# INTEGRATION AND SUB-REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
EUROMESCO WORKING GROUPS MEETING

Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo)
Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
Roma, 15-16/X/1999

a. Programme
b. List of participants
1. "Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée : rapport du Groupe de travail EuroMeSCo"/ rapporteur: Álvaro de Vasconcelos
2. "Le cout du non Maghreb pour le partenariat euro-méditerranéen"/ Mohattane Mohamed, Driss Khrouz
3. "Les obstacles politiques à l'integration regionale au Maghreb"/ Driss Khrouz
4. "Sub-regional cooperation : the case of the Middle East : working group report"/ Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan
5. "Democracy and human rights"/ Wijdan Ali
6. "Building blocks for the Euro-Med charter on peace and stability : report by the EuroMeSCo Working Group on the Euro-Med charter on peace and stability"/ rapporteur: Roberto Alboni (EuroMeSCo papers 7)
7. "The establishment of a Euro-Med conflict prevention centre"/ Stephen C. Calleya
8. "Early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean context: conceptual questions, procedures and instruments"/ Radoslava Stefanova
9. "Military dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean charter: an unjustified absence"/ Martin Ortega
10. "Comments on the Euro-MeSCo report on the Charter for Peace and Stability"/ Antonio Badini
11. "Visas et liberté de circulation"/ Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
12. "Xénophobie, migrations et perception de l'autre"/ Fifi Bernaboud

EuroMeSCo Working Groups Meeting
Rome, 15-16 October 1999

PROGRAMME

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15

9:00 am   Presentation and discussion of the final report of the Working Group on Sub-regional Integration and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
       speaker: Álvaro Vasconcelos, IEEI, EuroMeSCo Secretary, Lisbon
       respondents: The Arab Maghreb Union, Mohamed Mohattane, GERM, Rabat
                           The Middle East, Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, Al Ahram CPSS, Cairo

11:00 am   Coffee break

11:30 am   Democracy and human rights
       speaker: Princess Wijdan Ali, Institute of Diplomacy, Amman
       respondents: Nadim Shehadi, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford
                           Stephen Calleya, MADS, Malta

1:15 pm   Lunch

2:15 pm   Presentation and discussion of the final report of the Working Group on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability
       speaker: Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Rome
       respondent: Amb. Antonio Badini, Italian Foreign Office, Rome

3:45 pm   Coffee break

4:15 pm   Anti-personnel landmines
       speaker: Elvira Sánchez Mateos, CIDOB, Barcelona

5:30 pm   meeting recedes

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 16

9:00 am   International implication of domestic security
       speaker: Georges Joffé, RIIA, London

10:15 am   Coffee break

10:45 am   Movement of People and Cultural Contact
       speakers: - Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, CERI-Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris: "Visas and free Movement of People"
                     - Fifi Benaboud, North-South Centre, Lisbon: "Xenophobia and migrations and mutual perceptions"

12:00 am   The Middle East peace process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
       speakers: May Chartouni-Dubarry, IFRI, Paris
                     Mark Heller, JCSS, Tel Aviv

1:15 pm   Lunch - Meeting ends

EuroMeSCo Working Groups Meeting
Rome, 15-16 October 1999

List of Participants

Wijdan ALI	Institute of Diplomacy, Amman
Roberto ALIBONI	Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Antonio BADINI	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Coordinator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Fifi BENABOUD	Scientific Advisor, North-South Centre, Lisbon
Stephen CALLEYA	Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta
May CHARTOUNI DUBARRY	Scientific Advisor, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris
Khalifa CHATER	Vice-President, Association des Etudes Internationales, Tunis
Maria Rosario de MORAES VAZ	Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon
Mark HELLER	Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv
George JOFFÉ	Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
Rabah M'RAH	Institut National d'Etudes de Stratégie Globale, Algiers
Mohamed MOHATTANE	Secretary General, Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée, Rabat
Martín ORTEGA CARCELÉN	Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, Paris
Daniela PIOPPI	Research Fellow, IAI, Rome
Natalino RONZITTI	Professor of International Law, Scientific Advisor, IAI, Rome
Elvira SÁNCHEZ MATEOS	Centre d'Informació i Documentació Internacionals, Barcelona
Nadim SHEHADI	Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford
Gamal Abdel Gawad SOLTAN	Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Radoslava STEFANOVA	Research-Fellow, IAI, Rome
Roberto TOSCANO	General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Álvaro VASCONCELOS	Director, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon
Catherine WIHTOL de WENDEN	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales-Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris
Alexandre ZAFIRIOU	Council of Ministers, Brussels

EuroMeSCo

Rapport du Groupe de Travail EuroMeSCo

INTÉGRATION ET COOPÉRATION SOUS-RÉGIONALE EN MÉDITERRANÉE

Elaboré à partir des textes écrits par les membres du Groupe de Travail EuroMeSCo sur l'intégration et la coopération sous-régionale et des synthèses présentées par les sous-groupes sur le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient, coordonnés, respectivement, par Driss Khrouz et Gamal Soltan.

Rapporteur : Álvaro de Vasconcelos
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, IEEI, Lisbonne

Version non définitive
Octobre 1999

Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée

Textes ayant servi de base pour la rédaction du présent rapport :

Maghreb

Driss Khrouz, *Les Obstacles Politiques à l'Intégration au Maghreb*

Hafedh Zaafrane, *Perspectives Nationales sur la Coopération au Maghreb : la Tunisie*

M. Melbouci, *Perspectives de la Coopération Maghrébine*

Fouad Ammor, *Les Acteurs et les Priorités de la Coopération au Maghreb*

Moyen-Orient

Gamal Soltan, *Sub-regional Cooperaton in the Middle East – The Working Group Report*

Mark Heller, *Regional Cooperation in the Middle-East : an Israeli View*

Ghassan Omet, *The Prospects and Challenges of Sub-regional Cooperation: the Case of Jordan*

Emad Gad, *Regional Cooperation in the Middle East – Settlements Leads to Cooperation*

Mahdi Abdul Hadi, *Sub-regional Cooperation in the Middle East – A view from Palestine*

Turquie

Fatih Tayfur, *The Turkish Vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Observations on Sub-regional Cooperation*

Balkans

Jacques Rupnik, *In Europe's name : Post-War Cooperation in the Balkans*

Régionalisation

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, *Le Régionalisme et le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen* et *L'Union européenne et la Régionalisation du Système International*

Autres textes d'appui

Gamal Soltan, *Revitalising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

Mustafa B. Harmaneh, *The Process of Democratisation in the Arab Mashreq: the Role of External Factors*

May Dubarry, *Processus de Transition Politique au Proche-Orient*

Gema Martin Muñoz, *Réforme Politique et Changements Sociaux: l'Exemple des Pays du Maghreb*

Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée

Introduction

Le présent rapport est le résultat des recherches et des réflexions qui ont été menées dans le cadre du Groupe de travail EuroMeSCo sur l'intégration et de coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée. Ce processus se trouve dans une impasse et il est urgent de relancer le débat sur la question. Nous nous proposons ici d'examiner le phénomène de la globalisation, l'expérience de l'Union européenne et d'autres groupements régionaux et d'évaluer si et pour quelles raisons le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient sont une exception à la tendance générale de régionalisation du système international.

On essayera avec ce rapport de répondre à un ensemble de questions considérées comme prioritaires :

- Quels sont les obstacles politiques et de sécurité à la coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée ?

- Quelles sont les conditions et les priorités politiques et de sécurité pour la coopération sous-régionale ?

- Qui sont les acteurs favorables à la coopération régionale ?

- Quelle contribution la coopération sous-régionale peut-elle donner au Partenariat euro-méditerranéen ?

- Quel est le rôle que peut jouer le PEM pour renforcer la coopération sous-régionale dans le domaine politique et de sécurité ?

Les textes du Groupe de Travail (voir liste, p. 2) ont été discutés au cours de séminaires, à Rabat, en décembre 1998, au Caire, en avril 1999 et Tel Aviv, en septembre 1999. Le présent rapport général a été élaboré sur la base de cette recherche et sur le rapport sur la coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient, sous la responsabilité, respectivement, de Driss Khrouz, du GERM et Gamal Soltan, de l'Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

I - Considérations préalables

1. Différences nord-sud. La première constatation que nous sommes amenés à faire à l'égard de l'intégration et de la coopération sous-régionale dans la Méditerranée est celle de l'existence d'une nette asymétrie entre le Nord et le Sud.

Sur la rive Nord, l'intégration européenne s'est consolidée au cours de la dernière décennie. Les nouvelles démocraties ont adhéré à la Communauté européenne dans les années 80 et ont réussi, à l'exception de la Grèce, leur intégration dans l'Union économique et monétaire. Il est en outre possible que l'Union s'élargisse encore vers le sud avec l'adhésion de Chypre et de Malte. Celles de la Turquie et des pays des Balkans, à l'exception de la Slovénie, sont cependant moins probables à court terme. Il faut toutefois rappeler que la Turquie est liée à l'Union européenne par un accord d'union douanière. Par ailleurs, l'intégration européenne est indiscutablement plus poussée dans la Méditerranée occidentale que dans la Méditerranée orientale.

L'inverse de cette tendance marque la rive Sud, que ce soit au Maghreb, au Moyen-Orient ou encore au niveau plus ambitieux de la Ligue arabe, où aucun progrès visible n'a été noté en matière d'intégration. Les initiatives prises dans les années 80, telles la création de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), ont, après avoir suscité de fortes expectatives, fini par stagner. L'idée d'un nouveau Moyen-Orient régionalisé est resté otage du processus de paix. Quelques espoirs de revitalisation des projets de coopération régionale ont récemment resurgi avec, au Maghreb, les transformations qui se sont produites sur les scènes politiques du Maroc et de l'Algérie et au Moyen-Orient, la reprise du processus de paix.

2. La faiblesse des échanges à l'intérieur du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient. L'inexistence d'institutions de coopération ou d'intégration régionale s'accompagne, sur la rive Sud, d'un très faible niveau de relations économiques interrégionales. Dans le Maghreb, l'UMA représente 5% des exportations du Maroc et 3% de ses importations et 3% des importations et des exportations de l'Algérie. Dans le Moyen-Orient, les relations commerciales entre pays voisins sont d'un niveau tout aussi faible : le commerce interrégional ne représente que 5% des échanges commerciaux. Les relations commerciales entre l'Egypte et la région atteignent seulement 3% et le commerce d'Israël avec les pays arabes est pratiquement inexistant. Pour l'ensemble de la région, le commerce de ces pays se fait pour l'essentiel avec l'espace économique européen, destinataire de plus de 60% des exportations des pays de l'Afrique du Nord.

3. La faiblesse des relations inter-étatiques au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient. Dans le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient, on peut difficilement parler, pour la décennie qui vient de s'écouler, de l'existence de relations inter-étatiques "banales". La nature des régimes politiques, les disputes territoriales et de frontières et la question palestinienne contribuent bien entendu à cette situation et continuent d'alimenter les tensions sud-sud.

4. Les tensions sud-sud et le remède nord-sud. Au lieu de coopération régionale, on trouve, dans le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient une situation de tensions sud-sud, résultant de disputes territoriales, de questions nationales non résolues et de la course aux armements. Les grands problèmes socio-politiques et de sécurité ont une dimension internationale, tels que les migrations, la rareté de ressources hydriques, le terrorisme, mais ils relèvent essentiellement de la dimension sud-sud. Au contraire, la plupart des initiatives de confiance mutuelle qui ont été prises en matière de sécurité (dialogues méditerranéens avec l'OTAN et l'UEO) ont

un caractère nord-sud.

Le PEM est aussi un projet de coopération essentiellement nord-sud, que ce soit dans son volet politique et de sécurité, économique ou socioculturel et humain. La compréhension de l'importance de la coopération sous-régionale dans l'ensemble des "trois chapitres", a cependant été soulignée au cours de la Conférence des Ministres des affaires étrangères à Stuttgart (Barcelone III, avril 1999), en continuation de la Conférence de Valence sur le thème.

II   La régionalisation du système international

1. La régionalisation du système international s'est développée autour de deux objectifs fondamentaux : d'une part instaurer un climat de paix durable, notamment par la création de la CEE et, d'autre part, amener la possibilité, comme celle donnée au Mercosul, d'une insertion compétitive sur le marché dans l'économie internationale.

2. L'expérience européenne est née, dans l'après-guerre, de la prise de conscience des dangers du nationalisme et des théories géopolitiques qui définissent les ennemis en fonction de leur situation géographique et des dénommées " leçons de l'Histoire " ; un changement s'est en conséquence opéré au niveau de la stratégie des dirigeants politiques qui ont cessé de voir un ennemi en leurs voisins et sont allés au-delà d'une logique de politique étrangère reposant essentiellement ou exclusivement sur la politique de puissance. La France et l'Allemagne sont devenues dans l'après-guerre, par le biais d'une rupture radicale avec la doctrine traditionnelle en matière de défense nationale, le pivot de l'intégration européenne. Cette nouvelle culture stratégique a permis la création de l'Union européenne.

3. La globalisation, phénomène objectif, découle de l'évolution de la technologie, notamment dans le domaine de l'information, obligeant les Etats à coopérer entre eux pour relever ses défis et en tirer profit. Ces transformations se sont accompagnées, dans la plupart des pays, de l'abandon des doctrines tiers-mondistes de substitution des importations, en acceptant les règles du libéralisme économique. La coopération régionale apparaît, ainsi, comme une plate-forme vers la compétitivité dans un système globalisé et en même temps la création des conditions pour une cohésion sociale durable.

4. En vertu de la combinaison d'une nouvelle culture stratégique post-souveraine et des enjeux spécifiques de la globalisation, le régionalisme sous ses différentes formes s'est transformé en un élément essentiel de l'actuel système international. Il est effectivement perçu comme un instrument plus approprié pour promouvoir les intérêts que la politique traditionnelle d'équilibre des pouvoirs, permettant d'atteindre un certain nombre d'objectifs, tels que l'instauration d'un climat mutuel de non résolution violente de conflits [M. Heller] ; une insertion compétitive dans le système économique international ; la construction et la consolidation de sociétés ouvertes ; la libre circulation de personnes, l'échange d'informations et d'idées.

5   La régionalisation recouvre des formes très diverses que nous pouvons qualifier, pour simplifier, de "régionalisme ouvert", comme l'ALENA, l'APEC ; "d'intégration profonde", comme l'Union européenne et le Mercosul et encore de "régionalisme virtuel", comme dans le cas de la CEI, née du besoin de mener à bien le processus de désarticulation d'un empire. En outre, des projets de coopération régionale dans les domaines économique, politique et de sécurité se sont développés, notamment en

Afrique (SADC, CEDEAO) qui ne correspondent pas à des processus effectifs d'intégration économique. L'ASEAN essaye d'évoluer du politique à l'économique par la mise en place d'une zone de libre-échange. Malgré le succès relatif de l'ASEAN, l'Asie apparaît encore comme une région désarticulée, et il en sera ainsi tant que le Japon, la Chine ou l'Inde resteront étrangers au phénomène du régionalisme asiatique, même si des formes non institutionnelles d'organisation d'interdépendance régionale sont en train d'émerger, surtout en Asie orientale, dont témoigne par exemple la mise en place des réseaux commerciaux chinois.

6   La plupart des Etats de l'Europe, de l'Amérique et de l'Afrique, ainsi que certains pays de l'Asie sont engagés dans des processus de régionalisation ou de coopération sous-régionale, dont l'importance varie. Ces projets ont cependant démontré que les Etats sont toujours des acteurs de poids, certainement décisifs, si l'on considère que les processus de régionalisation relèvent de leur initiative. L'Union européenne, revêtant la forme la plus avancée de constitutionnalisme supranational, est elle-même née, dans l'après-guerre, de la nécessité de survie et de reconstruction des Etats européens.

7   Des expériences de coopération régionale existantes, nous pouvons conclure un ensemble de caractéristiques communes :

-       L'Etat est un acteur important du processus, certainement décisif, si l'on considère que les projets d'intégration régionale relèvent de son initiative.

-       La coopération régionale naît de l'affirmation du principe associatif [Edgar Morin] et de l'affaiblissement des courants isolationnistes et nationalistes radicaux.

-       La coopération régionale implique la délégitimation de la définition par les Etats du partenaire comme un ennemi et une volonté de passer outre la culture de la politique de puissance.

-       Un degré élevé de convergence démocratique est indispensable à la réussite de projets d'intégration profonde. Les projets d'intégration et de coopération régionale sont pour leur part un facteur de consolidation de l'Etat de droit et de la démocratie (Portugal, Espagne, Brésil, Argentine).

-       Les processus d'intégration résultent d'une décision souveraine des Etats qui s'assujettissent volontairement à une discipline collective. La légitimation publique de cet exercice de discipline auto-imposé est la condition de sa viabilité et de sa durabilité. L'engagement direct des dirigeants politiques, entrepreneurs, syndicaux, et d'autres secteurs de la société civile est essentiel à la légitimité sociale des processus de coopération et d'intégration.

-       L'intégration régionale effraie un ensemble diversifié de réseaux d'acteurs de la société civile qui sont appelés à jouer un rôle prépondérant dans le lancement et la consolidation de projets de coopération régionale.

-       Les réseaux non gouvernementaux, mais aussi gouvernementaux, facilités par la globalisation de l'information jouent aujourd'hui un rôle important dans la création de courants d'opinion transnationaux. En relativisant l'Etat national, on renforce la notion de citoyenneté, en la rendant plus active et informée. Les Etats impliqués dans des espaces d'intégration doivent promouvoir le travail de ces réseaux, prenant en compte leur rôle dans le renforcement de la durabilité publique du processus, la mobilisation des citoyens et l'élargissement d'une connaissance mutuelle dans tous les domaines.

- La coopération régionale, comme le montrent les expériences actuelles, se développent à partir de projets économiques, politiques, militaires bien concrets, reposant sur des intérêts communs et implantés d'une forme graduelle, impliquant un certain nombre d'Etats qui avec le temps pourront s'élargir [Bonvicini]

- La coopération régionale doit répondre aux problèmes de pauvreté, de la marginalisation sociale et des grandes asymétries de développement.

- La coopération régionale rend possible et implique une nouvelle doctrine militaire et la subordination du pouvoir militaire au politique, la prédominance d'entités civiles dans la formulation et la conduite de la politique de défense. Cela suppose, pour certains pays, une redéfinition de leur concept de sécurité et la satellisation du rôle de l'armée.

- La coopération durable implique, en résumé, la clause démocratique ; la reconnaissance du rôle des Etats et la recherche constante de leurs intérêts communs ; la légitimité sociale ; l'acceptation d'une discipline collective ; une nouvelle culture stratégique et militaire et la création de courants d'opinion transnationaux par l'action des réseaux.

8. Ce serait une erreur de penser que les "conditions objectives" qui prévalent aujourd'hui en Europe sont nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre de tout projet de coopération : la croissance économique, des gouvernements efficaces et de fortes institutions nationales et supranationales [Mahdi]. L'intégration est apparue en Europe, dans la grave situation politique et économique de l'après-guerre et a été considérée comme essentielle, également, pour passer outre les difficiles "conditions objectives" du moment. En cela, l'Europe est un modèle pour d'autres expériences qui devront se développer à partir de situations spécifiques dans lesquelles on trouve les régions respectives.

III   Le défi du nationalisme identitaire

1. Le régionalisme coexiste dans le monde avec l'émergence du nationalisme identitaire, des "politiques de culture" qui vont de pair avec la popularité des théories sur les chocs inévitables des civilisations. Ouverts ou profonds, les projets d'intégration qui ont abouti jusqu'à aujourd'hui ont été ceux qui ont résisté à une définition culturelle ou civilisationnelle. Leur dimension est, à l'heure actuelle, non pas continentale mais sous-régionale. Cependant, une tendance à définir l'identité des unités politiques à partir de valeurs culturelles et religieuses se manifeste aujourd'hui. En ce qui concerne le régionalisme, nous assistons à une évolution vers la continentalisation et par là à son renforcement dans un espace culturel donné.

2. Dans l'Union européenne, la question du choix entre la définition culturelle et la définition politique est en quelque sorte relancée par le débat sur l'élargissement à la Turquie et la problématique de l'émigration. L'identité de l'Union européenne est politique, et non pas culturelle ou religieuse. Certains préconisent une définition chrétienne de l'identité européenne qui exclurait non seulement la Turquie, mais aussi les millions de musulmans d'ores et déjà citoyens de l'Union européenne. Une telle définition de l'Union européenne mettrait en cause les principes et les valeurs de nature politique sur lesquelles elle a été fondée, visant à l'intégration dans un même objectif de l'énorme diversité étatique, régionale et culturelle des peuples de l'Europe. Le succès de l'Union européenne tient au fait qu'elle soit un projet d'intégration ouverte – " l'ouverture implique, avant tout, une

société plurielle qui défende les valeurs de la démocratie politique, de la diversité culturelle et religieuse, de la libre concurrence, de la participation des citoyens, de l'associationnisme et de la souveraineté partagée, et qui projette et promeuve ces valeurs dans ses relations extérieures. Cela implique également qu'elle s'oppose fermement à la création de blocs économiques fermés et qu'elle défende le multilatéralisme fondé sur le régionalisme [Martins/Vasconcelos].

3. La Ligue Arabe préconise la création d'un Marché commun arabe, sans succès pour le moment. Les pays arabes, bien qu'ils aient une langue commune, qu'ils connaissent une forte convergence religieuse et qu'ils soient traversés par le sentiment de solidarité des opinions publiques, se trouvent bien souvent opposés dans des conflits militaires, comme cela a été le cas au cours de la Guerre du Golfe. La coopération régionale sur la rive sud de la Méditerranée a plus de possibilités de réussir au niveau sous-régional et implique aussi le refus d'une identité culturelle du projet.

4. Au niveau sous-régional, on peut conclure que l'acceptation de coopération comme norme restera improbable tant que la politique d'identité prévaudra sur la politique d'intérêts [Rupnik]. Les politiques d'identité et le nationalisme radical sont une entrave majeure à la coopération régionale et dans certains cas, à l'existence de relations inter-étatiques normales.

IV   L'intégration et la coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient[*]

On peut tirer, à partir de l'analyse des textes présentés, quelques conclusions générales. On mettra l'accent, dans cette partie, sur les caractéristiques fondamentales de chaque région.

1. Introduction

Les antécédents de la coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient sont bien différents :

Maghreb

L'idée de l'unité maghrébine, au-delà de la langue, de la religion, des aspects culturels et des épisodes historiques que partagent les pays maghrébins, est bien ancienne et elle s'est manifestée dans notre passé proche lors de la lutte contre le colonialisme [Melbouci]. Cependant, peu après la reconquête des indépendances, les divergences et les particularismes des pays maghrébins ont refait surface [D. Khrouz].

L'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), créée en 1989 par le Traité de Marrakech, a célébré les retrouvailles des cinq pays le Maroc, la Tunisie, l'Algérie, la Libye et la Mauritanie. Elle est née de la prise de conscience par ses Etats de la nécessité de coopération régionale, voire même, de l'avis de certains, d'intégration, notamment pour mieux dialoguer avec la Communauté européenne.

L'UMA semblait essentielle, aux yeux de ses fondateurs, pour :

a) Donner une voix aux pays du Maghreb dans le cadre de leurs relations avec l'Union européenne et bénéficier d'une plus grande attention de cette dernière, ce qui s'est concrétisé au travers du dialogue 5 + 5 entre les pays de l'Europe du Sud et ceux de

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[*] Cette partie du rapport, sera ultérieurement développée à partir des synthèses du travail des sous-groupes, en cours d'élaboration, par Gamal Soltan et Driss Khrouz.

l'UMA. La conscience de l'importance des relations de l'UMA avec l'Europe a certainement poussé l'Egypte à montrer, quelques années plus tard, sa volonté d'y adhérer.

b) Permettre son insertion compétitive sur le marché international et parallèlement l'augmentation significative des relations économiques interrégionales ;

c) Abandonner les modèles socialistes et tiers-mondiste de substitution des importations, des pays du Maghreb et assumer l'idée que seulement l'intégration peut leur permettre de se défendre de la mondialisation et d'en tirer meilleur profit.

d) Apporter une réponse commune aux questions sociales et politiques qui se posaient dans les pays de la région, notamment à celle de la montée de l'islamisme politique en tant qu'alternative à la plupart des régimes de la région.

e) Le Traité de Marrakech a correspondu à la volonté de l'Algerie et du Maroc de régler leurs contentieux.

Malgré le juste fondement de ses objectifs, l'UMA, dix ans après la signature de son traité fondateur, n'est guère plus qu'un sigle, bien que son secrétariat permanent fonctionne toujours. Plusieurs facteurs sont en règle générale évoqués pour expliquer l'hibernation de l'UMA, dont on peut citer les sanctions internationales contre la Libye et la différence d'attitude devant la question de l'islamisme politique. L'attentat que l'on présume avoir émané d'un groupe islamiste contre des touristes au Maroc en 1992, vu par les Marocains comme une provocation algérienne, a marqué la fin de toute forme de coopération et a mené à la fermeture de la frontière Maroc-Algérie.

Ces objectifs ne sont pas moins pressants aujourd'hui, tant s'en faut, qu'ils ne l'étaient dans les années 80. La globalisation s'est accélérée et il est toujours plus difficile aux pays isolés, indépendamment de leur taille, d'attirer des investissements étrangers. Par ailleurs, la Communauté européenne est entre-temps devenue l'Union européenne, ayant scellé son marché unique et s'étant dotée de l'euro. Il est évidemment plus difficile de négocier avec elle aujourd'hui de manière isolée que dans les années 80.

Moyen-Orient

Au Moyen-Orient, la coopération sous-régionale n'a pas de tradition aussi forte qu'au Maghreb et semble entièrement liée à la nécessité de consolidation du processus de paix, notamment avec la vision du nouveau Moyen-Orient de Shimon Peres.

La conception de la coopération régionale sous ses plus divers aspects en tant que facteur essentiel à la construction de la paix transparaissait dans les différents schémas de coopération multilatérale mis en marche depuis la conférence de Madrid de 1991. Sur la base des conclusions de cette conférence, cinq groupes de travail ont été créés : sécurité régionale et contrôle des armements, économie et développement régional, réfugiés, eau et environnement. Jusqu'à 1995, ces groupes ont fourni un travail qui a été jugé très utile. Dans le domaine économique, plusieurs projets ont été lancés dans des domaines tels que le tourisme, le commerce, la communication, le transport, l'énergie, l'agriculture, les marchés financiers, l'investissement, la formation et les réseaux régionaux. Le fonctionnement des groupes multilatéraux, l'intérêt manifeste de la communauté internationale envers ceux-ci, montrent que le processus de paix avait créé des conditions pour un changement substantiel des relations dans la région.

2 Un instrument pour la paix au Moyen-Orient

La coopération sous-régionale au Moyen-Orient, apparaît à ceux qui la préconisent, comme l'Europe, avant tout comme essentielle pour la paix, considérant qu'elle est instrumentale pour le développement des conditions de confiance mutuelle entre Israël et ses régions voisines. La coopération sous-régionale dans le Moyen-Orient est avant tout un facteur de paix.

3 Un projet d'insertion compétitive au Maghreb

La coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb, comme dans le Mercosul, semble liée à l'insertion compétitive dans le système économique international, à la nécessité de relever les défis de la globalisation et d'être capable de dialoguer avec les grands groupes économiques, notamment l'Union européenne. La coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb est avant tout un facteur de compétitivité.

4 Les obstacles à la coopération

Le manque de convergence politique entre les différents régimes du Maghreb, leurs attitudes face à la question de l'islamisme, la variation de leur degré d'ouverture politique et de la vitesse de leurs réformes démocratiques s'inscrivent comme principales entraves à la coopération, au-delà, bien entendu, des conflits et des tensions inter-étatiques, notamment par rapport au Sahara occidental.

Au Moyen-Orient, le principal obstacle à la coopération réside dans l'inexistence d'un niveau minimum de confiance mutuelle qui permette la durabilité politique et publique des initiatives de coopération. La coopération sous-régionale au Moyen-Orient a comme priorité d'encourager le contact normal entre les différents secteurs de la société.

5 La relation entre bilatéralisme et multilatéralisme

Au Moyen-Orient, la question de la relation entre bilatéralisme et multilatéralisme se pose de façon bien plus aiguë qu'au Maghreb.

Les pays du Moyen-Orient, même au cours de la phase la plus avancée du processus de paix, de juin 1992 à mai 1996, n'ont jamais passé d'accord ou affiché d'attitude commune sur le rapport entre la voie des relations bilatérales et celle des négociations multilatérales : un certain nombre d'Etats connaissant de graves problèmes bilatéraux avec Israël estiment que la coopération régionale dépend du règlement préalable des contentieux existant ; d'autres ont prôné la conjonction des deux voies, ce qui a permis l'ouverture des négociations multilatérales régionales.

Les auteurs du groupe de travail EuroMeSCo considèrent qu'il existe, qu'on le veuille ou non, une relation entre l'état d'avancement du processus de paix et la réussite des initiatives de coopération régionale. Il n'existe cependant pas de consensus sur l'idée que la coopération régionale devrait être vue comme une récompense.

La question des différences d'attitude face à l'islamisme politique est une sérieuse entrave à la coopération régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient. Elle a donné lieu à une politique restrictive au niveau des visas, la fermeture des frontières, les restrictions des flux d'information et les échanges culturels.

Il n'existe pas d'attitude convergente entre les pays du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient par rapport aux réformes démocratiques et aux droits de l'homme. Le retard et la timidité de réformes politiques dans certains pays, l'autoritarisme sont des obstacles sérieux à la

coopération régionale.

Le poids du nationalisme traditionnel au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient se traduit par la méfiance en relation aux voisins et par un manque de compréhension des limites de l'Etat national dans le contexte de la globalisation. La politique de puissance et le concept que la force militaire peut légitimement être utilisée autrement que par l'autodéfense pour poursuivre des objectifs politique, la recherche des zones d'influence et de leur hégémonie est un des autres aspects de ce phénomène. Ce secteur malgré son influence dans l'opinion publique n'est déjà plus majoritaire au niveau politique.

6 Conditions de la réussite

Les auteurs signalent, dans le cas du Maghreb et surtout du Moyen-Orient, une forte liaison entre les domaines politique, militaire et économique. Au Moyen-Orient, même dans le domaine des relations économiques, même les pays les plus ouverts à la coopération se voient conditionnés par le "sentiment" de solidarité à l'égard des Palestiniens, dans leurs accords commerciaux (OMET). D'un autre côté, pour certains Etats, la réussite de la "normalisation" avec l'Etat d'Israël pourra se mesurer par l'impact économique qu'elle aura (OMET). Au Maghreb, la méthode de la coopération économique apparaît comme fonctionnelle pour la coopération future.

Au Maghreb, il est possible de discerner un noyau de cohésion, essentiel au projet d'intégration et de coopération, formé par l'Algérie et le Maroc. Il ne peut il y avoir de coopération entre les pays du Maghreb sans leur entente préalable. La Tunisie est dans une position très favorable pour faire démarrer des initiatives régionales [Zaafrane].

Au Moyen-Orient, il est impossible d'identifier une paire de pays qui puisse jouer ce rôle moteur, la conjugaison de plusieurs pays étant pour cela nécessaire.

Pluriculturalisme. Dans le cas spécifique du Moyen-Orient, la coopération régionale signifie nécessairement l'affirmation d'une réalité pluriculturelle et ceci concerne particulièrement le Moyen-Orient [Mahdi, Heller]. Le fait qu'Israël soit plus orienté vers l'Occident [Mahdi] que vers l'Orient ne doit pourtant pas empêcher la coopération régionale, ce serait le signal de la domination, d'un côté ou de l'autre de l'équation, de politiques identitaires. Au Maghreb, l'acceptation de la diversité culturelle est aussi fondamentale même si le problème n'a pas la même acuité.

Le rôle prépondérant de la société civile dans la phase actuelle. La coopération régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient peut dès maintenant se développer parmi les acteurs de la société civile. Il faut donner la priorité aux acteurs (entrepreneurs, universités, ONG) qui favorisent la coopération.

7 Une situation plus favorable

Les mutations politiques qui ont eu lieu au Maghreb et les progrès du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient ont créé des conditions favorables et un nouvel espoir pour la coopération sud-sud en Méditerranée.

V   Le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen (PEM) et les défis sud-sud

1. Un projet de régionalisme ouvert. Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen est un projet de régionalisme ouvert visant à la création d'une zone de libre-échange aux environs de 2010. Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen correspond à la nécessité d'élargir l'espace d'intégration économique vers le sud. De par la constitution d'une zone de libre-échange euro-

méditerranéenne, les pays du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient se verraient insérés dans une forme avancée de régionalisme ouvert. La zone de libre-échange viendrait en effet s'ajouter à la coopération déjà existante dans le domaine politique et de sécurité, culturel et social. Pour l'Union européenne, rappelons qu'il s'agit d'appliquer au sud la méthode d'inclusion qui a réussi quant à la consolidation de la démocratie et du développement durable de plusieurs pays européens, du Portugal à la Pologne. La zone de, libre-échange ne devait pas être conçue comme une fin en soi mais comme un instrument pour atteindre à long terme des objectifs semblables en Méditerranée. Il s'agit de l'instrument qui devrait permettre d'atteindre l'objectif plus ambitieux d'établir une zone de prospérité partagée et de paix.

2. Les objectifs politiques et de sécurité. Pour l'Union européenne, le PEM devrait contribuer au développement économique et aux réformes politiques en Afrique du Nord et dans le Moyen-Orient. Il s'agirait aussi d'une mesure de confiance mutuelle, d'un amortisseur des perceptions négatives réciproques qui se sont développées sur les deux rives de la Méditerranée. Le PEM gère une dynamique relationnelle différente, entre plusieurs secteurs de la société qui pourra, à terme, devenir un facteur de réforme politique et de paix. Le PEM peut contribuer à l'expansion de la démocratie, au respect des droits de l'homme et de l'Etat de droit et ce faisant pourra créer les conditions nécessaires à une convergence politique, permettant l'intégration au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient.

3. Des accords bi-multilatéraux. Le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen n'est pas pour autant un substitut de la coopération et de l'intégration sous-régionale dans le sud de la Méditerranée. La méthode actuelle qui consiste en l'établissement d'accords d'association euro-méditerranéens " bi-multilatéraux ", c'est-à-dire entre l'Union européenne et ses Etats membres et chacun des pays de la rive Sud est loin d'être la plus appropriée. Avec cette méthode, les pays d'Afrique du Nord persistent à approfondir solitairement leurs relations avec l'Union européenne, dans une perspective de concurrence entre pays voisins, éloignant par là l'horizon de la coopération sous-régionale.

4. Une relation asymétrique. Une méthode mettant l'accent sur les accords multilatéraux, entre l'UE et chaque pays considéré individuellement, aurait pour conséquence de renforcer la perception de relations asymétriques sous tous les points de vue, institutionnels, politiques, économiques et militaires, et viendrait alimenter la méfiance des courants politiques à l'égard du PEM. La coopération sous-régionale sud-sud au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient conférerait un plus grand équilibre aux relations nord-sud [Gamal].

L'encouragement, dans le cadre du PEM, à la coopération Sud-Sud ou à des projets de coopération régionale impliquant l'ensemble des partenaires pourrait aller dans ce sens. Au cours de la réunion ministérielle de Malte, l'accent a été mis sur la nécessité de développer les relations entre les partenaires du Sud à la recherche d'une plus grande harmonisation, compatible avec le marché interne européen. Cet objectif est certainement important, mais reste insuffisant : la coopération régionale euro-méditerranéenne ne représente que 10% du MEDA.

5. Les défis politiques et de sécurité. La convergence nord-sud et sud-sud recherchée par la PEM repose aussi sur une stratégie à long terme. Ce n'est que sur le long terme, en effet, que les initiatives de régionalisme ouvert pourront avoir un impact significatif dans le domaine de la sécurité. Il y a, cependant, dans la zone couverte par le PEM, des questions politiques et de sécurité qui exigent plutôt des réponses à court terme.

La sécurité comme le démontre l'expérience de la région ou l'exemple de la Yougoslavie est "paramount" pour tout le reste. [Paramount] Du point de vue politique et de la sécurité, les

grands défis pour atteindre l'objectif recherché peuvent ainsi être succinctement énumérés :

- Prédominance de politiques d'exclusion, y compris de nature identitaire par rapport aux politiques d'association et de coopération.

- Faiblesse de l'implémentation des mesures de confiance mutuelle.

- Terrorisme et grande criminalité.

- Tensions inter-étatiques et prolifération

- Autoritarisme et non respect des droits de l'homme

- Xénophobie et non respect du droit des émigrants

- Difficultés de circulation des personnes et de l'information.

6. Des problèmes avant tout sud-sud. Si nous regardons succinctement ces problèmes, nous constatons qu'ils ont une dimension nord-sud, mais la plupart d'entre eux sont essentiellement de nature sud-sud.

- Si nous considérons la question du terrorisme, nous pouvons conclure que l'essentiel du problème se pose au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient, bien qu'il ait également une dimension nord-sud. En 1997, par exemple, 118 personnes ont été victimes du terrorisme dans le Moyen-Orient. En Algérie, entre 1992 et 1999, près de 100.000 victimes ont péri. En Europe, le dernier acte de terrorisme ayant une dimension méditerranéenne remonte aux attentats de Paris, en 1995, qui ont fait 8 morts et 41 blessés. Le terrorisme est un des majeurs problèmes du Moyen-Orient et un facteur de méfiance et d'entrave pour la coopération bilatérale et sous-régionale [George Joffé].

- Les tensions pouvant avoir des répercussions militaires dont on témoigne aujourd'hui ont, pour l'essentiel, une dimension sud-sud ou nord-nord (Balkans). L'unique exception découle de la position particulière de la Turquie. Près de 11 zones de conflits peuvent être signalées, dix desquels ont une dimension sud-sud [R. Aliboni-P. Miggiano].

7. Le besoin d'initiatives sud-sud. La coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité pour être efficace dans le cadre du PEM doit résoudre la contradiction fondamentale voulant que les initiatives dans ce domaine soient de nature nord-sud, alors que les problèmes sont sud-sud et ont un caractère éminemment sous-régional. C'est donc à ce niveau qu'il est nécessaire de développer les initiatives qui vont changer les relations de sécurité et la méfiance ambiante.

8. La cooperation sous-régionale et les conditions de réussite du PEM. La coopération sous-régionale et même les progrès significatifs dans le PEM sont dépendants de la résolution de problèmes de sécurité dans le contexte sud-sud. Il s'agit certainement d'un des éléments d'un "cercle vicieux" qui devrait changer la situation de sécurité. Pour cela il est nécessaire de comprendre, comme l'ont fait plusieurs Etats, mais pas la totalité d'entre eux, que la coopération régionale est une forme plus appropriée pour garantir la sécurité que le traditionnel équilibre des pouvoirs.

9. En synthèse. La réussite du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen est directement liée au développement de la coopération dans le Moyen-Orient et le Maghreb. Ceci signifie qu'un des objectifs du PEM doit être de définir et orienter cette coopération dans ces zones. Ce n'est que sur cette base que la création d'un vaste espace intégré euro-méditerranéen pourra se concrétiser.

Cet objectif est d'autant plus important qu'en l'absence de perspectives d'intégration dans l'Union, il implique, au-delà du libre-échange, la formation de groupes sous-régionaux, cette situation étant en cela complètement différente de celle des pays d'Europe centrale dont la perspective est de devenir membres de l'UE. Les "bénéfices" pour les membres du PEM de progrès significatifs dans les relations régionales se situent dans la propre région, dans le relâchement des tensions sud-sud, dans le développement, dans l'augmentation de sa capacité de dialogue avec l'Europe et d'autres régions du monde. Comme le montre la réaction européenne à l'UMA, l'apparition d'un groupe régional sur la rive Sud de la Méditerranée aurait un impact significatif dans les relations euro-maghrébines.

VI   Recommandations

L'Union européenne et le partenariat euro-méditerranéen doivent prendre des mesures précises en vue de développer la coopération sous-régionale dans la Méditerranée. Identifier les secteurs intéressés par la coopération régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient et encourager leur activité doit être l'objectif prioritaire du partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Certaines mesures concrètes peuvent et doivent être prises au niveau du PEM :

a) *La coopération entre les sociétés civiles.* Promouvoir, indépendamment des progrès vérifiés dans la coopération au niveau inter-étatique, la coopération entre les secteurs qui lui sont favorables et des programmes pouvant être orientés vers la société civile.

b) Favoriser les projets communs proposés par des acteurs de plusieurs pays du Sud parmi eux ceux qui auront un contour régional clair. Favoriser également les projets qui impliquent des partenaires européens et plusieurs pays du Sud. Ces projets pourront être développés par des régions, des localités, des organisations gouvernementales ou non, ou encore des entreprises privées.

c) Co-financer des projets d'infrastructure sous-régionaux, notamment dans le domaine des voies de communication, de l'énergie, de l'eau ou des nouvelles technologies d'information et les lier, dès lors que possible, à des projets similaires européens. Valoriser la coopération décentralisée au niveau sous-régional, sur la base de programmes tels que le Med-Urbs, Med-Campus ou Med-Media.

d) Harmoniser la législation dans le sens nord-sud et sud-sud en mettant en contact les régulateurs et législateurs de l'Union et d'une sous-région donnée.

e) *Coopération militaire.* Promouvoir la coopération dans le domaine militaire, notamment dans le cadre d'opérations de maintien de la paix, entre les pays de la région euro-méditerranéenne.

f) Soutenir la création au niveau régional de mesures de confiance mutuelle et de gestion de conflits, notamment par l'appui à la mise en place du réseau sous-régional intergouvernemental, ou créé par des centres d'analyse dans ces domaines.

g) *Transfert de savoir-faire sur l'intégration.* Promouvoir, dans le cadre du PEM, la recherche et la formation en matière d'intégration qui ne soit pas nécessairement vouée à la seule expérience européenne – et sur la régionalisation, au niveau mondial. Contribuer ainsi à l'élaboration d'une culture stratégique de coopération succédant à la politique de puissance.

h)

GROUPEMENT D'ETUDES

ET DE RECHERCHES SUR LA MEDITERRANEE

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و الأبحاث حول البحر الأبيض المتوسط

LE COUT DU NON MAGHREB
POUR LE PARTENARIAT EURO-MÉDITERRANÉEN

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La mondialisation-régionalisation constitue l'une des dynamiques les plus saisissantes du phénomène de la globalisation qui caractérise l'économie monde de la fin du XXème siècle.

Ces nouvelles dynamiques ont pour finalité d'acquérir la taille critique suffisante pour infléchir dans le sens voulu l'évolution des flux économiques et commerciaux à l'échelle mondiale.

Partant de ce constat, peut-on affirmer que le non Maghreb constitue une perte non seulement pour les pays faisant partie de l'UMA, mais aussi pour leurs partenaires euro-méditerranéens ?

Cette contribution a donc pour but de procéder à un essai d'évaluation du coût du non Maghreb pour le processus de Barcelone.

La première partie est consacré à l'appréciation des pertes subies à cause du non Maghreb. La deuxième partie portera sur les conditions nécessaires pour la relance de la dynamique d'intégration maghrébine.

I. LE COUT DU NON MAGHREB POUR LE PROCESSUS DE BARCELONE

Les pertes sont à la fois d'ordre économiques et politco-sécuritaires.

I.1. le coût économique:

Grâce à sa proximité géographique, à sa dynamique démographique, ses capacités en ressources humaine, ses richesses naturelles, le Maghreb en tant qu'entité globale intégrée peut constituer un levier de taille pour la dynamique et les objectifs du processus euro-méditerranéen de Barcelone. Ces atouts du Maghreb deviennent marginaux et relativement insignifiants à chaque fois qu'on décline le raisonnement à l'échelle micro, c'est-à-dire au niveau de chaque pays maghrébin pris individuellement. Cela pour des raisons évidentes d'économies d'échelle, d'exiguïté des marchés et des seuils critiques de rentabilité des investissements. Autrement dit, ces limites de masse critique constituent des handicapes à toute stratégie euro-méditerranéenne de délocalisation et de transfert de l'investissement du nord vers le sud.

Même si les pays maghrébins sont destinataires des investissements étrangers, leur position dans les flux mondiaux de capitaux reste modeste et ne représente qu'une faible part des investissements étrangers vers l'ensemble des pays en développement. Ainsi, la proportion des investissements directs à destination du Maghreb sur le total des investissements directs des pays de la CEE n'a été que de 3% à la fin des années 80 et au début de la décennie 1990. Un faible niveau de l'investissement étranger au Maghreb qui fait douter de ses capacités à exercer un impact suffisant sur la croissance économique et par conséquent ses effets sur les opportunités de création davantage d'opportunités d'emploi, à même d'aider de façon significative la région à faire farce à certains maux comme l'exode humain de la rive sud vers le Nord, la marasme économique et les

tensions socioculturelles et politiques. Il peut être bon de rappeler à cet égard cette "prophétie" d'Alfred SAUVY: "si la richesse ne va pas vers les hommes, les hommes iront la chercher là où elle se trouve".

Le non Maghreb a également un coût pour le partenariat euro-méditerraéen, dans la mesure où cet espace de transit et interface entre les continents ne permet pas dans l'état actuel de la fermeture des frontières entre pays maghrébins voisins, à l'Europe d'être en contact avec ses hinterlands africains et arabes, des zones qui ont en partie assuré au vieux continent les ressources humaines et naturelles nécessaire à son essor économique et social des trente glorieuses.

Grâce au effets d'entraînement qu'elle est susceptible d'induire, l'intégration maghrébine peut également être un espace de sous-traitance industrielle pour l'Europe et source de croissance, à la lumière de ce qui se passe dans d'autres régions du monde (Japon et l'ASEAN, États Unis et MERCUSOR...); ceci est d'autant plus évident que certaines études font ressortir que pour 10 000 dollars de PIB des PSEM, l'Union européenne exporte 1266 dollars, contre seulement 580 dollars pour 10 000 dollars de PIB des PECO et 191 dollars pour 10 000 dollars de PIB des pays d'Amérique du Sud.

I.2. Les risques politico-sécuritaires du non-Maghreb

Le développement solitaire des pays du Maghreb a montré ses limites. Il est synonyme aujourd'hui de fragilité, de vulnérabilité, d'instabilité, de marginalisation, de déséquilibres accrus.

La proximité géographiques, les liens historiques et l'interdépendance multiformes entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée sont autant de facteurs qui font que les ondes de chocs des difficultés actuelles du Maghreb ne s'arrêtent pas au sud du Détroit de Gibraltar. Le dramatique phénomène des pateras, avec son coût de vies humaines, est là pour montrer à quels points les interférences positives ou négatives entre les deux rives sont inéluctables. Les filets de contrôles et de sécurité pour endiguer ce type de problèmes, qu'elles que soient leurs ampleur et sophistication ont montré leurs limites. Il suffit à ce niveau d'avoir présent à l'avenir l'expérience américaine et les tentatives, sans beaucoup de succès, de maîtrise des infiltrations migratoires mexicaines. C'est pour dire que la meilleure des sécurités réside dans la mise en oeuvre conjointe des conditions requises pour un développement durable au Maghreb, à savoir notamment son intégration économique.

II. LES CONDITIONS NÉCESSAIRES POUR L'INTÉGRATION MAGHRÉBINE

Il faut au préalable préciser que l'intégration régionale ne se décrète pas. C'est un long processus historique qui peut évoluer au gré des contingences politiques internes et externes.

Au Maghreb, l'intégration a toujours été perçue comme une condition préalable au développement, alors que les expériences historiques d'intégrations montre que les intégrations les mieux réussies apparaissent comme le point d'aboutissement d'un processus de développement économique et d'ouverture entre les pays qui ont fait l'intégration et non comme une étape préalable.

Il faut dire à ce niveau que les pays de l'UMA, les échanges sont restés aux plus forts moments de l'ouverture des frontières assez faibles, à cause de la nature des productions nationales, déterminées par les options politiques et les stratégies nationales de développement au lendemain des indépendances politiques.. Ainsi, 60% du commerce maghrébin se fait avec la rive nord de la Méditerranée, contre seulement 3% pour le commerce intramaghrébin et 5% avec tous les pays arabes.

Des données qui peuvent expliquer les tentatives éphémères d'intégrations régionales comme le cas de l'Union Arabo-Africaine en 1984 ente le Maroc et la Libye, ou le Traité de Fraternité et de Concorde en 1983, entre l'Algérie, la Mauritanie et la Tunisie, sans parler du cas de l'U.M.A. qui est toujours en panne.

L'affaire de Lockerbie, qui a finalement trouvé une issue, qui a pesé d'une certaine manière sur l'évolution de l'UMA n'était en fait que l'arbre qui cachait la forêt. L'intégration au Maghreb bat de l'aile à cause des nationalismes étriqués, des frontières indéterminées, du déficit démocratique, du manque de volonté et de courage politique. La méfiance des dirigeants maghrébins a prévalu

à la place des principes du respect des principes du l'intégrité territoire du voisin, à la recherche de règlements des différents par les moyens pacifiques.

La question du Sahara dit occidental, continue de peser lourdement sur le devenir de l'intégration maghrébine. Cette question est en voie de règlement par l'organisation d'un référendum sous les auspices onusiennes, prévu normalement à l'été 2000. Les procédures d'identification des personnes qui ont droit au voté posent des problèmes, pour des considérations historiques (fuite des populations vers le nord à cause de l'occupation espagnole invasion, des spécificités ethniques propres aux populations nomades.

Sur le plan économique, dans certains secteurs, les pays maghrébins enregistrent des excédents de même nature et des besoin assez similaires. Ils sont en concurrence sur les marchés externes, en particulier sur le marché européen. Une situation qui les affaiblis et les condamne à s'entendre et à être solidaires.

I ne faut trop céder au fatalisme de la non-Maghreb. La désunion n'est jamais définitive, ni irréversible et irrémédiable. Faut-il rappeler que deux guerres mondiales aussi meurtrières que coûteuses n'ont pas empêché les ennemis d'hier d'être la cheville ouvrière de la construction européenne ?

Des conditions objectives existent pour réussir l'intégration régionale au Maghreb:
    - l'existence d'un tissu industriel non négligeable, même s'il reste incomplet;
    - l'existence d'un marché potentiel régional de plus de 60 millions de consommateurs, démultiplié de ressources naturelles plus abondante et diverses;
    - des réformes économiques aussi ambitieuses que structurelles, qui ont vu leur début de réalisation dans les pays du Maghreb à partir des années 1980, dans le cadre des programmes d'ajustement structurel; des réformes qui portent sur la libéralisation et l'ouverture des

économies, moins d'État, plus de transparence et recherche de l'efficience des politiques publiques;

- la possibilité, pour des raisons historiques et des traditions commerciales, de dynamiser les échanges avec le continent africain; autrement dit la volonté de coopérer dans le sens horizontal Sud-Sud.

Dans le cas même où l'intégration régionale est mise en scelle au Maghreb, il n'est pas dit que qu'elle sera source de développement spontané et mutuellement fécond. Des phases d'adaptations sont nécessaires pour l'organisation de nouvelles filières de production, compte tenu des situations de concurrence entre les économies maghrébines.

L'articulation entre l'industrie et l'agriculture au Maghreb doit être un choix stratégique et prioritaire, dans la mesure où l'élévation du taux d'autosuffisance alimentaire permettra d'améliorer le niveau de vie de satisfaction des besoins et de renforcer l'indépendance économique, en permettant d'augmenter la productivité agricole par la mécanisation.

L'intégration ne peut être globale; elle doit se faire de façon pragmatique et sélective. Des opportunités de coopération intramaghrébine sont nécessaires dans certains domaines prioritaires, en particulier dans les domaines suivants:

- dans la filière de la production et la commercialisation des engrais. Le Maghreb est gros producteur d'engrais (phosphatés e azotés); mais il ne produit pas toute la gamme des engrais nécessaires;
- la production du matériel de culture, en développant en particulier les filières de la mécaniques et des plastiques (emballage, films pour les cultures sous-serres...);

- la question des transports est essentielle si l'on veut intensifier les échanges sous-régionaux. Le développement des plates-formes modernes de logistiques est déterminant pour plusieurs raisons:

- le transport est l'un des préalables pour le développement des échanges. L'état actuel des réseaux de transport et des interconnexions horizontales des différents modes de transport constitue un facteur majeur dans le blocage des échanges entre pays maghrébins et élément important dans la formation des coûts;

- la construction des moyens de transport peut constituer une industrie clé dans le cadre de la dynamisation industrielle, grâce aux effets d'entraînement en amont et en aval. Dans le secteur des transports, la construction navale en particulier s'est historiquement révélée, dans les pays asiatiques comme la Corée, comme capable à la fois de stimuler l'industrie en amont et d'élargir le marché, par ses effets en aval sur l'activité commerciale et portuaire, ainsi que par ses effets induits sur le commerce extérieur grâce aux capacités d'exportation qu'il peut générer.

L'avenir du l'intégration du Maghreb est dans une large mesure tributaire de son intégration négociée avec l'espace euro-méditerranéen. En effet, si l'Europe peut économiquement se passer du Maghreb -il ne représente que 3% des échanges extérieurs de l'U.E- , inversement le Maghreb en est fortement dépendant- globalement 50% de son commerce extérieur-; il ne peut ainsi se couper du marché européen sans risque de déstabilisation économique et sociale.

Cet arrimage à l'Europe est salutaire et dépend aussi de la capacité de l'U.E à accompagner à court et moyen termes les efforts nécessaires pour faire de l'intégration au Maghreb un projet crédible, durablement inscrit dans le temps.

La question se pose également de savoir si l'U.E. est prête à aider les pays du Maghreb à trouver des opportunités d'échange meilleures à l'échelle internationale, grâce au savoir-faire acquis dans le domaine du négoce, les traditions et réseaux commerciaux et le know how européen en matière de marketing.

L'U.E, comme les États Unis d'ailleurs, n'a pas le monopole dans le secteur des céréales, des viandes ou du sucre. Des pays du Sud comme l'Uruguay, l'Argentine notamment, sont des vendeurs importants de blé et de viande. De nombreux pays africains vendent du bétail. L'Amérique Centrale et du Sud, l'Éthiopie ou le Mozambique sont vendeurs de sucre et nombre de pays asiatiques sont exportateurs de riz.

Aider le Maghreb à s'intégrer peut passer par le développement de ses échanges Sud-Sud, et cela pour plusieurs raisons:
- la diversification des fournisseurs et des clients est en mesure de mieux équilibrer les comptes extérieurs;
- dans le cadre de la coopération Sud-Sud, il est possible d'imaginer des achats groupés et d'organiser des opérations de réciprocité, permettant à la fois d'échapper aux règlements en devises dominantes ou fortes, et de fixer les termes de l'échange, non pas en fonction du marché mondial, mais en fonction des exigences d'une structure de prix concertée, conforme aux exigences et besoins de développement des uns et des autres;

Il faut enfin souligner que dans l'attente d'une redynamisation de l'UMA, il serait souhaitable de voir EuroMeSCo prendre l'initiative d'entreprendre des études sur le coût du non-Maghreb pour le Maghreb et l'espace euro-méditerranéen, comme cela a été fait pour le cas de l'Europe, dans le cadre du rapport du professeur Paolo Cecchini sur "le coût du non-marché unique pour l'Europe".

Des études méritent également d'être entreprises ou approfondies pour comparer les profils sectoriels respectifs des pays maghrébins, en vue d'identifier les créneaux où les complémentarités seraient possibles; le développement d'instruments communs de comptabilité nationale et de planification comme par exemple l'essai de construction d'un Tableau Entrées-Sorties (T.E.S) maghrébins.

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LES OBSTACLES POLITIQUES
A L'INTEGRATION REGIONALE AU MAGHREB

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La construction de l'ensemble maghrébin constitue une question, une revendication, un discours et un appel, présents dans chacun des pays de la région depuis des siècles.

Le concept a repris de la vigueur et plus de pesanteur depuis le début des années soixante. Selon les périodes et selon les contingences de chacun des pays, la question d'une forme mieux articulée de coopération est de nouveau posée. De quel Maghreb s'agit-il ?

Comment faire émerger une vision d'un Maghreb plurinational ou transnational ?

Quels acteurs pour un projet Maghrébin ?

Que ce soit à cinq avec le Maroc, l'Algérie, la Mauritanie, la Tunisie et la Libye ou à trois avec le Maroc, l'Algérie et la Tunisie, la problématique maghrébine revêt globalement les mêmes dimensions.

Autant, l'idée de rapprochement des communautés de destin est présente dans les discours et les cultures populaires, autant la pratique et le comportement des acteurs consacre les divisions et approfondit les clivages.

Trois paramètres majeurs renvoient à trois types de blocages à la construction de l'ensemble maghrébin.

La construction et la consolidation de la Nation, les problèmes de blocage de la croissance et les difficultés pour sortir du sous-développement, les ripostes souvent inadaptées aux relents identitaires et la vulnérabilité des acteurs politiques face aux retombées de la mondialisation.

Depuis la conférence euro-méditerranéenne de Barcelone en Novembre 1995, toute la région est impliquée dans le partenariat euro-méditerranéen. La transition vers la zone de libre échange qui deviendra effective en 2010 en est une des composantes. C'est donc en fonction de l'articulation avec le partenariat et avec la mondialisation que le Maghreb doit être compris.

1 - LA CONSOLIDATION DES DETERMINANTS INTERNES DE LA NATION

Les préoccupations de chacun des pays de la région à consolider les composantes de ses acquis nationaux pour fortifier l'Etat et la Nation dominent depuis plus de deux siècles les choix et les comportements des acteurs politiques. C'est pourquoi les différences de régime et de systèmes politiques ainsi que les fondements idéologiques qui les sous-tendent prennent des dimensions considérables et ont un impact qui ne peut se comprendre en dehors des contextes de chacun des pays.

Le pouvoir politique, faute d'une légitimité démocratique - peut être impossible à asseoir d'emblée sans une préparation et des transitions nécessaires- est toujours à la recherche de nouveaux modes de légitimation. Le repli sur soi, la confusion entre patriotisme et nationalisme et l'homogénéisation des pensées et des valeurs, sous prétexte de culture nationale, de langue nationale, d'Etat national et de territoire national, se sont traduits par l'exacerbation des divergences d'un pays à l'autre. Le processus de consolidation nationale est une lame

de fond qui remonte très loin dans l'histoire et qui renvoie aux luttes internes pour le pouvoir, aux contingences des alliances tribales et communautaires et bien évidemment aux agressions extérieures dont les différents pays sont des auteurs ou dont ils ont été victimes au cours de l'histoire. Cette référence à des phénomènes historiques qui ont jalonné le Maghreb depuis le 12° siècle, éclaire bien, cette espèce d'obsession par laquelle l'Etat et la Nation sont conçus dans un perpétuel rapport d'antagonisme et de hantise du complot. Cette obsession sécuritaire réelle ou prétextée pour rejeter l'autre, a marqué de son empreinte la trajectoire nationale maghrébine.

C'est ainsi que les enjeux politiques ordinaires tels que liés aux partis politiques, aux élections, aux coalitions, aux alliances etc... ne sont pas perçus comme des actes objectifs mais prennent des tournures affectives, subjectives et foncièrement du domaine privé. Leur impact ne se limite pas à l'espace sociétal politique, il agit sur l'espace privé, familial et personnel. Les élections créent souvent des drames entre familles et au sein des familles.

C'est ainsi que la question des frontières ou de susceptibilité, des fois puérile en apparence, peuvent prendre des tournures démesurées. Cette rivalité sous-jacente et latente renvoie aux concepts d'alliances et de contre-alliances dans le système communautaire, villageois ou tribal dont les anthropologues ont largement analysé les contours. C'est ainsi que les négociations et le dialogue ne sont pas privilégiés en tant qu'instrument de régulation politique et sociale.

Les rapports de force et les discours enflammés ont tendance à précéder le dialogue et paradoxalement à en préparer les conditions de déroulement. Dans ce contexte les différences de régime politique au lieu d'être une caractéristique propre à chaque société sans interférence avec les voisins et les proches, devient un enjeu central de brouilles et d'ingérences maladroites dans les affaires de l'autre pays.

Les frontières, loin d'être conçues comme des espaces où les mêmes communautés vivent de part et d'autre d'un contour conventionnel, avec un patrimoine historique et culturel commun, deviennent des murs, des ruptures et des lieux de cristallisation des antagonismes politiques et géostratégiques, étrangers aux préoccupations des populations.

Les fausses rivalités s'alimentent et au lieu d'oeuvrer pour le rapprochement, les enjeux stratégiques liés aux conséquences de la colonisation, aux mouvements des populations et à des querelles localisées, approfondissent les divisions et la désintégration. C'est ainsi que l'intégration maghrébine ne peut être une réalité en construction et en mouvement que quand l'hypothèque nationaliste sera levée. L'intégration suppose des entités nationales sereines, reconnues, fortes non de leurs armées ou de leurs polices mais de leurs institutions, de leur démocratie et de leur acceptation normale des différences.

L'ouverture démocratique et le processus en cours dans la région, de mise en place de cadres institutionnels et des composants de l'Etat de droit, sont des ferments indispensables à une confiance de chacun des pays en soi. C'est là un préalable nécessaire à l'ouverture et à la connaissance de l'autre. L'autre le plus proche étant les peuples voisins.

Ainsi, les reflux identitaires et les expressions extrémistes des désespoirs et du rejet du projet de l'Etat comme c'est le cas en Algérie depuis le début des années quatre vint dix, se sont traduits dans les pays du Maghreb par le renforcement des options sécuritaires, la méfiance vis à vis des voisins et la multiplication des discours hostiles aux autres. En fait, moins la démocratie est une conviction et une pratique sociétale, plus la démagogie et le rejet des autres s'accroît.

C'est ce qui explique pourquoi les tentatives de construction maghrébine que soit en 1959, en 1969 ou en 1989 ne pouvaient aboutir à

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aucune réalité tangible tant elles n'émanaient pas de mouvements profonds de dialogue, de règlement des conflits et de cheminement commun des acteurs politiques et sociaux des différents pays.

Il me semble que l'intégration doit être conçue comme un aboutissement d'un processus complexe, porté par des partis, des universités, des personnes et des associations. C'est une maturation perpétuellement ajustée, adaptée et assumée. C'est alors que chacun des États se projetterait avec les autres et non contre les autres. Les questions de l'eau, des richesses minières, de l'accès à la mer, des territoires contestés trouveraient les solutions qui leur conviennent.

Les espaces de concertation et d'arbitrage, pour jouer leur rôle doivent exprimer un choix politique de chacun des partenaires. Le Maghreb devant être un projet de société pour les acteurs et les peuples et non un alibi et une idéologie de saison et d'occasion. Le problème de l'intégration maghrébine n'est ni un problème technique, ni un problème économique, elle est une carence historique, elle est un non choix politique.

2 - CHOIX ECONOMIQUES ET BLOCAGE DES DYNAMIQUES DE COMPLEMENTARITE[1]

Les activités industrielles développées par les pays du Maghreb depuis les années cinquante, se sont progressivement étendues, élargies et approfondies, en opérant selon les logiques qui sont à la base de leur création. Comme dans toute dynamique d'industrie naissante, les choix se sont faits en fonction des avantages qu'offraient les marchés interne et externe de l'époque. C'est tout naturellement que les activités de rente de pétrole, de phosphate et de soleil se sont imposées et ont relativement créé les conditions de leur écoulement.

L'exode rural massif des années soixante dix et les accords d'association avec la France d'abord et avec l'Europe ensuite ont petit à petit stimulé l'agriculture exportatrice et les activités industrielles de faible transformation et de sous-traitance; commanditées par des segments de demande situés sur les marchés extérieurs mais échappant aux opérateurs locaux.

La mondialisation de l'économie à travers la transcendance des barrières nationales par les flux de marchandises n'est pas un phénomène nouveau. La nouveauté, c'est qu'elle a atteint depuis les années quatre vingt dix des dimensions qui ont totalement bouleversé les schémas de fonctionnement antérieurs. Les flux financiers, les moyens de communication et d'information constituent les vecteurs de ces nouveaux espaces où les nations seront de plus en plus réduites à jouer un rôle comparable par son impact à celui des autres acteurs ; l'Etat, une entreprise parmi d'autres.

Dans ce contexte, les avantages créés par des situations favorables à un moment donné, ne sont pas donnés et acquis une fois pour toutes.

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[1] c.f. D. KHROUZ
L'annuaire de la Méditerranée - GERM - Publisud - Paris 1998

L'avantage ne peut durer que si les structures de l'économie qui en bénéficient évoluaient plus vite que les marchés et anticipaient sur leurs besoins et évolutions.

C'est ainsi que l'exploitation et exportation des sources d'énergie, des matières premières minérales et agricoles, le transfert de main œuvre excédentaire vers l'Europe et le développement du textile-habillement bas de gamme, de l'agro-indusrie, des industries mécaniques et électriques sur la base de coûts salariaux faibles et d'une main œuvre peu qualifiée, correspondent assurément à une étape des sociétés où les revenus générés sont importants et permettent la reproduction du système qui est à leur origine.

Le monde a changé, de nouvelles activités sont nées, de nouvelles cohérences des systèmes productifs sont apparues. Les choix du passé, faute d'évoluer, ne peuvent être que subordonnés à des logiques plus compétitives.

C'est l'une des raisons majeures qui expliquent que des petits espaces comme ceux de chacun des trois pays du Maghreb n'ont de place qu'à travers leurs capacités à s'insérer dans cette mondialisation, non en en subissant les chocs négatifs mais en maîtrisant des avantages dynamiques. En étant actives face aux mutations de l'environnement, ces sociétés auraient pu accorder une place plus déterminante à la richesse et au bien être de leurs citoyens.

C'est ainsi que les assises de leurs systèmes économiques et sociaux, telles qu'elles essaient de s'articuler avec les nouvelles exigences du partenariat euro-méditerranéen sont fondamentalement les mêmes qu'à la fin des années soixante, c'est-à-dire à l'ère des accords d'association avec l'Europe des cinq et bien avant l'adhésion de l'Espagne, de la Grèce et du Portugal, les concurrents immédiats des pays du Maghreb.

C'est pourquoi, loin de créer les convergences indispensables tant sur le plan économique et social que politique- aux rapprochements des sociétés, les choix industriels ont multiplié les fausses compétitions et ont alimenté des luttes pour les leaderships de seconde zone.

Il y a plus fort que les velléités d'intégration au Maghreb, ce sont les flux et reflux nationalistes, identitaires. Les logiques économiques sont de loin subordonnées aux impératifs d'expression des acteurs sociaux, l'Etat en tête. Entre les dogmes et l'histoire, les pays du Maghreb ont peu de temps pour l'accumulation et du capital et des expériences d'industrialisations ouvertes sur les autres. L'ouverture sur les autres, signifie d'abord confiance en soi.

Les secteurs qui dominent l'économie en général et les exportations en particulier doivent leur place et leur force à la protection dont ils ont pu bénéficier jusqu'au début des années quatre-vingt. C'est en effet à partir de cette date que la protection directe a du céder la place, dans le cadre des programmes d'ajustements structurels, à des mécanismes plus économiques que réglementaires, comme la protection tarifaire.

Les choix opérés se sont faits dans la précipitation des fièvres de l'après- indépendance à un moment où tout le monde était convaincu que le développement ne peut se faire qu'en opposition aux autres, notamment en rupture totale ou partielle avec les investissements extérieurs. C'est cette utopie de l'économie nationale, des nationalisations et de la suprématie du pouvoir central au niveau de l'Etat et de la société qui a fait que les spécialisations sont statiques. Cohérentes, relativement performantes jusqu'au milieu des années soixante dix, elles ne le sont plus après. En effet, les industries dans l'environnement où elles se sont faites sont d'essence statique. Tant au niveau du pétrole et gaz, du phosphate et autres minerais que des cultures exportatrices telles que le textile-habillement, ces activités

parce que privilégiées au départ, sont marginales par rapport à leur environnement. Ce sont des greffes qui n'ont pas pris.

La dimension scientifique, technologie et culturelle de l'industrie n'a pas pu avoir de prise sur les déterminants de l'Etat et de la société. C'est ce qui explique en profondeur pourquoi le travail ne s'est pas généralisé comme valeur sociale et que les effets d'intégration entre les segments des filières industrielles n'ont pas joué en faveur de la modernisation de la société à travers le fonctionnement des mécanismes économiques.

L'entreprise privée qui fait des progrès importants par son ouverture, son dynamisme et son développement, reste handicapée par des structures totalement inadaptées :

- Une culture d'entreprise à dominante spéculative et commerciale, où le pouvoir et le capital sont considérés comme une affaire de famille. Le travailleur n'est pas considéré comme un partenaire dans l'entreprise, le paternalisme ambiant continue à le maintenir dans le rôle de l'assisté.

- L'entreprise dominante est de petite dimension (moins de 20 emplois permanents), de surface financière faible et fragile.

- Une faible capacité de réaction aux aléas et aux retournements de marchés ; un faible pouvoir d'anticipation : la gestion au jour le jour est une pratique courante. C'est pourquoi le secteur privé qui représente autour de 10 à 15% de la V.A. au Maroc et en Tunisie, constitue un partenaire qui n'a pu encore prendre la place qui est la sienne dans l'économie et dans la société.

Pour toutes ces considérations, nous pourrons dégager quelques résultats en termes de coût du non Maghreb :

- Un énorme gaspillage des potentialités économiques, par la faible productivité du travail, de création de l'emploi et le faible niveau de bien être social.

- Un faible niveau de consommation des productions stratégiques : le marché intérieur ne joue pas son rôle dans les mutations économiques. Autour de 8% de la population vit en dessous du seuil de pauvreté ; le PNB par habitant (en dollar U S valeur 1993) est de 1780 en Algérie, 1720 en Tunisie et de 1200 au Maroc ; alors qu'il est de 9.130 au Portugal, 13 590 en Espagne et 21 650 en Belgique. La dépense annuelle moyenne par personne, à titre d'exemple est inférieure à 500 DH en 1996 ; elle ne dépasse pas 300 DH en milieu rural.

- Les positions acquises sur les marchés européens ne sont sauvegardées que dans le cadre des clauses préférentielles. Le recul constaté depuis 1996 montre que pour les biens industriels, les Maghrébins ne maîtrisent pas leurs débouchés extérieurs. Le partenariat entre l'Europe et le Maghreb ne se situe pas encore au niveau des sociétés mais des Etats.

C'est pourquoi, les avancées technologiques sont limitées et les investissements directs en deçà des possibilités. Le niveau de l'épargne varie entre 15 et 17% et celui de l'investissement entre 20 et 22% (25,2% pour le Maroc en 1996). L'investissement direct étranger est orienté dans le monde en priorité vers les pays développés. L'Europe détient 41,5% du stock total des investissements, l'Amérique du Nord 26% et l'Asie du Sud-Est 12,7%. En 1994, les flux se sont orientés à raison de 40% vers les pays nouvellement industrialisés de l'Asie. Sur les 3 200 milliards de dollars d'investissements dans le monde en 1996, les firmes transnationales ont réalisé 1400 milliards (soit 43,75%) orientés en priorité vers les secteurs de pointe comme l'électronique, la cybernétique, l'automobile et la chimie.

Malgré leur avancée, les investissements étrangers directs et productifs restent timides et hésitants. Leur avancée est rarement créatrice d'unités modernes de haute technologie et de diffusion d'expérience. Ce n'est pas le problème de la flexibilité du travail ou des charges financières qui constituent un obstacle mais le problème des pesanteurs administratives, des qualifications fines et de l'inadaptation de la justice à l'évolution du monde.

3 - PERSPECTIVES ET EXIGENCES DE L'INTEGRATION MABREBINE

les engagements pris par les vingt sept pays signataires des accords de Barcelone, placent les économies et les sociétés concernées dans des perspectives où toutes les logiques et tous les schémas antérieurs vont s'avérer de plus en plus obsolètes avant et après 2010.

Pour être bien compris, le partenariat euro-méditerrannéen doit être pris pour ce qu'il est : un pari, un choix civilisationnel. La question d'adhérer ou non à ce projet peut se poser légitiment pour un pays donné du Sud de la Méditerranée. Mais la mondialisation est telle, l'OMC est telle, la quadripolarisation de monde est telle qu'en fait, la véritable question qui se posera de plus en plus, n'est pas celle du pourquoi mais du comment.

La mondialisation fera en sorte que les enjeux de la science, de la technologie, de la mobilité du travail, des financements et des marchés s'articuleront de plus en plus en fonction des quatre blocs qui dominent la fin du XXème siècle : l'Union européenne ; l'ALENA, le Japon, l'ASEAN la Chine et le Mercosur.

Deux problèmes nous interpellent en priorité par rapport aux économies maghrébines: les exigences du libéralisme et l'ouverture; le pari maghrébin et les conditions de sa viabilité.

Les industries maghrébines doivent leurs atouts à la protection dont elles ont bénéficié et aux avantages -issus d'un âge révolu- qui leurs sont encore concédés. Les marchés européens étant totalement ouverts aux productions industrielles maghrébines, seules ces dernières vont devoir s'adapter au choc de l'ouverture de leurs frontières aux exportations mondiales' l'Europe s'ouvrant sur le monde, les productions maghrébines ne pourront plus bénéficier des systèmes préférentiels en vigueur avec l'Europe d'avant la monnaie unique, d'avant Schengen et Maastricht.

L'industrie maghrébine devra de plus en plus se structurer en fonction de ses marchés. En effet, s'il est maintenant admis que les exportations, malgré les récessions à court terme qui résulteront de l'ouverture, se maintiendraient au mieux à leur niveau actuel, les écarts de maîtrise de technologie, de la qualité et des marchés sont trop grands pour être comblés dans les secteurs clés comme le textile-habillement, l'agro-alimentaire et les industries chimiques et parachimiques.

Les spécialisations dynamiques, les nouveaux avantages compétitifs nés des nouvelles restructurations pourront par contre bénéficier de transferts de technologie, avoir accès à des marchés porteurs et mettre en place des instruments conformes aux besoins des sociétés de droit et des économies modernes, comme le fonctionnement de prix, compatibles avec les réalités économiques et les échanges internationaux et des niveaux de vie respectant la dignité de la personne.

Les réductions des prix à l'importation auront un impact paradoxal sur les économies maghrébines. D'un côté, cela permettra à l'entreprise maghrébine de mieux asseoir ses restructurations, ses mutations et

aborder les transferts et la mobilité des ressources de façon constructive. En effet, l'entreprise ne sera plus condamnée à importer du matériel issu de la fragmentation de segments technologiques obsolètes dans le Nord. Elle pourra acquérir le savoir et la technologie dans des conditions qu'elle va devoir apprendre à négocier et selon les normes mondiales. De l'autre côté, la déprotection réduira les recettes immédiates des Etats; des ressources alternatives seront nécessaires, des ajustements seront indispensables et de nouveaux acteurs émergeront.

Entre le 1er janvier 1997 et le 1er janvier 2009, le Maroc et la Tunisie se sont engagés à réduire progressivement les impôts et taxes à effets équivalents sur la totalité des productions industrielles en provenance de l'Europe. Le démantèlement tarifaire s'effectuera sur 12 ans.

Les réformes fiscales engagées sont partielles, inachevées et sont Tributaires en fait du poids des activités modernes privées, qui ne représentent que 8% à 10% du PIB au Maroc et en Tunisie. C'est ainsi qu'en 1996 par rapport à 1995, les droits de douane ont connu une baisse de 9,2% au Maroc et le PFI a baissé de 15% sous l'effet du début de la réduction des taxes et effets équivalents sur les importations. Le nombre de taux a été réduit pour être ramené le premier janvier 1996 de 13 à 6 ; le taux plafond d'imposition pour les importations qui est de 45% en 1996 est ramené à 35% en 1997 et il va se réduire encore plus. Avec 11,9 milliards de dirharms, la part du commerce extérieur dans les recettes fiscales stagne, du fait de la réduction de 6% du prélèvement fiscal à l'importation des biens d'équipement et des intrants industriels importés.

Sur cette base le manque à gagner du fait de l'ouverture et de la réduction des recettes fiscales qui commencent à en découler, serait au Maroc de l'ordre de 6% des recettes douanières par an. Cette perte pourrait être compensée par l'accroissement prévisible de la part de la

TVA applicable aux : importations qui est de 9,9 milliards de dirhams en 1996, soit 10,7 de plus qu'en 1995. Pour la Tunisie, on estime le manque à gagner à 18% des recettes fiscales totales ou 65% des recettes douanières. Le montant avancé serait de 75 millions de dinars pour 1996 soit un cumul de 4 milliards de dinars entre 1996 et 2010.Le nombre d'emplois menacés à terme par la disparition des entreprises les plus vulnérables est estimé à 120 000.

L'idée proposée ici est celle de voir en termes de scénarios, quels sont les atouts et les prédispositions qui peuvent à court terme servir de base à la forme la plus appropriée et la pluraliste possible d'intégration maghrébine.

Le marché maghrébin est un facteur important d'intégration: avec une population de près de 80 millions d'habitants en l'an 2000, le Maghreb peut constituer des débouchés importants pour ses productions industrielles. Cela est d'autant plus plausible que les niveaux de vie, les faibles couvertures des besoins sociaux, sont tels qu'ils ne peuvent qu'augmenter.

Les productivités et le niveau d'efficience sont encore ceux des premières expériences, ils sont tout à fait propices à des accroissements considérables en fonction de trois variables :

(i) le marché intérieur dont les vertus civilisationnelles et productives sont les plus profondes ;

(ii) Le marché extérieur en maîtrisant mieux les technologies motrices mais en s'inscrivant dans le partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Les effets demandes et les effets offres doivent être articulés en fonction des adaptations à l'évolution des de mandes et des concurrences. Les pertes de leurs créneaux par les exportations traditionnelles, appelle de nouvelles orientations qui concernent l'économie en général et

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l'industrie en particulier. Après avoir baissé de 3,8% dans les années 80, de 2,2% dans les années 90 et de 0,9% sur la période allant jusqu'en 20102, les recettes réelles d'exportation par habitant, tributaires de catégories déclinantes comme les transferts des émigrés, le tourisme et les exportations à faible valeur ajoutée, ne croîtront qu'avec d'autres logiques industrielles.

(iii) L'investissement privé national peut jouer un rôle essentiel par la réhabilitation du travail, la lutte contre la corruption, le clientélisme et l'orientation de l'épargne vers l'investissement et non la spéculation. Une autre répartition de la richesse et du pouvoir est indispensable.

- Une réforme en profondeur de l'enseignement, de la justice et de l'administration, pour les rendre compatibles avec les valeurs universelles, sont des préalables indispensables.

Les changements doivent commencer par l'adaptation de l'environnement et des valeurs libératrices valorisantes.

Les ingrédients d'un autre démarrage existent à trois niveaux :

(i) Au niveau des complémentarités sectorielles si une logique d'intégration prévalait. Du pétrole et du gaz, du phosphate, des biens agro-alimentaires, au tissu, fil et textiles-habillement, en passant par des industries électriques, électroniques et chimiques, les trois économies maghrébines s'inscrivent parfaitement dans une logique de complémentarité. Au niveau économique, le positionnement dans des marchés régressifs, les difficultés financières des Etats et le poids de la dette intérieure et extérieure, les pressions démographiques et le poids des jeunes; chômeurs, font que les économies ne bénéficient pas des marges de manœuvre et des délais qui pourraient favoriser d'autres choix. Les entreprises publiques encore dominantes pourraient jouer ce

rôle de levier en faveur d'une intégration horizontale, d'abord au niveau de l'aval en allant progressivement vers l'amont.

(ii) Au niveau d'une ouverture maîtrisée; pour des raisons objectives en priorité mais pas exclusivement, elle ne peut se faire que vers l'Europe. Les coefficients d'ouverture sont relativement favorables : 44% en 1986 et 57% en 1993, en Tunisie ce coefficient est encore plus élevé.

(iii) Au niveau d'une extension et d'un espace de déploiement des productions en fonction du premier pôle commercial du monde.

Des restructurations profondes au niveau de l'environnent de l'entreprise peuvent constituer un levier formidable pour l'attrait des investissements et des technologies internationaux. Les réponses à ce lancinant problème se situent au niveau culturel et politique. Les mutations considérables qu'ont connues des sociétés comme l'Espagne, le Portugal, le Liban, la Grèce, la Turquie, les Philippines et la Malaisie depuis trois à quatre décennies montrent que quand une société est dynamique, son économe peut l'être.

Les choix économiques en vigueur aujourd'hui sont ceux des années soixante. Leur logique est incohérente et obsolète. Le coût du non-Maghreb est dû à des positions de repli, de fausses rentes. Ils montrent que l'économie n'a pas encore le statut qui doit lui revenir dans l'inspiration des déterminants culturels et politiques de la société.

Le Maroc et la Tunisie sont membres à part entière dans les accords que l'Union européenne a commencé à mettre en place en fonction de l'architecture d'ensemble des 15 + 12 de la Conférence de Barcelone. Les négociations sont engagées avec l'Algérie. L'exiguïté des marchés intérieurs et l'exclusion d'une grande partie de la population des bienfaits de la croissance, font que les économies se sont enfermées dans

des insertions passives dans des segments régressifs des productions et des exportations de la mondialisation.

Une restructuration en profondeur des économies peut appeler l'intégration et créer les conditions de l'unité maghrébine. Pour cela, plusieurs conditions sont indispensables :

- Faire de la réforme de l'enseignement un instrument d'ouverture et de renaissance culturelle, où la personnalité maghrébine s'épanouisse dans les acquis universels. La généralisation de l'enseignement, la réappropriation par les peuples du Maghreb de leur histoire, émancipera les énergies. Prisonnières de leur passé, les sociétés maghrébines ont du mal à se projeter dans l'avenir. Un projet de société est un cadre de mobilisation, d'adhésion et d'expression des différences dans un cheminement commun.

C'est alors que la formation, la qualification et le poids de la jeunesse peuvent se transformer en atout.

- Créer les activités, inciter les initiatives et promouvoir les potentialités en relation avec l'emploi, la lutte contre le chômage et le bien être de la population.

- Concevoir les activités économiques en fonction d'une vision de l'espace où le monde rural ne soit pas laissé pour compte.

- Accompagner l'ouverture économique et les réformes politiques nécessaires par une meilleure participation des populations aux déterminants de leurs devenirs.

La réalisation de ces conditions est aujourd'hui hypothéquée par un blocage culturel et politique dans les sociétés maghrébines. En effet, l'Etat est central et il s'est historiquement constitué contre la société.

L'avancement vers la consolidation de la démocratie, fera que l'Etat pouvant acquérir un niveau avancé de maturité et de sérénité, il serait alors la cristallisation des aspirations de la société, ce serait une société de droit.

C'est pourquoi l'adhésion totale dans ce partenariat euro-méditerranéen en marche, accroîtrait considérablement les bénéfices de l'ouverture et à travers les changements obligatoires et la contagion démocratique qui en résulteraient, rendrait les mutations économiques faisables. Les mécanismes économiques pourraient alors exprimer le manque à gagner et le coût du non-Maghreb.

Le Maghreb ne pourra se constituer que par effet de ricochet à partir de son adhésion au partenariat euro-méditerranéen. L'Europe ne peut stabiliser son flanc sud que par la constitution du Maghreb. L'Europe y gagnera, les peuples du Maghreb aussi. L'économie ne peut que cimenter les aspirations culturelles et politiques arrivées à maturité. Les Maghrébins doivent au préalable régler les comptes avec leur passé et leur présent, pour mieux aborder leur avenir.

SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION

THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THE WORKING GROUP REPORT

by Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan

I. Introduction

,This project is part of a larger project aiming at the study of sub-Regional integration around the Mediterranean. The rational of this project is derived from two principal premises. First, integration between Europe and the Mediterranean countries has become among the major policy choices adopted by the countries participating in the Barcelona process. Particularly for the non-EU member countries, partnership with Europe has become a principal part of a grand strategy that aims at achieving development, modernization and reform. Together with market economic reform and openness to world economy, partnership with Europe has become the main policy choices made by countries in the southern Mediterranean.

The ultimate goal of the Barcelona process is establishing a free trade area across and around the Mediterranean by the year 2010. The ongoing process/negotiations toward the EuroMed partnership raise two important observations that should be addressed. While tremendous effort is taking place to achieve North-South integration, no matching effort is done along the axis South-South. There is an inherent imbalance in the Barcelona process, which is derived from the differences in nature between its partners. The Northern partner to this process is the EU; the largest and most developed regional entity in the world. On the other hand, the Southern partners to the process are the individual Mediterranean countries who are not, by any means, a match for their European partner. Since the whole project is designed to achieve cooperation in different aspects, this in itself is not the problem. The problem is rather that the current course could jeopardize the essence of the EuroMeed integration project by limiting it to its North-South Axis. Extending the partnership to the South-South level is a must if the ambitious integration project is to be implemented.

Within this context the issue of sub-regional cooperation in the southern Mediterranean comes in. Recent history of the region shows that few lines could be drawn to identify a number of sub-regions in the southern Mediterranean. Countries of the different sub-regions interact heavily with each other, though not necessarily in a positive way. Moreover, there have been attempts to

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achieve advanced levels of cooperation among the countries of some of these sub-regions. Though never materialized, such ideas and proposals still have a great deal of validity dictated by geography, history, and the availability and distribution of resources.

Sub-regional cooperation is a kind of middle ground between the current southern scene dominated by individual states, on the one hand, and a number of possible future alternatives in which the non-European Mediterranean could be developed into an integrated entity, whether by itself or together with Europe. It could also be seen as an initial phase of the transition toward the integrated EuroMed region.

The questions should be addressed in this research:

a. What are the factors obstructing sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean?

b. What are the prerequisites, political or other, for sub-regional cooperation?

c. What are the possible mechanisms of cooperation in the region?

d. What contribution can sub-regional cooperation bring to the EuroMed process?

e. What role can EMP/EU play in helping the achievement of sub-regional cooperation?

This part of the sub-regional integration project focuses on the Middle East. Five Papers should be produced in that part of the project:

1.   Sub-regional cooperation in the Middle East: obstacles, possibilities and mechanisms. Gamal Soltan, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt.

2.   A view from Egypt. Emad Gad, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt.

3.   A view from Israel. Mark Heller, The Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

4.   A view from Jordan. Ghassan Omet, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, The Hashemite University, Zarkaa, Jordan.

5.   A view from Palestine. Mahdi Abdel Hadi, PASSIA, Jerusalem.

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The five papers have been completed. Early version of the papers has been discussed in the Cairo, April 1999. An early version of this report has been presented by Gamal Soltan, the group rapporteur, in Tel Aviv, September, 1999. The current version of the report is the product of this and other consultations.

II. The State of Regional Cooperation

The group noticed the absence of grand designs or visions for a future Middle East where cooperation would be the prevalent mode of interaction between the different states in the region. Governments in the Middle East are busy dealing with the day-to-day regional politics, especially those pertaining to the Middle East peace process. There is a few number of visions for a future Middle East developed by some politicians and intellectuals at their individual capacity. Moreover, the defeat of the Labor Party in the Israeli election of 1996 has discredited one of these few visions, i.e. Shimon Peres' vision of "The New Middle East". The stalled peace process during Israel Prime Minister Nathanyahu's term blown a heavy strike to the idea of a future Middle East. These developments have reduced the enthusiasm for regional cooperation that was growing during the period 1993-1995. Such disillusion did not only hurt the unrealistic "New Middle East', but also discouraged the possibly more realistic approaches to regional cooperation in the Middle East. Unfortunately, it proved right the extremely cautious/conservative approaches adopted by most governments.

The group recognizes the fact that the unresolved regional conflicts, i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict represent a serious roadblock on the way to improve levels of regional cooperation. However, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only obstacle toward regional cooperation. The Arab Middle Eastern countries' record of regional cooperation among themselves is not much better, which means that the absence of conflicts as severe and complicated as the Arab-Israeli conflict is not sufficient to achieve regional cooperation. In other words, solving such severe conflicts is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regional cooperation.

Fortunately, the idea of regional cooperation in the Middle East is not rejected outright by peoples and elites in the region. It has been either conceived of as something left

for the remote future, or that should be approached in a gradual cautious way. The experience of the last few years in the Middle East shows that gradualism could be a fruitful approach to regional cooperation in the region. The group in that context has suggested two approaches. First, differential cooperation where cooperation among the ready parties is given a chance to proceed without allowing the least ready to hold regional cooperation all together at bay. While this approach could promote cooperation in certain sectors and among few parties, full-fledged cooperation even among the ready parties can hardly be achieved through this way.

The second approach is to give the spontaneous forces and processes of regional cooperation a chance to mature in a healthy environment. According to this approach regional cooperation *per se* should not be forced upon the parties. Rather, providing for the conditions conducive for regional cooperation could result in more sustainable and ever growing levels of regional cooperation.

The Conducive Conditions for Regional Cooperation

Based on the experience of other regions, there are two sets of preconditions for regional cooperation. The first set has its impact on the intrastate level. The foreign policy behavior of states is not only a function of their national interest defined in geostrategic terms, but also in the domestic social and political balance of power between the internationalist and backlash forces. Regional cooperation is likely to be enhanced between states in which internationalist forces have the upper hand and vice versa. The group has noticed that most countries of the Middle East are embarking upon programs of liberal economic reform and liberalization of their foreign economic relations. Such developments are likely to strengthen the internationalist forces. Even when regional cooperation is not meant to be served by these reform policies, which is the typical case in the Middle East, such developments are likely to strengthen the pro regional cooperation forces. The recent experience of the Middle East support this conclusion whereas entrepreneurs and globalized intellectuals and academicians are leading the way for regional cooperation.

On the interstate level, the following prerequisites have been identified:

1.   Acceptance of the regional status quo, where revisionism is not supported by any of the major actors in the system, **or the security clause**.

2.   Stable system of interstate relations, where there are no sudden serious interruptions to the normal relations between states, **or the stability clause**.

3.   Set of accepted norms and codes of conduct that can provide for a system of stable mutual expectations, **or the normative clause**.

4.   The presence of functioning regional institutions, **or the institutional clause**.

Although the current state of regional cooperation in the Middle East is not pleasant, there are some signs of progress. Comparing with two decades, or even less, ago, a number of the prerequisites for regional cooperation are gradually becoming present in the region. On the ideological level, economic liberalism has been adopted by elites in almost all countries of the region. Except in Syria, all other countries have embarked upon ambitious programs of liberal economic restructuring. Even Syria has shyly introduced few, but very indicative, measure of economic liberalization.

Relations between Middle Eastern states have reached a state of stability, where no major serious crises have erupted in the region for fairly long time. Surprisingly this happens at the same time where the status quo is not yet accepted by most Middle Eastern states. More specifically, this happens at the time when Arab states still resisting the Israeli control and claims to the Arab occupied territories. Arabs demand changing the status quo that has been present in the region for more than thirty years. However, their demand is not radical enough to endanger the major parameters of the status quo, i.e., the current state system in the Middle East. The fact that Arab states while resisting Israeli occupation, no longer question Israel's existence indicates that the region is maturing toward acquiring some of the necessary prerequisites for regional cooperation. At the same time, Israel claims to occupied Arab territories and its denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people have been greatly reduced, which can be seen as another sign of regional maturity. The mainstream in today's Israeli politics acknowledge the Palestinian right to self determination, though they differ on how Palestinian rights can be reconciled with the Israeli demands.

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More important, parties to the Arab Israeli conflict have developed a sort of an implicit understanding not to resort to the use of force as a means to solve their differences. However, the radical minorities on both sides still pose a substantial threat to the developing reconciliation. They could both obstruct the peace process and weaken the potentials for regional cooperation. Although the right wing in Israel is not necessarily opposing for regional cooperation, its reluctance to territorial concessions make look as if trying to have the cake and eat it at the same time. Arab radicals, on the other hand, oppose the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations even if a territorial compromise is to be reached. Although the governments currently in power in the different Middle Eastern countries belong to the moderate mainstream, they have to take into account the radical opposition, which slows down the process of regional cooperation.

Accepting and consolidating the Middle Eastern regional system of states, whether through abandoning the ambitious goals of Arab Nationalism or through the mutual acceptance between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, have helped developing a set of mutual expectations. The end of both radical Pan-Arabism and the denial attitude of Israel toward the Palestinian people finally brought to the Middle East the normative value of sovereignty. Sovereignty, the right to self determination, and the territorial state's legitimate national interest provide for the normative bases for today's regional system in the Middle East, the lack of which in the past contributed most to the troubled Middle East as the region has been known for years.

Even though full-fledged regional cooperation would rather wait for the peace process to be completed, the increasing levels of integration in the globalized world, which is experienced in the different countries, help qualify different countries for regional cooperation. It has been recognized by the group, however, that certain measures and levels of cooperation could be instrumental in facilitating the peace process. This is particularly important in the Arab-Israel conflict where the public opinion on both sides is ideologically and emotionally highly involved in the conflict and closely watching it. A middle of the road strategy between a full-fledged regional integration, on the one hand and the current state of affairs on the other is suggested. Normalization, which definitely is not equal to integration, could be the answer to the paradox of sequencing peace and integration. Gradual normalization is likely to strengthen the internationalist forces and allow an opportunity to explore the prospects of regional cooperation on more solid bases.

III. Beyond Power Politics

Governments in the Middle East are busy dealing with the day-to-day politics of the peace process. Laying the ground for regional cooperation should be an integral part of the peace process. This is particularly important considering the prevalent mind-set among the political elites in the region. Power politics remains the prevailing 'ideology' in decision-making circles and among the concerned public. Within this context, seeking spheres of influences rather than regional cooperation is likely to be main concern even when the peace process is concluded. Certain countries are likely to seek maintaining the dominance, or the special status they enjoy, over other countries in the region, which they have developed during the long years of conflict.

Such scenario is likely not only to jeopardize prospects for regional cooperation, but also risk renewing tension in the region. Since such scenario implies a great deal of injustice, and because it would restrict access to different countries and markets, the would be losers in such a game are likely to resist in a way that could be destabilizing to the entire region. The dynamics of Middle Eastern politics could be readily employed to serve the interests of the underdogs, specially if some of the major regional powers are among them, which is likely. Therefore, the current peace process in the Middle East should be upgraded to address the direct aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the future of the region in a more detailed, balanced and just way, where regional cooperation is allowed a chance for being at center stage in regional dynamics.

EuroMeSCo Working Groups Meeting

Rome, 15-16 October 1999

"Democracy and Human Rights"

Wijdan Ali

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

Theoretically speaking, democracy and human rights go hand in hand.
In practice however, they are not necessarily partners. In the West, the United
States is the most powerful and oldest of modern democracies as well as the
champion of human rights. It has a model constitution that guarantees
individual's duties and rights from every angle, though the civil rights issue is
still unresolved.

India is the largest democracy on earth whose system is based on
western developed democracy, yet discriminatory practices regarding the
untouchables (*dalits*) who are supposed to be protected by law are not in tune
with the democratic principles. Its feudal land system allows a peasant to lose
his and his family's civil liberties sometimes over a bag of rice and become a
slave for life to the landlord who has the right to rape his women and plunder
his village. Meanwhile, the practices of forced labor and child labor are
sanctioned through the blind eye that the authorities turn.

Is there something wrong with a democratic system where neither the
rich and powerful nor the poor and underdeveloped can reach a reasonably
acceptable standard of human rights practice within their societies!
Having said that, one should also remember that any mal-practice of human
rights does not necessarily reflect the shortcomings of a system alone but that

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of the practitioners as well. It should also be noted that there is not be one absolute form of democracy and human rights that can applicable to all nations on earth, regardless of their varied cultures. Concepts that concern the physical and spiritual well-being of man exist in each and every faith, philosophy and civilization. They might carry different variations in their mode of application yet they all meet on a broad common base.

Therefore it is imperative that an international framework of democracy be drawn. It should take into consideration the teachings of the various faiths and beliefs, which stress respect for human dignity and multicultural diversity within society, while respecting the geopolitical, economic and cultural circumstances and realities of each. There should not be one rigid form of democracy and one unbending set of human rights to be dictated by the strong to the poor according to the advantage of the first.

Let us take democracy in Islam as an example. The Islamic State was based on the concept of *ummah*, the body of Islamic community of peoples of different stocks and nations, regardless of ethnicity, race or color. It is a universal brotherhood that knows neither color nor ethnic identity. In its understanding, all men are equal, measurable only in terms of piety. If any one of its members acquires a new knowledge, wealth, or success, his/her duty is to share it with the other members of the community. The *ummah*, is the medium of knowledge, of ethics, of the caliphate (vice-regency) of man, and of world affirmation. It is a universal order comprising even those who are not Muslims. It is an order of peace, a *Pax Islamica*, perpetually open to all individuals and

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groups who accept the ideal of the freedom to convince and to be convinced of the truth; who seek a world order in which ideas, goods, wealth, or human bodies are free to move. In other words it includes freedom of expression, free debate and freedom of choice. In Islamic political literature, there is no such term as a 'minority' or a 'majority' group of population. The *millet* system safeguarded the rights of each ethnic or religious group within a larger framework made up of the different groups whose nominal political loyalty was foremost to the state represented by its head (the caliph or sultan). Simultaneously, each group's social and economic loyalty belonged to the *millet* itself to the extent that the social, economic and at times political promotion of an individual depended in the first place on his stature within his own *millet*.

The Prophet Muhammad in Madinah laid down the *Pax Islamica* in a permanent constitution fifteen centuries ago. He made it inclusive of the Jews of Madinah and the Christians of Najran, guaranteeing them their identity and their religious, social and cultural institutions. Hence, the *ummah* is a world order in addition to being a social order and the basis of Islamic civilization. It accords followers of other faiths such Zoroastrians, Buddhists and Hindus the same status, rights and obligations as peoples of the Book who are the Jews and Christians. It creates a *modus vivendi* that enables the non-Muslims to perpetuate themselves and acknowledges the legitimacy of every religious community, granting it the right to order its life in accordance with its own religious genius. Hence the continuing presence of minorities in the Muslim

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world. This type of acceptance of the other differs from the tolerance of modern times. It is abounding with respect and honor to religion, piety and virtue unlike contemporary tolerance - where such may be found- it is inbred with skepticism regarding the truth of religious claims, and cynicism and unconcern for religious values. Despotic rulers did exist in the Muslim world, but where they ruled both Muslim and non-Muslim suffered. Nowhere in the Islamic history, were non-Muslims singled out for persecution or prosecution for their adherence to their faiths.

Whenever there is malpractice in the field of human rights one should try and look into the reason behind it. Some modern states in the Middle East justify their malpractice as a means to combat violence and terrorism. In most cases violence is bred by injustice, be it unjust distribution of wealth, corruption at a high level, misinterpretation and misapplication of the law, or abuse of minority rights including women, children and ethnic minorities. Instead of getting to the root of the problem and rectifying it, authorities resort to extreme measures of suppression.

Who decides whether a country is democratic or not and how can one judge human rights on a universal basis? So far it is the big Western powers that pass judgment and recently these powers have filtered down to the United States who is quite selective in its discernment and punishment. What the South sees is a tolerance for a rigid micro-democracy that can fit a certain frame when the frame serves the interests of the powerful and those in power. Such uneven distribution of judgment, especially *vis-à-vis* issues and problems

related to the Middle East and the Arab world, creates a vicious circle of resentment and frustration, followed by despair and violence to be concluded with official harsh measures that invite punishment and sanctions. If the United States and the powerful North adopt a policy of macro-democracy that encompasses human rights and the respect for human dignity and equally apply it to all according to local religious and social convictions, leading to more resentment and frustration, it will then gain credibility and there will be a deliberate effort on the part of Arab governments to carefully watch their malpractice, knowing that they are all treated with the same objectivity among themselves and in comparison with others. Unless an impartial approach is adopted by the strong towards the weak, the weak will not accept the dictates of the strong nor will they adopt their ideologies.

EuroMeSCo

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BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE
EURO-MED CHARTER ON PEACE AND STABILITY

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report by the EuroMeSCo Working Group on the

Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability

rapporteur: Roberto Aliboni

Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI, Rome

second draft 8 October 1999

SUMMARY

FOREWORD

In its 1998-99 Workplan, EuroMeSCo established two main Working Groups, a first Group on "Sub-Regional Integration and Co-Operation in the Mediterranean" and a second one on "The Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability". The first Group's rapporteurs are Dr. Álvaro Vasconcelos, Director of the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais-IEEI, seated in Lisbon; Dr. Gamal A.G. Soltan, Senior Researcher at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies-CPSS, in Cairo; and Dr. Driss Khrouz, Director of the Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée-GERM, in Rabat. The second Group's rapporteur is Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies of the Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI, seated in Rome.

This Report has been generated by the Working Group on "The Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability". The members of the Working Group are the following:

- Dr. Stephen C. Calleya, Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies - MADS, University of Malta

- Dr. Jean-François Daguzan, Director of Studies, Fondation Méditerranéenne d'Etudes Stratégiques - FMES, Toulon; Senior Researcher, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

- Dr. Thanos Dokos, Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy - Eliamep, Athens

- Dr. Martín Ortega Carcelén, Senior Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Western European Union - ISS/WEU, Paris

- Prof. Natalino Ronzitti, Scientific Counsellor, IAI; Professor of International Law, LUISS University, Rome

- Dr. Mohammed Kadry Said, Senior Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies - CPSS, Cairo

- Prof. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, Director, Center for Asian Studies, and Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, University of Cairo

- Dr. Claire Spencer, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London; Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, University of Reading

- Dr. Radoslava Stefanova, Researcher, IAI, Rome

- Dr. Fred Tanner, Deputy Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy - GCSP, Geneva.

In drafting this Report, the rapporteur, Roberto Aliboni, has made reference to the papers generated by the members of the Group. These papers are listed in an annex to the Report. In the text, they are referred to in brackets and in italics.

Reference is also made to other papers commissioned by the EuroMeSCo Steering Committee, whose findings proved relevant to the Group on the Euro-Med Charter, namely:

Xenophobia, Migration and Mutual Perceptions, paper by Dr. Fifi Benaboud, Co-ordinator, Trans-Med Programme, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon;

International Implications of Domestically-Managed Security Issues, paper by Dr. George Joffé, Royal Institute of International Affairs - RIIA, London;

The Antipersonnel Landmines in the Mediterranean, paper by Dr. Elvira Sanchez Matéos, Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona.

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The Visas policies in Euro-Med relations, paper by Catherine Withol de Wenden, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques - CERI, Paris.

1. A FIRMER COMMON GROUND

1.1. Reshuffling priorities

The Conclusions of the April 1999 Euro-Med Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart defines the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability as the "instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration where issues of peace and stability are concerned". In fact, this functional task was assigned to the Charter ever since the latter was put forward, by mid-1996, to replace the Action Plan. The debate on the Charter which has unfolded to date, however, has made clear that the definition of the instruments to make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) work must be coupled by an important reshuffling of the priorities assumed by the Barcelona Declaration. To a good extent, what it has made clear is that such reshuffling is the real challenge for the EMP to survive and succeed. Such reshuffling doesn't exclude the perspective of co-operation in regard to hard security. Still, it renders the EMP an instrument to achieve co-operation in regard to soft security with an emphasis on partnership-building and conflict prevention, By this token, the drafting of the Charter overlaps to a great extent with the search for a firmer common ground, namely one more attuned than the initial common ground to the real political context and what exists of political will.

Most of the members of the Group built on the basic incongruities of the EMP and/or the changes in the regional political context which have exacerbated or created such incongruities. Others gave them for granted in dealing with challenges ahead. Thus, further to its normative and policy-oriented task, much of the work of the Group has revolved around the new directions and priorities the Charter should take on so that it comes to single out a workable common ground.

While the policy-oriented work of the Group, with a focus on Partnership-Building Measures, Conflict Prevention and Peace Support is presented in parts 2 and 3 of the Report, this first part considers a number of broad issues and directions with a view to an overall reshuffling of the EMP priorities and strategy.

In this revisionist perspective, first adopted by the June 1998 *ad hoc* Ministerial meeting of Palermo, the Group felt that it would be very important to allow for options to remain open, as much as they may be put off, this being the case for the establishment "at the appropriate time" of a co-operative security scheme concerning military factors or the accomplishment of conflict resolution tasks rather than prevention only. Albeit current common ground appears more reduced than it would need be in order to achieve in a shorter run the complex set of goals set forth by the Barcelona Declaration, in the Group members' view the EMP should commit itself over time to make some progress in its political will so as to achieve their early goals as well. Such perspective should be stated clearly in the Preamble of the Charter, thus coupling the planned reaffirmation of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.

1.2. Revising the political and institutional balance

The revision of priorities must be first and foremost directed at revising the political balance of the EMP so as to make it more a Partnership than it is today *[Selim; Spencer]*. In this sense such revision has two dimensions - one political and one institutional dimension - being the two sides of the same coin.

From the political point of view, since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration it emerged more and more clearly that there are different political and security agendas between EU and non-EU

Partners with respect to national security as well as human rights, democratisation and economic development. The prevailing Arab feeling, for instance, is that the EMP has been initiated and then managed by the EU with a rather exclusive view to its own stability concerns, thus overlooking Arab national security interests as well as other non-EU perceptions. The necessity to overcome this kind of EU unilateralism and reach out, with the Charter, an actually shared common ground was clearly pointed out by the Egyptian representative to the 19-20 March 1999 EuroMeSCo - Senior Officials Seminar organised in Bonn by the German Presidency and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. In the minutes generated by the latter, Amb. Fathi El-Shazly says that the "Barcelona process ... entered a crisis of identity that only ended when, in June 1998, 'we started a process of redefining ourselves'" [Block: 3].

This imbalance is reflected in the other relevant dimension, namely EMP's institutions [Aliboni 1999; de Guttry; Edwards, Philippart; Molnar]. According to one such authors:

> The EMP cannot be regarded as a distinctive organisation in which the EU participates. Rather it has to be seen as a multilateral and holistic extension of the Union's long-standing pluri-bilateral Mediterranean policy. In the Partnership, the Union gives non-EU Mediterranean countries nothing more than a limited co-management of its Mediterranean policy. In practice, all the non-EU Partners can do is either corroborate or oppose EU decisions. Their initiative is limited in that it is strongly conditioned by EU mechanisms for reaching consensus or otherwise making decisions in the framework of its CFSP. ... To correct this situation, some European governments are now proposing to reinforce the Euro-Med Committee by giving it full competence over initiatives and policies related to all three pillars of the EMP, in particular, the initiatives pertaining to the security and political partnership, presently rather secluded in the Senior Officials Committee. [Aliboni 1999].

Another important aspect of this institutional imbalance is the fact that the EMP secretariat is performed by the European Commission rather than by an EMP proper secretariat.

The unilateral character of the EMP and the overwhelming initiative upheld by the EU are pointed out in many passages of this Report as weakening factors of the EMP political cohesion as well as stumbling blocks in the essential confidence-building process. For this reasons, the Report's policy prescriptions are constantly inspired by the necessity to establish more inclusive decision-making procedures and processes (see, in particular, part 2 on the PBMs, and the suggestions relating to conflict prevention policies). Even with respect to the by-definition-unilateral MEDA's procedures, one member of the Group recommends that "One approach might also be to set up joint commissions composed of an EU and in-country membership, not only to oversee small funding initiatives but also to sustain a continuing two-way process of communication between the EU and individual southern partners on a variety of 'partnership-building' issues" [Spencer].

The "Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability" approved by the EMP Ministers in Stuttgart (hereafter "Guidelines") don't build on "Institutions" nor on the procedures which would regulate "Joint Operations". The final draft of the Charter, however, will have to give a response on this points, from the political as well as institutional point of view. A political statement about the need of well-balanced institutional and decision-making frameworks would be in order, as obvious as it may appear in principle. Some institutional revisions, adopted by the Charter, should substantiate that statement.

Which institutional revisions? In the Group, EMP institutions were not explored in themselves or in specific detail. Attention was paid, however, to institutional and organisational instruments to make the Charter work. In this respect, the most relevant indication of this Report concerns the

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strengthening and more regular character the Euro-Med Committee should assume so as to become an instrument for the enhanced political dialogue and conflict prevention policy-making (see section 3.1.1). In a previous EuroMeSCo work [Aliboni 1999], this indication was included in a set of reforms which are worth being recalled herewith:

> (a) there should be one institutional layer under the Conference of Ministers (the Euro-Med Committee) in which the substance of the Partnership is secured by giving all Partners similar capacities of initiative, decision and control; to that purpose, the work of the Euro-Med Committee should be more regular and extensive - similarly to the OSCE's Permanent Committee - and should be supported by a Secretariat of its own, as light as it may be;

> (b) the chair of the Senior Officials Committee should revolve among all Partners;

> (c) there should be areas related to the political and security partnership in which the EMP is able to implement its own decisions (e.g. CBMs, conciliation procedures, etc.); or, were this prove unfeasible, to retain a collegial possibility of directing and monitoring implementation by EU bodies;

> (d) some measures (such as those just mentioned), should be financed by making the necessary MEDA funds available to the EMP's (or Senior Officials') Presidency and the latter accountable to the Commission for their use.

With respect to the Secretariat, the broad EuroMeSCo's mood is for making some more autonomous organisational resources available to the EMP. One member of the Group *[Daguzan]* suggests a light Secretariat on the line of the former secretary-general of the EU Council of Ministers or the Chief Secretary of the Eureka Programme. The same member, however, maintains that an increased secretarial role of the DG1B would be desirable. A majority in the Group would point out that such DG1B's increased role is part of the problem rather than of its solution, however.

1.3. Soft security and the Charter's normative character

Following the "big change" impressed to the Partnership by the Ministers in Palermo, the lead to the EMP's reshuffling is now provided by shifts in emphasis from hard to soft security and partnership-building.

What do these shifts entail in substantive terms? The papers generated by the Group show that EU and non-EU interpretations are backed up by different basic perspectives. In Southern perspectives, partnership-building is regarded as a process of political co-operation where a number of soft security issues, like terrorism or migration, are dealt with in strict inter-state terms and on a case-by-case basis, thus minimising interferences with domestic factors. In this perspective, all the political dialogue provided by the Charter would amount to is a kind of macro-confidence-building measure *[Aliboni]* geared to create a partnership that today is not there. This vision doesn't rule out some functionalities, but it assigns the EMP a fundamentally reduced task with respect to its chances of taking action.

The EU perspective seems more complex and far-reaching. Partnership-building means that political co-operation has to be upgraded with a view to strengthening the broad and long-term foundations of security (put in other words: establishing the conditions for a long-term policy of conflict prevention) by achieving sustainable development, political democracy and good governance. In this sense, the EMP is now seated on a broader and longer-term notion of security

(quite distant from any notion of hard security) but, on the other hand, on a closer relation between security- and democracy-building. Such closer relation entails an as much closer interplay between inter-state and intra-state frameworks, for regional security gets dependent on a set of domestic processes of democratisation.

The difference between the two perspectives triggers questions on the future of the EMP which are not pertinent to this Report. Independently on their impact on future developments, these emerging perspectives raise specific questions which affect the Charter's possible format which, on the contrary, must be tackled here. A first question is to what extent military factors must be excluded from the picture or put off (as suggested by the "Guidelines") "at the appropriate time". A second question, put forward by Spencer *[Spencer]* and Joffé [1998; 1999], regards the way democracy-building processes have to be articulated, whether through straight political reform or the strengthening of the rule of law and good governance. A third question, raised by Tanner *[Tanner]* concerns the relationship between security- and democracy building. Needless to say, the second and third questions relate to the EU-held perspective and come to suggestions for the Charter's format that could result divisive.

On the first question, several members of the Group wanted to look ahead to some more distant kinds of security co-operation, for example in the field of conflict management *[Calleya on the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre]* and military-related CBMs/CSBMs *[Said]*. It is noteworthy that one such perspectives comes from the South. Mohammed Kadry Said says that "The top-down political process of the Charter has to take into account and benefit from the bottom up process of the existing [military and military-related security] measures". Other members of the Group have reflected on the way military factors may be instrumental to non-military ones. In section 2.2 the notion of PBMs-attendant CBMs is discussed. In part 3 a set of measures of military nature are taken into consideration as factors in the EMP conflict prevention policy-making. The response of the Group to the first question seems in line with the idea that the EMP is undergoing a process of shifts in emphases rather than a change in its tasks. This response suggests that the Charter, while postponing a number of tasks to the appropriate time, should take note that the notion of comprehensive security it seems willing to retain prominently includes military factors as well and that a reminder of the non-military use of military factors might be in order.

Still, the Group proved largely in tune with the shift to soft security and partnership-building. In what follows of this Report, the Group's inputs on these points are referred to in part 2, devoted to PBMs, and the sections on conflict prevention in part 3.

Coming now to the second question, what must be stressed is the response provided by Group's members to the relative weight the EMP should attribute to components of soft security as diverse as democracy, the rule of law, good governance and accountability. This point is fairly important, for in the debates which have brought about the necessity of revising the EMP's common ground, North-South differences about the varying soft security components were no less important (and divisive) than those about the relative role hard and soft security had to play.

One member of the Group *[Spencer]* has elaborated on the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, pointing out the strategic importance of the latter with respect to the achievement of the former: "An ... approach, and one already subscribed to under MEDA Democracy as well as the Stuttgart Chairman's Conclusions is to concentrate the multilateral focus of the EMP on the promotion of the rule of law. In many ways, the creation of a legal framework is a precondition for ensuring the rights of citizens, including their rights to due process through independent courts. A concentration on the rule of law, as precursor to democracy, could also serve to promote the effective separation of powers within existing governments, as well as submitting the region's military to civil, if not yet democratic, scrutiny".

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Also, Spencer recalls what George Joffé [1998; 1999] has said about the relevance of the rule of law in the field of Euro-Med economic and financial co-operation - including the attraction of private foreign investment:

> The demands of economic restructuring also involve demands for administrative reorganisation and greater financial transparency, These, in turn, often threaten the vested interests of elites within the private sector who also form part of the governing elite. As a result, the economic requirements of the Barcelona Process are having significant effects on the process of government ... Although this process is still in its infancy ... it could also have a more profound and irresistible long-term effect that might contribute significantly towards more accountable and transparent government in the region ...

What these remarks do suggest is that the intrusive and abstract demand from the North for introducing democracy in the South should be replaced by more detailed and substantive understandings on the establishment of legal rules, good governance and accountability. Agreements to gradually establish such rules would amount to an incremental process of democratisation over time. At the same time, they may prove easier to be negotiated and stipulated. This focus on the steps to democracy rather than their end-result should be received and articulated by the Charter.

As for the third question, Tanner has highlighted in his paper *[Tanner]* the relationship between good governance and the military realm, by suggesting that the EMP may help narrowing the democratic gap resulting from the distorted role of the military in many Mediterranean polities by looking at such gap in a good governance perspective. He stresses the need of the democratic control of armed forces or civil-military relations and points out very aptly that "The question of civil-military relations in the security sector is intrinsically linked to liberalisation and democratisation, economic performance and legitimacy of power".

In these analyses, good governance - a concept put forward by the Guidelines" for the first time in the brief history of the Charter's debate- emerges as a focal factor together with the rule of law. How can the Charter give prominence and substance to the achievement of good governance and the rule of law? This is a key-question not only in itself but also because these tasks are shared by the Partners only in different contexts, with different purposes and with strong ambiguities. Furthermore, it must be noted that whichever understanding about good governance and the rule of law is bound to have an intra-state impact, thus incurring in a well-known stumbling block in the brief history of the EMP attempts at co-operation.

The only way out is an early understanding on the <u>normative character of the Charter</u>. In this sense, the establishment of rules or codes of conduct would become the fundamental task of the Charter or, to be more precise, its mechanism of political dialogue. On the normative character of the Charter have insisted the representative of France, Ambassador Courtois, at the occasion of the previously mentioned meeting in Bonn between EuroMeSCo and the EMP Senior Officials [Block: 6], as well as Fred Tanner in the EuroMeSCo Group. That the Charter would play a normative function means that there will be negotiations on specific kind of conduct to be regulated (civil-military relations; economic competition; etc.). Some monitoring would also be needed. Even without entering into much detail, the Charter should very clearly assert its normative task and reinforce its institutional framework accordingly.

1.4. Conflict prevention and conflict resolution

The Group's members resulted substantially unanimous in looking at conflict prevention as the most important and natural task of the EMP, particularly if the reshuffling initiated at Palermo is taken into consideration. Both the enhanced political co-operation and the partnership-building tasks which the Charter is expected to pursue have been regarded as the foundations of a conflict prevention policy. Such policy would characterise the EMP and give it a distinctive task with respect to other political and security organisations dealing with the same and adjoining areas.

Peace support operations could well couple preventative policies. All in all, however, the new common ground that the Charter is expected to reflect, while not ruling out peace support operations, was thought to be rather limitative in their respect, especially with respect to peace enforcement. Tanner has stressed in his paper *[Tanner]* that peace-building seems more fitting with the EMP than peace operations. In this sense post-conflict rehabilitation operations should be attuned with EMP capacities. Peace support is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.

As already mentioned in the above, one member of the Group has maintained that the Charter should be characterised by a mandate to conflict resolution if it is to reflect Arab aspirations *[Selim]*. His paper suggests that the achievement of the Charter's objectives, as stated in the Stuttgart "Guidelines", "necessarily entails the resolution of the major conflicts among Euro-Mediterranean actors as no common values or shared principles will be reached between actors who are in conflict" (in the words of the "Guidelines" the Charter "will aim to ... promote common values and shared principles").

This point must be understood as an expression of the Arab concern about the risk that security co-operation in the Mediterranean may detract from concentrating efforts on solving the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Middle East or give Israel undue gains. Selim says that his point "does not necessarily mean that the EMP will replace present frameworks of conflict resolution, but rather its involvement in process leading to such resolution at least by making its stand clear on the issues". While the Charter could hardly contradict the crucial statement of the Barcelona Declaration whereby the Partners have stipulated to abstain from interfering with existing conflict resolution processes, the request of a clear stand on the issue refers to a sensible political question which should be addressed, however, less to the EMP than to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

All in all, a successful scheme of conflict prevention and partnership-building addressing the root political, economic and cultural causes of instability and conflict across the Mediterranean would certainly be in itself an important contribution to the solution of the Arab-Israeli and other ongoing conflict in the region without detracting from the national security of any Partner in the EMP.

1.5. Fragmentation, Security Indivisibility and Differentiation

In the EMP framework, joint action and policy-making must be multilateral in their application and scope so as to fit the task of establishing a joint scheme of security co-operation in which security is indivisible. The Stuttgart "Guidelines" for the Euro-Med Charter very clearly point out the "indivisibility of security".

This multilateral character is difficult to attain in a context as fragmented as the Euro-Med one. Unlike Cold War Europe and the Middle East today, the Euro-Med area is not a bloc-to-bloc context [Spencer 1997]: (a) there are a number of unrelated sub-regional conflicts, particularly in the South-South dimension; (b) national security agendas are largely differentiated; (c) the nature of threats, risks and perceptions in the South-South sphere is substantively different from that prevailing in the North-South context. In EMP experience so far, the multilateral application of

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measures or policies has regularly clashed with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab's already-pointed-out unwillingness to establish any kind of economic or security co-operation with Israel before peace is attained. It may be easily foreseen that similar problems can come up with respect to Partners involved in other, admittedly less acute disputes in the Euro-Med framework.

Variable geometry may well be a response to such challenges, provided the variability doesn't undermine the basic cohesion of the body concerned. Variable geometry is a normal practice in the EU, where it has proven to be a good tactical device in situations of political crisis or impasse, making progress possible in the longer term. In this sense, while the principle of the indivisibility of security must remain the natural pillar of the security co-operation the Partners want to achieve, several members of the Group *[Daguzan; Spencer; Tanner]* have supported the idea that some flexibility must be introduced (and perhaps mentioned in the text of the Charter).

One kind of flexibility could be provided by adhesion on a voluntary basis to specific policies or measures which do not involve principles or the basic mechanisms of the Partnership. Such flexibility has already been adopted, for example in the case of the only semi-operational CBM approved so far by the EMP, i.e. "Co-operation between Civil Protection Services"[1]: For the time being, adhesion to this CBM is on a voluntary basis. Another important kind of flexibility has been suggested by the 1997 EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [EuroMeSCo: V 12], on the basis of suggestions previously made with respect to the ACRS, and then reiterated by individual analysts [Tanner: 22; Spencer 1997 & 1998a, who repeatedly speaks of the necessity of a differentiated "sub-regional" approach]. The "differentiation of circles" that the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report pointed out as a negotiating as well as an implementing principle can still be helpfully quoted [V d]:

> As in the EMP there are actually different strategic circles not necessarily related to one another, some kind of differentiation could be introduced in the implementation of CBMs: transparency and CBMs in one of such circles could be endorsed by all the members of the EMP, though subsequently implemented in their diverse respective frameworks.

In addition to the principle of "differentiation", that of "sequencing" has also been mentioned by Tanner [22] and the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [V 14]. Basically it refers to sequences in the field of arms control and limitation: their suggestions are to eliminate sequencing between CBMs/CSBMs and arms control, on one hand, and to accept sequencing across issue areas (for example between a military CBM and economic measures), on the other. While sequencing between CBMs-CSBMs and arms control is irrelevant with respect to the PBM concept introduced by the Palermo Chairman's Conclusions, issue-linkages and related appropriate sequencing may fit well with the partnership-building task of the EMP as it was redefined by the ministers in Palermo.

The Stuttgart "Guidelines" seems to envisage the introduction of some flexibility where they foresee consideration, in the next versions, of a heading on "Other provisions" relating to groups of countries in special situations. A specific proposal was made by one member of the Group [Daguzan] to introduce in the EMP light institutional setting a kind of reinforced political co-operation along the lines stipulated by articles J-1, 3 and J-3 in the Maastricht Treaty.

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[1] Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Co-operation between Civil Protection Services*, Information Note No. 32, in www.euromed.net.

1.6. The Charter in a crowded environment

The Mediterranean area is crowded by more or less effective international organisations dealing with co-operation in various fields. These organisation may appear less effective than one would wish. Still, they made and continue to make helpful contributions to economic development as well as security and other areas of international co-operation. Other essential contributions come from NGOs and the civil societies. The EMP must be very open towards both these contributions. Its normative character should take advantage of the important corpus of norms and rules set out by other co-operative organisation like the OSCE or the ACRS or the Arab League. It should be open not only to their norms but also to joint operations, for instance in the field of peace-keeping *[Tanner]*. The EMP's perspective being hardly operational, it would be wise to join forces and tasks with more operational bodies or to use co-operation with such bodies to make the EMP more operational.

This openness towards co-operation with other organisations should be explicitly contemplated by the Charter. It would help the Charter to acquire flexibility and credibility.

2. PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING MEASURES

In the Barcelona Declaration the achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability is strongly predicated on the introduction of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). The *ad hoc* Ministerial conference held in Palermo on 4-5 June 1999 set out the goal of establishing first and foremost Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs). This entails important consequences for EMP policy-making.

The introduction of PBMs is not meant to replace that of CBMs, but to make the notion and purpose of CBMs more fitting with the general goals the EMP wants to pursue. What the Palermo decisions point out is that Euro-Med security must be attained primarily by building partnership. In this process of partnership-building, confidence remains a key factor [EuroMeSCo], but measures to attain the latter must be of a scope and have a purpose quite different from those pertaining to European [Aliboni] as well as Middle Eastern [Kemp; Selim] experiences - in the CSCE/OSCE and the ACRS respectively.

In fact, in Cold War Europe the process of confidence-building was strictly related to the management of military conflict. The same is true with today's attempts to bring peace to the Middle East. On the contrary, in Euro-Mediterranean relations the military dimension is unimportant and fragmented [EuroMeSCo; Spencer 1997], for there is no conflict in the North-South sphere and conflicts in the South-South sphere are unrelated to one another. Euro-Med security relations are characterised by political differences and socio-economic tensions rather than by military conflict. To be overcome, these differences and tensions require a partnership-building process in which confidence takes on much more significance than military factors or conflict.

2.1. Conceptualising PBMs

An early definition of PBMs was provided by Brauch as "political measures primarily in the economic but also in the ecological realm which have a positive impact on the societal and cultural level" [Brauch: 274]. Brauch and Sainz de la Peña [245] also anticipated an important kind of PBMs by pointing out the necessity to establish "tolerance furthering measures" or "exchange-furthering measures", which would be directed at overcoming existing mutual "enemy" images. In fact, PBMs may go well beyond the economic and ecological realms and include cultural and social as well as political aspects.

While CBMs and CSBMs have largely been conceptualised, there is no such conceptualisation of the definition of PBMs. For such a conceptualisation to be initiated, the precursors of a partnership-building process must be explored. This exploration would involve, first of all, the basic security aims and perceptions that affect Partners and make them interested in the EMP. The identification of basic political and security "common grounds" between the Partners would, in turn, allow for the conceptualisation of a set of PBM categories or tasks the EMP Partners could share to some degree. Finally, the identification of these categories or tasks would make it possible to single out specific PBMs more easily and systematically.

2.1.1. Aims and perceptions

To explore security aims and perceptions, three groups of Partners have to be taken into consideration: the Arab countries; Israel; and the European countries. In the European group, countries like Cyprus and Malta, with a more or less controversial aspiration to become EU members, have to be included. Turkey's posture in some ways resembles that of Cyprus and Malta.

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Still, the uncertainty of the future relationship between the EU and Turkey makes the Turkish position towards the EMP somehow ambivalent [Tayfur].

Arab security perceptions [Aliboni 1998] are shaped by the unresolved conflict with Israel and a strong aspiration to preserve political and cultural identities with respect to Western intrusiveness. These aims are jeopardised by the Western unilateralism objectively embedded in post-Cold War international relations, the risk of coercion such unilateralism brings about and the interdiction effects these risks entail. In terms of security, what the Arab Partners expect from their participation in the EMP is a more equal and important relationship with the EU which would (a) enhance and strengthen their international status with respect to other geopolitical areas of European concern; (b) stimulate European interest towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and prevent the possibility of an EU drift toward Israel; (c) provide an institutionalised political co-operation in which the Arabs would have a say and a chance to contain possible unilateral tendencies by the EU and the Western alliances to which the EU members belong; (d) provide a forum of co-operation in which European factors with an impact on domestic situations (xenophobia triggered by migration; pressures to comply with Western-promoted human rights; etc.) may be either shaped or contained.

Israeli expectations are in some respect similar to Arab ones, though such expectations are deemed less important with respect to national security. What Israel expects from the EMP is (a) to prevent a European drift towards the Arab world; (b) to establish a principle of political co-operation with the EU in view of the new regional balance of power which achievement of the peace process would bring about.

As for the Europeans, security perceptions are dictated by a number of spillover effects generated by the various kinds of instabilities that affect, in particular, Arab Partners and Turkey. From the EMP they expect (a) in the middle-longer term, an attenuation of these instabilities (essentially as a consequence of the economic development and political reform the EMP is assumed to foster); (b) in the shorter term, more effective control of the domestic impact deriving from spillover effects. One important result that the EU expects from the EMP is the reinforcement of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Mediterranean security space being one of the more [Lesser 1999; Lenzi & Martin] or less [Spencer 1998a] important components of the definition of the European security space in combination with other adjoining geopolitical spaces. In this sense, the EU – like the Arabs – is expecting an upgrading of its international status from the EMP. In this status-upgrading perspective, what makes the Mediterranean important to the EU is that in this area, unlike central-eastern Europe or Russia, transatlantic links are somewhat blurred and Europe's feelings about its security identity and tasks are stronger.

A set of Euro-Mediterranean shared tasks or common grounds can be discerned from this analysis: (a) respective enhancement and/or reinforcement of international political status; (b) assurances against unilateral actions and marginalisation; (c) indirect control over and assurances against external factors affecting domestic stability. All in all, another broader target shared by the EMP Partners can be defined as (d) the attainment of greater mutual trust or confidence. Greater mutual trust is not only a broad objective of the EMP but, at the same time, a broad condition for any common ground to be achieved. Above and beyond the different kinds of perceptions and aims that characterise the structure of Euro-Med relations, for historical as well as political reasons, the role of mistrust in these relations is paramount. Hence the primary importance of transparency in building a partnership in this area.

2.1.2. A PBMs Typology: common grounds and functions

The common grounds just pointed out provide an indication of the privileged areas in which partnership can be sought and built up. Consequently, PBMs have to refer primarily to these areas and can be divided into three broad categories:

- *status-enhancing measures*, allowing Partners to reinforce, enhance and reassure their international status;

- *reassuring measures*, providing Partners with assurances against and improved control over external and internal factors affecting national security and domestic stability;

- *broad partnership-building measures*, geared to enhancing partnership, exchanges and mutual trust in every possible political, social, economic and cultural field.

In another perspective, PBMs can be identified according to their basic functional purpose:

- *information measures*, providing information and transparency through measures largely similar in their mechanism to CSCE-like CBMs of declaratory nature;

- *communication measures*, providing information exchanges by means of some regular background or infrastructure, thus leading to forms and networks of institutionalised or institution-like contacts among governments as well as non-governmental organisations;

- *access measures*, directly or indirectly providing Partners with an enhanced political role internationally and regionally as well as better control over and management of external and internal factors affecting national security or domestic stability;

- *co-operation measures*, fostering co-operation in every possible fields with a view to enhancing mutual trust and confidence.

Needless to say, specific measures may be multi-functional, that is, directed toward the achievement of various objectives, e.g. both access and information. Unlike CBMs and CSBMs relating to the European experience [Darilek] and the ACRS Middle Eastern agenda [Feldman; Jentleson], PBMs exclude any kind of "constraint measures", at least for the time being.

2.2. Military-Related CBMs Working as PBMs

As increasing emphasis is being put on the EMP as a political process essentially relying on non-military PBMs, the April 1999 "Guidelines" postpone the establishment of military or military-related CBMs to an "appropriate time".

The absence of military conflict in Euro-Med relations is what makes CBMs almost irrelevant in the EMP framework. It cannot be overlooked, however, that military threats and risks contribute to shaping perceptions even in today's EMP, particularly on the Arab side. As already pointed out, Arab perceptions of the overwhelming Northern military power as well as Western tendencies towards unilateralism are one important reason for Arab interest in the Euro-Med Partnership. While the EMP is expected to be a process of political co-operation predicated on the implementation of a number of PBMs, there is no doubt that the military roots of these perceptions call for a confidence-building process similar to those experienced in Europe and other violent conflict-prone spheres. These CBMs may be part of the "reassuring" set of PBMs mentioned above or they may be instrumental to their implementation. Thus, CSCE-like CBMs must be taken into consideration, though in the EMP they would work less like traditional mechanisms and more in the PBM logic.

Surely there are limits to such CBMs working in a PBM logic. First of all, in the present political context they can hardly be directed at performing a structural function (i.e. opening the way to

measures of arms control or limitation) or setting "constraints" on Partners' military policies and conduct (as the Vienna-like CSBMs). They will generally be declaratory and, to some extent, operational.

Second, a more or less severe limitation to these military or military-related CBMs comes from the existence within the EMP area of unsolved sub-regional conflicts [Tanner: 13]. Because of the multilateral character of the EMP, the acceptance of CBMs in the Euro-Med context may surreptitiously introduce such CBMs in South-South (or even North-South and North-North) contexts in which CBMs are undesired or premature. This is certainly the case with the Arab policy rebuffing the establishment of CBMs in the Arab-Israeli framework. Within the context of the Western Sahara dispute, this question is less acute but might be raised. Problems may also arise from the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, for instance in case there were attempts to multilateralise maritime CBMs or even PBMs relating to the regime of the sea and its resources (though one cannot exclude that things might work the other way round and make acceptable in the EMP context what is normally not in bilateral relations).

In conclusion, the fact that there are military and military-related perceptions at the origins of the EMP political process, in addition to other more important political motives, makes it possible to use CSCE-like CBMs to make PBMs work. Though the mechanics and content of these CBMs will be similar to those employed in other contexts to avoid military conflict and pave the way for arms control and limitation, their task will be very different. For, in the EMP context CBMs will be subservient to specific processes of partnership-building; that is, they will be PBM-attendant CBMs. This political subservience excludes the introduction of structural CBMs but allows for declaratory and, to a lesser extent, operational CBMs. In a more general way, their use will be limited by the existence of unresolved sub-regional conflicts.

2.3. A Tentative List of PBMs

The principles and tasks illustrated in the above with respect to PBMs, the possible working of PBM-attendant CBMs or CSBMs, and the possible application of principles relating to differentiation of circles and issue-linkages in establishing sequencesdiscussed in section 1.4, can be used in setting out suggestions for the establishment of PBMs. In the following, on the basis of the typologies outlined above, a tentative list of PBMs is drafted.

2.3.1. Status-Enhancing Measures

2.3.1.1. EURO-MED MIDDLE EAST INFORMATION GATHERINGS - The purpose of this measure would be to provide regular information on policies and events relating to the Middle East. Information would regard current events and related policies and would be provided on a voluntary basis in *ad hoc* gatherings of invited parties willing to provide information. Information would not be followed by discussion or even questions. Still, discussing and questioning would be possible in case the parties concerned were available or wished to get reactions from Partners. Information would be provided in gatherings rather than in an *ad hoc* group so as to stress the informal and voluntary character of the exercise. The Partners, however, would endorse such gatherings as part of regular and official EMP activities.

The regular and official character of these gatherings would be their most important feature. In fact, despite its name, from a functional vantage point, this status-enhancing measure would be less about information than about access. Its rationale would be to provide the Partners, in particular the EU and its members, a privileged Euro-Med space to keep in touch with political events that strongly affect the EMP but are dealt with separately by Partners. This situation mostly concerns

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and is particularly important with respect to the Middle East process, but it also regards other issues, such as developments in Iraq.

Such gatherings could take place at 27 or between the non-EU Partners and the new EU *troika*. In a sense, this PBM could be interpreted as an extension and specialisation of the mechanism for political dialogue, though such an interpretation could prove detrimental to both the mechanism of political dialogue and the PBM in question. The gatherings should be clearly distinguished from the EMP's existing Committees, so as to give them more visibility and help strengthen the status-enhancing functionality this PBM would be expected to perform. In compliance with the broad structure of the EMP, the gatherings would be chaired by the EU Presidency. Its distinctive character, however, would allow for a rotating or *ad hoc* chair, a measure that would have a positive side-effect on the broad political cohesion of the Partnership. The PBM in question would be reinforced by the release of press-communiqués by the gathering's Chairperson.

It would be up to the parties or the managerial ability of the Chairperson whether or not these gatherings take on a preventive function as well. However, such a function should not (and for the time cannot) be deliberately attached to the PBM in question. A preventive function could emerge spontaneously over time as a result of the effectiveness of the PBM or specific circumstances.

2.3.1.2. RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - All EMP Partners are concerned about and in many cases involved in post-conflict management operations in the Western Balkans. In this area, some EU and non-EU Partners are contributing essentially (though not only) to peace support operations under the umbrella of the United Nations and the guidance of such regional security organisations as NATO and the OSCE. On the other hand, the EU is pursuing a number of efforts of civilian and economic post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation under the aegis of the United Nations (as in Bosnia Herzegovina and now in Kosovo, where it has taken responsibility for the fourth pillar of UNMIK and to that purpose has established the European Agency for Reconstruction). At the same time, in a more political and security perspective, the EU has also initiated an action of its own through the Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe, in which the civilian and socio-economic component is bound to be pivotal.

The EU's important role in civilian and economic post-conflict management operations in this region may give way to the establishment of a PBM in the EMP framework. The purpose of this PBM would concern non-EU Partners' participation in the planning and implementation of the civilian and socio-economic operations that the EU-led effort of reconstruction in the area is expected to set in motion.

This PBM would be directed first of all at enhancing non-EU Partners' status by increasing access to one of the most politically sensitive peace operations in today's European area. While elements of joint monitoring would associate non-EU Mediterranean Partners in the planning of the processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation, in the implementation stage this PBM could give way to a cluster of specific co-operation measures in the field of social, cultural and community rehabilitation, such as joint training or the rehabilitation of education systems.

Beside access, joint Euro-Med work under this PBM would include important factors of information and transparency. In the eyes of non-EU Mediterranean Partners, notably Arab (and Turkish) peoples, transparency in reconstruction in South Eastern Europe, especially the Western Balkans, would help dispel suspicions with respect to political and military developments that have been regarded by many of them as a Western and European attempt at hegemony and domination in the region.

In the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Special Co-ordinator appointed by the EU "will be responsible for promoting achievement of Pact's objectives ... in close co-operation with the

governments and relevant institutions of the countries, in particular other interested associated countries of the European Union, as well as relevant international organisations and institutions concerned". This agenda seems to allow for consultations with the individual associated Mediterranean countries and institutions such as the EMP. Whatever the interpretation of this passage, it would be better to organise Euro-Med consultations and possibly joint action within the EMP in relation only to civilian and economic affairs and the varying efforts currently being conducted by the EU.

An intergovernmental Standing Group within Euro-Med should thus be established to monitor events and put forward proposals to the Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona Process. The EU Presidency would then provide co-ordination with the different EU bodies (the European Agency for Reconstruction, the Special Co-ordinator of the Pact, etc.) involved in the management of reconstruction and rehabilitation in South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

2.3.1.3. STUDY GROUP ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SPACE - EU commitment in the EMP as well as broader EU relations with the Middle East are destined to become a common strategy in the sense given to this expression by Art. J3 of the Amsterdam Treaty. In fact, a common strategy towards the Mediterranean is being prepared by the Union's institutions.

The purpose of this PBM would be to give the non-EU Mediterranean Partners a role and first-hand information in a policy-planning process which is bound to affect their national security and regional relations. This purpose would be achieved by setting up a Euro-Med Group to study the Mediterranean dimension of the European Security Space in parallel with the EU's work to shape its common strategy. In this Group, the EU Presidency and the new *troika* would provide information about the work and the orientations carried out in the EU institutions. The non-EU Partners would be asked to provide comments and recommendations before the EU draws up its conclusions. Though non-EU comments and recommendations would obviously have a non-binding character, the process would increase Mediterranean Partners' access, dispel and prevent mistrust and provide reassurance.

This PBM includes all three components of the PBM typology (status-enhancing; reassurance; and broad partnership-building). Its most important feature is that comments and recommendations are requested before EU decisions are made, in a process of mutual investigation and information. This feature and the focus on Euro-Med security interaction should make the exercise more effective and sensible than the one on the European Security Model carried out in the OSCE.

The Group would in principle be an emanation of the Senior Officials Committee, in which the EU would be represented by its new *troika*. However, as this PBM amounts to a study Group committed to articulating a reflection, it lends itself well to combining official and non-governmental contributions. In this sense, participation of the EuroMeSCo network or other NGOs could be envisaged and would help to reinforce the impact and scope of the PBM.

Needless to say, study Groups like the one suggested here could be established on other topics or processes affecting Mediterranean concerns, e.g. if and when the EU commits itself to setting out a common strategy on Central Asia or the Persian Gulf.

2.3.1.4. EURO-MED STANDING GROUP ON AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA - For all EMP members, Africa South of Sahara is an important political and economic partner. For the North African countries participating in the EMP (and Libya) the OAU is an important political arena with considerable impact on national security and sometimes even internal affairs. For the EU, Africa South of Sahara is a relevant economic partner and a factor of political involvement for historical reasons. With respect to Africa South of Sahara, the European and non-European members of the EMP have

different *atouts* and special relations which could be mutually beneficial in increasing access and prestige.

On a good number of occasions, Africa South of Sahara has already invited peace support operations where positive collaboration between European and Arab countries emerged [Kühne, Lenzi, Vasconcelos]. However, this status-enhancing PBM would not be geared to a kind of Euro-Arab "strategic co-operation" towards Africa South of Sahara. Its purpose would be to create a Standing Group in the EMP tasked with informing other Partners about the outlook of and policies towards Africa South of Sahara. This would prepare the ground for some direct or indirect operational co-ordination and present the sub-Saharan partners with a Euro-Med co-operative dimension.

This Standing Group could be arranged as a specialised gathering of the Euro-Med Senior Officials Committee with procedures similar to those of the Euro-Med gatherings on the Middle East. Like the latter, the Standing Group on Africa South of Sahara includes the germs of joint preventive actions.

2.3.2. Reassuring Measures

2.3.2.1. STANDING LIAISON WITH EUROFORCES - As is well known, the establishment of Euroforces, in particular the Euro Maritime Force (Euromarfor), has been strongly criticised by a number of Arab Partners. Euroforces have been set up by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain as a contribution to the development of a European defence identity. For the time being, it is less a military than a political move, pertaining to the European and transatlantic circle rather than any other specific area, let alone the Mediterranean or the Middle East. A European analyst has defined Euromarfor as an "empty gesture" [Pugh: 12]. Still, the Euroforces and Euromarfor are part of a set of initiatives of Western and European alliances triggering perceptions of threat in the Arab world of the kind illustrated in section 2.1.1 of this Report.

Along with other developments involved in the re-organisation of European and Western armed forces (like Navocformed, Stanavformed, the Helios satellite, etc.) [Lesser 1993; Ben Salem; El Dessouqi], the Euroforces remind the Arab countries of their military weakness and division with respect to Europe and the West. In the post-Cold War context, they see them as - to use the familiar CSCE conceptual framework relating to "defence sufficiency" and "non-offensive defence"- Western or European "illegitimate defence requirements" giving way to "legitimate security concerns".

The perception of European unilateralism underlying the Arabs' Euromarfor vision could give way to a unilateral EU CSBM of the kind of PBM-attendant-CSBM illustrated in section 2.2 above. This CSBM/PBM would create a standing Mediterranean liaison unit at Euroforces/Euromarfor headquarters, composed of a limited number of non-EU Euro-Med officers (acting on an individual/national basis). This measure, anticipated in 1997 by the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [V f] and subsequently by Spencer [1997] and Calleya [1999], has an information as well as an access function, the latter being far more important than the former.

The PBM in question could be completed and consolidated by a cluster of CBMs/CSBMs relating to what exists of EU military capacities in the WEU [Aliboni 1998]. These measures have already been put forward in recent years by successive WEU Presidencies. In December 1997, the German WEU Presidency organised a visit to the Torrejón Satellite Centre for the non-WEU Mediterranean countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The visit by the same countries to the Planning Cell in Brussels (May 1998), organised under the Greek Presidency, achieved the same result of establishing a principle of transparency and information.

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The WEU satellite capacity is regarded by Mediterranean Arabs as part of the EU/Western military power threatening their national security. It is therefore part and parcel of the issue already discussed above. The Euro-Med liaison unit should therefore be given some form of expanded access, by providing for some kind of access for non-EU Euro-Med Partners to WEU/EU satellite and planning operations. As we are talking about PBM-attendant CBMs, what comes to the forefront here is less the potential of the Planning Cell and Satellite Centre to help verification in relation to arms control than its potential to monitor events in relation to natural and man-made disasters, thus supporting Euro-Med PBMs like the one on co-operation between civil protection services. Were this expansion of the PBM to prove unfeasible, the continuation and enlargement of the information CBMs inaugurated by the German and Greek Presidencies should nevertheless be in order.

As pointed out, the measure is expected to be of a unilateral character, but it could well be opposed by a number of European partners and, above all, by the European military. At a minimum, reciprocity would be claimed. The challenge with reciprocity is less the Mediterranean Partners' consent than the locus of such reciprocity in the Arab case. In any case, it must be stressed that the recommendation of this Report to make the PBM in question unilateral is linked to the reassuring purpose the PBM is supposed to achieve with respect to specific Arab security perceptions. In this case, security perceptions are lopsided and what is needed is a PBM in the shape of a CSBM rather than a CSBM proper. Therefore, the unilateral character seems part and parcel of the PBM advocated here.

Other factors which may work against this PBM or reduce its impact are related to the more general Arab thinking about conflict management in the post-Cold War period (and the Western European role in it) as well as the possible developments in the EU structure and capacity if the WEU is incorporated into the second pillar (or added as a fourth additional pillar).

2.3.2.2. COMMON GUIDELINES FOR THE HUMAN DIMENSION: NETWORKING PRIVATE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATIONS - Reassurances should also be provided to the EU with its strong perception that a more liberal policy by Southern Partners in the realm of human rights and fundamental freedoms would diminish instability in the South and the spillover effects such instability appear to generate.

In their 1997 Joint Report, the EuroMeSCo Groups put forward the proposal of appointing a Wise Persons Council of independent figures from partner countries, with the task of elaborating on principles and values which today divide European and non-European countries within the EMP and providing non-binding, public recommendations stemming either from their own reflections or from questions raised by public and private individuals or bodies in the EMP [EuroMeSCo III d]. Although everything said about human rights at the first meeting between EuroMeSCo and the Senior Officials, which took place in the Hague on March 4, 1997 to discuss the Joint Report, was harshly criticised by the Arab group of Officials, this proposal could be picked up again. In fact, by providing authoritative and independent, albeit non-binding, responses to cases arising in the field of human rights and minorities, the Wise Persons Council would help the EMP to set the minimum basis for building-up a shared human dimension and would acquire an essential instrument for developing a preventive diplomacy. What should be noted is that in the EMP, as it stands today, unless a common body like the Wise Persons Council sets out common guidelines to deal with the EMP human dimension, this task will be left to EU unilateral decisions in the framework of the political conditionality procedure.

At the Malta Conference, all that the Ministers were able to approve in this field was a declaratory CBM consisting of a procedure for the exchange of information on adherence to international human rights instruments by partner governments. In fact, common ground relating to human rights is so scarce among EMP governments that, independently of their compliance with the CBM just

mentioned (which seems very low), the governments are unable for the time being to deal with this challenge in any case. What could be retained of the early EuroMeSCo proposal is the idea that the human dimension should be tackled by civil society components of the EMP. At the same time, the formula adopted by the Stuttgart "Guidelines" deserves consideration, as it provides a cue for what common ground there may be. In fact, according to the "Guidelines", EMP governments are willing to "promote common values and shared principles" in relation, among other things, to "the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms". This common willingness could give way to a PBM by which these common values and shared principles are jointly explored and then form the basis of what could be a common EMP human rights posture. Despite differences, there is no doubt that there must be a considerable overlapping of the existing different North-South concepts of human rights. The indication provided in the "Guidelines" to identify this overlapping is both correct and promising.

The purpose of this PBM would be to provide a definition of common values and shared principles with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Euro-Med circle. To promote this research, a networking of private human rights associations and institutions on both sides of the Mediterranean should be encouraged and supported by the Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona process with the task of annually reporting their conceptual and factual findings as well as an evaluation of Partners' compliance with such common values and shared principles. Though the NGOs' report would not be binding in any way, the report and governments' comments should be given great diffusion in the media.

As already pointed out, a PBM on human rights is in principle more interesting for the EU countries than for the Southern Partners, for it increases transparency in the eyes of the North and gives the latter increased access to a field that is rather secluded today in the various domestic arenas. However, the mechanism of this PBM is less unilateral and intrusive than it may appear at first sight. It is less intrusive because it would be a non-binding process whose impact in terms of domestic public opinion remains in the hands of the governments. It is less unilateral because the process of investigation and, above all, of conceptualisation would be entrusted to NGOs of different sides, including religiously-inspired groups. Sooner or later this approach would be bound to increase Southern access as well. As the most obviously divisive issues would be put aside by definition (and, perhaps, postponed to an "appropriate time"), the outcome of this exercise should provide guidelines for internationally converging and domestically equilibrating government actions which would not seem or be perceived as disruptive or destabilising responses.

2.3.2.3. EURO-MED ELECTIONS MONITORING – Elections monitoring [*Tanner*] has performed and is still performing an important role in supporting partners states in the OSCE. In the latter, an *ad hoc* institution, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), takes care of elections monitoring and related tasks directed at upgrading the democratic and legal context of the countries concerned.

The establishment within the EMP of an instrument to perform functions similar to those of the ODIHR is not contemplated by the Barcelona Declaration. There are both political as well as historical reasons for this. The political reasons are that the Barcelona process is a conspicuously inter-governmental body that does not envisage, at least for the time being, any institutional autonomy within its framework. If implemented, elections monitoring in the EMP would have to be backed by intergovernmental agreements and initiated and operated essentially by individual governments. The historical reasons are that the ODIHR was established in Europe in a situation of general disruption and weakness of the concerned states, whereas in the Mediterranean, situations of weak political legitimacy do not necessarily mean disruption, weakness or instability of regional

states and governments. In recent times, elections monitoring has been performed in only a few particular situations, namely in Palestine (the EU) and Algeria (where the practise of voluntary invitations to observers has been adopted).

Still, a Euro-Med instrument to monitor elections could work as a helpful reassuring PBM. The purpose of such a PBM should be different from what is suggested by the OSCE/ODIHR experience and its workings should also, in some respects, differ from the way the ODIHR works. Obviously, Euro-Med elections monitoring would be a voluntary instrument: it would work upon request of the concerned state. It would provide observers and/or technical assistance. It would concern every EMP Partner. As a rule of thumb, it would be performed by joint North-South EMP teams. The task could be partially or fully entrusted to other security organisations, such as the Arab League, the OSCE or the UN, which could act alone or in combination. Specific tasks could be entrusted to Euro-Med NGOs.

The Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona process would be responsible for making the necessary decisions and providing directions. The Committee could appoint a task force to overlook the process. The Secretariat of the EMP would be responsible for implementing the elections monitoring operations.

2.3.2.4. COMMUNICATION NETWORK - The establishment of a communication network among the Partners is the basic reassuring PBM functionally geared to securing the communicating infrastructure for upgrading information and transparency. Whatever its effectiveness, it is destined to serve as a symbol of the existence of a special, regular link between the Partners.

This measure comes from the set of CSBMs approved in Vienna in 1990 to reassure CSCE parties with respect to military events [Darilek]. It was functionally connected to two other CSBMs: an obligation for consultation and co-operation in case of "unusual and unscheduled" military activities; and the establishment of a conflict prevention centre to implement that obligation. A similar functional sequence was envisaged by the deliberations in the ACRS before talks came to a standstill [Peters]. In the EMP, particularly after the Palermo conclusions establishing PBMs as a priority, the military relevance of the communication network must be understood as a sleeping function.

The Malta conclusions brought about the "setting up of a network of contact points for political and security matters". In this sense, and with tasks differing from those of its predecessors, this important PBM is already working, though its purposes and contents may still be undefined.

The communication network, especially where it is considered in combination with the setting up of conflict prevention centres, can be regarded as a mechanism for conciliation and, more generally speaking, conflict prevention. To that end, the functions of the communication network can be expanded to individual sectors; otherwise, a set of sectoral networks could be set up. In this perspective, the mechanism is taken into consideration subsequently, in section 3.1-3 of this Report.

2.3.2.5. PBMs CONNECTED TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM, ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING - *(to be compiled)* *[main reference: Joffé]*

It must be pointed out that this struggle is one of the objectives mentioned by the "Guidelines".

2.3.2.6. TOLERANCE AND UNDERSTANDING FURTHERING PBMs: XENOPHOBIA AND MIGRATION - *(to be compiled)* *[main references: Benaboud; Karmi]*

These are the most important reassuring measures. The name set out by Brauch and Sainz de la Peña fits very well with the task of promoting the "better understanding and mutual acceptance" indicated by the Stuttgart "Guidelines".

In shaping out these PBMs, the Report would refer to two tiers of issues. First, to challenges related to the improvement of mutual images among the Euro-Med countries by means of an upgrading of cultural information, instruments and institutions. In this context, it must be pointed out that much is already contemplated by the Barcelona Declaration, where it refers to the implementation of decentralised cultural co-operation programmes, like Med-Campus. The Charter in its text should recall expressly the importance and priority of these programmes. Second, to the set of questions relating to migration and xenophobia. Here, very much has to be done.

A possible PBM could consist of the establishment of a non-governmental "observatoire" on mutual images in sensitive fields like public education and media. The observatoire would generate a regular report that would be endorsed by the Senior Officials and provide guidelines for changes. The "observatoire" would also take care of assessing compliance with its recommendations.

A PBM on xenophobia is a necessary reassuring measure towards the Southern countries.

Attention should be paid to the idea of achieving some form of Southern participation in the EU processes related to migration. There is a strong European interest in obtaining Southern collaboration to prevent, limit and/or suppress illegal migration. This collaboration is obviously contingent to the possibility of establishing some collaboration at the level of decision-making and management in relation to legal migration, on one hand, and constabulary measures, on the other. It must be noted that much of what should be done in the field of migration-related PBMs pertains to status-enhancing measures as well (because their success would have a strong domestic impact and help stabilising governments). Collaboration and participation are conditions needed to make maritime CBMs (section 2 3.3.2) and conflict prevention measures (part 3) work.

With respect to the Southern idea that Euromarfor could be directed at stopping seaborne illegal migrants or refugees, a possible PBM could be a supply-side EU measure geared to limit or exclude the use of military forces for this purpose.

Another supply-side measure the EU could achieve is a special effort to make member states' immigration policies more homogeneous and transparent. Broadly speaking, more clarity and uniformity by the EU member states in regulating the status of Muslims and other communities in Europe would help greatly.

2.3.2.7. CHANGING PROCEDURES ON VISAS -*(to be compiled) [main reference: Withol de Wenden]*

2.3.3. Broad Partnership-Building Measures

2.3.3.1. MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SEA RESOURCES - Interdependence is bound to be a major indicator of fields where partnership-building can be broadly developed. This is obviously true for economic relations amongst the Partners, as well as for the regional air space and the sea. In this respect, the latter - the Mediterranean Sea – is of particular importance. The governance of interdependence with respect to the Mediterranean Sea provides the Partners with numerous and significant opportunities to build partnerships in a variety of fields.

In Euro-Med relations, three kinds of co-operation can be set in motion in relation to the sea:

♦ the shared regional organisation and management of the marine environment and the resources of the sea;

♦ the shared organisation and management of civil safety and related search and rescue operations;

♦ the shared organisation and management of sea-related constabulary measures.

This section is concerned with the first. Civil safety at sea and constabulary measures as sources of PBMs are dealt with in the next section (2.3.3.2).

Both the resources of the sea and the regional marine environment refer to important legal and organisational frameworks. The Law of the Sea provides an extensive and strongly consensus-based normative framework on sea resources, which in cases of closed seas like the Mediterranean, however, requires a special effort of co-operation and understanding amongst the parties concerned for its implementation [Ronzitti]. This effort has been weak and uneven so far. Sometimes, as particularly in the case of defining fishing protection areas, there have been situations of tension and potential conflict.

In this respect, there is much scope for promoting Euro-Med co-operation by promoting compliance with the norms and suggestions of the Law of the Sea and, in particular, by promoting a "regional approach" [Attard: 52-3], which could amount to the gradual application of a regional "clause" to the various normative areas contemplated by the Law of the Sea in Euro-Med relations. Such a regional approach has been advocated by the FAO General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean as an alternative to the ongoing growing tendency towards unilateral and uncoordinated action by the Mediterranean littoral states.

As for the regional marine environment, the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) established in the UNEP framework provides important guidelines for co-operation among the riparian states of the Mediterranean Sea. However, the launch of the Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme (SMAP) by the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment, held in Helsinki on 28 November 1997[2], could prove a more decisive step towards more effective and regular environmental co-operation with respect to the region. Without detracting from the importance of the MAP, the SMAP could emerge as the actual "enforcer" of a sound environmental order in the region. Though the EU is part to the MAP (and recently became a full member of the General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean), the Euro-Med profile of the SMAP is tighter and neater and should bring to bear more effectively the weight and resources of the EU. In a sense, the SMAP could provide the overall "regional approach" which is presently lacking with respect to the Mediterranean marine environment and sea resources. The adoption of well-devised priorities is also an important advantage of the SMAP as well as its institutional link with the financial resources that MEDA can provide.

Above all, co-operation with regard to the Law of the Sea - from boundaries to fishery - requires an effort in terms of new or reinforced international and regional legal agreements amongst the Partners. It also requires stronger harmonisation inside the EU. The Barcelona process and the SMAP can ease but cannot manage these efforts directly and quickly. They can perhaps help to introduce some simple CBMs in areas relating to the exploitation of marine resources, e.g. the prompt release of fishing vessels [Ronzitti: 45-50]. At the same time, the environment-related framework provided by the SMAP can prove more conducive to the implementation of operational co-operation in the shorter term. There is no doubt that the ongoing Euro-Med framework of environmental co-operation started by the 1997 Conference of Helsinki allows for a prompter promotion and implementation of a number of PBMs.

Thus, with regard to environmental protection, a first example of PBMs could be the establishment of a joint system for Integrated Resources Management (IRM) relating to the Mediterranean Sea [Spiteri]. This system of early warning and emergency action would allow for real-time information with respect to sea resources trends and incidents and pave the way for necessary interventions. It would operate through a communication network combining remote sensing, GIS (Geographical Information Systems) and appropriate data communication infrastructures (see section 2.1.3). The

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[2] See www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg11/smap.

IRM requires a strong structured regional framework of co-operation, which could, as of today, be provided by the SMAP. It fits perfectly with the "preventive policies" the SMAP intends to develop.

Two authors have seen in the SMAP [Spencer 1998b] and, more particularly, the IRM *[Stefanova]* a functionalist approach gradually connecting environmental security to soft security and even security in the narrower sense by means of sectoral spillover effects. The link between environmental and soft security corresponds to the link between the early warning and the possible operational dimensions of the IRM: for example, between the detection of an oil spill and the constabulary actions that may ensue. The link with security in its narrower sense is also relevant but it is not essential to the establishment of a PBM, the latter being geared to encourage security less than partnership, for in the EMP context, security may be the content of a PBM but that does not necessarily make it its primary purpose.

Another important PBM relates to the access to technology. The latter is a broad element of any discourse on international developmental co-operation and the governance of regional or global interdependence, thus of any discourse on the management of sea resources and the marine environment [Attard; Busuttil]. In operational terms, this means that technology transfer should be assisted by governmental or other public bodies, in this field as well as others. While most of technology transfers must be secured through private channels and investment, the role of public resources and bodies in fostering and directing such flows cannot be overlooked. In the global governance of interdependencies there is an inherent need for "redistribution", as Attard aptly notes in describing the purposes of environmental diplomacy. The given distribution is not perceived by less developed countries as a matter of fact but, more often than not, as a mostly unfair state of affairs brought about by history and other irrational events. Thus, providing fair access to technology is a way of establishing partnership by gradually replacing a strongly perceived state of unequal and unjust relations.

Finally, governance of the interdependence created by the Mediterranean Sea also provides an opportunity for exchanging training and expertise, which on the whole can also be regarded as forms of access (with capacities generally more equally distributed than technologies, as the first implementations of the Euro-Med co-operation on civil protection clearly show[3]).

In conclusion, the Barcelona process in itself and the process initiated by the SMAP can be regarded as frameworks in which effective co-operation regarding regional sea regimes and the environment can be established. It is thanks to the existence of such frameworks that a number of more specific co-operative processes and actions can be set in motion. These frameworks are thus working as a matrix for a set of interrelated PBMs (a cluster-PBM), concerning the establishment of a shared IRM system, as well as measures for easing the access to technology transfers, training, technical help and exchanges of experts.

2.3.3.2. MARITIME SAFETY AND CONSTABULARY MEASURES - Civil safety is a realm in which a first important CBM/PBM on "Co-operation between Civil Protection Services" has been approved in the shape of a pilot project which is in the process of being constructively expanded and structured. Co-operation has been initiated in non-maritime fields, such as earthquakes, flash-floods, forest fires, ground deformation, water-table rises, oil fires (which may also be at sea). Co-operation in sea-related fields remains to be developed.

Coming to undeveloped sea-related co-operation and, in particular, to actions geared to saving human lives, search and rescue (SAR) operations is a field where such co-operation could be successfully set up in the Euro-Med context and yet has not been. It may be that the constant

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[3] See www.euromed.net/document/12091998eng.htm.

association of SAR operations with military-related procedures to prevent incidents at sea amongst warships (INCSEAs agreements) throughout the history of Cold War CBMs and subsequently in the ACRS deliberations has obscured the non-military or the not necessarily military character of SAR operations, which remains first and foremost a humanitarian activity. SAR operations could easily lead to a Euro-Med PBM.

With the negotiating experience acquired while being taking responsibility for trying to develop maritime CBMs in the ACRS context, the Canadian government has identified the technical requirements for taking joint action in the field of SAR operations: "At the lower end of the scale of complexity there were seen to be communications capabilities which would cut across regional and political boundaries. Moving higher on the scale, participants identified the need to familiarize each other with their procedures, training and equipment, and ultimately to standardize these on regional or sub-regional basis" [Jones: 105]. This Report refers to communication networking in section 3.1.3. Apart from the organisation of a shared early warning network, the implementation of this PBM essentially requires that officials/officers learn to work co-operatively and that efforts be made to foster interoperability in relation to hardware. In other words: transfers of technology, training, technical assistance and exchanges of expertise, i.e. the same clustered elements pointed out with respect to the management of sea resources and the marine environment.

Maritime constabulary measures may be regarded as the possible operational side of the sea-related measures considered so far. Maritime constabulary measures may comprise a range of actions regarding environment and safety as well as the issues contemplated by the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, namely illegal migration, drug trafficking, other forms of internationally organised criminality and terrorism [Calleya] [Pugh]. These measures are normally enforced by national coast guard services (with the involvement of military vessels when legally appropriate). Would Euro-Med maritime constabulary co-operation be feasible and could it be arranged in the form of a PBM?

The range of targets coast guard services pursue seems to require a selective and sectoral approach, in which joint activities could concern, for instance, constabulary environment policing activities rather than countering illegal migration or SAR operations, with a view to gradually expanding joint activities over time.

This approach would also give precedence to intergovernmental co-operation, thus requiring specific accords on sectors, procedures, etc. Another, more institutional approach was submitted to the Group [Calleya]. Provided that some form of communication network must be previously established (see section 3.1.3), it is suggested that a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency (EMMA) be set up, mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with objectives similar to those carried out by a coast guard. The EMMA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety and maritime pollution. At a later stage, it could also include monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants. Areas where co-operation can be strengthened include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil tankers, and monitoring fishing activities with a particular emphasis on overfishing.

Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partners states that wish to participate, i.e. it should remain voluntary.

In order to ensure that this PBM can become operational in the shortest time possible, the EMMA should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation. Any two or more EMP members can start co-operating in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to maritime safety. This would enable the EMMA to evolve along subregional lines.

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At a later stage, the PBM could be upgraded to make it more operational. The EMP members should investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coast-Guard (EMMC) with more operational tasks in the sectors they would determine. Like the EMMA, the EMMC would be of a voluntary nature, would pursue a sectoral approach and would act as the harbinger of a subregional division of labour.

The development of the EMMC could link up with that of EMP conflict prevention capacities, in particular the setting up of situation centres. In this context, it could contribute to Euro-Med conflict prevention policy-making.

2.3.3.3. CLEARING LAND AND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES - Besides compliance with other international instruments of arms limitation and control, the Barcelona Declaration calls for compliance with the "Convention on prohibition or restriction on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects"- CCW. In recent years, land mines and anti-personnel mines have been particularly targeted by the international community with efforts and proposals geared to ban or limit their transfer and production and to clear them from past and current battlefields. The EU has operated a number of mine-clearing projects in South Eastern Europe, but requests coming from Mediterranean partners in the EMP have remained unheeded. Egypt requested that de-mining be included in the Action Plan and repeated its request within the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue subsequently, but to no avail.

Prohibition or restriction of mines as well as their clearance is an important aspect of arms control and limitation and it is in this dimension that it is contemplated by the Barcelona Declaration [Tanner 1997: 19]. However, in a broad partnership-building perspective what comes to the fore is the more specific necessity to clear mines as a humanitarian and political undertaking. Mines left on World War II North African battlefields and territories are largely regarded and perceived by concerned peoples as part and parcel of a colonial past that has to be concretely redeemed. Therefore, de-mining operations would work as a PBM in the shorter run, whereas in the longer term they could be regarded as a first step towards the development of a joint Euro-Med policy of arms control and limitation.

This PBM could be construed as a facility to be activated on specific request. Requests should be endorsed by all Partners. The facility could consist of an *ad hoc* Euro-Med military team headed by the country concerned and comprising personnel from the country or countries with information on mines as well as one or two third countries with mine-clearing technical capacities. It would be funded by MEDA.

If setting up such *ad hoc* military team would prove too politically demanding, another possibility is that personnel from Southern EMP partners could be associated to mine-clearing operations carried out in other regions (for example, the Balkans) by Northern partners and/or their intergovernmental organisations for training and/or liaison.

3.CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE SUPPORT

This part deals with two crucial elements of the Charter as sketched out by the Stuttgart "Guidelines": conflict prevention and peace support. Peace support and possible peace support operations are called differently in the "Guidelines", which refer to "crisis management measures", "post-conflict rehabilitation" and "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping".

In putting forward these elements of conflict prevention and peace support, the "Guidelines" are extremely cautious. They say that these measures will be developed "on a strictly voluntary and consensual basis ... without interference with other institutions and bilateral efforts". It is likely that this cautious approach reflects Partners' consciousness of the political constraints which limit the Charter's scope and the EMP's capacities today (see section 2.1.1. and *[Aliboni]*).

In their more recent deliberations, the Partners adopted a basic perspective of conflict prevention by conceiving of the EMP as an instrument which, while refraining from dealing and interfering with ongoing conflict, has to establish the premises for a conflictless, co-operative area. This approach entails the achievement of structural and systemic conflict prevention through the promotion of partnership more than the implementation of preventive diplomacy by means of adequate shorter-term instruments and policy-making. Still, this perspective makes the implementation of preventive diplomacy more feasible than forms of peace support, from peace-keeping through peace enforcement. For these reasons, this Report deals with conflict prevention and limits itself, when it comes to peace support, to taking into consideration peace-keeping and post-conflict rehabilitation as forms of peace support operations that can normally be used as instruments of preventive diplomacy with regard to the eruption or re-eruption of conflict and, more broadly speaking, are regarded as less intrusive forms of intervention and may draw consensus more easily than other forms.

3.1. Conflict prevention and good neighbourly relations

As already pointed out, after the decisions taken by the Ministers in Palermo and Stuttgart, there is no doubt that from the security vantage point the Charter (and, as a matter of fact, the whole of the EMP) now has a strong focus on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy.

The following sections of this Report deal with conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in the framework of the Charter and report the indications coming from the Working Group about the ways and means conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy can be organised and implemented in this framework.

Good neighbourly relations are included in this part and treated as an instrument of conflict prevention, though the Stuttgart "Guidelines" deal with this instrument on its own and in combination with the development of regional and subregional co-operation.

Conflict prevention is dealt with in the following three sections: (a) the preventive use of the Enhanced Political Dialogue; (b) the Charter's instruments of conflict prevention and their limits; (c) the networking of communication on conflict prevention.

3.1.1. The preventive role of the Enhanced Political Dialogue

The most relevant factor allowing for action in preventive diplomacy, particularly with regard to parties directly concerned by incoming conflict, is consensus *[Stefanova]*. As obvious as this may appear, it must be stressed that, with respect to such consensus, early warning activities and facilities are only instrumental. They cannot be regarded as factors triggering action. The decision

of an intergovernmental body to set up an early warning facility reflects a consensus among the parties concerned that they will at least consider intervention in case of warning. Nonetheless, preventive action can well take place even without the technical information early warning facilities provide. In fact, it can take place as the result of political information deliberately provided by parties concerned as well as of political interaction in the intergovernmental body in question. Such political information or interaction includes consensus thus sufficing to trigger action, if it is so desired by the parties involved.

Without early warning no consensus-based action to prevent conflict can take place. The relevance of political rather than technical information to trigger preventive action is important in every international security organisation, but particularly so in the EMP, where political will and cohesion are still limited and cannot be easily articulated in more or less mandatory institutional sequences. The decision of the Ministers in Palermo and Stuttgart to enhance the political dialogue as a pivotal instrument of the Charter must be regarded, amongst other things, as a way to introduce political early warning information as a possible trigger of preventive action. Thus, the Enhanced Political Dialogue (EPD) should be expected to work as the nucleus of early warning and preventive action in the EMP and, in the longer term, as the source from which EMP conflict prevention policy-making and relating interventions should spring.

In this perspective, according to Aliboni *[Aliboni]*, the most obvious suggestion is that the EMP institutions adopt a procedure similar to the so-called "Berlin mechanism" (Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation in Emergency Situations), stipulated in June 1991 by the CSCE members for bringing crises to the attention of the Conference and, if necessary, setting preventive action in motion [Bloed]. In the OSCE this procedure provides for emergency meetings of the Ministerial Council.

This idea was already present in previous proposals put forward in the EMP's brief history. The Luxembourg draft of the Charter envisaged the possibility that the Senior Officials Committee hold "special meetings" in case of tensions or crises upon the request of one or more Partners. Another solution was planned by Malta's early proposal for a Stability Pact in the Mediterranean. By using the jargon of the OSCE Stability Pact in Europe, the Malta plan advocated the establishment of "round tables" devoted to specific crises, upon demand of concerned parties, which would take place, however, outside the EMP framework: the round tables would thus have the nature of *ad hoc* conferences, initiated but not run by the EMP, and which could be deferred to other institutions. The the idea of holding such round tables, if needed, has never been appreciated by some non-EU Partners.

While the Malta suggestion looks too committing with respect to the present level of political will in the EMP, the Luxembourg draft proposal may correspond to the use of some kind of "Berlin mechanism". The sometimes cryptic language of the Stuttgart "Guidelines" could refer to this mechanism where it states that there will be "consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings": the "structures" could correspond to the procedure to place complaints or ask for information contemplated by the "Berlin mechanism" and this procedure could take place in special meetings of the EMP institutions.

The OSCE "Berlin mechanism" has been used very few times only. Its level (ministerial) may not have facilitated its use. It might be interesting to note that this mechanism has been superseded by the increasingly regular character of the OSCE Permanent Council meetings. In the OSCE today, information and complaints (i.e. early warning) are dealt with on a day-by-day basis by the Permanent Council.

It has been maintained [Biad; Marquina] that giving the EMP Senior Officials Committee a more permanent character would be especially important in a conflict prevention policy perspective, as it

would provide the EMP with more opportunities to build consensus, both in general and with respect to individual crises, by consolidating the habit of working together. However, the situations in the OSCE and the EMP are different. Early warning in the OSCE web of conflict prevention institutions has a diffuse character and results not only from members' initiative but also from uninterrupted diplomatic interaction in the Permanent Council and between the latter and other relevant bodies of the OSCE. Instead, the institutional autonomy and differentiation of the EMP is very reduced.

An evolution of the EMP Senior Officials Committee towards a permanent status and a political role similar to that of the OSCE Permanent Council is desirable but can hardly be envisaged in the near future. Still, the argument that the matrix of any possible joint conflict prevention action should continue to be regular diplomatic and political interaction is a forceful one.

Consequently, the application of the "Berlin mechanism" seems fitting with the stage of political development of the EMP *[Aliboni]*. However, its effectiveness in the EMP would require two conditions: (a) more regular and frequent gatherings of EMP institutions; and (b) Senior Officials should be enabled to deal with information and complaints to an extent and in cases which the Ministers should set out in a limited but precise mandate. In fact, some form of more regular and autonomous interplay is in order and should be secured primarily by both the Senior Officials and the Euro-Med Committee.

3.1.2. Euro-Med instruments and means for conflict prevention

As pointed out in the previous section, the EPD could work as the basis of Euro-Med conflict prevention. By upgrading mutual confidence, it may generate that mix between early warning and consensus needed to give way to joint action in the field of conflict prevention. Once consensus is there, however, the Charter will have to establish the necessary means, procedures and instruments to set its preventive actions in motion. A set of such means, procedures and instruments is discussed in the following.

3.1.2.1. SITUATION CENTRE - The Action Plan taken into consideration by the Senior Officials in 1996 introduced the idea of "setting up a Euro-Med 'Situation Centre'" to work as an "early warning procedure". This idea is not explicitly mentioned in the "Guidelines", but that does not mean that it is out of the question. The "Guidelines" have deliberately been very generally formulated. They speak of a "Euro-Med mechanism for preventive diplomacy", thus leaving it up to subsequent talks to define mechanisms and their extent.

Such a Euro-Med Situation Centre could take on very different profiles. A first one could be a situation centre relying substantially on the situation centres and similar instruments within the EU, like the situation centre about to operate as part of the Cell for Policy Planning and Early Warning under the direction of the Secretary-General of the EU Council of Ministers; the situation centre within the WEU Cell; and the Torrejón Satellite Centre operating within the WEU. The procedure could be arranged through a protocol stating limits and ways the EMP would be enabled to accede and/or the "services" demanded by the EMP. It is very likely that these limits would be very strong or that they could hardly be defined precisely. From a political point of view, such a solution would unnecessarily expose EU unilateralism instead of healing Southern Mediterranean perceptions relating to it (see section 2.1.1). This kind of procedure has an inclusive character if implemented with respect to East European countries with more or less distant prospects of becoming members of the EU. It could take on an exclusive character in relation to countries lacking those prospects.

A second profile would make the Euro-Med information rely on the EU but would secure access to the EU situation centres by means of a number of PBMs (see section 2.3.2.1). The latter would have

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the task of securing a convincing liaison with and participation in EU situation centres by non-EU Mediterranean officials and officers.

A third profile would try to achieve the networking of EU and non-EU situation centres, by means of protocols defining limits and purposes of co-operation. The problem with this solution would be the asymmetries between the non-national EU system, on one hand, and a number of national systems, on the other, which would not necessarily be willing to achieve a direct co-operation with other systems, let alone to pool resources or information. Non-EU-situation centres may refer, however, to international organisations' centres rather than national ones. This would be a relevant and operative profile, particularly if the Partners were to decide to focus on non-military and non-political events, such as disasters or environmental developments [Calleya; Stefanova] (see sections 2.3.3.2 and 3.1.3).

A fourth solution is establishing a Euro-Med situation centre proper. This solution may be difficult but not unfeasible if, as just pointed out, the situation centre were to focus on non-political and non-military events and work as a gathering centre of information coming from technical-economic centres, in particular international centres. Otherwise, it looks unlikely.

The most feasible profile seems a combination of the second and third solution indicated above; that is, a combination of Southern access to EU systems and a modest Euro-Med cell based on the networking of information coming from international agencies. To such networking the EU could well volunteer information, but this step should be taken very cautiously. All in all, the risk to be countered by all diplomatic skills is that of making non-EU Partners feel overwhelmed by EU capacities. This would increase information but, at the same time, diminish confidence and make information useless.

3.1.2.2. CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS - In general, a conflict prevention centre is less an instrument to gather information than one to manage procedures seeking to prevent latent or potential conflict between more or less consenting parties and settle disputes.

The conflict prevention centre set up by the 1990 CSCE Vienna decisions was functionally connected to the obligation for consultation and co-operation in case of "unusual and unscheduled" military activities. Similar mechanisms were envisaged in the ACRS, where three such centres were to be established in Amman, Tunis and Qatar. Given the EMP's willingness to exclude military activities from its scope for the time being, what could be the purpose of a Euro-Med conflict prevention centre in the framework of the Charter?

A conflict prevention centre might be given the task of developing and performing, first of all, the functions outlined by the "Guidelines" as "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice". The existence of a number of such sub-regional centres would be helpful. These, appropriately located, could be mandated by the EMP central institutions to proceed on a case-by-case basis. They could be asked to perform fact-finding missions and set up local "round tables for analysis and recommendations" whose outcome would be deferred to the Senior Officials. The sub-regional centres could be directly addressed by parties and thus act as an element of decentralised early warning. In this way, they could be enabled to perform an essential job in securing good neighbourly relations.

Whether in a centralised or decentralised organisation, it can be expected that mediation and clarification would be more successful than conciliation or the settlement of disputes. This is what is suggested by previous experience with "regional" conciliation and dispute settlement. The OSCE has no less than eight formalised procedures for that purpose, according to Lohmann [347], who says somewhat ironically that "It cannot be said that the OSCE is short of procedural tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes" Nevertheless, settlement procedures have never taken place in the

CSCE/OSCE – neither within the OSCE itself in the non-legal form of conciliation (the OSCE, it must be recalled, is a politically-binding rather than legally-binding institution) nor after being deferred to legal arbitration outside the OSCE (to the Courts in Geneva or in the Hague, etc.).

The OSCE's experience suggests that, unless specific circumstances invite political conciliation inside the institution concerned, the institution would be better advised to refer to existing international incumbent bodies like the Court in the Hague. The task of establishing EMP procedures for settling disputes may prove too demanding with respect to the EMP's narrow political breathing space. This procedure is envisaged by the "Guidelines" where encouragement of judicial settlement of differences and disputes is foreseen.

3.1.2.3. POLITICAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS - Functions of political planning and analysis are generally associated to the situation and conflict prevention centres. In particular, the direction given to such a planning function in the new EU Cell for Political Planning and Early Warning is one which emphasises conflict prevention. Could political planning and analysis be established in the Euro-Med framework with a view to helping prevent conflict? The fact of the matter is that this function requires a high degree of political cohesion, so high that even the EU Cell has dropped any idea of full autonomy and is now based on a system of networking among national elements.

The model inspiring political planning for conflict prevention in the EU Cell is the experience of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) which operated for a while in the Commission as a result of earlier ideas and requests put forward by the European Parliament. This model could prove more interesting for the EMP than for the EU Cell. In fact, what made the CPN of interest was its deliberate and systemic interaction with think thanks, NGOs and other components of the civil societies. In this sense, the EMP, through its links with the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks of institutions of security and economic analysis, respectively, is already operating an embryonic system of analysis and political planning, a system the Partners would be unwilling to operate jointly at governmental level under present political conditions.

Once collected, however, analyses coming from non-governmental networks must be handled in some way by a dedicated EMP unit (unlikely to be set up) or its Secretariat. The Secretariat is presently managed by the European Commission (which is, in fact, already handling the very few established CBMs/PBMs, like the one on civil protection and the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks). This is not the best solution politically, for the same reasons indicated during discussion of the establishment of a situation centre above. Still, it would allow for a minimum of joint Euro-Med planning and analysis. In this sense, rather than trying vainly to include political planning and analysis in whatever situation and conflict prevention centres it would be possible to establish, it may be better to foster a strict and well planned co-operation between the EMP institutions and what exists of decentralised co-operation in the Partners' civil societies.

3.1.3. Networking sectoral communication

In section 2.3.2.4, this Report points out the important PBM function of establishing a basic communication network amongst Partners. It also recalls that such a principle has already been accepted by the EMP Partners in the Malta Conclusions. The implementation of this network at a diplomatic level, amongst "contact points for political and security matters", must be under way.

As already pointed out, the setting up of a regular communication network "for political and security matters" can be regarded as an essential preliminary mechanism to provide early warning so that action can be taken in the field of conflict prevention. By strengthening early warning capacities, the existence of a communication network at the diplomatic level - i.e. amongst Foreign Ministries - is both an aspect and an instrument of the basic EPD conflict prevention function considered in section 3.1.1. It can be regarded as a functional element with respect to the regular

character the EPD is wished to assume so as to be enabled to act as "preventer" (toglierei del tutto l'ultima frase; è terribile). Also, it is a preliminary, significant expression of the existence of a political will geared to considering crises jointly and possibly dealing with them jointly. It is primarily in this sense that such networking is referred to in this section.

Communication networking can concern political and security matters as well as a number of technical functions performed in sectors pertaining to the implementation of the Partnership. It is also in this sense that communication networking is outlined in this section.

A technical network of this kind, in addition to the diplomatic network of contact points, may have a high value in terms of expanding EMP early warning and conflict prevention capacities. Furthermore, if successfully implemented, technical communication networking would provide a broad upgrading of the political capacity and legitimacy of the EMP as a whole.

In general, such a technical network would relate to the PBMs considered in sections 2.3.3.1-2. Linked to these PBMs, essentially two tiers of communication networks seem relevant in terms of early warning and conflict prevention and thus deserve special consideration:

◆ networks bringing together information on the protection of economic and environmental resources and civil societies, as well as safety of goods and the safety and rescue of persons;

◆ networks bringing together information for constabulary and (soft) security purposes.

Though these networks are an indispensable premise for the implementation of operational measures, it must be stressed that they are seen here as instruments to increase information and transparency only. A breakdown into two stages of information and operation is evident, for example, in the implementation of the CBM approved in Malta on "Co-operation between Civil Protection Services". In terms of conflict prevention, these networks provide early warning, but whether any consequent action is taken to prevent (let alone suppress) events, tensions or conflict remains to be seen. For example, there could be an exchange of information on seismic activities but not necessarily joint action for civil protection; likewise, shared information on illegal migration would not necessarily have to give way to joint actions to prevent or suppress it. Of course, information can lead to national actions. Therefore, in relation to sensitive policy areas, information could be denied.

Even if we limit ourselves to considering communication networks as declaratory rather than operational PBMs, the two tiers of networks outlined above could still have considerable applications and importance. As regards the first tier, protection of the environment and sea resources as well as maritime search and rescue operations are fields in which PBMs can start being shaped out fairly soon and with good prospects.

As a matter of fact, the follow-up mechanism envisaged by the Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme (SMAP), adopted by the 1997 Helsinki Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment, could pave the way to other sets of measures. It could provide an excellent start for the expansion and strengthening of the kind of technical communication network we are referring to.

The present network of SMAP Correspondents, with their Steering Committee, annual meetings and system of reporting, could be the basis for the intra-sectoral system of information of the Integrated Resource Management (IRM) of the Mediterranean environment envisaged by Anna Spiteri. In her words, the system would be "... based on the premise of shared information flows not only vertically but laterally, i.e. from sector to sector. The latter flow is then not necessarily restricted towards the top of the sector, as it may indeed occur predominantly at the level where the actual

data is required. The basic idea of IRM is based on open networks, the size and the number of the points in the network depending on the task in hand."

She specifies what would be required to set up an IRM: "a data communication technology infrastructure on a regional scale which would also allow for real-time transmission from satellites, and their data input to strategic GIS [Geographical Information Systems] nodes. These GIS data centres will collect, store and have the facilities to utilise instantly information in the environment, especially on coastal and marine resources as diverse as water quality, fish stock movement, coastal urbanization impacts. sea level fluctuations, coastal dynamics and so on." [Spiteri: 145-46].

Suggested in 1994 with an view to the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan, it is evident that this agenda fits very well with the Euro-Med SMAP and its possible enhancement.

As for SAR operations, the establishment of a communication network is feasible both in case EMP Partners were willing to set up a regional and integrated facility for SAR [Jones: 107] *[Calleya]* and in case they wish to operate nationally on the basis of networked information. It has been pointed out [Jones: 106] that "a good beginning would be made if the regional states were to exchange information on their SAR communication frequencies and their command and control provisions for SAR. This would enable them to contact each other quickly in cases of emergency and to have some idea of the capabilities which others could contribute quickly to a SAR response".

Other communication networks could refer to constabulary co-operation to exchange information and/or as a first step towards joint operational measures. Communication networks would concern international crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration and terrorism. It must be stressed that the boundary between the two kinds of network may be blurred. An oil spill or the violation of a fishing reserve may be detected through an environmental as well as a police network. From an operational point of view, both would give way to constabulary operations, be they multilateral or not. In general, the decision to share information, not to speak of acting jointly, in this field calls for a political understanding much stronger than the decision to set up an IRM or a SAR communication network.

3.1.4. Cultural and civil-military relations

The task mentioned in the Stuttgart "Guidelines" of promoting "better understanding and mutual acceptance of the cultures, religions and civilisations of the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean region" must be regarded as a kind of joint action to be taken essentially in a conflict prevention perspective. The Group looked at this question from the angle of the PBMs that could be introduced in order to help reinforcing cultural understanding and mutual acceptance (see sections 2.3.2.6-7). It is obvious, however, that beside PBMs all the actions already developed by the EMP with a view to enhance cultural contacts and understanding, from audiovisuals through decentralised co-operation, should be strengthened and expanded. The mechanism of enhanced political dialogue, while may get across some difficulties in trying to develop the instruments for preventive diplomacy that have been taken into consideration in previous sections (3.1.2), should be more at ease in taking up the opportunity of strengthening EMP's systemic and structural capacities of conflict prevention by developing cultural co-operation in every possible respect.

The Group looked into another important factor affecting EMP's conflict prevention capacities in the longer term, namely civil-military relations and the use of military factors to attain civil objectives.

This point can be regarded from two perspectives: one in which military factors are seen as instrumental to meeting non-military, i.e. civil community or civil power, needs; another one in which the military-civil relationship is seen as a question of good governance (a point which has

been already raised by this Report in section 1.3): under a good governance profile, military factors and resources are re-directed or reduced so as to make room to meeting civil needs, strengthening democracy and achieving peaceful purposes. The two perspectives - it must be stressed - are complementary, for both of them are bound more or less directly to re-direct tasks and resources in public policy making and national budgets.

All in all, the target would be that of introducing in the EMP framework some elements of the co-operative security perspective on military forces which has gradually prevailed in intra-European relations with the advent of the CSCE. This would make the adoption of Petersberg-like tasks in the EMP possible and, meanwhile, it would perhaps help changing Southern perceptions with respect to a number of Western security arrangements. More importantly, the target would also be that of a basic incremental modification in the relationship between the military and civil components in the governments of countries where the military has undue weight.

In this sense, many members of the Group *[Tanner; Spencer, Daguzan; Aliboni]* gave prominence to strengthening joint action in disaster relief within the EMP. The basis for such orientation has been already set out thanks to the adoption of the often-mentioned measures of co-operation among civil protection services. Though the arrangement presently envisaged by the Partners doesn't include the use of military factors in disasters relief explicitly, the very existence of this mechanism and its development would make the eventual passage to the use of military instruments easier.

This kind of suggestion can be put in a broader perspective *[Spencer]* by pointing out that "the political dialogue could concentrate on incentives towards allocating defence budgets to more humanitarian ends". In this way, while present political conditions do prevent the EMP from acting jointly in the field of non-proliferation and arms control, the re-direction of budgeted resources towards civil purposes would diminish the arms expenditures component in the budgets and put the use of existing military factors in a good-governance perspective.

Establishing a code of conduct could be the way the EMP's political dialogue could create such "incentives towards allocating defence budgets to more humanitarian ends". While a code of conduct regulating in detail military-civil relations *[Tanner]* may appear premature at this stage, a code of conduct influencing the allocation of resources in the budget may have a more distant an indirect impact only but could result meanwhile acceptable to Partners.

Other measures to create such incentives concern the establishment of CBMs of a kind that has been already aired in the EMP, though without much success. One CBM that would be much in line with the discourse in the above is the establishment of an EMP arms register [Tanner 1997:18] *[Daguzan]*. This arms register should be less linked to tasks of arms control, disarmament or proliferation control than to a kind of joint cost-benefit analysis in terms of social and economic development. The just-mentioned code of conduct would then encourage Partners to the necessary adjustments in policy-making as well as budgetary terms. In this respect, one should not forget, however, that the possibility remains always open to unilateral supply-side measures [Heller; EuroMeSCo V, 15] which would certainly add to the reshaping of the broad military-civil relations which is being discussed here.

Another important CBMs regards training and education of military. The establishment of a network of national defence centres specialising on academic research and training was discussed in 1996-97 within the Senior Officials Committee, but put on hold by the 1997 Malta's "Conclusions": Such activity of training and research should first and foremost make the military familiar with ongoing transformations in the patterns of military-civil relations, on the line of what is being presently done in NATO-related Partnership for Peace. Second, the same activity may regard a set of "conceptual clarifications" [Tanner 1997] on military-and security-related notions (arms control; CSBMs; defence sufficiency; legitimate security concerns; military capacities going beyond defence requirements),

which would make strategic thinking more homogeneous thus attenuating security-dilemmas . While training on military-civil relations would more explicitly and immediately relate to good governance, activities in conceptual clarifications would have less relevance to present developments in the EMP but prepare the ground for tomorrow's security co-operation. Training and research activities of this kind are already carried out by NGOs like Malta's Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and EuroMeSCo.

To conclude on this point, it must be pointed out that other international security organisations with a Mediterranean dimension, like NATO, the WEU and OSCE, are already offering training and other exchanges opportunities to selected groups of Southern Mediterranean countries. This is due to the non-multilateral character of their relations with the latter. As suggested in section 1.5 of this Report, an attenuation of the indivisibility clause in the EMP would help the latter to work out its contribution to an essential dimension of Mediterranean security and partnership-building.

3.2. Peace support operations

The Stuttgart "Guidelines" mention the "estabishment of Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms for preventive diplomacy and crisis management", which both may entail peace support operations (PSO). Further, it mentions a "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping". Besides, the "Guidelines" refer to "post-conflict rehabilitation", a field which may overlap with PSO.

To what extent would PSO be warranted by the current EMP political context? Joint action in PSO is normally largely dependent on strategic and political cohesion. The latter being presently weak in the EMP context, the question is whether attempts at co-operation in PSO would be feasible and help reinforcing Euro-Med cohesion with a view to security co-operation. Let's first discuss briefly the link between PSO and security co-operation and then their feasiblity.

Some EMP Partners have co-operated or are co-operating in PSO under non-EU and non-WEU umbrellas [Echeverria]. Carlos Echeverria has mantained that such co-operation can be successfully transposed into the EU-WEU context thus strengthening Euro-Med security co-operation. One member of the Group [Said] came to the same conclusion. On the contrary, Michael Pugh wrote cogently about the weakness of functional links between PSO and security co-operation in the Mediterranean with respect to other areas (in particular that concerned by NATO's Partnership for Peace, i.e. Central eastern Europe), due to the absence of strategic and political cohesion in the Mediterranean area: "PSO activities in the Mediterranean will remain dependent on wider political developments towards stronger security relationship. At most they will reinforce such developments rather than initiate them" [Pugh: 10].

More in detail, Pugh is skeptical about the possibility of developing a peace-keeping Mediterranean agenda similar to that implemented by the Partnership of Peace on the basis of the 1993 Athens Report on Co-operation on Peace-Keeping. Still, while the whole of the programme doesn't seem fittting with the EMP context, a selected number of activities like those envisaged by the Athens Report would not be ruled out (for example. in thd field of training and education: see also section 3.1.4 in this Report). Whenever implemented, these activities could stimulate the emergence of the premisses of the Euro-Med security co-operation that are lacking today. Such skepticism may be reinforced by Southern Mediterranean reactions to 1999 NATO air campaign on Kosovo and European participation in it. As it is well known, these reactions have been vividly negative and contributed to erode Western legitimacy to initiate PSO and the possibility, at least in the Mediterranean, of a North-South co-operation to take action.

As limited as they might be in their scope and substance, PSO could be introduced in the EMP Charter besides other Euro-Med instruments and possible joint actions. Though, such limitations

cannot be overlooked. One has to take them in full account if the EMP is to come to an achievable agenda.

Given such limitations, what PSO do look feasible in the Euro-Med context? The wording of the "Guidelines", where they suggest a "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping" rather than Euro-Med peace-keeping, may suggest that Euro-Med joint action in this field may be directed less to operational task, diretly accomplished by the EMP, than establishing the elements which would make the Partners ready to participate to PSO under differenrt umbrellas or, more importantly, acquire common perceptions and visions about PSO and their role.

In the EuroMeSCo Group, it was Fred Tanner who looked more organically than other Group's members to the PSO question. Tanner is more open than Pugh to the the existence of a functional relation between PSO and security co-operation. In the following, the Report quotes his paper (in its preliminary version) extensively.

In view of elaborating recommendations for peace operations in the Euro-Med context, the following preliminary observations have to be made.

- First, it will be important to allow Euro-Med joint actions to be open to potential outside participation. For instance, the Charter should prepare the conceptual ground for close co-operation (in peacekeeping and other areas) between the Euro-Med Partnership, the OSCE and Arab League, for instance. At the same time, it may be premature to suggest co-operative arrangements with organisations, such as the OAU, that are clearly. beyond the Euro-Med parameters.

- Second, it is important to accept the fact that peacekeeping co-operation continues to represent a sensitive matter for states with uneasy civil-military relations at home. Peace operations imply, after all, military-to-military contacts among Mediterranean Partner states—a type of Euro-Med co-operation that has been rejected repeatedly by Partners such as Syria or Lebanon.

- Third, the Euro-Med Partnership lacks the political cohesion and credibility for mandating peace missions or for acting as sub-contractor thereof.

The above constraints still leave the Political and Security chapter of the EMP with a number of options in the broad field of peace support and responses to complex emergencies. The Partnership should be able to prepare peace missions under a Euro-Med hat in the field of training, contingency planning and security sector reform. Furthermore, the Partnership could support peacekeeping operations in non-military domains, such as demining and disaster relief.

Suggestions and Recommendations

Model 1:   Joint peacekeeping training

The Euro-Med security co-operation could concentrate on building capacity in peacekeeping. Areas that deserve particular attention are language training, civil-military relations and humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. Such training activities are politically very much possible in the Euro-Med context, once the project of Euro-Med networking of defence institutes has taken off the ground.[4] To date, training activities are concentrated in Germany and Egypt. In Germany (Oberammergau), the NATO School offers in the PfP framework a number of peacekeeping training courses to officers from NATO Mediterranean Partners. In Egypt, peacekeeping curricula are offered at Cairo's Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (C.C.P.A.). Currently, the C.C.P.A. is geared towards

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[4] This proposal was launched in 1996, but then put on hold due to objections from Syria and Lebanon. France tried to revitalise it again in 1999.

African countries, but the peacekeeping training could be offered also to military officers and civil officials from Euro-Med countries.

Model 2:   Joint force planning for peacekeeping purposes

Joint force planning in the Mediterranean could be designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in a Euro-Med context. Such operations could consist of peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. Joint planning would not imply any institutional ramifications for the Euro-Med Partnership. Military and political co-operation for peace missions could be done in various venues in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It could deal with the lessons learned of the UN. Also, Euro-Med meetings could work out common rules of engagement, status-of-forces model agreements, prepare the ground for joint contingency planning for peace and humanitarian operations, and agree on stand-by arrangements. Joint force planning would also be essential for jointly preparing non-military operations that require military support especially in the fields of emergency assistance and disaster relief (see also model 5).

Model 3:   Joint peacekeeping module

More difficult to achieve, but conceivable in the long-term may be the creation of regional joint peacekeeping modules. Regional and sub-regional co-operation in peace operations has become very fashionable in the late 1990s. There are now peace support battalions in the Baltic, in Scandinavia (Nordic Battalion) and in Central Europe (CENCOOP). Also, in south-eastern Europe the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe has been established with troop contributions from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. In addition, numerous current UN peace missions are made up by the task force principle: On the Golan Heights, for instance, a Slovak unit is integrated in an multinational Austrian-led battalion.

The basic idea behind these arrangements are to prepare multinational peace forces, that are interoperable and that are based on the task force principle. Such a Euro-Med module would be a contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the security and stability in the region. The Euro-Med Partnership could serve as a framework for political co-ordination. Given the low comfort level of some Arab states to military co-operation, such a module could also be conceivable as a non-armed support contingent with priority tasks such as communications, logistics, engineering and transport. Those states that may chose to stay away from such peace forces could participate as observer states.

Model 4:   Euro-Med Co-operation in Mine Action

The land-mine question has taken prominence through the Ottawa process and the mobilisation of the international public opinion in recent years. Furthermore, humanitarian de-mining has become an integrate part of peace operation and peace building. In the Mediterranean region, there are several mine hot spots. There are mines deployed in the Near East, Cyprus, the Greek-Turkish borders and elsewhere in the Mediterranean region. Israel is co-operating with Jordan together with Canada and Norway in an anti-personnel clearing project along the Jordan-Israel border. Egypt, in turn, claims to have 23 million land mines left over from the Second World War and the countries four wars with Israel.

These mines are – in addition to being dangerous - also an obstacle to the economic development of entire areas. For example, the El-Alamein region has a density of up to three mines to the square metre. Egypt has approached several international institutions, including NATO through the MCG, for enlisting support. Individual EU countries have already agreed to support Egypt by sending experts and clearing equipment. A recent Rand study suggests integrating the mine clearing efforts into the NATO Dialogue programme [Lesser et al.: , 45].

Mine action could develop as an important field of co-operation in the Euro-Med Partnership. But the Partnership is not equipped to set up and run a regional mine action centres. In fact, mine action centres are national, given the sensitivity of sovereignty when it comes to on-site missions. The main activities of such centres are to assess the mine problem, make plans for the removal of the mines, work together with the government for the prioritisation, raise funds, train management staff and staff for mine clearance.

The Partnership could, however, play an important role as facilitator, co-odinator and as focal point: It could act as a co-ordination body for mine action in the Mediterranean and provide programmatic assistance to those Partner states who wish to create their own Mine Action Centres. The Euro-Med mine action programme could act as clearinghouse for the creation of tailored mine-clearing programmes; it could assist the Partners in their efforts to raise funds and to establish technical control standards. Given the interrelationship of mine action with post-conflict rehabilitation and economic development, current MEDA programmes could be enlisted to support mine awareness programmes in civil society and the socio-economic rehabilitation of mined areas.

Model 5:   Disaster Relief and Humanitarian emergency response

There exists a clear need for emergency assistance and civil protection programmes in the Mediterranean. Recent earthquake catastrophes in Turkey and Greece in August 1999 revealed the obvious lack of emergency aid co-ordination, despite the excellent work that was done by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The record of the past indicates that the bilateral approach works much better than assistance through regional or international organisations: during the earthquake in Cairo, France and other countries have sent their support on a bilateral basis.

The envisaged creation of a "Euro-Mediterranean system of prevention, of reduction and of management of natural and man-made disasters" is a first step towards multilateralisation of disaster co-operation. But, it is questionable to what extent the Disaster relief activities could be institutionalised beyond its current steering committee. If an institutionalisation would take place, then it would make sense to link it up with the proposed Euro-Med conflict prevention centre *[Calleya]*. In such an operational mode, the Centre could assume the following tasks: the alert of the Euro-Med Partnership of an unravelling emergency, mobilising resources and channelling emergency contributions, and the co-ordination of the deployment of military and civil protection assets.

It is obvious that such a Centre would need to work very closely with relief organisations such as the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Also, sooner or later a division of labour needs to be made between an Euro-Med disaster relief programme and the NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) that is actively promoted by the NATO's Mediterranean work programme.

Long-term activities of the Centre could include the exchange of information on disaster preparedness, a Euro-Med model agreement for mutual assistance, joint exercises and border crossing arrangements. Under Euro-Med auspices there could be the development of joint activities such as awareness-raising, team visits, courses and workshops.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(to be drafted)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACRS	[Working Group on] Arms Control and Regional Security
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measure
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EMMA	Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency
EMMC	Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coast-Guard
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EPD	Enhanced Political Dialogue
EU	European Union
Eurofor	Euroforce
Euroforces	Eurofor & Euromarfor
Euromarfor	European Maritime Force
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
Femise	Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
INCSEAs	Incidents at Sea Agreements
IRM	Integrated Resource Management
MAP	Mediterranean Action Plan
MEDA	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Navocformed	Naval on-Call Force for the Mediterranean
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African States
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBM	Partnership-Building Measure
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSO	Peace Support Operations

SAR	Search and Rescue
SMAP	Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme
Stanavformed	Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean
UEO	Union de l'Europe Occidentale
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNMIK	United Mission In Kosovo
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

MEETINGS OF THE GROUP

Rome 5-6 July 1998

Halki 12-14 September 1999

Some papers of the Working Group on the Euro-Med Charter were also presented at the EuroMeSCo general Working Groups meeting in **Cairo** 18-19 April 1999.

EuroMeSCo

**Working Group on the
Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability**

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EURO-MED CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

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Abstract

This study examines the concept of conflict prevention with a specific emphasis on conflict prevention at a regional level (the Euro-Mediterranean area) in post-Cold War relations. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy. This study offers a set of clearly defined rules, principles, and mechanisms that form the basis of a strategic planning doctrine that can be applied whenever such crisis situations emerge. The research project clarifies the distinction between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of any particular crisis. It also spells out the short, medium and long-term phases of setting up such a Centre that include creating a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime crisis information and early warning network and agency (EMMA) and also investigating the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EMMC). The study concludes by articulating clearly what the objectives and functions of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) will be given developments taking place in the European Union's common and foreign and security policy and the more general geo-strategic changes taking place across the Mediterranean.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the concept of conflict prevention with a specific emphasis on conflict prevention at a regional level (the Euro-Mediterranean area) in post-Cold War relations. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy. This study offers a set of clearly defined rules, principles, and mechanisms that form the basis of a strategic planning doctrine that can be applied whenever such crisis situations emerge.

Since the launching of the Barcelona Process in November 1995 the twenty-seven Foreign Ministers agreed on the need to develop and sustain Partnership Building Measures. While recognising the constraints that currently exist, a commitment was also made to focus on the concept of global stability and the need to develop common perceptions of the factors that contribute to it.[*1]

The Annex to the Chairman's Formal Conclusions at the Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial meeting in Stuttgart in April 1999 provide a specific framework for elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability for the first time. The guidelines emphasise that the Charter will serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration.[*2]

The Annex stipulates that the establishment of an enhanced political dialogue, in appropriate institutional framework and on adequate levels, will have priority. It is also stated that the dispositions regarding partnership-building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional co-operation and preventive diplomacy will be developed in an evolutionary way and progressively strengthened. It is within this context that the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) should take place. The primary function of the Centre will be to enhance

political dialogue in order to prevent tensions and crises as outlined in the annex. This will include establishing specific arrangements for conflict prevention and elaborating upon partnership building measures that promote crisis prevention.

The Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability already spell out the parameters within which the modus operandi of a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention Centre can be set up. These include: encouraging consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings, developing procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice, encouraging judicial settlement of differences and disputes, acceding and adhering to appropriate international conventions, and setting up a structure of workshops that identify root causes of instability and tension.

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

The first step that needs to be taken prior to the setting up of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) is to identify the circumstances in which effective action could be considered and the means most suited to a given situation, in order to prevent a conflict breaking out or escalating. The concept does not of course presume that a conflict will necessarily break out.

An operational definition of prevention means intervening at the right moment to prevent social, ethnic and political tensions from developing into violent conflict. In practice this means pressuring a state to start negotiating with the relevant groups or communities concerned and to introduce the structural reforms needed to defuse the crises.

There is no doubt that this is a demanding task. Adequate resources are required to identify and monitor inequalities and tensions between different linguistic or ethnic communities in addition to the analytical capacity to pinpoint the causes and potential development of the situation. A particular effort must be made to ensure that the analysis, diagnosis and recommendations for action remain unbiased and objective.

Conflict prevention therefore consists of concerted actions whose aim is to deter, resolve and/or halt disputes before they erupt, that is to say before any escalation of internal or external violence occurs.[*3]

Conflict prevention requires accurate knowledge, a precise assessment of the problem and 'mobilization', which are complex in organising due to the varied nature of interethnic conflicts. It is therefore essential to be able to distinguish symptoms of instability as a set of distinctive preliminary signs such as repressive measures, the radicalization of political rhetoric or excessive arms purchases.

The difficulty in distinguishing the possible variables that could lead to a conflict breaking out hampers decisions on the measures to be taken. Conflicts often evolve in a manner that often contradicts predictions. Certain preventive measures sometimes

have the opposite effect to that expected. This is quite often due to the fact that an incorrect interpretation of the aim of an external intervention occurs.

It is clear that more than one preventive measure can be adopted in any given situation and that what may at first seem the most appropriate or have proved effective in other instances may prove unsuited to a given situation in practice. On the other hand, the need to adapt to each specific case does not imply that having a set of clearly defined rules, principles and mechanisms is an invalid approach.

Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy for identifying the causes as well as the means to be employed in any intervention. A first step in this direction is to define clearly the objective of intervention. Conflicts are a fact of life, due to the combative nature of our species. A conflict free society is unimaginable. The challenge is to find peaceful solutions instead of remaining neutral while conflicts are resolved.[*4]

Two preliminary questions that also need to be addressed are how can conflicts be prevented by extraregional actors and how can a state or international organisation make decisions that will defuse tensions before the outbreak of violence?

A basic problem with conflict prevention is that international relations until recently have been governed by the fundamental principle of non-interference by individual states or by the international community in any country's internal affairs. Since the League of Nations was created in 1919 and some would argue even since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has been an essential part of the law by which countries conduct their relations with each other. As this principle is enshrined in the UN Charter, bilateral negotiation has been the sole possibility open to a state or international organisation wishing to act inside another state.

NATO's war in Kosovo was the first direct challenge by an alliance of serious countries to the internal untouchability of dictators. Although NATO accepted that Kosovo was part of the sovereign country labelled Yugoslavia, it was not prepared to allow Mr. Milosevic carry out his campaign of ethnic cleansing.[*5]

One must therefore ask whether the recent decision by the international community to intervene within the borders of a sovereign country creates a more conducive atmosphere in contemporary international relations for the establishment of a conflict prevention centre in the Mediterranean?

ACHILLES HEEL OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

Overcoming problems associated with co-ordination are important, but they will add up to nothing if not accompanied by political will. The problem with the concept of conflict prevention is that it raises as many ambiguities as it seeks to resolve. The prevention of conflicts should not be confused with the management of conflicts,

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during the stage of the outbreak of hostilities and armed confrontation and the resolution of conflicts following the cessation of hostilities.

Political choice is inherent in conflict prevention – it often implies adopting a political position, which excludes the idea of political neutrality: there can never actually be truly neutral mediation between parties as numerous post-Cold War conflicts have demonstrated.

Political will is therefore absolutely crucial in conflict prevention. Its absence can often be attributed to a lack of means, too high costs or the lack of vital interests. In any case far from being an abstract mechanism, conflict prevention is a reflection of the consequences of the actions of government. The failure of conflict prevention measures often results from the absence of common perceptions, the primacy of special political and economic interests and insufficient political will as it does from the inadequacy of available conflict prevention mechanisms. Given the heterogeneous make-up of the Mediterranean area, specific attention needs to be dedicated this point.

The decision to act quite often does not result from a direct attack on a state's vital interests (territorial integrity, economic interests) and not even from the first signs of a potential conflict, but rather from the perception of a momentum that is contrary to the interests of international or regional stability.

It is also clear that the psychological and financial costs of taking no action, even if they are difficult to quantify, are much higher in the long run.

The traditional approach of the concept of prevention which only covers diplomatic mediation, is limited in that it does not take into account all the various political options which include the option of using force. In contrast, an approach that is too all embracing runs the risk of becoming entangled with a state's overall foreign and security policy.

Some observers argue that the role of conflict prevention should not be given too high a priority for a number of reasons. These include the fact that there is an absence of a major risk of destabilisation at the international level, the sometimes hypothetical nature of predictions that a conflict will break out, non-interference in internal affairs, and constraints imposed by reduced defence budgets.

It is also a fact that prevention is a daunting political task for any country or international organisation to undertake. Prevention means intervening before there are many casualties, hence before public awareness of the problem takes place. By definition successful prevention means that nothing happens which means that there will be no public opinion and no political benefits to be derived from success.[*6]

OBJECTIVE OF THE EURO-MED CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The main objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre is to nurture a political, economic and cultural dialogue amongst Euro-Mediterranean

partner countries. A Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention will therefore have to focus on intensifying sub-regional co-operation in the Maghreb and the Mashreq if it is to contend effectively against security challenges across the Mediterranean area.

When setting up a conflict prevention centre it is worth considering two prerequisites. The first stems from the fact that conflicts are multidimensional in nature. The second is that it is in the interest of the international community jointly to solve conflicts and overcome bureaucratic obstacles through the creation of a single conceptual and institutional framework.[*7]

The conflict prevention mechanism that should be adopted needs to be specifically designed to tackle existing and potential risks and threats. Such contingency plans should focus on developing crisis-management principles and procedures for the entire Mediterranean area.[*8]

A concept that should be considered is that of creating flexible forces that can be deployed in each security eventuality that emerges. In order for this to become operational multilateral agreements on intelligence exchange and air space surveillance, and substantial investments in facilities for the reception and sustaining of peace-enforcing and peace-keeping units, needs to occur. Sensitive regional defence issues should be tackled at a later date.

One example of a type of conflict prevention force that can already be introduced at this point in the partnership process is that of investigating the feasibility of setting up an early warning communications network across the Euro-Mediterranean area. At the moment there are no elaborate mechanisms to contend with security crises such as an accidental collision at sea between transport tankers crossing through the choke points such as the Straits of Sicily, or the alarming rate of degradation which is currently taking place in the environmental sector. One must also mention the proliferation of drug consignments which are reaching ever deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean, and the accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to north which risks destablising the legal structures of the state.

A concerted effort should be made to immediately take incremental steps towards setting up an information mechanism that can assess the significance of such security issues and their likely impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations in the near future. Once this has been realised the co-operative maritime security network can be instructed to draw up policy positions on security issues that are regarded as the most serious.

Ideally, one should also investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency (EMMA) that would be mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with objectives similar to those carried out by a coastguard. The EMMA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety and maritime pollution. At a later stage it could also include monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants.

Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partner states that wish to participate. In order to ensure that such a security model can become operational in the shortest period possible, the EMMA should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation.

Any two or more EMP members can start co-operating in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to maritime safety without having to wait until all partners are ready. This will enable the EMMA to evolve along sub-regional lines before it becomes feasible to establish a fully-fledged Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date.

Areas where co-operation can be strengthened include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil tankers, and monitoring the activities of non-Mediterranean fishing boats that are operating in the Mediterranean with a particular emphasis on over-fishing.

At a later stage the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership member states should investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EMMC). The EMMC would be mandated to carry out stop and search exercises in four principal areas: maritime safety, maritime pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the transport of illegal migrants. Such an early warning and crisis prevention mechanism should be introduced in accordance with the principal of consent and open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partner states that wish to participate in such a flexible soft security arrangement. In order to ensure that such a security model can become operational in the shortest period possible, the EMMC should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation.

For example, any two or more EMP members can formulate co-operative alliances in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to narcotics trafficking without having to wait until all partners are in a position to introduce such measures.

In addition to strengthening political and security channels of communication, the establishment of such a Euro-Mediterranean early warning and conflict prevention network will assist in cultivating more intense crisis management mechanisms in an area where these are lacking. In order to ensure that such a flexible security arrangement moves beyond the conceptual stage in the shortest time-frame possible, its primary mandate may be limited to the following codes of conduct: fact-finding and consultation missions, inspection and monitoring delegations. Such traditional rules of engagement may also be supplemented by operations that include the facilitation of humanitarian relief particularly in times of natural disasters.

At a later stage, situation centres may be set up around the Mediterranean to monitor activities under this mandate.[*9] Consideration should also be given to opening the doors of the maritime security arrangement of EuroMarfor to its southern Mediterranean neighbours (at least offer observer status in the short-term). This will help dispel the negative perceptions that have been generated since the establishment of this maritime security force. Once the EMCPC is operational this force can become the actual confidence building enforcer of EMMA.

Arriving at such a threshold will ensure that elaborate forms of confidence building and crisis prevention measures that seek to further advance regional disarmament as spelt out in the guidelines of the Charter for Peace and Stability will be functional. The introduction of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability will also assist in creating a climate where the partner countries can develop command and control mechanisms to intervene as early as possible in crisis situations. Acting only after an aggressor has acquired territory or access to natural resources is to force the unwelcome choice between a massive military response and a major strategic debacle. The later the international community and security organisations intervene, the larger the cost and the less chance to restore stability.

Conflict prevention should be regarded as a series of political options ranging from the non-coercive to coercive measures – diplomatic, political, economic, military instruments appropriate to the evolution of a dispute before it erupts into conflict in the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.** (Article 33, para.1 of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice).*10

FUNCTIONS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre should be based on Article VIII of the United Nations Charter. This calls for the creation of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies, and their activities are consistent with the purposes of the UN.*11

The initial objectives of the conflict prevention centre should focus on the following: the formulation of principles and codes of conduct to shape the relations between participating states. These principles would include those of the Barcelona Declaration and therefore be similar to the principles found in the Helsinki Final Act. These include:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
- Avoidance of threat or the use of force;
- Inviolability of frontiers;
- Territorial integrity of states;
- Peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Non-intervention in internal affairs;
- Respect for fundamental rights and fundamental freedom, including the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief;
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

- Co-operation among states;
- Fight against terrorism, organised crime and drugs;
- Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

Once the conflict prevention centre is fully operational a more intense set of objectives should be undertaken. These include:

- Monitoring political, military, and economic matters of interest to countries and the Euro-Med Partnership process itself;
- Supervising and operating communications among focal points which have already been established as a CBM;
- Maintaining and updating background information for crisis prevention and management;
- Being prepared to provide facilities in case a contingency staff is set up with respect to a given crisis or conflict;
- Supporting briefings to the public and private bodies;
- Providing a continuous flow of information to members according to mandates;
- Providing information to media

At this stage a decision will have to be taken on what the scope of instruments will be at the disposal of the Centre. These would range from fact-finding and observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure and the deployment of troops. The introduction of economic and diplomatic sanctions can be supplemented by the use of force if there is an escalation of violence.[*12]

A distinction of "soft" and "hard" types of measures needs to be conducted in order to ensure that the application of such measures corresponds to the types of disputes to which they are being applied. A basic formula that can be adopted is one in which non-coercive strategies are adopted in the early stages of a dispute whereas coercive strategies are applied when hostilities have escalated. A short, medium, and long-term based strategy is appropriate irrespective of the intensity of the dispute. Particular attention needs to be given to long-term implications if any action taken is to be regarded as credible.

In order for a conflict prevention mechanism to be effective it is also important to be able to distinguish between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of any particular crisis. An adequate conflict prevention strategy presupposes an ability to identify the immediate internal causes of the dispute which can be classified in four categories: structural (weakness of the state's authority, ethno-geographic distribution); political (the nature of the political system, interethnic relations, elites); economic and social (discrimination); and cultural (cultural rights and mutual perceptions).[*13]

Attention must then be directed towards the underlying causes (historical memory and perceptions, relational models) that form the fertile ground in which the immediate

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causes flourish. Analysis of these causes will make it possible to define the means to be applied in a conflict resolution approach.

When it comes to time-scales – whereas the immediate causes can be tackled in the short-term, the underlying causes call for more long-term measures. Yet both should start together in order not to undermine medium to long-term preventive measures.

When it comes to the internal and external dynamics of a crisis situation – a decision needs to be taken as to whether they should be addressed together or separately? Even though it will ultimately depend on the willingness of the indigenous parties to find a lasting solution to crises as they emerge, a comprehensive solution calls for an approach that combines both the internal and the external dimensions of a crisis. In other words, conflict prevention measures should be regional in nature as any internal conflict will inevitably have a regional dimension and implications.

The CPC should also be in a position to put forward proposals for the further elaboration of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and other security-related issues of arms control, and in particular the proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean area of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.[*14]

Arms control should be regarded as including not only arms reductions or disarmament, but also measures to strengthen regional security and the diminishment of the use of military force as an instrument of national policy. The objectives of CSBMs are to prevent war by misunderstanding or miscalculation, to reduce the possibility of surprise attack and to reduce the ability to use military forces for the purpose of political intimidation or for carrying out foreign policy. It is therefore essential that this take place in a transparent and thus predictable manner.

CSBMs can be further categorised into two levels of analysis: technical-military CSBMs, which are at the tactical operational level of military policy and political-military CSBMs, which can be considered to be declarations of intent concerning the planed use of force.

CSBMs could include the following:

- Exchanges of information between military establishments;
- Prenotification of military movements;
- Prenotification of major military movements;
- Establishing a treaty for the prevention of accidents at sea;
- Establishing a Search and Rescue agreement that would incorporate the concept discussed above in relation to the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard;
- Declaratory statements of intent. This includes identifying the relevant participants, identifying and defining the zone of operation, examining the preconditions for negotiations and implementation, and assessing alternative methods of verification compliance and prospective arms control agreements.[*15]

The EMCPC should also serve as a centre of excellence when it comes to organising seminars and conferences on topics that support regional stability across the Mediterranean area. The intention would be to promote education and training in support of conflict prevention and arms control, and to function as a communications and data base centre. These seminars could be composed of government and military officials and specialists from think-tanks and academia.[*16] Such an exercise could follow the structure of the already existing confidence building measure, the Euro-Med Information and Training Seminars for Diplomats.[*17]

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The purpose of the new body will be to enhance stability and security across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The EMCPC will be a forum within which regional participants can take stock of and review all other activities contributing to peace and security in the area.

The EMCPC framework will not replace already existing conflict prevention initiatives such as the Middle East peace process, nor would it replicate the measures already considered and the arrangements already adopted by participants.

When it comes to an appropriate conceptual framework for regulating the Euro-Med conflict prevention centre's actions these should take into account the following administrative and institutional procedures. At a political level the establishment of a democratization process over a period of time that would include setting up institutions, a constitution, an electoral system, human and minority rights and the media needs to take place. Similar actions also need to take place in the economic field (privatization, the banking system, budget) and the military dimension (civil-military relations, defence industry, arms control).

Both conditionality and accountability need to be clearly defined concepts when it comes to economic and financial assistance. The possibility of sanctions (negative) and an incentive scheme (positive) should be attached to the implementation of reforms. Criteria for membership into international security institutions such as Nato, the OSCE, and the WEU should be clearly spelt out.

One should also examine the use and participation of the armed forces to humanitarian missions and tasks. The goal of this endeavour would be to indicate the relations between armed forces and civilian institutions to arrive at a more rational and efficient use of their various specialist capabilities.

In a region as heterogeneous as the Mediterranean area is, the main sponsor of the Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre, the European Union, should act as a mediator, facilitator and/or guarantor. The role of decision-making and action should be left as far as is possible to the main actors directly involved in a crisis. This will

assist in guarding against the perception that the EU is trying to impose its political will upon the Mediterranean area.

The EU has a wide range of mechanisms in the economic, political and social domains that will enable it to influence decision-makers at the local level when it comes to complying with preventive measures. It is only once the majority of local actors, both at governmental level and the public at large, perceive that more will be gained by compliance, that preventive measures will be able to attain their true objective.

This is not meant to exclude the participation of extra-regional powers in the EMCPC. On the contrary, all those actors that affect the region's security dynamics should be encouraged to join as partners. A formula for involving the United States in the Centre is essential if the EMCPC is to be regarded as a credible conflict prevention mechanism.

When setting up the structural design of the EMCPC it is crucial that a series of guidelines be taken into consideration to ensure that the new regional body is able to function smoothly. Basic questions that will have to be addressed include: who will be responsible for commissioning missions, which unit or committee will be responsible for deciding upon operations, and which component of the CPC will be accountable for the implementation of measures that are adopted?

Given the geographical and geopolitical proximity of the European Union to the EMCPC it seems logical to examine the various obstacles that the EU itself has had to overcome in order to gradually develop an effective common foreign security policy structure. The recent appointment of a High Representative and the setting up of a policy planning and early warning unit offer interesting insight into the type of mechanisms that the EMCPC can adopt at an early stage of development.

The numerous teething problems that conflict prevention or similar post-Cold War operations have encountered throughout the 1990s also offers plenty of food for thought when it comes to drawing up a EMCPC command and control structure. Should the regional CPC adopt a Contact Group type of approach to regional security challenges or does it make more sense to adopt a UN Security Council or OSCE type of decision-making process? Is it perhaps more feasible to introduce a limited version of NATO SitCen?[18]

It is also essential that the EMCPC's relationship to the eventual Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability is also made clear from the start. The numerous roles that the EMCPC can play in this regard include those of enforcer of the Charter, co-ordinating body of measures introduced as a result of the evolution of the Charter, or an agency that monitors actions undertaken by security networks that are set up once the Charter is introduced. This will assist in removing any risk that proponents of the Charter for Peace and Stability may perceive the EMCPC as a regional security arrangement through a competitive lens.

The EMCPC should also tap into the large number of already existing academic institutions, public-policy institutes and non-governmental organisations, such as the EuroMeSCo network of public-policy institutes, that are tackling the technical and analytical dimension of conflict prevention. The bringing together of researchers and specialists from different Mediterranean countries to monitor regional developments, warn concerned parties of potential conflict situations and suggest alternative policies that might further their prevention will help to ensure that the proposed centre will become one of excellence in the shortest time-frame possible.[*19]

LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT PREVENTION

The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre is certainly an initiative that will help manage security and stability across this very heterogeneous region of the world. The setting up of such a regional framework will also dispel perceptions that the Mediterranean has been neglected by the international community since the end of the Cold War. The risk of such a view settling in at the start of the new millennium is particularly high given that post-Cold War great powers and international organisations have now upgraded their attention in an adjacent region of the Mediterranean, namely the Balkans.

It would also be a strategic error if the United States and the European Union dedicate political and economic resources to the Balkan stability pact at the expense of other important strategic areas, including the Mediterranean area. Foreign policy strategists that are seeking to establish peace and stability around Europe should introduce policies that seek to balance regional interests and not turn regional security into a zero-sum-game.

It is precisely because of the importance of such a regional security initiative that the creation of the EMCPC needs to be implemented in a coherent and consistent manner. First, the setting up of the EMCPC should be gradual. No country should feel undo pressure or even force to participate in the initiative but allowed to contribute to the endeavour at their own pace. Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region will have to recognise for themselves that it is in their own self-interest to become actively engaged in such an exercise. Failure to do so will prevent them from being able to forge closer political and economic ties with one another and strengthen security ties with international institutions such as the Europe Union.

Second, the European Union must guard against promising the Mediterranean area more than it can deliver. The introduction of the EURO, the enlargement process, and development of a common foreign and security policy already means that the EU plate will remain very full for the next few years. The EU is thus better off offering the region a conflict prevention framework that does not totally rely on its services to function.

In order for the creation of the EMCPC to be successful it is essential that the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries of the Mediterranean become more vocal, open, and

engaged in the post-Cold War regional security environment that is evolving around them. Otherwise they will have no one but themselves to blame for being marginalised from the wider security framework that is emerging. With the EU due to compile a common strategy document on the Mediterranean by mid-2000 the timing to adopt such a stance could not be better.

In retrospect, a number of additional lessons can already be learnt from past conflict prevention attempts. These lessons should serve as a guide when setting up a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre.

The first is that individual governments acting alone to prevent conflicts are ineffective. National biases and interests are far too strong. It is more logical that analysis and proposed solutions should come from an ad hoc unit created for this purpose, which is international in its composition. The setting up of a conflict prevention unit by the EU in early 1997 is a good example of the type of model than can be adopted.

A second lesson is that appropriate mechanisms should be set up for political, not charitable reasons. This will help ensure that the political will is available when the time comes to set the structures in motion.

A third important point is that of identifying prevention with discretion. Measures taken to prevent the escalation of conflicts need to be kept as low key as possible to give confidence building measures a chance to flourish.

Fourth, parties to the conflict should be aware of the fact that the cost of conflict exceeds the cost of avoiding it.

Fifth, third parties should be convinced that certain developments are just a prelude to serious conflict which might affect some of their valued national interests, and that the cost of preventive action is lower than attempts at conflict resolution afterward.

Sixth, third parties should have the capacity to anticipate conflict and intervene in a timely and proper manner.[20]

Ten years after the end of the Cold War it is in both the EU's and the countries of the Mediterranean's interest to strengthen relations. Steps that can be taken to realise this include processing in the shortest-time frame possible the EU membership applications of Mediterranean candidates, upgrading relations with Turkey, and developing a more proactive Euro-Mediterranean partnership process that includes the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre.

Such measures will assist in the complex task of identifying Euro-Mediterranean common interests, a prerequisite to being able to nurturing a common Euro-Mediterranean political will. This is the strategy that should be incorporated in the Common Strategy document on the Mediterranean that the European Union is currently compiling.

Two positive turn of events in the western and eastern sectors of the Mediterranean also offer external powers such as the EU an excellent opportunity to move ahead with attempts to establish a conflict prevention network across the Mediterranean. At a meeting in Algiers earlier in 1999 North African countries decided to try and reactivate the moribund Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) that was created in 1989 and seeks to create a common market between Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya. An UMA summit is being planned for late 1999.[*21]

Further east, interest in moving ahead with the Middle East peace process has continued to increase since the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister and chances for a comprehensive regional peace have never appeared better. This positive pattern of regional dynamics therefore offers a window of opportunity to advance a conflict prevention network in a geo-strategic area where it is necessary. In addition to the intrinsic value of such an initiative, the establishment of a EMCPC will also increase visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean Process as a whole, a factor that to date remains lacking. It is only through such credible partnership building measures that the EMP will remain sustainable long-term.

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17) *Chairman's Formal Conclusions*, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, April 15th-16th 1999, paragraph 13.
(In the course of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process, the necessity for shaping a culture of dialogue and cooperation among the European member states and its Mediterranean Partners has continually been emphasised. As one of the results, the European Commission has entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, to run a semi-annual Information and Training Seminar for Euro-Mediterranean desk officers of the 27 partner countries. The first six Euro-Med seminars in October 1996, March 1997, November 1997 and May 1998, November 1998 and April 1999 consisted of a series of presentations with a primary objective of familiarization with the Euro-Mediterranean Process. Subject areas examined were: the EU institutional setting and decision-making patterns, the question of how to deal with the EU in practical terms, and the selected aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its implementation. An additional feature in recent years was the Euro-Mediterranean Internet Forum, a project that the European Commission entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies to design and to operationalise. This project aims at facilitating the flow of information between the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and became fully functional at the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in Malta).

18) Aliboni, R., op.cit., April 1998.

19) Soltan, G., and Monem Said Aly, op.cit., and Aliboni, ibid.

20) Soltan, G., and Aly, Monem Said, ibid., p.32.

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Working Group on the
Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability

Early Warning in the Euro-Mediterranean Context: Conceptual Questions, Procedures and Instruments

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The concept of early warning is becoming increasingly relevant in the post-Cold War world due to the re-ascendance of regional and primordial types of conflict. While it would be imprecise to claim that the nature of conflict has changed at the end of the Cold War—it would be more correct to assert that some classic forms of conflict have re-emerged—a marked novelty in the global attitude towards conflict in general can be clearly noted. In particular, intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state for reasons of redeeming humanitarian disasters or human rights abuse has become frequent. The definition and explanation of the sociological origins of this new worldwide trend are clearly beyond the scope of this research, but it is important to note that an undoubted normative evolution in the conduct of world affairs has taken place. This socio-political change has defined new priorities in international relations, inter alia, by placing unprecedented importance on problems of conflict prevention, as opposed to respect for state sovereignty. In this context early warning, as part of the process of conflict prevention, constitutes a prescriptive policy choice, which is normative par excellence. In fact, more than at any time in the past, axiological considerations have come to constitute a sufficient policy making base.

The processes responsible for the transformation of the international normative system and the reconsideration of the concept of state sovereignty have also pushed new actors to the forefront of international relations. While classical theories of international conflict have traditionally developed on the basis of analyses of inter-state interactions, modern explanations have tended to include also various non-state actors. It is in this context that considerations of early warning should be defined and analyzed, as they transcend the faculties of the state and make necessary recourse to sub-state actors. In this sense it is particularly important to consider the current transformation of the international system when explaining the concept of early warning.

When applied to the Mediterranean, early warning assumes a distinctive dimension, as does conflict prevention, because of the intertwining history of conflict in the area. As will be discussed later, among the pre-conditions for the successful application of early warning is absence of large-scale hostilities, which, given the idiosyncrasy of the region is not always the case. It is clear, therefore, that in such historical and political conditions the net effect of the application of early warning and conflict prevention would be null, if not counter-productive. Furthermore, as already stated, the conduct of early warning is a normative policy-choice, which implies establishing an intricate network of coordinating bodies united by a common political will to prevent an impending conflict, and for that reason interested in cooperative monitoring of a risky area. In this sense, applying early warning and conflict prevention in the Mediterranean context looms out as a genuine conceptual and policy challenge. The purpose of this paper will thus be to establish whether application of early warning is relevant in the Mediterranean, and if so, what plausible policy procedures could be suggested for it.

Theoretical dimensions and definition of terms
Early warning of a conflict should be considered part of conflict prevention theory. It should be immediately specified that neither early warning nor conflict prevention policies per se guarantee the absence of conflict or a linear policy of conflict-avoidance on the part of the potential belligerents or an interested third party. Early warning is the first stage of conflict prevention, whose actual success is conceptually independent of the will to carry it out. Early warning thus consists in predicting impending violence before it breaks out based on a set of specific indicators that are theoretically and empirically known to lead to open conflict. While

the selection of indicators that could be considered the harbingers of violence is subject to a debate, the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention are based on predictive reasoning and counterfactual theory.

Counterfactual theory examines the causal interaction between predetermined elements and complex, i. e. multi-dimensional outcomes that result within a fixed time frame. When applied to prognosis related to future events, counterfactual theory uses known (e. g. observed or observable) antecedents, which it presents as structurally linked to, i. e. inducing, one (or more) eventualities within a stated time lapse. From the point of view of counterfactual theory preventive action can be understood as logically connected inverted sequence of events. As already mentioned, the very essence of preventive action calls for intervention on the part of the actor intended to engage in conflict prevention before violence has erupted. The "preventor", therefore, will have to act on the basis of a set of early warning indicators, which in their interaction allow a presumption of impending violence. What is implied here is that there can never be an absolute certainty that the conflict will actually break out, nor that the particular action applied to prevent it will certainly produce the desired outcome.

> The prediction of early warning will never be as precise, as say, weather forecasting, which has the technological capability to identify hurricanes and other natural disasters with a high degree of accuracy. Nor will predictions of ethnic conflict be able to rely as much on statistical evidence as, say, economic forecasts, that warn of recessions based on widely accepted leading economic indicators. Rather, the prediction of ethnic conflict can be linked to the process of medical diagnosis of diseases, for which there exists no conclusive physical test. In such cases physicians make a positive diagnosis based on the appearance of clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through testing, some merely observable.[1]

It is important to realize that attempting to predict social, political, or psychological phenomena through counterfactual reasoning can never have the technical precision of a mathematical estimate based on a known dataset. Behavioral occurrences function according to consequential logic, which has not yet been explained in a theory-conducive schematic way. Counterfactual explanations of socio-political events will thus have the axiomatic value of what is known based on observation, but not the scientific weight coming from the understanding of its organic content.

Another particularity of counterfactual reasoning as applied to social conflictual behavior is the impossibility to produce a prognosis, which has veracity percentage close to that of weather forecasting, due the fact that, unlike in the theories of the natural sciences, the ceteris paribus assumption cannot be applied. In the socio-political reality it is impossible to determine the change of one element by holding the others constant, because it is precisely the interaction of the variable under scrutiny with the others that determines the direction of its change. A highly complex systemic setting characterizes, for example, ethnic or civil wars, where it is not so much the identification of a certain number of risk factors that is important to predict the outbreak of violence, but their interaction in the new situational environment that has been produced. Therefore, in determining the final picture, it is impossible to focus only on one systemic element of the conflict puzzle, because it can only make sense when analyzed in combination with the others. As Robert Jervis notes, "changes in one unit or the

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[1]Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausnik, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Towards a Predictive Model," *Parameters*, US War and Army College, vol. xxvi, N° 1, Spring, 1996, p. 23.

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relationship between any two of them produce ramifying alterations in other units and relationships [which results in a] high degree of complexity as causation operates in ways that defeat standard forms of common sense and scientific method."[2]

It can therefore be concluded that even if counterfactual theory presents some fundamental elements, which will most likely turn extremely useful as methodological tools in the more complex development of this research, such as analyses on the consequential logic of early warning indicators, it cannot by itself provide a satisfactory methodological approach to the topic of conflict prevention. As a result, it should be borne in mind that the theoretical premises of early warning are still quite new particularly in the field of international relations, and there are still many conceptual controversies to open, a fact which impedes the construction of a secure policy based solely on theoretical premises.

Establishing structural parameters for early warning
Having defined early warning and having located it in the realm of international relations theory, two other structural components need to be briefly clarified before evaluating the plausibility of the concept's application in the context of the Mediterranean. The first concerns establishing what are the early warning indicators that need to be observed in order to predict an impending conflict, and the second has to do with establishing a generic procedure for policy application of early warning. With regard to both parameters, it should be noted that very little related literature is available that deals directly with this *problematique*. Therefore, much of the discussion to follow will be based on inductive speculation of different branches of international relations theory and will be subject to serious refinement in a more specialized form of research.

For the purposes of this study, however, three categories of early warning indicators will be put forward, keeping in mind that while important, as specified above, their individual components and linkage will not be derived and explained here. Another necessary limitation of the scope of this study is that the choice of these categories over others, in the absence of specialized data research, can be justified on a quite rudimentary basis, namely, one of common international relations axiomatic affirmations, contextual self-evidence, and personal discretion.

First among the early warning indicators to consider is the type of regime in the state under consideration. A classic thesis in international relations theory holds that democracies do not fight among each other. Furthermore, due to transparent collective decision-making based on the principle of representation through periodic elections, democracies tend to respect fundamental human rights more than other types of regimes, thus minimizing the probability for the occurrence of violence due to social dissatisfaction.

Scholarly discussions of conflict prevention have given rise to much controversy about whether democracy is really structurally conducive to the avoidance of violence.[3] Based on the footnoted sources, it could be claimed that there indeed seems to be evidence that

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[2]Robert Jervis, "Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity," in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 309.
[3]C. Layne, "Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace" and D. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" International Security 19:2, Fall 1994; "Correspondence: The Democratic Peace," International Security, 19:4, Spring 1995; T. Risse, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4, December 1995.

democracies possess more war–avoiding tools than alternative state organizations, creating a structural environment, which seems to facilitate the effectiveness of various conflict prevention strategies, including early warning.

There is a need to differentiate, however, between democracy as a state of affairs and democratization as a process directed at it. While the former, in its stable and complete form, is indeed less prone to aggressive violence, the latter constitutes a structural change which tends to be accompanied by major systemic cataclysms, often conducive to conflict. Nonetheless, even democratizing states tend to favor peaceful settlements of contrasting relationships, rather than violent ones, despite the inherent structural weakness implied in various transition regimes.[4] The presence or the absence of a democratic state system, therefore, can be considered to constitute an effective early warning mechanism.

Besides examining the type of regimes, an analysis of regional geopolitics and related conflict precedents could also be considered to constitute a valid early warning category. A recent history of conflict in a geopolitical environment where territory, resources, or places of high social symbolic value are still disputed, most likely bides for incoming violence, particularly if the regimes in place in the prospective belligerents are not democratic.[5] It should be noted that despite sporadic affirmations to this effect, the linkage between conflict history based on geo-politics and the outbreak of violence is intuitive, rather than straight-forward. Again, the reason for the lack of a straight-forward scientific method lies in the unavailability of empirical data , due to the recent ascendance of conflict prevention, and consequently, early warning in the realm of international relations theory. For the purposes of this study the geopolitics-conflictual-history-unresolved-disputes-high-likelihood-for-violence pendulum will be assumed to be an effective early warning mechanism, even if some valid reservations, such as the strong influence of the local leadership against possible conflict recurrence, could be put forward. It should be noted, however, that the character of these reservations is even more difficult to conceptualize than the dependency already established, which finds some theoretical backing in social psychology.[6]

The third category of early warning indicators is even more controversial than the one already dealt with, and has very little conceptual support in main-stream political science theory. It has to do with a certain cultural proclivity towards conflict, which renders some nations more war-prone than others. Such arguments, which are quite often over-shadowed by more conventional *real politik* explanations for the occurrence of violence, are often quoted, for example, in relation to the Balkans (a notable reading in this respect are British parliamentary debates from the end of last century through the first decade of this century), the Middle East, or some parts in Asia. It is clear that this category holds very little scientific backing of any kind, and is in itself so controversial to predispose an ideological rather than theoretical debate, even if some scholars have actually considered cultural predisposition a valid conceptual explanation for the sequence

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[4] Michael Lund, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall" in Peter Cross (ed.) *Contributing to Preventive Action* Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook 1997-98 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1998), p. 19.

[5] R. J. Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," *European Journal of International Relations* 1:4, December 1995.

[6] R. W. Mack and R. C: Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict-Toward an Overview and Synthesis", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, 1957, pp. 212-248.

of events.[7] It was deemed necessary to include it in this brief early warning taxonomy for the sake of completeness, rather than conviction. As large part of the theoretical premises of this research, this category is subject to empirical verification.

Procedures and instruments: a speculation
The final theoretical part of this research concerns the analysis of possible ways of operationalizing early warning in a given context. In fact, the above categories of indicators may serve as such, only if related mechanisms of information gathering and processing are in place. In this research structural passages of turning isolated facts into early warning indicators will be examined.

As already mentioned beforehand, early warning awareness tends to imply a normative choice of a conflict prevention activity. Therefore, in order to conduct any early warning activity, a violence avoiding determination on the part of a particular institution must be in place. Furthermore, most of the indicators contained in the broad categories examined above, such as large-scale human rights abuse, require a certain time frame to determine with certainty. As a result, early warning requires an elaborate organization of an authority that is aware of preventive mechanisms, has the faculty to commission monitoring and data gathering, and, finally, considers that the information gathered and processed can be used in a way to prevent impending violence. This implies possessing the necessary decision-making instruments, support and operation control mechanisms, area and policy expertise, and most importantly, the corresponding political influence to both carry out the early warning monitoring per se, and ensure that the information passes to authorities in a position to take appropriate action to prevent an expected conflict.

It is evident that these are particularly difficult conditions to fulfill, especially having in mind that early warning warrants expedient action, if violence is to be prevented. Here the question arises as to who could plausibly commission, coordinate, and make use of early warning capacities in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Clearly, until quite recently early warning faculties institutionally structured as just described, have been the privilege of states with regard to their internal affairs. Only with the beginning of the current decade have some international early warning capabilities been put in place, mostly on an ad hoc basis and availing of the national technical means of individual states. As a result it can be noted that conducting an early warning activity on a regional or international level, even if some partnership agreements are in place, is a very delicate and controversial endeavor.

First, signaling some early warning indicators, e.g. human rights abuses or unstable political regimes in place, even if conducted with the necessary transparency and within the framework of an established agreement, might create suspicion among neighbors and contribute to tensions, rather than dissipate them by creating suspicion and mistrust.

Second, it would not be realistically feasible to set up an independent data gathering center on a regional/international level because in the absence of independent information gathering network, countries would have to rely on their own intelligence sources for collecting and verifying data. Most states would consider evaluations related to civil relations within a

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[7] Beate Winkler, "Intercultural Conflicts and Approaches to Solutions", *Peace and the Sciences*, March 1996, pp. 5-6.

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neighbor a state secret and would be reluctant to share it with others. The political implausibility of intelligence sharing, especially in regions such as the Euro-Mediterranean, is quite evident.

Third, while information gathering and other early warning monitoring on the part of international non-governmental organizations, including think-tanks, humanitarian organizations, etc. is possible without consent on a governmental level, it should be noted that such activities could at times be considered directly or indirectly threatening the power of the regimes in place, and will most probably be hindered by governments in every way. It suffices to recall how international monitoring groups were thrown out of Iraq or Serbia to understand how important the collaboration of official authorities is to verify what is going on within a state.

Fourth, given the considerations just listed, which render the practical application of early warning extremely difficult to generalize, it should be pointed out that some "politically neutral" niches are nevertheless available for the conduct of early warning activities. These include humanitarian and natural disasters, such as famine, control of refugee flows, earthquakes, epidemic decease, etc. It could be presumed that in such cases political and power considerations will not be in contradiction with a concerted preventive action on a regional and international level.

Early Warning in the Euro-Mediterranean Context

Operationalizing the concept of early warning in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean area is a challenging undertaking, especially on a sub-regional level. The main difficulties stem from political considerations, which often run against inter-state cooperative arrangements necessitated to carry out early warning activities at a governmental level. Furthermore, such hindrances also make the work of NGOs particularly difficult, as already explained above.

With such premise in mind, it should nevertheless be pointed out that there is space for the conduct of early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Possibilities can be explored on two levels: one, that of exploiting existing institutional and political niches, and the other, that of suggesting how these could be elaborated, political circumstances permitting, to organize a more comprehensive system of early warning in the region.

Early Warning Based on Already Available Instruments

There are some possibilities for the conduct of early warning activities through what has been called the "Barcelona process", initiated in November 1995 by 27 states of the region, which agreed to a declaration of a multi-faceted partnership aimed at "giving their future relations a new dimension based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity."[8] More specifically, the signatories agreed to work towards the creation of a common area of peace and security, whose realization can only be possible through collaboration, including one on early warning issues. Naturally, the Declaration has no binding force, and at this stage of regional relations it would be unrealistic to pretend that. However, it should be noted that on the one hand, in the background of the changing normative environment on a global level, declaratory statements of the Barcelona type have a strong moral as well as political weight on the basis of which a legally

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[8] Text of the Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27 and 28 November 1995, preamble.

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binding agreement can be envisioned in the long run.

On the other hand, given the difficult diplomatic situation particularly of the Middle East Peace Process,[9] even statements of declaratory nature of the Barcelona type are extremely important in that they lay the ground for stronger commitments by getting adversaries to talk. Quite beyond the moral commitment, the Barcelona process contains some real perspectives of arriving at a political consensus for conflict prevention through creating precedents of cooperation through learning based on mutual trust. Naturally, this aspect can be compromised by incidents eroding the fragile basis of good will, which permitted the launching of the Barcelona process. In any case, confidence building, or rather, partnership building, as it came to evolve after Barcelona, is undoubtedly a complex process which would only allow the needed political basis for the conduct of early warning for conflict in the very long run.

Having established that the both the political and the normative premises for early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean area realistically allow for the effective application of the concept in an indeterminate point in the future, it is nevertheless possible to identify several specific points on which, political circumstances permitting, and based on a regional consensus, early warning can be conducted even at present, albeit on an ad hoc basis.

In its chapter on political security partnership the Barcelona declaration contains clauses on democratization, respect for human rights and territorial sovereignty, disarmament, cooperation in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, all of which will be difficult to encode in legal terms, given the current political situation in the region. Subsequent specifications of this chapter in the documents issued by the Euro-Mediterranean conferences in Malta and Stuttgart deepeened these aspects, particularly by producing at the latter, an informal set of guidelines for the elaborating a Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability. What is notable in the Guidelines for the Charter is the proposal to agree on an annex devoted to partnership building measures, which draw on all three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and their further elaboration. What can be inferred from this decision is that security aspects can be built also on the basis of the chapter on economic and financial partnership and that of social, cultural, and human affairs.

One of the most important expressions of such indirect security building is, for example, the meeting of the Steering Committee of the Pilot Project for the "Creation of a Euro-Med System of Prevention, Mitigation and Management of Natural and Man-made Disasters" in 1998 near Rome. It was attended by almost all Barcelona partners, who agreed to share tasks related to the cooperation in emergency situations, such as earthquakes, forest fires, oil fires, oil splits, water table uprise, ground deformation, emergency medication, etc. Several lower-level meetings have been held since stressing on aspects of training, information sharing, and common actions in view of reacting to emergency situations which have arised as a result of natural disasters.

As mentioned above, information sharing between some of the Euro-Med partners might be problematic because of the necessity to rely exclusively on national technical means, the same used for intelligence purposes. However, progress made so far makes it plausible to believe that

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[9] Even if in practically all documents of the Barcelona process, it is explicitly stated that it is not supposed to be linked in any way to the MEPP, in practice many scholars and officials agree that there is a clear inter-dependence between the two. See interview with Patrick Laurent, *Euromed Special Features*, N° 6, 1999.

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cooperation in disaster situations has the potential to become a real break-through in the region, where natural emergencies at times cannot be handled effectively but in cooperation with neighbors and partners. In this sense early warning acquires a broader meaning, namely, while not looking for armed conflict and violence indicators, interested parties are nonetheless preparing to act in practically analogous situations.

Anna Spiteri presents an elaborate system of early warning and emergency action through an Integrated Resource Management in the Euro-Mediterranean region, which could facilitate rapid decision-making when facing impending disasters.[10] In sum, the author envisions a "sectorial spill-over"[11] from an essentially technical collaboration in disaster prevention to a cooperative security arrangements, in which early warning for conflict will be an integral part. Such proposals might sound as rather banal reverberation of neo-functionalism, but it has to be recalled that security has become to be seen as a rather broad concept only in the 1990s, and it is not at all unrealistic to imagine spillover of cooperation from issues of environmental security to issues of soft security, and more generally to security understood in its classic sense. It is in this perspective that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership should be understood.

The same is valid for conflict early warning considerations. While at present information and technology sharing on early warning indicators are likely to create tensions, rather than reslove them, it is not too optimistic to expect that some cooperative experience in the field of disaster management might lay the ground for it in the future. Intentions in this respect were also expressed by partners when regional cooperation issues were discussed in Valencia this January. The guidelines for the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability also foresees a gradual approach in strengthening the process of security cooperation overtime[12]. Naturally, it is fundamental not to overshoot cooperative intentions ahead of realistic political possibilities. In that it is vital to carry out all security-enhancing initiatives in the region, prime among these being the MEPP.

Some Suggestions for Practical Deepening of Early Warning in the Future
Suggesting concrete institutional strengthening of the Charter is the natural approach to suggest, but without the necessary political setting, as reiterated repeatedly above, such suggestions will remain purely academic speculations. Political climate permitting, however, a gradual approach should be adopted to give the Barcelona process more vigor. It is considered here that it would be superfluous to propose the creation of new institutions because the texts of the three declarations is almost exclusive in setting the terrain for successful and well-organized early warning activity. Therefore, efforts should be concentrated on giving the Barcelona documents more legal as well as political weight.

The gradual approach suggested here is aimed at arriving eventually at binding political accords between the partners, which would constitute a genuine institutionalization of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Clearly, at present this is not a feasible option, but incremental

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[10] Anna Spiteri, "Remote Sensing: The Tool of Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Towards Peace in the Mediterranean" in Fred Tanner (ed.) *Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East* (Malta: Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, December 1994), pp. 143-151.

[11] The term in its conceptual essentially functional meaning was coined by Philippe Schmitter, Professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

[12] See point II.b of the Guidelines.

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efforts could be made, based on stronger institutional settings, such as the one available through the OSCE, which would lay the terrain for a consistent reinforcement based on cooperation. As mentioned above, areas not directly related to security, but ones involving common needs transcending regional borders, such as reacting against natural disasters should be explored first. Some have also suggested a classical functionalist approach aimed at arriving at comprehensive security framework in the Euro-Mediterranean region through socio-economic development and soft security.[13] Such approach is thoroughly compatible with the establishment of functioning early warning capabilities in the area.

In more concrete terms, the gradual approach could be structured in the following way, naturally in the presence of the needed political will. First, on the example of the Guidelines to the Charter on Peace and Security, partners should prepare a similar document specifically aimed at regional early warning, but encompassing all three chapters. It should be particularly complete in areas where regional cooperation, such as data gathering, rapid alert, technical and humanitarian aid in cases of natural calamities, which necessarily involve sub-regions, rather than individual states. The objective is to gradually arrive at an autonomous institutional setting for early warning.

The role of the EU Commission here might be crucial, especially in encouraging the setting of a regional early warning center. The chances for its success will be greater, if at first the center's objectives do not explicitly include conflict prevention, since the current political circumstances in the region would hardly allow it, but instead focus exclusively on technical cooperation in disaster relief. Besides a small coordinating unit (e. g. a Secretariat), on-field fact-finding missions and regional experts with the necessary expertise should constitute its stuff. Even if initially predicting political violence will not be one of the objectives of such a center, the structure needed for early warning for conflict, as described above, is essentially inter-operable.

At a subsequent level it might be suggested that one or more of the aspects of this early warning for natural disasters should be considered as separate agreements with binding force. For example, it may be agreed that if it is established by the center's experts that country A is directly threatened by a natural disaster, while countries B and C are indirectly threatened by it, all should collaborate to redeem the costs. Some participation from all states in the region could also be envisioned as mandatory, by creating a common disaster relief fund, for instance. Given the fragile geological nature of the Mediterranean,[14] it would seem that a similar arrangement would render concrete results from its very inception.

The next step of setting up an early warning unit for the Euro-Mediterranean area would be to introduce strengthened mechanisms of consultation on some security problems not involving particular political controversies, such as poverty relief or organized crime. At present, however, even topics of this kind are quite controversial to handle, and it is unlikely to expect to arrive at a consensus between Partners in order to extend to such an extent the center's responsibilities.

Much improvement in putting such suggestions into action could be achieved if the EU's early

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[13] Roberto Aliboni, "Re-Setting the Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda" *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXIII, N° 4, October-December 1998, p.13.
[14] Spitteri, p. 144.

warning capabilities are strengthened independently, and within the framework of the CFSP. The EU's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPWEU) that is being set up might be very helpful in this respect. For example, it might be proposed to use its technical and institutional setting at an initial stage, before it is agreed by Partners where and how to set up a Euro-Mediterranean Early Warning Center.

In the medium-longer run, some strictly security mechanisms for the Euro-Mediterranean might be drawn on the example of the OSCE: These could include trigger mechanisms for consultation on pending security problems, whereby a Partner would have the right to raise a problem it considers a security concern for the area. Another mechanism, modeled on the structure of the OSCE could be one for consultation on emergency issues of military nature, whereby a group of Partners can convene a meeting at a governmental level and jointly decide on a particular course of action.

Finally, it should be noted again that in such hypothetical proposal for establishing and strengthening the Euro-Med early warning mechanisms, the role of the EU is fundamental. First and foremost, it can offer some help through its own institutional structures, which are quite advanced due to the structurally different nature of the Union, as compared to that of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is also not at all far-fetched to expect and to demand that the EU make available some of its resources in the setting and strengthening of a Euro-Med early warning unit, not least, because the EU's own security hinges on that of the Mediterranean. Given the geo-political belonging of the EU's Southern rim to the Mediterranean area, the expected EU institutional reforms might envision some funding devoted to the Euro-Mediterranean security as part of the CFSP. If the gradual approach adopted here is followed, initially such support should not require the commitment of large amount of funds, as it would only concern the setting up of a small permanent unit of technical experts dealing with natural calamity forecasting, and the affiliation of some known regional specialists, who could advise on the broader security context. For this purpose some of the already existing structures throughout the region can be used. Only at a much later stage, based on a qualitative change in the political situation in both the EU and the Mediterranean, this small unit may have to be significantly reinforced also by committing more resources to it.

Some conclusions
What emerges from this brief overview of conceptual and policy problems of early warning applicability in the Euro-Mediterranean is that the global normative predisposition has hardly been more conducive to the conduct of conflict prevention activities. Nonetheless, having established that early warning itself is a positivist approach to the conduct of state affairs, one that has only recently started to take prevalence in contemporary international relations, major applicability difficulties emerge.

First, at a conceptual level, most of the premises of early warning are axiomatic, rather than theoretical, due to the virtual lack of empirical verification of the basic hypotheses. As an integral part of conflict prevention, the concept of early warning needs to mature through the verification of its validity based on the classic scientific method. In the meantime, however, several early warning categories can be isolated from classic social science theories, which can be analyzed on the basis of counterfactual and predictive methodologies with a relatively

satisfactory percentage of veracity.

Second, at a general institutional level, favorable political circumstances consisting in generating regional leaders' will for cooperation, are an absolute must for the successful conduct of any fact-finding and information-gathering activity pertinent to early warning for conflict. If political will on the part of the governing structures of the region concerned is hesitant and inconsistent, strategies should be devised to cultivate and strengthen it on the basis of cooperation precedent and learning and confidence building. Only in such way can linkage be created from general awareness of conflict incipience to early action to counter it. Even if not directly related to early warning, such strategies are fundamental in order to set the ground for conflict prevention proper. In relation to these findings, it was also established that while important with regard to policy implementation, non-state actors of different kind cannot satisfactorily conduct early warning missions without cooperation on the part of the governments concerned.

With regard to the Euro-Mediterranean area some propitious pre-conditions were created with the launching of the Barcelona process, which have been gradually strengthened. While political reality in the area clearly impedes the adoption of legally binding commitments for the moment, much can be done in boosting cooperation precedents and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust. Such strategies should be incorporated to make part of a aggregate (i. e. based on all three chapters of the Declaration) step-by-step approach in the area, where most of the results should be expected in the long run.

In more concrete terms, the broad institutional framework of Barcelona allows the build-up of mutual trust through cooperation in politically-neutral areas of common concern, such as disaster relief, famine, and economic development. A small center with a relatively modest resource pool, quite within the financing possibilities of the EU Commission alone, might institutionalize this initial stage of the process. In the medium-to-long run such center may start to deal with early warning proper, should political circumstances create a propitious environment for such activities. In the long run binding agreements for collaboration to this effect might be feasible.

Such concerted multi-track approach aimed at the establishment of early warning capabilities as part of a broad strategy of area cooperation and integration should be seen as an investment in the regional security and stability. It is in such context that actors capable of rendering concrete results aimed at boosting regional security should be encouraged to get directly involved.

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EuroMeSCo

Working Group on the
Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability

MILITARY DIALOGUE IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CHARTER: AN UNJUSTIFIED ABSENCE

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's (EMP) constitutive texts do not refer expressly to military dialogue, let alone military cooperation. In the Barcelona Declaration, Ministers just stated that they would "consider any CSBMs that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an 'area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean'", as a future possibility. While this intention has not been fulfilled so far, the Guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter, agreed as an informal working document at Stuttgart, foresee an enhanced political dialogue whose purpose would be to prevent tensions and crises and to maintain peace and stability by means of comprehensive and cooperative security. However, no mention of military dialogue or other kinds of military measures can be found in the Guidelines. Although a generic scheme of objectives and means is drawn up, which might also include military relationships according to a very broad interpretation, the lack of any specific reference to a military dialogue is significative. In fact, the expressions "military", "defence", and "armed forces" have been avoided in all texts produced by the Barcelona process. [1]

The absence of military dialogue and cooperation in the EMP is a gap that should be filled. In one sense, this absence is justified because there have been enormous difficulties to establish a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in military and defence issues, and yet, from another point of view, the gap is no longer justifiable, since there are slow but profound developments which are creating an impetus towards such a dialogue. The purpose of this contribution is to argue that the lack of a military dialogue within the Barcelona process is neither coherent with the EMP's global and comprehensive objectives, nor with recent developments in CFSP after the entry into

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[*] The views expressed are personal, and not the position of any organization. The author would like to state his gratitude to Mohammed Kadry Said (Al-Ahram Centre, Cairo) with whom part of this work was discussed.

[1] The last but two paragraph of the Barcelona declaration of principles is the only instance in which the terms "military" ("military capacity") and "defence" ("legitimate defence") can be found.

force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the declaration on a common security and defence policy of the Cologne European Council. In addition, that absence gives the wrong impression that there is no current dialogue in military and defence matters in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, in actual fact, there exists a relatively rich intercourse which has two dimensions: a web of bilateral cooperation schemes, on the one hand, and multilateral dialogues, through NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean initiatives, on the other. The concrete measures at present in place show that the prospect for a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in military issues within the EMP may be better than the silence of the texts now suggests. The Charter should, consequently, fill the gap and anticipate some sort of military dialogue and cooperation. Nevertheless, following another principle of the Barcelona process, the establishment of military dialogue and cooperation must be, of course, gradual and progressive.

2. SHOULD THE BARCELONA PROCESS HAVE A MILITARY DIMENSION?

Up to now, military dialogue has been kept apart from the EMP for three main reasons.

Firstly, since 1991 the EU has been a civilian power giving birth to a common foreign policy, but devoid of any real common security and defence policy. At the time of planning the Barcelona conference, and later, the EU could not offer its Mediterranean partners a dialogue on military and defence issues. Instead, the broad term "political and security partnership" was preferred; however, even if "security" could be interpreted in a wide fashion, although isolated references to CSBMs, non-proliferation, and self-defence are contained in the Barcelona declaration, and even if the Stuttgart Guidelines include some references to CSBMs, crisis prevention and management, and peace-keeping, "security" could never be construed as meaning "hard security", or defence issues, given the EU's lack of competence in this respect. At the same time, NATO was, and still is, the main security and defence organisation for the Europeans, as was reaffirmed in its new strategic concept of April 1999. Most of the EU members, along with their allies, started NATO's Mediterranean dialogue with some Mediterranean countries in 1995. NATO having its own Mediterranean dialogue, members of both EU and NATO, along with their colleagues in the EU (and their Mediterranean partners), had to decide what kind of parallel military dimension EMP could eventually have, and this decision has not yet been taken.

Secondly, EMP has no military dimension because the Mediterranean partners' armed forces are rather reluctant to engage in multilateral military cooperation. This is not always clearly stated but some declarations do express sentiments that reveal a perception of neo-interventionism and neo-colonialism, which may be considered as a lack of desire to establish military dialogue and cooperation. Bilateral military relationships allow a greater adaptability on the part of the respective associates, whereas multilateral relations impose general standards to which some military bodies are not used.

Thirdly, international disputes in the Mediterranean region also hamper steady advance in a possible Euro-Mediterranean military dialogue. This applies particularly to the Middle East Peace Process, although this and other disputes do not impede bilateral north-south and south-south military cooperation nor the multilateral dialogues proposed by NATO and WEU. Syria and Lebanon are the two EMP partners which do not take part in other multilateral military dialogues, because international disputes that they maintain with Israel make it impossible, form their point of view, to engage in such dialogues.[2]

In spite of these main difficulties, there are three reasons that justify attributing a new military dimension to the EMP.

The first reason is the Barcelona declaration's global approach to the Euro-Mediterranean relationship, whereby the partnership applies to a broad range of themes, not only economic questions but also the political and security fields, as well as social, cultural and human questions. There is no reason to leave the military dimension out of this all-encompassing approach. If EMP's final purpose is to establish a common area of peace, stability and prosperity, through a reinforcement of political dialogue, defence and military matters cannot be neglected.

Secondly, the relevant role of the military in the political systems of many Mediterranean partner countries makes it necessary to give the present political and security dialogue a military dimension. An initial and limited military dialogue would not immediately transform the overall nature of the current political dialogue, but it would surely give a more realistic basis to the EMP.

Thirdly, at the Cologne European Council of June 1999 the EU decided to establish a common security and defence policy (CSDP) to supplement its CFSP, and more specifically to acquire new capabilities for crisis prevention and crisis management. EU's new military scope makes it easier to confer a new military dimension on the various fields covered by CFSP, including the Barcelona Process. This is relevant to EU members, but CSDP may also be of interest to EU's Mediterranean partners for a number of reasons, which equally justifies including gradually some defence and military aspects into the EMP and in the Charter.

3. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A MILITARY AND DEFENCE DIMENSION OF THE EMP?

In the academic debate, there is an ongoing discussion about the real aims of the Barcelona process. The different objectives laid down in the Barcelona declaration are scrutinised and classified. Some experts point out that stability in the region is the main objective for the European partners, while economic cooperation and development is the paramount aim for Southern partners. Others stress either the overriding political

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[2] See section 6 below for a comment on the difficulties regarding EMP membership.

objective of democratisation, or the importance of the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs as the most original contribution of the EMP.

Nevertheless, the historical importance of the whole process cannot be found by identifying its various purposes and putting them together, or by defining a hierarchy between its objectives. The more profound significance of the EMP is rather to dispel a historical inertia of misunderstanding and fragmentation in the area, and to inaugurate a new period of closer relationships. In other words, the Barcelona process is the first attempt to constitute a region in the political sense, where formerly only a region in the geographical sense existed. In the preamble of the Barcelona declaration, states affirm that they are "moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension", and they proclaim the "general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation". Four years after its inception, it is perhaps too soon in historical terms to evaluate EMP's practical achievements. However, leaving aside its bilateral dimension, it is obvious that the Barcelona process's multilateral activities have created a new consciousness regarding the Euro-Mediterranean region; these activities have led to a renewed knowledge of the other side on the part of both shores of the Mediterranean. The various contacts, meetings, networks, and cooperation projects that have taken place since 1995 within the EMP framework would not have seen the light otherwise.

Bearing this historical significance in mind, the general purpose of the proposed new military dimension should be in tune with the same idea of facilitating a new *rapprochement*. Instead of advancing more ambitious objectives, like the establishment of Mediterranean CSBMs or other types of institutionalised cooperation in the security field, the first objective should be to promote dialogue and mutual knowledge among the politico-military authorities and among the respective armed forces. Of course, the final purpose of the whole process, and more specifically of the Charter, is to promote peace and security in the region or "to prevent tensions and crises and to maintain peace and stability by means of cooperative security", as the Stuttgart conclusions put it. However, the intermediate purpose of military dialogue in the EMP should be to build up new avenues for discussion and mutual understanding in the region.

In a future Euro-Mediterranean relationship in the military and defence fields, the accent should shift from traditional confidence-building to the more modern notion of partnership-building measures (PBMs), a notion that has been conceptualised by Roberto Aliboni.[3] At least for the ten first years or so, the EMP should include a number of military partnership- and transparency-building measures which will allow a better understanding between authorities who belong to different political and military traditions. A good example is seminars and other kinds of academic activities and visits, that are carried out currently within NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean dialogues, as will be examined below. Once a better mutual knowledge amongst Euro-Mediterranean

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[3] See Roberto Aliboni, *Building blocks for the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability*, report of the EuroMeSCo's Working Group on the Charter, October 1999, section 2.

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politico-military and military authorities has been achieved, new measures in the fields of confidence-building, military cooperation, and even institutionalised cooperation could be envisaged.[4] Nevertheless, the EMP's military dimension will always be realised within the limits of the EU's security and defence competencies, which will have to be defined, in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept, after the Cologne declaration of June 1999.

4. FIVE MODELS FOR EURO-MEDITERRANEAN MILITARY DIALOGUE

Several principles of the Barcelona declaration have direct implications in the field of state defence: respect for the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners, to refrain from any intervention in the internal affairs of another partner in accordance with international law, cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism and organised crime, non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and to promote good-neighbourly relations, among others. Apart from these principles, the only mechanism connected to defence issues that was mentioned in Barcelona was CSBMs. This is understandable because, at that time, the model for multilateral security relations that most probably stimulated the minds of the founders of the EMP was the CSCE process. Participants in the Barcelona conference did not set up a system of CSBMs, but the mere mention of the term contributed to establishing in the eye of the observer a tacit parallelism between the recent CSCE experience, from the 1986 Stockholm document onwards, and the probable future development of the EMP. In fact, the first academic analysis of the Barcelona declaration from a security standpoint concentrated on the possibility and feasibility of translating the traditional method of confidence- and security-building measures that had worked well on the European scene to the Mediterranean theatre.

In that academic exchange, scholars demonstrated that the European model did not fit into the Euro-Mediterranean framework. For instance, Claire Spencer has eloquently shown that the CSCE confidence-building scheme was based on certain conditions that were not present in the region.[5] From the political point of view, the Presidency conclusions of the Palermo meeting in June 1998 confirmed that the approach had changed. The conclusions no longer use the term confidence-building; they encourage instead the development of partnership-building measures not only in the political and security chapter but also in the other two chapters.

For their part, the Stuttgart Guidelines for the Charter again mention CSBMs as a future possibility, but now the accent is definitively on partnership-building as a general concept. As has been pointed out above, the Guidelines for the Charter define first its principles, scope, and objectives, and then a number of means and mechanisms to attain

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[4] This gradual approach seems advisable in view of the evolution of the EMP since 1995. For a more determined approach, see the concrete measures suggested in EuroMeSCo, *Joint Report*, (mimeo) April 1997, sections IV-VI.

[5] See Claire Spencer, 'Building confidence in the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 2, 1997, 23-48.

those objectives are described. Five categories of means and mechanisms are set forth: (a) enhanced political dialogue, (b) partnership-building measures (that may be understood as a list of concrete measures but also as the general inspiration of all the means and mechanisms), (c) measures to improve good-neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, (d) preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation,[6] and (e) joint action modalities.[7]

Although concrete measures in the military and defence fields are not foreseen, they could be added to the framework depicted in the Guidelines, with the same inspiration of creating a new partnership in those matters. In order to realise this exercise, five different models of international relations in the military and defence fields could be taken into account. Contrary to the assumption underlying the initial insistence on confidence-building, there is not just one archetype (that of the CSCE) but five, at the time of planning multilateral relationships in defence matters in the Mediterranean basin.

A general description of the five relevant models may be as follows.

1. CSCE/OSCE confidence-building model. This model was established within the CSCE framework to appease tensions between the Western and Eastern blocs, particularly between 1986 (Stockholm document on CSBMs) and 1994 (Budapest Conference establishing the OSCE). From the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to the 1986 Stockholm document there were really no practical measures, and from 1990 until 1994 rapid political developments made CSBMs less and less meaningful.[8] CSBMs were originally conceived as tangible steps to soothe threat perceptions and to make it more difficult the occurrence of incidents and accidents that may cause crises. It is obvious that this is not the present point of departure in the Mediterranean. In Cold War Europe, confidence-building had to precede partnership-building (see fourth model below), which could only be attempted once there was no manifest hostility between European countries. In the Mediterranean, partnership-building comes first because there is no direct military threat. Even so, the CSCE documents offer a wide range of "softer" and "harder" CSBMs, such as annual and more specific exchanges of information, improvement of communications, observation, compliance and verification, points of contact, etc., that could be adapted to the Mediterranean region, and possibly transformed into transparency- and partnership-building measures.

2. Bilateral military cooperation in the Mediterranean. There is a novel but already well established practice of north-south bilateral military relations in the Mediterranean, and there are also some brand-new south-south bilateral exchanges. North-south

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[6] This last category "to be developed on a strictly voluntary and consensual basis in the framework of the EMP without interference with other institutions and bilateral efforts".

[7] This category "to be developed at a later stage".

[8] In 1990 alone the following texts were adopted in the CSCE context: First Vienna document on CSBMs, CFE Treaty, and Paris Charter for a new Europe. The Budapest Conference of 1994 changed OSCE's priorities towards dispute settlement, early warning, conciliation, investigation, and supervision of democratic processes.

military cooperation comprises a complex and varied web of heterogeneous relationships. A typical format of these relationships would include a friendship and cooperation treaty developed into more concrete agreements in the defence field which would allow periodic visits of the Ministers of Defence and of chiefs of military staffs. Exchanges in military training, observation of military exercises, military visits, and contacts in military social and cultural events are frequent activities, that may be completed by armaments trade and practical cooperation in military exercises in some cases. South-south military collaboration is starting between some Mediterranean states. Kadry Said has made a thoroughful study of the Egypt-Israel example, showing that this experience in confidence-building may be significant for further cases of bilateral cooperation in the region.[9]

3. NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean dialogues. The objective of both initiatives is basically to increase mutual knowledge and transparency between the respective organisations and their partners, for which reason those initiatives share EMP's general approach, that of cooperative security, that was made explicit in the Stuttgart Guidelines. NATO's and WEU's multilateral dialogues consist of a political dimension and a practical dimension. The political component consists of periodic meetings with representatives from partner countries who express their points of view on security issues and to whom the latest evolutions of the respective organisations are explained. Visits, seminars, and observation of some military exercises are the types of measures that make up the practical dimension.

4. NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP is an original initiative introduced by the North Atlantic Council in January 1994. in order to promote practical military cooperation with NATO's partner countries in accordance with their different interests and capabilities. So far, 27 countries have joined the Partnership, which allows them to maintain a fruitful bilateral relationship with NATO. Amongst PfP's objectives are: to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, to ensure democratic control of defence forces, to maintain the capability to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE, and to develop cooperative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises. Some have propounded that NATO could consider attributing a similar content to its Mediterranean initiative. Although this is not an immediate prospect, it is obvious that the PfP experience could be exemplary at the time of developing NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and EMP's military dimension in the future.

5. Institutionalised multilateral military cooperation. This type of cooperation may be established between states which do not necessarily belong to the same military alliance. One example of this cooperation is the multinational forces (MNFs) that are being created in Europe. Some of them, like EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, are

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[9] See Mohammed Kadry Said, 'Confidence-Building Measures: A Practical Approach', contribution to this same EuroMeSCo's Working Group on the Charter (mimeo), September 1999.

composed of states that belong to both NATO and WEU. But there are also other MNFs, like the Multinational Land Force (MLF) that includes Italian, Hungarian and Slovenian units, or the Polish-Ukrainian battalion. At present there are more than forty MNF in Europe, with varying levels of operability. One cannot dismiss the possibility that MNFs or other types of institutionalised military cooperation will also be created between countries from various shores of the Mediterranean or even within the EMP, at a later stage, once partnership-building measures have been explored and have produced a positive outcome.

After this description, it seems clear that no single model offers a set pattern that could be utilised by the Charter, but some lessons may be drawn particularly from the multilateral dialogues, those of NATO and WEU, and perhaps PfP. The EMP has to find a new approach to regional military relationships, picking and choosing what contributions from former experiences might be used profitably. It is to be expected that a new model will have appeared at the end of this process. In any case, it seems clear that the top-down political process of negotiating, drafting and developing the Charter has to take into account and benefit from the bottom-up process of the existing measures within NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean dialogues but also within the current north-south military bilateral cooperation schemes.

1. CONCRETE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING MEASURES

There are two practical ways of incorporating a new military dialogue in the framework for the Charter established in Stuttgart. Either military PBMs are included in existing categories of means and mechanisms defined in the Guidelines (for instance, under the heading of preventive diplomacy and crisis-management, or else within the list of general PBMs), or a new specific category is set up. If this is the case, a new mechanism called "military partnership- and confidence-building measures", which will realise the same objectives of the Charter, could be created.

Concrete measures should be conceived and approved of, at least in their guidelines, by the Senior Officials of the Barcelona process. Proper financial and human resources should be allocated to coordinate those measures. The Unit dealing with EMP at the EU Council Secretariat could be in charge of military PBMs. Another possibility would be to establish a specific office, with some degree of independence, to coordinate these and other measures established in the Charter, although this possibility is dependant on the wider decision on whether and to what extent the EMP should be institutionalised. It seems more improbable, however, that the European Commission could act with regard to military PBMs, given its lack of competence in military and defence issues.

The following are some ideas for developing military PBMs in the EMP.

- Seminars and academic meetings

- Information seminars and sessions, specifically focused on security and defence issues, either in European or in Mediterranean capitals.

- Euro-Mediterranean network of institutes of defence studies.

- Visits, fellowships, and other personal exchanges.

- Observation of military exercises.

- Informal and working meetings of governmental experts (diplomats, other officials, and military officers) in military issues.

- Exchange of basic information (documents, procedures, doctrines) on military assistance to the civil authorities, military role in civil emergencies, civil-military relationships, participation in peace-keeping operations, land de-mining, etc.

Such activities conducted continuously will make it possible to design a new background for a more profound dialogue and further military cooperation in the future. As already mentioned, the EMP will only at a later stage be able to consider other kinds of measures, such as more traditional CSBMs, planning and holding of joint exercises, institutionalised multilateral cooperation, establishment of Euro-Mediterranean multinational forces, etc.

1. DIFFICULTIES FOR ESTABLISHING A MILITARY DIMENSION IN THE EMP

Although there are reasons that justify incorporating a military and defence dialogue in the EMP, substantial difficulties remain. These difficulties may be classified in three clusters. Firstly, the definition, planning and execution of concrete measures that are suitable for all EMP's partners will be a complex task. Informal contacts ought to pave the way to more specific negotiations. Concrete measures should be feasible, and have a manifest added value for Mediterranean partners. It seems advisable to start with modest measures that are acceptable to both EU and Mediterranean partners.

The existence of some EMP partners with no experience in multilateral military cooperation in NATO's or WEU's Mediterranean dialogues will be the second difficulty. Syria and Lebanon do not take part in those dialogues, and are not apparently ready to start a new experiment within the EMP framework, until they have satisfactorily settled their differences with Israel. Cyprus and Malta are candidates for EU membership but do not partake in multilateral security dialogues either, and the final status of the Palestinian Authority has to be established before it can participate in such dialogues. All those Mediterranean partners (and Libya when it becomes a partner in the Barcelona process) may have serious difficulties in engaging themselves in the military dimension of EMP,

at least at the outset. One way of overcoming this hurdle is perhaps to allow a system for opting-out in a transitional period.[10]

Thirdly, another practical difficulty will be to coordinate this new dimension of the EMP with bilateral military cooperation in the Mediterranean. The existing web of bilateral relations does not satisfactorily achieve the objectives of the Charter, so a number of multilateral partnership- and transparence-building measures could be complementary to the current bilateral relations, which could be continued independently. On the other hand, NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and the military dimension of the EMP are also compatible and mutually reinforcing. Transparency, information, and partnership in security and defence matters are so badly needed in the Mediterranean that EU's and NATO's efforts will continue to be necessary in the foreseeable future. One must also take into account that EMP's military dimension will be limited by the competencies that the EU has in its common security and defence policy, that is to say, in the field of conflict prevention, conflict management, and Petersberg operations. According to its new strategic concept, NATO is the main organisation dealing with security and defence in Europe, for which reason it is only logical that the Alliance continues the dialogue with its Mediterranean partners about such broad issues. NATO's Mediterranean dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to international security. Both EMP's future military dimension and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue are useful and compatible and should be designed consequently. Concrete activities of both dialogues will contribute to a better mutual knowledge and a further rapprochement of EU and NATO, on the one hand, and their Mediterranean partners on the other.

As a general observation, one way of surmounting these substantial difficulties will be to start the proposed dialogue with modest steps. The list of concrete military partnership- and transparency-building measures suggested above contains a number of activities whose realisation seem to be neither particularly troublesome nor politically controversial. Another way would be to allow sub-regional dialogue projects within the EMP and the Charter.

2. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

(1) EMP's global approach, the importance of the military component in the Mediterranean political systems, and the establishment of a common security and defence policy by the EU after the Cologne European Council of June 1999 justify the gradual establishment of a military dialogue within EMP. Some Mediterranean partners may have specific motives for also starting this kind of dialogue.

(2) In order to attain the principles and objectives stated in the Guidelines for the Charter (notably comprehensive and cooperative security), dialogue in military and defence

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[10] Mauritania takes part in NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean dialogues, but it is not a member of the EMP.

issues should be included among the means and mechanisms. The idea is to create modest military partnership-building measures (PBMs) aimed at a better mutual knowledge of security and defence matters, and of officials dealing with these issues in Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and in the respective armed forces.

(3) When defining concrete multilateral military PBMs within the EMP, the experience of NATO's and WEU's Mediterranean dialogues could be very useful. General descriptions of such concrete measures that could be included in the Charter at a first stage are: joint seminars and other academic activities, military visits and similar exchanges, and exchanges of basic information.

(4) The establishment of EMP's military dimension should be prudent and gradual in order to surmount several difficulties. If some Mediterranean partners find it difficult to participate initially in EMP's military PBMs, they could be allowed to opt out at least for a transitional period.

(5) A new military dimension of EMP would supplement current bilateral military cooperation schemes. At the same time, this new dimension would not affect NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and associated measures. NATO's Mediterranean dialogue has an intrinsic value and is complementary to EMP.

Martin Ortega
October 1999

Comments by Ambassador Antonio Badini
on the EuroMeSCo Report on the
Charter for Peace and Stability
Rome, October 15, 1999

It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this session of Euro-Mesco held in Rome. I therefore wish to thank the organizers for inviting me.

I am firmly convinced that the existence of a network involving political research institutes of the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is useful in terms of improving mutual knowledge and building up trust.

The exchange of experiences and evaluations done within Euro-Mesco allows to perform comparative analyses based on the specific situations and conditions of the area. No doubt, this type of analysis will be very useful with a view to drawing up the Peace and Stability Charter. I am sure that the High Officials will put to good use this important tool in the execution of the task assigned to them by the Foreign Ministers in Stuttgart. The time assigned to draw up the Charter is not much. By May an interim report must be ready and submitted to the Foreign Ministers who will meet in Portugal, while the detailed text of the document has to be ready for the IV Ministerial Conference that will take place in France in November.

The Finnish Presidency has already worked out a timetable, but so far no real method has been set. For instance, it is not clear as to what synergy will be established with Euro-Mesco and what guidelines of the

Charter will be given priority in the drafting phase in order to build up consensus.

From what I have seen reading through the documents for discussion of this meeting, I find the quality of the ideas and the proposals suggested encouraging. I think we could not have expected anything better. Turning to the Final Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability, I find the analysis very well-focused on the key issues. It offers interesting evaluations stemming from experience and adequate to the Mediterranean reality.

I hope that the outcome of this meeting and the documents approved, which are being submitted to the High Officials, may help to promote a stronger inter-active dialogue.

As for the document on the «Charter» prepared by Dr. Roberto Aliboni, at this point it should be up to the High Officials to indicate which concepts need to be further analysed in depth and which deserve priority attention.

Since I am here with you today, I would like to make a few preliminary and obviously partial observations.

I would rather focus on two 'over-arching' aspects, so to speak : the concept of security and institutional aspects.

I agree with the thesis that in the Mediterranean the military dimension of security is, at least in the foreseeable future, much less pressing than political contrasts, socio-economic tensions and cultural differences. I am convinced that greater confidence in the region, to be

promoted through a more structured dialogue, would be a powerful antidote to military proliferation brought about by the imbalance of powers. Here is a case in which political security becomes a priority objective to be pursued and that should become a task for High Officials.

What provisions should the Charter contain to strengthen the non-military components of security ? It is clear that the answer to this question implies the identification of «common ground» among the Partners. One could thus give practical expression to co-operative security, a notion which so far has remained somewhat vague.

I would like to be clear on this point. I do not think that it is possible to remove from the political partnership agenda the issue of negotiated disarmament, or of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. However, one could address with urgency the factors that are liable to circumscribe the phenomenon and to facilitate its solution. The intermediate objective should be to strengthen the relationship of trust between North and South and among Mediterranean Partners.

A fundamental factor to be considered in this regard is the perception of mutual behaviours. This is fertile soil on which to build up trust. Are there interferences in the regions ? Perceived threats ? Actions taken by European Countries that generated or are liable to generate fears in the Partners ? If the answer is yes, how can they be eliminated, reduced or avoided ? How much can we do together in order for greater transparency to help create a shared space of security ?

Section 1.1 of the document on the Charter offers some very stimulating ideas. In my opinion, it would be worthwhile analysing them carefully.

For instance, I find pertinent the idea of assuring Partners that no unilateral actions or measures will be undertaken that may fuel mistrust and suspicion or that may be perceived as an intrusion or undue interference into the hierarchy of identity values.

At the same time, it will be necessary to prevent the Partners from appealing to the risk of intrusion to turn down «sic et simpliciter» the internationally accepted standards of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

In this regard, can a shared concept of Good Government provide a useful meeting ground ?

Personally, I am not surprised at the insistence with which Mediterranean Partners expect the EU to play a more poignant role in supporting the stability of the region.

Here too it is necessary to make some choices and to establish clearly which security interests can be co-managed.

This implies that the EU is to define the role of the Charter in building up the CFSP, the Common Strategy and the MEDA Review.

I realise that all this can make some people frown. But a realistic analysis offers no alternatives.

If through the Charter we intend to focus more on co-operative security, it will be necessary, on the one hand, to avail oneself of the

experiences and instruments of the WEO, which should be progressively incorporated into the CFSP, and, on the other, to recognise formally - through the MEDA Regulations that is - the political dimensions of economic development, social stability and cultural understanding.

Thanks to the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can rely on an integrated approach to security.

The Barcelona document is all-encompassing, marking a historical transition in relations between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partners.

However, there remains the unresolved problem as to how the political-economic and social chapters of the EMP interact.

Unfortunately, it does not seem to me that the High Officials unanimously recognise the holistic nature of the Barcelona Declaration, as instead is the case within Euro-Mesco.

In my opinion, an effort should be made in order for the chapters to reinforce one another, so that the impact of the overall action may be greater than that resulting from the mere sum of the single measures.

What does all of this mean ? In my opinion, it means that the value added of a stability action has to be measured by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

It is up to them to decide the right mix of political, economic and cultural instruments to be used, without however changing the financial rules.

The problem is therefore institutional.

The Barcelona Declaration does not provide an appropriate institutional framework and consequently does not allow the political dialogue to perform effectively its main function, which is to prevent tensions and remove the factors of friction and risk.

It is not by chance that the EMP has always remained extraneous to the management of tensions in the area.

We realise that the Partnership cannot replace the initiatives taken in the interest of peace, but it can and indeed must contribute to their completion.

Actually, exactly the opposite was happening before the Palermo meeting of June 1998 ; in other words, the Barcelona process was being held captive by the crisis in the Middle East, so to speak.

Today, thanks to the successful outcome of the Palermo meeting, which so far has been the only case in which the Partnership acted as a sort of «Berlin Mechanism» of the OSCE, a correct relationship between the two processes has been reinstated, as was confirmed by the Stuttgart Conference which, however, failed to give it a concrete content.

Hence the need to solve the problem upstream, giving a political shape and perspective to the Common Strategy of the EU on the Mediterranean, whose first task is precisely to ensure greater consistency in the use of the CFSP and MEDA instruments.

It is for this reason that I believe the Charter and the Common Strategy need to be compatible.

To make a long story short, I think that the problem that currently represents the greatest threat to the credibility of the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership is the lack of an institutional structure, which today is replaced by heavy bureaucracy, infinite procedures and regulations, confusion of roles.

The result is that the Barcelona Declaration has lost its political perspective and that, owing to the fragmentation and dispersal of initiatives, the Partnership has lost its strategic meaning.

What the Mediterranean certainly does not need now is a new «monster» document creating more useless bureaucracy.

The Charter cannot rival with the Barcelona Declaration but rather must represent a functional instrument for its correct implementation and therefore provide an appropriate institutional framework. Italy had already suggested that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should play a central role, meeting in Partnership Councils of sorts.

At the same time, Ministerial Meetings and Meetings of High Officials should be reconsidered, in order to reduce paperwork and to mobilise the actors of development, who currently appear as co-opted and bridled witnesses rather than actual players. The best way, as I see it, would be to lend support to the reforms of the Partners through the national development plans and to encourage greater synergy between the functioning of Association Agreements and the regional dimension of the Partnership. However generous MEDA may be, it will always cover a modest fraction of the financial requirement. It should serve as a catalyst of external resources, including private ones. MEDA, EIB and private funds - if co-ordinated - could allow the EU to play a stronger role in the region and become a true reference factor for international financial institutions.

Sooner or later, the instruments of the Partnership will have to face and compete with the measures implemented by other multilateral fora, starting from the MENA summits. That is why I see the link between the Charter and the review of the MEDA Regulations. How credible can the stepping up of security championed by the Charter be if gaps and shortcomings prevent the Partnership from strengthening development prospects as well as economic and social stability ?

To be sure, Foreign Ministers will not have to meet wearing sometimes the hat of the Charter and other times that of the Barcelona Declaration. I do not think that will be possible. Much better if at their meetings - except when urgent consultation procedures can be activated - two sessions are scheduled : one dedicated to the implementation «strictu sensu» of the provisions of the Charter, and the other to economic, social and cultural matters. This would emphasise the holistic nature inherent in the Barcelona Declaration which has not found practical expression as yet.

VISAS ET LIBERTE DE CIRCULATION

Rome, Euromesco, 15-16 Octobre

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Introduction

Les récents débats, en France, sur la politique d'entrée et de séjour, l'affaire des sans papiers et leur régularisation et, en Europe, sur les difficultés du contrôle des frontières à l'Est et au Sud et les opérations récurrentes de régularisation ont posé, en filigrane, la question de l'efficacité et, au-delà, de l'opportunité du contrôle des flux migratoires.

Dans quelle mesure les Etats peuvent-ils contrôler leurs frontières, séparément ou à plusieurs ? Comme la maîtrise des flux ne fonctionne pas de manière satisfaisante, ni du point de vue de l'efficacité du contrôle, ni du point de vue du respect des droits de l'homme, existe-t-il un moyen terme entre l'ouverture des frontières et l'immigration "zéro"? En termes de coût, de co-développement, de relations avec les pays voisins, ne perd-on pas plus à fermer qu'à ouvrir, compte tenu des effets pervers de la fermeture, contraire à la fluidité des mouvements migratoires ? Qu'en sera-t-il à l'horizon 2 020-2 030 si les sociétés du Nord manquent de main d'oeuvre et doivent à nouveau faire appel à l'immigration ? Quels effets pervers déstabilisateurs pourrait-on attendre, dans ce cas, de l'ouverture des frontières ?

Cet ensemble de questionnements interroge le dogme, partagé par presque tous les pays européens, du bien-fondé de la fermeture des frontières ainsi que des pratiques du contrôle. Il permet aussi de dépasser les postulats du lien entre efficacité du contôle et réussite de l'intégration, ou entre co-développement et alternative à la migration.

I - L'espace migratoire euro-méditerranéen :

I - Le mythe de la pression migratoire massive

II - Les mirages de l'immigration zéro

III - Etude de cas : la politique française des visas

I.   <u>La pression migratoire, sans être massive, va perdurer</u> :

Si, aujourd'hui, l'Europe fait l'expérience de son niveau le plus élevé dans l'histoire, de migrations internationales, notamment dans l'Europe du Sud ancienne terre d'émigration devenue région d'immigration (Italie, Espagne, Grèce, Chypre, Portugal), la migration de masse n'est pas récente et ne constitue nullement une exception historique .

En Europe de l'Ouest, tout laisse à penser que la pression migratoire va continuer à croître dans les prochaines années, du fait de la persistance de causes, même s'il ne s'agit plus d'une immigration majoritairement de main d'œuvre. D'autres flux migratoires, comme la mobilité des qualifiés et des élites à l'intérieur de l'Europe, d'Est en Ouest ou du Sud au Nord se sont développées dans les années 80, en même temps que l'on assistait à une explosion des demandeurs d'asile ·

En Europe, l'idée selon laquelle le Nord comblerait son déficit démographique par le Sud n'est pas partagée par les décideurs des politiques publiques qui se considèrent comme incapables d'admettre davantage d'immigrés. Ils se distinguent en cela radicalement des Etats-Unis, du Canada et de l'Australie

L'Europe demeure la seule grande région d'immigration à ne pas pratiquer le système des quotas, quantitatif ou qualitatif, et à faire de la fermeture des frontières sa doctrine migratoire. Elle semble réagir de façon essentiellement défensive au profond bouleversement démographique planétaire auquel elle doit faire face : six milliards d'habitants avant l'an 2000, contre un milliard au début du siècle, et une pression migratoire dont elle n'a pas le monopole mais qui engendre chez elle un syndrome de saturation.

Des propositions ont été faites en France en faveur d'une nouvelle politique migratoire prenant en compte l'idée de réouverture des frontières à des catégories limitées et sélectionnées de population (suppression des visas aux universitaires en visite, allégement du régime des étudiants, inscription de l'asile territorial dans la loi sur l'entrée et le séjour des étrangers : Mission de Patrick Weil de 1997) mais ces initiatives se sont parfois un peu perdues dans les méandres d'une réforme qui ne touchait pas fondamentalement à la remise en cause des principes de la politique migratoire.

D'autres pays, comme l'Allemagne, pratiquent les quotas de main d'œuvre, parfois sous couvert d'accords bilatéraux avec les pays de l'Est, ou entr'ouvrent leurs frontières à leurs frères de sang, les Aussiedler, candidats potentiels à la migration. En Europe du Sud on régularise au coup par coup pour dégonfler le "matelas" de clandestins qui se constitue dans ces pays attractifs, économiquement et géographiquement pour une telle main d'œuvre (Italie 1986, 1989-90 et 1998-99, Espagne et 1986, 1991, Portugal 1992-93 et 1996, Grèce 1997). On assiste à une multiplication de situations au rabais, bricolées de façon diverse et discrétionnaire par beaucoup de pays européens : statut provisoire, séjour à titre humanitaire, asile territorial, contrats de sous-traitance, maintien de personnes dans une situation précaire, ni régularisables ni expulsables.

Les frontières existent, leur fermeture ne fonctionne pas de manière satisfaisante car elle est sélective, alimente des filières de passage liées à la prohibition et ne respecte pas les droits de l'Homme.

II   En Europe : les mirages de l'immigration zéro

A l'échelle de l'Union européenne, la politique migratoire s'inspire de deux principes : ouverture à l'intérieur et fermeture à l'extérieur. Les accords de Schengen, signés en 1985, avaient pour objectif premier de faciliter la libre circulation intérieure pour les pays signataires. Leur interprétation conduit essentiellement à en faire un instrument de lutte contre les migrations externes, en "communautarisant" la gestion des frontières extérieures par le système des visas et par le filtrage des demandes d'asile. Des accords de réadmission, signés avec les pays tiers et qui font de ceux-ci les garde-frontières du système Schengen, viennent parachever le dispositif, avec pour but de lutter contre l'immigration clandestine. Ces pays s'engagent à reprendre sur leur territoire les personnes venues de ces pays ou ayant transité par eux avant de franchir illégalement les frontières de l'Union (le premier accord avec la Pologne a été signé le 29 mars 1991). Cette stratégie de dissuasion concourt à une immigration stable dans les pays de l'Union, et à une diminution des entrées et notamment de l'asile, à l'exception des flux déterminés par des événements conjoncturels (éclatement du bloc communiste, conflit yougoslave). Les accords de Trevi et de Dublin complètent le dispositif, à l'échelon de l'Europe des Quinze, pour l'harmonisation des politiques d'asile et de lutte contre le terrorisme.

En fait, il n'y a plus de réponse nationale au phénomène des migrations internationales, car leur échelle et leur diversité dépasse toute expérience antérieure. Car par delà la symbolique du contrôle et de la frontière, l'essentiel des

politiques d'admission réside aujourd'hui dans le système des visas, mis en place depuis les accords de Schengen à partir de 1986, assorti de condamnations plus sévères des entrées illégales et de la responsabilité des transporteurs, de l'élargissement des possibilités d'expulsion, de reconduction à la frontière et de détention, du renforcement des sanctions contre les employeurs, de difficultés accrues pour le regroupement familial et le mariage sur le territoire de l'Union européenne.

Partout, la restriction l'emporte, ainsi que la dissuasion et parfois la suspicion (à l'asile, au tourisme, au mariage, aux études) à l'égard de toutes les voies d'entrée.

A l'échelle nationale, l'immigration zéro est encore plus un leurre, car les Etats ne peuvent agir que sur un volume très limité, l'essentiel des entrants étant protégés par des textes constitutionnels (le droit de vivre en famille pour le regroupement familial) ou par des traités (la Convention de Genève de 1951 pour le droit d'asile) et, plus encore, par le dispositif européen. A moins d'une détermination politique exceptionnelle, aucun pays de l'Union ne peut avoir de politique autonome, enserré qu'il est dans une série d'accords internationaux.

Le passage des questions d'immigration et d'asile du troisième pilier (aux termes des accords de Maastricht) intergouvernemental, au premier pilier (traité d'Amsterdam), communautaire aura peut-être pour effet de rendre moins dépendantes les politiques nationales à l'égard de l'opinion. De fait, celle-ci jouent davantage sur leur effet d'annonce et sur les entrées de quelques "petites" catégories, numériquement, car elles sont de plus en plus dépendantes

d'un jeu international, tout en continuant à agiter la symbolique de la souveraineté étatique.

Pourtant, de fait, les frontièrs ne sont pas fermées pour tous. D'autres formes de sélection des flux migratoires existent, par l'argent et par les relations. Elles sont de l'ordre du pouvoir discrétionnaire des Etats : titres de séjour délivrés "intuitu personae", qui correspondent souvent à une sélection "par le haut" ; développement de l'asile territorial et de dispositions humanitaires qui peuvent parfois ressortir de l'arbitraire. C'est ainsi qu'aucun modèle de fermeture ne fonctionne de manière totalement satisfaisante, ni en termes d'efficacité restrictive, ni en termes de respect des droits de l'homme : la conciliation de l'une et de l'autre, objectif affiché des politiques d'admission en Europe, est toujours le fruit d'une bataille ou, au mieux, d'un compromis.

Le contrôle des frontières a un coût

Le contrôle des frontières a un coût paradoxal, à la fois politique et économique. Un coût politique, car les Etats n'ont ni les moyens de lutter radicalement contre l'immigration clandestine, ni la possibilité, vis-à-vis de leurs voisins du Sud avec lesquels ils entretiennent des relations diplomatiques et culturelles (francophonie, etc...), de mettre en pratique les reconductions prononcées. Un coût économique, car la politique de fermeture des frontières coûte cher en moyens policiers (escortes, centres de rétention, contrôles d'identité) pour des résultats aléatoires et qui vont à l'encontre d'autres réalités économiques. Sait-on par exemple que l'instauration des visas de court séjour

en 1986 a eu pour effet de diminuer de plus du tiers l'activité du port et de l'aéroport de Marseille, et que de grands commerces de la ville ont dû fermer, car la migration traditionnelle et le commerce transméditerranéen se sont reportés sur d'autres grandes métropoles côtières, en Italie et en Espagne ?

De plus, le fait que l'on ne puisse finalement mener à bien une politique de maîtrise des frontièrs annoncée haut et fort, crée de graves frustrations dans certaines parties de l'opinion, qui risquent d'adhérer ensuite aux propositions de fermeture les plus électoralistes et les plus extrêmes. Une telle politique est d'ailleurs difficile à évaluer, par suite d'une mauvaise connaissance des flux migratoires : sous-enregistrement des étrangers, absence de statistiques sur les sorties d'étrangers et d'enregistrement global des flux d'entrée ; le silence sur le sujet profite à ceux qui le rompent ... Les politiques migratoires sont ainsi de plus en plus dépendantes de l'état de l'opinion, au point d'avoir recours à des pratiques souterraines par peur de celle-ci : régularisations au cas par cas, délivrance de titres de séjour "à la carte". Les opérations de régularisations, auxquelles ont procédé la France (1982 et 1998) et l'Europe du Sud (Italie, Espagne, Portugal, Grèce), ainsi que la mobilisation des "sans-papiers" en France, montrent que la fermeture est inefficace et sans doute pas nécessaire.

La politique de fermeture est également génératrice d'effets pervers, contraires à la fluidité des mouvements de population et aux éventuels ajustements structurels des pays du Sud et de l'Est, ceux-ci étant aussi liés à la mobilité des personnes, qui permet de réduire les écarts économiques, sociaux et culturels entre régions de départ et d'accueil. De plus, comme le montre

Danièle Lochak (1997), la politique de fermeture, loin de favoriser l'intégration de ceux qui sont déjà là, comme les discours officiels l'ont souvent répété, tend au contraire à l'entraver, en installant dans la précarité des populations qui, de toutes façons, resteront (impossibilité d'accéder à un titre de séjour ni à un travail régulier, parents d'enfants nés en France, déboutés du droit d'asile venant de pays où ils risquent leur vie, irréguliers installés de longue date).

La politique de fermeture des frontières va de surcroît à l'encontre de son objectif affiché d'incitation aux retours, en bloquant sur place, par crainte de perdre leurs droits, ceux qui auraient préféré pratiquer des allers-retours et, à terme, repartir chez eux. Depuis la suspension officielle des entrées en 1973-1974, cette politique provoque le regroupement et l'installation durable de migrants qui étaient mobiles durant les années de croissance. L'échec des politiques de retour, tant en France qu'en Allemagne, démontre la réalité de ce phénomène.

Enfin, la fermeture, toutes catégories de migrations concernées, risque d'aggraver les écarts entre pays d'émigration et d'immigration, souvent atténués par la circulation des hommes : l'intégration du Portugal dans l'Union européenne en constitue le meilleur exemple. On pourrait élargir la comparaison à des pays largement tournés vers l'Europe, comme le Maroc et, plus généralement, le Maghreb, où la frustration liée à l'absence de possibilités de *sortir* tend à aggraver les déséquilibres. En accordant plus de place aux mouvements de travailleurs qualifiés et en facilitant leur circulation entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, on pourrait leur permettre de participer plus activement à la

consolidation du développement et à la création d'emplois dans leur pays. Comme le fait remarquer Jean-Pierre Garson (1998), le seul passage au libre échange est insuffisant pour constituer un processus d'intégration régionale.

Ainsi, le bien-fondé des politiques d'admission axées essentiellement sur la police des étrangers n'est pas aussi évident qu'il y paraît, malgré l'apparente convergence des pays européens sur ce point. En tout état de cause, l'effet des politiques de fermeture reste limité, quand on sait que c'est le marché du travail et les aspirations culturelles qui incitent au départ.

Ainsi, dans les pays européens la surenchère législative qui a caractérisé les politiques migratoires depuis les années 1980 correspond tout autant à une politique d'opinion qu'à une volonté de renforcer l'efficacité des politiques de contrôle, qui joue en amont, plus discrètement, à travers les refus de visas dans l'espace Schengen (550.000 refus par an en moyenne sur un nombre de demandes cinq fois supérieur en France).

III - Une étude de cas : l'évolution de la politique française des visas

L'instrument central du contrôle des flux migratoires repose sur le système des visas. Cette procédure, délivrée par le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, en fonction d'une tradition ancienne qui remonte à la Révolution française a été considérablement durcie et élargie en octobre 1986, par la suspension des accords bilatéraux dispensant de l'obligation de visa pour l'entrée sur le territoire : rétablissement des visas pour l'ensemble des pays, sauf pour l'Europe communautaire ou la Suisse. Les accords de Schengen conclu le 14 juin 1985 entre la France, l'Allemagne fédérale, la Belgique, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas, dont la convention d'application a été signée en juin 1990, ont étendu et harmonisé les conditions d'entrée dans les Etats signataires : suppression progressive des contrôles aux frontières communes des pays concernés assortie d'un contrôle renforcé aux frontières externes de l'espace Schengen. Le contrôle des frontières s'effectue ainsi en amont et à distance, de l'Europe « forteresse ». Les Etats signataires s'engagent à harmoniser le système de délivrance des visas, d'information commune (SIS), de lutte contre l'immigration illégale et d'éloignement du territoire Une collaboration policière concernant le refus d'admission pour des motifs d'ordre public et de sécurité, s'est mise en œuvre dans un cadre intergouvernemental et non encore communautaire. L'arrivée de l'Italie, de l'Autriche et de la Grèce a renforcé le dispositif commun de sécurité. Mais, à l'échelon français, des dysfonctionnements se produisent en raison du nombre élevé d'acteurs impliqués dans la délivrance de quelques deux millions de visas par an.

De l'avis du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, le système des visas est relativement souple, mais il est possible d'alléger encore le dispositif pour les personnes « de bonne foi ». Il existe plusieurs types de visas, définis par les accords de Schengen et par les dispositions réglementaires de mars 1995 :

- Les visas de court séjour, qui concernent moins de 100.000 personnes, valables

pour l'ensemble de l'espace Schengen.

Le rapport Weil de 1997 a introduit début 1998 un assouplissement du dispositif d'ensemble,

permettant davantage de mobilité. Leur coût est de 230 F. pour trois mois. Il s'agit de visiteurs

venant pour convenances personnelles.

-    Les visas de circulation, d'une durée d'un à cinq ans, permettant à des catégories de

personnes ne présentant pas de risque migratoire de circuler plus librement et plus

facilement : universitaires, journalistes, hommes d'affaires, commerciaux. Comme un

dispositif trop rigide empêchait beaucoup de ces personnes de venir en France, une ouverture

à leur égard a été amorcée dès 1992 afin de favoriser les échanges et la francophonie (des

instructions « ciblées » ont été données à l'égard de l'Afrique du Nord et de l'Afrique noire).

La durée de validité d'usage des visas a été allongée et le visa de circulation devrait devenir la

norme pour les « élites » auxquelles on le propose même si elles ne le demandent pas. Leur

coût est de 325 F. par an et il faut ajouter 155 F. pour chaque année de plus. Leur durée ne

peut excéder cinq ans car on ne peut pas donner aux visas une durée supérieure à celle d'un

passeport. Ce visa est valable pour l'ensemble de l'espace Schengen. Les pays du Maghreb

constituent le quart des demandeurs de ces visas, précédés par le Liban.

- Les visas de long séjour : étudiants, bénéficiaires du regroupement familial, travailleurs

échappant à l'opposabilité de l'emploi, visiteurs pour convenances personnelles. Les délais

d'obtention sont plus longs et les visas sont valables pour un seul pays d'accueil.

Quant aux demandeurs d'asile et réfugiés, à peine 600 par an demandent un visa.

Sur les quelques 170 millions d'étrangers annuels franchissant les frontières

françaises, ceux qui entrent par une frontière extérieure de l' espace Schengen représentent 40

millions. En amont, la France est saisie dans ses postes diplomatiques et consulaires d'environ

2,3 millions de demandes de visas par an, parmi lesquels on évaluait les refus, en 1996, à

quelques 550.000 cas. Mais les refus de visas (dont le nombre aurait, semble-t-il, diminué aujourd'hui) ne sont pas publiés, pour éviter les tensions diplomatiques entre les pays demandeurs.

Quelques tendances, tant dans la politique des visas que dans les mouvements de personnes, caractérisent la zone euro-méditerranéenne :

- un consensus se fait jour autour de l'idée que les élites doivent circuler et que toutes les personnes qui contribuent au développement de cette zone doivent bénéficier d'un traitement privilégié.

- le déplacement familial a constitué un « boom » dans les pays du Maghreb au cours des dernières années : besoin ou rencontre entre proches et nécessité, parfois, de quitter son pays (Algérie)

- les commerçants et trafiquants ne constituent plus de « problème » migratoire : (migrants temporaires libanais, commerçants et entrepreneurs maghrébins), à la différence, selon le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, des ressortissants du Moyen Orient. Quant aux saisonniers au titre d'accords bilatéraux (Tunisie, Maroc), leur volant tend à se réduire, de même que pour les contingents étudiants.

A l'exception de l'Afrique du Sud, il semble que la discipline de Schengen se soit bien mise en place, grâce au système d'informations européen (SIS) et au modèle de visa unique et uniforme entre les différents pays de l'Union. Certains craignent que le grand avantage du système de Schengen, sa souplesse, ne disparaisse avec le passage des questions d'immigration et d'asile au Ier pilier d'Amsterdam. L'assouplissement du système des visas continue à constituer un objectif à court terme pour la formation des élites et la poursuite du dialogue euro-méditerranéen.

Toutefois, des questions demeurent en suspens et constituent autant de revendications pour le mouvement associatif immigré dans l'espace européen :

- la suppression des visas de court séjour pour ceux qui effectuent des va-et-vient entre l'Europe et le Maghreb et ne constituent pas de « risque » migratoire. L'existence de ces visas, qui accentue la fracture entre Européens, bénéficiaires de la libre-circulation intra et extra-européenne et non Européens bloque un processus de mobilité qui vient contredire les velléités de libéralisation des échanges. Le forum européen des migrants s'est fait, depuis plusieurs années, l'un des porte-paroles de cette revendication.

- la motivation des refus de visas : celle-ci a donné lieu à une série de débats entre l'opinion et le Ministère de l'Intérieur. La loi Chevènement de 1998 précise que dans le cas général, en dehors de situations dûment précisées, il n'est pas nécessaire de justifier le refus de visas. Certains mouvements (associations, parti des Verts) considèrent que les dispositions qui exonèrent l'Etat de la justification de ses actes sont contraires à la notion d'Etat de droit et proposent d'inverser la procédure en rendant générale la motivation des refus de visas et en l'assortissant d'un recours offert au demandeur, sauf dans les cas expressément précisés par la loi.

Quelques ouvertures sont à signaler, notamment à l'égard de l'Algérie : alors que, pendant quatre ans, le nombre de visas a été divisé par plus de dix, le quota de visas accordé par la France aux Algériens a été porté à 200.000 en juin 1998. A l'égard de la Roumanie également, on constate une relative ouverture par rapport au blocage des visas au nom du « risque migratoire » qui s'apparentait à une politique discrétionnaire de guichet il y a trois ou quatre ans. Une libéralisation s'amorce, à l'égard des populations de classes moyennes qui cherchent à circuler davantage. Quant aux demandeurs d'asile roumains, nombreux à s'adresser à la France, ce n'est pas par les visas que l'on réglera ce flux (entre le tiers et la moitié des demandes d'asile annuelles).

II - Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen :

I - Les réseaux transnationaux

II - Les clandestins, fruit de la fermeture ou de l'ouverture ?

III - Migrations et co-développement

I   La frontière, qui est une contrainte pour les uns, peut être une ressource pour d'autres

L'existence, ou l'apparition de frontières liées aux politiques des Etats, peut générer plusieurs logiques : une logique diasporique, parfois née de prohibitions religieuses ou ethniques, qui a connu une immigration autour de la Méditerranée aujourd'hui (les réseaux transnationaux, analysés par Jocelyne Cesari), une logique d'installation, liée à la fermeture

Cette logique de réseaux est aussi une forme de migrations d'un type nouveau car elle correspond, à sa manière, à la migration-prestation de services à laquelle les Etats et les politiques migratoires ont beaucoup de mal à s'adapter. Cette migration "du troisième type" (après la mobilité des "oiseaux de passage" des années de croissance et la migration d'installation des années de crise) contribue à retirer aux Etats leur rôle d'acteurs principaux des logiques migratoires : les acteurs des réseaux économiques transnationaux sont dans des situations de double insertion, de double installation, d'allégeances multiples. Cette migration est une ressource, elle défie la souveraineté des Etats et l'existence des frontières, elle entrecroise continûment le symbolique et l'instrumental dans un espace international renouvelé, fonctionnant davantage "par le bas" que "par le haut". Le territoire étatique n'est plus l'espace exclusif et identitaire pour ceux qui transgressent les frontières et sont capables d'en tirer des ressources. Une didactique s'installe entre Etats et réseaux, entre nomades et sédentaires. L'Etat perd le monopole du contrôle (il ne l'a eu qu'à la fin du XIXe siècle) et s'inscrit dans une démarche ambiguë, tendant à

faciliter les voyages et la circulation des personnes qui ne sont des immigrés (la citoyenneté européenne) et à contrôler les migrations. Mais, comme une partie des migrations se fait par le voyage (entrées avec visas de touristes) il y a parfois contradiction entre ces deux objectifs (migrations des étudiants et des classes moyennes, aux marges du "brain drain" et de la migration économique, qui tantôt s'installent – thèse de Mustapha Belbah -, tantôt repartent, faute de perspective d'ascension sociale – travaux de Vincent Geisser -). Des réseaux marchands divers fleurissent dans les crevasses, les interstices, les "niches" des grands systèmes : économie de la drogue, de la contrefaçon, de la contrebande, du "trabendo" (jouant sur des taxes et détaxes à l'importation et à l'exportation des voitures, et sur le marché des pièces détachées, sur le marché de gros et de détail pour l'électroménager et l'habillement entre l'Europe de l'Ouest, le Maghreb et l'Afrique de l'Ouest). Des entreprises diverses se développent, créant des espaces migratoires où l'État n'est plus un acteur qui disparaît, mais un acteur qui n'est plus exclusif : entreprises ethniques s'adressant à une clientèle ethnique (la viande hallal ou le prêt à porter islamique, comme élément d'accompagnement de la migration de travail), entreprises de produits non ethniques s'adressant à une clientèle nationale (restauration, épicerie, artisanat), et entreprises-refuges de produits non ethniques pour une clientèle variée (cigarettes, fleurs). L'espace devient multipolaire et consiste parfois à revitaliser des commerces anciens. L'exemple des entrepreneurs et commerçants maghrébins en est un : il fonctionne essentiellement en dehors de la coopération institutionnelle euro-méditerranéenne et le processus engagé à Barcelone en 1995 apparaît comme "l'instrumentalisation politique d'une aire géo-politique décalée des manières d'être des acteurs" (Rémy Leveau).

II.   Les clandestins et l'ouverture des frontières

Si la trop grande sévérité de la loi, accompagnée d'une tolérance de fait about it à la création de clandestins "officiels", l'ouverture, même sélective, l'entr'ouverture ou la non fermeture des frontières a-t-elle une conséquence sur l'augmentation de l'immigration clandestine ? Si, par définition, une partie de l'immigration clandestine se légalise avec l'ouverture, transformant le regard que les autres portent sur elle (le cas des Portugais depuis leur entrée dans l'Union européenne et hier suspects de clandestinité en fournit un exemple), il n'y a pas de relation mécanique entre ouverture des frontières et immigration clandestine car tout dépend de la structure de l'immigration potentielle et des anticipations de la migration concernée.

1) L'ouverture ne signifie pas invasion

Les exemples sont là pour le montrer, dans l'histoire et dans le temps. Au temps où l'immigration coloniale maghrébine bénéficiait de facilités de circulation avec la France et où le marché du travail français était demandeur de main d'œuvre dans les années de croissance on n'a pas assisté à un déferlement de populations venant envahir l'Europe, même s'il s'est agi d'une immigration de masse. A Ceuta et Melilla, bastions extrêmes aux avant-postes de l'Europe en terre africaine, l'idée de hordes de clandestins prêts à investir l'Espagne et l'Europe est plus fantasmatique que réelle : dans la zone d'Algesiras, depuis 1990, les autorités espagnoles n'arrêtent guère plus d'un millier de clandestins par an.[1]

Les frontières se déplacent : il y a trente ans elles auraient été dans les Pyrénées .

2) <u>L'ouvertue est porteuse d'une meilleure intégration</u>

Dans la mesure où elle supprime ou diminue les effets de précarité des étrangers dus au séjour et au travail (nécessairement clandestins si l'on n'a pas de papiers), l'ouvertue est porteuse d'une meilleure intégration des nouveaux venus, qui bénéficient, en outre, de plus de mobilité, n'étant plus "assignés à résidence" faute de papiers ou du fait des difficultés à obtenir un nouveau visa d'entrée. La fermeture entrave au contraire l'intégration de dizaines de milliers d'étrangers maintenus en situation irrégulière alors qu'ils resteront, et les allers et retours de ceux qui craignent de perdre leurs droits (pensions, retraites) s'ils envisagent de rentrer chez eux (le rapport Weil avait mis en évidence cet argument en simplifiant les modalités d'entrée des retraités). L'ouverture est synonyme de plus grande fluidité, d'un plus grand respect des droits de l'homme. C'est dans cet esprit que nombre d'associations, dont le Forum des Migrants de l'Union européenne, plaident pour que les résidents réguliers (carte de dix ans, en France) puissent se déplacer sans visa en Europe. L'abolition des visas de court séjour permettrait entre autres, à des nationalités largement réparties sur le territoire européen (Turcs, Marocains) de circuler plus facilement pour ensuite pouvoir étudier ou travailler dans un espace européen.

En France, la régularisation de 1982-83 a montré qu'à l'époque, 30% des régularisés travaillaient dans le bâtiment, les autres étant répartis dans les services domestiques, la restauration, la confection, ce qui indique que ces secteurs fonctionnent structurellement avec de l'immigration clandestine.

Le cas de l'Italie est encore plus éclairant. Presque tous les immigrés sont entrés en Italie sans permis de séjour, pour y travailler et ont donc dû

accepter des emplois non déclarés. Mais, même lorsqu'ils ont été régularisés et qu'ils ont pu avoir un emploi régulier, une forte proportion d'entre eux a continué à travailler dans l'économie souterraine. Dans la plupart des emplois (agriculture, bâtiment, services domestiques, garde d'enfants, nettoyage) les immigrés clandestins ont remplacé un travail autrefois domestique. Dans les autres métiers (marchands ambulants), ils sont complémentaires à la fabrication italienne dans l'économie souterraine (contrefaçon, artisanat du cuir et de l'habillement). Les domaines où il y a concurrence véritable avec le marché du travail national sont relativement faibles, du fait également que ces migrants vivent surtout dans le Centre et le Nord de l'Italie, qui sont des régions de plein emploi pour le travail manuel. Mais cette incorporation dans l'économie "submergée" est un facteur d'appel pour l'Italie et empêche l'installation promotionnelle des immigrés qui doivent faire la preuve d'un travail régulier pour voir leurs titres de séjour renouvelés, en vertu des procédures de régularisation .

Malgré le chômage, dont le taux est l'un des plus forts d'Europe, le déséquilibre entre l'offre et la demande entraîne un effet d'attraction de travailleurs immigrés, ce qui remet en question l'équation présumée entre immigration et chômage. "L'opinion publique, les hommes politiques et l'Etat consacrent beaucoup d'attention et de ressources à contrôler les frontières externes de la "forteresse" Europe. Peut-être serait-il bon de s'attaquer à la dégradation du marché du travail, dont le travail au noir est la forme la plus extrême et la plus perverse" (Emilio Reyneri, 1998).

Au début des années 1990, à côté de la coopération centralisée ou de la coopération entre gouvernements, on adopte le concept de développement humain, incluant aussi bien la dimension économique que socio-politique et culturelle. De nouvelles approches se font jour, "du bas" vers "le haut" mettant en avant les communautés locales et les institutions décentralisées (coopération décentralisée) ou encore des partenaires individuels (coopération ex-centrée), de façon plus personnalisée. Ces trois formes de coopération, centralisée, décentralisée et ex-centrée doivent opérer en symbiose, avec comme cible des unités locales bien définies et à forte propension migratoire.

1) Les mécanismes européens : Lomé, Barcelone

A l'échelon européen, la première orientation d'une politique de coopération européenne trouve ses racines dans les rapports historiques – le lien colonial – des pays européens avec les nouveaux Etats indépendants, bénéficiaires d'une association au Traité de Rome (1957). Le premier accord institutionnel de la Communauté européenne dans le domaine de la coopération au développement est la Convention de Lomé, fondée en 1975 : de bilatérale, la coopération devient multilatérale. Mais cette politique communautaire n'a pas pour but de contrôler ou de constituer une force de dissuasion pour les mouvements migratoires : chaque pays européen accueille "ses immigrés".

Mais certains ont qualifié la coopération de ressources que l'on prend aux pauvres des pays riches pour les donner aux riches des pays pauvres. Au

cours des années 1980, les pays européens cherchent à dépenser mieux avec moins. D'un côté, ils prennent conscience que l'interdépendance Nord-Sud a changé de nature (la sécurité, l'humanitaire sont devenus pluri-dimensionnels) et que les mouvements migratoires font partie de ce nouveau concept de sécurité, accompagné d'autres comme l'environnement, les crises régionales, les trafics de drogue. D'un autre côté, et de façon quelque peu contradictoire, les pays industrialisés, répondant en cela aux tendances les plus nationalistes de l'opinion publique se focalisent sur le contrôle des frontières. La nouvelle approche de la coopération décentralisée met l'accent sur le partenariat, la plus grande transparence des décisions et la valorisation des savoir-faire.

Le second processus est celui engagé à Barcelone en 1995 où l'Union européenne a décidé de promouvoir la Coopération euro-méditerranéenne, incluant Israël et l'Autorité palestinienne. La paix, la sécurité, les droits de l'homme apparaissent comme la contrepartie du libre échange, sur le modèle des accords liant les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique (ALENA : association de libre échange nord-américain – NAFTA -). Des accords bilatéraux ont donné l'occasion à de nombreux Etats (27 pays étaient réunis à Barcelone) de confirmer leur engagement : la libéralisation progressive des échanges se fera par étapes jusqu'à l'horizon 2010. Le commerce est envisagé comme une alternative à la migration, grâce à une libéralisation des échanges commerciaux qui diminuerait l'incitation à la mobilité (mais l'Union européenne n'importe que 6% de ses produits des pays méditerranéens alors qu'ils exportent plus de la moitié de leurs marchandises vers l'Europe). Cette dépendance économique

des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée à l'égard de l'Europe, qualifiée, par certains, d'excessive, s'articule sur deux postes-clés : les services, créateurs d'emploi (tourisme saisonnier) et l'agriculture, gros employeur de main d'œuvre (fleurs, fruits, légumes), qui doit devenir compétitive avec l'Europe avec l'argument : "Si vous ne voulez pas les tomates des Marocains, vous aurez les Marocains". Mais le risque, à court terme, est d'accélérer la mobilité, liée à la liberté de commercer et de libérer des masses paysannes mises au chômage par les impératifs de productivité et de professionnalisation de l'agriculture, car certains préféreront être clandestins dans un pays riche qu'en situation régulière dans un pays pauvre.

2) La libéralisation des échanges :

L'OCDE, qui a cherché à évaluer l'effet des migrations sur les pays d'origine (Conférence de Rome, 1991) a ensuite exploré les voies d'une politique visant notamment à libéraliser les échanges et à encourager l'investissement, public et privé (Conférence de Madrid, 1993). Les conclusions portant sur les relations entre les échanges commerciaux, les migrants et le développement sont doubles : si la migration est avant tout une réponse à des différentes importantes de revenu et d'emploi et si l'ouverture aux échanges et aux capitaux augmente le revenu et le bien être de tous, il y aura diminution de l'invitation à partir. Si la migration est due à une rupture de l'équilibre démographique et économique qui se produit lorsque le développement est annoncé, la mobilité interne tendra à sortir des frontières :

développement et migration iront de pair. Les deux thèses se concilient si l'on introduit la dimension temporelle : "Dans le court et le moyen terme, le développement initialement favorisé par le processus d'ouverture accroît l'incitation à émigrer, mais dans le long terme, le développement économique améliore le niveau de vie et rend l'émigration moins avantageuse" (OCDE, Migrations et développement, 1994). S'appuyant sur des études de cas, les experts de l'OCDE constatent que la relation la plus fréquente rencontrée entre une libéralisation des échanges et les flux migratoires est de type complémentaire et non substituable. Certains se demandent même si la réduction des flux migratoires est un objectif légitime, "compte tenu des effets bénéfiques que peuvent exercer l'un sur l'autre migration et développement ainsi que sur des valeurs humaines essentielles qui sont en jeu" et qu'eu égard aux écarts considérables entre les niveaux de vie des populations dans le monde, "l'étonnant n'est pas qu'il y ait autant de migrations mais qu'il y en ait si peu" (Bernard Wood, OCDE, 1994). Enfin, la propension à émigrer et la possibilité de le faire peut demeurer plus élevée pour certains candidats à la migration que pour d'autres, même si le plus grand nombre est aujourd'hui touché par la mondialisation de l'information : exode des cerveaux, don t l'effet est particulièrement néfaste aux pays en développement qui d'ailleurs manquent moins de main d'œuvre qualifiée et d'élites que de modes d'utilisation efficace de ceux-ci.

3) Les transferts de fonds

L'un des effets les plus directement palpables des migrations sur les pays de départ sont les transferts de fonds, qui parfois dépassent, de loin, les aides publiques au développement et constituent dans certains pays, l'une des premières sources de devises (Maroc, par exemple). Le phénomène des transferts de salaires a acquis une dimension de plus en plus importante dans les échanges internationaux et il s'accroît : d'après les données de la Banque Mondiale les transferts de salaires représentaient, en 1989, 8,5% de la valeur des opérations financières internationales et constituent aujourd'hui, pour les pays exportateurs de main d'œuvre, une part non négligeable des importations et des exportations : dans certains pays, 25 à 30% des exportations sont liées à la consommation et aux entreprises commerciales des émigrés, et les chiffres varient de 10 à 35% pour les importations. Il y a plusieurs sortes de transferts : transferts de biens exportés (notamment voitures, électro-ménager, électronique), système de "compensation", notamment entre la France et l'Algérie du fait du contrôle des changes. Comme le décrit Jean-Pierre Garson (OCDE, 1994) : "Le principe consiste pour l'immigré à régler en France et en francs les factures ou les achats de ses compatriotes non résidents. De son côté, l'acheteur non résident dépose de l'argent sur un compte dans le pays d'origine, le compte appartenant à l'émigré."   Il y a aussi les transferts bancaires (deux milliards de dollars par an rapportés par les émigrés au Maroc   en 1994) et les transferts "à la valise" pratiqués notamment par les Africains sub-sahariens chez qui plus de la moitié des transferts effectués vers le pays d'origine emprunte d'autres chemins que ceux

mis en place par les institutions bancaires et postales – "tontine", groupes d'entraide, groupements de développement local de la région d'origine –.

Même s'il n'y a pas de rapport mécanique ni de lien de cause à effet entre les transferts de salaires et le développement, l'émigration a un effet positif sur l'allégement de la pauvreté. Ces investissements, qualifiés d'improductifs par certains, permettent de créer des emplois dans le bâtiment et les transports. Peu d'immigrés ont les capacités, le désir et un environnement propres à créer des entreprises, car ceux qui réussissent dans leur pays d'origine sont ceux qui ont réussi ici. Ces transferts sont aussi un facteur de modernisation des modes de vie, indispensable au développement qui peut permettre des investissements dans des projets de création d'entreprise plus ambitieux.

Ainsi la Turquie, en maintenant stable le taux de change, a réussi à profiter des avantages des versements effectués par ses ouvriers en Allemagne.

Les aides bilatérales ou multilatérales des gouvernements et des entreprises sont-elles de nature à diminuer les flux migratoires, quand les transferts de salaires des émigrés représentent plus de la moitié de "l'aide au développement" ?

4) L'investissement étranger

Seuls les Etats des pays d'immigration peuvent le promouvoir, par une politique de coopération active, mais à la condition qu'elle soit relayée par les entreprises, souvent peu enclines à investir dans des zones considérées comme peu sûres.

L'aide, publique, notamment, peut être conditionnée à l'évolution démographique et démocratique des pays de départ, car l'impulsion pour le développement ne doit pas être imposé de l'extérieur et ne peut réussir que si les pays bénéficiaires sont partie prenante.

5) Les micro-projets régionaux

Il s'agit de formes de coopération économique régionale autour d'associations villageoises, comme au Maroc, au Mali, en Mauritanie et au Sénégal. Instruments de coopération ex-centrée ou décentralisée selon les cas, nés autour des années 1970, ils se posent, depuis les années 1990, en partenaires à part entière des ONG et des Etats, du Sud comme du Nord. Faisant le constat des limites des Etats dans ce domaine, les associations développent des stratégies parallèles avec l'adhésion des populations aux processus de développement. Priorité est donnée aux micro-projets par rapport aux macro-projets En France, plus de 400 associations d'immigrés d'origine sahélienne s'étaient ainsi tournés vers le développement de l'Afrique de l'Ouest en 1993, dont 105 implantées en Ile de France. Les pouvoirs publics soutiennent parfois ces micro-projets, encore fragiles (PDLM – Programme de développement local Migrations en France -) afin de créer des emplois sur place, avec un succès inattendu.

6) L'aide au retour

Considérée au début comme le remède-miracle à une immigration de main d'œuvre fortement touchée par la crise, la politique de retour a connu quelques réaménagements au début des années 1980, avec un accent plus fort mis sur la réinsertion volontaire et concertée. Mais le bilan qui en a été dressé dès le milieu des années 1980 en a révélé des résultats très modestes : seule une très faible proportion de candidats s'est manifestée, même là où les mesures étaient d'autant plus incitatives que l'on partait dans un délai court (proportionnalité de la prime en fonction de la rapidité de la décision, comme en Allemagne), les départs ont surtout été le fait d'Européens (Espagnols et Portugais), originaires de pays d'où ils sont parfois revenus au bénéfice de la libre circulation établie par la suite (1992). D'autres immigrés, originaires de pays extra-communautaires (Maroc, Turquie) sont parfois revenus coûte que coûte (en Allemagne un dispositif a cependant permis aux enfants de se réinstaller) souvent dans la clandestinité, car l'une des clauses des aides au retour et à la réinsertion était la redistribution lors du départ, des titres de séjour. Les nationalités les plus anciennement installées en Europe, comme les Algériens en France, ont boudé cette politique, car la perte des droits sociaux liés au retour était loin d'être compensée par le montant des aides proposées. Enfin, les expériences de retour et de réinsertion ont parfois manqué de suivi à moyen et long terme et se sont soldées, soit par des investissements peu productifs, sans effet d'entraînement économique, soit par des projets trop ambitieux et abandonnés par la suite. Malgré son caractère séduisant, mais quelque peu démagogique, le projet des "immigrés coopérants" ne compte que quelques exemples ponctuels réussis.

La mission interministérielle "co-développement et migrations internationales" confiée en 1998 à Sami Naïr innove en ce sens qu'elle propose aux immigrés des pays signataires de conventions de co-développement, une "mobilité maîtrisée" permettant aux bénéficiaires et aux anciens immigrés en situation régulière de revenir en France pour y effectuer des stages (visas de circulation). L'image de la France y gagne quant à l'ouverture et à la francophonie grâce à cette mobilité "restaurée" et l'aide aux projets doit dépasser la simple aide au retour par l'accroissement de l'aide financière, la création de systèmes financiers décentralisés et le renforcement des dispositifs d'appui et d'accompagnement. Il s'agit "d'organiser la mobilité pour dynamiser les échanges", de "transformer l'aide au retour en aide au projet", de "réintroduire la fluidité" d' "établir des relations de partenariat", enfin et surtout de ménager un "retour dans la dignité" aux sans papiers non régularisés (Le Monde 5 mai 1998). Les résultats n'ont pas été à la hauteur des attentes. Un an après (Le Monde 16 juin 1999), Vingt-et-un contrats de réinsertion seulement avaient été signés. Certains ont parlé d'aide au retour déguisée. Un tel projet a eu l'intérêt de prendre en compte la mobilité et les micro-projets. Mais le temps n'est pas le même pour l'individu et pour l'Etat, et encore moins pour l'opinion publique et le co-développement.

Enfin, le co-développement n'est pas seulement économique : le transfert de savoir-faire politique n'est pas à négliger (radio, presse pluraliste). Il doit surtout être dissocié de l'obsession de la maîtrise des flux migratoires et du retour des immigrés dans leur pays d'origine.

Dans les grandes zones de "fracture" du monde que sont la rive sud de la Méditerranée 50% de la population a souvent moins de 25 ans même si la baisse de la fécondité est bien amorcée.

Si la perspective d'une émigration massive n'est plus de mise pour des pays, les effets d'ajustement liés au processus de Barcelone ne sont pas encore prêts à dissuader les candidats à une émigration de moindre ampleur et l'hypothèse d'inversion des flux par des retours massifs n'est pas non plus d'actualité.

Peut-on envisager de réduire les flux migratoires à court terme par le seul développement potentiel des pays d'origine ? Sur le long terme, le libre échange et l'augmentation de la production dans les pays pauvres peuvent diminuer l'émigration. Mais à court terme, l'accélération des échanges induite par ce processus aura plutôt pour effet d'inciter davantage à la mobilité, compte tenu des écarts de développement, non seulement économique mais aussi socioculturel et politique, entre les aires d'arrivée et de départ.

Mais, si le (co)développement ne peut tenir lieu de solution unique au problème de la régulation des flux migratoires, l'ouverture pure et simple des frontières ne suffit pas non plus.

Conclusion

Quelques recommandations s'imposent :

- Puisque l'ouverture des frontières est à l'ordre du jour (sommet de Tampere, en Finlande, du 15 octobre 1999) à l'échelon européen, il importe d'accompagner ce mouvement d'idées en demandant l'abolition des visas de court séjour qui bloquent la mobilité, creusant la frontière intérieure qui s'établit, autour des visas entre ressortissants européens et non-européens et freinant les échanges entre les immigrés, leurs pays de départ et les acteurs du partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Les refus de visas doivent tous être motivés.

- Puisque plus les frontières sont fermées, plus les migrants se stabilisent dans les pays d'accueil et que plus elles sont ouvertes, plus les populations circulent, il convient, pour accélérer la mobilité et limiter les formes de sédentarisation liées à la fermeture, de faciliter, voire d'encourager, la circulation des populations peu enclines à une installation définitive et actrices des relations euro-maghrébines (intellectuels, hommes d'affaires, commerçants, artistes, classes moyennes, étudiants avancés) par des politiques d'échanges bénéficiaires au développement de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée.

- Un assouplissement des politiques d'asile, restées rigides dans les pays européens quand l'Etat n'est pas l'acteur de la persécution (à l'encontre des Algériens) est tout aussi indispensable pour améliorer le dialogue.

- Enfin, les tracasseries administratives qui enserrent le regroupement familial dans des règles trop strictes et condamnent parfois à la clandestinité des catégories fragilisées sont à revoir dans un cadre euro-méditerranéen concerté.

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<u>Xénophobie, Migrations et Perception de l'Autre</u>

<u>EUROMESCO – WORKING-GROUP</u>
<u>ROME 15-16 OCTOBRE 1999</u>

Fifi Benaboud - Centre Nord-Sud du Conseil de l'Europe

La multiplication des discrimination et des actes d'intolérance dans la vie quotidienne est une réalité qu'aucune société ne peut occulter. Le phénomène semble désormais être pris au sérieux. Au delà des décisions et mesure gouvernementales, c'est la société toute entière qui doit se sentir concernée par ce phénomène menaçant.

Les actes des xénophobies et d'intolérance sont en Europe notamment, et surtout, commis à l'encontre des immigrés et des personnes issue de l'immigration. L'objectif premier de ce papier est d'identifier des mesure pratiques susceptibles d'êtres prises pour combattre les comportements racistes et xénophobe. Avant d'identifier les mesures appropriées, il est nécessaire de procéder à deux tâches préliminaires.

- La première consiste à cerner de façon claire et précise le phénomène xénophobe de telle manière que l'objet des mesures soit identifiable.

- La seconde tâche qui découle de la première vise a cerner les causes du phénomène de façon à ce que les mesures de prévention touchent également leur objectifs.

Sans une compréhension claire et précise de la nature et des causes du problème, il n'est pas toujours possible d'élaborer de façon appropriée des mesures pratiques et d'en attendre des effets positifs. Les concepts dont nous traitons ici, identité, perception, rejet, intolérance, échappent au domaine de la logique. Nous naviguons dans les représentations, les images, les clichés, c'est à dire dans un système de subjectivité qui s'appliquent pourtant à des réalités objectives : **l'immigration existe, les immigrés aussi.** Ceci est d'autant plus exacerbant qu'on observe une fragilisation des sociétés et une montée des tensions sociales provoquant une crise d'identité chez les "autochtones" eux mêmes.

Le traité d'Amsterdam, entré en rigueur le 1/5/99, rappelle que "l'Union est fondée sur les principes de la liberté, de la démocratie, du respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales ainsi que de l'état de droit, principes qui sont communs aux Etats membres."

Le refus et la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie, font partie intégrante de ces droits. D'autre part, la Convention Internationale des Nations Unis sur l'élimination de toutes formes de discrimination raciale, (1965) définit le problème comme "toute distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondées sur la race, la couleur, l'ascendance, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, qui a pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de compromettre la reconnaissance, la jouissance ou l'exercice, dans des conditions d'égalité, des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales dans les domaines politique, économique, social, culturel ou dans tout autre domaine de la vie publique ".

La convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme reste, quand à elle, le cadre général de la lutte contre la discrimination et la xénophobie. Il est utile de rappeler que le respect des Droits de l'homme, tel que garanti par la Convention, est un principe général du droit communautaire, notamment dans un contexte de migrations.

1. Phénoménologie de la xénophobie :

Il existe des conditions historiques et sociales, que nous ne développerons pas ici, qui engendrent la xénophobie : " l'état d'étranger ", le préjugé ethnocentrique, les perceptions négatives et stéréotypées des migrants. Dans le binôme xénophobie/migrations, les effets sont nombreux et touchent tous les domaines de la vie quotidienne (éducation, emploi, logement, question administratives).

Les " tendances " politiques et économiques fluctuantes ont aussi un effet sur l'intensité xénophobe selon les périodes (Rôle des Institutions, chômage, inégalités économiques, etc.). D'autre part, le rôle des médias est primordial et insidieux quand aux clichés véhiculés et à détermination de " l'état d'étranger ", de l'Autre.

Xénophobie et Culture : Ce rapport prend de plus en plus d'ampleur et se présente, même souvent, comme le point fondamental basé sur un système de valeurs " dérangé " par des différences culturelles. Il y a en Europe, une crise de valeurs basée sur un certain rejet de l'Autre, plus profondément une incapacité de sortir de cette logique séculaire Occident/Orient, Christianisme/Islam, National/Etranger. Logique dont le migrant est perçu comme la première colonne. Or les valeurs qui sont au fondement de la civilisation judéo-chrétienne, européenne notamment, sont des valeurs de justice, de liberté, de partage et de complémentarité qui, toutes, prétendent à l'universalité. Or, une pratique discriminatoire qui réserve l'application de ces valeurs aux seuls communautaires, ne nie-t-elle pas ses valeurs et ne les ampute-t-elle pas de leur dimension universelle?

De plus, le social est profondément lié au culturel. Le fait qu'une grande partie des migrants du sud de la Méditerranée est constituée par des catégories inégales du point de vue social, prend une ampleur démesurée en période de crise caractérisée par le chômage, comme c'est le cas actuellement en Europe.

Des enquêtes touchant les opinions publiques, avec le témoignage de nombreuses associations, montrent que les conflits culturels et normatifs passent au premier plan et devancent les conflits fondés sur les signes physiques de différenciation (couleur de la peau par exemple). Pour reprendre l'expression de Taguieff, 'il y a eu déplacement de la race vers la culture'.

Xénophobie et perception de l'Autre : La xénophobie entraînant discrimination, suppose de traiter différemment certaines personnes, de les traiter avec iniquité. L'acte de violence xénophobe peut compléter (ou complète souvent) cette attitude de discrimination. Et là le rejet est direct, violent. Les groupes visés : les migrants.

La composante commune réside dans le fait que ces groupes sont perçus comme étant " Autres ", des groupes qui sont fondamentalement différents d'une conception ethnocentrique du " nous ".

L'identité des migrants en tant qu'objet de rejet et de xénophobie, ne tient pas à des caractéristique objectives des dits groupes, mais à la perception que les autres ont d'eux. Cette

identité est souvent caractérisée par des stéréotypes, des clichés négatifs (l'arabe, l'immigré, le maghrébin, le musulman, l'islamiste) et une suspicion exacerbée par rapport à ces catégories. Cette perception négative fait que les groupes établis, rejettent, excluent de leur domaine social des personnes perçues comme appartenant aux groupes étrangers d'identité religieuse ou ethnique différente. Cette perception et ces représentations de l'Autre se construisent et se réactualisent en fonction, aussi, du contexte politique, social et économique. Ces perceptions négatives des migrants induisent des effets réels, que ce soit dans le discours politique, et de manière plus pratique dans les phénomènes courants de discrimination, voire de violence raciste et xénophobe. La discrimination liée à la perception négative de l'Autre, se manifeste à l'école, dans le logement, l'emploi.

Bien souvent, la discrimination et le rejet xénophobe ne découle pas de normes ou de prescriptions sociales, mais constituent une réaction spontanée imputable à des sentiments et des attitudes négatives, liées elles même à une perception négative et stéréotypée de l'Autre. De plus, certains facteurs sous-jacents sont déterminants dans le renforcement du phénomène de xénophobie et d'intolérance. Les plus marquants étant l'influence du discours politique et des médias, de même que le contexte socio-économique. Nous somme convaincus qu'une lutte efficace contre, la xénophobie et l'intolérance, exige une approche soutenue et globale, concrétisée par une vaste série de mesures qui soient complémentaires et couvrent tous les domaines de la vie sociale, politique, économique et culturelle.

2. Mesures de lutte contre la Xénophobie et les perceptions négatives

Les mesures juridiques ont une importance primordiale, mais néanmoins, ne suffisent pas a elles seules à faire barrage aux phénomènes en question. De plus, le défaut d'application des lois pertinentes qui existent, discrédite l'ensemble des mesures prises pour lutter contre la xénophobie.
Les Etats, doivent examiner, de manière constant, leurs législations pour s'assurer qu'elle prévoit des mesures effectuées dans le domaine de l'interdiction de la discrimination ainsi que dans le domaine connexe d'élimination de toutes formes d'intolérance et de discrimination fondées sur la religion ou les croyances. En termes législatifs, ils doivent intégrer la lutte contre la xénophobie et le racisme dans l'ensemble des politiques et programmes. Il est important aussi, du fait de l'évolution des formes de rejet, liées a de nouvelle conditions socioculturelles, d'élaborer de nouvelles approches.

Toujours en termes législatifs, il serait judicieux de prendre des mesures qui contraindraient les Etats du Partenariat à interdire les discriminations fondées sur l'origine ethnique où la race, dans les domaines sociaux et économiques et de prévoir des sanctions strictes contre les pratiques discriminatoires.
Les solutions juridiques, fondées pour une grande part, sur le maintien de l'ordre, ne peuvent permettre à elle seules de surmonter le problème.
La volonté politique est indispensable à la mise en œuvre de la législation antixenophobe et antidiscriminatoire.

L'efficacité de la lutte contre ces phénomènes, repose en grande partie sur des mesures pratiques, concrètes. Des plans d'actions intégrées tant sur le plan national qu'international et qui repose en grande partie sur l'Education, la Formation, la sensibilisation des opinions publiques, la promotion et la protection des droits des individus appartenant a des groupes minoritaires ou de migrants, ainsi que sur les médias, doivent être élabores et menés à bien par tous les Etats du

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partenariat.

Plusieurs plans d'action ont déjà été menés en Europe depuis des années. Mais il faudrait en élaborer essentiellement entre les 27 partenaires et les mener dans le cadre global de la Déclaration de Barcelone.

- La lutte contre la xénophobie, est un phénomène horizontal commun aux programmes concernant l'éducation, la formation professionnelle et tous les domaines touchant la jeunesse.

Education : Au niveau de l'éducation, des stratégies à moyen et long terme, reposant sur des mesures à caractère éducatif sont cruciales pour enrayer ou du moins atténuer les différentes manifestations de la xénophobie.

Nous pouvons apporter ici quelques point concrets touchant à la mise en œuvre de mesures de confiance dans ces domaines d'actions :

- Renforcement des programmes visant à éliminer les préjugés par l'enseignement de l'histoire, en mettant en évidence les influences mutuelles positives entre l'Europe et les pays du sud de la Méditerranée, entre les différentes religions et idées dans le développement historique de la région.

- Le développement de l'éducation dans les domaines des droits de l'homme et du respect des diversites culturelles

- Renforcement de la compréhension mutuelle et d'une perception plus positive entre les peuples au moyen de programmes de coopération et d'assistance. A ce propos, soulignons que de nombreux programmes développés par le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Union Européenne pour les PECO. fonctionnement depuis de nombreuses années et ont donné lieu à des résultats probants. (Phare, Socrates/Comenuis, Leonardo da Vinci, Jeunesse pour l'Europe, Tempus II, etc.) Il faudrait envisager un travail de fond et de forme afin de créer de semblables programmes orientés vers les pays du partenariat euroméditerranéen.
L'école, l'université, en tant qu'institutions privilégiées de formation, sont totalement concernées par ces questions fondamentales.
L'Education doit forcer a la mobilisation de l'arsenal des outils et mécanismes déjà existants, et à l'élaboration et la conception de nouveaux instruments dans la connaissance et l'application de la règle de droit.

- Promouvoir une éducation à la compréhension inter-culturelle, notamment dans un contexte de migrations.
En effet, il est indéniable que les sociétés ont des caractéristiques pluri-culturelles certaines, crées en Europe essentiellement par les mouvements migratoires des dernières décennies et constituent un phénomène irréversible et globalement positif dans la mesures ou ces sociétés peuvent contribuer à la création de liens plus étroits entre les peuples des deux rives de la Méditerranée.

La présence dans les écoles européennes de millions d'enfants issues de l'immigration constitue une richesse et un atout important à moyen et long terme, à condition que soient promues des

politiques éducatives qui encouragent et favorisent l'ouverture d'esprit et la compréhension des différences culturelles. Dans ce contexte, les enseignants ont un rôle primordial à jouer en aidant les élèves à s'intégrer à l'école et à la société, ainsi qu'en favorisant une compréhension mutuelle et une perception non entachée de clichés et de stéréotypes négatifs. Pour remplir cette tache, les enseignants doivent recevoir une formation adéquate qui les prépare à adopter une approche inter-culturelle, formation fondée sur une prise de conscience de l'apport que constitue la compréhension entre les cultures. Les enseignants, aussi bien dans les pays d'accueil que dans les pays d'origine, devraient adopter une approche inter-culturelle car tous sont concernés.

La formation des enseignants devrait leur permettre de prendre conscience des diverses formes d'expression culturelle des communautés de migrants. Ils doivent aussi reconnaître que les attitudes ethnocentriques et les stéréotypes peuvent avoir des effets néfastes. Les causes et effets économiques, sociaux, politiques et historiques des migrations doivent être a la base de leur réflexion.

Les échanges entre les différentes approches éducatives des pays du partenariat seraient positifs et permettraient d'ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives dans la coopération développée dans le cadre de Barcelone.

- L'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de matériel scolaire et didactique conjoint, développant clairement ces principes serait une bonne initiative de la part des Etats du Partenariat.

- L'organisation de stages communs de formation pour enseignants des pays d'accueil et enseignants des pays d'origine est à encourager

- Développer de manière organisée et intégrée les échanges entre écoles des pays d'accueil et des pays d'origine.

Formation : Nous avons focalisé notre recherche de plan d'action et de mesures de confiance surtout au niveau éducation. Au niveau formation, nous avons abordé, plus haut, la Formation des enseignants, mais elle se situe aussi dans d'autres domaines. Il s'agit de la Formation de la Police de la Formation des personnels administratifs ayant un contact direct avec les migrants, aussi bien niveau local qu'au niveau national. Ces domaines de formation pourront être développes dans une finition plus poussée de notre étude.

Médias: Nous le rappelions précédemment, le rôle des médias est primordial dans la lutte contre les perceptions négatives de l'Autre et contre la xénophobie. Les journalistes et les hommes de médias d'une manière générale, devraient être contraints par un code de déontologie à respecter l'image des autres et à ne pas inciter à l'intolérance, au rejet et à la xénophobie.

Un plan d'action " des bonnes pratiques " au niveau des médias pourrait être élaboré. Mais nous n'allons pas détailler ici ce chapitre, qui a lui seul constituerait une recherche complète.

Sensibilisation des opinions publiques : L'une des mesures concrètes de lutte contre la xénophobie et l'intolérance, qui nous semble d'un grand intérêt, est la sensibilisation des opinions publiques, qu'elles soient du Nord ou du Sud. Cette politique de sensibilisation du

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public, en faveur d'une société de tolérance, de compréhension mutuelle et d'interculturalité, est efficace, dans la mesure où elle touche toutes les composantes de la Société. Elle doit avoir une dimension locale, régionale et nationale.

Elle implique les gouvernements, les pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, les organisations non gouvernementales, les différentes institutions éducatives et culturelles, etc.

Cette politique se basera sur une campagne de sensibilisation et sur des projets pilotes impliquant différents secteurs de la société des pays du partenariat. En effet les actions contre la xénophobie et l'intolérance ne peuvent reposer uniquement sur les mesures prises par les gouvernements. La contribution des partenaires sociaux et de la société civile est essentielle à tous les niveaux.

Nous pouvons dire qu'autant le phénomène de xénophobie est complexe, autant il est difficile de le combattre. Il est cependant essentiel de s'atteler à cette tâche si on tient à ce que le partenariat euro-mediterranéen puisse se construire sur des bases humaines solides. En effet, il sera difficile de concevoir une mise en œuvre solide du partenariat au niveau du premier et deuxième volet, si le pilier humain n'est pas pris en considération et si les perceptions sont négatives et entraînent des rejets.

Il est alarmant de constater la résurgence des phénomènes de racisme et de xénophobie, le développement d'un climat d'intolérance, la multiplication des actes de violence, notamment à l'égard des migrants, des traitements dégradants et des pratiques discriminatoires qui les accompagnent. Cette recrudescence du phénomène est du aussi à une résurgence de nationalismes agressifs et d'ethnocentrisme qui constituent de nouvelles formes de xénophobie. Tout cela avec un sous bassement de dégradation des conditions économiques que menace la cohésion des sociétés nord et sud méditerranéenne, en engendrant des formes d'exclusion susceptibles de favoriser les tensions sociales et les manifestations xénophobes, alors même que les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales constituent les assises d'une société démocratique. Il est évident que ces phénomènes d'intolérance menacent les sociétés démocratiques et leurs valeurs fondamentales.

Un des objectifs de la construction européenne a été la l'établissement de sociétés démocratiques et pluralistes, respectueuses de l'égale dignité de toutes personnes. Dans ce contexte, il est important de promouvoir une prise de conscience des exigences des droits de l'homme et des responsabilités qui en découlent dans une société démocratique. Et c'est à ce niveau que les pays du partenariat devront développer une coopération et un dialogue poussé.

La diversité culturelle est souvent, et de plus en plus, perçue comme une barrière. Des mesures de confiance adéquates, justement élaborées et menées avec constance, pourraient atténuer, réduire cette perception négative et permettre une construction solide de l'espace euro-méditerranéen tant sur le plan politique, économique, social que culturel. Une volonté politique décidée et franche de la part des Etats du partenariat est indispensable en premier lieu.

Je dirais que si on veut que l'espace euroméditerranéen devienne une zone de stabilité, de paix et de croissance partagé, il faut que les perceptions changent et que les sociétés évoluent vers une compréhension mutuelle et un dialogue réellement basé sur le partenariat.

▶ Schedule

Ramallah, 1-2 December 1999
Annual Conference
General Assembly

Roma, 15-16 October 1999
Working Groups' Meeting:
"Integration and Sub-regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean"
"The Euro-Mediterranean Charter";

Israel, 15-16 September 1999
Working Groups' Meeting:
"Integration and Sub-regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean"

Cairo, 19-20 April 1999
Working Group's Meeting: "Integration and Sub-regional Co-operation in the Middle East"

Bonn, 20 March 1999
Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar during the German Presidency of the European Union
Steering Committee Meeting

Paris, 31 January-1st February 1999
Steering Committee Meeting

Rabat, 12-14 December 1998
Working Group's Meeting: "Integration and Sub-regional Co-operation in the Maghreb"
EuroMeSCo projects 1998/1999: presentation of the progress reports
Steering Committee Meeting

Barcelona, 16-18 July 1998
Working Group's Meeting: "Integration and Sub-regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean"
Workshop: "Antipersonnel Landmines in the Mediterranean"
Steering Committee Meeting

Brussels, May 1998
EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Meeting

London, 15-17 May 1998
Annual Conference
General Assembly
Steering Committee Meeting

Sintra, 25 and 26 April 1998
Working Groups' Meeting
Steering Committee Meeting

London, 29 March 1998
Steering Committee Meeting

Lisboa, 22 November 1997
Steering Committee Meeting

Tunis, 29 September-1 October 1997
Annual Conference
General Assembly
Steering Committee Meeting

Paris, 16-17 June 1997
Working Group's Meeting: "Political and Security Co-operation"
Steering Committee Meeting

Malta, April 1997
Presentation of the EuroMeSCo Working Groups' Joint Report to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference

The Hague, 13-14 March 1997
EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar during the Dutch Presidency of the European Union

General Assembly

Lisboa, 24-25 February 1997
Working Group's Meeting: "Political and Security Co-operation"

Cairo, 14-17 February 1997
Working Group's Meeting: "Confidence Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention"

Rabat, 28-30 November 1996
Working Groups' Meeting:
"Political and Security Co-operation"
"Confidence Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention"

Madrid, 25-26 October 1996
Working Group's Meeting: "Political and Security Co-operation"

Roma, 5 October 1996
Steering Committee Meeting

Sesimbra, 7-8 June 1996
EuroMeSCo Inaugural Meeting

Archive

Working Groups

Groupe de travail EuroMeSCo

L'intégration et la coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée

Les objectifs du groupe de travail sur la coopération politique et de sécurité sont, premièrement, définir les conditions politiques nécessaires au renforcement de la coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen Orient, les acteurs favorables à cette intégration et, ensuite, formuler des recommandations pour le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Les objectifs du groupe de travail sur la coopération politique et de sécurité sont, premièrement, définir les conditions politiques nécessaires au renforcement de la coopération sous-régionale au Maghreb et au Moyen Orient, les acteurs favorables à cette intégration et, ensuite, formuler des recommandations pour le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Les relations entre l'Union européenne et les partenaires méditerranéens se développent dans un contexte international dans lequel coexistent des facteurs d'intégration, de multilatéralisme et de multipolarisme, d'unipolarisme et d'unilatéralisme politique et économique. Le groupe EuroMeSCo sur la coopération et l'intégration sous-régionale vise continuer et approffondir la réflexion menée dans le passé par EuroMeSCo. Des considérations générales et des recommandations spécifiques ont été formulées et présentées dans le rapport commun EuroMeSCo.

Tout d'abord, contrairement aux accords signés entre l'Union européenne et d'autres ensembles, le pem est de nature différente dans la mesure où les partenaires ne forment pas un groupe intégré. En effet, le Sud méditerranéen présente un évident déficit institutionnel et d'intégration sous-régionale. L'intégration sud-sud est quasiment inexistante. Le Sud méditerranéen échappe à la tendance mondiale vers l'intégration sous-régionale et la régionalisation économique. Il n'existe dans le monde arabe aucun projet d'intégration comparable au Mercosul (Marché commun du sud), à l'ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) ou à la SADEC (Southern African Development Community), et les initiatives du passé, comme l'UMA (Union du Maghreb arabe), se trouvent en état d'hibernation. Les projets concernant la création de nouveaux espaces d'intégration économique sous-régionale, tels que le «nouveau Moyen-Orient» et un marché commun de la Ligue arabe, n'ont pas encore été mis en place.

Deuxièmement, la réussite de l'intégration sous-régionale suppose un degré suffisant de «convergence politique» et de coopération pacifique entre les Etats membres. Au Moyen-Orient, la réalisation de progrès significatifs au niveau de la coopération économique et de l'intégration reste suspendue à des contraintes politiques, et surtout à des percées significatives dans le processus de paix. Au Maghreb, ces contraintes sont liées aux difficultés et aux tensions inhérentes aux processus de transition politique et aux contentieux inter-étatiques. La culture du «power politics» et les nationalismes sont des facteurs à surmonter en tant qu'obstacles à la coopération régionale et à l'intégration.

Ainsi, le processus d'intégration euro-méditerranéen est donc limité, surtout comparé à celui du Nord. Il a été décidé à Barcelone d'aller au-delà du libre-échange en intensifiant la coopération dans les domaines politique et social. Ainsi, le processus d'intégration doit aller plus loin que la perspective "bi-multilatérale" (un accord signé entre, d'une part, une organisation multilatérale, l'Union européenne, et d'autre part un Etat) et inclure des dimensions d'intégration Sud-Sud et Nord-Sud.

Textes

Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée

«Régionalisme dans le contexte international actuel»

«Les obstacles politiques à l'intégration au Maghreb»

«Les acteurs et les priorités de la coopération au Maghreb»

Perspectives nationales sur la coopération au Maghreb

Tunisie

Algérie.

Maroc

Perspectives nationales sur la coopération au Moyen-Orient

Israel

Egypte

Palestine

Jordanie

«Les obstacles politiques à l'intégration au Maghreb»

«Les acteurs et les priorités de la coopération au Maghreb»

Perspectives nationales sur la coopération au Maghreb

[Annual Conference] [EuroMeSCo - Senior Officials Meetings] [General Assembly] [Steering Committee] [Working Groups]

Working Groups

EuroMeSCo Working Group
The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability
In general terms the Group on the "Charter" has the task of reflecting and elaborating on the decision-making mechanism of the Charter and the instruments by which it can pursue the implementation of the "area of peace and stability" in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

Papers and terms of reference

In general terms the Group on the "Charter" has the task of reflecting and elaborating on the decision-making mechanism of the Charter and the instruments by which it can pursue the implementation of the "area of peace and stability" in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

These mechanisms and instruments are mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration as well as in the Action Plan set out by the Senior Officials at the beginning of the process. However, these principles and purposes cannot be accomplished unless the Parties to the EMP establish more clearly and in more detail the decision-making mechanism which would allow to perform such tasks effectively. This is definitely expected to be the purpose of the Charter and will be the topic of the Group.

To fulfil its task, the Group will generate the papers which follow. These papers (along with all the papers produced by EuroMeSCo) will support the drafting of a final report by Roberto Aliboni, in his capacity as the rapporteur of the Group, and the IAI's in-house staff.

Paper (A) -Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, IAI, Rome

The mechanism for political dialogue of the Charter - a broad reflection on the political dialogue's institutions, the political rationale, and the instruments that the Charter would provide as a central feature of the EMP Political and Security Partnership

Paper (B) Prof. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim. Director, Center for Asian Studies, University of Cairo

Contending perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability and their Policy Implications. An Arab point of view

The paper will review the main approaches advocated by the EU and the southern partners to formulate a Charter for Peace and Stability, assess the roots of these different perceptions,and reflect on their likely impact on the formulation of the Charter and the future of Euro-Mediterranean political co-operation.

Paper (C) Jean-François Daguzan, Directeur des Recherches, Fondation Méditerranéenne d'Etudes Stratégiques, Toulon - **La charte euroméditerranéenne : aspects institutionnels et opérationnels**

1 - options institutionnelles: 1.1 - quelles structures acceptables ? 1.2 - quel contenu ?

2 - options opérationnelles: 2.1 - médiations, prévention et résolution des crises et

Paper (J) Dimitrios Triantaphillou, Deputy Director, Eliamep, Athens

The "Charter" in a sub-regional context: CBMs, CSBMs and conflict prevention in the Eastern Mediterranean area - the paper will address the security picture in the Eastern Mediterranean by focussing on the various major bilateral and multilateral treaties, accords and facts that are in existence. An attempt will then be made to analyze those in the context of regional stability and to propose a framework for CBMs, CSBMS and conflict prevention which will aim to alleviate some of the tension stemming from some of these accords.