highly visible or important internationally, is also less likely to be reported."

[14] This approach differs from the others by putting into perspective the necessity and value of extensive testing of the model and its methodology. As the name suggests, it is not the best model for explanation, but it is a simple model for apprehension, with the aim to specify preconditions and present responses at pressure points.

Figure 1:
Overview of theoretical conflict prognostication models
and their dimensions[15]

TYPE	MODEL	TIMING	TYPE OF CONFLICT	OBJECTIVE	APPROACH	COMBINATION OF EFFORTS	RELEVANCE FOR POLICY CONTEXT
A	Minorities at Risk	Risk assessment Structural model	Communal (ethno-political)	Explanation Causality	Quantitative	Linkage to accelerator approach	+ good insight in conflicts where ethnicity has become mobilizing factor + particular value in combination with accelerator approach - operating with hindsight
A	PIOOM	Risk assessment Structural model	Human rights violations	Monitoring	Quantitative & Qualitative	Integration Minorities at Risk	+ large questionnaire on various dimensions of human rights violations - too extensive for practical and regular use
A	State Failure Project	Risk assessment Structural model	State failure (generic)	Explanation Causality	Quantitative	Integration Minorities at Risk and Accelerator approach	+ good insight in correlation between conflict factors on general issues of concern to policy makers, such as level of trade openness, partial democracies. - operating with hindsight - some indicators are too broad
B	Accelerators of Genocide	Accelerators Dynamic model	Genocide and politicide	Anticipation Sequential	Quantitative	Linkage to Minorities at Risk and uses data event systems	+ pre-specified standardized accelerator monitoring - only tested retrospectively
C	CEWP	Structural and triggers Dynamic model	Generic	Anticipation Conjunctural	Quantitative	Uses data event systems	+ assessment of when conflict is to erupt - highly computerized and quantitative approach
C	Cluster Analysis	Triggers Dynamic model	Generic	Anticipation Conjunctural	Quantitative	Uses data event systems	+ focus on transition process, demonstrated that behavior is important indicator to monitor - approach is highly statistical exercise
C	PANDA	Triggers Dynamic model	Generic	Anticipation Conjunctural	Quantitative	Uses data event systems	+ includes level of conflict as well as cooperation in actual behavior, and hence gives insight in intensification - complicated quantitative and statistical approach
D	LIVA	Response Dynamic model	Genocide and politicide	Apprehension	Qualitative	Uses content analysis of Amnesty International Reports	+ good insight in patterns of violations, and goals and ideologies of states + focus on responses at pressure points - call for response-oriented warnings is not well-developed

[15] The figure is composed on the basis of four key dimensions (timing, type of conflict, objective, approach) as described in the mid-term report "Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment", *Clingendael Occasional Paper*, The Hague, February 1999. Further, the figure includes a reference to the combination of efforts, as some of the models are linked or use elements of others. In the final column we have summarized what we consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of the models for use in the policy context. See also appendix 1.

useful or 'consumer-driven' early warning models. The response model, then, tries to identify the points in the conflict process in which strategic interventions are likely to make a difference in outcome. While built on the findings of sequential analyses that identify the sequence of causal conditions and events that lead to violations, the model then specifies responses that might deflect or mitigate effects. These models make an important methodological step in the direction of the development of a model for the policy context.[16] Some efforts undertaken in this area will be discussed after some general remarks on these theoretical models and research.

Strengths, limitations, and challenges

Unquestionably, the search for and research on conflict theory, early warning, and response mechanisms has contributed enormously to our general understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict. These efforts provide valuable insights and input for further use in a policy context. By themselves, however, they do not suffice for this objective. Since the models investigated are not (yet) operational as forecasting device, we can only to a limited extent comment on the validity of their predicting capacities. These limitations also result in modesty from the theoreticians themselves, as most models are still 'work-in-progress'. Their efforts mainly consist of the development of a methodology and the timeliness of the warnings.

In general, we may conclude that the effort of theoretic conflict prognostication and the separate models that are currently being developed and tested have great value from a scholarly point of view. Their contribution for use in a policy context mainly lies in the fact that it has corroborated the value of standardized indicator-based monitoring. More precise risk assessments and theoretically guided monitoring can provide a greater degree of certainty about impending conflicts, and conversely, help identify those factors most successful in defusing a crisis. Yet, even if we can explain phenomena, it does not necessarily provide us with clues for solution.[17] Consequently, these are only part of the requirements for practical early warning and conflict-prevention policy models.

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[16] Although Fein's model makes strong suggestions toward the response side of early warning, we have here included the model under the heading theoretic models. The idea of the Good Enough Model is not well developed, and cannot be seen as an operational model. Instead, the arguments are of a theoretic nature, and the main effort of Fein's research effort is put in identifying patterns of genocide and politicide.

[17] Doom, R. (1998: 113) "From Information to Political Action: Some Political Prerequisites", in K. van Walraven (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention; Limitations and Possibilities*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 101-120.

B. Practical Efforts of Early Warning Modeling in a Policy Setting

Although no policy-useful model is operational yet, there are several efforts that address operational issues (see also figure 2). Most of these efforts are attempts at implementing the findings of theoretic models in policy practice. The emphasis, then, is no longer on theoretical testing. We will touch upon a few of these models.[18]

A first effort of putting the theoretic models into practice as early warning systems is the UN-Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS). The HEWS focuses on creating an international early warning capacity, and provides background reports and analyses of present and developing situations[19], based on an extensive database information system. The model, however, is not primarily directed towards applicability for conflict *preventive* actions, but instead for emergency preparedness.

Others tried to develop conflict anticipating capacities at the national level (e.g. BMZ-Germany, State Failure Project Phase II-United States, FAST-Switzerland) or the NGO level (e.g. FEWER). The efforts however clearly differ. Whereas the BMZ has developed a survey to quantitatively determine between the stages of conflict, the State Failure Project Phase II focuses on statistical methods to identify key variables and derive general policy recommendations. Yet another—quite ambitious—effort is undertaken by the Swiss Peace Foundation for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Department of Foreign Affairs. Whereas the approach of FAST is indeed directed toward linking warning to response, it has developed an early warning chain that includes activities as assessing background conditions, event analysis, round tables and monitoring of actions. The value of the pilot study lies in its ability to study the impact of direct access of 'early warners' to decision-makers. On the NGO level, FEWER has developed a manual for early warning that proposes some standardization of analysis—without however indicating the value of particular indicators—and links response options to actors at various levels of intervention.

Yet others have attempted to provide general assessment guidelines for practitioners (Fund for Peace, Creative Associates International Inc.). In particular the model of the Fund for Peace appears

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[18] See appendix 2 for a more extended overview of these models.
[19] In order to identify crises with humanitarian implications (Ahmed and Kassinis, 1998).

to be manageable due to the limited number of indicators and the qualitative approach in assessing trends. Further, some suggestions are made toward the response side (clarity of mission, exit

Figure 2:
Overview of practical efforts of early warning modeling
in a policy setting[20]

MODEL	TARGET-USER	FOCUS	APPROACH	OPERATIONAL	RELEVANCE FOR POLICY CONTEXT
ORCI	International	Warning	Quantitative	Effort abolished	- too general, broad, and unsystematic - no clear commitment to the project
HEWS	International, UN	Assessment	Quantitative & qualitative	Provides country reports mainly for humanitarian intervention, 100+ indicators in database	+ systematic nature of country monitoring , with division in stages of intensity, to determine which are in need of extensive monitoring + contributes to preparedness but only to lesser degree to prevention - no criteria yet to determine movement of conflicts along stages
Fund for Peace	Variety of practitioners	Warning	Qualitative	Framework and guidelines used and tested in a number of workshops	+ clear statement of objective (sustainable security) and state-oriented approach - aims at wide range of practitioners, which results in a very general framework - response side is hardly addressed
BMZ-Germany	Governmental	Assessment	Quantitative & Qualitative	Framework in development, presented to OECD-DAC	+ specifically designed as analytical tool for policy field of development cooperation + gives a good picture of political culture of country -quantitative evaluation system
State Failure Project Phase II	Governmental	Warning and policy advice	Quantitative	In development, further specification needed e.g. with regard to environment, democratic transitions and state capacity. General policy recommendations.	+ refinement of role democracy in conflict development + inclusion of intensity and time aspect with regard to democracy in relation to conflict
Canada Peacekeeping Initiative	Governmental	Response capacity	Qualitative	Statement of intentions. Work on conflict assessment by John Cockell now carried in at UN Staff College	+ emphasis on importance of including strategic linking and process linking + highlights problems of models in operational context - no concrete framework or model
FAST-Switzerland	Governmental	Warning and assessment	Quantitative & Qualitative	In development, pilot study	+ aims at close cooperation between academic specialists and high level decision makers + input for discussion and decision making -high level of ambition

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[20] The figure is composed on the basis of some key characteristics that indicate who is expected to be the end-user of the model, what aspects of the warning-response cycle it aims to address, and whether the nature of the model is qualitative or quantitative. Further, some suggestions are made whether the models are operational or still in development. Finally, an assessment is made by the authors on the strengths and weaknesses of the various 'practical efforts'. See also appendix 2.

MODEL	TARGET-USER	FOCUS	APPROACH	OPERATIONAL	RELEVANCE FOR POLICY CONTEXT
FEWER	NGOs	Warning, (response), and network	Qualitative	Manual tested by a.o. UNDP and analysts in the field. Applied by e.g. USAID	+ presents framework for discussion, input for political decisions on conflict prevention + includes a part on response development, evaluation of policy responses, instruments and combinations of options + includes peace opportunities, stresses positive developments - not model for standardized assessment and pre-specified monitoring on indicators
Creative Associates International Inc.	Variety of practitioners	Response capacity	Qualitative	Guide for practitioners	+ clear response orientation and framework for assessment of policy instruments + eight-step approach to intervention - general frameworks aiming at a variety of practitioners - not a well-developed framework for analysis of conflict and conflict potential

option), without however specifying policy instruments and options. Creative Associates International Inc. has developed several frameworks of issues to include in an analysis, including policy instruments. In particular the assessment of a large number of these instruments is novel and significant.

Still another effort attempts to increase the exchange of information between academics and practitioners, and for this reason Early Warning Networks have been established, such as the 'Early Warning/Response Network (EWNET) and the 'Forum on Early Warning and Early Response' (FEWER). Until now, however, these networks often remain discussion forums. FEWER however, as was just discussed, has developed a manual for early warning and response for NGOs, and supports activities in the field.

Strengths, limitations, and challenges

Again, the initiatives strongly differ in aim, coverage, extensiveness, methods, and indicators, thus resulting in various approaches. Notwithstanding the attempt at designing a framework with operational considerations as well as guidelines of how to apply the model in policy practice, the models involved still mainly focus on indicators and their weight, and address essentially questions of identifying conflict potential. These attempts at operational models, consequently, seem to confront the same problems as their theoretical counterparts. This is also a result of the variety in needs, goals, and capacities of operational agencies requiring early warnings, and in the political contexts within which the crises and responses occur. Nevertheless, they make an important contribution in standardizing and operationalizing conflict assessment issues for practitioners, but they hardly address the response capacity side, thus still discussing only one aspect of the early-warning/early-response problem.

The issue of how to respond in a proactive or reactive way to these conflict-prone situations has been taken up by a number of governments and international organizations.[21] These attempts explicitly address the issue of the warning-response gap, and focus on developing warning and response capacities, conflict impact assessments, proactive conflict prevention, peace-building, rapid reaction forces, stand-by agreements, et cetera. Most of these efforts are of a very general nature, do not present an analytical framework (our main focus of study), and have therefore not been included in the more extensive overview of early warning models in appendices 1 and 2. An

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[21] See also the Clingendael report by K. van Walraven (1999) Conflict Policy in Some Western Countries: Some Explorative Notes, *Clingendael Occasional Paper,* The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

exception is made for the Canadian Peace Initiative. The DFAIT department—and in particular John Cockell— has made explicit efforts in addressing the issue of developing conflict assessments or response-oriented warnings for use in a policy context. In his assessment of the current affairs on early warning practice, he argues that it is not so much information that is needed, but instead policy-oriented analysis that will suggest logical operational responses. He sharply pinpoints the problems by stating that "...the debate on early warning has not yet moved forward to deal with the issue of the process link between early warning analysis and effective preventive action. This may be because existing early warning praxis is not effective in producing analysis (as distinct from reporting or monitoring) that clearly presents options for effective preventive action and rapid engagement policy".[22]

IV. A Mid-term Conclusion

The analysis of theoretical and practical models has indicated that early warning models still lack direct linkage with the policy practice. As Reychler (1999: 7) observes, current early warning systems pay little attention to opportunities for constructive conflict *transformation,* which is considered to be a central objective of conflict prevention policy. He argues that "most research money is spent on the development of systems for the early warning of threats, dangerous escalation or worst case scenarios. Practically no attention is paid to the development of early warning systems identifying the points in the conflict processes in which particular interventions would enhance a constructive transformation of the conflict." In this regard, an analysis of policy instruments is deemed appropriate.

None of the above mentioned models address the core elements of understanding, anticipation, and intervention in an integrated way. Nor do they meet the criteria as mentioned in paragraph 2. Nevertheless, they contain valuable elements that may be integrated in a CPAF, in a so-called eclectic approach. As regards *understanding,* theoretic models—as well as more general theories on conflict—provide insight in the causes and dynamics of conflict processes. The methodologies and research techniques however, are too 'complicated' for direct use in a policy context. As regards *anticipation,* the type of framework we think offers the best opportunities to undertake this effort emanates partly from Fein's 'good enough model' and response-oriented warnings approach. As Lund (1998: 25) observes "...forecasting accuracy can always be improved, ... the mythical

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[22] J. Cockell (1997) Towards Response-Oriented Early Warning Analysis, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems,* Colorado: Boulder (manuscript).

perfection in the form of the precise predictions need not drive out the 'good enough' of plausible probabilities". Lastly, the CPAF should address issues of *intervention*, as for the policy context it is not as much the question of *how* to warn about conflict, but instead how to deter them.[23] Indeed, situation reports on impending conflicts are not enough, and with hindsight we observe that in numerous cases early warnings of impending conflict were neglected.[24] Based on the observation that in reality most conflictive situations only receive attention in a very late—or too late a—phase, Nicolaïdis (1996: 65) argues that "[w]e should ... strip prediction from prevention to the greatest extent possible". He argues in favor of so-called 'blind intervention'. Such 'blind prevention' may be the most cost-effective strategy, as not intervening or intervening too late may involve costs far exceeding early involvement. Yet, this does not rule out the crucial role for analysis of early warning signals and targeted action on the part of a variety of actors (*ibid.*). If prevention strategies are to have any chance of success, not only is a better understanding of the uniqueness of individual conflicts necessary, but also a deepening of the search for recurrent pattern-forming.[25] If, however, the intention exists to prevent conflicts, an analysis that links indicator categories with policy instruments is indispensable. Indeed, responding to the consequences of a crisis-situation may differ substantially from responding to the causes.

The argument for a response and consumer-oriented approach is not a new one,[26] but has not been taken up sufficiently in practice. The end-user and its responses are addressed marginally, and in a very late stage of model-development, whereas it is here suggested to opt for an end-user approach in which the specific instruments available to an actor should be the starting-point.[27] In a consumer-oriented model the warnings themselves are an integral part of the framework, but they take a second place.[28] Hence, the suggested consumer-oriented approach does not imply an early warning

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[23] Rotberg (1996: 267).

[24] Adelman (1998) points to three barriers: In the first place, early warnings can 'drown' amidst signals that convey a contrary assessment. Further, warnings may be 'crushed', or pushed aside by signals of impending conflict in other parts of the world. And lastly, warnings may become 'dead-ended'; whereas they have been received, they are not forwarded to the appropriate level for analysis and decision-making (in Van Walraven, 1998: 164-5).

[25] Doom & Vlassenroot, 1997.

[26] W. Spencer (1994), for example, has observed the need for "consumer" and "end-user driven" instead of "producer-driven" early warning systems ("Implications for Policy Use: Policy Uses of Early Warning Models and Data for Monitoring and Responding to Humanitarian Crises", in *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1), pp. 111-116). See also J. Cockell (1997) who argues for the specific targeting of organizations of governments, and in this regard points to the need of including operational mechanisms, budget restraints, policy frameworks and mandates in the development of an early warning capacity (Towards Response-Oriented Early Warning Analysis, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems,* Colorado: Boulder (manuscript).

[27] In our case, the user is the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[28] Wallensteen (in Walraven 1989: 12) also argues for a focus on what to do rather than how to predict, since even conflicts that experience rapid intensification are usually known beforehand to the outside world.

or prognostication model *per se*. Instead, the aim is a conflict and policy assessment framework (CPAF) that integrates the objective, the mission, and the 'tools' of the end-user, in order to come to realistic policy options for intervention.[29] This approach consequently departs from the common practice of developing models with a global reach. It is argued that each actor in the international arena first has its own spectrum of instruments, the strengths and weaknesses of which have to be taken into account when developing a conflict policy assessment framework.

V. Towards the Design of a Conflict Policy Assessment Framework[30]

The objectives of the CPAF are to clearly define the mission, to catalogue and assess the policy and response capacity available, in order to deal more effectively with the outcomes of analyses. In the previous part theoretical models and attempts at application in policy practice were assessed according to these criteria. The analysis indicated that, although no such model exists in practice, various models and attempts contain elements that could be used for such a framework. The proposed CPAF, therefore, is not a completely new concept, but composed of parts of other models, and other research. The attempt at designing a CPAF consequently is an attempt at eclectically bringing together 'the best of all worlds'. The criteria will be used as a guideline for drawing up the components for the CPAF. For this example, focus is on the level of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or a Ministry of Development Cooperation.

The steps in the CPAF relate to the following:
1. Mission statement of the actor on the aims with regard to conflict prevention;
2. Identify and assess the policy-toolkit with regard to conflict prevention instruments in order to further determine the limits;
3. Choice of countries to focus the policies of conflict prevention on;
4. Drawing up country profiles of the countries involved;
5. Identifying which of these are risk-countries on the basis of a list indicators;
6. Structured monitoring and assessment of the (risk-)countries;
7. Identification of the conflict trend-line: positive or negative;

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[29] Since our model goes beyond the aim of solely anticipating the escalation of conflict, we choose to use the term conflict and policy assessment. It should however be clear that we here do not refer to conflict impact assessments, which have different objectives. Instead, the conflict and policy assessment is based on an assessment of the actual situation, the issues and actors involved, possible future patterns of development, and a related assessment of the available policy instruments in the particular conflict situation and moment in the conflict life cycle. The assessment is therefore related to what Lund has called 'prospective conflict policy analysis'.

8. Assessing the available instruments for their effectiveness as regards conflict prevention

9. Application of policy-instruments toolkit in order to strengthen positive trends, or redress negative ones.

Flowchart 1 reflects these steps. What is essential for this model to work, however, is the aspect of timing. The toolkit of instruments, and especially the assessment of the instruments, implies that they not only need judgement with regard to their overall conflict-preventive character, but also with regard to their most effective application moment. Certain (clusters of) instruments may be more effective in certain stages of a conflict lifecycle. This particular characteristic has to be taken into account when applying the instruments or combinations thereof. The nine steps, however, require further elaboration. This applies especially to the mission statement, the conflict analysis, the policy analysis, and the application in practice.

a. Mission Statement

For a model to be successful, the goals have to be as clear as possible. The goals should be formulated in the mission statement of the actor involved. As indicated, however, the mission statement requires some modesty. It has to be operational, in the sense of being realistic, practical, and feasible. Failing to do this, implies that, in the absence of a useful policy toolkit, a mission statement is nothing but a paper tiger. Political will can never make up for this omission. The mission statement consequently has to be linked to the available policy toolkit. Thus *strategic targeting* as well as a *process link* are important criteria in formulating the mission statement. Strategic targeting implies taking into account the capacity of the actor involved. Hence a mission statement should include the following elements:

- Which countries and conflicts will the actor focus on?
- Which goals are aimed for when intervention takes place?
- What is the timeframe for the goals set?
- Which instruments will be available and used for reaching the goals set?

It is obvious that the mission statement also should result in making the terminology uniform. This aspect should not be underestimated, as divergent definitions can result in different interpretations of phenomena, miscommunication and redundant discussions. Clarity on this point is favorable to the swift analysis of conflict situations, and the formulation of policy interventions.

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[30] See the report "Conflict Prevention as a Policy Strategy: A conceptual framework for conflict policy assessment and prevention" for an elaboration and specification of the framework.

b. Conflict Analysis

A next criterion is the conflict analysis. A model for conflict analysis should be linked to the mission statement (i.e. the criteria for policy), as well as easy to use. Complex analysis models, especially those with a strong quantitative character, are less easy to apply in policy practice. The Fund for Peace (FfP) has developed an analytical model that *could* work in a policy setting. The 'Analytical Model of International Conflict and State Collapse' has a 'state-centered' approach. This is not to be confused with a statist approach. Central to a state-centered approach is the relationship between state and society, not only the hierarchical power struggle among elites. This analytical model consequently links up with the findings of various research groups, indicating that the state-society relationship is important, if not crucial, in the outbreak of conflict. A second aspect of the FfP-model is its ability to analyze trends. This implies that the model lives up to the requirement of not only indicating factors causing instability and crisis, but also providing dynamic conflict profiles. Such conflict profiles make it possible to link indicators of instability and crisis to existing focal points in the actor's conflict prevention policy tools and mechanisms. Such profiles could be drawn up for the countries the actor involved wishes to focus upon. A third aspect with regard to the FfP-model relates to a manageable number of indicators. It contains 12 so-called 'top indicators' in three main sectors: social, economic and political-military. This, again, makes it easier for policy makers to link the indicators to focal points of policy and policy instruments.

c. Toolbox and Policy Analysis

The next criterion of a CPAF concerns the feedback of analysis to policy. On this aspect, the FfP-model does not live up to the requirements. Other models, however, can be helpful in creating this feedback. A first step towards feedback is already taken by linking the policy toolkit to the policy aims in formulating the mission statement. A second step is to distill suggestions for policy interventions from the findings of the conflict analyses and the country profiles. Lund's 'toolbox' approach and the CAII's overview of instruments provide important suggestions in this regard. They assess conflict-preventive instruments on their use for intervention in various stages of conflict. In practice, however, it is likely that a multitude of instruments is available on various levels for intervention. The CPAF therefore aims at *sensitizing* various policy levels for conflict prevention. In practical terms: it could very well be that there are more conflict-preventive instruments than those identified according to ideal-type assessments. This implies assessing as many policy instruments available as possible for their contribution to the goal of conflict prevention. FEWER's 'Manual for Early Warning and Early Response' contains useful suggestions

for such an assessment. It suggests steps for making an inventory of instruments on various levels (international, regional/sub-regional, and local), as well as in various fields (political[-military], economic, and socio-cultural). The FEWER-manual therefore could help in systematically listing and assessing instruments of a given actor on the levels and in the fields indicated. Linking the findings of the inventory and assessment to the findings of the conflict analysis and the country profiles could enhance insight in timely and effective deployment of policy tools. Thus the CPAF lives up to the requirement of a *process link*.

d. *Application in practice*

The last step of the model is, of course, its application in practice. Here it is important to take into account that conflicts are dynamic. Interventions, therefore, should always be monitored and assessed on their effects. A simple conflict impact assessment before intervention is insufficient. What is required is a constant conflict impact *evaluation* during a period of intervention.

Flowchart 1:
A FRAMEWORK FOR TREND ASSESSMENT AND CONFLICT
PROGNOSTICATION IN POLICY PRACTICE

A final note of the Authors

One could argue that the approach to conflict prevention we here propose still is broad and general, and in contradiction to the scholarly refinement that has taken place recently. We obviously have to agree with this comment. However, we do not see this as a negative critique. It is the overall purpose of our effort. Whereas the 'cutting up' is important for (scientific and academic) reasons to gain a better understanding, the 'gluing together' of the bits and pieces is indispensable for the policy context. Instead of focusing on and searching for new policies and new instruments, we argue that the currently available policies and instruments still leave enough room for conflict preventive actions when properly understood, realized and utilized. We have doubts about conflict-prevention policy plans with high levels of ambition. Instead, we propose modesty and straightforward practical applicability, and a recognition that already a multitude of instruments are available to policy makers. These should be properly assessed on their conflict-preventive capacities before developing new ones. A bottom-up approach—by focusing on the national institutional framework and the national preventive instruments—could provide more effective and visible results. The goals, then, should be adapted to the means. We thus argue that *new* policies and *new* instruments are only the last stage in the development of a conflict-preventive policy framework.

In the end, it comes down to sensitizing the policy context for the need for a conflict preventive focus. Institutional memory with regard to conflict and causes of conflict often appears to be lacking. By sensitizing the policy context for conflict prevention and creating a 'culture of prevention' at the national level can we begin to talk about strengthening the preventive policy framework, and in the last place the development of new instruments. Nevertheless, many lessons still have to be learned, and one should not underestimate the fact that issues of peace and conflict are highly complex. As Wallensteen (1998: 84) notes, 'early action' does not end a problem, but will often also require later action. This, in effect, becomes a question of commitment to the prevention process.

VI. Conclusion and Summary: Recommendations for the Development
of a Conflict Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF)

Efforts to sensitize the policy practice for early warnings are often reduced to the question of how to convince policy and decision makers by addressing issues of validity and reliability of the warnings and developing new policies and operational guidelines. Whereas these may be valid and important activities, here an alternative approach was proposed in order to bridge the gap between warning and response. Indeed, the prediction of violence and escalation, the communication and transmission of warnings, as well as the possibilities and difficulties with regard to political action are in need of a better understanding. In an attempt to address the issue, it was argued that already in the first stage of coming to warnings (finding the indicators, predicting the likely course of conflict) the response side needs to be included (who takes action, when and how). This implies a framework for conflict and policy assessment that not only provides a 'risk assessment' of a particular situation, but also presents options for response that fit the 'toolbox' of the specific end-user of the framework. Consequently, it was presumed that in order to come to a more conflict preventive policy, it is not the warnings by themselves or the prediction that one should worry about. Actually, there may even be far too many warnings, thus creating a situation of overload for policymakers. Hence, for a policy-oriented early warning/early response framework to become effective, it is imperative to improve the *analysis* of conflict situations in such a way as to derive guidelines for policy interventions. This implies sensitizing the policy environment for responding more effectively and timely to conflict-prone contexts in which it often operates. The 'consumer oriented' approach that was suggested focuses, therefore, on both integrated and systematic *analyses* and *policies*.

Notwithstanding their important contributions, we identified the shortcomings of the currently available models, systems and frameworks for use in a policy context to be:

- They lack a direct linkage with the policy practice
- They strongly focus on testing for validity and reliability, and work with hindsight
- They often are of a quantitative nature, using statistical techniques
- They do not offer clues for solution or response

Instead, we argued that a framework for conflict policy assessment should include the following characteristics:

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- A response and end-user oriented 'good enough' model
- A bottom-up approach that focuses on a specific institutional framework ('end-user'), its preventive instruments, and its strengths and weaknesses
- An adaptation of the goals to the means i.e. clarity on the needs, goals and capacities of the operational agency
- A shift of focus from the warning itself, to an indication of how to deploy available policy-instruments in a conflict-preventive way

The main objectives when developing such a framework are:

A. Clearly define the mission

Before propagating the possibility of a 'global' approach, it is important to have clarity of mission within a particular institutional context. This includes and asks for:

- A standardization of approach and analysis
- A clear choice on the objective of conflict preventive policy (structural or operational)
- The identification of tasks that need to be accomplished in an operation
- The formalization of communication within the institution/organization
- An improved coordination between various policy areas

B. Catalogue and assess the situation in relation to the policy and response capacity available

It is imperative to focus the analysis of conflict situations in such a way as to derive guidelines for policy interventions. It should:

- direct the analysis toward understanding, anticipation, *and* intervention
  - understanding requires analysis directed toward conflict processes in general as well as the particular contextual conditions (country profile)
  - anticipation asks for the monitoring and analysis of dynamic processes and risk evaluation criteria (trend analysis)
  - intervention refers to an inventory of the institution's toolbox, an analysis of the applicability of the policy tools to the goals and the conflict's various needs, and the identification of potential moments and fields for intervention
- a case-specific assessment of the conflict-preventive capacities of the various instruments

C. Deal more effectively with the outcomes of analysis

Preventive action is all about knowing how to do 'the right thing'. The standardized analysis then needs to be applied for the purpose of:

- helping to identify and prioritize options for operational response
- finding the right mix of short-term, medium-term, and long-term projects
- committing to sustained efforts instead of ad-hoc operations betting on instant successes
- identifying shortcomings in existing policies and instruments, adapting these, or developing new ones

The CPAF, then, should include the following steps:

1. Mission statement by the third-party actor on the aims with regard to conflict prevention
2. Identify and assess the available policy-toolkit with regard to conflict prevention instruments in order to determine the 'limits' of one's response capacity
3. Chose countries to focus the policies of conflict prevention on
4. Draw up country profiles of the countries involved
5. Identify which countries are risk-countries on the basis of selected risk evaluation criteria
6. Structured monitoring and assessment of the (risk-) countries
7. Identify a trend line: positive or negative
8. Assess the available instruments in order to effectively intervene in a preventive way
9. Apply the toolkit in order to strengthen positive trends, or redress negative ones

In a follow-up report, these issues will be further concretized, as more detailed suggestions will be made for the consecutive steps in the conflict policy assessment framework and examples will be provided to illustrate the use of CPAF in the policy context.

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Appendix 1: Theoretic Conflict Prognostication Models

Structural models of conflict prognostication:

I.   Minorities At Risk
II.   State Failure Project
III.   PIOOM Human Rights Violations

Dynamic models of conflict prognostication:

IV.   Accelerators of Genocide Project
V.   Life Integrity Violations Analysis (LIVA)
VI.   Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA)
VII.   Conflict Early Warning Project -- Pattern Recognition
VIII.   Cluster Analysis

I. A Risk Assessment Model for Communal Conflict Minorities At Risk[1]

The risk assessment model of Gurr is based on the *Minorities At Risk Project*, and focuses on ethnic minority groups within existing states. The project in itself intends to specify the conditions under which some ethnic groups are drawn into cycles of rebellion and repression. The model aims at identifying groups at greatest risk of victimization in future episodes of ethnic warfare.[2]

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Highest Risk: High Incentives, High Capacity/Opportunities
                    + East Timorese +
                 ++ Hindus in Pakistan 0
                ++ Lhotshampas in Bhutan -
                  + Zomis (Chin) in Burma -
          0 Turkmen in People's Republic of China 0
                  0 Papuans in Indonesia 0
Medium-High Risk: High to Middling Incentives and Capacity/Opportunities
               ++ Rohingya Muslims in Burma +
             ++ Bouganvillians in Papua-New Guinea +
                  ++ Baluchi in Pakistan 0
          ++ Tibetans in the People's Republic of China -
                    ++ Hmong in Laos -
                  + Ahmadis in Pakistan +
                - Vietnamese in Cambodia 0
Medium Risk: High Incentives or Capacity/Opportunity
                  + Mohajirs in Pakistan +
                   + Muslims in India +
                 - Acelunese in Indonesia +
                   - Sindhis in Pakistan +
               -- Malay Muslims in Thailand +
               0 Montagnards in Vietnam -
                -- Hill Tribes in Thailand 0
                    - Sikhs in India -
    Note: Groups in the highest-risk cluster have both incentives and capacity/opportunity scores
  higher than the average of Asian groups engaged in serious rebellions in 1995. The medium-high risk
  groups have either incentives or capacities/opportunities above the rebel groups' average and middling
  values on the other dimension. Medium risk groups have either incentives or capacities-opportunities
  above the rebel groups' average and low values on the other dimension. Groups are ranked within each
  cluster according to short-term changes in incentives (left-hand symbols) and capacities/opportunities
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Figure 3: Risk assessments on ethnic minorities (Gurr, 1998).

The Minorities At Risk Project has developed a theoretical model in which the concepts of grievances, mobilization, rebellion and repression are hypothetically linked. Statistical analysis was used to identify the correlation between these concepts, which found a direct link between mobilization and rebellion; an indirect link between grievances and rebellion (through a positive correlation between grievances and mobilization); and a positive correlation between group coherence, repression, and grievances on rebellion. These findings, then, are used in the development of a range of indicators for the assessment of the potential risk for communal conflict, focusing on group incentives, capacity, and opportunities for collective action.

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[1] Sources: Gurr, T. (1994) Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System, in *International Studies Quarterly* 38, pp. 347-377; Gurr, T. (1994) Testing and Using a Model of Communal Conflict for Early Warning, in *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1), pp. 20-24; Gurr, T. (1997) A Risk Assessment Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Gurr, T., B. Harff (1994) *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, chapter 5 "A framework for analysis of ethnopolitical mobilization and conflict", Boulder: Westview; Gurr, T., B. Harff (1998) Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies, in *Journal of Peace Research* 35(5), pp. 551-579.

[2] A limitation is that the empirical data on indicators are for politically-active communal groups. They do not suffice as data necessary to identify non-communal groups at risk of politicide (Gurr and Harff, 1998).

INDICATORS OF RISK FACTORS OF ETHNOPOLITICAL REBELLION	
A. Group Incentives	
1.	Lost Autonomy
2.	Economic Discrimination
3.	Political Discrimination
4.	Cultural Discrimination
B. Group Capacity	
1.	Cultural Identity
2.	Militant Mobilization
C. Group Opportunities	
1.	Recent Changes in Regime Structure
2.	Support from Kindred Groups

Figure 4: Indicators of communal conflict

On the basis of these indicators, a Risk Index can be developed that quantifies information designed to help answer the question which politically active communal groups are at greatest risk of ethno-political rebellion. Serious future rebellions are most likely among groups with high incentives and medium-to high capacity *and* opportunities.

The model has limited itself to structural conditions, but not without acknowledging that in order to come to early warnings, dynamic indicators/accelerators and trigger events need to be added. In a recent article, Gurr and Harff (1998) have indeed made the attempt to do this, and they have formulated eight accelerators of ethno-rebellion (see figure 5; see also model 4 'Accelerators of Genocide Project' in this appendix).

They further explain that the theoretical framework is not likely to change, but the results of future research may lead to changes in the indicators used to operationalize its key concepts.

ACCELERATORS OF ETHNO-REBELLION[3]	
1.	Violations: Attacks on or threats to core symbols of ethnic group identity
2.	Demand Escalation: Qualitative changes in demands made on behalf of an ethnic group (changes in group rhetoric)
3.	Group Militancy: Increase in the Disposition and capacity of elements within the group to use force and violence in pursuit of their objectives (changes in group actions)
4.	Domestic Support: Increase in symbolic or political support for group objectives from domestic actors
5.	External Support: Increase in symbolic, political, or military support for communal group objectives from international actors
6.	Elite instability: Disunity within the state elite, conflict and inefficiency in the conduct of routine government
7.	Elite Insecurity: Responses by state elites to perceived threats from domestic challengers short of open rebellion
8.	Occurrence of violent opposition by kindred groups in neighboring countries

Figure 5: Accelerators for Communal Conflict

Relevance of the findings for the policy context
In a conflict situation in which it is clear from the outset that conflict is ethnically motivated, or where ethnicity has become a mobilizing factor, the model provides a good insight. On the basis of the

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[3] See Harff and Gurr (1998).

model's risk assessment, it may be possible to identify and analyze alternative responses that may reduce those risks. In particular by adding the accelerator events, it has become possible to study how these might aggravate or moderate the impact of the general conditions. Whereas the structural conditions focus on the group level, the accelerators make a link to the state level. As a limitation of the model it should be noted that it is still operating with hindsight. In this regard, it is extensively tested for validity and reliability, to reduce the chance of 'false positives' and 'false negatives' to a minimum. Whether the model will be operational as a forecasting device, and in this regard will stimulate responses that will prevent what is predicted, has not been of major concern to the modelers.

	MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT
	T. Gurr, University of Maryland
Methodology	Group profiles (conflict chronologies, narrative summaries, coded data on group's status, traits and political activities) Statistical and comparative methods. Correlates through study of historic cases.
Aim	Explanation, finding causality in conflict factors
Conflict-preventive focus	Structural
Type of conflict	Communal (ethno-political) conflict
Timing of warning	Longer-term risk assessment
Approach	Quantitative

Figure 6: Overview of Minorities At Risk as Conflict Prognostication Model

II. State Failure Project[4]

The *State Failure Task Force*[5] was established in 1994 to design and carry out a data-driven study on the correlates of state failure[6], with the ultimate objective of developing a methodology to identify key factors and critical thresholds signaling a high risk of political crisis in countries some two years in advance. Research, however, is still in an early phase, and includes partial state failure since the occurrence of complete state collapse are "too few for meaningful generalization" (Esty a.o. 1998).

KEY CONCEPTS	SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
A. Political and Leadership Issues	*A. Political/Leadership*
1. Regime capacity 2. Elite characteristics 3. Political and economic cleavages 4. Conflictual political culture 5. International influence	1. party legitimacy 2. party fractionalization 3. executive dependence on legislature 4. separatist activity 5. years since major regime change 6. ethnic character of ruling elite 7. religious character of ruling elite 8. political rights index 9. maximum cleavage 10. democracy
B. Demographic and Societal Issues	*B. Demographic/Societal*
1. population pressure 2. mortality 3. education 4. militarization of society	1. calories/capita/day 2. military personnel/physicians' ratio 3. civil liberties index 4. infant mortality 5. life expectancy 6. extended longevity 7. percent of children in primary school 8. percent of teens in secondary school 9. girls/boys in secondary school 10. youth bulge 11. labor force/population
C. Economic and Environmental Issues	*C. Economic/Environmental*
1. economic strength 2. quality of life 3. constraints on resource base 4. government and economic management 5. economic openness and trade 6. international economic aid	1. defense expenditure/total government exp. 2. government revenues/GDP 3. government expenditure/GDP 4. investment share of GDP 5. trade openness (import plus export/GDP) 6. real GDP/capita 7. cropland area 8. land burden 9. access to safe water 10. famine reports in 'The New York Times'

Figure 7: Key concepts and statistically significant indicator categories for state failure research.

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[4] Sources: Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1995) *Working Papers State Failure Task Force Report;* Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1997) "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning", in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems,* Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1998) *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings.*

[5] Consisting of academic experts, data collection and management specialists (CIESIN), and analytic methods professionals (SAIC). The research was commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

[6] Label for a type of severe political crisis in which institutions of the central state are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or political order, usually occurring in circumstances of widespread and violent civil conflict and accompanied by severe humanitarian crises (Esty a.o. 1998).

The problem set of state failures, then, includes four categories, distinguishing for the type of crisis and extent of state failure (by scaling events by magnitude): Revolutionary wars (with Small and Singer 1992 as primary source), ethnic wars (Minorities of Risk as primary source), geno/politicides (Harff 1992 as primary source), and adverse or disruptive regime transitions (Polity III data set of Jaggers and Gurr 1995).

For the time span of 1955 to 1994 113 consolidated cases of state failure were identified, and these were matched with a random sample of control cases to identify those independent (sets of) variables that discriminated most significantly and efficiently. Initially 617 measures were included in the data set, of which 31 appeared to be statistically significant in differentiating between states that had a regime crisis and control cases that did not (see figure 7). Multivariate analysis, then, identified a single best model (approaching 70 % accuracy) which includes three variables: *openness to international trade* (with high openness associated with a low risk of state failure), *infant mortality* (as indicative of the quality of life in a society, with above-international median rates associated with high risk of state failure), and *democracy* (above a middling threshold of democracy associated with low risk of state failure, because of conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic governance)[7]. Further, statistical analysis unfolded an interaction effect between democracy and the other two variables: the risk of state failure in more democratic countries is greater when infant mortality is high, and trade openness low, while in less democratic countries this is the case regardless of the level of infant mortality.

In order to extend the generic model with models of *magnitudes* and *duration* of conflict, the set of background variables needs to be expanded. Also some first steps are taken in elaborating on the generic model with additional variables, in order to enhance the explanatory power for specific *types* of state failure.[8]

Phase II of the State Failure Project (1998) has tried to refine the measure of democracy, to study in more detail the vulnerability of partial democracies[9]. Further it developed a regional variant of the global model to anticipate state failures in Sub-Saharan Africa,[10] and a focus on the role of environmental factors[11] in state failures. Also, the Task Force comes with some policy implications (see appendix 2).

Relevance of the findings for the policy context
Although the methods and techniques of the State Failure Project are hard to copy because of the scale of the project, and the multidisciplinary knowledge brought in by the large research team of specialists, the research provides significant insights in correlation between conflict factors. These findings, e.g. with regard to the vulnerability of partial democracies, could be interesting for use in a policy context. The project has also demonstrated the validity of using indicator *categories* instead of well-defined indicators, since variables can be measured in various ways because of the inter-correlation between concepts (see also note 7).[12]

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[7] *Infant mortality* is a marker indicator that represents a basket of interdependent conditions, which could be substituted by other quality of life indicator, dependent on availability of data. *Democracy* is a summary measure of open political institutions, correlating strongly with indices of political rights, civil liberties and party legitimacy. *Trade openness* has few close correlates (Esty e.a. 1998).

[8] For ethnic conflicts, these include youth bulge; extent of ruling elite representing one group in an ethnically divided society. For adverse or disruptive regime transitions, the length of time that the type of regime is in place appears to hold high significance.

[9] The level of democracy was found to be a significant factor. Partial democracies were shown to be several times more vulnerable to state failure than either full democracies or autocracies.

[10] The model includes: Level of trade openness, level of democracy and changes in material living standards, plus additional dimensions of urban share of population, type of colonial heritage, and presence of ethnic discrimination.

[11] A "mediated" model was developed, in which environmental change influences the quality of life, and which in turn affects the risk of state failure.

[12] This finding is of relevance for the conflict and policy assessment framework to be developed by Clingendael. The idea that indicator categories can be 'measured' in various ways, is also taken up by the Fund for Peace model.

However, although the generic model as identified by the State Failure Task Force strengthens the case for a systematic approach to risk assessment and early warning of political crises, its limitations should be recognized. For example, the model identified is generic in character, and no models have yet been identified that help account for the type or degree of state failure, or the sequential relations among them. Also a lot more needs to be learned about conditions that keep partial state failures from escalating. Further, most variables refer to structural conditions, and thus need to be complemented by the analysis of potential accelerators if they are to be used for early warning. Thus far, it remains to be demonstrated whether the model will be accurate in identifying *prospective* cases of state failure. The model's findings may nevertheless be used in a qualitative way by directing policy (see appendix 2).

	STATE FAILURE PROJECT
	Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Surko, Unger / State Failure Task Force
Methodology	Quantitative, indicator-based macro-approach. Correlates of state failure during the last 40 years. Global reach.
Aim	Identify key factors and critical thresholds, signaling high risk of political crisis in countries some 2 years in advance.
Conflict-preventive focus	Structural
Type of conflict	Generic, state failure
Timing of warning	Long-term risk assessment
Approach	Quantitative

Figure 8: Overview of State Failure Project as Conflict Prognostication Model

III. PIOOM
Monitoring Human Rights Violations[13]

Jongman and Schmid (1994) of PIOOM have developed an extensive monitoring "checklist" on human rights violations[14], to be submitted regularly by two in-country monitors and one regional expert. They choose the approach of standardized and sustained monitoring as a middle-station between traditional fact-finding and future early warning, with the more than 500 indicators providing the basis of a data set which can be inserted into various models to forecast increased risks (Gupta, Jongman, Schmid, 1993). The primary objective is to gain a better understanding of the root causes of fundamental human rights violations, and discover the facilitating and inhibiting factors of abuses.[15] For this purpose, past data and analyses will be stored in a documentation center, which will be the basis for trend analysis on the incidence of human right violations, and for risk assessment in particular periods and places. In a next phase, indicators need to be detected which can serve as early warning signals for impending violations (see figure 11). These focus on the political system, on transition/elections, the judiciary, media freedom, support for 'radical' groups, political protest, and the economy. The ultimate goal will be to develop the capacity to make policy recommendations, thereby enabling prevention or at least mitigation of the predicted outcome.

INDICATORS FOR MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. CPDQ (165 questions)
1. General country data 2. Demographic data 3. Socioeconomic data 4. Historic data 5. Legal data 6. Political data 7. Conflict data [16]
B. MARQ (132 questions) (For max. 5 highly mobilized minorities at risk)
1. Group disadvantages (stress, discrimination) 2. Group demands and grievances 3. Political rights 4. Economic rights and benefits 5. Social and cultural rights 6. Group organization for political action 7. Political strategies of groups 8. Profile of anti-regime political action
C. 12 types of human rights

Figure 9: Indicators on human rights violations

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[13] Sources: Gupta, A. Jongman, A. Schmid (1993) *Creating a Composite Index for Assessing Country Performance in the Field of Human Rights: Proposal for a New Methodology*, Leiden: PIOOM; Jongman, A. (1994) The PIOOM Program on Monitoring and Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises, in *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1), pp. 65-71; Jongman, A. (1998) Oorlog en Politiek Geweld, in B. Bomert, H. de Lange (eds.) *Internationale Veiligheidsvraagstukken en het Nederlands Perspectief*, Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 1998: Nijmegen, pp. 33-51; Jongman, A., A. Schmid (1994) *Monitoring Human Rights; Manual for Assessing Country Performance*, Leiden: PIOOM.
[14] Index of countries' human rights violations. This index takes into account the argument of cultural relativism (Western perception on human rights), by distinguishing gross human rights violations from political rights and civil liberties, the former one being considered 'non-negotiable'.
[15] The scientific goal of monitoring being the identification of cultural, social, economic and political conditions which make the implementation of fundamental rights more likely.
[16] Possible cleavages in society; possible internal challenges to governing elite, which forces to reallocate resources; response governing elite (policies of accommodation and coercion); external challenges to governing elite; inflammatory rhetoric against groups (by regime, opposition, media, religious leaders).

The checklist consists of 2 lists for possible root causes of conflict, and 12 lists for specific human rights. Here the focus is on the first two lists, the Country Profile Date Questionnaire (CPDQ) with the main focus on the behavior of government, and the Minorities at Risk Questionnaire (MARQ) on groups potentially at risk (based on Minorities at Risk Project of Gurr) as indicators with a high conflict prediction potential *when fed into an adequate model.*

The research techniques put forward by PIOOM include regression analysis on long series of data over time to provide insight in trends, and causal analysis to identify the turning points in trends, which may form the basis of forecasts.

	PIOOM
	A. Schmid, A. Jongman
Methodology	Delphi-method. Checklist to monitor conflict escalation (human rights), which are submitted regularly to different monitors (2 in-country, 1 regional expert)
Aim	Gain better understanding of root causes human rights violations. Discover facilitating and inhibiting factors.
Conflict-preventive focus	Structural and operational (direct)
Type of conflict	Human rights violations
Timing of warning	Longer-term risk assessment
Approach	Quantitative and qualitative

Figure 10: Overview of PIOOM Checklist on Human Rights Violations as Conflict Prognostication Model.

Relevance of the findings for the policy context

Human rights violations are often seen as the most clear signal to conflict potential and conflict escalation. For this reason monitoring is taken up by a large number of organizations. PIOOM has contributed in this regard by providing a more structured approach to this monitoring and information gathering exercise.

However, the manual that has been developed by PIOOM to monitor country situations with regard to human rights violations, and which should provide the input for a data information center and trend analysis, appears to be too extensive for practical and regular use. The anticipating capacities are therefore limited, even more so because it takes a considerable number of years before the data information system can be used for time series analysis.

Stages of Conflict	Characteristic Variables	Signals
1. Stable Social System	High degree of political stability and regime legitimacy	1. Functioning democracy, with minority rights protection 2. Regular peaceful transitions of power between government and opposition (no coups d'etat) 3. Independent judiciary 4. Free press 5. Social-revolutionary and ethno-seccessionist groups without mass support 6. No abrupt deterioration of political condition due to (para-) military activities 7. No abrupt deterioration in economic condition

2. Political Tension Situation	Growing levels of systemic frustration and increasing social and political cleavages along sectarian identities	1. New political parties try to mobilize people around polarizing political or sectarian issues 2. Elections heatedly contested 3. Court rules sees as politically charges 4. Freedom of the press under stress as a result of growing polarization of opinion within society 5. Non-violent protests and violence against property and national symbols by radicals 6. Political protests by students, labor unions, sectarian groups 7. Rising unemployment, little economic growth
3. Serious dispute stage	Erosion of political legitimacy of the national government and rising acceptance of sectarian politics	1. Increasing use of inflammatory rhetoric by political elites and sectarian leaders. 2. Election-time violence and charges of fraud 3. Increasing use of courts for political purpose by government 4. Freedom of the press threatened by threates from militant groups and by government pressure 5. Sporadic violence against individual political figures and/or members of ideological or ethnic groups 6. Terrorist and vigilante and (para-) military groups appear on the scene 7. Economy under stress: high unemployment, high inflation
4. Lower intensity conflict	Open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups; regime repression and insurgency	1. Increase of power among nondemocratic forces 2. Civilian rule trheated by military role in politics 3. Rule of law seriously impaired 4. Freedom of the press seriously impaired as a result of sanctions by militant groups and emergency measures of (military) regime 5. Intermittent armed conflict between government and opposition forces and/or sectors of the population 6. State of emergency; security forces violate human rights systematically 7. Capital flight, disinvestment
5. High intensity conflict	Open warfare among rival groups	1. Breakdown of civil society; disintegration of central government 2. Multiple claims of political sovereignty 3. Rule of law abolished; political justice 4. Media as propaganda instruments of regime 5. Open warfare among rival groups with military taking sides or splitting apart along group lines 6. Military or emergency rule 7. Black market economy dominant, falling production 8. Deteriorating health situation, decreasing life expectancy, rising child mortality 9. Growing dependence on food imports

Figure 11: The Stages of Conflict and their Signals (Jongman, 1994: 69-70)

IV.   Accelerators of Genocide Project[17]

The modeling effort of Harff focuses on accelerators in the conflict process. Because these accelerators are mainly context-specific, she prefers a case studies approach by looking at the basic chronology of the conflict; the theoretically specified conditions (causal variables) of communal conflicts; and an analysis of accelerators derived from event data. The approach, then, theoretically specifies the variables that accelerate geno/politicide, and then operationalizes the accelerator variables using events date.[18] In this way, the accelerators are tools for theory-driven monitoring.

Although the model focuses on accelerators of geno/politicide, the same process could be used for other types of conflicts, Harff argues. Experts of specific kinds of conflicts can identify lists of potential accelerators, while others can be identified inductively. "What counts as evidence is the observation of a sharp increase in clusters, sets, or numbers of accelerators during the three months prior to the onset of an event. Expected outcomes should correspond to the basic logic of the sequential model, namely that the static model plus accelerators plus triggers should exponentially increase escalation", Harff argues (1997). The expectation is that accelerator events should increase in relative and absolute frequency three to six months prior to the onset of a major episode, and be accompanied by a simultaneous decline in cooperative activity (decelerators).

ACCELERATORS OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE[19]	
1.	Occurrence of Violent Opposition by Kindred Groups in Neighboring Countries
2.	Increase in External Support for Politically Active Groups
3.	Threats of External Involvement Against Governing Elites
4.	Increase in Size of, or Degree of Cohesion in, Opposition Group
5.	Aggressive Posturing or Actions by Opposition Groups
6.	Physical or Verbal Clashes
7.	New Discriminatory or Restrictive Policies by the Regime
8.	Life Integrity Violations by Government or Government-Supported Groups Against Targeted Groups

Figure 12: Accelerators of genocide

In order to test the model of accelerators, Harff compares perpetrator and non-perpetrator states. By using dynamic data on accelerators in retrospective analyses, she finds that, whereas in all cases background and intervening conditions indicated high levels of risk of genocide or humanitarian crisis, accelerators were useful in providing early warning indices of which cases were sliding toward genocide and when. The weighting of accelerator events on the basis of theory and evidence that some kinds of acceleration events are more important than others in moving conflict toward a particular outcome is being carried out as work in progress (Gurr and Harff, 1998).

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[17] Sources: Harff, B. (1994) A Theoretical Model of Genocides and Politicides, in *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1), pp. 25-30; Harff, B. (1997) Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises: Sequential Models and the Role of Accelerators, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Gurr, T., B. Harff (1998) Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies, in *Journal of Peace Research* 35(5), pp. 551-579.

[18] This is in contrast to the inductive tradition of using events data to track international political conflicts and crises (Gurr and Harff, 1998).

[19] This should not be interpreted as a final set of accelerators. Instead, these need to be continuously evaluated, adapted and added to.

Events per Month for Each Geno/Politicide Accelerator Category

Rwanda (genocide):

Pre-Accel. Phase: (54 Accels)   Accel. Phase: (41 Accels)

Figure 13: Example of accelerator model (Harff, 1997).

In assessing the potential for genocide and politicide, Harff proposes daily monitoring of high-risk situations to determine whether or not escalation occurs. The key to monitoring crisis development, then, lies in tracing accelerators and decelerators. This would provide the link between the theoretical models and the early warning.

Relevance of the findings in the policy context

The model pays key attention to accelerators and monitoring on these events to assess the conflict situation and its development. Although the model has not been extensively tested yet, and only a very small number of case studies has been executed, it would provide an argument for the possibility of monitoring on pre-specified standardized indicators. This makes the model better manageable than inductive approaches to identifying accelerators and triggers, which ask for computerized processing of information. Although the model of Harff is developed as a quantitative approach (linked to a data event system and the scaling of events in approximate order of severity), the approach could also be adopted to a more qualitative interpretation. Since the model has only been tested retrospectively, the question remains whether—when operational as a forecasting device—the somewhat late warning will leave enough room to respond in time and adequately.

	ACCELERATORS OF GENOCIDE PROJECT
	B. Harff, CIDCM Univerity of Maryland
Methodology	Sequential analysis. Case study research (chronology of conflict, theoretically specified conditions of communal conflicts, analysis of accelerators). List of accelerators by experts, tested in comparative cases. Accelerator-events derived from event data system (GEDS)
Aim	Anticipation; trace development of processes leading to onset of geno/politicide
Conflict-preventive focus	Operational (direct)
Type of conflict	Geno/politicide
Timing of warning	Medium to shorter-term early warning
Approach	Quantitative

Figure 14: Overview of Accelerators of Genocide Project as Conflict Prognostication Model.

V. LIVA – "Good Enough Model"
Life Integrity Violations Analysis[20]

The focus of the work of Fein has mainly been on the specification of preconditions of geno-politicide and life integrity violations.[21] The *LIVA project* uses methods of content analysis (Amnesty International reports) to assess whether one could discriminate states perpetrating geno-politicide from other states before these crimes were corroborated. The model is directed toward understanding as well as responding to geno/politicide. The aim, then, is to detect signs and portents of escalation of violence towards geno/politicide; to relate the levels of violation to underlying and intervening causes; and to relate life integrity violations to other kinds of rights violations. With regard to preventive action, LIVA aims at tracing the impact of government intervention and aid on the level of violation; considering the efficacy of different response strategies at different levels of violation; and tracing the impact of NGO campaigns against various classes of violators.

The response levels to life integrity violations as suggested by Fein are of a very general nature. Although she distinguishes normative responses from economic and physical sanctions, she does not go into the implications of these responses.

	Responses to Perpetrator		
	I Normative:	II Economic sanctions:*	III Physical:
Level of Life Integrity Violation:	1. Appeal 2. Condemnation 3. Warning	1. Reduction 2. Cut-off 3. Embargo	1. Peace-keeping force 2. Multilateral humanitarian intervention 3. Other intervention
E. Epidemic** genocide...	-	Embargo	Intervention or war
D. Disaster or danger of disaster	Warning	Embargo Cut-off	All three
C. Calculated deaths	Warning	Cut-off	-
B. Bad	Condemnation Appeal	Reduction	-
A. Other violations	Appeal	-	-

* The table illustrates only negative economic sanctions (assuming the simultaneous cut-off of military aid); but assistance can serve as a positive and negative sanction.
A complementary approach (advocated at times by International Alert) is to tie the successful conclusion of negotiations and mediated solutions to aid packages, using development assistance as an incentive.

** This stage, best describing the genocides of Nazi Germany during 1941-45, was not found in the present study. Early response to anti-Jewish discrimination and violations of life integrity might well have checked Germany's use of epidemic genocide during the war.

Figure 15: Suggested response levels to life integrity violations (in Fein, 1992: 53)

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[20] Sources: Fein, H. (1992) Dangerous States and Endangered Peoples: Implications of Life Integrity Violations Analysis, in K. Rupesinghe, M. Kuroda (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 40-61; Fein, H. (1994) Tools and Alarms: Uses of Models for Explanation and Anticipation, in *The Journal of Ethno-Development* 4(1), pp. 31-35.
[21] Contrary to the broad approach to human rights by PIOOM, the LIVA model focuses on capital punishment and discrimination.

While there is much agreement between Fein and Harff on the precipitating events leading to geno/politicide[22], Fein proceeds in focusing on the responses at the pressure points. The indicators derived from the theoretical model are to apprehend, not to explain. (a Good Enough Model instead of a Causal Explanatory Model). The testing of models should thus not be the testing of indicators (as Harff does), but the testing of the effect of intervention/responses.

	LIVA – GOOD ENOUGH MODEL
	H. Fein
Methodology	Content analysis of Amnesty International country reports. Comparison of states with similar background (region, length of political experience since independence, similar colonial experience, similar degree of cultural heterogeneity, dominant religion), while one being perpetrator, and other non-perpetrator.
Aim	Apprehension; understanding as well as responding
Conflict-preventive focus	Structural and operational (direct)
Type of conflict	Geno/politicide; life integrity violations
Timing of warning	Medium to shorter term early warning, indication for response
Approach	Qualitative

Figure 16: Overview of LIVA as Conflict Prognostication Model

Relevance of the findings for the policy context

The contribution of the Good Enough Model of Fein is in particular found in the fact that it was one of the first theoretic efforts that broke with the highly quantitative and statistical approach to early warning and its focus on testing the models on scientific reliability and validity. The ideas are strongly in line with the call for response-oriented warnings and conflict impact assessments. Nevertheless, the arguments she puts forth of what is needed (i.e. focus on responses at pressure points and its effects) have been left undeveloped. The approach holds value as a qualitative study of why some states experience violent escalation into conflict while others do not, by each time comparing two states with similar background conditions. These 'small-scale' comparisons are much more specific than for example the State Failure Project that in a quantitative way identifies statistically significant variables by comparing conflict cases and non-conflict cases (from all over the world and over a time period of 50 years) . Fein's conclusion is that perpetrators differ from non-perpetrators by different *patterns* of life integrity violations. This implies the need for a specific focus on these patterns, and hence on ideologies and goals of states.

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[22] With exception of the effect of external support for targeted groups (Fein, 1994).

VI. PANDA
Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action[23]

PANDA seeks to identify conflict situations early in their development, before they erupt into violence, when the prospects of peaceful and constructive intervention are most promising. For this reason it tries to track interactions between state and non-state actors, to determine if and when conflicts become violent. The focus is on mass political conflict, i.e. popular mobilization for non-institutionalized collective action (Bond 1997). The approach is quantitative and statistical and makes use of the event data system KEDS to code and interpret real-time events.

First, the model determines what portion of reported events take place outside of the political system, in an attempt to answer two questions: are people (state and non-state actors) interacting within or beyond the rules set, and are these interactions of a peaceful or violent nature? The resultant combined measures ('conflict carrying capacity' of the system, and 'conflict civility' of non-state actors), then, offer an assessment of *system stress*.

INDICATORS FOR MASS POLITICAL CONFLICT

A. Outcome dimension: physical force indicators
   1. violence
   2. non-violence

B. Contentiousness dimension:
   1. Routine action
   2. Direct action

C. Coerciveness dimension: social, political, economic indicators
   1. Range of sanctions
   2. Costs

Figure 17: Indicator dimensions of mass political conflict

The central dimensions in the conceptual framework of the PANDA monitoring system are contentiousness and coerciveness. Contentiousness can be defined as the extent to which action is disruptive, reaching the outside bounds of routine resolution procedures (the outcome of which is a product of interests, capabilities, and wills of the antagonists). Coerciveness refers to the severity of negative sanctions or costs. A third dimension in the model is the outcome dimension, indicating the attribute of violence, and thus illustrating a conflict front where coerciveness and contentiousness are both of high intensity.

These dimensions are used to develop the key indicators of the model: conflict carrying capacity (referring to the behavior of the regime) and conflict civility (referring to the behavior of non-state actors). The conflict carrying capacity measure is an indicator of the intensity of conflict[24]. A six-point lethality measure is used for sanctions and violence. The predictions are for quarter-year periods (in

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[23] Sources: Bond, D., K. Rothkin (1995) Recovering Events from Events Data, http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/DOCS/papers/EVENTS.html; Bond, D. (1997) Timely Conflict Risk Assessments and the PANDA Project, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Bond, D. (1997) Indications of Social Change and Emergent Conflict: Toward Explanations of Conflict Processes, position paper for *Second International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict*, Stockholm 4-6 June 1997; Bond, D., J. Jenkins et. al. (1997) Mapping Mass Political Conflict and Civil Society, in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4), pp. 553-579; Bond, D., S. Lee, K. Rothkin (1995) "PANDA's Early Warnings on Conflict", draft paper annual meeting *International Studies Association*, Chicago; Bond, D., K. Rothkin (1995) Recovering Events from Events Data, draft paper for *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, 2 September 1995.
[24] It is defined as the proportion of contentious action to all action, multiplied by the proportion of violent action to all direct action, and subtracted from unity to facilitate interpretation.

future monthly or bi-weekly). The carrying capacity of a system to manage conflict beyond its routine conflict management procedures is undermined by violent action. A combination of the two indicators, which can be presented graphically, gives an indication of whether political conflict is moving towards a violent confrontation.


Figure 18: Dimensions of conflict (Bond, 1998).

Relevance of the findings for the policy context

The events that are monitored include interactions with a positive as well as a negative impact on mass political conflict. In other words: conflict-generating ('accelerator') and conflict-inhibiting ('decelerator') behavior is included in the model. Although because of its quantitative and statistical approach the model is less useful for a response-oriented qualitative policy framework, its central concepts (conflict carrying capacity and conflict civility) hold value. It implies the need for a focus on actual behavior, which can indicate an intensification of political conflict towards violent conflict. The approach could therefore contribute in identifying transition or breaking points in the phases of conflict, and indicate points of intervention. For this purpose, however, the central concepts need to be newly interpreted in a qualitative way.

	PANDA
	D. Bond, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Methodology	Continuous monitoring of events (KEDS); full range of actors, issues, targets, forms of political action. Mapping of conflict and tracking of evolution.
Aim	Anticipation; examination of contentious and coercive, but not yet violent, behaviors which are evident early in conflict process.
Conflict-preventive focus	Operational (direct)
Type of conflict	Generic (including non-violent actions)
Timing of warning	Shorter term early warning
Approach	Quantitative

Figure 19: Overview of PANDA as Conflict Prognostication Model.

Conflict Carrying Capacity

Score / Proportion

Report Count: 1844

Conflict Carrying Capacity — Government Repression

Forms of Mass Defiance

Proportions

Report Count:892

Demonstrations Noncooperation — All Direct Action

Overall Conflict Intensity

Mean Levels

Report Count: 2736

Sanctions Violence

Figure 20: Example of a Conflict Risk Profile for Turkey. The regime's conflict carrying capacity has eroded steadily since 1989. One of the reasons for this is revealed in the second chart, the forms of mass defiance. The participation of civil society makes up only a small portion of all direct action. The balance is violence, which is recognizable in the vast white space between the bars and the line on the chart (Bond, 1997).

VII. CEWP – Pattern Recognition
   Conflict Early Warning Project[25]

The prognostication project of Brecke at the Georgia Institute of Technology is a computerized conflict alert system, based on the assumption that harbinger configurations[26] exist and can be identified through a pattern-finding procedure. These could then serve as templates against which current country situations are compared. The critical design decision is what indicators should be collected that provide the best chance at finding patterns. Although background conditions as well as intervening and catalyst conditions are included, the focus is on indicators that occur early in the sequence leading to conflict. The theoretical approach selected to guide the choice of indicators is based around the concepts of mobilization, grievance and capability.

INDICATOR CATEGORIES
A. Catalyst indicators on mobilization
B. Background conditions indicators on grievances
C. Background and catalyst indicators on capabilities

Figure 21: Guide to indicator choice for pattern recognition

Key element of the approach is the combination of indicators. These combinations are made explicit for analysis by creating a grid picture for each country, for each day.[27] These cards are then run through pattern recognition software (Artificial Neural Network). The following issue is to discern the connection between country situation patterns and a particular type of conflict by developing conflict description patterns[28]. It is thus assumed that each type of conflict has a unique output grid pattern. If it is indeed true (the project is still work-in-progress) that particular patterns consistently appear before conflicts of particular types occur, and if there is a match with a current country situation pattern, then it could be said that conflict of a particular type is likely to happen.

Relevance of the findings for the policy context
The main reason for skepticism about this type of highly computerized and quantified research is that it is evaluated as being too technical, and that policy makers are not motivated to make decisions solely on output. Brecke, for this reason, aims at developing a model that is easy to use and also provides background information about the alert and the situation, information that is needed to judge whether a conflict alert should be taken seriously. Not only should the probability assessment specify what type of conflict is evolving, and what the nature of the escalation is, but it should also provide a time-varying probability assessment as to when conflict is to erupt. As to the question of why conflicts erupt, the model cannot provide any insight, nor for the type of response needed. For the moment, the model does not have relevance for the policy context (yet) because it is too much a work-in-progress. The search for patterns, however, remains an interesting and important one, as it is not the individual indicators, but instead the *patterns* that are considered of key importance in conflict prognostication.

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[25] Sources: Brecke, P. (1997) A Pattern Recognition Approach to Conflict Early Warning, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript).
[26] Particular combinations of values of indicators that have consistently appeared before the outbreak of conflicts.
[27] Each cell in the grid can take one out of four values: (1) background and catalyst condition both exist (2) background condition exists but catalyst condition not (3) background condition does not exist, but catalyst condition does (4) background and catalyst condition both do not exist.
[28] Each row consists of the criteria upon which the conflict taxonomy is constructed, and each column indicates the classification value.

	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8	B9	B10

B1 — Has the level of malnutrition been increasing?
B2 — Has one group been in a long-term dominant position?
B3 — Is the society split along linguistic lines?
B4 — Has economic Growth relative to population growth been declining?
B5 — Are there strong regional inequalities in economic development?
B6 — Has the dominant group used police powers to repress other groups?
B7 — Did the current government come to power through force?
B8 — Is the military dominated by a particular group?
B9 — Is there a history of violent acts between the groups in the society?
B10 — Has the terms of trade index been declining for five or more years?
C1 — Are groups or individuals drawing attention to disparities in government treatment of different social groups?
C2 — Are groups or individuals drawing attention to the recent entry into the society of others?
C3 — Are groups or individuals raising the issue of the separateness of others?
C4 — Are groups or individuals mobilizing public opinion against the government?
C5 — Has an outside power declared its policy is that of non-interference?
C6 — Has the government recently cracked down on the media?

Figure 22: Example of a simplified country situation grid (Brecke, 1998).
Black: both background condition and catalyst exist
Dark grey: background condition exists, catalyst does not
Light grey: background condition does not exist, catalyst does
White: neither background condition nor catalyst exist

	CONFLICT EARLY WARNING PROJECT
	P. Brecke, Georgia Institute of Technology
Methodology	Historic analogy. Make grid pictures for each country, each day and run through pattern recognition software (ANN). Time-varying probability assessment to anticipate when escalation. Conflict description patterns for each type of conflict.
Aim	Anticipation: Identify patterns of particular combinations of values of indicators that have consistently appeared before outbreak of historical cases of conflict. If patterns are found, then serve as templates against which current country situations are compared.
Conflict-preventive focus	Operational (direct)
Type of conflict	Generic
Timing of warning	Shorter term early warning
Approach	Quantitative

Figure 23: Overview of Pattern Recognition as Conflict Prognostication Model.

VIII. Cluster Analysis
Transition Between Stages of Conflict[29]

The cluster analysis of Schrodt and Gerner (1998) is not as much an early warning model, but an early warning technique that utilizes a dynamic approach to study the various stages in conflict development. The approach is based on the assumption that structural variables –although they are theoretically important– do not change at a rate sufficient for use as an early warning indicator. The use of event data without specific reference to background conditions is justified by the assumption that these will be reflected in *patterns of events* prior to a major change in the political system (i.e. lagged values of events are substitutes for structural variables).

Instead of contemporary studies that qualitatively delineate phases by emphasis on different types of behavior (e.g. the stages of conflict by Bloomfield and Moulton, 1997), Schrodt and Gerner have analyzed political behavior by monitoring the movement of a vector. A region in the vector space where points cluster over time, then, characterizes a 'phase'. Whenever there is an extended period of time when the parties to the conflict are reacting to each other in a consistent fashion, a cluster will occur. Contrary, these clusters begin to 'stretch' prior to breaking apart, which is a characteristic that can be used as an early warning indicator.


Figure 24: Example of clusters for various phases of conflict in Israel (Schrodt and Gerner, 1998).

Relevance of the findings for the policy context
The approach is a highly statistical exercise. As Schrodt and Gerner (1998) themselves observe, this approach "...faces the practical constraint that purely statistically-based warning systems are unlikely to be accepted in the qualitatively-oriented policy community". The approach holds value by focusing on the transition process in the stages of conflict. It has demonstrated that most of the time these transitions are made up of gradual change and only to a lesser degree of jumps. Hence there is a change in the behavior of the system prior to the phase transition, and behavior therefore is an important indicator to monitor. What behavior exactly we should monitor, Schrodt and Gerner are not conclusive on. The most obvious one—and also used in other models—would be a dimension on cooperation and conflict. Nor does the model point out *what* is to be expected, i.e. what the change is going to be. It should therefore only be seen as a supplement to structural models. "Because political behavior is a human activity ..., human understanding and intuition are likely to be powerful tools in predicting that behavior", Schrodt and Gerner (1998) argue.

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[29] Sources: Schrodt, P., D. Gerner (1997) Empirical Indicators of Crisis Phase in the Middle East, 1979-1995, in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4), pp. 529-552; Schrodt, P., D. Gerner (1997) Cluster Analysis as an Early Warning Technique for the Middle East, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manusript).

Appendix 2: Practical Efforts of Early Warning Modeling in a Policy Setting

(Attempted) Operational models:

I.   United Nations Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI)
II. United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS)

Indicator model, framework design and guidelines for policy/practical use:

III. Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) – Germany
IV.   The Fund for Peace – Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse
V.   Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)
VI.   Pilot study for an Early Warning System for the Swiss Foreign Ministry (FAST)
VII. Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAIT)
VIII. Creative Associates International, Inc. – A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace

Indicator model and policy implications/recommendations:

IX.   State Failure Project Phase II

I.   ORCI
United Nations Office for Research and Collection of Information[30]

Th Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) has been operational from 1987 until 1992. During this period the office has attempted to develop an early warning system under the mandate to assess global trends and to prepare country, regional, sub-regional and issue-related profiles. ORCI's global data base consisted mainly of country profiles, with the purpose of providing the Secretary-General with reliable and up-to-date information regarding potential conflicts and crises that might endanger international peace and security. Although the focus was on the international system, the decision was made to select many indicators on the country level as well (Dedring, 1992).[31]

ORCI has spent considerable time on the development of indicators, including those related to massive flows of refugees and the 'triggering events' that are likely to set large populations into motion. The results, however, have either not been tested on any large scale or not been made public (Thoolen, 1992). Moreover, the long list of indicators used by ORCI—which included information on the international, regional and internal situation—did not permit for comprehensive coverage, mainly because of the limited availability of data. The capacity of ORCI to detect and to forewarn, therefore was limited.

EXEMPLARY INTERNAL INDICATORS
Socio-political indicators
1.   oppression/persecution of social groups
2.   size internal security forces
3.   occurrence domestic hostilities/conflicts
4.   government policy toward tension
5.   existence of separatist groups
Secondary factors (standard data collection)
6.   demonstrations, strikes, riots
7.   basic government and defense data
8.   land ownership
9.   population growth, density
10. basic food and health statistics
11. employment/unemployment
12. refugees and displaced persons
13. distribution wealth and income
14. per capita and GDP figures, inflation

Figure 25: Indication of ORCI indicators on conflict (in Dedring, 1992).

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
Although ORCI has not been able to develop a well-functioning early warning system, we can here draw on some 'lessons' as regards practical matters in the development of such a system or a conflict and policy assessment framework. The breakdown of the ORCI early warning capacity has been attributed to the lack of systematic research, its role within the UN system and high expectations of the

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[30] Sources: Dedring, J. (1992) Socio-political Indicators for Early Warning Purposes, in K. Rupesinghe, M. Kuroda (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution,* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 194-214; Gordenker, L. (1992) Early Warning: Conceptual and Practical Issues, in K. Rupesinghe, M. Kuroda (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution,* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 1-14; Adelman, H., S. Schmeidl (1996) *Towards the Development of an Early Warning/Response Network (EWNET),* http://www.yorku.ca/research/crs/prevent/-ewpro3.htm; Thoolen, H. (1992) Information Aspects of Humanitarian Early Warning, in K. Rupesinghe, M. Kuroda (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution,* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 166-180; Adelman, H. (1998) Humanitarian and Conflict-Oriented Early Warning: A Historical Background Sketch, in K. van Walraven (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities,* The Hague: Kluwer.
[31] The underlying argument being that many international disturbances can arise out of strictly domestic developments or considerations.

system (Adelman and Schmeidl, 1996). Moreover, problems related to budget and personnel as well. "Consequently, at the beginning of 1991, ORCI was not even equipped with a suitable computer capacity, let alone a tested data base that was appropriate to the analysis that would lead to early warning", Gordenker (1992) observes. Hence the experiences of ORCI imply that there is a need for a clear commitment to the project, but also a clear definition of its objective and realistic expectations. In its goals, but also in the indicator choice, ORCI was too general, broad, and unsystematic, which resulted in a quick loss of confidence in the project.

II. HEWS
Humanitarian Early Warning System[32]

HEWS is part of UN DHA and was established in 1993 to identify crises with humanitarian implications, to facilitate DHA's role in preventive humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. HEWS is often described as the only functioning contemporary early warning system. With an extensive database of qualitative and quantitative country information at their disposal (sources, amongst others, coming from the UN field offices), HEWS is "... a provider of background reports and analyses of present and developing situations" (Ahmed, Kassinis, 1998).

The setting up of HEWS as an early warning system was not an end unto itself, but rather, was part of a larger process to endow decision makers with the tools necessary to make better-informed decisions and to initiate actions. In the project proposal its scope of activity was defined as covering the range of social, economic, political, and ecological factors and root causes that could give rise to complex man-made emergencies, but also the building and maintaining of a sophisticated computer-assisted information gathering network to manage the large flow of information. Hence one of its tools, is an extensive database of country information, which includes reporting from various sectoral early warning systems (e.g. FAO, WFP, USAID on food availability). HEWS, then, uses a comprehensive list of indicators and tries to give as wide a description of a country or region as possible.

The monitoring of background conditions employs quantitative indicators to establish trends. Over a hundred structural indicators undergo an automated analysis, which, in combination with a more "subjective filter" (Ahmed, Kassinis, 1998), is used to short-list countries of concern. These countries of concern then will be monitored on the latest events reported on by media or field offices, and that may escalate tensions. The approach here is more dynamic, and includes qualitative analysis and country-specific indicators. Triggers of crises are hardly predictable, and it is only through scenario analysis and intensified monitoring that some lead time for contingency planning is created.

INDICATOR CATEGORIES[33]
1. population: changes and differences between various sections of the population
2. general economic indicators: GNP, government expenditure, employment
3. review of trade
4. financial position
5. situation regarding food and agriculture
6. social indicators
7. review of health and nutrition
8. environment and natural resources
9. review of number, origin, place of refugees
10. human rights
11. position of government
12. presence of (potential for) conflicts: internal, external, regional
13. presence of military and weapons
14. general background information: historic, geographical, cultural etc.

Figure 26: HEWS indicator categories.

[32] Sources: Ahmed, A., E. Kassinis (1997) The Humanitarian Early Warning System, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems,* Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); R. Doom, K. Vlassenroot (1997) Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?, http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a008.htm; DHA-Online (s.a.) *Policy and Analysis: Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS),* http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/pad/hews.html.
[33] In R. Doom, K. Vlassenroot (1997) "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?", http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a008.htm

Hence three stages can be identified in the monitoring process:

I. *Background conditions*: the analysis is intended to be quick but global, and for this reason quantitative indicators and methods are used, as well as automated analysis. The list contains more than 100 structural indicators for twenty-five years. Analysts have the ability to graphically compare indicators over time and between countries, and they can rank countries based on various criteria.

II. *Accelerating factors*: identifying and monitoring factors that may escalate tensions. This requires a dynamic approach, because factors are less structured and demonstrate quicker movements. The unit of analysis for time therefore is shorter. An important element is the monitoring of the latest events reported by news wires, field offices, and NGOs. *Country-specific indicators* are developed in cooperation with field offices, which also require qualitative analysis. Concurrently, periodic, interdepartmental consultations are held to give the analysis a broader, multi-disciplinary perspective. A further narrowing down of countries takes place, to those that are on the threshold of crisis.

III. *Trigger incidents*: Possible trigger incidents may be determined through scenario analysis, others spotted by intensified monitoring.


Figure 27: The HEWS country monitoring process. Source: Ahmed and Kassinis (1998).

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
With regard to practical relevance of the model, DHA argues that its approach "...falls somewhere between the academic and the practical—it keeps abreast of the latest developments in the academic fields related to early warning but recognizes that as part of the UN it must feed into a decision-making process driven by practical (and often political) considerations" (Ahmed and Kassinis, 1998).

Key is the *systematic* nature of country monitoring. The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative information and accommodates both indicator-based and case-based approaches. Stages of intensity of conflict are used, in order to decide which countries need extensive monitoring. Criteria, however, are still needed to determine the *movement* of countries among these phases. In principle, HEWS is a provider of information to feed into the consultation process, in order to determine what actions need to be taken towards preventing crises, but also to prepare for their impact. In practice, HEWS is often applied in a context for coming to responses to humanitarian disasters. In this way it may contribute to preparedness, but only to a lesser degree to prevention.[34]

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[34] Cockell (1997) attributes this to the vigorous opposition from the G-77 to political early warning systems. Conflict analysis for early warning purposes in the UN therefore remains "decentralized", "ad hoc", and a "desk-level exercise". The orienting purpose of HEWS, then, remains humanitarian intervention rather than a focused and standardized tracking of political instability.

III. Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) - Analytical Model for Violent Conflict[35]

The research of Angelika Spelten for the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development had as its aim the development of an indicator model for use as an "... additional instrument for planning and analysis in development co-operation" (BMZ, 1998). The model distinguishes four stages of conflict[36], and implies that in each stage of the conflict it is possible to assess the probability of the social situation moving on to the next stage of escalation using certain developments as indicators. These indicators provide information that can be divided into structural issues, medium-term and short-term changes in the structural framework conditions, and political behavior in accordance with the main driving forces behind the dynamics of escalation. Hence the focus of the models is on stages and thresholds.

CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN HYPOTHESES OF THE BMZ MODEL
1. group identity and grievances
2. low level of legitimacy and effectiveness of the state
3. economic, political and social status changes
4. current constellations in conformation with the historical situation
5. diminishing number of fora for peaceful solutions
6. external support for group
7. increase in aggressiveness of putting demands, leading to a diminishing chance on negotiated solution

Figure 28: Indication of central concepts of BMZ model.

A questionnaire is developed that includes indicator questions based on hypotheses regarding causality between phenomena to be observed and probability of further escalation. The so-called catalogue of indicators comprises of three sections: The first section focuses on structural factors and the potential for escalation. The second one identifies foreseeable pressure for change and modernization, and the last one enables the monitoring of the potential for violence and *de facto* escalation.

The model, hence, focuses on three threshold values: a stable potential for conflict, a potential crisis escalation, and a high potential for crisis or violence. The first category refers to countries in which socio-political conflicts exist, but where these divergences have not yet led to social disputes and therefore do not currently require any further escalation analysis. The second category is for countries whose long-term structural disparities have already led to conflicts at the political level, and although these are not always pursued by violent means, state legitimacy and effectiveness has been jeopardized. It is in particular in this stage that conflict impact assessments need to be carried out in order to place the planning and implementation of development projects within the framework of a concept for conflict management an prevention. The threshold to the third category has been crossed, when there are strong indications that (one of the) conflicting parties is less interested in basic consensus, but instead pushes through particular interests. In this case BMZ advises a thorough redirection of development co-operation, concentrating it on strategies aimed at preserving the peace and preventing violence.

Determining intensity and stages of conflict

The analytical system that is used in the catalogue of indicators is divided into two sections. The first section covers questions under (A) and (B) (see figure 29) and enable an initial categorization between

[35] Sources: BMZ [Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development], A. Spelten (1998) *Excerpt from a Study "Crisis Analysis in Development Co-operation"*, Room Document no. 2 Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris.
[36] Stage 1: relatively stable, violence-free with latent potential for conflict. Stage 2: manifest tensions, various structural factors and change coincide. Stage 3: dispute is translated into concrete collective action. Stage 4: extensive use of violence.

countries with a "stable potential for conflict" and "potential crisis escalation". If the latter is the case, then a more detailed analysis is needed, which takes place in section II. This section is to evaluate the potential for violence, to differentiate between countries with "potential crisis escalation" and "high potential for crisis or violence".

LIST OF TOPICS COVERED BY THE INDICATOR QUESTIONS	
A. Structural conflict factors and potential conflict	
1. Determining disparities in society in terms of economics, ecology, and political power:	• What social groups can be identified in a society? • What impact does the socio-cultural structure of society have on existing economic, ecological and political disparities?
2. Determining the social competence for dealing with conflict peacefully:	• How are social conflicts perceived and communicated? • Are state institutions willing and able to negotiate social conflicts and bring about solutions? • Do they have sufficient legitimacy to carry out this function?
3. International and regional conflict factors:	• Is there a danger that armed disputes will be imported from neighboring countries?
B. Medium or short-term changes in structural framework conditions	
4. Future changes in structural framework conditions and perceived threats born out of historical experiences:	• What political strategies by international actors will lead to comprehensive political or economic reform in the country to be analyzed? • What are the forecasts for changes in the general ecological situation?
5. Recording social clichés:	• What violent disputes have taken place in the past between the social groups? • What role did various groups play in the colonial past, in founding of nation, in any earlier wars? • How have relations between the various social groups developed in recent past?
C. Political behavior in accordance with main driving forces behind dynamics of escalation	
6. Evaluating the social climate:	• In what fora is social life played out and who normally has access to these fora? • What is the traditional pattern of organization for the rural population?
7. Changes in manner in which conflict is played out:	• What images are being developed in media, public speeches, songs, etc., or covertly by political opponents or by specific social groups? • What images of 'the enemy' exist? What style of political debate is used in the media? • What strategies do various parties in the conflict use to strengthen their powers of persuasion or their political influence?

Figure 29: Indication of topics covered in the BMZ conflict assessment framework (questionnaire).

Scaling on the intensity of conflict

The answers to the various questions in the questionnaire each have a value in points (1 or 2), with some having an additional "accelerator point" (which is illustrated by a plus sign). The total number of points and accelerators is added up at the end of each box (i.e. A.1., A.2. etc.), and is then compared with a pre-specified range of points given as indication of each of the three categories to establish a trend (e.g. "slight trend towards crisis: 4-5 points; "medium trend towards crisis: 6-8 points; "high trend towards crisis: 9-12 points).

At the end of the sections A, B, and C the trends from the sectoral analyses are summarized and entered into a *quantitative* evaluation system. Then it is possible to allocate the country to one of the

categories "stable potential for conflict", "potential crisis escalation" or "high potential for crisis or violence".[37]

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework

The model is specifically designed for the policy field of development co-operation, as an instrument to plan and analyze development cooperation policy in the light of strategies aimed at preserving peace and preventing violence. It is, hence, not a forecasting device, but an analytical tool. Although mention is made of the need for conflict impact assessments, no further suggestions are made with regard to responses. Moreover, since the model is designed for the field of development co-operation, these responses are above all expected to be at the structural conflict prevention level. Spelten (1998) mentions that for the future it is planned to integrate the sections of analysis into the existing range of instruments of BMZ.

The model has strong similarity to the theoretical approach of Gurr's Minority at Risk. The main emphasis is put on social groups, discrimination and disparities, and relative deprivation. The state and its behavior, actions, and policies are included in the model in a far less substantive way, and the focus is on the state and state institutions are perceived by the various groups. Although the model includes elements that are expected to give a good picture of the political culture in a country, the way in which it is presented (i.e. the framework) is less satisfying. For assigning clear-cut weights to the answers (1 or 2), the questions seem to be too general in nature. In this regard a scaling system from 1 to 10 or a continuum would have enabled a specification of the answer, but indeed would have complicated the workings of the quantitative evaluation system. Hence, it is in particular this quantitative evaluation that is considered to be the short-coming of the BMZ model for conflict potential assessment.

Second classification of the country:

How many sectors indicate a "slight", "medium" or "high" tendency towards crisis? Transfer the tendency figures from the sectoral analyses:

"slight"_____ "medium"_____ "high"_____

multiply the
figure by 1   multiply by 2   multiply by 4

Indicator value:
_____

Overall classification of the country:
Transfer the above indicator value:

- An indicator value of 3-8 corresponds to the classification potential crisis escalation

- An indicator value of 8-12 corresponds to the classification high potential for crisis or violence
  this still includes countries for which the criterion of a "de-escalation phase" (see above) applies

Qualified amended assessment:
Would you, based on concrete information about developments not covered by this catalogue of indicators, classify the tendency of the country towards crisis differently?

a   No
b   Yes
     Reasons:

New classification of the country:

stable   potential   high potential
potential for conflict crisis escalation   for crisis or violence

Figure 30: Example of the format of the BMZ quantitative evaluation system

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[37] With regard to this method, Spelten (1998: 7) remarks: "In principle, it should be emphasised that the determining of threshold values for the evaluation of conflict potential is primarily a political task, which will also be guided by political priorities and the room for manoeuvre which the policies being pursued allow. Such analytical methods are only able at best to offer guidelines and describe trends, they do not have the precision of mathematical formulae."

IV. The Fund for Peace – Pauline Baker
Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse[38]

In an effort to provide practitioners with a systematic methodology for early warning and assessment of divided societies at risk of violent upheaval, The Fund for Peace has developed an analytical model of internal conflict (by which is meant ethnic or identity conflict)[39] and state collapse[40]. It is designed for practical application in order to measure and monitor the likelihood of intergroup violence and state collapse, and to evaluate whether, and in what ways, the international community may contribute toward promoting peace. The aim of the model is also set at enhancing clarity of mission, unity of effort, inter-agency coordination, and implementation of transition strategies for sustainable security.

The model is based on the assumption that state failure is a primary cause of internal or ethnic conflict, not the reverse. It posits state building as the basis of a potential strategy for resolving or managing such conflict. The model therefore focuses on sustainable security[41] instead of the ending of violence or signing of peace agreement as a measure to determine when to wind down external peace operations. On the policy side, then, the model stresses the importance of building the core state institutions of police, military, civil service and system of justice. The model consists of a framework which tracks a conflict through five stages. Twelve indicators on ethnic conflict and state collapse are used, which may be evaluated with various data.

KEY INDICATOR CATEGORIES
A. Social indicators
1. Mounting demographic pressures
2. Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies
3. legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
4. chronic and sustained human flight
B. Economic indicators
5. uneven economic development along group lines
6. sharp and/or severe economic decline
C. Political/military indicators
7. criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state
8. progressive deterioration of public services
9. suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights
10. security apparatus operates as a state within a state
11. rise of fractionalized elites
12. intervention of other states or external political actors

Figure 31: Key indicator categories of Fund for Peace conflict model.

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[38] Sources: Baker, P., J. Ausink (1996) State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model, in *Parameters* (Spring), pp. 19-31; Baker, P., A. Weller (1998) *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners*, Washington, D.C.: The Fund for Peace.

[39] Internal conflict is defined in the model of Baker (1998: 9) as "any conflict or dispute based on communal or social group identity, including language, race, religion, sect, ethnicity, caste, class, clan, or some combination of these".

[40] A collapsing state in Bakers model (1998: 10) is "one that is losing physical control of its territory, forfeiting the authority to make collective decisions for the national population, lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and cannot interact in formal relations with other states as a fully functioning member of the international community".

[41] Sustainable security may not be achieved by relying on an acceptable political framework that will mitigate conflict among internal conflicting factions. If state structures have collapsed or have been politically compromised by coming under the control of competing factions, then it will be necessary to combine the political framework with a strategy to rebuild the core state institutions.

Baker (1998) points out the methodological limits of her model. It should not be construed as a paradigm for all conflicts, nor should it be seen as a prescription for specific policies, a formula for predicting responses, or a mechanism for addressing questions of political will or national interest. She compares the methodological approach of her model to medical science, since it can be no more than making a diagnosis on the basis of "...the appearance of clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through testing, some merely observable by expert assessment" (1998: 14). The model therefore postulates clusters of leading societal indicators of state decay.

Determining intensity and stages of conflict

The conceptual framework identifies five stages and one major 'decision point' (whether the conflict will remain non-violent or become violent) between the stages two and three. In particular with regard to this decision-point, it is important to pay special attention to concepts of leadership, velocity of failure and the quality of peace. For the first two stages, the indicators may serve as early warnings. The stages three through five can be of assistance in policy assessments.

STAGES OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	
Stage 1: Analysis of *root causes*	e.g. historical background, socioeconomic composition, environment that predisposes a society *towards fragmentation.*
Stage 2: Identification of *precipitating events*	e.g. discriminatory policies, collapsed empires, coups d'état or political assassinations that lead a state *from fragmentation to friction.*
Stage 3: *State transition*	State is in transition *toward becoming a new entity.* Transition may be violent (full scale conflict, secession, ethnic cleansing, disintegration) or non-violent (negotiations, reforms, power-sharing).
Stage 4: State *transformation*	A violent transformation may result in military victory, ethnic domination, warlordism, unresolved conflict. A non-violent transformation may result in elections, peaceful partition, conflict resolution, new state structures.
Stage 5: Outcome	Continuum between chaos and constitutionalism.

Figure 32: Five stages of conflict in the Fund for Peace conceptual framework.

Scaling on the intensity of conflict

Indicators should not be applied in a mechanistic way that ignores individual characteristics of a society. The intensity-assessment is rated on a scale from 1 to 10. For some indicators, this can be quantitatively measured, otherwise it could be an informed judgement.

| Indicators Niwanda	Application #1 1973	Application #2 1992
1	0	1
2	0	1
3	5	6
4	0	1
5	5	6
6	0	5
7	0	5
8	0	5
9	0	1
10	0	5
11	0	5
12	0	1
TOTAL	10	42

Figure 33: Trendline indicators of the Fund for Peace model (Baker, 1998: 42).

To establish the extent of danger, one must look at trend lines, by evaluating the frequency and intensity of the indicators over time. If these intensify, then the state is on the road to violence or collapse. In case of a diminishment, the state is on its way to recovery, which however does not necessarily mean that the root causes of conflict have been resolved. Collectively, the indicators provide a 'snapshot' of the condition of a state at one moment in time. Succeeding ones can be used to assess trends. Baker emphasizes the importance of constant monitoring on all twelve indicators, because a change in any one may affect the others.

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
The model is of specific significance by demonstrating the importance of a clear objective. For Baker, the target is establishing sustainable security (including the four core institutions, instead of only the political framework). The model has adopted a state-oriented approach, which is reflected in the choice on key indicator categories. In this regard, the model is clearly in line with the research findings of the Causes of Conflict in the Third World (CODW) research of Clingendael, that has demonstrated the central role of political institutions and state capacity in explaining conflict.

The Fund for Peace, however, remains too general in approach. One of main reasons for this is that it aims at providing a framework for broad application (diplomats, mediators, humanitarian workers, military commanders, representatives of governmental and international organizations, policy-makers). This complicates the effort to focus on particular response options. The reference that is made to responses and policy tools, consequently, remains very general.


Figure 34: Conceptual framework Fund for Peace (Baker, 1998: 16).

V.   Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) Analytical Model for Early Warning and Response[42]

The FEWER consortium had as its purpose to set up an independent early warning system with the participation of various UN agencies, NGO's and other players and to elaborate strategic policy alternatives for decision makers. The rationale behind the establishment of the consortium was that no early warning models existed to collect information from various sources and at the same time present clear cut alternatives for action. The FEWER model therefore should allow for structured studies of complex disasters and violent conflicts.

FEWER has recently (December 1998) developed a manual for early warning and early response, which it considers to be a "...provisional framework for understanding trends in areas of potential and actual conflict, as well as identifying approaches for conflict prevention" (page 3). Yet, the manual may also be used as a tool to identify common ground and common strategies for peace among protagonists in a conflict situation.

The analytical model consists of two parts, the first one focusing on early warning and the second one on responses. According to the FEWER manual both parts of the model need to be used and get equal attention. It is also stressed that attention to the emergence of conflict and its management is not sufficient, Instead, the focus needs to be on conflict *and* peace, in order to be able to identify when opportunities for peace emerge, as well as how initiatives for peace can be supported.

Steps for *early warning* include, first of all, understanding the context by addressing issues as *what* factors contribute to conflict and peace, *where* is the conflict located, and *when* has the conflict or peace process started (all in terms of political, economic, socio-cultural and institutional terms). Key actors and their motivations should also be identified. Together, these factors establish the framework for analysis. The second step is the identification of conflict indicators to monitor the conflict dynamics and its development (see the list of indicators at the end of this description). A third step analyses the situation by categorizing the indicators as structural factors, triggers, or accelerators, and assessing the relative importance of the different indicators and their interrelationships. In a final step, opportunities for peace need to be identified. This means that the windows of opportunity for peacemaking need to be clarified, i.e. the events that could allow for peace initiative. Potential mediators and facilitators should be identified, as well as possible options and agenda items.

EXAMPLARY INDICATORS
A. Political indicators
1... human rights violations
2. internally-displaced peoples and refugees
3.   military intervention in political affairs
B. Socio-cultural indicators
4.   lack of access to mass media
5.   discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds
C. Institutional indicators
6.   failure of rule of law
7.   weakness of state institutions
8.   repression of civil society organizations

Figure 35: Some indicators suggested by FEWER.

The second part of the model focuses on steps for *response development*. First of all, instruments for conflict prevention need to be identified, and potential responses should be seen as an assimilation of

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[42] Sources: FEWER (1998) *Early Warning Resource; Manual for Early Warning and Early Response,* FEWER: London.

multi-level policy options. Responses need to be listed internationally, regionally and locally, as well as located within three operational spheres (political, economic, and socio-cultural). In this way, response options should be identified that are unique to the situation, actors and the region. A second step in the analysis of responses is to identify potential peace actors and institutions (internationally, (sub-)regionally and locally). Then, in step 3, the responses need to be placed in a time frame, in order to transform the situation by stages. In a final step all possible response options are evaluated to understand the feasibility and sustainability of the responses proposed. This evaluation should take the following issues into consideration:

1. *What are the response consequences?*
   Better understanding of the potential impact on relevant parties, those directly and indirectly involved. Prediction on the type, size, timing and intensity of the effects.
2. *Who is for/against or neutral in relation to the response (power and priority)?*
   Analysis of the position of key actors, to predict the relative strength of support and opposition, and hence the viability of the response.
3. *What are the alliance configurations?*
   Mapping of direction and strength of influence among groups and organizations, in order to identify common agendas.
4. *What are the organizational/political changes likely to occur?*
   Analysis of opportunities to influence change, in an attempt to identify changing dynamics of the situation (e.g. change of leadership in an organization).
5. *What are the opportunities and possible approaches to effect changes?*
   Identify actions that may improve or reinforce the feasibility of responses (e.g. alteration of public perception, mobilization of institutional support and ways of responding to opposing factions).

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
Rather than being a model for standardized assessment and pre-specified monitoring on indicators of conflict situations, FEWER presents a framework for discussion. This follows from the objective of the model to provide an input for political decisions on conflict prevention. For this purpose, quantitative crisis indicators alone do not suffice. Hence, FEWER does not provide a generic model for conflict assessment, but a case-specific approach.

Although the model does not suffice as a framework for generic and standardized conflict assessment and prediction, it gives relevant suggestions as to what should be taken into consideration when developing a framework. In particular the part on response development contains interesting elements with regard to the evaluation of policy responses, instruments, and combinations of options.

Figure 36: Potential indicators, included in the FEWER manual.

Possible indicators[1]

Structural Factors
Political
Military and security
- security expenditure
- growing illicit arms trade
- -number of private security firms

Unstable social structure
- changing elites

Unwillingness to effectively govern
- human rights abuses
- constitutional abuses
- abuses of power

Inability to effectively govern
- systemic instability
- unconsolidated power
- illegitimacy
- incomplete territorial control

Economic
Internal Economic Stability
- prevalence of poverty
- degree of unemployment
- inflation/ price stability
- access to social security/welfare
- pronounced social stratification

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[1] Drawn from the Africa Peace Forum, PIOOM Foundation, Rassian Academy of Sciences/Institute of Ethnology, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/Centre for Documentation and Research, and the University of Maryland

- income disparities
- land distribution

Environmental
- agricultural failure
- pollution
- environmental disaster

Mismanagement
- disparity and inequality
- corruption

Instability
- macro-economic instability

Socio-cultural
Media and Propaganda
- inflammatory statements
- exploitation of divisions/tensions

Institutions and Events
Religious institutions
- antagonistic behaviour
- propaganda

Police and judiciary
- institutional bias

Institutional
- lack of civil institutions
- link between populous-government

Accelerators
Political
Domestic insecurity
- inability, on the part of the state, to deliver security and stability
- security forces on the streets
- inability to maintain territorial control
- imposition of curfews

Population movements
- civilian movement across border
- restriction of movement into and out of the state
- IDP's and refugees

Political opposition/ Government oppression
- proliferation of opposition groups
- frequency of political arrests
- miniaturisation of dissent
- problems processing dissent
- disillusionment with security apparatus
- dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs
- unfulfilled expectations
- general despair (linked to justice, economic welfare, personal/family security)

Consolidation of opposition
- increased opposition activity
- increase in size and cohesion of opposition groups

Economic
International confidence
- capital flight
- foreign debt
- currency stability
- foreign exchange reserves

Economic decline
- increasing poverty/ economic disparity
- food shortages

Socio-cultural
Ethnicity
- ethnic tension/violence
- historical rivalries
- territorial disputes

- antagonistic behaviour
- institutionalised persecution
- language laws

Triggers
Political
Human rights
- freedom of expression
- freedom of movement
- freedom of religion
- freedom of assembly

Integrity of elections
- electoral fraud
- voter intimidation

Internal political instability
- changing alliances
- purging of persons of doubtful loyalty
- politically motivated arrests
- dominant political positions/ideologies and their impact of peace and stability

Government policy
- new discriminatory policies
- increased tension between regime supporters and opposition groups
- mass human rights abuses

External intervention
- external support for opposition groups
- threat of intervention

Cross-border activity
- military build-ups
- cross-border shootings

Levels of violence
- political assassinations
- political violence
- ethnic violence

VI. FAST – Swiss Foreign Ministry
Pilot Study for an Early Warning System[43]

FAST [Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding] is a pilot study for an out-of-government early warning center, functioning in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. The early warning system should be in the interest of various departments of the Swiss Foreign Ministry: the General Secretariat, the section Peace Policies and OSCE, and the section Development Cooperation. The effort, undertaken by the Swiss Peace Foundation and funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, is described as "…an early warning chain-system going all the way from monitoring, collection and dissemination of information up to analysis, evaluation, risk assessment and finally presentation of policy options and scenarios credible enough to convince policy-makers about the need for early action" (Kohlschütter, 1998). As an applied early warning project it should make the warning-response link an integral part of its activities. Hence a system with several component parts was created "…that links the collection of information to analysis and analysis to policy recommendations" (Krummenacher and Schmeidl, s.a.). The key element of the system is said to be the fact that it is embedded into the political decision making process due to institutionalized access to high level decision makers, which should increase the likelihood of early action and conflict prevention.

OBJECTIVE OF 'FAST'
1. Instrument for facilitating effective preventive diplomacy
2. Enabling the Swiss administration to recognize and act upon a crisis as early as possible
3. Enhancing the "institutionalized pressure" for such early decision-making

Figure 37: Objectives of FAST.

The project is highly ambitious, as it describes the system to be
- Functional and operational on a rather short term basis, but also based on (computerized) early warning models and indicator clusters which lend themselves to constant refinement, scientific testing, and adjustments as needed by political practitioners;
- Multi-departmental, multi-purpose and multi-directional;[44]
- Structured and equipped so as to monitor and collect different levels and types of data;

The components of FAST, then, consist of: a time frame of early warning, with a focus on proximate or short-term conditions (3-6 months); an holistic approach to early warning, including pre-crisis, in-crisis, and post-crisis stages of conflict; armed conflict as a flexible dependant variable; and a multimethod approach to supplement quantitative with qualitative approaches.

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[43] Sources: Kohlschütter, A. (1997) FAST: A Pilot Study for an Early Warning System for the Swiss Foreign Ministry, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Krummenacher, H., S. Schmeidl (s.a.) *FAST: An Integrated and Interactive Early Warning System*, Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution, SDC Department of Foreign Affairs.

[44] Kohlschütter (1998): "…the data and information to be monitored and the geographical areas to be covered satisfying the early warning requirements of different agencies in the Swiss MFA. On the one hand there is the more globally oriented political department, looking after Swiss interests worldwide (trade, investments, migration, terrorism, proliferation, etc.) and concentrating on the 53 OSCE states, especially those in transition from communism to democratic civil societies; on the other hand, the more narrow and third-world-focused development cooperation agency which concentrates on some 16 focal countries with major foreign aid projects.

FAST EARLY WARNING CHAIN						
ACTIVITY	Assessing country background conditions	Choosing relevant conflict · indicators	Monitoring flow of events (event analysis)	Risk assessment based on quantitative or qualitative research	Round table with policy makers	Monitoring of actions taken
PHASE	1	2	3	4	5	6
PRODUCT	Country risk profiles	Factsheets	Tension barometers	Risk assessment	Presenting policy options	Evaluation paper

Figure 38: FAST early warning chain, taken from H. Krummenacher and S. Schmeidl (s.a.).

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework

The system's objectives and fields of operation are very extensive, and its operationalization appears highly complex. Moreover, since the system is supposed to function outside the structures of the Ministry (the end-user), the presentation of the warnings are of significance, and should be able to convince the policy makers. This differs from a conflict and policy assessment framework that is used within an organization, and provides 'in-house' (political) warnings. This however is described by Krummenacher and Schmeidl (*s.a.*) as the main relevance of FAST: it is a "one-of a kind" project and learning experience on the impact of direct access to policy makers on actual response to other early warning systems.

FAST includes a large number of methodologies and techniques to provide policy makers with early warnings. With the various objectives, different users, wide variety in policy fields, and global coverage in mind, we are afraid that the system cannot be more than very general in its assessments and response recommendations. Although direct access may exist between academics and policy makers, this appears to be the case in a 'producer'-type relationship, in which the results are presented to the policy makers. Whereas it may provide an important learning experiment on how access to policy makers impacts on early responses, we think the high level of ambition provides an argument as well for the necessity to be very specific on the objective, the user and the policy instruments, in order for the framework to hold operational value.

VII. Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework[45]

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative dates back to October 1996, and was initiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The emphasis is put on peacebuilding[46] and human security. Whereas the overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence, it ultimately aims at building human security,[47] a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security. Hence, the focus is on the political and socioeconomic context of conflict, rather than the military or humanitarian one, and has as its aim to institutionalize peaceful resolution of conflict. In this regard, it should be noted that the effort is very general in nature, directed at a broad policy framework and structural conflict prevention.[48]

The Initiative has selected four specific topics for further policy development: small arms proliferation, gender dimensions of peacebuilding, free media development, and the impact of armed conflict on children. In the area of preparedness, the Initiative focuses on "identifying and assessing Canadian peacebuilding capacity and training skills", "enhancing and promoting peacebuilding knowledge in Canadian academic and research facilities", "developing a stand-by Canadian peacebuilding capacity, ready for deployment", and "conducting ongoing analysis of conflict situations to allow Canada to define priorities and pinpoint interventions on a proactive basis" (DFAIT, 1998).

For some years, John Cockell has been involved in the work at DFAIT, and he has focused his attention on conflict assessments for use in the policy context, in a call for more response-oriented warnings and an action-oriented approach. In this approach, the focus should be on how and why there is a potential for escalation, as a first step to identifying priority areas for preventive engagement. In short, response-oriented analysis should address issues of strategic targeting and the process link, in order to have an interactive relationship between the analytical framework and the operational response policy-making mechanism.

However, the work has mainly been done on a personal title. Cockell is currently involved in early warning policy development and training for the UN department of Political Affairs, and the UN Staff College, in a project called "Early Warning and Preventive Measures: Building UN Capacity". It is based on an applied policy planning approach to linking early warning analysis with UN capacity for preventive measures.

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[45] Sources: Cockell, J. (1997) Peacebuilding and Human Security: International Responses to the Politics of Internal Conflict, draft for discussion; Cockell, J. (1997) Towards Response-Oriented Early Warning Analysis, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); DFAIT [Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] (1998) Canada and Peacebuilding; The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca..

[46] Peacebuilding may involve conflict *prevention*, conflict *resolution*, and *post-conflict activities*.

[47] The Fund for Peace is even more specific by focusing on *sustainable security*, clearly directed at the state and the core institutions.

[48] See also K. van Walraven (1999) Conflict Policy in Some Western Countries: Some Explorative Notes, *Clingendael Occasional Paper*, The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EARLY WARNING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	
SUGGESTIONS ON CHARACTER OF FRAMEWORK:	• Find a balance between a general model and detailed case specificity
	• Region-specific analytical frameworks in concert with regional capacity-building for preventive action
	• Focus on near-term trigger, rather than broader background factors
	• Information sharing in order to use field proximity of specific organizations to full advantage
SUGGESTIONS ON INDICATOR CATEGORIES (WITH A FOCUS ON THE OVERLAP AND DYNAMIC INTERACTION):	• status of governance/political process • polarization/potential for conflict • structural/societal tension • human rights violations • military/arms supply • external support • other context-specific factors

Figure 39: Source: Suggestions put forward by Cockell (1997) for an analytical framework for early warning.

VII. Creative Associates International, Inc.
A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace[49]

The work of Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) is strongly directed toward the response side of conflict prevention, as is suggested by use of the term 'toolbox'. The 'Guide to Practitioners' and its revised version is developed at the request of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, and executed by a multi-disciplinary team of regional experts, and specialists in conflict prevention, policy analysis, economics, democracy-building, civic society and development. The revised version furthermore has benefited from feedback from policy-makers and practitioners.

The most interesting part of the guide is indeed the one that focuses specifically on the toolbox. A broad array of policy interventions and instruments to prevent or mitigate conflict is analyzed, in particular in the context of the Greater Horn of Africa. Further, the guide examines the development of conflict prevention strategies and "...offers guidelines on how to build on an understanding of policy tools to develop coherent multi-tooled strategies to prevent or mitigate conflict, including the goals, tasks and issues in planning and implementing conflict prevention strategies", as the guide indicates.

The toolbox is developed as an attempt to address present shortcomings in established programs, which inhibit conflict preventive capabilities. This first of all is caused by often insufficient budgetary, staff and other resources. More importantly to address here, are the shortcomings in analysis of and approach to the conflict. These include for example: a dominant crisis—instead of prevention—orientation, a state-to-state focus, a focus on armed conflict as the cause of conflict, an inadequate link between general development assistance and conflict prevention, and detection without enforcement. The work on early warning indicators and preventive mechanisms is criticized for its gaps in the response structure, its fragmented coverage, inadequate knowledge and feedback, and the neglect of existing prevention mechanisms.

CAII offers a systematic approach that specifies objectives, policy tools and timeframes for action, and offers an eight-step approach:

CAII EIGHT-STEP APPROACH	
1. Track national transitions	Understanding of the sources and nature of local conflicts
2. Set goals	Choose strategic priorities and establish goals and objectives
3. Assess national needs and tasks	Policy-makers must pinpoint key policy sectors, and tasks to reach the specified goals
4. Choose tools	Determine the mix of policy options each goal requires, assess the effects, and determine where new initiatives must fill gaps
5. Identify implementing partners	Determine which internal and external partners may best implement policy interventions
6. Time interventions	Policy options vary according to stages of conflict, and some must be sequenced
7. Coordinate responses	Spell out actors' responsibilities and mandates
8. Plan the exit strategy	Define criteria for disengagement

Figure 40: The CAII eight-step approach to conflict preventive interventions.

The analysis is organized by the stage of conflict (stable peace, unstable peace, crisis, war, post-conflict crisis, post-conflict unstable peace, and reconciliation), and for each stage a separate framework is developed that includes illustrative issues as regards the environment for interventions, the timeframe for action, the primary objectives, and policy tools.

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[49] Sources: Creative Associates International, Inc. (1998) *Preventing and Mitigating Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners*, http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai

The tools, as indicated in figure 41 are then assessed, following the format of a *description* of the tool (objectives, expected outcome or impact, and relationship to conflict prevention), a discussion of the tool's *implementation* (organizers, participants, activities, cost considerations, set-up time and timeframe), a summary of the *conflict context* in which to apply the tool (stage and type of conflict, cause of conflict, prerequisites for effective implementation), an in-depth illustration of *past practice*, and an *evaluation* of the tool (strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned).

POLICY TOOLS INCLUDED IN THE ASSESSMENT BY CAII
a. Official Diplomacy
Special envoys
b. Non-Official Conflict Management
Non-official facilitation Peace commissions Indigenous conflict management
c. Military Measures
Confidence and security-building measures Military professionalization and reform Military restructuring and integration Military demobilization Preventive deployment
d. Economic and Social Measures
Conditionality Sanctions and embargoes Economic and resource cooperation Humanitarian assistance Development assistance Power-sharing arrangements National conferences Political institution-building Electoral assistance Civic society-building
e. Political Development and Governance
Decentralization of power Judicial/legal reform Police reform War crimes tribunals/truth commissions
f. Communication and Education
Peace media Media professionalization

Figure 41: Tools that are assessed by CAII (1998).

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
The Guide holds a lot of interesting information for the development of a conflict and policy assessment framework, in particular as a result of its response orientation. The extensive assessment of policy tools may even be said to be novel. However, due to the general nature of the guide, which is said to be for "practitioners", it cannot come to specific suggestions of a framework and therefore remains largely illustrative. The Guide further provides a larger framework that includes 8 'steps' to take before coming to actual intervention. The inclusion of setting goals and defining tasks enables the framework to become more specific and realistic. Since the focus of this 'model' is on policy tools, the actual conflict potential assessment—as was the main focus of the major part of the here included prognostication models—is developed to a lesser extent. Indeed, the emphasis is on how to respond effectively (whether proactive or reactive) instead of how to anticipate.

IX. State Failure Project Phase II
Policy Recommendations[50]

Whereas the first phase of the State Failure Project, as described in the previous chapter was a search for viable generic indicators for state failure, the second phase of the project was directed towards refining and specifying the generic model. This was done by testing the importance of the indicators, and applying the model to the Sub-Saharan African context. Whereas the generic model held its value, it was agreed that further refinement could be made by including additional dimensions[51].

Also a closer examination was undertaken on the democracy dimension. As the task force (1998: viii) reports, "[a]mong the most interesting results from this model was that partial democracies were on average 11 times as likely to suffer severe political crises than autocracies, and that, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, having a more urban population increases the risk of state failure only in poorer states".

From the findings, the Task Force infers some policy implications, that ask for a mix of context-specific policy responses:
- Involvement in international trade is associated with a lower risk of state failure in virtually all states and all contexts.[52]
- Partial democracies—particularly in lower-income countries where the quality of life remains poor—are associated with elevated risks of failure.
- Material living standards have an undeniable effect on the risks of state failure.
- Despite the prevalence of ethnic conflicts—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa—ethnic discrimination or domination is not the sole, or even the most important, correlate of state failure.
- Environmental stress, vulnerability, and capacity form an interdependent triad that affects quality of life, and, indirectly, the risk of state failure.
- Newer democracies, especially in countries where quality of life is relatively low, are more likely to fail than long-lived ones.

For future research, the task force indicates:
- Forming a better understanding of the conditions of successful democratic transitions.
- Further developing the concept that the impact of environmental degradation on state failure is mediated by vulnerability and capacity[53], and more thorough testing of the model.
- Developing a more detailed concept of 'state capacity' to test as a mediating factor in general and regional models.
- Investigating the usefulness of pilot studies of event data for bridging the gap between model-based risk assessments and early warnings.
- Investigating the impact of international support on the risk of state failure.

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[50] Sources: Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1995) *Working Papers State Failure Task Force Report;* Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1997) The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning, in J. Davies, T. Gurr (eds.) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems,* Colorado: Boulder (manuscript); Esty, D., J. Goldstone, T. Gurr et. al. (1998) *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings.*

[51] For the regional model, this included indicators on urban share of the population; type of colonial heritage; and the presence of ethnic discrimination.

[52] However, it is not the eventual prosperity that trade provides, but the involvement in international trade itself that is the key to this effect. This is a result of the observation that free trade helps bring together coalitions of elite actors that support the rule of law and stable property relationships (Solingen in State Failure Project, 1998: 29).

[53] Task Force (1998: 23): "Vulnerability is the degree to which crop yields might be expected to fall in the absence of effective intervention. It might be measured through extent of irrigation or sensitivity of crops to rainfall. Capacity is the degree to which the government and social actors are able to lower the actual impact, and might be measured as the size of the government budget, number of scientifically trained experts, or extent of communications infrastructure.

Relevance of the model for the policy context and a conflict and policy assessment framework
The State Failure Task Force has tried to refine the concept of democracy and its role in conflict development. The importance of intensity has been included by focusing on partial democracies (i.e. *partial* democracies being more likely to suffer state failure), and the time aspect is emphasized by including a time frame of democracy being established (i.e. *newer* democracies being more likely to suffer state failure).

The Task Force also emphasizes the importance of developing conflict impact assessments in order to better trace the effect of international interventions on the risk of state failure.