THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BEYOND
Reearch and Development Center - Intercollege
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Nicosia, 21-23/X/1999

a. Programme
1. "The Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation"/ Roberto Aliboni (+ sintesi)
2. "Changes in the East Mediterranean security situation: implications for American policy"/ Glen D. Camp
3. "Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the European Union"/ Andreas Theophanous
4. "Greek-Turkish relations: hostages of confrontation or beneficiaries of cooperation?"/ Ismail Kemal
5. "The Arab-Israeli conflict: the role of external actors"/ Emad Gad

The New Geopolitical Environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond

Thursday, October 21,1999

OPENING AND GREETINGS

6.00-6.10 p.m.   Andreas Theophanous, Director of the Research and Development Center - Intercollege and of the MA Program in International Relations at Intercollege

6.10-6.20 p.m.   Theodore Couloumbis, Director-General, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece

6.20-6.30 p.m.   Kyriakos Rodoussakis, Ambassador of Greece to Cyprus

6.30-6.40 p.m.   Opening Address by Ambassador Miguel Angel Moratinos, EU Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process

6.40-8.00 p.m.   RECEPTION

Friday, October 22, 1999
SESSION I : THE BROADER REGION: THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL MAP

Chair: THEODORE COULOUMBIS

9.30-9.50 a.m.   **Roy Allison**
Head of the Russia and CIS Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, UK
The Security Aspect of Regional Groupings and Blocks from the Black Sea to Central Asia

9.50-10.10 a.m.   **Rafael Biermann**
Research Fellow, Centre for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn, Germany
The New Agenda for Euro-Atlantic Security

10.10-10.30 a.m.   **Robert E. Ebel**
Director, Energy and National Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA
Caspian Oil, Energy Routes and the New Security Agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Broader Area

10.30-11.00 a.m.   DISCUSSION

11.00-11.30 a.m.   COFFEE BREAK

Chair: STELIOS S. STAVRIDIS

11.30-11.50 a.m.   **Philip Gordon**
Director of European Affairs, National Security Council, USA
Redefining the US Presence and the New Role of NATO

11.50-12.10 p.m.   **Nadejda Arbatova**
Head, Department of European Political Studies, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Russia's Emerging New Role in the Area

12.10-12.30 p.m.   **Elizabeth Abela**
Adviser at the OSCE Secreteriat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Section for External Cooperation, Austria
The Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE: Confidence Building in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

12.30-1.00 p.m.   DISCUSSION

1.00-3.00 p.m.   LUNCH BREAK

Chair : ANDREAS THEOPHANOUS

3.00-3.20 p.m.   **Roberto Aliboni**
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
The Eastern Mediterranean in the Context of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation

3.20-3.40 p.m.   **Thanos Dokos**
Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece
The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

3.40-4.00 p.m.   **Glen D. Camp**
Professor of Political Science, Social Science Department, Bryant College, USA
Changes in the East Mediterranean Security Situation: Implications for American Policy

4.00-4.30 p.m.   DISCUSSION/ END OF SESSION

Saturday, October 23, 1999
SESSION II : RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Chair : DAVID ANDERSON

9.00-9.20 a.m.   **Henri J. Barkey**
State Department Official, Policy Planning Staff, State Department USA
US Policy Toward the Triangle Athens-Nicosia-Ankara

9.20-9.40 a.m.   **Theodore Couloumbis**
Director-General, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece
Imprisoned in History? The Challenge of a Changing World

9.40-10.00 a.m.   **Christos Iakovou**
Research Fellow, The Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, Israel
The Crisis of the Turkish State and the Implications for Greco-Turkish Relations

10.00-10.30 a.m.   DISCUSSION

10.30-11.00 a.m.   COFFEE BREAK

Chair: NADEJDA ARBATOVA

11.00-11.20 a.m.   **Robert Rotberg**
Adj. Professor of Public Policy, President of the World Peace Foundation, Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention, Belfer Center, Kennedy School, Harvard University, USA
Prospects for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem

11.20-11.40 a.m.   **Andreas Theophanous**
Director of the Research and Development Center - Intercollege and of the MA Program in International Relations at Intercollege
Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the European Union

11.40-12.00 noon   **Ismail Kemal**
Researcher, Department of Turkish Studies, University of Cyprus
Turkish-Greek Relations: Hostages of Confrontation or Beneficiaries of Cooperation

12.00-12.30 p.m.   DISCUSSION/END OF SESSION

12.30-12.50 p.m.   COFFEE BREAK

SESSION III : ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Chair : THANOS DOKOS

12.50-1.10 p.m.   **Moshe Ma'oz**
Professor, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Prospects for Peace between Israel and Syria and the Day After

1.10-1.30 p.m.   **Ibrahim Arafat**
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt
Military Cooperation between Israel and Turkey and Security Implications for the Broader Area

1.30-1.50 p.m.   DISCUSSION

1.50-3.40 p.m.   LUNCH BREAK

Chair : ANDREAS THEOPHANOUS

3.40-4.00 p.m.   **Emad Gad**
Expert at the International Relations Unit, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (CPSS), Egypt
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Role of External Actors

4.00-4.20 p.m.   **Shmuel Sandler**
Chairman, Department of Political Science, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University (RA), Israel
Israel and the Arab World in the Post-Cold War Environment: the International Crisis Perspective

4.20-4.40 p.m.   DISCUSSION/ END OF SYMPOSIUM

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organised by
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and
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(ELIAMEP), Greece

Venue: Intercollege Amphitheater
Nicosia, Cyprus
October 21-23, 1999

RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
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ELIAMEP

A Symposium on

The New
Geopolitical
Environment
in the Eastern
Mediterranean
and Beyond

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
IN THE CONTEXT OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CO-OPERATION

Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Different circles of co-operation

The Eastern Mediterranean concept remains partly heir to Cold-War geopolitics, when it focused on Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, other countries on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean being referred to as Levant, Near East or Middle East. The concept was first and foremost strategic in its character, as it alluded to Greece's and Turkey's membership in NATO as well as to their special geographic location and military posture with respect to the communist world (Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact countries).

As matter of fact, however, Eastern Mediterranean identified also an issue which has lived out the end of the Cold War, namely the Greek-Turkish dispute and Cyprus' entanglement in it. The endurance of the Greek-Turkish dispute as well as the failure to solve Cyprus' issue make it sensible to retain the concept of Eastern Mediterranean even today. Still, one has to account for the fact that, while the focus on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus continues, the context of such focus has changed remarkably, by including, further to the Levant and the Northern Tier's countries (another geopolitical concept coming from the Cold War) i.e. Iraq and Iran, the Black Sea adjoining areas and the Balkans, which play completely new roles with respect to the old Eastern Mediterranean focus. It is to this enlarged and fresh notion of Eastern Mediterranean that this paper makes reference to.

Today's Eastern Mediterranean area is part to various formats or circles of co-operation. Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO, the Partnership for Peace, and the OSCE. Besides, they are both members of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation as well as a number of sub-regional co-operative arrangements regarding South-eastern Europe. Important circles of co-operation, however, do cut across Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with the EU and WEU, where Greece and Turkey statuses differ significantly, while Cyprus is in a transition towards full EU membership (the outcome with respect to its partition lookung still unclear). Furthermore, Eastern Mediterranean is divided by different cultural kinship and political alliances with respect to the European East and the Caucasus area as well as the Levant and the Middle East.

Greece and the Greek Cypriots are strongly linked to the world of Orthodox faith, from Serbia through Russia. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, despite domestic jacobeanism, tend to link up with Muslim countries and peoples internationally. This combinations are first and foremost determined by structural, long-term factors. Partly, however, are the result of the very basic dispute characterising the Eastern Mediterranean area. This appears especially true with respect to the Middle East — the Levant in particular — where respective relations with Arab countries and Israel are strongly commanded by national security reasons.

In this context, what are the significance and role of the 1995-born Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP) to the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region and the countries it comprises?

As it is well known, the EMP is an international understanding enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration, whereby 27 signatory Partners — the 15 members of the EU plus Cyprus, Israel, Malta, Turkey, the Palestinian National Authority and six Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) — have established a so-called holistic or multi-dimensional arrangement of co-operation contemplating political, security, economic-financial and cultural relations with a view to enhance "peace and stability" as well as "prosperity" in the region.

EMP's trends and results have been widely commented (1). It is not worth going back to this debate here. With respect to Eastern Mediterranean problems, four issues have to be highlighted, instead: (a) the multilateral character of the EMP and the inherently indivisible character of its security concept; (b) the comprehensive security notion the EMP has adopted and its tendency to move less towards the achievement of security than broad partnership-building; (c) the role of the EMP with respect to Turkey; (d) the role of the Black Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean countries' national security.

Sub-regionalism in the EMP

In a scheme of security co-operation — so much so in a scheme based on co-operative security (2) — security must have an indivisible character, in the sense that no factor or measure must increase one country's security while diminishing that of other countries. For this reason, security co-operation must be achieved in principle in a multilateral context where a kind of "most favoured nation" clause is working. In the starkly-opposed but strategically-homogeneous Cold-War context of the CSCE, such indivisibility helped the countries involved to build up a common framework of security and attenuating security dilemmas. It was the strategic coherence of the context that allowed the CSCE members to gradually achieve an equal security by applying the same measures.

The area encompassed by the EMP, far from being strategically consistent, is highly fragmented. In this area there are many disputes and conflicts, each one fostered by different factors, like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western Sahara dispute, and the Greek-Turkish dispute, just to mention the most important ones. These conflicts cannot be brought to a common denominator. Consequently, the establishment within the EMP of security measures pertaining to the whole of the Mediterranean has proved practically unfeasible. To be fair, in the debate on this point which took place in the past four years in the EMP, it was the Arab-Israeli conflict to highight the incongruity between the Mediterranean setting and the aim of establishing a multilateral scheme of security co-operation (3). Still, it is clear that parties to other conflicts or disputes in the Mediterranean would raise objections similar to those put forward by the Arabs towards the establishment of CBMs or CSBMs in what they perceive as a unique political and military context.

In the relations between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey a number of CBMs and CSBMs have been implemented (4). These measures are strictly linked to the situation of the Eastern Mediterranean area, however, and could progress in the sub-regional context only.

The experience made so far suggests that the EMP cannot be a surrogate for bilateral or sub-regional negotiations, by taking into account specific factors and trends. This is not say that the EMP is a useless, perhaps dangerous "rationalist" gadget. The problem the EMP and their members are facing is to finding out the right level for taking joint action. This level cannot be singled out that easily. It cannot be so specific as to interfere with

sub-regional or bilateral relations; at the same time, must not be so broad as to get void. With respect to these questions, current negotiations on the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability (5) may bring about a more operational EMP in its own multilateral context. First, the EMP is beginning to set out a new generation of measures which are directed at building broad confidence and transparency with a view to increase partnership rather than fostering military security (like it was the case woth the CSCE/OSCE three generations of CBMs/CSBMs we are generally more familiar with). These CBMs/CSBMs have been called Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs) by the EMP *ad hoc* ministerial conference which took place in Palermo in June 1998. One such PBMs approved in the EMP context relates to joint action in case of natural or man-made disasters. This PBM contemplates a co-operation between national civil protection services. It is close to the kind of peace support operations defined as Petersberg tasks in the WEU/EU circle.

Second, while the current draft of the Euro-Med Charter stresses security indivisibility as a pivotal principle in regulating relations among Partners, there are pressures in the EMP towards adopting a certain degree of flexibility in the implementation of such indivisibility. The implementation of the above mentioned PBM on disaster, when considered in more detail (6) is an example of such flexibility. On the other hand, while the Euro-Med Charter asserts security indivisibility, it points out the principle of voluntary participation as well. The outcome of this debate on flexibility will be very important for the EMP to be enabled to support sub-regional conflicts or crises. Eastern Mediterranean could take advantage from this flexibility as well as other Mediterranean sub-regions. At the occasion of the recent earthquakes in Turkey and Greece, collaboration between civil protection services emerged as a factor of confidence- and peace-bulding. In the event, the collaboration took place independently of the EMP, Still, it shows that the EMP is moving in the right direction.

Comprehensive security

Another important character of security in the EMP is its comprehensiveness, meaning that Euro-Mediterranean security is perceived as dependent on a plurality of factors of different nature rather than military factors only. This notion is clearly reflected in the Barcelona Declaration, where the achievement of the area of peace and stability contemplated by the first chapter is linked to the achievement of the area of shared prosperity envisaged by the second chapter as well as to the co-operation in the social, cultural and human realms of the third chapter. In the debates which brought about the establishment of the EMP the inherent linkage between these different factor with respect to the achievement of security was unequivocal. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the EU was willing to include in the new Mediterranean security initiative a notion of broad security that characterises the EU itself and its fundamental experiences in shaping security in Europe.

The difficulties in setting out a viable security co-operation in the military field, which have been illustrated previously, have accentuated the multi-dimensional character of security of the EMP and provided the latter with a concept which is definitely tilting towards non-military factors (and the possibility of taking joint action less in crises management and peace enforcement than in conflict prevention and peace-building). The decision to establish PBMs rather than CBMs/CSBMs is an evidence and a result of this trend towards a non-military concept of security in the EMP.

In principle, this trend would suggest a Euro-Med Partnership focusing on fostering economic and social development as well as strengthening the human dimension, the rule

of law and democratisation. On the Southern side, however, while the goal of social and economic development is welcome, that of strengthening human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance tends to be regarded as a destabilising intrusion. Problems relating to human rights and democratisation in the Eastern Mediterranean are not new. With respect to Turkey and the situation in Cyprus, the EMP is facing the same problems faced in EU-Turkey relations. Could the EMP help solving EU opposition with Turkey in relation to human rights and the rule of law? One may be sceptical thereon for a number of reasons.

The most cogent reason is not at all the weakness the EMP is showing in convincing the Southern Partners to move to different standards in the field of human rights, democracy and governance. It is now clear that the EMP perspective is one of long-term. In fact, many Partners may be even willing to converge towards similar Euro-Med standards in democracy, governance and human rights. At the same time, it is also clear that they cannot do it overnight. At the same time, Southern Mediterranean countries feel culturally different from Europe and want this difference to stay. For this reason, their convergence not only will take time but will be in any case different from the movement of re-identification of Eastern European countries towards their real or imaginary "mother Europe". This means that their convergence will be, so to speak, reduced in its character and purport with respect to what is expected from Eastern European countries.

After the end of the Cold War, the identity of Turkey is less clear than it used to be, and this is more true with respect to Europe than with respect to the West as a whole. This author believes that Turkey will remain a secular country despite the importance of its Muslim component. Still, it has to accommodate this religious component by including it in its secular polity rather than suppress it in an old-fashioned kemalist-jacobean way. On the other hand, Turkey must also find the way to accommodate its cultural differences, thus giving some degree of autonomy and identity to the Curds. If Turkey will be unable to come to terms with these problems, its convergence with Europe is destined to be also "reduced" in its character.

Eventually, this could be a solution leading to an EU-Turkey relationship similar to, say, EU-Egypt or EU-Israel relations. But it cannot be so, because Turkey is envisioning its participation in the EU as a full member rather than a "reduced" convergence with the EU in the long term. Consequently, the most cogent reason the EMP cannot act effectively with Turkey in a context of comprehensive security like the one prevailing in the EMP today, is precisely that Turkey wants to become a member of the EU and believes (correctly) that these issues of human rights and democracy must be solved in its bilateral relations with the EU rather than in the EMP.

In sum, when looking at the question from the point of view of comprehensive security and the prominence human rights and democracy do have in this very notion, the EMP doesn't look like the most appropriate instrument to deal with Turkey and to contribute to solving the Eastern Mediterranean dispute between the countries of the region. When it comes to such question, EU-Turkey relations seem more in order.

The role of the EMP with respect to Turkey

Let's elaborate a little bit on the point just raised, as it is crucial to the relations between the EMP and Eastern Mediterranean. If Turkey were really to go its own way as a power with a distinct identity from Europe and were to be happy with it, a "reduced" political and cultural convergence within the EMP — as it is the case with NATO — would be possible and bring co-operation to bear with the EU and its Eastern Mediterranean members. But,

despite recurrent declarations that Turkey will go its way no matters what Europe thinks or does, Ankara continues to envisage a special link with the EU, including membership. In this perspective, the EMP can be easily perceived by Turks as a discriminatory and divisive factor. If this were true, the EMP initiative would not help solving conflicts and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean area. On the contrary, it might exacerbate existing negative perceptions and make any action geared to conflict resolution more difficult than it is already.

Something more must be said on Turkish perceptions of the EMP and the contradictions its non-European location within the EMP seems to bring about. With the establishment of the latter, for the first time Turkey has found itself on the other side with respect to Europe. In a good number of international organisations, Turkey is siding with the West and Europe. In the EMP, it finds itself on the side of the Southern Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, while Cyprus and Malta are candidate to become members of the EU, the Turkish candidature has been rebuffed at the 1997 Luxembourg Council, thus confirming its non-European identification by the Europeans.

As we have pointed out in previous sections, the evolution of the EMP has put off to an indefinite time (the draft of the Charter approved in 1999 Stuttgart ministerial conference says "at the appropriate time") the achievement of the measures of arms control, arms limitation and disarmament envisaged by the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration including CBMs and CSBMs of military or military-related character. Still, the role of Turkey in the EMP military-related security co-operation remains an issue to be clarified. For Turkey is an EU ally in NATO and has a status in the WEU. This entanglement (and the one with NATO) cannot be overlooked in relation to the possible implementation of regimes of security co-operation between the EU and the Middle Eastern area.

The most intractable problem, however, is the trend of the EMP towards reinforcing its non-military notion of security, thus reinforcing its interest towards human rights and democracy. This trend complicates EU relations with its Southern Partners in the EMP, but creates a greater problem in Turkish European relations. For Turkey may accept to discuss its democratic deficit as a European country, much less so as a Southern Mediterranean one.

In this situation, no wonder if Turkey has maintained in the EMP a very low profile and expressed reservations (7??). The EMP exposes its problematic relationship with the EU vividly. In this sense, the EMP may tend to hindering rather than fostering regional crisis management and solving, to the extent (a very important extent) Eastern Mediterranean conflicts are related to Turkey-EU relations, instead.

Mediterranean and Black Sea

It must be pointed out that Turkey's reactions to the impact of the EMP on sub-regional security are not only negative. One significant discourse that emerges from the Turkish debate on Turkey's relations with EU points out the important convergence of Turkey and the EU on the Black Sea rather than the Mediterranean (8). This is a good argument both in the EU-Mediterranean and the Eastern Mediterranean sub-regional perspectives.

In the perspective of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean there is no doubt that the lesson of the last four years with the EMP is that there is no specific problem of security across the Mediterranean but a limited set of stability issues, generally related to social trends like immigration, criminality and the like. In the same years or so, the Balkans and Russia came up as problems of security strategically affecting the EU and the wider trans-Atlantic security system the European countries are linked to. There is no

doubt that from the EU point of view the Black Sea concerns areas more security-intensive than the Mediterranean Sea.

In the sub-regional perspective. that is the Eastern Mediterranean perspective, undoubtedly there is a convergence of security views between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey about the most relevant role the Black Sea adjoining areas do play with regard to respective national security and interests. To be sure, Greece is strongly supporting the EMP but — like all the EU countries — more because it is part of the Union's common ground than because of its real priority in the Greek national security and foreign policies. Like in the case of Italy, the EMP is an important complementary factor for the Mediterranean policy of the country but doesn't coincide with national priorities. The latter are elsewhere: for Italy as well as for Greece security concerns are related to the Balkans and Russia. In this sense, there is a convergence of national interests with Turkey.

Thus, Eastern Mediterranean countries' national interests look towards the same areas. Priorities are very similar. In these priorities the Mediterranean ranks lower than the Black Sea. In a sub-regional perspective of conflict resolution, this indication may be very important. It is important in the EU-Eastern Mediterranean relations as well. In the latter perspective, it suggests to give prominence to the Black Sea rather than the Mediterranean for the former may act as a unifying factor.

Conclusions

The paper has tried to comment on the significance and role of the 1995-born Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to Eastern Mediterranean and the countries it comprises.

Four issues have been highlighted: (a) the multilateral character of the EMP and the inherently indivisible character of its security concept; (b) the comprehensive security notion the EMP has adopted and its tendency to move less towards the achievement of security than broad partnership-building; (c) the role of the EMP with respect to Turkey; (d) the role of the Black Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean countries national security.

The multilateral character impressed on the EMP entails a more or less strict application of a principle of security indivisibility. The paper points out that in a strategic perspective the actual very fragmented character of the Mediterranean area makes the implementation of security indivisibility very difficult. The Eastern Mediterranean countries have already adopted a set of CBMs and CSBMs attuned to sub-regional and bilateral security requirement. The application of region-wide CBMs and CSBMs may not fit with specific situations, unless region-wide policies are implemented at a very general, maybe ineffective level. Within the EMP, however, the implementation of non-military related PBMs, like that providing co-operation between civil protection services in case of disasters, may help upgrading broad confidence and become a factor of co-operation in sub-regional situations, despite differences. Furthermore, there is trend in the EMP debate towards making the application of indivisibility more flexible.

After four years, it is clear that the EMP is putting off its ambitions of establishing a security co-operation comprising a strong military-related component and is directing itself towards a comprehensive security co-operation in which non-military factor have a strong prominence. In the European vision, these non-military factors, besides economic and social aid, would include important elements of human rights protection, democratisation and good governance. This tendency is opposed by Southern Partners, who would like to give prominence to economic development. The risk of this trend with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean is that it singles out Turkey by displacing its human

rights/democracy debate from a European circle, in which Turkey is available to discuss its position, to an exclusive non-European circle, where Turkey may feel it helpless and humiliating to negotiate.

The paper points out that, in more general terms, the role of the EMP towards Turkey may expose the problematic Turkish-EU relationship to the point of radicalising Ankara and generate a negative impact on the sub-regional conflict management and resolution perspective.

The paper concludes by highlighting the convergence of the EU, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey on the higher importance, from a sub-regional perspective, of the Black Sea co-operation with respect to co-operation in the Mediterranean. While this direction would not necessarily detracts from the EMP co-operation, it would enhance the chances of a conflict resolution perspective in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region.

Notes

(1) The establishment of the EMP has given way to an extended literature. Among other references to general works, see: Aliboni R., "Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten der EU-Staaten sind gefragt", *Internationale Politik* (vol. 51, no. 2, Februar 1996), pp. 9-14; Attinà F. et al., *L'Italia tra l'Europa e il Mediterraneo: il bivio che non c'è più*, (Bologna: Il Mulino for AREL, 1998); Bin A. (ed.), *Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean. Prospects After Barcelona*, (Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 1996); Bistolfi R. (sous la diréction de), *Euro-Méditerranée, une région à construire*, (Paris: Publisud,1995); Marks J., "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative", *Mediterranean Politics*, (vol. 1, no 1, Summer 1996), pp. 1-24; Tsardanidis Ch., "Common and conflicting interests of Mediterranean EU member states and third Mediterranean countries", in E. Ahiram, A. Tovias (eds.), *Whither EU-Israeli Relations? Common and Divergent Interests*, (Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 29-44. Comments on recent developments can also be found in: Aliboni R., *The Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean*, (presentation to the Informal EuroMeSCo -Senior Officials Seminar on "Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue" organised by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs), (Bonn: 19-20 March 1999) (mimeographed); Calleya S. C., "The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?", *Mediterranean Politics*, (vol. 2, no. 2, Autumn 1997), pp. 1-22; Joffé G., *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona*, (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Middle East programme, Briefing no. 44), (London: May 1998); Joffé G.(ed.), "Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *The Journal of North African Studies*, (vol. 3, no. 2, special issue, Summer 1998); Spencer C., "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, (vol. 2, no. 2, Autumn 1997), pp. 23-48.

(2) Nolan J. E., "The Concept of Cooperative Security", in J. E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18.

(3) Heller M., *WMD and EMP Policies of Arms Control and Limitation: An Israeli Perspective*, (Rome: EuroMeSCo Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, 1998), (mimeographed). Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, *Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective*, (Rome: EuroMeSCo Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, 1998) (mimeographed) [to be both published by Frank Cass, London in a book edited by R. Aliboni, G Joffé, A.M. Said Aly, Ávasconcelos].

(4) Tanner F., "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitation and Confidence-Building after Malta", *The International Spectator*, (vol. 32, no. 2, April-June 1997), pp. 3-25; Miller S., "CBMs in the Maritime Arena", in S. Feldman (ed.) *Confidence Building and Verification: Prospcts in the Middle East*, (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp. 71-79.

(5) The Euro-Med Charter is being negotiated as the functional instrument which should enable the EMP to implement the principles pointed out by the Barcelona Declaration. After three years, all these talks have brought about is a draft presented by the German EU Presidency to the 1999 ministerial conference in Stuttgart under the name of "Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability".

(6) Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Co-operation between Civil Protection Services*, Information Note no. 32, in www.euromed.net. For details in implementation see www.euromed.net/document/12091998eng.htm.

(??7)Turan I., "Mediterranean Security in the Light of Turkish Concerns", *Perceptions*, (vol. 3, no. 2, June-August 1998), pp. 16-31. Tashan??

(8) Tayfur F., *The Turkish Vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Observations on Sub-Regional Cooperation*, (Ankara: EuroMeSCo Working Group on Sub-Regional Co-Operation, 16 March 1999) (mimeographed).

ABSTRACT
of the paper presented by Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

symposium on
"The New Geopolitical Environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond"
Nicosia, 21-23 October 1999

The paper tries to comment on the significance and role of the 1995-born Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to Eastern Mediterranean and the countries it comprises.

Four issues are highlighted: (a) the multilateral character of the EMP and the inherently indivisible character of its security concept; (b) the comprehensive security notion the EMP has adopted and its tendency to move less towards the achievement of security than broad partnership-building; (c) the role of the EMP with respect to Turkey; (d) the role of the Black Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean countries national security.

The multilateral character impressed on the EMP entails a more or less strict application of a principle of security indivisibility. The paper points out that in a strategic perspective the actual very fragmented character of the Mediterranean area makes the implementation of security indivisibility very difficult. The Eastern Mediterranean countries have already adopted a set of CBMs and CSBMs attuned to sub-regional and bilateral security requirement. The application of region-wide CBMs and CSBMs may not fit with specific situations, unless region-wide policies are implemented at a very general, maybe ineffective level. Within the EMP, however, the implementation of non-military related PBMs, like that providing co-operation between civil protection services in case of disasters, may help upgrading broad confidence and become a factor of co-operation in sub-regional situations, despite differences. Furthermore, there is trend in the EMP debate towards making the application of indivisibility more flexible.

After four years, it is clear that the EMP is putting off its ambitions of establishing a security co-operation comprising a strong military-related component and is directing itself towards a comprehensive security co-operation in which non-military factor have a strong prominence. In the European vision, these non-military factors, besides economic and social aid, would include important elements of human rights protection, democratisation and good governance. This tendency is opposed by Southern Partners, who would like to give prominence to economic development. The risk of this trend with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean is that it singles out Turkey by displacing its human rights/democracy debate from a European circle, in which Turkey is available to discuss its position, to an exclusive non-European circle, where Turkey may feel it helpless and humiliating to negotiate.

The paper points out that, in more general terms, the role of the EMP towards Turkey may expose the problematic Turkish-EU relationship to the point of radicalising Ankara and generate a negative impact on the sub-regional conflict management and resolution perspective.

The paper concludes by highlighting the convergence of the EU, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey on the higher importance, from a sub-regional perspective, of the Black Sea co-operation with respect to co-operation in the Mediterranean. While this direction would

not necessarily detracts from the EMP co-operation, it would enhance the chances of a conflict resolution perspective in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region.

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I.   The Way Things Were:

"Den eimai Athinaios, den eimai Ellinas, eimai politis tou kosmou"
(I am not an Athenian, I am not a Greek, I am a citizen of the world."
--Sokrates.

"In the end, Americans will always do the right thing after
exhausting all other alternatives." --Winston Churchill, cited by Karen
Elliot House, the *Wall Street Journal*, 02/21/89, p. 10a.

"There is a tendency among Greeks to analyze Greek-American relations
(or international politics in general) in a sentimental fashion. Terms such
as 'we have been betrayed by our friends' or 'we have been sold out' have
been employed frequently by political elites as well as by the Greek media.
But international politics, despite protestations to the contrary, is not being
played in a field of law and morality but in an arena of shrewdness and
power. Therefore, the policies of the United States toward Greece should
be prudently understood in an analytical, detached, and generalized setting.
They have been in short, the type of relations which are typical between
superpower and their strategically located and relatively dependent allies
or satellites. Consequently, the analyst who wishes to shed more light onto
the nexus of Greek-American relations, should first explore and describe
America's aggregate position in world affairs. Then he... can proceed to
relate this larger picture to the specific setting of Greek-American rela-
tions. The benefits of this exercise are likely to prove quite useful for Greeks
as well as Americans and their mutual relationships in the years to come."
Theodore Couloumbis in *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics*,
(NY: Pella, 1976), pp. 140-141.

"Something there is that doesn't love a wall....
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down."
--Robert Frost, *Mending Wall*, from *North of Boston*, 1913.

II.   The End of the Cold War and the New Global Configuration.

A. A Bipolar to a Unipolar + Fragmented World: The Cold War Model is described
by Morton A. Kaplan as a "Loose Bipolar Model II," since two superpowers dominated the
international system. We must add that a subset of "nonaligned" states flourished to the mutual
dismay of Washington and Moscow, each of which constantly tried to "turn" them and
add them to its bloc so as to create Kaplan's Model III, "the Tight Bipolar Model." The

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interesting thing about this "Bipolar Model" was that the USSR was really only a superpower in military terms, since economically it was a "dual economy" with only the defense sector enjoying world-class status.. Moreover, economically the Soviet Union was confronted by by overwhelming economic competition since North America, Western Europe, and Japan were united in opposition. Unfortunately for the world (and Greece and Cyprus) this fundamental fact was not clearly understood in a strategic sense by many American leaders, a good many of whom in retrospect seemed possessed by an unrealistic fear of "The Evil Empire." Evil it surely was, in our view, but weak it also was; for it was never able to feed its people properly, even though Tsarist Russia (with about the same acreage) was a major grain exporter Nor was its Gulag or *sharashki* system an effective use of the Soviet peoples' human resources, hard work, or scientific genius in our view. Even the "free sector" of Soviet society was remarkably inefficient in its use of labor and materials.

B.   Clearly, Cyprus under Makarios was one of these "nonaligned" states much to the impotent fury of Washington. Indeed Makarios was often referred to (somewhat lugubriously in our opinion) as "The Castro of the Mediterranean") despite the fact that he allowed U-2 spy flights from British Sovereign Base Areas (S.B.A.'s) and permitted UK and US electronic monitoring stations to operate in the Troodos Mountains. But the fact that AKEL, on which he depended for maintaining his position, was extremely independent and Euro-Communist (like the Italian and Spanish C.P.'s and unlike the French CP) was not generally appreciated in Washington. To American leaders there, all Communist parties were alike just as all Communists were identical. The Cold War was seen as primordial struggle between Good and Evil, a Manichaean a moralistic crusade in which external parties had to choose. Among the sad ironies of the Cold War, few were more poignant than the fact that during the battle, the US seemed to adopt Andrei Zhdanov's "Two Camps" vision. Zhdanov the Cold War as a zero-sum-game which had but one victor. In this he followed the Leninist adage of *"kto kogo"* (who will kill whom) despite George F. Kennan's plea that the Cold War was being overmilitarized by Washington. A good deal of research might well be addressed to the psychoanalytic motivations of leaders in both Washington and Moscow accounting for this "mirror image" phenomenon.

C.   We would argue that the current world system is unstable with the **absolute power** of the U.S.clearly declining as its armed forces are gradually pared down to peacetime levels, and the U.S. trade deficit rising; even as the EU's "euro" and Japan's Yen rise in relation to the former unchallengeable dollar.

Thus we live in a Unipolar world in transition. Moreover, a series of concentric "levels" can be posited of which the largest is the outer or world level previously occupied by the US and USSR. After, the USSR's disintegration, it is now occupied solely by the US.

The next or regional level is occupied by regional powers such as the three guarantor powers of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution: Britain, Greece, and Turkey.

Finally, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Middle East comprise the third or local level and vibrate to the tones emanating from the world and regional levels..

Alexis Alexandris cogently summarizes the relationship of the regional to the local ring by noting that "While Greece considers itself as the gate of the European Union in the new Balkans, the Turks are convinced that the post-Cold War environment has opened up new foreign policy options in a region stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Central Asia republics of the former Soviet Union.... The geographical boundaries of Greek-Turkish rivalry.. include the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Thus Ankara accuses the Greeks of forming an anti-Turkish alliance with Syria, while Turkey has been flirting with Albania and FYROM at Greece's northern backyard. The Greeks openly regard Turkey as their main threat, citing troop build-ups in the Thracian border and the presence of the [Turkish-GC] Fourth Army on the Aegean coast. For its part, the Turkish military cites the Greeks as the reason that these troop cannot be transferred eastwards to tackle the Kurds." (Alexis Alexandris, "Greek-Turkish Relations: A View from Athens," Draft MS. presented June 12, 1996 to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 2-3) He observes that "An examination of the Greek-Turkish minority question cannot but

include, beside Thracian issues, the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the regime of local self-government for Imbros and Tenedos provided by Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne, [also-GC] Some formula .... so that the native Greek Orthodox population may be repatriated in [sic-GC] Imbros and Tenedos...." Alexandris concludes "The property rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne to the deported Istanbul Greek nationals should also be reexamined." *(ibid.* p. 26) Alexandris provides a detailed list of Greek concerns about apparent Turkish revisionism in the Aegean with which we are forced to agree by his logic and facts: "Since 1974, there is a consensus in Greece based on the perception that Turkey is pursuing revisionist objectives, seeking to impose a shared sovereignty and resource utilization in the Aegean, in spite of various multilateral treaties and the customary international law." *(ibid.,* p. 4) Among the further issues he lists in the Aegean are the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, (p. 5), the extension of Greek territorial limits according to the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) (p. 6), the Greek-Turkish Aegean airspace and control dispute (including FIR (Flight Information Region), (pp. 7-8), Greek-Turkish NATO command structures (p. 8-9), the military status of Aegean islands and the Turkish Aegean Fourth Army, (pp. 10-11) and Greek-Turkish relations regarding their mutual roles in Turkish entry into the European Union (p. 13). Indeed, Alexandris' paper is so complete, one could recommend it as the basis for the Greek Government's negotiations with Turkey on a "Big Package" *rapprochement*!

From our point of view, his meticulous list of complaints against Ankara clearly demonstrates the linkage between the regional and local geopolitical rings listed *supra*. He also includes Cyprus (pp. 13-20) proving that "Although it cannot be included in the Greek-Turkish bilateral issues," (p. 13), like all good Greek analysts he proceeds to do just that from pp. 13-20! Nor could he, in our view, do otherwise; since "Cyprus continues to burden Greek and Turkish foreign policy agendas and is indeed "both the cause and victim of a recrudescence of a Greek-Turkish antagonism." (p. 13) Thus the Cyprus dispute interacts on several levels as we have argued *supra*, and certainly involves the world level: "On another level, the Cyprus question is an international problem, for the settlement of which the Secretary General of the United Nations, in cooperation and co-ordination with the United States and the European Union, has been offering his good offices since the 1960s." (p. 13)

D. Even as U.S. power has declined **absolutely**, its **relative power** has increased owing to the disintegration of the USSR and the breakup of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia into competing nation-states each dominated by a single "custodial ethnic elite." Many of these states are seeking a road to national unity as in Indonesia, the Philippines, Columbia, and Turkey. More importantly, the EU, gradually coalesced from a strictly Iron and Steel Community under Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, into a vast customs union. Now it has moved into the monetary field (the European Monetary Union), and is just starting to develop a fundamental aspect of a loose confederation: via a "National Defense Identity" (PJB art. of 09/29/99, p. B6, by Louis R. Golino, "European Union Links up with NATO."). Contrary to the asseverations of many analysts such as Van Coufoudakis and Philippos Savvides, the U.S. has done everything it can to assist this process, a policy which we find difficult to reconcile with their oft-stated description of the US as a "hegemonic power" clinging to a policy which we agree is counter-productive under a putative "Theory of Continuity" which we argue is no longer relevant or supported by the current Administration.

Moreover a Reuters article from Plovdiv, Bulgaria of 09/11/99 offers an even more dramatic report of change in relations between Greece and Turkey. It reports that "Top military official from six Balkan states and Italy gathered on Saturday to inaugurate a joint peacekeeping force as part of efforts to boost stability in the conflict-torn region.

What is most striking, however, is the statement indicating that the forces in the joint Balkan peacekeeping force **will include Greek troops** (along with Albanian, Bulgarian, Italian, Macedonian, and Romanian units) **and Turkey "will lead the force for the first two years before handing (it-GC) over to Greece or Italy."** Truly as Nikolaus Dimadis, chairman of the military and political steering committee of the force, has noted, "Today is a historic day expressing the determination of our governments [Greece, Turkey *et al.-GC]* to start jointly a new era for our region." The "peace force would also aim to improve regional cooperation in case of natural disasters" said Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu. The force will be

headquartered in Plovdiv, Bulgaria and reflects "our policy of good neighbourly relations and attempts to strengthen security" added Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov.

Moreover, the "Balkan force" will work in peacekeeping or humanitarian operations under the umbrella of international bodies including the UN, OSCE, NATO, and WEU.

Other signs of a "paradigm shift" in relations between Athens and Ankara include the exchange of rescue efforts by Greek and Turkish rescuers (NYT article by Stephen Kinzer, of 09/13/99, p. 1, "Earthquakes Help Warm Greek-Turkish Relations" which also, however, contains a warning by Prof. Thanos Veremis at Athens University who doubts that the "logjam" in relations can be broken since "the Turkish military is highly conservative and it wants to preserve its political power."

But foreign governments, Kinzer concludes, including the US, are encouraging the countries' new-found friendship" and US President Clinton is to receive Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit this month and is expected to visit both Turkey and Greece in November. The EU will hold a crucial summit meeting in Helsinki and Turkey is "hoping that Greece will help persuade the 15-nation Union, many of whose members have been critical of Turkey's human rights record, to add Turkey to its list of prospective members."

Finally, a new Special Assistant to the President has been hired, Alfred H. Moses; while David Philips, a specialist in conflict resolution, has been engaged by the U.S. State Department to suggest ways of bringing Greeks and Turks together. These efforts hardly suggest a continuation of the "Theory of Continuity," devoted to partition or division of Cyprus via a "double enosis" formula for that has already occurred *de facto* though not *de jure*. Rather it suggests a focused effort by the President to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes fairly and irenically. We suggest the world is currently in a shift from a unipolar to a "National Fragmentation" or "Multipolar Model VII" in Kaplan's taxonomy, a transition from political and territorial **disintegration** hopefully preceding further global political and economic integration. We hope to see further world integration with an international criminal court, and a further increase in the frequency of UN- or regionally-sponsored "peacemaking" and "peacekeeping" operations, perhaps tied to such regional organizations as NATO or the W.E.U. If carried to its logical conclusion, the world might be fortunate enough to end the current terribly dangerous state of international anarchy which Robert J. Lieber accurately calls a world with *No Common Power* (3rd Ed. (NY: HarperCollins, 1995). He cites Hobbes' *Leviathan:* "during the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war." (*ibid.*, p. iv). Alternatively, at the end of the current transition we may find ourselves back in Kaplan's "Oligopolar" or "Classical Balance-of-Power" Model I. (Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics. NY: John Wiley, 1962.* See also Theodore A. Couloumbis & James H. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations, Power and Justice.* 4th Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1990).

E.   We would stress the remarkable development of Greece in recent years into a mature civil society (Cf. Adamantia Pollis' . "Modernity, Civil Society, and the Papandreou Legacy," JFD, 1997; cf. also Theodore C. Kariotis (ed.), *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989* (NY: Pella, 1992) together with the concomitant efforts of the Europeans (including Greece) to develop both a joint Monetary (via the EMU) and European Security and Defense Identity. We note the EU slowly and painfully setting up an independent but integrated European pillar within NATO. This "pillar" would be capable of acting autonomously from NATO in certain situations, say in ex-Yugoslavia or other localized European areas or even the Middle East. That is, Greece and the other European democracies would be "separable but not separate" from NATO's integrated command structure within a common W.E.U. framework.

F.   Thus the existing W.E.U. which to Greece's disappointment refused to support Athens against Turkey (via Art. 5 of the WEU Charter, Robert Kagan, the Benevolent Empire in FP, vol. iii, summer, 1998, pp. 24-35) would be merged into the European Union and an EU Council of Defense Ministers and an EU military staff appointed. (See Louis R. Golino, *European Union links up with NATO*, PJB, 09/29/99, p. B6)

G.   Such a new European Defense Identity would clearly have profound effects on the strategic shape of Eastern Mediterranean affairs including Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and probably a stabilizing effect both on the Balkans and the Middle East neighbors of Turkey. For the EU, the price would have to include entrance of Turkey as a full member; for Turkey it would clearly paying two high prices: First, resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece. But this would mean that Turkey would have to follow Greece's example begun by Papandreau and almost completed by Simitis via his "New Balkan Profile": good relations with Ankara's European and Balkan neighbors. But then Turkey would be free to deal with her less altruistic neighbors: Syria, Iraq, and Iran while pursuing the Kemalist dream of a secular Turkey as a fully accepted partner of the Western democracies. Second, Turkey would have to develop domestic policies to meet the *aquis communitaire* requirements of the EU in such areas as the economy, and political and human rights for all citizens, including Kurds.

Would Turkey be prepared to pay such heavy prices? We believe it will have little choice for the alternative to be "marginalized" as a Third World power, and experience a tragic descent into the miasma of a secular military dictatorship such as Iraq, or--even worse from the Kemalist elites' point of view--become another Iran and suffer the victory of the hated Muslim fundamentalist extremists within Turkey such as Necmettin Erbakan.

H.   Thus we suggest the present period of U.S. unipolar dominance is likely to be challenged by rising new aggregations of power including the EU and the European "pillar" of NATO, Japan and South-east Asia, and later on China, etc. We also believe that Russia will gradually "get its act together" and once more become a major player in international politics. At the present time, Russia is almost totally preoccupied with its domestic problems and has, unfortunately, gotten involved in a war with both Chechnya and Dagestan. Consequently, it is most unlikely that it will be able to play much of a role in the former Turkic republics of the ex-USSR or do much in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond offer to provide arms or stuff Cypriot banks with dubiously-obtained cash from looted assets in Russia..

When the Cold War ended, the two protagonists, the US and the USSR, were like boxers after a bitter and savage bout. Russia was knocked down, but not out. In our view the Russian people will come back and again assume their role as *velikie russkiye* (Great Russians). The U.S. boxer, stood groggy but still standing. Groggy because the Cold War had cost the American people alone--not counting what our allies had paid or suffered--some $7 **trillion** dollars according to one Defense Department expert. (Lawrence J. Korb in "Shock Therapy for the Pentagon," NYT, 0215/94, p. A21.)

Thus when President Clinton assumed office, he promised to focus on the American "domestic deficit," all the huge infrastructure and other investments which had been allowed to lapse owing to the nation's concentration on foreign and security policies by previous administrations. Indeed, Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren M. Christopher, was selected largely because Clinton believed he could safely be left to "handle" foreign problems while the President and the White House staff concentrated on rebuilding American schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, and reducing the enormous budget deficits accumulated under President Reagan. Reagan certainly helped defeat "the Evil Empire" by $350 billion-dollar DoD budgets and threatening a "Star Wars" Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. But in the process he weakened the basic strength of America's economy in the process in our view.

Unfortunately for Clinton, the rest of the world refused to "go away" and Clinton was forced (as many presidents before him) to face foreign policy problems such as Cyprus and the Aegean dispute.

But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Greek-Turkish policy of the US could and did, we believe, change fundamentally. Some Greek analysts may doubt it, but US policy shifted massively like a huge supertanker reversing course. US **interests** remained the same, but the **policies** which could best defend those interests changed. To doubt this in the case of the Eastern Med is to suggest that US policymakers cannot learn from their mistakes, a somewhat arrogant view. Acheson I & II, Ball, the NATO Plan and other policies pursued by the US clearly were intended to achieve "double enosis" with consequent partition of Cyprus. But that existing partition has not led to a lessening of tensions between Athens and Ankara, and permanent

division of Cyprus via a "Hispaniola Partition" has clearly not brought about any lessening of the bitter hatreds of the parties involved.

This failure of US and UK policy, I believe, is clearly recognized by both Foggy Bottom and Whitehall. The problem is "What Is To Be Done?" (Sto delat'?). And we believe that the only real solution is for a "Big Package" agreement between Athens and Ankara similar to that achieved by Paris and Berlin in the 1950's or between Venizelos and Ataturk in the 1930's. It is not widely known ,but Ataturk recommended Venizelos for the Nobel Peace Prize in that period.

I. Thus those who chafe under putative "hegemonic" policies of the U.S. need only wait a bit and they may find themselves free from such onerous burdens. However, like the current nostalgia for the seductive simplicities of the Cold War and its search for enemies (Cf. Brian Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978) they may find being the executors of policy for the first time in Greek history since the Delian League a bit less fun than being the objects of policy. For the latter status gave them unlimited opportunity to shift the burden of moral opprobrium to others which they cannot do as equal members of a union of European democracies larger by far in population and GNP than the US.

J.. The "Theory of Continuity" which is so well developed by my friends, Van Coufoudakis and Philippos K. Savvides, does need to be reconsidered to see if it is still relevant (PKS, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the `Theory of Continuity Still Relevant?" (JHD, (1998), Vol. 24.1, pp. 31-59). We would suggest that both scholars make an irrefragable case with respect to the period from the early days of the Cold War through the Nixon Administration. Our former professor Henry A. Kissinger's did clearly and admittedly "tilt" toward Turkey in the grim "July Days" of 1974 and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces. He and his administration did nothing to prevent the totally illegal and continued occupation of northern Cyprus (37%) by Turkish troops as well as the importation of some 35-40,000 Anatolian settlers which illegally changed the demography of the area in clear violation of customary international law as well as Treaty obligations freely accepted by Turkey, i.e., Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the London-Zurich package and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The former required any of the Guarantor Powers, after consultation (which Turkey did with the UK) in case of unilateral intervention, to reestablish the situation *ante-bellum*. That is, each guarantor power "reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing a state of affairs created by the present treaty" (Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee). This clearly Turkey did not do, rather in August 1974 it began a further advance from occupying about 3% of Cyprus to some 37% after its own recalcitrance led to the failure of the Geneva meeting of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain.

III. US Policy.

A. Unfortunately, for the "Theory of Continuity" however, while "the times they are a'changin" the Theory of Continuity" evidently failed to keep up.. The Clinton foreign policy team of Secretary Albright, UN Ambassador Holbrooke, Secretary Cohen and President Clinton have rather different ideas about the goals of US power in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Eastern Med. As Secretary Albright noted in greeting Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides on June 6, 1997, "The United States' goal remains to encourage a Cyprus settlement that establishes a stable, bizonal federation, with adequate security guarantees for all." She noted further: "**What we see(k *sic*-GC) is the reunification of Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island (of Cyprus-GC) is unacceptable.... We continue to support the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will do everything we can to bring the process forward." (bolding added-GC)** (Press remarks of 06/06/97). Even if we doubt the accuracy of Cyprus Desk Officer Tom Boyatt's clear denial of U.S. involvement in the Turkish invasion of July 20, 1974 we are left with a puzzling conundrum. For as Boyatt cogently noted, "If U.S. policy is so clever, so consistent, so Machiavellian; why has it failed so miserably in the Eastern Mediterranean?" Surely, brilliant statecraft would not envisage pushing two strong allies into a sullen and bitter mood which lasts to this very day! So if Coufoudakis and Savvides are correct that U.S. policy has been consistent in the area from 1947 to 1999, why does everyone in the

Clinton administration recognize that the current situation both in the Aegean and on Cyprus is so dangerously unstable? Were American policy-makers really so stupid as to wish to bring about a situation which threatens war every few years over islets inhabited by rabbits and goats? As Boyatt noted with some bitterness, "...comparing the situation before the attempted coup (on Cyprus-GC) by Ioannides and the situation today from the point of view of the best interests of the [US-GC], I think everyone ... agrees [that the U.S.-GC] is a damned sight worse off today than it was on July 13th and 14th [1974-GC]... I am prepared to accept that U.S. policy was inadequate... and that... mistakes ... have been made...**But I absolutely reject the devil theory, the proposition that this [U.S.-GC] Government, through any of its arms, somehow bluntly and clandestinely developed a situation with General Ioannides so that he would take any action which ... would have the result which is so totally disastrous for the [U.S.-GC].** (For Coufoudakis' exegesis of the "devil" "Conspiracy Theory" alleging a forceful, consistent U.S. policy directed toward the liquidating of the Republic of Cyprus under President Makarios and its replacement with a NATO-sponsored cantonized government, see also his "The Theory of Continuity, in *Greek World 3* (August-September 1978), p. 15a. See also Coufoudakis' valuable contribution in Couloumbis and Hicks, *U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Turkey*, pp. 11, 115, 128, 130, and n. 15.

B.   Even after the subsequent advance of August; even if we discount John C. Campbell's poignant comment that "American success in holding back the Turks in 1967 also strained U.S. influence to the ultimate point, and American officials who performed wonders in averting war on that occasion knew that in a new crisis the same type of diplomatic persuasion would not work" we still find the "Theory" wanting. (John C. Campbell, "The United States and the Cyprus Question,1974-75, in *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict* (edited by Van Coufoudakis, NY: Pella, 1976), p. 16). Campbell continues regarding the tragedy of the July Days: "Prof. Van Coufoudakis has argued this theme of continuity in American policy. But even a continuity in attitude on the question of autonomy for Turkish Cypriots or partition of the island would not necessarily imply an intention to bring these things about, an intention to do so, in July 1974." *(ibid., p. 19)*

C.   Thus we are confronted with a dilemma: Coufoudakis and Savvides have a very strong argument in favor of their Theory: **the result**. A divided Cyprus, partitioned between Turkey and Greece, is a political result regardless of legal niceties. The so-called "TRNC" is nothing but a 28th *villayet* of Turkey; while the "Defence Dogma" and cultural, linguistic, and religious links with Athens make the Republic of Cyprus *de facto* part of Greece. But their Theory has another fatal flaw: it assumes that American decision-makers cannot learn from their mistakes and that they are currently unaware that partition of Cyprus is simply a formula for eventual war between Greece and Turkey. It is simply unreasonable to assume that 80% of the Cyprus population will ever accept the occupation by a foreign army and illegal settlers of 37% of the island by a minority of 18%. And this fact has been brought home to U.S. policymakers most dramatically by the constant threat of war over islets such as Imia or veiled threats by Ankara to place populated Greek Aegean islands such as Gavdos under Turkish control *pace* the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

D.   The end of the Cold War has changed everything, or as the Americans say, "all bets are off." A firm but wise policy by the Simitis Government in Athens meets with a positive response from the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem. In his opening comments at Istanbul University on October 5, 1999; Cem stressed that "he and his counterpart, Papandreou, were trying to break new ground and find new words to utter about the rapprochement between the two countries. These words included 'peace, understanding, and shared benefits.'" Cem pointed out that the Greek foreign minister was defending his own country's interests just as he was defending those of Turkey." (Turkish Daily News, via CYPRUS LIST4 Oct. 1999 at 18:35:05 + 0100)
        In our view the views of both foreign ministers are hopeful precisely because they share a common appreciation of "neo-realism," of *mutual* rational self-interest. We suggest such a basis is a very hopeful change from the superheated rhetoric of name calling earlier employed and further is the *only* basis upon which a successful *rapprochement* between Athens and Ankara could possibly be constructed. For all chancelleries and nearly all diplomats throughout the world

operate on the *assumptions* of neo-realism. And in international as in national politics, perception is often the *sine qua non* for successful conflict resolution.

E.   So we are prepared to admit openly that Acheson I & II, Ball, the NATO and ABC plans, and perhaps the Clifford Mission of 1977, etc. *did* intend the result which occurred, although Savvides admits that Clifford's account of his mission is "very brief and vague" (Savvides, JHD, vol. 24.1 1998, p.46).. (so perhaps a "Scotch Verdict" is needed there). (For a handy summary of the documents involved in the Acheson, Ball, NATO, ABC, plans, cf. the carefully and meticulously edited text by our friend Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. (NY: St. Martin's, 1997). But that does not "prove" that that policy still continues as part of a consistent plan in the face of the architectonic changes of the Cold War's end. What (now) Professor Dimitris Keridis cogently notes about US policy in the Balkans is also true of US policy in the Eastern Med in our view: "Greeks should not make the mistake of assuming that the Americans have a detailed plan of supporting Turkey and Albania to the detriment of Greece, as tempting as this might be. There is no coherent US policy for the Balkans, and there may never be [We hope he has changed his mind here!-GC]. American policy-making is fragmented between the regional embassies, the State Department, the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House. There are some general guidelines, but nothng more.. **Those familiar with the American political system know how difficult it is to formulate a policy in the absence of an overwhelming threat.**" (Dimitris Keridis , "Greek Foreign Policy after 'Macedonia, *EMPHASIS*, *A Journal of Hellenic Issues* (April/June 1995), Issue 1, vol. 1, p. 42 [bolding added-GC}

         Precisely! The overwhelming threat is gone now so we can hope for a "general guideline" to assist in the reunification of Cyprus and the settlement of the Aegean issues between Athens and Ankara. We wonder with Keridis why, "Words such as economic penetration of the hinterland are used with ease to describe what Greeks should do in the Balkans. There is no need to emphasize that such **imperialist talk** is no music to the ears of Greece's neighbors. What this vocabulary shows is arrogance coupled with a profound lack of knowledge and good judgement on the part of Greeks..." (*ibid*, p. 34) Keridis suggests that "Not all is gloom. There have been some successes [including-GC] the Greek presidency of the E.U. and Greece's consent to th E.U.-Turkey customs union in exchange for a fixed timetable for Cyprus's accession to the Union... If Theodoros Pangalos is to be credited with the above successes, Giannis Kranidiotis should be praised for the E.U-Turkey rapprochement, Greece successfully linked European policies towards Turkey with Cyprus while de-linking Cyprus' own accession from the prior settlement of the Cypriot question. Greek policy was flexible, innovative and ultimately successful." (*ibid.*, pp. 42-43).

         Our question to the "Continuity" theorists is simple: "If Greeks can learn from their mistakes, why can't Americans learn from theirs? Or is my Greek-born wife correct in arguing only partly tongue-in-cheek: *"pas mi Ellin varvaros!"*
The US leadership clearly realizes that the current "Hispaniola Formula" is both dangerous and counterproductive in the extreme. It adds little to Turkish or Greek or Cypriot or American or UK or world security. In fact it guarantees (in our view) a Greco-Turkish War which would be a disaster for all concerned. If Europe (the EU) and America move together, Turkey will either join in or be marginalized and that would run directly counter to the Kemalist *Weltanschauung* of the Turkish military and civilian elite. It would be a *denouement* which could not but arouse alarm among Turkish decision-makers.. For Turkey needs Europe, and Europe needs a reformed Turkey as a full partner in the EU, EMU, revised WEU, Balkan peacekeeping force, and NATO.

IV.   Other Sinners:

A.   In our view, all sides to the Cyprus tragedy made policy misjudgments which led to great suffering for all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish. The polemic between the "National Narratives" of the Greek and Turkish peoples of Cyprus with their subtexts might not have been so devastating if the two peoples had not been together on an island the size of the US state of Connecticut.
But the British used one people against the other in classic *"divide et impera"* imperial policy to maintain their control over the island when in fact they only needed two S.B.A.'s, Akrotiri and

Dhekelia, for their reduced status as a European regional power. Ironically the Cyprus tragedy might have been avoided had the British given more weight to realistic political and less to unrealistic security needs in the Eastern Med. Indeed it is a tragedy that little transethnic "Cypriot nationalism" ever developed, for in our view there is no "Cypriot nation" --only two ethnic communities: one Greek and one Turkish. In my various trips to Cyprus, I never saw a Cypriot flag, only Greek on one side of the Green line and Turkish on the other. I doubt if many G/C's know what their flag looks like and they have, as far as I know, no national anthem. Pollis is correct in suggesting that British colonialism bears much responsibility for the lack of a Cypriot sense of "nationhood." Still we doubt very much that such a hybrid nationalism could have emerged in the cruel world of Middle East and Eastern Med politics: for Cyprus has been the object of foreign intrigues since Neolithic times. As Markides suggests pessimistically regarding T/C nationalism:

> As early as 1914, [T/C-GC] leaders protested ... against Greek agitation for
> *enosis.* And in December 1949,only six years before the EOKA struggle had
> started, about 15,000 Turks marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia
> hurling cursing Enosis and hurling insults and threats at the [G/C's-GC].
> Cyprus never became a "consociational democracy" like Switzerland... owing
> to the failure of political will of <u>both</u> elites [G/C & T/C-GC].

Markides concludes as do we with the sad negative conclusion that "Nothing short of a 'cultural revolution' can establish the *internal preconditions* [ital. added-GC] of a lasting intercommunal peace. (Kyriacos C Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 21-23 and 186 *passim.*)

Those "preconditions" just do not exist in the view of Prof. Thomas Ehrlich of Stanford; they "could only develop if supported by pressures from without." (Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus: The Warlike Isle; Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 18, no. 5 (May 1986), p. 1089.) We would suggest that the EU and the US should seriously consider ways to help provide that external support by adding to the strength of internal Cypriot forces on both sides of the Green line which are willing to push for a "bizonal, bicommunal, confederal" solution brokered by the UN and supported by the Western democracies including Greece.

Our friend and colleague, Joseph S. Joseph comments in similar negative fashion:

> Despite four centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, the
> [G/C's and T/C's-GC] remained separate and distinct ethnic groups di-
> vided along linguistic, religious, cultural, and political lines. The pre-
> servation of their ethnic identity could be attributed to ....loyalties with
> Greece and Turkey. *With the establishment of the [RoC], the ethnic*
> *And political fragmentation inherited from the past were institutional-*
> *ized and incorporated into the state apparatus and the political pro-*
> *cess. Commonal dualism became the foundation of political struc-*
> *tures and practices that prevented the development of ... common pa-*
> *triotism, joint Cypriot consciousness, and unifying political culture sup-*
> *portive of the Cypriot state.* [Ital. added-GC)] (Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus,*
> *Ethnic Conflict and International Concern (NY: Lang,1985),* pp. 241-242)

B.   For a contrary view, blaming British policy for the lack of a common Cypriot nationalism, cf. Adamantia Pollis, "International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus" in *Small States and Segmented Societies* (NY: Praeger, pp. 44-83; also *ibid.* "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus," in *Comparative Politics* (July 1973), pp. 576-599.

We conclude that although Whitehall's policy in Cyprus exacerbated the problem of inter-communal relations for reasons of *raison d'etat,* Britain was successful in this policy because of preexisting conditions of communal division. Very few were the marriages of Greek and Turkish Cypriots such as those of Demetrios A. Theophylactou in the touching dedication of his trenchant

work, *Security, Identity and Nation Building, Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot/Brookfield USA: Avebury, 1995). For though *his* parents "were brave enough to break the norm of Cypriot society in the mid-fifties" we fear that few others were as courageous. They were, as Theophylactou himself notes, "one of a handful." (p. i)

C.   Moreover , the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots seemed never to fully take into account in their strategic calculations that Turkey was only 40 miles away while Greece was 400 miles away. Thus their continued struggle for *enosis* was bound to produce a bitter response from Ankara. Their huge majority of 80% vs. 20% blinded them to the strategic realities with tragic results.

President Makarios himself committed a second Greek policy failure on November 30, 1963 when he unilaterally proclaimed his famous "13 Points" which in effect unilaterally revised the London-Zurich Agreements with disastrous results. We admit that the Agreements were rigid, that "The 1960 Constitution was a peculiar and highly rigid one that, in the final analysis, proved to be unworkable." (Philippos K. Savvides, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the `Theory of Continuity Still Relevant," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, vol. 24.1 (1998), p. 39. But that begs the question, "could the Constitution have been made to work absent Greek (EOKA, EOKA B!) and Turkish (TMT) extremism? Savvides assumes the answer is "no" as do many Greek analysts. But Greek Professor Dimitris Kitsikis and American Professor Linda B. Miller as well as many Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot analysts (e.g., Kemal H. Karpat, "Solution in Cyprus," in *The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace* (NY: Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967; also *ibid., (ed.), Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974* and *ibid., The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History* (Leiden: Brill, 1974) believe the 1960 Constitution could have worked given more flexibility on the part of the Greek-Cypriots including Makarios. Moreover, we find Savvides' description of the Makarios 13 Points somewhat exiguous since he fails to note either that the British High Commissioner supported Makarios' Proclamation or that the wise statesman of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, opposed it. Moreover, Savvides' description that "the disproportional rights provided to the Turkish minority impaired the orderly functioning of the state, *thus leading to the collapse of the First Cypriot Republic.* (ital. Added-GC) seems somewhat tendentious. He further rather blandly argues that President Makarios' Thirteen Proposals merely "sought to amend constitutional provisions that had become detrimental to the normal functioning of the Cypriot government." *(ibid.,* p. 39) The facts were a bit more dramatic in our view. For in effect, Makarios clearly and unilaterally revised the London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution with disastrous results.

As Joseph S. Joseph wisely observes, Makarios "pursued a policy aimed at the establishment of Greek Cypriot dominance in an independent, unitary, and nonaligned Cyprus. (Joseph S.. Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* (NY: Lang, 1985, p. 145). Even Hitchens, a harsh critic of US and UK policy on Cyprus, notes that "Throughout the years of independence, the Makarios government failed to set up any institution specifically designed to meet Turkish needs. (p. 161). Nor does Savvides mention the Turkish-Cypriot "ghettoization" after 1964 in the sense of psychological oppression of the Turkish population on the island as stressed by Vamik Volkan who contends that 3% of the land was occupied by 18% of the population which had a profoundly negative and bitter impact on T/C's both psychologically and politically. (Vamik D. Volkan, M.D., *Cyprus-War and Adaptation, A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, *passim* for a description of events by a Turkish-Cypriot psychiatrist. *His* "national narrative" seems to describe a different island than the one by Greek-Cypriot analysts who, like Dr. Volkan, are native to Cyprus.

Indeed, one must ask, "Where were the reformers (on both sides) on Cyprus? Where were the Jean Jaures, the Mahatma Gandhis, the Martin Luther Kings, the Ibrahim Rugovas? Why was there no Cyprus branch of the Greek Amnesty International or Akim Birdal's Turkish Human Rights Association? The answer, we suspect, has to do with the depth of the ethnic divisions and the regnant political culture of Cyprus such that even the then President and Vice President of the RoC made little effort to "reach across" to the other community and build a sense of common Cypriot nationalism.

D.   Thus the "national narrative" of Turkish Cypriots seems psychologically inaccessible to many Greek and Greek-Cypriot analysts. They appear concerned only with the *Greek* national narrative and its subtexts, while the Turkish narrative is viewed solely through a monolithic Hellenic lens to the tragic detriment of both communities. They evidently see no linkage between Makarios' and the Greek-Cypriot majority's policies and the violent response of the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963, 1964, and 1967. Was not this linkage connected to the fateful decision of Bulent Ecevit to invade Cyprus in 1974? "We did it your way in 1963 and 1964 and 1967," he is reputed to have told American diplomats, "now (1974-GC) we're going to do it our way."

For the Republic of Cyprus was constructed via the London-Zurich Agreements as a *"consociational state.* And *"Consociationalism* involves the systematic sharing of political power among the different groups, giving each group control over its own life." Almond and Dalton continue: "This system allows each group to veto collective policies that it believes will affect it adversely and it provides for proportionate sharing of national offices and resources...." They conclude in words which surely describe Makarios' dilemma and which many Greek analysts totally overlook: "... this approach ... offers security to communal groups **at the cost of the efficiency and redistributive possibilities of majority rule.**" (Gabriel A. Almond & Russell J. Dalton *et al., European Politics Today,* (NY: Longman,1999), p. 21.)[bolding added-GC). Thus we would argue that the 13 Points of President Makarios destroyed the fragile basis of the Cypriot state, which clearly put communal peace above efficiency. But many Greek analysts see the question solely in terms of efficiency because they were the majority and the business elite and thus the controlling community. Indeed, Coufoudakis and Savvides adopt a sort of "legal brief" for their Theory of Continuity, a kind of grand *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy which can only be maintained by asserting that the U.S. and Britain had one overriding goal--the partition of Cyprus—which never changed even though that policy was clearly a total failure in terms of resolving the problem to the mutual satisfaction of both communities. They offer little space to the possibility that US and British decision-makers might also have considered partition the **only** way to stop killings by extremists in both communities along with admitted *Realpolitik* power-related considerations. Even today many analysts wonder if extremists in both communities could be put under control if a fair and just negotiated settlement between the two communities in Cyprus were achieved. We too have our doubts, but feel the risk must be taken.

E.   We doubt that the summum bonum clearly sought by Coufoudakis, Savvides, and many other Greek analysts--recreation of a "democratic unitary" state is possible today, even though it was envisaged as the only legal justification for individual or group intervention via Art. IV of the Treaty of Guaranty. For pace Savvides' assurance, we find the "Theory of Continuity" both "static" and "monolithic. (Savvides, p. 53). Too much blood has been shed, too much history has intervened. But a confederal solution embracing a bicommunal and bizonal state incorporating the "confederal" aim demanded by the Turks and the "Three Freedoms" and democratic structure and sovereignty for the central government demanded by the Greeks is possible in our view. Confederation offers the possibility of future evolution into federation, and even eventual evolution into a democratic unitary state when mutual trust has developed, and fear of the majority subsided. But a return to the unchallengeable power of the majority Greek community in terms of both demographics and economic control is impossible in our view. A new form of "consociation" will have to be developed with powerful guarantees for the Turkish minority and full security for the Greek majority. A number of suggestions for how this could be done have been advanced (Cf. Thomas F. Farr, "Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let Cypriots be Cypriot, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 8, fall 1997, pp. 32-62; also Marcia Christoff Kurop, "Greece and Turkey, Can They Mend Fences," in *Foreign Affairs,* January/ February 1998, vol. 77, no. 1, esp. pp. 11b, where she recommends a Greek-Turkish Non-Aggression Pace overseen by the US as well as maintaining current Greek bases and active development of economic ties between business elites of the two countries. (p. 12b).

F.   Thus we feel that many Greek and Greek-Cypriot analysts who embrace the "Continuity Theory" are enmeshed in a logical fallacy akin to that described by America's "Nastradin Hodja," redoubtable Mark Twain . Twain had a favorite kitten which loved to sit on a stove lid in the kitchen during winter. One day, Twain relates, the kitten made a serious error and sat on a stove lid which happened to be hot. Twain reported that the kitten never made the same mistake of sitting on a hot stove lid. Unfortunately, it never again sat on a cold one either. We hope that "Continuity analysts" do not draw a similar illogical conclusion and refuse to help resolve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes when the opportunity arises.

G.   In cataloging Greek policy failures we must also include Ioannides' fatal errors of judgement in beginning the July Days by trying to overthrow the elected leader of the Cypriot people, President and Ethnarch and Archbishop Makarios. The Junta's inability to realize Turkey's propinquity to Cyprus is a bit mind-boggling in retrospect, but must be included in Greek errors of contributing to the Cyprus tragedy.
          And their perhaps desperate selection of a pathological thug such as Nikos Sampson, whose sobriquet was reputedly "the Turk Killer", to carry their banner on Cyprus also displayed a rather primitive understanding of Cypriot political reality.

H.   Finally, the Greek side must take some responsibility for the activities of Gen. George Grivas (Dighenis) who died on January 27, 1974. To the best of our knowledge, Grivas is rarely mentioned in Savvides' article or in most Greek or Greek-Cypriot national narratives. Rarely is he given responsibility for contributing to the pathological fear of Greek Cypriots which we observed on the part of Turkish Cypriots and which we believe was made indelible by the "July Days". (Cf. *General Grivas* edited by Charles Foley (NY:Praeger, 1964).

V.   Conclusions:

A.   Nor were we Americans without guilt in the Cypriot tragedy. Perhaps then U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca, was correct: the brutal leader of ESA, (Ethniki Stratiotiki ?Astinomía or Greek Military Police) was only a "cop". But that hardly relieves Tasca in our view from the responsibility of dealing with him. Diplomats are not entitled to choose the leaders of countries to which they are accredited and simply walk away. (For ESA and the Junta's brutality, cf. James Becket's revealing if depressing survey of repression, *Barbarism in Greece with a Foreword by Senator Claiborne Pell* (NY: Walker and Co., 1970.) Becker was an Amnesty International lawyer married to a Greek, while Pell is the retired and greatly loved ex-senior U.S. Senator from our state of Rhode Island.)
          Tragically, it is widely believed by Greeks and Turks everywhere as well as by some foreign students of Eastern Med affairs that the U.S. Government financed EOKA-B! despite its bloodthirsty practices toward patriotic but dissenting Greek Cypriots. Whether the U.S. helped finance TMT is also not clear, but it certainly followed similar practices toward its dissenting majority. (Cf. PIO, ROC, "Turkey's Expansionist Designs on Cyprus: The Role of TMT" Nicosia, September, 1979). Again, absent convincing evidence, a "Scotch Verdict" must suffice until the files are available.

B..   Finally, there is the counterproductive role played by President Nixon in sending his Vice President, Spyros T. Agnew, to visit the Junta leadership in Athens and Nixon's Secretary of State and former Special Assistant for National Security, Henry A. Kissinger's dubious statecraft before and during the July Days of 1974. His vaunted *Realpolitik* seemed to backfire as both America's allies, Greece and Turkey responded negatively to his "tilts"--first toward the Greek Junta, then toward Ankara. He did not even follow the dictates of Bismarkian *Realpolitik*, which never **required** that the manipulator of the balance of power should not consider the deeply felt wishes of the manipulated. But Kissinger seemed oblivious to both Greek and Turkish national feelings (Cf. Demetrios A. Theophylactou, *Security, Identity, and Nation Building, Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective* (Avebury/Brookfield USA::Avebury, 1995), p. 152) and, after Congress instituted a boycott on US arms to Turkey, the Turks closed down US bases in Turkey while America's best friend, the wise though conservative Greek Prime Minister

Karamanlis; withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO. He was the same Greek leader who advised Makarios *against* proclaiming his 13 Points discussed earlier.

C.　　We must conclude that the "July Days" of 1974 brought little credit to US statecraft or then Secretary of State Kissinger, for it is rarely the goal of prudent diplomacy to infuriate one's closest allies. Once again, US policy seemed oblivious to strongly felt local needs, and seemed unnecessarily dominated by short-term security considerations at the expense of regional alliance and local political needs.

　　　　Taken together with Acheson's, Ball's, and others' policies, Henry Kissinger's statecraft does not arouse much enthusiasm either among Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish, or American observers of US Eastern Mediterranean policy. We are, however, persuaded that American decision-makers have learned from their mistakes; and that the Clinton Administration can help provide the "external pressures" which Ehrlich so wisely saw as the vital diplomatic ingredient in reaching a just and lasting settlement on Cyprus.

　　　　Since there are enough failed policies on all sides to go around, perhaps we should adopt the old Greek apothegm "perasména. xehasména" ("Let's forget the past") and start afresh. The signs are hopeful in Athens, in Ankara, and in Washington and Europe. We must not delay for lack of courage to begin anew.

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
RESEARCH AND
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The New Geopolitical Environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond

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# GREECE, CYPRUS, TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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RESEARCH AND
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GREECE, CYPRUS, TURKEY AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION

I.   INTRODUCTION

II.   BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

III.   THE EU OBJECTIVES AND THE STAKES INVOLVED

IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS

GREECE, CYPRUS, TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. INTRODUCTION

Four important issues - Greco-Turkish relations, the Cyprus problem, EU-Turkish relations and the Cyprus-EU accession process - although separate and independent in themselves have been *de facto* interrelated. Given the high stakes involved, these issues have attracted the attention not only of the three countries - Greece, Cyprus and Turkey - but also of the EU. The US also has a great interest in promoting stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and acknowledges that the EU can play a substantial role in this process. Indeed, the US was successful in contributing toward the March 6, 1995 package involving the EU, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey which paved the way for Turkey's Customs Union agreement with the EU and for fixing a time framework for the start of accession negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the Union. Nevertheless, the US has not been successful in convincing Turkey to alter its maximalist policy on the Cyprus problem.

This paper addresses these issues and puts forward the view that the way the EU acts will not only affect the four issues in question as well as stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean but will also act as a litmus test for the EU itself and the role it will play in the new century and the new emerging international environment. The outcome of the issues under consideration will also

depend to a considerable degree on how the US chooses to act. So far, the US has been effectively and consistently supporting the Kemalist regime in Turkey irrespective of gross violations of fundamental human rights internally and externally as well as of international law. Furthermore, the US views the EU as more of an economic union and less of an autonomous political entity.

In the next section the background within which this discussion is taking place is briefly analyzed. In section III the relevant objectives of the EU are assessed. Within this framework the new role of the Union is examined. The way the Union will act will to a great extent determine its future global position. Finally some concluding remarks are put forward.

II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Following the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of almost 40% of the Republic of Cyprus, Ankara adopted a maximalist policy which amounts to consolidating and legalizing its strategic control over the island. Responding to the realities, the Greek side accepted the setting up of a bizonal bicommunal federal type of government - an option which was never regarded as an ideological goal but instead as a painful price to pay for the reunification of the island and the withdrawal of the Turkish troops which have been occupying the northern part of Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in 1974. What the Greek side has refused and will refuse to accept is the consolidation of the strategic control of Turkey over the island. Ever since 1974, the Turkish agenda focused on a confederal constitutional arrangement despite the fact that the high-level agreements and the subsequent UN resolutions referred to a bizonal bicommunal federal Republic. That is why the

unprecedented concessions of the Greek Cypriot side have not led to a breakthrough.

Encouraged by the lack of political will on the part of the international community to enforce its decisions on Cyprus and, moreover, by the tolerance of the US, the Turkish side has remained adamant in its maximalist positions and has been trying to consolidate its gains utilizing the time factor. Furthermore, the procedure of the intercommunal dialogue under the auspices of the UN has been inadequate, to say the least, for it addressed the problem mainly as an intercommunal issue and paid little or no attention to other substantial dimensions such as the international and the geostrategic aspects. This procedure was also a reflection of the fact that the West essentially tolerated the *status quo* which was established by force in 1974, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary.

The Turkish side has not only been threatening the Greek side with "tears and pain" but has also consistently refused to comply even with provisions of agreements that had been signed by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. For example, while Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership accepted the high level agreements [Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979)], they have never worked within their guidelines. On the contrary, ever since these agreements were reached, the Turkish side has been undermining them. Whenever called upon to discuss the future of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot leadership would put forward proposals amounting to a diarchy. Indeed, the Denktash proposals calling for a confederation - made in the presence of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismael Cem on August 31, 1998 - did not come as a surprise. The proposals themselves amount to an attempt to maintain and legalize the strategic control of Cyprus by Turkey. Thereafter, Denktash repeatedly put forward his new position that he would not negotiate unless the so called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") was recognized - and that negotiations should thus take place between two states. It is useful to remember that when the "TRNC" was unilaterally declared in 1983 the Greek side demanded its annulment before the resumption of any negotiations. The "TRNC" was not annulled and the Greek side once more

entered a new series of intercommunal negotiations. Yet, ironically, today the Turkish side demands recognition of the "TRNC" before it negotiates. The prospects of any Turkish concessions meeting the minimum objectives of the Greek side remain bleak.

It should also be recalled that the Cyprus problem has been one of the major issues of discord between Greece and Turkey even before 1974. In spite of the fact that the governments of Athens, Nicosia and Ankara for different reasons currently do not describe the Cyprus issue as a Greco-Turkish problem, it nevertheless by definition remains, among other things, a problem seriously affecting relations between Greece and Turkey. Indeed the American concern over Cyprus is basically due to the fact that this conflict can by design or by accident provoke a crisis between Greece and Turkey with destabilizing effects on security in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Likewise, the US would like to eliminate a major source of tension between Greece and Turkey in view of the fact that escalation of the crisis could also lead to major problems for NATO.

The Simitis government gradually began to deviate from the traditional Papandreou policy which basically stressed that a major change in Turkish policy over Cyprus was a precondition for an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations. Encouraged by the US and the EU, Simitis has been seriously working toward improving relations as a means of changing the psychological climate on both sides of the Aegean thereby paving the way for a rapprochement on high politics. The immediate response of Greece to the earthquake in Turkey on August 17, 1999 was warmly received by the Turkish public. Likewise Turkey reciprocated when a less severe earthquake hit Athens on September 7, 1999. With the new policy inaugurated by Simitis and upgraded by the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, Athens has been expecting a major political gesture by Ankara - something that several Turkish journalists also have urged their government to make. So far no signs of such a gesture are visible. The question that is raised is what the Greek government will do if Ankara remains adamant in its maximalist policy over Cyprus and in its revisionist policy regarding the Aegean. Naturally this is an issue that should also be of concern to the EU and the

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US. A vacuum of uncertainty, to say the least, will be created on the day after high expectations are frustrated.

Cyprus' accession process in conjunction with the EU interest to upgrade relations with Turkey inevitably have intertwined all these related issues. Cyprus' application to join the EEC on July 3, 1990 was a natural step by a small European country in the Mediterranean to seek its destiny in the new evolving international environment and in the new millennium. This move by the Republic of Cyprus entailed at the same time a strategic objective which, if successful, would disengage the island from the strategic control of Turkey. Thus, it is no surprise that the Turkish side reacted to Cyprus' application. It is also no surprise that the accession process of Cyprus did not act as a catalyst for the promotion of a solution of the problem as expected by some. For the accession process to have acted as a catalyst a major precondition was goodwill on both sides - Greek and Turkish. Unfortunately though, once more the Turkish positions frustrated hopes for a breakthrough.

While Cyprus is eligible for membership and accession negotiations are in progress, Turkey does not satisfy major preconditions even for the status of candidate for membership. The relevant decision of the Luxembourg EU summit in December 1997 which did not offer candidacy status to Turkey was therefore to be expected. Turkey reacted angrily to the decisions of the EU at the Luxembourg Summit Conference in December 1997, by which, among other things, Cyprus, in accordance with previous decisions, was given a firm date for the start of accession talks while Turkey was rebuffed. This failure could not have come as a surprise to Turkey; after all, in addition to its socio-economic problems, Turkey has a huge democratic deficit and a negative record in its foreign policy with Greece and Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkey chose to perceive the EU decision as a humiliating act, turning down a traditional ally while opening its doors to former adversaries - the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Within this overall political atmosphere Turkey increased its pressure on the EU with the objective of preventing or decelerating the accession process of Cyprus and of

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promoting its own candidacy irrespective of the existing problems. Thereafter, on several occasions in 1998, some EU members, e.g. France, expressed the view that the resolution of the Cyprus problem should be a precondition for Cyprus' membership. However, if this policy is adopted it would amount to giving Turkey veto power over Cyprus' accession to the EU. So far, while the EU has already made several gestures toward Turkey with a view to strengthening the relations between the two parties and indeed has been considering offering the possibility of candidacy, it has not yet adopted a definite policy on the issue of Cyprus' accession before the resolution of the Cyprus problem. What may be stated at this point is that the idea of accession before a solution under certain circumstances is gaining ground.

In the progress report (on Turkey) submitted on October 13, 1999 the European Commission has recommended that Turkey should gain the status as a candidate for membership, despite the fact that this country does not satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. The US is also very much interested in Turkey receiving a candidacy status. Both the US and most members of the EU urge Greece not to use its veto power over Turkey's candidacy in the Helsinki EU summit scheduled for December 10-11, 1999 as it did in the Cologne summit in June 1999. While Athens is not unwilling to see Turkey receiving candidacy status, it will, in addition to securing entry to the Euro-zone, most likely insist on receiving assurances:

(a)   that Cyprus will join the EU in the next enlargement irrespective of developments in the Cyprus problem;

(b)   that Turkey will abandon its revisionist plans in the Aegean;

(c)   that Turkey will cooperate for a viable solution to the Cyprus problem; and

(d)   that Turkey will commit itself to a "road map" toward covering her democratic deficits.

In sum, Athens may be willing to lift its veto in exchange for a package deal similar to the one of March 6, 1995 but upgraded. In the opposite case it will be difficult for any democratically elected Greek government to lift its veto without receiving anything in return.

II.   THE EU OBJECTIVES AND THE STAKES INVOLVED

An examination of EU objectives in relation to the relevant issues arising between the EU, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey will facilitate the analysis regarding the stakes for the EU and its likely options. It should, however, also be kept in mind that the EU has not yet developed a cohesive political identity and that national instead of EU interests play the most significant role. Last but not least it should be kept in mind that the US has strong vested interests in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey as well as in the broader area. Consequently, the US objectives in the area will play a decisive role in addressing all these issues.

A fundamental objective of the EU is the promotion of stability, security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. This should come as no surprise given that in the context of post-Cold War developments the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean is growing as it is at the apex of two geostrategic triangles:

(a)   in the north and north-east with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and

(b)   in the south and south-east with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The Eastern Mediterranean is also a focal point for existing and emerging energy routes as well as a meeting point of east and west, of the economic north and south and of three major world religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Given that the concept of security in the post-Cold War era is broadened to include economic and social parameters, the Eastern Mediterranean will be critical to European security and prosperity. That is why the potential accession of Cyprus to the EU as well as the resolution of the Cyprus problem should not be perceived as exclusively Cypriot concerns and objectives.

The EU is also concerned with the future of Turkey and its own relations with this country. At minimum the EU aims at a substantial upgrading of relations with Turkey and at maximum,

accession itself. This range of objectives allows for flexibility and provides room for an activist policy on the part of the EU, in spite of statements by Turkish politicians who insist that Turkey does not accept any conditions for receiving candidacy status. After all the EU operates on the basis of rules and regulations, respect for which is not a matter of choice.

The EU is also interested in advancing a social, economic and political agenda for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It is understood that the great socio-economic and political gap between the two sides of the Mediterranean - north and south - must be addressed as a European challenge because its persistence and widening may lead to serious problems. Suffice to say that already illegal migration, drug trafficking, terrorism, intense nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism already preoccupy the EU as serious issues.

The EU is also most likely to seek in the near future closer cooperation with two other blocs: in the northeast with the Russian Federation and the independent Republics of the ex-Soviet Union and in the south and southeast with the Arab and broader Islamic world. Such a cooperation will initially aim at capitalizing on the existing and emerging opportunities in the economic domain. Simultaneously, efforts will be made to foster an appropriate political climate conducive to furthering cooperation and promoting security. The overall objective is the promotion of economic prosperity and political stability.

The EU will also attempt to upgrade and consolidate its Common Foreign and Security Policy. This has acquired an urgency in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis which, among other things, has shown that unaddressed simmering crises could lead to bloody conflicts and human tragedy while also generating the possibility for wider destabilization.

Naturally the upgrading of the CFSP will be addressed in relation to two other related issues: on the one hand the future of the EU-US relationship and on the other hand the role of the EU in the

new century and in the emerging new international environment. During the Cold War it was clear that the EC was basically an economic organization and that the security issues were addressed within the framework of NATO. The natural leader of the Euro-Atlantic relationship was the US. In the post-Cold War era the EU is likely to substantially upgrade its political dimension. While it will continue to abide in the Euro-Atlantic partnership, it is to be expected that the EU will try to forge a partnership of equality with the US. Naturally the outcome of these efforts will have an impact on the objective of the EU to play a leading role in the new international environment. It is within this overall framework that the EU will have to address the Cyprus problem, the Cyprus-EU accession process, the EU-Turkish relations and the Greco-Turkish problems. It is also understood that the EU would direct its efforts towards addressing these issues concurrently.

Addressed from a European perspective, the Cyprus problem and the vital objective of the Republic of Cyprus to become a member of the EU pose both challenges and opportunities. While until now efforts towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem have failed, the EU will have made a great step toward adopting a new role in European and international affairs if it is successful in contributing substantially toward its peaceful resolution. The solution of the Cyprus problem and the accession of Cyprus to the EU would symbolize the commitment of the EU to decisive involvement in the Mediterranean. It will also be a step towards adopting a CFSP. On the contrary, failure to follow an assertive policy may be indicative of the inability of the EU to act even on the basis of its own declarations and in its own geographical domain.

Given that the Eastern Mediterranean is of great importance to the European post-Cold War security system, inevitably the EU has to address the Cyprus question as well as the possibility of Cyprus' accession to the Union before a solution to the problem is found. In this context the EU will have to take a stance on whether Cyprus will continue to remain under the strategic control of Turkey or whether it will become an integral part of the European security system. Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the accession of Cyprus to the EU prior to a solution of the Cyprus question

entails considerably fewer risks and problems for the EU than the reverse. The membership of Cyprus would imply, among other things, that a possible conflict in the island could be contained, but in the event of a crisis in Cyprus before membership, the threat to regional peace and stability would be much greater. The accession of Cyprus to the EU even in the absence of a solution to the Cyprus question would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus.

Moreover, the accession of Cyprus to the EU entails great advantages for the Union as it will project its influence to the vital area of the Eastern Mediterranean. Certainly, it is in the interest of the EU to extend itself into the Eastern Mediterranean and be only a few miles away from the Middle East. Cyprus, as a member of the EU, may well have a pivotal role to play in advancing the economic, social and political objectives of the Union in the 21st century with respect to the Euro-Mediterranean agenda. Likewise, in a network of cooperation between the EU and the Russian Federation and the independent Republics of the ex-Soviet Union on the one hand and the Arab and broader Islamic world on the other, Cyprus would be a primary focal point not only geographically, but also economically, politically and socially. Because of its history, civilization, development and good relations with most countries in the region, Cyprus can be a very important and useful partner in the EU. Within this framework Cyprus as a regional and subsequently as an international economic, academic, and medical center could be an invaluable asset not only to the EU but to all the parties involved.

Furthermore, at a time when the EU and the west in general are trying to advance the cause of market economies, democratic systems and multiculturalism, Cyprus could be a model in the Mediterranean and beyond. In other words, because of its experiences and its political and economic system, Cyprus could indeed play a key role in promoting these objectives. For such a role to be played however, a major precondition is that Turkey should respect the island's independence. Only then would the two Cypriot communities be able to make a Cypriot federal

system work and, thereafter, move on towards a fully integrated society.

The EU, like the US, has a vested interest in the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations. Ironically and tragically, it took the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece to show that public opinion on both sides of the Aegean wishes to see the two countries embarking on a path of peaceful co-existence and creative cooperation. For this to happen though a major precondition is mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Furthermore, there cannot be a normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey without a viable solution of the Cyprus problem. The Greek side has made painful concessions for the minority Turkish Cypriot community - concessions that Turkey would never even consider for its own Kurdish minority. While addressing the Cyprus problem the EU and the US should remember that the present situation, with the forcible separation of the two communities, is the outcome of the Turkish invasion, the subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and of the ethnic cleansing that Turkey carried out.

The objective of the EU and the US to help Turkey overcome its domestic problems is understandable. But a policy of tolerating the gross violations of human rights in Turkey and its revisionist foreign policy will sooner or later lead to broader destabilization. It is this tolerance which allows Turkish leaders to bluntly state that they accept no conditions in order to enter the EU. After all Ankara seems to forget that the EU is a club with particular rules and norms that all members must respect. The EU can offer Ankara candidacy for membership even though Turkey does not fulfil the necessary criteria, provided Turkey agrees to a substantive road map for democratization at home and respect for the territorial integrity of all its neighbours as well as of international law. Likewise, Cyprus should receive a commitment that it will be included in the next enlargement.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Undoubtedly the EU is at a critical phase in its process of growth and integration. Consequently the way it acts will be decisive for its own role in the future as well as for its own standards and objectives.

The future of Turkey as well as EU-Turkish relations constitute two of the many challenges that the Union has to address. Offering Turkey candidacy for membership is one of the options that the EU is currently contemplating with the US strongly encouraging this possibility. If the EU views itself as more than an economic union - and more specifically as an evolving political entity with a global status - it cannot afford to be generous to Turkey offering candidacy unless Ankara conforms to a list of minimum standards that all EU countries and all those wishing to join the Union respect and follow. If Turkey wishes to become a European state then it must take the following steps:

(a)   It must move toward closing its internal democratic deficits. Among other things, it must show genuine respect for human rights while simultaneously recognizing the rights of the Kurds. Turkey cannot demand a confederal solution for the 90,000 Turkish Cypriots who constitute about 12% of the population of Cyprus and refuse to offer minority rights to almost 18 million Kurds who constitute about 25% of the population of Turkey.

(b)   It must respect the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty of its neighbors. This means among other things that it must terminate the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus.

(c)   It must embark on radical socio-economic reforms in order to comply with the obligations arising from the accession process.

(d)   The army should abandon the leading role it is now playing in Turkish political life.

If the EU offers candidacy status to Turkey without insisting on these steps then the Union will simply demonstrate that it has no firm objectives but is wavering with regard to its own future

direction.

It is obvious that the Eastern Mediterranean is critical for post-Cold War European security and prosperity. Consequently, the extension of the EU's influence and indeed its own presence in this region would be a vital step in the right direction. This means that the EU should proceed with the accession of Cyprus as soon as possible and irrespective of developments in the Cyprus problem. Such a move by the EU will entail several benefits. First, as it has already been noted, it will project its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Second, it will give a message of credibility regarding the seriousness of the Euro-Mediterranean policy. Third, it will be a step forward toward adopting a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Fourth, it will eliminate the risk of a Greco-Turkish war starting in Cyprus by design or by accident. Fifth, it will lead to the beginning of substantive negotiations between all parties involved for the solution of the Cyprus problem, because with Cyprus' accession, the maximum objective of Turkey for strategic control of the whole island would be thwarted.

On the contrary, if the EU adopts a policy which essentially considers the solution of the Cyprus problem as a precondition for accession, it will effectively reward Turkish aggression and bless the ethnic cleansing committed in 1974. It will also lead to the perpetuation of the problem as the Greek side will not accept to sign anything which violates human rights and places the future of Cypriot Hellenism in the hands of Ankara. Moreover it will harm the EU itself as it will indirectly but clearly offer veto rights to Turkey over the accession of Cyprus. With such an approach the EU will also be contributing toward the perpetuation of the violation of human rights in Turkey and to the further destabilization of the area since Turkey will receive the message that irrespective of what it does or it does not do, in the end it gets what it wants.

Last but not least it should be stressed that, over time, it was perceived interests that shaped international relations. As we are about to enter the new century and the new millennium the EU

should consistently pursue its own interests in the new evolving international environment. Those interests coincide with a list of minimum fundamental principles which form part of the acquis communautaire. These include human rights, protection of minority rights, and respect for democracy. The EU is in a position to adopt a comprehensive policy incorporating these principles. Their application and implementation in the broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean will generate security, stability and cooperation and could indeed create an environment conducive to shared economic prosperity.

Greek-Turkish Relations: Hostages of Confrontation or Beneficiaries of Cooperation?

Dr. Ismail Kemal
(Draft)

The political and economic costs of continued confrontation are higher than a mutually acceptable compromise and a new era of good relations. As long as the disputes between Turkey and Greece remain unresolved, even minor incidents could escalate into conflict with serious and long-term consequences for both sides.
European integration could serve as an instrument and as an incentive in resolving the problems and achieving cooperative relations. Cooperation needs identifying common interests, building trust, interaction based on reciprocity and equal distribution of costs, risks, burdens and rewards.

Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War created new challenges and new opportunities in the field of Greek-Turkish relations. The Cyprus problem and the Aegean issues are the main sources of the Greek-Turkish conflict.
In the new and evolving international system, military power is unipolar. The U.S. is the most important military power, whereas the economic power is tripolar, that is U.S., Japan and the EU. Turkey and Greece are allies of the U.S. within NATO. Greece is already a member of the EU and Turkey endeavors to become a candidate for EU membership, with the hope of full membership in future. Both countries are located in areas where vital American and EU interests exist.
Systemic transformation has influenced Turkey's and Greece's domestic and foreign policies. National preferences of both countries are reformulated in line with changing international and regional environment. The transformation of the international system necessitates a redefinition of interests as well as the means of achieving them. Greek-Turkish relations are affected by the efforts of adjustment to the new environment.
How did changes in the international and regional environment influence Greek-Turkish relations? In some respects the new environment added new constraints on these relations. In other respects they have created the necessary incentives for better relations.

The current Greek-Turkish détente

As Prof. V. Coufoudakis pointed out in one of his essays, the Greek-Turkish relations follow the cycle of confrontation-negotiation-confrontation. Now we are in a period of negotiations and détente. In the past, the negotiation periods were usually short-lived. Whether the current détente will be lasting and successful remains to be seen.

The causes of the recent period of détente are:
1. The current successful low-level talks between Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministry officials. The relevant parties are discussing prospects for the strengthening of cooperation in such areas as economy, trade, tourism and environmental protection.

2. A good climate in relations has been created following the recent earthquakes which hit the two countries. This climate offers an opportunity for improved relations.
3. The conciliatory attitude of Greece on Turkey's aspirations with regard to the European Union (EU).

Good relations with Turkey by resolving the long-standing problems and stability in the area will give Greece the much-needed secure environment to concentrate on economic development. There is a more constructive Greek attitude towards Turkey now and Turkish officials also accept this. Turkey's attitude is not clear yet.

In the new era Turkey has broader concerns. In addition to Greece, the Balkans and the Mediterranean she has to deal with the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. But closer relations with the EU is a major goal of Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish government understands the economic and political importance of the EU in the post-Cold War era very well. The Turkish officials are aware that a new Europe is in the making and if they do not respond quickly enough, Turkey may find herself out of this Europe. Turkey also has concerns about her role in future European defense arrangements (European Security and Defense Identity). Turkey's aspiration of becoming an EU member and the need to avoid a Greek veto is an incentive for Ankara to take the necessary steps for rapprochement with Greece.

At present there is strong public support on both sides for reconciliation and better relations. We are witnessing frequent contacts among businessmen, intellectuals, academics, municipalities, the mass media, NGO's etc. The "Davos process" which was another era of détente did not enjoy such strong public support. The results of a poll published in the Athens daily Ta Nea are very interesting in this respect. The poll conducted from 17 to 29 September revealed that 43.1% of those asked completely agreed with the notion of holding direct talks and negotiations with Turkey. Another 30.9% said they rather agreed, while 9.7% completely disagreed, 9.5% rather disagreed and 6.8% did not answer. This is a clear proof of the existing positive public mood. This new domestic situation makes compromise easier for the politicians in both countries.

The Greek government is making some moves in the direction of rapprochement. This reflects the self-confidence of Greece. After all, in Turkey there is now a stable government. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is known as a hawk in foreign relations. But he has the moral authority to make the necessary concessions, imperative for a Greek-Turkish reconciliation.

In this new environment, Greece and Turkey have to decide what to do about their relations. Among the options available, reconciliation and cooperation are the best ones. They must accept short-term risks for the sake of long-term benefits.

In the short run, a variety of confidence-building measures can contribute to the new atmosphere. I will mention just one. In 1988 Andreas Papandreu and Turgut Ozal talked about examining Greek and Turkish history curricula in their schools, in order to improve the unfavorable image of their respective nations. It is time to put this idea in practice.

However, future developments between Greece and Turkey depend primarily on the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the Aegean issues, an improvement in Turkish-EU relations and democratization in Turkey. These problems are complex and interrelated. They must be approached from a realistic point of view. They cannot be resolved with one stroke.

We know that Greek-Turkish relations are burdened by historical animosity, suspicion and mistrust. This past weighs heavily on current issues. Deep-seated suspicions and mistrust are impediments on the road to reconciliation and cooperation. The interaction between history and present conflicts is a two way process. While history is burdening the current conflicts, the continuation of these conflicts is feeding history with new material for mistrust, suspicion and animosity. Countries in Western Europe have managed to overcome their past animosities. Nationalist passions and animosities left their place to integration, cooperation, interdependence and friendly relations. Turkish-Greek relations should benefit from this experience.

The Cyprus Problem

Finding a mutually-acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem is imperative for good relations among Greece and Turkey.
The Cyprus problem has had the most damaging impact on Turkish-Greek relations. Important national interests are thought to be at stake. The island is a constant source of tension and potential destabilization. As Boutros Ghali observed, "Cyprus is one of the world's most heavily militarized potential flashpoints". Efforts to solve the problem have so far been unsuccessful.
The latest round of intercommunal talks, two years ago, did not bring about positive results. The Troutbeck and Glion negotiations in 1997 were followed by a stalemate. The international community is now trying to overcome this stalemate and initiate new, hopefully fruitful negotiations. In the meantime two important developments have taken place. Cyprus has started substantive accession negotiations with the EU. The Luxembourg summit of the EU in December 1997 decided to open accession talks with five Central European countries and Cyprus. Turkey was excluded from the list of candidate countries. The beginning of the accession negotiations was supposed to help resolve the Cyprus problem. But this did not happen. Instead, Cyprus's accession to the EU has become a major issue of strife in intercommunal relations. The immediate reaction of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leaders was to harden their stance. A federal solution to the Cyprus problem was officially rejected and a proposal for a confederal solution was put forward.
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots will not take part in the accession talks, until Turkey's relations with the EU and their status is clarified. The issue of status is related to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Although the EU is trying to provide Turkish Cypriots with information on the benefits that would accrue from the accession of the entire island to the EU, there are no indications that the Turkish Cypriot position will change. The dynamics created by the EU-Cyprus accession talks can evolve in two directions: towards

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a solution or permanent partition. EU-Turkey relations will largely determine this outcome.

Improvement in EU-Turkey relations can pave the way for a softer Turkish policy on the resumption of intercommunal talks and finding a mutually acceptable solution. At the same time a constructive Turkish attitude on Cyprus could help Turkey's EU aspirations. US special presidential envoy Alfred Moses has told Turkish officials that the resumption of talks on Cyprus problem will facilitate the official declaration of Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki. So the connection between progress in Cyprus and Turkey's candidacy is obvious.

The best option for Cyprus is to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem, coupled with accession of the entire island to the EU.

Aegean issues

Since the early 1970s, Turkey and Greece have been unable to solve their differences on the Aegean issues. The two parties are in disagreement over the substance of the issues as well as on the means to solve them. The disputes include the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the airspace, and the militarization of certain islands. Lately Turkey added the issue of the so-called "grey areas" to the existing ones. On three occasions (1976, 1987, 1996) the two countries came to the brink of war over these issues. On 8 July 1997 at NATO's Madrid summit, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Turkish president Suleyman Demirel issued a declaration that no threats of war will be made and no force will be used and that differences will be settled peacefully. This was a correct step in the right direction.

The principle of non-use of force and threats is very important. The other important principle is the peaceful settlement of the issues. In the framework of these principles the parties can find a compromise solution which will satisfy their sensitivities through negotiations, mediation or adjudication and arbitration.

There were some high level talks during the 1990s but no progress was made. In September 1991, Prime Ministers Constantine Mitsodakis and Mesut Yilmaz met in Paris. Contrary to high expectations, this meeting failed to produce an agreement. After the Madrid Declaration, in the autumn of 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis met on the island of Crete. Again there was no progress.

After a period of non-dialog and the Ocalan crisis at the beginning of this year, the foreign ministers of the two countries initiated the current low-level talks. The ongoing diplomatic efforts on the eve of the Helsinki summit and the decisions of the summit will be crucial for the future of Greek-Turkish relations.

Resolving the conflicts has its dividends. The biggest peace dividend will be more security. Greece and Turkey allocate yearly an appreciable share of their national income to defense. Between 1985 and 1995 Turkey's defense expenditures more than doubled. Among NATO countries only Greece followed the pattern of Turkey. Greco-Turkish conflict is the main reason for this arms race. An end to the arms race would allow reallocation of resources from defense to the economy. Both countries need these resources for economic and social development.

Enhanced economic cooperation will be profitable for both countries.

Finding solutions to the bilateral problems will speed up Turkey's integration with Europe. A European and democratic Turkey serves the Greek interests too.

EU Turkey

EU can have a catalytic effect on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem as long as the "membership incentive" exists for Turkey. In this sense the Luxembourg Summit's decision of not including Turkey in the list of candidate countries, was a mistake. Indeed, the EU has lost much of its ability to influence and impose restraints on Turkey, including such issues as the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish relations.
If Turkey is isolated from the process of European integration and new security arrangements, the outlook for Turkish-EU and Greek-Turkish relations will be bleak. Turkey also has to take some important steps before and after the upcoming summit meeting in Helsinki.
In the post-Cold War era, the EU acts like a magnet for non-members. However Turkey's European aspirations are old. Turkey always wanted to be accepted as a European nation in its own right. This has always been an objective of Turkish foreign policy. The issue of "westernization" and modernization touches upon the very sensitive issue of the Turkish identity. It touches upon the question "where does Turkey belong?".
The rapid changes taking place in Europe gave an impetus to the European aspirations of Turkey. There is a consensus among the political parties that Turkey should join the EU. It is interesting to note that Islamists who used to reject EU and proposed an Islamic common market now support Turkey's accession to the EU.
Turkey's European vocation necessitates new approaches to her external and internal problems. Turkey's full membership in the EU will only be possible when the Turkish political system meets European standards. As all other candidate countries, Turkey must fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. In the post-Cold War era, values such as human rights, rule of law and democratic principles are very important. Authoritarian forms of government, the role of the military in politics and the Kurdish issue are major obstacles. There is an intensive internal debate on the issues of democratization and the EU. Pressure from the EU and the incentive of full membership has been influential in bringing about democratic changes in the past.
We know that important political changes in Turkey have been the result of external changes and pressures. The transition to a multiparty system after the Second World War is a good example. Pressure and incentive put together can bring about the necessary changes.
So, the EU must soon decide on " What to do with Turkey"

Conclusion

Cooperation and friendship in Greek-Turkish relations is definitely the best option for both countries. The existing issues should be resolved through peaceful methods. Shared benefits could form the basis for compromise solutions and cooperation. European integration can be very helpful, both as an instrument and reward.

Now we are in a very delicate phase of diplomatic efforts. It is very difficult to predict whether a breakthrough will be achieved. In the aftermath of the Helsinki summit, the prospects of Greco-Turkish relations will be clearer.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Role of External Actors

Dr. Emad Gad

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External actors played a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the very early stages of that conflict. Its eruption goes back mainly to roles played by foreign powers. They even played an active part in controlling the process of conflict on both its military and negotiating sides.

Before going into the details of that role, we will define first, the nature of the conflict, the requirements of its settlement, then the role played by external parties.

First: The Nature of Arab-Israeli Conflict

This conflict belongs to what may be called Protracted Social conflict, known for its continuity, and extenuation for a long period. Its hostile interactions are distinguished by their intensity, their repetition and changeability. They are also characterized by their outbreak within the society or conflicting societies in a way that makes the conflict itself a source of more hostile interactions. Besides, this kind of conflict has deep causes and is difficult to solve in between conflicting parties or by intervention of external actors. Therefore the solution of Protracted Social conflicts needs a relatively long time in which important changes happen in the atmosphere of the conflicting parties. (1)

Some believe that this kind of conflicts runs deep into the roots of ethnic or natural divisions. Hence it is originally ideological, and is reflected in the goals of parties in conflict. These goals may include the desire to secede, obtain national freedom, the right to self-determination, equality or independence. (2)

Most of these conflicts are inherited from the colonial past. They also erupt within societies that have a high degree of structural distinctions in political, economic and social fields. Some of these examples are the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, the Turkish-Greek conflict (especially on Cyprus), the Kurdish problem in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, the conflict in Korea, in Northern Ireland (3), and many others in the Balkans, the latest of which was Kosovo.

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exchange of prisoners of war. For these conflicts pass through phases of acute changes ranging from confrontation to cooperation, from open violence to underground war. Sometimes they stay for a long time without any trouble, then suddenly they erupt and escalate to a comprehensive war between nations, or a civil war within the nation (4). That is why researchers give both the open and clandestine conflict the same importance.

As it is difficult to realize the point where this kind of conflict has begun, it is also difficult to realize its end. We cannot say it has ended merely because one or some of its issues are solved, or because the parties involved have cooperated in order to reach an armistice or a peace agreement. For such conflicts are extremely complicated, intricate and wide.

Because these conflicts are deep rooted in the society, their settlement must come from within the society itself. Any external efforts to intervene or impose a settlement usually end in failure or even add to the complications already there (such as Kosovo). Any imposed settlement which the environment of conflict is not ready for, may end in solving some issues at a high level, but the roots of conflict and its main causes remain and grow once more. (5)

Second: Requirements of Settling protracted Social Conflicts:

In the light of former experiences in settling such conflicts, we may say that the requirements of settlement are also prevail within the society in conflict, and that the role of external actors comes as a helping factor, to sponsor the negotiations, offer the subsidies needed to stabilize the agreements reached, but it cannot play an essential role in the settlement process. If it tries to do so for its own interests, the results will be negative.

Hence, settling such conflicts needs three main requirements; two of them concern the parties in conflict, the third concerns external actors: (6)

1- The Acknowledgement of Both Parties in Conflict of the Uselessness of Military Force:

This means that both parties in conflict are completely convinced that the use of arms would not solve the problem, but will complicate it and increase the enmity is that goes down deep in the roots of human entity.

This also means that if only one of the parties in conflict was convinced with the uselessness of a military option, while the second party did not reach that

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conclusion, there would be no suitable foundation to a settlement. On the contrary, this would lead to a severe damage in the situation and rights of the party that has dropped the military option. The damage would even be greater if that party dropped the military option in order to tempt the other party and invite it to a dialogue. For this would mean ignoring the simplest rules of the settlement game and denying one of the essential principles of negotiations. In that case the party that initiated this step must then be prepared to accept what the other party dictates or is ready to give away. It cannot even go back to use the military option as a pressure card, or even resist. Because what may be decided on the negotiating table, and whatever agreements may follow, will rearrange new situations that cannot be ignored by the weaker party even if that party has a deep desire to resist its faulty calculations.

2- The Presence of Political Leaders Convinced with a Peaceful Settlement :

The acknowledgement of both parties in conflict that the military option is useless, will be helpful only in the presence of political leaders on both sides who are really convinced with this principle, and who continue their efforts for the sake of a successful settlement, that will lead to comprehensive and just solutions, that will be accepted on both sides of conflict or negotiations and that will be based on compromises.

For any agreement that comes at the cost of any party's rights means an agreement of submission that will become —as all historical studies proved-time bombs that blow out at any time. This was also proved from the experience of settlement made after the First World War, which forced the Versailles Treaty on Germany. In less than two decades, Germany raged the Second World War. In world war II the leaders of victorious countries took a lesson from this experience, they offered the initiative of developing and rejoining the defeated countries in a way that helped them enjoy stability and development at the same time. With this principle in mind, comes the necessity of acknowledging the usefulness of a settlement on the side of political leaders in both parties, and also on the side of leaders who will take over after them.

3- The Absence of Bias on the Part of Superpowers :

Towards any of the parties in conflict or in negotiation, or at the very least, the presence of relative bias that will make the alignment itself neutral, and that will not

out obstacles in the way of a settlement. So when the two parties in conflict acknowledge the uselessness of the military option, and when the political powers that believe in a settlement are available, there will still be the role of mediation or patronage that should be taken by regional and international organizations.

Third: Role of External Actors in Conflict and Settlement:

Since the beginning of this conflict and its eruption into armed confrontation at an early stage of the Cold War, and until the end of the eighties, external actors played a major role in feeding the conflict. They even used it as a tool in directing the Cold War between the Eastern and Western camps: Washington and Moscow. While Washington pledged to guarantee the security and superiority of Israel, Moscow's interests were in gaining areas of influence in the Arab world, particularly in countries in conflict. It had to prevent their defeat and stop Washington from dictating its will on these countries.

Throughout the Cold War, there was a sort of balance in general inspite of the results of 1967 war. But there was no thinking about the adoption of final settlements to the conflict due to the lack of the three demands needed for settlement. At that time the conflict was not ready for settlement. Both superpowers had no interests in settling these conflicts. They were a sort of "zero sum game".

Egypt's case was exceptional. Since its decision to discharge the Soviet experts in 1972, under Sadat's rule it decided to prepare the medium of conflict with Israel for settlement. The 1973 October war came within that frame. It led to negotiations under American sponsorship resulting in the Camp David Accord (1978), then the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. At the same time, the medium of conflict between Israel and the other Arab countries lacking the demands of settlement. This continued until the radical changes happened in the world order at the end of the eighties.

The Impacts of Change in the World Order:

After the revolutionary changes in Eastern and Central Europe beginning from 1989, ending in the breakdown of Socialist regimes and Warsaw Pact, as well as the Soviet Union (1991), the whole world order passed through deep changes. Most researchers in international relations described these changes as the end of the bipolar world order that was formed after World War II. What happened in 1991 was not

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quite different from what happened at the end of former big wars and led to major changes in the structure and distribution of power, as well as in the rules that governed international interactions.

We may say that what happened since the beginning of the nineties was the end of a world order and the beginning of a new one. Its characteristics may be summarized in:

a) The breakdown of the Soviet Block which was governed by the Soviet Union and was represented by Warsaw Pact. The breakdown happened without a military war and happened in a very short period.

b) The end of communism as a political power due to the breakdown of ruling regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. Even the changes in China are heading towards capitalism, if not liberalism. Other communist countries, such as Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam, are not able to offer an international alternative.(7)

c) Changes in the relation between superpowers. The breakdown of Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the end of international conflict that ruled since 1945. It also ended the arms race between Washington and Moscow.

d) The shifting towards economic blocks, since it became difficult for any country to perform effectively by itself. (Nafta, Apec, and the Group of 15.)

e) The change of the political map by the breakdown of the Soviet Union into 15 Republics, and Yugoslavia into five countries, Czechoslovakia into two and Germany was united. There may still be more changes to come, with more disintegration and more merging.(8)

After the end of the Cold war, the US became the only country capable to play a decisive role in any conflict anywhere in the world, and use its tools of power to impose its rules of the New World order. What happened in second Gulf war was an example of this capability. The US succeeded in winning international support – from the Security Council – against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and formed a huge military coalition under its command – to deal militarily with Iraq. It even succeeded in making the war against Iraq seems as a foundation for the New World order. But in fact, these moves came as a result of realizing that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait may risk its vital interests in the area. This was enough to justify its intervention just as happened in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Chili, Grenada and Panama. (9)

The Second Gulf War Confirms the American Single-handedness in Managing the World Order:

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 came at a time Moscow was trying to quit the policies of the Cold War and begin a period of complete accord with the West. It joined the Warsaw Pact countries in condemning the Iraqi invasion and called on Baghdad to withdraw directly from Kuwait.

Warsaw Pact countries tried to give priority to diplomatic solutions, but when the US and some of NATO countries mobilized their forces against Iraq, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe gave their consent to the Security Council resolutions, including those that supported the use of force. Some of them shared with non-combatant units in the international coalition. Czechoslovakia sent a unit specialized in chemical war to Saudi Arabia. Poland sent a unit for medical services and a hundred servicemen for its hospitals. Hungary sent doctors and nurses.

Thus the Gulf war was an unprecedented opportunity in which Warsaw Pact countries supported an American or NATO's position. It was even the first time that any of these countries offer support to a Western military action. This showed the depth of changes that happened in these countries and the nature of these changes.

The relation between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries became more and more cooperative to the extent that NATO made some changes in its military doctrine and structures of power, and opened its membership to some countries from the former Warsaw Pact, particularly those that shared in the Gulf war: Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

The main results of the Gulf war on the relation between the two camps may be summarized as:

1- Emphasizing the radical changes in the Soviet position towards conflicts and regional problems. It shifted from confrontation and contradictory positions to a complete accord with U.S. policies.

2- Emphasizing the US leadership of the world order after the Cold war. Washington was able to impose its resolutions in the Security Council in order to gain a legal umbrella for its policies and actions. Neither Moscow nor Peking tried using its veto to stop it.

Thus the Middle East peace process began at a time the US was ruling the world order at the head of capitalist countries, while the other superpower was absent

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with no alternative to play a balancing role, or to ease the pressures of the other side. On the contrary, Russia and China changed their former positions for the sake of special gains from the U.S. Their positions became worse after the Madrid conference that coincided with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the liberals' control over power. Those liberals sought to adopt the western policies towards regional conflicts outside Europe. Thus Washington became the only sponsor of the peace process, while Moscow's role declined to a mere procedural presence, such as the sharing in ceremonies for signing agreements.

China was involved in its own economic changes, and was keen to win the position of a most favored nation in trade with the U.S.

The US Exclusive Role in Managing the Peace Process:

The settlement process for the Arab-Israeli conflict began at a time of deep Arab deterioration and an international environment that gave the capitalist system, under the leadership of US the right to rule the world order exclusively.

Arab parties began negotiating the settlement in Madrid confidant that the US will fulfil its obligations towards a just settlement. In this atmosphere, the Madrid conference was convened in October 1991 to usher the beginning of the peace process for the Arab Israeli conflict under the complete supervision of the U.s.

The Madrid Conference:

From the very beginning of the conference, it was clear that the U.S. was keen to put definite principles that lead to direct bilateral relations without a stable reference. This made the balance of power as well as the restraints of both the international and regional environment the main reference of negotiations. Therefore the United Nations and international resolutions were left out of the principles guiding the negotiations. Azmy Bishara the Arab member of the Keenest described this position by saying that the dilemma of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations according to Madrid and Oslo is caused by the absence of a single principle that translates the negotiations into acts, such as the withdrawal from other peoples' land, the right of self-determination etc. In the absence of such a principle, then there has to be a balance of power between the two parties, such as the capability of Israel to dictate, and the desperate efforts by Palestinians to limit that capability by winning the US to their side. (11)

Thus the US was the only party that put the principles of negotiations. It decided to concentrate –in Madrid- on the issue as a whole, and left details to direct bilateral negotiations. In such a case, the parties usually fail to reach accepted principles, especially in the absence of guiding rules. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir expressed this when he said that he was seeking to negotiate for ten years without achieving any progress.

The direct bilateral tracks as well as the multilateral tracks came to cause more disagreements between the Arabs, and opened the way for Israel to manipulate with the different tracks in a way that led to the Oslo agreement and the Jordanian Israeli peace treaty.

The American Administration introduced the idea of the two negotiating tracks in an effort to drop the Arab Israeli boycott, and begin a mechanism for normalizing relations and projects for cooperation without linking this process with the direct bilateral track. The direct result of this idea was divisions among the Arabs. Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority refused –until Oslo agreement - to share in any of the regional multilateral negotiations except after the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. Differences were clear between Arabs who accepted the regional multilateral negotiations. Some of them accepted the separation between the two tracks and were convinced by the American-Israeli concept that any progress in normalizing relations and cooperation will help the direct bilateral negotiations (Jordan is an example). Others -including Egypt- saw that stopping normalization and cooperation will help the success of direct negotiations.

All the ended with the Palestinian Authority accepting the idea of secret negotiations away from the Arabs, and aborting the principle of coordination. The Palestinian Israeli Declaration of Principles that was signed in the White House (13th September 93) under the name of "Gaza-Jericho first" came as a result of negotiating in the absence of a clear and coherent foundation, as well as the presence of a sole superpower ruling the world order.

The United States: A Role According to the Israeli Demand:

Arab parties continued negotiating with the different Israeli governments that began to more backward and demand renegotiations. At the same time the US position was completely biased towards Israel. For example, according to Oslo agreement, negotiations were supposed to end before May 4th 1999. But when that

date arrived, Israel began manipulating in order to ignore the second stage of agreement, and kept on confiscating the lands and building new settlements.

Washington did not play the role that should have led to success. It was keen to support the Israeli side only. Besides guaranteeing Israel's military superiority in quality and quantity, and Israel's exclusive ownership of nuclear weapons, it was also keen to confine its role to the Israeli demands. When Netanyahu's government (May 96 – May 99) freezed the negotiations, Washington threatened to stop playing any role in the peace process. That position was contradictory to its obligations as a sponsor to the negotiations, and as the sole superpower in the Post Cold War Era. Still, it played the role that suited Israel alone. That was made clear after the signing of Wye River Accord (28 October 98). The Palestinian side implemented all that was needed, while Netanyahu refused to comply with what was asked of him. It is true that Washington clashed with Netanyahu but that was because he challenged the US policy and embarrassed Washington.

In spite of this, Washington kept on pressuring Arab countries in order to normalize relations with Israel. This annoyed most Arab countries, even U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia. They even boycotted El Doha Economic Conference.

When Barak took control in Israel (June 1999) the US was keen to affirm its strategic alliance with Israel. At the same time it accepted shrinking its role in the peace process according to Barak's wishes.

Evaluating the Role of External Actors in the Arab Israeli Conflict:

As said before, the role of external parties in settling protracted social conflicts is an assisting role. It usually comes after major changes in the environment of conflict, or if there were divisions at the top of the world order concerning this conflict, and the bases of its settlement, or if the major powers sought to utilize the conflict for its own interest, in its conflict with other major powers.

After the Cold War, the US began to impose its settlement from the top without going down to the roots of conflict. At the same time, Israel was still considering arms to be the main guarantee to its security, and thus military superiority in quality and quantity was the main guarantee to that superiority.

The role of external parties, represented by US, since Madrid Conference, was trying to reach partial agreements on all tracks, while Arab parties were trying to fend off the damages done by the American bias. This drove the US and Israel to complain

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from the slow process of normalization, and drove the different parties to feel the use lessens of negotiations, as well as the unreadiness of the environment to reach a real and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Whenever negotiations reach a deficient settlement or an imposed settlement, it usually leads to a split between the official relations of governments and the real parties in conflict. This in turn stops the normalization process.

What Washington is doing in that case will never lead to a real peace, that opens the door to normal relations between the peoples of the Middle East.

In the case of any change in the international environment or in the surrounding atmosphere may put an end to all agreements reached in that way.

Thus, in order to reach a real and lasting peace, there must be an American and international effort to regain respect for international resolutions and implement them in all fields of conflict, as well as guarantee compromises in all conflicts in a way that does not leave any of the parties with the feeling of injustice. Because satisfaction with any agreements reached is the only basis for a settlement leading to real and everlasting peace. At least it may stop the escalation of historic enmity.

Footnotes

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8-Ibid. Pp.43-44.

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10- David S. Mason, Revolution in East-Central Europe: The Rise and fall of the Communism and Cold War, Westview press, 1992,p.170.

11-Azmy Beshara, The Forth of May 1999, Al Hayat Newspaper, 8/8/1998. (In Arabic)