Halki

International Seminars 1999

TEN YEARS OF FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION



The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

a seminar jointly organised by:

the HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP)
&
the EUROPEAN MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY COMMISSION (EuroMeSCo)

Halki - Greece
September 12 - 16, 1999

THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
European Mediterranean Security Commission (EuroMeSCo)
Halki, 12-16/IX/1999

a. Programme
b. List of participants
1. "The greater Middle East in the twenty first century"/ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh
2. "CFSP from theory to practice"/ Guido Lenzi
3. "NATO's Mediterranean dialogue"/ Alberto Bin
4. "The enhanced political dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership"/ Roberto Aliboni
5. "La charte euro-méditerranéenne pour la paix et la stabilité: éléments juridiques et politiques"/ Jean-François Daguzan
6. "The establishment of a Euro-Med conflict prevention centre"/ Stephen Calleya
7. "Early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean context: conceptual questions, procedures and instruments"/ Radoslava Stefanova
8. "CBMs and CSBMs and partnership building measures in the charter"/ Claire Spencer
9. "Israeli perspectives on regional security and confidence building"/ Gerald M. Steinberg
10. "The enduring rivalry between Greece and Turkey: can democratic peace break it?"/ Kemal Kirisci
11. "Turkey-Greece : prospects for cooperation or confrontation"/ Ilter Turkmen
12. "Turkey-Greece : prospects for cooperation or confrontation? A review of recent developments : summary of presentation"/ Constantinos Zepos
13. "Cyprus as a challenge and an opportunity for Europe"/ Andreas Theophanous
14. "Libya's inclusion in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership"/ Alison Pargeter

(a)

Halki International Seminars

TEN YEARS OF FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION **1999**

Session 99.3b

The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

A seminar jointly organised by
The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
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With the support of the WEU – Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Programme

Halki - Greece
September 12-16, 1999

Sunday 12 September

18:30 **Seminar Registration (Halki Hotel)**

18.45 **Welcoming Addresses – Seminar Orientation- Introductions**
Prof. Theodore **COULOUMBIS**, *University of Athens; Director General, ELIAMEP, Athens*
Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, ELIAMEP, Athens*

19:00 – 21:00 **The Greater Middle East in the 21st Century**

Chair: Prof. Fawaz **GERGES**, *MacArthur Fellow and Visiting Senior Scholar, American University, Cairo*

Speakers: Dr. Pirouz **MOJTAHED-ZADEH**, *President, Urosevic Foundation, London*
Mr. Mohamed **ABD EL-SALAM,** *Senior Researcher, The Center for Political & Strategic Studies, Al – Ahram Foundation, Cairo*
Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, ELIAMEP, Athens*

21:00 **Buffet Dinner** (Halki Hotel)

Monday 13 September

09:30 – 13:00 **International Organisations and the Mediterranean Region**

Chair: Mr. Guido **LENZI**, *Director, WEU – Institute for Security Studies, Paris*

Speakers: **Presentation of the Scenarios "Europe 2010":** Dr. Gilles **BERTRAND**, *Forward Studies Unit, European Commission, Brussels*
EU's Mediterranean Policy: Dr. Stelios **STAVRIDIS**, *Director, Center for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, University of Reading, UK*
NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Dr. Alberto **BIN**, *Political Affairs Division, NATO, Brussels*
WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue: Dr. Martin **ORTEGA**, *Research Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris*

09:30-13:00 **EUROMESCO PARALLEL SESSION: The Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean: Institutional and Political Arrangements**

Chair: TBA

Speakers: **The Mechanism for Political Dialogue of the Charter:**
Dr. Roberto **ALIBONI**, *Director of Studies, IAI, Rome*
Contending Perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability and their Policy Implications: An Arab Point of View: Prof. Mohammad **SELIM**, *Director, Center for Asian Studies, University of Cairo, Giza*

La Charte Euromediterraneenne: Aspects Institutionels et Operationnels: Dr. Jean-Francois **DAGUZAN**, *Directeur des Recherches, Fondation Mediterraneenne d' Etudes Strategiques, Toulon*

17:30-20:00 **EUROMESCO JOINT SESSION I: Conflict Prevention and Early Warning**

Chair: **Dr. Anwar AL-SAID**, *Assistant Director, United Nations University; International Leadership Academy, Amman*

Speakers: **Euro – Med Joint Actions in Support of Peace-Building and Good Governance:** Dr. Fred **TANNER**, *Deputy Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva*
The Establishment of a Euro – Med Conflict Prevention Centre: Prof. Stephen **CALLEYA**, *Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies, Malta*
Early Warning in the Euro – Med Context: Conceptual Questions, Procedures and Instruments: Dr. Radoslava **STEFANOVA**, *Researcher, IAI, Rome*

Tuesday 14 September

09:30-13:00 **EUROMESCO JOINT SESSION II: CBMs in the Mediterranean**

Chair: Prof. Theodore **COULOUMBIS**, *Director-General, ELIAMEP; University of Athens*

Speakers: **CBMs and CSBMs and Partnership-Building Measures in the Charter:** Dr. Claire **SPENCER**, *Deputy Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London*
Confidence-Building Measures: A Practical Approach: Gen. (Ret) Dr. Mohammed **KADRY SAID**, *Military Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo* and Dr. Martin **ORTEGA**, *Research Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris*
A View from Israel: Prof. Gerald **STEINBERG**, *Director, Program on Conflict Resolution, Political Studies Dept., Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan*

18:00-20:30 Eastern Mediterranean
A. Greece-Turkey: Prospects for Cooperation or Confrontation? *[CBMs, Business Cooperation, Cooperation in Soft Security Issues]*

Chair: Dr. Henry **SIEGMAN**, *Senior Fellow, Director, US/Middle East Project, Council on Foreign Relations, New York*

Speakers: Dr. Kemal **KIRISCI**, *Bogazici University, Istanbul*
Prof. Theodore **COULOUMBIS**, *Director-General, ELIAMEP; University of Athens*
Ambassador (ret.) Ilter **TURKMEN**, *Istanbul*

Ambassador (ret.) Constantinos **ZEPOS**, *Athens*
Dr. Gulnur **AYBET**, *Assist. Professor, Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara*

21:30 Dinner at a taverna , Pontamos Beach

Wednesday 15 September

09:30-13:00 **Regional Perspectives**

Chair: Mr. Abdul-Hadi **IZZAT**, *Director General, Bisan Center for Research and Development, Ramallah*

Speakers:
A View from the US: Dr. Henry **SIEGMAN**, *Senior Fellow, Director, US/Middle East Project, Council on Foreign Relations, New York*
Egypt's Role in the Eastern Mediterranean: Dr. Mohamed **ABDEL-MONEIM**, *Instructor, Cairo University, Cairo*
The Israeli-Turkish Partnership: Dr. Ekavi **ATHANASSOPOULOU**, *Research Fellow, Bristol University*
Security Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Israeli View: Dr. Shai **FELDMAN**, *Director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv*
Cyprus as a Challenge and an Opportunity for Europe: Dr. Lysandros **AVRAMIDIS**, *Senior Fellow, Intercollege, Nicosia*
Libya's Re-emergence in the EURO-MED Dialogue: Ms. Alison **PARGETER**, *Research Associate, Center for Defence Studies, King's College, London*

18:00-20:30 **Roundtable Discussion: The Mediterranean Region: A Zone of Cooperation or of Conflict?**

Chair: Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, ELIAMEP, Athens*

Speakers:
Dr. Shai **FELDMAN**, *Director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University*
Dr. Joel **PETERS**, *Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Politics & Government, Ben Gurion University, Neger*
Dr. Fred **TANNER**, *Deputy Director, Geneva Center for Security Studies, Geneva*
Dr. Aylin **AVCI**, *Instructor, Dept. of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara*
Prof. Heba **NASSAR**, *Director, Center for Economics and Financial Research and Studies, Cairo*

Closing Remarks

Dr. Thanos **DOKOS**, *Director of Studies, ELIAMEP,Athens*
Elizabeth **PHOCAS**, *Deputy Director, ELIAMEP, Athens*

Farewell Reception (Halki Hotel)

Thursday 16 September

07:30	**All participants must have their baggage packed and assembled either in the lobby of the hotel Halki or at the entrance to their accommodation, in order to be carried to the port for loading**
08:00	**Departure from Halki to Kamiros Skala Port in Rhodes and from there to Rhpdes airport by bus**

(b)

Halki International Seminars

TEN YEARS OF FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION **1999**

Session 99.3b

The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

A seminar jointly organised by
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With the support of the WEU – Institute for Security Studies, Paris

List of Participants

(with addresses & telephones)

Halki - Greece
September 12-16, 1999

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The Greater Middle East in the Twenty First Century

Presented to:

Halki International Seminars 1999

Session 99. 3B

The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

September 12 - 16, 1999

Halki Island - Greece

by

Dr Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh

Chairman of Urosevic Study
and Research Foundation -
London

Introduction

A first reaction to the subject may be formed in the question: why the term "Greater Middle East"; a seemingly locational reference which can hardly represent a real geographical region.

It is for sometimes that attempts are being made in some academic circles to fashion this term. On the appearance, the term "Greater Middle East" is ment to include the region of Caspian-Central Asia in what is generally known as the Middle East. Yet, the aim or purpose of such an attempt is not clear. A possible explaination can be that the entire idea is to facilitate a geographical justification for the involvement of such Middle Eastern countries as Israel and Turkey in the regions of Caspian Sea and Central Asia with which they have no geographical link. If this is the driving force behind the attempt to fashion the term "Greater Middle East", one cannot fail to see the futility of the reason; firstly because Turkey and Israel are active in the regions of Caspian Sea and Central Asia without requiring geographical justification, specially in our modern world of rapid globalization which transgresses geographical and regional limitations. Secondly because the term "Middle East" does not represent a real geographical region, let alone the term "Greater Middle East".

The term "Middle East" or "Near East" or "Near and Middle East" has been used in recent decades with great variation in terms of territories included. It

has extended from North Africa to the Indian borders, and from southern boundaries of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea to the Red Sea and beyond. This is a vast area with obvious lack of homogeneity, be it geographical, cultural, political, economic, strategic or any other criterion that would constitute a spetial arena as a "region" (1). The area known as the Middle East is in reality an amalgamation of several different regions such as "the Persian Gulf", the Arabian Peninsula", the "Maghrib", the "Levant" etc. each of which is a region on the merit of the homogeneity of objects that constitute an environment as a region. In his "The Emergence of a New Second Order powers in the International System", Saul B. Cohen points out that: as second order powers emerge, they begin to fashion geopolitical regions in their own image. While often the regional boundaries are the same as those shaped by the impact of greater powers, sometimes they are shaped by the action of the second level nations (2). The area known as the Middle East not only does not have the critria constituting a geographical region, but does not have boundaries of any description to have been shaped by the actions of greater or second order powers. More than any thing else, the term "Middle East" is used conveniently in reference to the political environment that is shaped mainly by Arab-Israeli relationships (3). Such a usage of the term is harmless as long as it is not considered to represent a real region. Having said this, one can only conclude that the areas ment to be included by the term "Greater Middle East", are in reality a collection of the regions included in the general term of the Middle East as well as the two regions of Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Of these, the last two can be combined into one geopolitical region of Saul Cohen's description (4). Central Asia with a number of nations sharing various aspects of geographical, historical, cultural, political, strategic and economic homogeneity of environment is a region on its own. But as two very important nations of this region (i.e. Kazakhstan and Turkmanistan) are also active members of the Caspian Sea family of nations linking the rest of Central Asia with the Caspian Sea, they bridge the gap between the Caspian Sea and Central Asia creating a larger geopolitical arena worthy of the term "geopolitical region of Caspian-Central Asia".

If the so-called Middle East was to be connected geographically to the region of Caspian-Central Asia, this geographical connection can be possible only through Iran which is the only Middle Eastern country with actual geographical presence in the region of Caspian-Central Asia. But Iran sees no geographical justification for the term "Greater Middle East" to be used as a very poor substitute for the bi-regional heartland position which is emerging between the two regions of the Persian Gulf and Caspian-Central Asia of Geofrey Kemp's description (5).

Security Issues in the Persian Gulf and Caspian-Central Asia

The two regions of Persian Gulf and Caspian-Central Asia are posed to function as the two main energy supplying regions of the early decades of the twenty first century with an interconnected geopolitical and geostrategic role in the emerging world of politics. Any issue of security in these two region will be of great interest to the regional and global players equally, and there are a number of such issues in these two regions.

A- The Persian Gulf

With the collapse of the bi-polar global system after the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, security concepts in the Persian Gulf changed almost beyond recognition. These concepts changed from outside threats through the Strait of Hormuz to the increased territorial disputes within the the region, of which the Kuwait Crisis of 1990-91 brought the outside military presence to the region for the protection of security while prolongation of that military presence can itself become a source of tension and insecurity in the region.

There are a number of territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf which, in general terms can be classified into two categories: the inter-Arab disputes: and the Arab-Iranian territorial differences. Of the former the Kuwait-Iraq territorial disputes were settled by the United Nations in 1993, at least temporarily: Bahrain and Qatar have referred their territorial and maritime disputes to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates prefer to keep their mutual territorial differences at a low profile for the time being, whereas the United Arab Emirates has done its best to politicise and internationalise the issue of its claims to the Iranian held islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa. Iran's age-old territorial and boundary disputes with Iraq which led to Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 imposing a war of attrition for eight years, have been kept at a lull since the ceasefire of 1988. On the other hand, given Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands' location in the strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz, and given that both the regional countries of the Persian Gulf and the oil-consuming countries of the industrial world depend heavily on peace and security in the Strait of Hormuz, a one sided outside support for either side in this argument against the other could easily lead to a conflict potentially as explosive as that of the Kuwait crisis of 1990-91. Iran treats these islands as its integral parts.

At present, a rapid Arab-Iranian raprochement is increasing the level of general security in the Persian Gulf. The overall prospect of Arab-Iranian rela-

tions is positive and mutual understanding between the Iranians and major Arab countries of the region are on the increase on the basis of constructive grounds for peace and cooperation which gradually overshadowing territorial differences among them. Iranian presidential election of June 1997 and declaration of Iran's new administration's policy of expanding detente in its regional and foreign policies marked a new beginning in these relations. At present, Iran's relations with Qatar, Oman and Kuwait are good and cordial. A key to the safegoarding of peace and security in the Persian Gulf is the Saudi-Iranian cooperation which is on the increase. These developments give rise to the hope that the region of the Persian Gulf is moving into an era of lasting Arab-Iranian cooperation for peace which is bound to keep most of the territorial disputes at bay.

8- Caspian-Central Asia

The geopolitics of oil and gas pipelines in the region of Caspian-Central Asia seems still to be used against Iran's position in that region, whereas Iran's geography and national interests are becoming the predominant factors determining its foreign and regional policies. An added factor that has provoked Iran to modify its purely ideological stance of early 1990s in the Caspian-Central Asian region and to give noticeable priority in late 1990s to its national interests in its foreign policy was the US strategy of alienating Iran in her natural geographical regions of the Persian Gulf and Caspian-Central Asia.

Construction of a new pipeline network running on the Caspian seabed from Turkmanistan to the Republic of Azerbaijan was agreed in mid-February this year. If materialised, this project will prove to be very costly involving advanced technology in marine pipelining and for the maintenance of such a seabed pipeline. Moreover, with the current oil prices - about $18 - this project does not seem to be commercially viable. Having met all these costs, when the oil from this pipeline reaches the Republic of Azerbaijan, will face the same dilema of which route to take to the international oil markets with its prices still remaining compatitive: the Armenian route to Turkey which is not secure because of Armenian-Azeri conflicts and Turkey's Kurdish problems: the Russian-Georgia route which is not secure because of local conflicts in Chechnia and Abkhazia: or the Iranian route which is the shortest, the safest, and the cheapest route without involving costly seabed pipelining, but it does not seem to meet the approval of the United States. Washington has, for the past seven years or so, vetoed transportation of the Caspian oil and gas via Iranian territories to the detriment of all commercial, geographical and technological reasons.

Furthermore, what seems to be happening beyond the confusion over oil and

gas pipeline routes in the region of Caspian-Central Asia, is that by signing numerous contracts, mostly without real viability, for investing in development of oil production and transportation projects in the region, the United States has been able to claim real interests in the region which, in turn, facilitates the possibility of having the final say in the regional affairs. It is on this platform that the United States seems to be moving gradually to the areas of security arrangements in that region by preparing for NATO's eastward expansion as far as Central Asia. The United States has, at the same time, made it possible for Israel to move into the Caspian-Central Asian arena for commercial and geopolitical activities by way of a military cooperation agreement with Turkey - a member of NATO - and some vague arrangements with the Republic of Azerbaijan. This will pave the way for Israel's involvement in the future military arrangement that NATO may come up with for the Caspian-Central Asia through the backdoor (6).

Moreover, it is worth noting that the United States staged in the last two summers joint military exercises in Central Asia with the participation of military units from the United States, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Republic of Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey which is not a Central Asian state. Officials in the United States and in NATO organization have repeatedly said that they want to have Russia on board of their global military arrangements. On the other hand, the fact that Turkey with no geographical presence in that region is given a role in the emerging strategic arrangements of Caspian-Central Asia but Iran, with its prominent geographical presence in that region, is being overlooked, raises suspecions that the United States intends to expand NATO to the Caspian and Central Asia and wants to have Israel in it through Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This emerging alignment in the region coupled with Washington's announcement in January 1999 of moveing its military base from Ancelic in Turkey to the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Caspain Sea, leave little doubt that the United States wants to militerise that region without there being a real reason for it, and without any real cause in the region of Caspian-Central Asia for NATO's concern (7). This is an unnecessary undertaking which can only irritate others in the region and in the world at large.

When the president of the Azerbaijan Republic announced on 20th February 1999 that his country would welcome American military bases and is ready to join NATO, apprehensions were raised in the region; among the Iranians, Armenians, Russians etc. Russia declared that it wanted to establish a new military base in Astrakhan of the Caspian Sea. Leader of Iran's expediency Council warned wehemently saying:

> "Azerbaijan officials should know that any NATO base in the Caspian Sea region will be extremely dangerous

> and constitutes a threat to peace and development. "NATO and the United States should know that their presence in the region will be a source of tension for themselves and an obstacle to the exploitation of the oil of the Caspian" (8).

Similarly, the Russian head of Duma's defence committee warned that the action by the United States in bringing NATO to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea will induce Iran and Russia to enter into more military cooperation and may even lead to a new alliance in the region. He said that in such an eventuality, Russia, Iran, India and China can form a military alliance to counter the expansion of NATO to the region (9). This will be a highly dangerous geo-strategic alignment in the region of Caspian-Central Asia which is being encouraged by the United States of America unnecessarily and without there being any reason for it at all in the region.

In conclusion, one might be tempted to dwell on the hope that the United States would realise, sooner than later, that its relentless onslaught against Iran's legitimate geographical presence and position in its natural region of Caspian-Central Asia is no longer comprehensible and cannot be seen as a mere display of disapproval of the policies of the Islamic Republic in Tehran, but is effectively a far reaching animosity against the national interests of the people of Iran, some 65 millions of them. Yet, what is equally important is the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would realise, sooner than later that it can no longer be complacent about its situation vis-a-vis the national interests of the country in that region. In spite of much efforts, Tehran does not seem, as yet, to have formulated a clearly defined strategy for maximising the benefits of Iran's unique location between the two important energy depots of the world - the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Somehow in the cacophony of anti-Iranian rhetoric piped from regional and extra-regional sources, the sheer geoeconomic facts have yet to state the case for Iran's value and role in the developments of the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asia.

In its diplomatic overtures to the countries in the Caucasus, Caspaian Sea and Central Asia, Iran has been trying hard to emphasise on economics and downplay its image as an ideological hegemonist. Iran's likelihood of success as an emerging significant regional player and an economic powerhouse still depends in large part on the institution of major structural alterations to both its foreign and domestic policies, to the extend that would render the existing global-wide anti-Iranian political campaign by the United States and Israel ineffective. The present policy of detente of the Khatami government can be helpful and continuation of the role of an honsest broker of peace in the regional conflicts - as opposed to being perceived as a source of tension -

could strengthen its image in the region and may therefore blunt the negative publicity directed against it from quarters in bed with Israel (10).Agreement of cooperation among Iran, Armenia, Georgia and Greece will provide a badly-needed balance to Iran's position in the Caucasus, creating a counterweight to the extra-regional US-Turkish-Israeli inroads through the Republic of Azerbaijan, and other financially/technologically dependant countries in the region (11).

To exert itself as a major player in the region of Caspian-Central Asia, Iran may play its strongest suit yet - that is, to offer to each of, Russia, the republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan the use of one of its many ports in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman for their exclusive and autonomous use for international trade and communication. This will bind the Caspian-Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, allowing the Arab states of that region to establish their own direct link with each one of the landlocked Caspian-Central Asian countries.

Such an undertaking will give Iran a pivotal role in the world of oil and gas geopolitics of the early decades of the twenty first century wich, in turn, will solve any concern about the Islamic Republic of Iran by means of true and lasting integration (12).

Iran's New Approach

In addition to offering a pivotal geopolitical landbridge between the two most important energy depots of the 21st century' Iran is addressing itself to the global political community by offering a new and constructive form of dialogue amongst nations through the proposal of discourse among civilizations.

Considering that civilizations are the result of dialogue, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran has offered, under the auspices of the United Nations, a new and constructive cultural and communicational dialogue, that is discourse among civilizations. What he is proposing is a new form of more culturally based contacts among groups of nations which can be geographically defined within the parameter of Islamic, Christian-Judaic, Buddhist, Confucianist and various African civilizations; among the Chinese, the Africans, The Europeans, the Middle Easterns, the Far Easterns, the Americans and other civilizations aimed at building a new and more tolorable and amicable world of geopolitics based on a multi-polar global system. A multi-polar global structure in which a heirarchy system of power which would revolve around multi-lateral understanding and cooperation to replace the NATO-based unilateral attempts for the domination of the so-called international community.

This call from Iran is fundamentally different from that made by those who base their thoughts on medieval notions of the categorisation of mankind according to religious and racial divides in which civilizations clash and eradicate each other; those who totally ignore the speed at which information technology is bringing our divided world together in a harmonious "Human Community". New meanings have been devised by ultra-right tendencies in the West for terminologies such as 'civilization' so as to give a new facade to the old hegemonial desires. The scope of their concept of the term 'civilization' does not go beyond the limits of religious and racial divisions. Arts, literatures, science, technology and other cultural aspects of the human environment are not included in their particular definition of the term, for, if they were, the term could no longer be used to show the exploitable divisions among the children of Adam (13).

In the Iranian call for discourse among civilizations, religious divide is given some prominance solely because there are vast areas of misunderstanding among the Christian-Judaic West and political Islam which needs to be addressed. An important part of this misunderstanding is related to the stalemate in the US-Iranian relationships. In their new approach to the issue of political relations with the world's single supper-power, the new Iranian administration openly and through international media offered its appreciation of the significance of Tehran-Washington rapprochement to the peace and security of both regions of the Persian Gulf and Caspian-Central Asia.

In their new approach, the new Iranian administration openly offered to restore relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and announced that it awaits Washington's positive response in the form of either lifting the economic sanction of Iran, or by freeing Iran's frozen assets in the United States. Iran's cooperation with the United Kingdom in settling the so-called Rushdi affairs and elevation of diplomatic relations with the UK to the ambassadorial level should have paved the way for the United States to take the long awaited positive step towards normalising relations with Iran, but Washington seems to be unable to decide.

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6- For further discussion on this matter see: "Taliban, Iran and America's Strategic Belt", Dr. Pirouz mojtahed-Zadeh in interview with Fekr-e now monthly of Tehran, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Bahman 1377)January 1999.

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CFSP FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

Presentation by Guido Lenzi, Director of WEU Security Institute

At the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Stockholm, 29 September 1999

Another defining moment for the European integration process is before us. Dramatised and catalysed by Kosovo, it was also stimulated by the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, and framed by the results of the Washington and Cologne summits. On the one hand, NATO has developed a "new strategic concept" designed to take into account the multiple requirements of crisis management, including the possible provision of NATO assets and capabilities to EU-led operations. On the other, the EU has opened the way to the adoption of WEU assets and capabilities for the needs of CFSP. The necessary prerequisites are thus finally in place for the emergence of more effective and credible European defence capabilities. Their shape and consistency will be determined by the political conviction that the Fifteen will acquire over time, as much as by the extent to which the wider international community responds to tensions and crises as they build up and erupt.

Regardless of the actual state of readiness of EU, the fundamental issues will remain before us. They are still encompassed by the dual proposition of EU "deepening" (in institutional terms, implying additional structural reforms toward streamlining, which would improve both operational effectiveness and decision-making capabilities, with the necessary transparency) as well as "widening" (politically involving an increasing number of countries in a common space, and operationally stimulating as many diversified contributions to continental stabilisation as possible). The Kosovo crisis has now imposed both these avenues of European cooperation, respectively inward- and outward-looking. They must be pursued not in

sequence, as logic would have it, but simultaneously, given the pressure of intervening circumstances. Much more convincingly than the "European Conference" that was proposed in 1997 with scant results, EU's pre-accession strategy ought now to include CFSP elements, thus mirror-imaging in political terms NATO's "partnership for peace". As far back as 1994, the then Foreign Ministers of Italy and the UK, Andreatta and Hurd, indicated the need that non-full members of EU be invited to contribute to emerging "second pillar" activities well before the much more stringent "pillar one" criteria could be met. With the activation of the mechanisms of the Amsterdam Treaty, the issue is more than ever on the agenda.

In this context, it can no longer be denied that crisis-management involving military means has become an essential component of EU's widening policy. The Stability Pact, taking such a wide-ranging responsibility in the Balkans, will in itself change the scope and significance of EU's enlargement process and, thereby, its very nature, in the direction of more flexible and inclusive mechanisms. This in turn will produce differentiated responsibilities for each of the Fifteen in their common foreign and security policy, allow variable geometries and other enhanced co-operation formulas. The distinctions between membership of the various European security organisations will be blurred. No institutional obsession should set in, since only events can determine the actual composition of the coalitions of the willing. Institutions can hardly provide them with the compulsion but will be instead called upon for coherence, continuity and legitimacy purposes. Conversely, neither should a fear of directoires spread, that may instead constitute the necessary "start up" catalysing further aggregation. Specific national interests will be safeguarded, the position of smaller countries protected and the overall political commitment preserved. A distinction must in fact be made between common, joint and single policies. Only a single policy (single market, single currency) implies either unanimity or binding majority voting, while a joint policy allows two or more countries to act together without excluding others. It is in between that a common policy such as CFSP allows the willing and able to proceed, while the others constructively abstain.

This last rung on the ladder of integration is where EU stands, with no obligation to produce a single result (the Treaties preserve the formula "should the Council so decide"). As it develops, CFSP will now increasingly involve the Fifteen in projecting a common attitude towards neighbouring countries and regions. This will present them with an "out-of-area" predicament, albeit in functional rather than geographical terms. What complicates matters is that, setting apart the countries that are candidates for European integration, the other contiguous areas comprise states (with the exception of Ukraine) that are apparently dysfunctional to the EU, since they do not obviously reach out to it. Towards them, Europe's appeal will be at best tentative and must utilise a variety of instruments, political, economic and diplomatic.

Not being about territorial defence, crisis management carries with it a series of different implications, both practical and political, that rely on intergovernmental mechanisms and modular building blocks. What is essential for crisis-prevention purposes, is to promote the compatibility and ensuing convergence of attitudes and behaviour, evoked as far back as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and which the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (in terms of democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, human rights, market economy, etc.) have narrowed down, more as exhortations than strict conditionalities. In the interest of full members and candidate countries alike, it is of course essential to preserve at all costs the "acquis" and not to dilute these achievements. But the momentum and magnetism of the European integration process must also be maintained, in order to amplify participatory pluralism and promote the multi-layered contributions required nowadays by international cooperative endeavour. For military crisis management as well as for broader political purposes, it should be not so much an issue of different statuses, concentric circles, variable speeds or waiting lists, but rather a matter of different intensities within a shared purpose, which present circumstances allow and even suggest.

It can be argued that, especially now that the CFSP and ESDI will be brought to bear on European security issues, the EU constitutes the best-suited organisation, the "débutante" most-likely-to-succeed, considering the variety of its components and therefore its greater adaptability to the multiple ambiguous situations of the current

transitional international phase. CFSP will provide the indispensable policy framework to select the missions most suitable and feasible for EU's DNA. It should over time produce greater coherence, not only in national foreign policies, evening out the advantages and disadvantages of different institutional statuses, but also inside international organisations, among which the Fifteen could establish the most appropriate interconnections and encourage their role specialisation. Of course, all of this remains to be demonstrated, which only time can provide. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty the premises are however undisputably in place. Results will emerge pragmatically, on the basis of actual needs, and not theologically, as a matter of principle, which may even be counterproductive.

In military terms, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) will provide the tool box, both institutionally (refining the decision-making mechanisms and the relevant advisory bodies) and operationally (with the necessary command-and-control arrangements). ESDI is not yet the common defence policy, let alone the common defence that Maastricht had indicated as a goal beyond the political horizon. Europe is still positioning itself, mustering the assets and capabilities needed for political and operational credibility. It is this trend and a sense of direction, not the pace of progress, that must be established more clearly, in order to dispel the scepticism that Atlanticists and non-allied countries share. To be credible and therefore effective, if only for persuasive purposes, EU's military instruments should admittedly include the most essential command, communications, heavy lift, satellite observation and similar systems. The headquarters requirements would be entrusted on a case-by-case basis to the "framework nation", i.e. the country providing most of the necessary means. The need for some "convergence criteria" for the military structure of individually nations (not as stringent as those that apply to the euro) has also been making some headway lately, to encourage harmonisation and convergence, rather than create impositions or discriminations. There is still a long way to go from the European defence policy in the making to the future ideal of a common defence, and in any case the EU will hardly ever become a clone of NATO.

The emergence of a more recognisable Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains the essential precondition to any evolution. Its main objective should be to identify a course of action and provide coherence to it. In this respect, it must be acknowledged that the EU can only hand out what it has developed for itself. No hierarchical or other enforcement structure has been set up: the absence of some countries from the EMU system demonstrates that the EU can only propose, certainly not impose, any supranational mechanism. The effectiveness of CFSP will furthermore depend on the responsiveness that it may stimulate in those to whom it is addressed, as well as on the degree of reactivation that it may stimulate in institutions such as the UN and OSCE, generating the participatory multilaterism on which EU thrives. With the international cooperative system caught in between the assertiveness of the US and the reservations of Russia and China, Europe holds a very crucial position for the consolidation of the international order. On the other hand, to a great extent, CFSP will be demand-driven, in response to stimulation from applicant countries and other external partners, rather than supply-driven, out of a compelling urge of the Fifteen. The mechanisms established in Amsterdam are intended precisely to provide it with a more credible and sustained cohesiveness, stimulate proactiveness rather than reactiveness, promote not identical behaviour but convergence, compatibility, as well as more extended legitimacy and political solidarity.

Whatever the case may be, regardless of the actual intentions that may emerge among the Fifteen, and contrary to economic matters such as the single market or the euro, foreign and security policies are and will remain inherently intergovernmental, since the unpredictability of international events will not admit pre-established responses. In any case, a non-art. 5 (non-collective territorial defence) situation, i.e. crisis management, requires differentiated and multi-layered, military and non-military, interventions. Recent experience has demonstrated that, for any nation or international organisation (even NATO), contingency planning is insufficient as only circumstances will in the end indicate if and what specific response is called for. Confounding its detractors, the intergovernmental structure of CFSP can therefore best accommodate different degrees of involvement that will in fact reinforce

effectiveness and credibility, provided that the sense of direction of the Fifteen is not muddled or lost.

That is why the Amsterdam Treaty provides only the road map, not the exact itinerary that CFSP should take, which explains why the modalities for the inclusion in the EU of the assets and capabilities developed over time by the full members of WEU, as decided in Cologne, were established with all the necessary prudence. The ensuing process will reinforce the visibility, if not suddenly the effectiveness of Europe's role in military matters. The Cologne Summit has decided to proceed with the "inclusion of those functions of the WEU [a Presidency Report spells them out] which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the areas of the Petersberg tasks", after which "WEU as an organisation will have completed its purpose". WEU will therefore fade out as an organisation, not as a Treaty, which will preserve among its ten signatories the commitment of art.V and the relevant connection with NATO's collective defence. The former neutral states that have joined EU have been particularly instrumental in achieving this objective, ever since Finland and Sweden produced their joint memorandum accepting the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in EU's second pillar. Not surprisingly, if one considers that the Nordic countries (as much as Austria and Ireland) have always been the first to respond to the UN's call for peacekeeping troops, whose role has not been substantially different from the one that confronts the EU now. The Cologne communiqué therefore rightly foresees "the possibility of all EU Member states, including non-allied members, to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-making for EU operations". This is of course a possibility, not an obligation (in the same vein as NATO's Partnership for Peace arrangements, that allow the inclusion of non-NATO members).

In any case, the acquisition of WEU's capabilities will not in itself alter the very original characteristics of the EU. CFSP's task will be to bring together its various external relations, attributing political significance to its outreach in the economic and social fields. Aid, trade, infrastructural support and market access have proven quite useful for conflict prevention, providing the Union over the years with a

most convincing "track record", which now needs to acquire an overall coherence across the three pillars devised by Maastricht. In Amsterdam, the Fifteen therefore decided that "common strategies" agreed upon unanimously should be produced. The first one has just been drafted, most appropriately about Russia, which must be persuaded to integrate Europe; others are in the making concerning Ukraine, the Mediterranean including the Middle East and, of course, the "Western Balkans" of which the Stability Pact is the first expression. On the other hand, the joint actions and common positions that will result from these common strategies will allow (and may even suggest) qualified majority voting or constructive abstention (even in matters military, Art.24 excludes the former, but not the latter). This flexibility should not be interpreted as a possibility of *à la carte* opting-in or –out. On the contrary, core groups (ad-hoc contact groups) as well as subregional initiatives could thus usefully develop, allowing an adaptability that will be most appropriate for dissuasion or persuasion purposes, as well as for political credibility and sustainability over time.

In the process, sovereignty will be preserved, as it ought to be in the non-art 5 contingencies that the Fifteen have essentially undertaken to consider. The effectiveness of national sovereignty will in fact be sustained and reinforced by international cooperation in matters of cooperative security that can only be tackled multilaterally. The nation-state has run its course, and balance of power is being set aside as co-operative security is given another chance, after the two inconclusive attempts at the end of both World Wars. We are therefore not, as is too often wrongly stated, confronted with uncharted territory, but instead essentially back "at the creation", as Dean Acheson saw it in 1945. Public opinion itself accepts nowadays (and did so even in the heat of the Kosovo crisis) that only multilateralism can restore the authority of State functions, with respect to transnational risks and challenges which while not-strictly military in nature, may require a response a military content (which has given rise to the concept of "operations other than war").

In this respect, the Balkans have been described as the unfinished business of Europe, meaning that that region has so far been rather impenetrable to the logic of European harmonisation, if not homogenisation or outright integration. The

fundamental question confronting the European process today resides in the course of action that should be taken when responsiveness is not forthcoming, and the results become gravely detrimental to the common interests of European countries. In Kosovo, after Bosnia, apart from the humanitarian situation that had become intolerable after ten years of degradation, essential interests were at stake not only for some EU countries (notably Italy and Greece), but also more widely in the European context as defined by the Helsinki Final Act and successive OSCE commitments, and finally for the very preservation of the UN system of international relations. With Europe recovering its role as an actor in international affairs, what needs to be determined and organised is how the EU members will deal with the use of force that may be needed in situations of non-direct aggression (non-territorial defence) and yet gravely destabilising or damaging for international relations.

The UN system allows the use of force (Ch.7 of the Charter) not only in order to counter aggression, but also more generally for international law enforcement purposes, including intra-state matters. A humanitarian justification has been claimed in successive resolutions since operation "Provide Comfort" to the Kurdish minority in Iraq (the missions in Somalia and Haiti also come readily to the mind), but the broader purpose of protecting the international system as developed since 1945 remains paramount. This task requires the contribution of regional actors (Ch.8), while not excluding recourse to self-defence (art 51). But what need to be argued out, on a case-by-case basis, are the specific modalities that can best persuade countries to act collectively and recipients to respond accordingly. The fact is that, when crises are intra-state and imply a breakdown in the functions of a state, their ingredients, implications and repercussions are often too ambiguous to overcome the reluctance of countries and individual organisations to intervene forcefully. Experience has demonstrated that military means may in the end be needed for many non-strictly military peace-support (preventive, interposition, containment) if not outright peace-enforcement, purposes. Such operations must meet the criteria not only of operational efficiency, but also of institutional legitimacy and political credibility. This implies an appropriate sequence of interventions and suitable multilateral interreactions

involving as many actors as possible (UN, OSCE, W/EU, contact groups, special representatives, etc).

In any crisis-prevention or -management situation, the following questions must each time be asked, regardless of which country or organisation may consider action:

-*Why* should any given peace-support operation be undertaken? on the basis of which principles/moral imperatives or national/international interests;

-*Where?* what should its geographic and/or functional scope be;

-*What for?* which purpose would it serve, what added/catalytic value would it provide;

-*How?*in terms of actual feasibility and operational modalities;

-and finally, *When?* neither too soon, which may needlessly internationalise the situation, nor too late, of course.

The resulting algebraic formulas, comprising variables and unknown factors deriving from the interplay of so many elements, are clearly best suited for multi-purpose organisations such as the EU. For the crisis-management scope of its newly-created CFSP, EU will not (and should not) be a clone of NATO, with integrated structures, pre-established procedures and activation orders. Its means are admittedly slower, but multidimensional and in the end more sustainable. It will nevertheless need the essential decision-making and operational assets and capabilities which, after the decisions taken in Cologne, it will now acquire. That will not produce any hierarchical constriction or supranational imposition since, in crisis-management contingencies, only a coalition of the willing may eventually come together (or be deemed inappropriate, which may also be at times a sensible decision).

On the other hand, the persisting importance of the EU-NATO connection, for both dissuasive and cohesive purposes, cannot be diminished. On the contrary, as NATO delegates and EU upgrades, it must be ensured that the two processes - however different in scope- proceed "in synch". This implies that improved US-EU political consultation occurs early enough, at every level, essentially in order to raise

the threshold at which NATO may need to step in. So that, and only in the most serious contingencies, NATO will be the last to intervene, if all else fails, and the first to hand back responsibilities to others. In the meantime, EU will learn to walk before it can run, and gradually establish a more extensive track-record and the resulting credibility in the matters it demonstrably deals with best, i.e. nation-building and reconstruction, before or after a conflict, addressing therefore mostly the causes rather than the consequences of crises. That is why the differences in the geopolitical positions and national interests of each of the Fifteen may finally be an asset and not a hindrance for a more significant and comprehensive EU profile that must now emerge on the ever-evolving international scene.

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in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea"

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NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

by

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Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, and the emergence of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation thereafter, security in the Mediterranean region was too often perceived as an extension of the East-West standoff that divided the European continent. This region was seen as a perimeter to NATO, regarded as the Alliance's "Southern Flank".

In recent years, a fundamental transformation in the Mediterranean security environment has occurred. The end of the Cold War and progress – albeit slow and uneven – in the Middle East Peace Process have provided an auspicious environment for the promotion of new, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations in the Mediterranean region. As a result, the Mediterranean has finally come to be regarded as a security region on its own merit, to be approached without intellectual or ideological barriers.

I would argue that NATO has drawn the right conclusions from these developments. Indeed, one of the most important facets of NATO's reorientation in the Post Cold War security environment has been the decisions adopted by the Alliance Foreign Ministers in 1994 to establish the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Mediterranean security: conceptual and institutional problems

The Mediterranean region is currently facing a multitude of problems and challenges. They include socio-economic disparities, migration, conflicts and arms proliferation. The nature of the issues which characterize the Mediterranean security environment is by no means exclusive to the region. The specific geo-political and socio-cultural context, however, give the Mediterranean a particularly complex security identity.

Within this degree of diversity and challenges, there is a clear interrelation among the countries and regions insisting on the Mediterranean, which derives mainly from their growing interdependence. This interrelation suggests the need for a cooperative approach to security, one that privileges dialogue and cooperation.

In fact, attempts at generating a dialogue in the region date back to the early 1970s, but these were relatively ineffective due to the conditions prevailing at the time of the East-West confrontation. The end of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on the type of regional cooperation that can effectively address security challenges in the Mediterranean

An analysis of today's Mediterranean security must first consider the problems surrounding the definition of concepts.

Over time, the concept of security has increasingly been given a broader meaning then merely the absence of military aggression. Although the bottom line of security continues to be survival, it also includes a substantial range of concerns other than military ones. Indeed, today there seems to be a broad consensus on the need for a comprehensive vision of security, one that takes into account not only political and military requirements but also socio-economic, environmental and cultural factors. In fact, many of the security-related concerns that have come to the fore in the Mediterranean after the end of the Cold War are non-military issues that may interact with more traditional security risks.

Unlike security, the Mediterranean appears to elude a coherent and comprehensive definition. Some look at the Mediterranean as "the place where the Persian Gulf begins"[1], that is, in terms of its proximity to geostrategically sensitive areas such as the Middle East. Some others look at developments in and around the Mediterranean mainly in terms of their implications on European security and stability. Some regard the Mediterranean as an area whose problems stand in their own right, that is, in addition to their links with broader European and Middle Eastern security issues. Some believe it useful to approach the Mediterranean in sub-regional terms and consider the Western and Eastern Mediterranean as distinct areas characterized by different problems and issues.

[1] Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), p. 8.

Some even consider the Mediterranean as a sort of "fault line" in civilizational terms.

One of the most important factor contributing to the confusion surrounding the concept of the Mediterranean is the lack of political, economic, social and cultural cohesion in the region. Difficulties in developing regional security arrangements in the Mediterranean derive in part from these problems of definition and scope.

At the same time, the multidimensional character of the Mediterranen security environment accounts in large part for the growing interest in the Mediterranean on the part of individual nations, international organizations, and non-governmental bodies. Indeed, many intra- and inter- regional cooperative undertakings have seen the light of the day since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. They include the EU's Barcelona Process, the Middle East Peace Process, and the Mediterranean initiatives of the WEU, OSCE, and NATO. The long-term objective common to all the cooperation schemas is creating a climate for peaceful and mutually rewarding relations in the Mediterranean region.

As the prevailing problems of the region are mainly of a socio-economic nature, it is only logical that in promoting cooperative relations across the Mediterranean the EU takes the lead. Indeed, the Union offers what the Mediterranean probably needs most: economic cooperation. Yet it is equally

clear that the EU alone could not cope with the breadth and diversity of that region. Moreover the EU alone does not represent the views of all nations that play a major role in the Mediterranean such as Turkey and the United States.

It is thus only logical that the evolution of the Mediterranean as a stable and prosperous region requires the involvement of other actors. NATO is one such actor. Its Mediterranean Dialogue is a component of the broad framework of regional cooperation. At the same time, the Dialogue's scope and nature makes clear that NATO sees its role as complementing that of other organizations, most notably the EU's Barcelona Process.

In this regard, it would be useful to start a reflection on how to achieve better coordination of existing cooperation initiatives – while respecting their specific characteristics – in such a way as to exploit to the full their complementary nature.

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

The Alliance's Dialogue with six non-NATO Mediterranean countries - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - is part of NATO's overall cooperative approach to security, and stems from the realisation that security in the whole of Europe is linked to the security and stability in the Mediterranean.

As such, it is an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation.

NATO looks to the Mediterranean as a region with its own specific dynamics and challenges, and with a still largely untapped potential for dialogue and cooperation in security matters. The objective of its Mediterranean Dialogue is primarily political: to increase understanding of NATO's policies and activities and get a better appreciation of the security needs of the countries involved. It is also by necessity differentiated, starting with the idea that the same solutions and methods of cooperation cannot be applied wholesale to the entire area, taking into account the richness of the political, socio-economic, cultural and religious diversity of the region.

The Mediterranean Dialogue gained special momentum at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 when the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) - under the authority of the North Atlantic Council - was established. Through the MCG, NATO member states are directly involved in political discussions with Mediterranean Dialogue countries, thus providing a forum for an exchange of views on the security situation in the Mediterranean.

The first political discussions between the Allies and individual participant countries took place in late 1997; the next round is planned in October this year. Although the Dialogue is predominantly bilateral, multilateral meetings also take

place, particularly in the form of information sessions and briefings specifically for officials from Dialogue countries. These included regular updates on NATO's operations in Kosovo, which were especially appreciated by the Alliance's Mediterranean partners. In addition, Allies have met regularly within the framework of the MCG to discuss policy and other matters of direct relevance to the Dialogue. The creation of the MCG has added a high degree of visibility to the Alliance's Mediterranean dimension.

In addition to its political goals, the Mediterranean Dialogue also seeks to foster practical cooperation. The primary vehicle for this is an annual work programme between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This programme includes activities in the information field, civil emergency planning, scientific and defence-related areas. Over the course of the past year, the Dialogue has demonstrated a solid basis for building deeper trust and increasing transparency in security matters among states in the region.

Information is a key component of the initiative, facilitating mutual understanding between the Alliance and Dialogue countries. NATO has supported conferences and seminars for representatives from NATO and Dialogue countries, including the 1997 Rome conference on NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, co-sponsored by the Italian *Centro Militare di Studi Strategici*, and the Conference on "The Mediterranean Dialogue and the new NATO" organized by the Spanish authorities in cooperation with NATO in Valencia in February 1999.

While the Rome Conference helped identifying the practical cooperative dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Valencia Conference was the first opportunity for Ambassadors from NATO and the six Mediterranean partner countries to meet jointly to discuss the way ahead. The Valencia Conference was an important step towards greater interaction between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. It was particularly timely before the Washington Summit as the Alliance was considering how to move forward NATO's external adaptation, of which the Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part.

In the field of Information, NATO also awarded its first Institutional Fellowships to scholars from the region, following a successful pattern established for partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Five fellowships have been awarded in 1998 to scholars from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco. These research topics include such issues as *Eastern Mediterranean security*, *Economic aspects of security cooperation in the Mediterranean region* and *Competing security and cooperation visions in the Arab world*.

Other information activities have included visits of parliamentarians, opinion leaders, academics, journalists and officials from Mediterranean Dialogue countries to NATO Headquarters. For instance, in October 1998, opinion leaders

representing such institutions as the Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in Egypt, the University of Nouakchott in Mauritania and the Tunisian Institute of Strategic Studies, came to NATO for briefings on the Mediterranean initiative. Parliamentarians from the foreign affairs and defence committees of all six Mediterranean Dialogue countries were also invited to come to Brussels for a briefing in December 1998.

An important step in the effort to exchange information was the decision taken by Alliance foreign ministers last year to establish "Contact Point Embassies" in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Under this system, similar to that which has been successfully operating in Central and Eastern European partner countries since 1992, the embassy of a NATO member country will represent the Alliance in each Dialogue country. The programme is fully operational since 1 January 1999.

Another key element of the Alliance's Mediterranean work programme is in Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). Mediterranean Dialogue countries have already been invited to participate in several CEP activities, including courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau on civil-military cooperation in response to natural or man-made disasters, as well as conferences and seminars in Portugal, Austria and Hungary. In order to strengthen cooperation in this field, visits to Dialogue countries by NATO's CEP teams have also been organized.

In addition, NATO -- together with the Greek authorities -- sponsored a seminar on *Natural disaster reduction in the Mediterranean basin* designed specifically for Mediterranean Dialogue countries and held in Athens in November 1998. The seminar brought together heads of CEP agencies from NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries for the first time. The event was a forum for both the exchange of information and for professional and personal contacts among civil emergency planning experts.

A similar event, this time focusing on *Search and Rescue in Disasters*, will take place in Turkey from 30 September - 2 October 1999. Like its predecessor, the seminar aims at enhancing confidence-building between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries by pursuing cooperation in areas of common concern.

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has also promoted scientific cooperation through the NATO Science Programme. Mediterranean Dialogue country scientists have participated in NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshops, Advanced Study Institutes, Collaborative Research Grants and Science Fellowships. For example, a workshop co-directed by a Greek and an Israeli scientist held in Israel in 1998 took up the subject of *Unconventional optical elements for information storage, processing and communications*. Scientists from Jordan and Morocco also participated in the workshop.

There is also a military dimension to the work programme. It includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe NATO and PfP sea and land exercises, to attend seminars and workshops, visits to NATO military bodies and exchange of staff officers between NATO and Dialogue countries. The programme also includes port visits to Dialogue countries by NATO's Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).

NATO's military authorities have devised a military concept specifically designed for the Mediterranean Dialogue countries which includes three main components: courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, courses and other academic activities at the NATO Defense College in Rome, and specific activities to be conducted under the responsibility of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT).

Mediterranean Dialogue countries are regularly sending students to courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau in environmental protection, peacekeeping, multinational forces, conventional arms control implementation, and European security cooperation. There is also a course in civil-military cooperation for civil emergency management available to Dialogue country participants and, given the strong interest shown in crisis management, a course has also be opened in this field.

The NATO Defense College in Rome offers General and Flag Officers Courses specifically intended for Mediterranean Dialogue country representatives. These courses provides an excellent opportunity to learn more about current Alliance issues, including NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. In addition, in December 1998 year the College organized its first International Research Seminar on Mediterranean security. The seminar aimed at increasing understanding between researchers and experts in security studies from NATO and its member states and from Mediterranean Dialogue countries. A similar event is scheduled in October this year.

In terms of exercises, NATO's two major commands - ACE and ACLANT - offered 34 and 49 military activities in 1998 and 1999 respectively, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. These included observing PfP activities in the fields of search and rescue, maritime safety and medical evacuation, as well as exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief. In this regard, three of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries – Egypt, Jordan and Morocco – have already cooperated militarily with the Alliance in the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of these countries will also participate in the NATO-led KFOR operations in Kosovo.

What next ?

In December 1998, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to explore ways of enhancing cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue countries. As a result, at the

Washington Summit in April 1999, Heads of State and Government decided to enhance both the political and practical dimensions of the Dialogue.

Enhancements include increasing the frequency of political discussions between representatives from NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, as well as offering additional opportunities for Ambassadors' meetings in conjunction with ad hoc events, including conferences and seminars on the Mediterranean Dialogue. In this regard, both Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries have been encouraged to organize such events as the Rome Conference of November 1997 and the Valencia Conference of February 1999.

Allies also decided to strengthen the practical dimension of the Dialogue by including additional activities in areas where NATO can add value, particularly in the military field, and where Dialogue countries have expressed interest.

The Washington Summit has further demonstrated that the Mediterranean Dialogue has the potential to evolve. There is room for expansion of both participation and content. Indeed, one of the leading factors in the evolution of the strategic environment in the Mediterranean will be the future of NATO's own approach to the region and individual states in the South.

At the same time, the future of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue will be influenced to a large extent by developments in two other regional fora, the EU's

Barcelona process and the Middle East peace process. Both aim at enhancing stability and improving security cooperation in the region. The success or failure of these two very different processes will have a considerable effect on the region as a whole. Thus it is in the interest of all Allies to ensure that both processes are alive and functioning well if NATO's own bridge-building effort is to be successful.

In this regard, NATO's contribution should be to continue to strenghten the Mediterranean Dialogue by concentrating on fields where it has a clear comparative advantage: defence and security. This will complement the initiatives of other organizations and contribute to constructive relations with NATO's Mediterranean neighbours.

Thus, NATO could consider developing additional military cooperation venues and increasing participation of Dialogue countries in peace support and other military-related activities, including by providing additional training opportunities.

It is clear, however, that the ultimate success of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue will very much depend on the active participation and strong support by both NATO members and Mediterranean Dialogue countries alike, working together to build the trust and transparency required of a true partnership.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has injected a new sense of dynamism into the Mediterranean region. There is now much more fluidity, a situation far more conducive to exert a positive influence on the region. The new NATO, acting in concert with other major institutions, is in a better position than ever to have a stabilising effect. The Mediterranean Dialogue is NATO's specific contribution to the broader effort of constructively engaging the Mediterranean. As such, it is an investment in the long-term stability of the Mediterranean region and indeed beyond.

(4)

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THE ENHANCED POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

paper presented by Roberto Aliboni

2nd meeting of the EuroMeSCo Working Group on the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability, Halki (Dodecanese) 12-14 September 1999

The Barcelona Declaration contemplates political dialogue as an important instrument available to the institutions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to attain its purposes. The subsequent debate on the establishment of a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability as "a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration" has came to the firm conclusion of setting up an "Enhanced Political Dialogue" (EPD) that would work as the key instrument for the implementation of the EMP.

The idea of an intergovernmental political dialogue is embedded in many international organisations. A political dialogue is included among the tasks of the Council of the Arab League. A stronger and more engaging form of political dialogue has been developed by the member states of the European Community/European Union (EU), first in the shape of an intergovernmental and diplomatic European Political Co-operation, subsequently as incremental attempts at establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. An intergovernmental form of political co-operation is operated in the framework of the EU enlargement to countries in the European East. Across the Mediterranean this kind of co-operation was contemplated by the "5 + 5" Group of Western Mediterranean countries that operated for a very brief while at the beginning of the nineties. It is currently working in the Mediterranean Forum as well as in the Barcelona process.

In this varying, more or less institutionalised organisations, political co-operation plays different roles, is conducted in different ways and is supported by inputs of political will of very different intensity and character. The first part of this paper discusses a number of possible models of Euro-Med political dialogue and tries to ascertain which one appears more in tune with the broad goals of the EMP as well as sustainable with respect to political conditions prevailing in the EMP circle.

In discussing these models, the semi-institutional character of any political dialogue must not be overlooked. To be sure, political dialogue is but one of the instruments by which international institutions co-operate to achieve their goals. Still, the interrelation of international institutions with their instruments of political dialogue is not the same as with other instruments available to such institutions. For political dialogue mediates the implementation of the other instruments as well as the effectiveness of such implementation. Political dialogue is an instrument in itself as well as the "instrument of instruments". Consequently, in our discussion the EPD will be taken into consideration in itself and as a mover of other instruments.

On the assumption that, at least in the foreseeable future, the most important and attainable goal of the EMP is conflict prevention, in the second part of the paper EPD

is considered as a mechanism of conflict prevention in itself as well as a mover of other instruments for conflict prevention.

The mechanism for political dialogue

We can distinguish between different possible models for the Euro-Med political dialogue. Differences are the result of the different functions and contents contemplated by the various models. According to their ultimate purpose, we can envisage three such models, in a range where political will and cohesion tend to increase.

The first model is that of the political dialogue as a kind of macro-partnership-building measure. This model is geared to narrow the gap of political trust or confidence that separates today EU from non -EU countries across the Mediterranean. An in-depth analysis of security perceptions can easily illustrate that Northern and Southern Partners in the Mediterranean are not opposed by threat perceptions but separated by a set of perceived risks of spillover effects (on the Northern side) and intrusion, interdiction and coercion (on the Southern side)[1]. If these perceptions are taken into account, building broad confidence and trust looks like an inescapable preliminary necessity and provides the basic substance of the partnership. A regular, substantive and institutionalised political dialogue is provided by this model as the primary measure to achieve a higher level of broad confidence and give substance to partnership in the Euro-Med context with a view to make possible security co-operation and the application of co-operative security schemes in a more or less distant future.

To some extent, this is the model of political dialogue contemplated by the most recent proposal of the Euro-Med Charter, i.e. the "Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability" approved in April 1999 by the EPM Ministers in Stuttgart (hereafter "Guidelines"). The addition of the adjective "Enhanced" (pertaining to previous Charter's proposals as well) refers to the wish of expanding confidence and mutual trust as the primary means to reinforce the Euro-Med Partnership.

In this sense, the model sets out an instrument less geared to intervention than to information, transparency and the creation of systemic confidence. To be sure, it doesn't exclude operational modes by recurring to the instruments envisaged by the Charter or *ad hoc* instruments. These modes, however, would be introduced by a "gradual and evolutionary implementation of individual clauses by agreement", on the basis of consensus, in a non-binding institutional environment. Thus the tasks envisaged by this model include broad political monitoring and exchanges to promote stability and prevent conflict by means of soft, consensus-based measures and; perhaps, a little bit of common declaratory policy according to the blueprint provided by the old European Political Co-operation.

A second model would emphasise the political dialogue as an instrument of conflict prevention and crisis management. To be sure, this model - which obviously would

[1] Roberto Aliboni, *Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean: Perceptions and Notions in Mediterranean Arab Countries*, paper presented to the Conference on "Building the Euro-American Partnership in the Mediterranean", Oporto, 22-23 June 1998 (mimeographed) [this paper is going to be published by the Rand Co. in a collective book edited by Steve Larrabee and Álvaro Vasconcelos].

include the functions of the first one and put such functions more concretely at work - can be implemented according to different layers of cogency and consensus. A lower layer would make it similar to the Pact of Stability in Europe. In this sense, it would be very close to what was proposed in the first (Irish) version of the Charter: a reinforced mechanism of political dialogue lying on two pillars, (a) a set of principles and conventions destined to be integrated by all the members and (b) a set of CBMs/PBMs to be gradually expanded.

A higher layer would make the EMP mechanism for political dialogue similar to the Permanent Council in the OSCE. What characterises the Permanent Council in the OSCE context is its important operational role with respect to conflict prevention. It provides quick reactions to early warning stimuli coming from the different institutional and intergovernmental branches of the organisations. Furthermore, and more important, it works itself as an instrument through which governments can channel early warning and their consensus with a view to look for acceptable and desired interventions. On this basis, interventions can be quickly indicated by the Council and, according to cases, implemented.

In the EMP, the application of this model would entail a full and quick development of the specific instruments envisaged by the Charter (Euro-Med instruments proper) and/or the consensus for acceding to operational facilities made available by other institutions (e.g. the EU, the Arab League, the WEU, etc.). Thus, this kind of model would require a considerable strengthening of the EMP on institutional ground as well as an increased logistical support to EMP institutions in a rather brief while.

A third model is the political dialogue as an instrument for decision and consequent implementation. This model would see a full-fledged, well balanced and institutionalised Euro-Mediterranean entity, in full command of instruments and procedures to achieve security co-operation and thus implement the "area of peace and stability" envisaged by the Barcelona Declaration. In this model the EMP should be by far more politically and organisationally autonomous from the EU than today. It would require a strong regional Euro-Med identity, that would allow for joint decisions to conduct a variety of conflict prevention and peace support operations.

Political sustainability

While the achievement of the third model is out of question as of today, conditions of political sustainability with respect to the first and second model must be ascertained. Three principal factors shaping political sustainability can be identified: (1) indivisibility of security in relations among EMP Partners; (2) comprehensiveness or globality in the EMP overall approach to security and co-operation; (3) respect of sovereignty and jurisdiction, i.e. reassurance against interference. This three point will be discussed here very briefly, taking advantage of the debate on the Barcelona process started up with the Malta Ministerial Conference in April 1997[2]. This discussion will allow to single out the scope of the EPD as it is warranted by current

[2] Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 1-22; Claire Spencer, "A Tale of Two Cities", *The World Today*, March 1997, pp. 79-82; Roberto Aliboni, "Re-Setting the Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda", in G: Kostakos (ed.), *Democratic Elections and the Mediterranean*, Eliamep, Athens, 1999, pp. 27-32.

political conditions and, consequently, to identify which kind of political dialogue is feasible.

Indivisibility of security - The indivisible character of security is an obvious cornerstone of any scheme of security co-operation. It is explicitly called in among the principles of the "Guidelines". However, political trends actually prevailing within the EMP circle today are not easing the attainment of security indivisibility in the area. Three such adverse political trends deserve particular consideration:

(a) the terminated but unsolved status of the Arab-Israeli conflict; beside its relevance in terms of international security, the solution of this long-standing conflict is an essential building-block in terms of domestic stability and political legitimisation in the Mashreq countries;

(b) the protracted domestic crisis in Algeria and the as much as protracted international isolation of Libya and the weakening of regional relations both trends have brought about;

(c) the nationalist trend and activism prevailing in Turkey as a consequence of changes stirred by the end of the Cold War with respect to its identity and regional role.

These political conditions are generating fragmentation within the EMP. In fact, there is a renewed tendency to the achievement of exclusionary pan-Arab or inter-Arab relations with respect to Israel and Turkey. Once again, there is an Israeli tendency to go its own way both politically and economically. There is a renewed tendency of the Maghreb countries to avoid being embroiled in Mashreq's affairs and promote their own relations with the EU. Finally, there is a tendency to the regrouping of the "peripheral" countries, Turkey and Israel. These tendencies are furthering divergence among national security agendas already very different from one another. They are making the attainment of an indivisible security more difficult instead of easier to attain.

A comprehensive approach - Beside the indivisibility of security, a comprehensive (multi-dimensional or holistic) approach to security and co-operation is considered as another cornerstone of the Barcelona process

So far, the experience in the EMP is that the basic groupings of Partners have different priorities. They assign very different importance to economic development vs. security or to democratisation vs. stability, etc. Most of these opposition are in the shape of different notions with respect to key targets, like human rights, democracy, globalisation, cultural values, etc.

A first opposition worth mentioning is between concerns for human rights and democratisation, on one hand, and for jurisdiction and legitimacy, on the other. A second opposition is between some mostly European temptations towards globalist absolutism and some mostly non-EU Mediterranean attempts at disguising protectionism and state-intervention under the need to preserve cultural authenticity. A third opposition concerns the need for respect for human rights and minorities in the non-EU Mediterranean Partners vs. a concrete and effective policy towards immigration in the EU countries.

These oppositions have proved resilient to both compromise and issue-linkages, thus downgrading Euro-Med consensus to a minimum.

Sovereignty and interference - Security co-operation in the military or military-related realm has proved more difficult to be achieved than it was maybe thought in European circles at the time the Barcelona process was initiated. In fact, on this point political conditions remains really backward with respect to EU expectations and very distant from allowing for the beginning of a structured co-operative security scheme. Military security has been put very back in the stage of the EMP. The Palermo decision to replace the concept of CBM with that of PBM has been a first decisive and significant step in this direction. The "Guidelines" suggest that the military security requirements of the Partnership will be advanced " at the appropriate time".

Non-EU Partners' uneasiness with respect to security co-operation have different backgrounds. Most of them, however, are concerned by sovereignty and interference. The Arab countries in particular are concerned by their perception of European unilateralism. European unilateralism is regarded as part of the wider Western unilateralism in dealing with international security in the post-Cold War context. In Arab perceptions, it is reflected by the fact that Europe and the US make available their own security instruments and institutions to manage or prevent crises, whereas in a security co-operation perspective the creation of common instruments and institutions should come first. This point has clearly emerged in the little diplomatic crisis raised by the creation of Euroforces. To be sure, these forces are not directed against the Arabs, but they cannot be sold as an element of Euro-Mediterranean security co-operation either.

This unilateralism reinforces the second and most important objection (or perplexity) the Arab countries do have with respect to European (and Western) proposals of co-operation. This objection or perplexity concerns the tendency of Europe (and the West) to change the foundations of sovereignty by introducing a new concept of legitimacy predicated on moral factors rather than on recognised jurisdiction. Whenever this tendency fails to be framed by a shared international institution like the UN, the alternative may simply become that of either staying on the "right side" (like Turkey) or facing the risk of gross interference. This dilemma is, thus, strongly linked to the "double standard" which according to Arab feelings is practised by the West and Europe (especially with regard to Israel).

These objections or perplexities don't allow for much room for security co-operation within the EMP, even if and when peace were made in the Middle East.

Which model is sustainable - Political and security fragmentation, differences in priorities with respect to the common goal of a comprehensive security, and perceptions of EU trends towards intrusion, interdiction and even coercion on the side of most non-EU Partners, provide the clear indication that before any operational security co-operation can be started within the EMP, trust and confidence must be strongly reinforced and more uniformly expanded to all the Partners. In this sense, the model aiming at establishing an EPD as a macro-partnership-building measure is definitely fitting with Euro-Med prevailing political conditions. This kind of political dialogue allows for the introduction of PBMs directed at improving information and access in the political, economic, social and cultural field. The enhancement of broad confidence secured by the working of PBMs would prepare the possibility of more engaging joint activities and decision with respect to Euro-Med co-operation.

In principle, the second model may appear premature, because of its interventionist character with respect to tensions and conflicts. It was already pointed out, however,

that this interventionist character can be modulated according to varying layers of action.

The "Guidelines", which represent the first consensus-based and coherent statement about the Charter generated by the Senior Officials Committee in the last three years, indicate a number of actions the EMP could undertake, though such undertaking is surrounded of strong caveats and limitations. Beside generating PBMs and implementing them, the "Guidelines" envisage that the EMP would take action in the field of good-neighbourly relations and regional co-operation and, what is most important, in that of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation.

They foresee also EMP crisis management measures, though in terms of political sustainability this seems hardly feasible. By the same token, joint actions of peace-keeping - mentioned by the "Guidelines" as well - can hardly be envisaged, unless they consisted of limited actions directed at preventing conflict or other non-operational tasks.

Current political conditions do not allow for a strong and quick implementation of these instruments and means, but they don't exclude some step forward, as cautious and limited as it may be. Instruments will likely refer to conflict prevention essentially. Conflict prevention in turn could refer, especially in a first stage, to longer-term actions of structural and systemic character rather than to preventive diplomacy actions proper. The model cannot be that of the OSCE Permanent Council, but cannot be that distant from the model provided by the Pact of Stability in Europe. Furthermore, in handling a successful EPD, the Senior Officials and the Ministers could come to use the EMP institutions as a channel of early warning and consensus. The achievement of the model would be gradual and incremental. Its strengthening would be determined by a virtuous circle between the will concretely expressed by governments in the EMP institutions and the success of the EPD in increasing mutual trust and acting as a mover with respect to the Charter. The working of such circle would help reinforcing and expanding limited instruments available at the outset and include new ones over time.

A serious limitation to the political dialogue and its ability to set in motion other instruments and make the EMP advance is the constraint provided by the strict interpretation of the indivisibility of security that prevails today. A conventional and stolid application of this principle could come to limit EMP dialogue and its effectiveness very sharply by preventing helpful sub-regional interventions[3]. In order to avoid such risk, it must be pointed out that the notion of security indivisibility can be understood less in a territorial or regional than a functional sense. Functionally, the indivisibility of security is not affected in case EMP policies improve the security of a group of members without worsening, or basically changing, or neglecting the security of other EMP members. If this (second best) Paretian rule of thumb is respected, specific local or sub-regional security policies may be feasible an contribute to upgrade the political dialogue model of the EMP.

[3] Claire Spencer, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 23-48: Fred Tanner, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitation and Confidence-Building after Malta", *The International Spectator* (Rome), Vol. 32, No. 2, April-June 1997, pp. 3-25; see also Jean-François Daguzan's paper in the Halki Seminar folder.

In conclusion, the sustainable model of political dialogue is an attenuated variation of the second model examined in the above. It promises to secure an incremental strengthening of the EPD by making the first model work, particularly in the fields of conflict prevention. It can be defined as an instrument of partnership-building and conflict prevention directed at securing broad stability and comprehensive co-operation. The way and the extent such function can be carried out must be considered in more detail. This is essentially the task of next section.

Enhanced Political Dialogue and Conflict Prevention

The experience of the first three years has clearly unveiled that all political will currently available to the EMP can sustain is an EPD basically geared to broadly reinforcing confidence and setting in motion policies of conflict prevention. In the EMP outlook, the latter looks in fact as the most important and pivotal function the Barcelona process would be able to perform through the Charter. This section is thus devoted to analyse the potential in terms of conflict prevention of the EPD in itself as well as the conflict prevention means and instruments the Dialogue may be able to put at work.

The preventative role of the Enhanced Political Dialogue- Four ingredients are needed in order to make preventive diplomacy feasible[4]: (a) consensus-building, i. e. how consensus must be built among concerned parties as to make conflict prevention possible; (b) selection of cases deserving intervention, i. e. the ability of working out a "convincing selectivity" in interventions; (c) leverage, i.e. the existence of an adequate leverage in the hands of preventers; (d) narrowing gaps in principles and values (essentially, in human rights and democracy) and/or in willingness to make state sovereignty and its attributes more penetrable to international action (essentially, interference in domestic affairs in the name of more or less shared principles and values).

According to our previous analysis on the limits to political sustainability in the EMP, it is evident that, for the time being, leverage would be weak because political cohesion in the EMP (as well as in its constituent groups) is not still solidified and subjected to important limitations. Besides, strong gaps in values and principles make EMP Partners particularly opposed to whichever attenuation of sovereignty and thus to whichever forms of international interference. Thus, the ingredients left to start building up a shared system of conflict prevention in the EMP consist of consensus-building and selectivity. Are the EMP institutions fitting with the task of building consensus to take preventive diplomacy action and selecting cases and instruments? Which procedures should these institutions make use of to introduce requests for action or stimulating the latter?

The establishment of a communication network amongst designated focal points has been already approved by the EMP in the 1997 Ministerial Conference of Malta as a CBM (to be renamed as a PBM after the 1998 Palermo Ministerial *ad hoc* meeting). The author is not informed about the effective implementation of the measure. Whichever its implementation, however, this PBM is a minimum infrastructure requirement that must be there but cannot surrogate policy-making and joint action.

[4] See Ettore Greco, *Conceptual Problems and Policy Dilemmas of Conflict Prevention*, paper presented at the Joint IAI/SWP Project Conference on "Preventing Violent Conflict in Europe", Ebenhausen, 22-23 November 1996, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 1996 (mimeographed).

The most obvious suggestion is that the EMP institutions could adopt a procedure similar to the so called "Berlin mechanism" (Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation in Emergency Situations), stipulated in June 1991 by the CSCE members for bringing crises to the attention of the Conference and, just in case, setting preventive action in motion[5]. In the OSCE this procedure is tasked to provide emergency meetings of the Ministerial Council.

This idea has been already aired by previous proposals put forward in the EMP brief history. The Luxembourg draft of the Charter envisaged the possibility that the Senior Officials Committee held "special meetings" in cases of tensions or crises at the demand of one or more Partners. Another solution was planned by Malta's early proposal for a Stability Pact in the Mediterranean. By using the jargon of the OSCE Stability Pact in Europe, Malta's plan advocated the establishment of "round-tables" devoted to specific crises, upon demand of concerned parties, which would take place, however, outside the EMP framework: the round-tables would thus have the nature of *ad hoc* conferences, initiated but not run by the EMP, or could be deferred to other institutions. The engagement to hold such round tables, in case they need be, has never been appreciated by some non-EU Partner.

While Malta suggestion looks too engaging with respect to the present level of EMP's political will, the Luxembourg draft proposal may correspond to the use of some kind of "Berlin mechanism". The sometime cryptic language of the Stuttgart "Guidelines" may refer to this mechanism where saying that there will be "consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings": the "structures" could correspond to the procedure to raise complaints or ask for information contemplated by the "Berlin mechanism" and this procedure could take place in special meetings of the regular EMP institutions.

The "Berlin mechanism" has been used four times only (Former Yugoslavia; Nagorno Karabakh; Bosnia and Herzegovina). Its level (the Ministers) may have not eased its use. It may be interesting to note that this mechanism has been superseded by the more and more regular character assumed by the OSCE Permanent Council. As already noted, in today's OSCE, information and complaints (i.e. early warning) are dealt with on a day-by-day basis by the Permanent Council.

Biad[6] maintains that giving the EMP Senior Officials Committee a more permanent character would be especially important in a conflict prevention policy perspective, as it would provide the EMP more chances of building up consensus, both in general and with respect to individual crises, by consolidating habits to work together. The situations in the OSCE and the EMP are different, however. Early warning in today's OSCE web of conflict prevention institutions has a diffuse character and comes not only from members' initiative but also from the uninterrupted diplomatic interaction

[5] See Arie Bloed., "The OSCE Main Political Bodies and Their Role in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management", in Bothe M., Ronzitti N., Rosas A. (eds.) 1997, *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security. Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,* Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1997, pp. 35-52.

[6] Abdelwahab Biad, "Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Challenges and Prospects", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No. 2, April-June 1999, pp. 109-122. The same opinion has been put forward by Antonio Marquina Barrio in an unpublished paper written in the framework of the IAI-USIP-funded research project on "Prospects for crisis prevention within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership": *Conflict prevention in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: a European point of view* (mimeographed).

in the Permanent Council and between the latter and other relevant bodies of the OSCE. The institutional autonomy and differentiation of the EMP is very reduced, instead.

An evolution of the EMP's Senior Official Committee towards a permanent status and a political role similar to that of the OSCE Permanent Council is desirable but can hardly be envisaged in the near future. Still, the argument that the matrix of any possible joint action of conflict prevention stays in a regular diplomatic and political interaction is a forceful one. Consequently, the application of the "Berlin mechanism" seems fitting with the stage of political development of the EMP. However, its effectiveness in the EMP would require two conditions: (a) a more regular and frequent gathering of the EMP institutions; and (b) that the Senior Officials were enabled to deal with information and complaints to an extent and in cases that the Ministers should set out in a limited but precise mandate. In fact, some form of more regular and autonomous interplay is in order and should be secured primarily by both the Senior Officials and the Euro-Med Committee.

Euro-Med instruments and means for conflict prevention - As pointed out in the previous section, the EPD is the basis of Euro-Med conflict prevention. By upgrading mutual confidence, it may generate the mix between early warning and consensus which is the indispensable condition to give way to joint action in the field of conflict prevention. Once consensus were there, however, the Charter must establish the necessary means, procedures and instruments to set its preventative actions in motion. A set of such means, procedures and instruments are discussed in the following.

Situation Centre - The Action Plan taken into consideration by the Senior Officials in 1996 introduced the idea of "setting up a Euro-Med 'Situation Centre'" to work as an "early warning procedure". This idea is not explicitly mentioned in the "Guidelines", but this is not to mean that it is out of question. The "Guidelines" have adopted a deliberate very general formulation. They talks about "Euro-Med mechanism for preventive diplomacy", thus leaving to subsequent talks the task to define mechanisms and their extent. This concerns the Situation Centre as well as other instruments mentioned in the following. This paper speculates about their adoption and its political sustainability.

Such Euro-Med Situation Centre can assume very different profiles. A first profile could be that of a situation centre relying substantially on the situation centres and similar instruments operating within the EU, like the situation centre about to operate as part of the Cell for Policy Planning and Early Warning under the direction of the Secretary-General of the EU Council of Ministers; the situation centre within the WEU Cell; and the Torrejón Satellite Centre operating within the WEU. The procedure could be arranged through a protocol stating limits and ways the EMP would be enabled to accede and/or the "services" demanded by the EMP. It is very likely that these limits would be very strong or that they could hardly be defined with precision. From a political point of view, such solution would unnecessarily expose EU unilateralism instead of healing Southern Mediterranean perceptions relating to it. This kind of procedure has an inclusive character if implemented with respect to East European countries with a more or less distant prospects to become members of the EU. It may take on an exclusive character in relation to countries without the same prospects.

A second profile would make the Euro-Med information rely on the EU but would secure an access to the EU situation centres by means of a number of PBMs. The latter would have the task of securing a convincing liaison with and participation into EU situation centres by non-EU Mediterranean officials and officers.

A third profile would try to achieve the networking of EU and non-EU situation centres, by means of protocols defining limits and purposes of co-operation. The problem with this solution would be the asymmetries between the non-national EU system, on one hand, and a number of national systems, on the other, which would not necessarily be willing to achieve a direct co-operation with other systems, let alone to pool resources or information. Non-EU-situation centres may refer, however, to international organisations' centres rather than national ones. This would be a relevant and operative profile particularly if the Partners would decide to focus on non-military and non-political events, like disasters or environmental developments[7].

A fourth solution is that of establishing a Euro-Med situation centre proper. This solution may be difficult but not unfeasible if, as just pointed out, the situation centre would focus on non-political and non-military events and work as a gathering centre of information coming from technical-economic centres, in particular international centres. Otherwise, it looks unlikely.

The most feasible profile seems a combination of the second and third solution indicated in the above. that is a combination of Southern access to EU systems and a modest Euro-Med cell based on the networking of information coming from international agencies. To such networking the EU could well volunteer information. This step should be made very cautiously, though. All in all, the risk to be countered with any possible diplomatic skills is that of making non-EU Partners feel overwhelmed by EU capacities. This would increase information but, at the same time, sink confidence and make information helpless.

Conflict Prevention Centre - In general, a conflict prevention centre is less an instrument to gather information than to manage procedures seeking to prevent latent or potential conflict between more or less consenting parties and settle disputes.

The conflict prevention centre set up by the 1990 CSCE Vienna decisions was functionally connected to the obligation for consultation and co-operation in case of "unusual and unscheduled" military activities. Similar mechanisms were envisaged in the ACRS, where three such centres were to be established in Amman, Tunis and Qatar. Given the EMP willingness to exclude military activities from its scope for the time being, what could be the purpose of a Euro-Med conflict prevention centre in the framework of the Charter?

A conflict prevention centre might be given the task of developing and performing, first of all, the functions outlined by the "Guidelines" as "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice". The existence of a number of sub-regional such centres would be helpful. Sub-regional centres, appropriately located, could be mandated by the EMP central institutions to proceed on a case-by-case basis. They could be asked to perform fact-finding missions and set up local "round tables for analysis and recommendations" whose outcome would be deferred to the Senior Officials. The sub-regional centres could be directly addressed by parties and thus act as an element

[7] See Stefanova's paper in the Halki seminar folder.

of decentralised early warning. In this way, they could be enabled to perform an essential work in securing good-neighbourly relations.

Whether in a centralised or decentralised organisation, it can be expected that mediation and clarification would be more successful than conciliation or the settlement of disputes. This is what is suggested by previous experience with "regional" conciliation and settlement of disputes. In the OSCE, no less than eight formalised procedures can be numbered out, according to Lohmann, who says somewhat ironically that "It cannot be said that the OSCE is short of procedural tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes"[8]. In fact, albeit so numerous, settlement procedures have never taken place in the CSCE/OSCE, neither within the OSCE itself in the non-legal form of conciliation (the OSCE, it must be reminded, is rather a politically- than a legally-binding institution) nor after being deferred to legal arbitration outside the OSCE (to the Courts in Geneva or in the Hague, etc.).

The OSCE's experience suggests that, unless specific circumstances invite political conciliation inside the institution concerned, the institution would be better advised to refer to existing international incumbent bodies. The task of establishing an EMP procedures for settling disputes may prove too demanding with respect to the narrow political breathing space of the EMP. At the same time, it is doubtful whether the task is worth being pursued rather then left and deliberately deferred to incumbent international bodies like the Court in the Hague. This procedure is envisaged by the "Guidelines" where they foresee to "Encourage judicial settlement of differences and disputes".

Political planning and analysis - Functions of political planning and analysis are generally associated to the situation and conflict prevention centres. In particular, the direction given to such planning function in the new EU Cell for Political Planning and Early Warning is one which emphasises conflict prevention. Could political planning and analysis be established in the Euro-Med framework with a view to help preventing conflict? As a matter of fact this function requires a high degree of political cohesion. So high that even the EU Cell has dropped any idea of full autonomy and is based on a system of networking among national elements.

The model inspiring political planning for conflict prevention in the EU Cell is the experience of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) which operated for a while in the Commission upon earlier ideas and requests put forward by the European Parliament. This inspiration may prove more interesting for the EMP than it is for the EU Cell. In fact, what has made the interest of the CPN was its deliberate and systemic interaction with think thanks, NGOs and other components of the civil societies. In this sense, the EMP, through its links with the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks of institutions of respectively security and economic analysis is already operating an embryonic system of analysis and political planning, a system the Partners would be unwilling to operate jointly at governmental level in present political conditions.

Once collected, however, analyses coming from non-governmental networks must be in some way handled by a EMP dedicated unit (unlikely to be set up) or its Secretariat. The Secretariat is presently managed by the European Commission (that in fact is

[8] Page 347 in Torsten Lohmann, "Dispute Settlement Procedures in the OSCE - Genesis and Overview", in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti, A.Rosas (eds.), *cit.*, pp. 343-365.

already handling the very few outstanding CBMs/PBMs, like that on disaster and the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks). This is not the best solution politically, for the same reasons indicated when the establishment of a situation centre has been discussed in the above. Still, it would allow for a minimum of joint Euro-Med planning and analysis. In this sense, rather than trying helplessly to include political planning and analysis in what situation and conflict prevention centres it were possible to establish, it would be better to foster a strict and well planned co-operation between the EMP institutions and what exists of decentralised co-operation in the Partners' civil societies.

Conclusions

This paper has outlined three kinds of model for an enhanced political dialogue in the EMP and discussed their sustainability in present political conditions. On the basis of its analysis, the sustainable model of political dialogue would combine the task of upgrading systemic confidence and trust amongst EMP Partners with that of gradually setting out and implementing a web of means and instruments to prevent conflict. The achievement of the model would be gradual and incremental. Its strengthening would be determined by a virtuous circle between the will concretely expressed by governments in the EMP institutions and the success of the EPD in increasing mutual trust and acting as a mover with respect to the Charter's implementation. The working of such circle would help reinforcing and expanding limited instruments available at the outset and include new ones over time.

The working of the EPD in itself would set the basis for joint action in preventive diplomacy and, in time, in other peace support operations. To that purpose, the use of a kind of "Berlin mechanism" seems fitting with the stage of political development of the EMP. However, its effectiveness in the EMP would require two conditions: (a) a more regular and frequent gathering of the EMP institutions; and (b) that the Senior Officials were enabled to deal with information and complaints to an extent and in cases that the Ministers should set out in a limited but precise mandate. In fact, some form of more regular and autonomous interplay is in order and should be secured primarily by both the Senior Officials and the Euro-Med Committee.

As for the means and instruments for conflict prevention to be developed within the Charter framework, the papers has discussed the possible achievement of an Euro-Med situation centre, a conflict prevention centre and facilities for joint planning and analysis.

As for the situation centre, the most feasible profile seems a combination of Southern access to EU systems through the implementation of PBMs and a modest Euro-Med cell based on the networking of information coming from international agencies.

A conflict prevention centre is regarded as feasible mostly for achieving procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation and, more broadly speaking, the settlement of disputes. The paper contends that, in the light of other experiences, conciliation and other kind of dispute settlements seems difficult to achieve. Thus, while disputes should be referred to existing judicial incumbent bodies, like the Court in the Hague, the Euro-Med centres should focus on mediation and clarification. The establishment of sub-regional centres seems highly desirable.

Joint policy planning and analysis in present political conditions seems out of question. The Partners have an opportunity. however, to put at work North-South networks of non-governmental institutions, like EuroMeSCo and Femise, then limiting themselves to handle incoming information and analysis by means of their secretarial facilities.

The paper warns about the risk of overusing EU facilities to make up for difficulties in setting up joint instruments and procedures. In fact, this could deepen Southern perceptions of EU unilateralism in dealing with the EMP and downgrading confidence-building with respect to non-EU Partners.

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Halki International Seminars 1999

The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

EuroMeSCo Working Group on the Euro-Med Charter

A seminar jointly organised by

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&

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Halki - Greece
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JEAN-FRANÇOIS DAGUZAN

La Charte euro-méditerranéenne pour la paix et la stabilité : éléments juridiques et politiques

First Draft do not quote

L'établissement d'une organisation institutionnelle de l'espace méditerranéen ne date pas d'hier.[1] Bien sûr, la guerre froide avait figé pour presque cinquante ans la situation, mais les réflexions théoriques ne manquèrent pas. A plusieurs reprises, le désir de dépasser le cadre théorique produisit des initiatives opérationnelles, toutes vouées à l'échec. Cependant, celles-ci jalonnèrent le chemin jusqu'à la conférence de Barcelone des 25-26 novembre 1995.

La Déclaration solennelle rédigée à l'issue de cette conférence prévoyait dans son volet 1 « Partenariat politique et de sécurité : définir un espace de paix et de stabilité », l'établissement à terme d'un *pacte euroméditerranéen* visant « à la consolidation d'un espace de paix et de stabilité en Méditerranée ». Les premières réunions qui suivirent la conférence dans le but de développer le programme de travail qui l'accompagnait, avaient fait avancer notablement certaines mesures de confiance et le cercle vertueux initié alors semblait produire des effets rapides. Toutefois, le blocage du processus de paix israélo/palestinien après l'élection de Benjamin Netanyahou entraîna, peu à peu, la paralysie de la dynamique euro-méditerranéenne. La conférence de Malte (15-16 avril 1997) qui devait symboliquement entériner le lancement du « deuxième étage » de la fusée de Barcelone ne permit que d'éviter l'éclatement du processus et le départ définitif de certains Etats arabes.

Le compte-rendu ne fit donc l'état que de succès d'estime et de travaux en cours et se contentait de prendre « note du travail des Hauts Fonctionnaires sur la Charte pour la paix et la stabilité » à approuver « quant les circonstances politiques le permettront ».

En dépit de cet échec, et grâce à l'obstination de l'Espagne, de l'Italie et de la France, les travaux se poursuivirent. La conférence de Palerme (juin 1998), en dépit du contentieux israélo-arabe plus que jamais aigu, permit de constater quelques avancées notables en matière de mesures de confiance dont l'action

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[1] Voir, entre autres : Henry Marchat, A propos d'un plan de communauté méditerranéenne, *revue de Défense nationale*, août-septembre 1958, p. 1840-1858.

conjointe des Etats signataires en matière de catastrophe naturelle ou provoquées par la main de l'homme. Le compte-rendu de la conférence met également l'accent sur le travail conceptuel à fournir en matière de « sécurité globale » ainsi que sur les perceptions communes à développer ; ces deux éléments étant désignés comme préalable à l'établissement de la Charte dont les principes généraux devaient être débattus à l'occasion de la conférence de Stuttgart (mars 1999).

Ainsi les conclusions de la Présidence allemande lors de la conférence de Stuttgart entérinaient la volonté des Etat partenaires d'engager les premières discussions sur l'élaboration sur une *Charte euroméditerranéenne de paix et de sécurité*.

Sur ces bases, cet article a pour objet de d'interroger sur la pertinence de la création d'une organisation internationale gouvernementale euro-méditerranéenne et, si cette pertinence semble avérée, d'en étudier le contenu potentiel voire de proposer quelques suggestions.

Pourquoi une Charte euro-méditerranéenne ?

Au fil des siècles, Les Etats se sont attachés à compenser, le plus souvent poussés par la nécessité, leurs faiblesses intrinsèques en s'associant. Les alliances ont eu, dans l'histoire, une fonction d'abord essentiellement militaire (défensive ou offensive). Peu à peu, le champ d'association s'est élargi à des objectifs plus larges, le plus souvent à caractère économique et basés sur la réciprocité ou un intérêt général bien partagé (ex : Commission centrale de navigation sur le Rhin, (CCNR), 1815). Parfois, le militaire et l'économique firent bon ménage dans une alliance globale (Sainte Alliance, Pacte d'acier, Pacte de Varsovie/Comecon, etc.). La forme des alliances a peu à peu évolué. De coalitions de circonstances, souvent limitées dans le temps, les regroupement d'Etats ont, à partir de la deuxième moitié du XIXème siècle, commencé à se structurer progressivement dans le but de développer un objet commun.[2]

La deuxième moitié du XXème siécle a vu l'émergence d'organisations internationales à caractère générique, à but universel et non limitées dans la durée. Ces organisations se sont développées graduellement prenant leur place auprès des organisations politico-militaires (Otan, Pacte de Varsovie, UEO,

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[2] Voir Max Gounelle, *Relations internationales*, Memento Dalloz, Paris 1993, 2ème édition, p. 114 et 115.

OSCE, etc.) jusque à les marginaliser en nombre et en activité (Nations Unies, Union européenne, ASEAN, Mercosur, Pacte Andin, Ligue Arabe, OUA, etc.)Parallèlement des organisations à objet exclusivement économique ou social se sont développées (OCDE, OMC, FAO, ALENA, OIT, UIT, etc.). La prolifération de ces organisations internationales a eu, en dépit des crises et conflits qui émaillèrent ces cinquante dernières années, un effet positif sur la communauté interétatique. Elle a permis de juguler en partie « l'état de jungle » qui était l'état naturel des relations internationales traditionnelles et a favorisé l'établissement de règles relativement bien acceptées de bon comportement, voire l'adhésion volontaire à un principe de sanctions en cas de transgression desdites règles.

Cependant, la création d'un organisme international nouveau n'est pas chose aisée (la prolifération de ceux-ci ne pousse pas les Etats à poursuivre leur multiplication). L'établissement d'une organisation internationale intergouvernementale (OIG) suppose aussi de la part des membres qui la fondent l'acceptation d'un minimum d'obligations. Il y a donc à peser les contraintes à accepter et les abandons virtuels de souveraineté qu'il implique en échange de quel gain politique ou économique.

Un bassin méditerranéen encore vierge de toute organisation

On ne peut pas dire que la Méditerranée ait eu à pâtir d'un excès d'organisation internationale. La fragmentation a plutôt été le trait commun des Etats ou groupes d'Etats qui en forment le pourtour. L'Europe s'est organisée économiquement puis politiquement en construisant l'Union européenne - (les pays européens sont sans doute les pays du monde adhérant au plus d'OIG : Otan, UEO, OCDE, OMC, OSCE, sans oublier les Nations Unies et autres organisations à but dédié). Les pays arabes sont associés dans la Ligue arabe (à l'influence limitée), l'Organisation de la conférence islamique (OCI), et pour certains l'Organisation des Etats Africains (OUA), l'OPEP et l'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) pour l'Algérie, la Libye, le Maroc, la Mauritanie et la Tunisie. La Turquie (OTAN, OCDE, Conseil de l'Europe, OCI), Israël, (à l'accès limité aux OIG universelles et génériques) et Malte et Chypre aux situations spécifiques pour des raisons différentes. En réalité, la seule conférence internationale intéressant l'espace euro-méditerranéen a réunir l'ensemble des riverains fut la Convention de Gènes du 13 septembre 1985. Elle concernait un objet commun spécifique : la protection écologique du bassin méditerranéen.

Organiser l'espace euro-méditerranéen n'avait rien de naturel ni d'évident. L'OSCE au cours de son histoire avait repoussé du pied (même si l'existence d'une réalité méditerranéenne co-adjacente fut courtoisement admise par les membres) les démarches insistantes de Malte pour élargir à la dimension méditerranéen une problématique des blocs européens déjà très complexe. La démarche la plus intéressante fut celle poussée par l'Espagne et l'Italie de Conférence pour la sécurité et la confiance en Méditerranée (CSCM) au début des années 1990 qui cherchait à organiser l'espace méditerranéen sur un mode inspiré de l'expérience CSCE. Mais l'initiative était venue trop tôt et eut à souffrir de sa trop grande ambition initiale. A vouloir trop embrasser la CSCM déboucha sur un échec. Au même moment, la France jouait une partie plus modeste en recherchant une structuration de la Méditerranée occidentale à travers le dialogue 5+5 et dont les objectifs de coopération étaient réduits au strict minimum. Mais, dans ce cas précis, des conditions historiques défavorables vinrent briser une dynamique assez bien engagée : La guerre du Golfe stoppait le processus de coopération et, ensuite la Libye se voyait placée sous embargo par les Nations Unies en raison de la participation de membres de ses services secrets dans les attentats de Lockerbie et de l'avion d'UTA.[3]
La seule coopération durable était celle que la Communauté puis l'Union européenne entretenait de façon bilatérale avec les différents pays méditerranéens et dont le dernier avatar, entre 1990 et 1994, fut la Politique méditerranéenne rénovée (PMR) qui avait été lancée en catastrophe par les Européens pour faire face aux soubresauts politiques du Sud liés à la guerre du Golfe . Elle consistait presque exclusivement à l'octroi de fonds financiers.

Cependant, les signaux négatifs inquiétants qui arrivaient des rives sud et est de la Méditerranée poussèrent progressivement les Etats membres et la Commission européenne a engager une action de grande envergure. L'initiative n'était pas plus évidente pour le nord que pour le sud.

Aussi, quand l'Union européenne en 1994, décida de lancer le mouvement qui aboutirait à la conférence de Barcelone, fallut-il convaincre les Etats européens

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[3] Une très bonne analyse critique des différentes initiatives antérieures (CSCE, CSCM, 5+5) a été faite dans le document : Eléments d'une politique de voisinage en Méditerranée : précédents, projets déjà en place, actions engagées ; Commission européenne, DG1A - Unité PESC, du 15 décembre 1994, *in L'Annuaire de la Méditerranée 1996*, GERM, Paris Publisud, P. 205 à 221.

du Nord, moins concernés et briser le scepticisme de nombre de pays du sud, que l'évolution favorable à l'époque du Processus de paix n'avait pas convaincu d'un pas supplémentaire. La démarche ne pouvait donc être qu'une approche progressive et prudente, placée sur un plan essentiellement politique et tirée par ceux qui avait le plus d'intérêt à ce que la manoeuvre réussisse : les Etats d'Europe du sud.

Cette démarche était d'autant moins évidente que les intentions du nord n'étaient pas pures et désintéressées. Il s'agissait, en échange de promesses de développement et d'aide financière, de faire accepter par le sud un ensemble de contraintes visant à diminuer sensiblement le niveau de risque pour le Nord (non prolifération , règlement pacifique des conflits, suffisance militaire, etc., d'une part et, d'autre part de réduire les phénomènes migratoires par une action concertée de tous les participants). On peut dire alors, qu'aux prémices de la conférence de Barcelone, la vision de la sécurité et de la stabilité qui prévalut fut une vision « par le petit bout de la lorgnette ».[4]

En dépit des intentions sous-jacentes et des difficultés dans les négociations, la conférence de Barcelone fut une réussite éclatante. Cet événement dépassait le strict cadre diplomatique pour manifester un besoin, un désir de rencontre et de coopération de la part des sociétés civiles des deux rives. Cette rencontre de la diplomatie et de l'attente de l'opinion publique (même si elle n'eut pas la même intensité partout) fit de la conférence de Barcelone un moment d'exception dont l'Histoire accouche quelquefois ; il eut aussi pour revers d'avoir conduit à trop espérer, trop rapidement d'un processus qui ne pouvait se concevoir que sur le long terme.

L'affaiblissement notable du processus de paix et les difficultés dans la mise en place du programme financier MEDA remirent rapidement les choses dans leur juste perspective. Dans un deuxième temps, le processus de Barcelone que d'aucuns étaient prêts à enterrer faisaient la preuve de sa résistance en

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[4] « Il s'agit d'abord d'un succès majeur pour les pays méditerranéens de l'Union européenne, la France, L'Italie et l'Espagne, qui sont parvenus à impliquer les pays du Nord longtemps indifférents au concept méditerranéen, même si c'est par le biais de facteurs négatifs que cette prise de conscience s'est faite : la recrudescence de l'immigration clandestine avec les problèmes sociaux et sécuritaires qui lui sont liés, d'une part ; la crise algérienne et ses répercussions en France, d'autre part. » Basma Kodmani-Darwish, La France et le Moyen-Orient : entre nostalgie et réalisme, *Politique étrangère* N°4 1995/1996, p. 950.

surmontant les moments les plus difficiles de la crise israélo-arabe comme de la crise gréco-turco-chypriote.

Cette capacité de résistance aux « coups de mer » (pour prendre une métaphore marine) a conduit les partenaires du processus a reprendre les discussions dans l'idée de passer un nouveau cap en matière de coopération euro-méditerranéenne ; c'est-à-dire en engageant des discussions visant à entamer une deuxième phase institutionnalisant la dynamique engagée à Barcelone à travers l'élaboration d'une Charte euro-méditerranéenne pour la paix et la stabilité. Cette possibilité avait été ouverte dans le volet 1 de la déclaration de Barcelone sous le terme de « Pacte ». Le mot « Charte » fut préféré au premier car considéré par d'aucuns comme trop guerrier - (juridiquement les deux mots, on le verra, ont la même signification ; tout est question du contenu). Ce désir d'accomplir un nouveau saut qualitatif a été entériné dans les conclusions de la présidence allemande lors de la conférence de Stuttgart (mai 1999) et un ensemble de « *guidelines* » visant à préciser les objectifs et les modalités de la Charte a été accepté comme base de travail par les participants.

Le nouveau défi qui se pose désormais aux partenaires eurro-méditerranéens est donc de fixer durablement les principes décrits au volet 1 de la Déclaration de Barcelone dans un cadre juridique solennel qui dépasse le cadre de la simple conférence intergouvernementale pour s'inscrire dans la durée.

Cependant, eu égard aux avatars diplomatiques qui ont troublé l'évolution harmonieuse du processus de Barcelone, l'édification d'une Charte euro-méditerranéenne pour la paix et stabilité n'est possible que si l'on prend en compte un certain nombre de préalables avant de se lancer dans son élaboration. Ces paramètres sont les suivants :

- Il y a un différentiel d'organisation et de structuration entre les pays européens et les PSEM. D'un côté, l'évolution politico-structurelle de l'Union depuis le traité d'Amsterdam offre un niveau d'intégration politique et économique qui flirte, dans certains domaines, avec le fédéralisme (l'Euro). De l'autre, on a affaire à un ensemble éclaté et disparate allant d'une union de pure façade (L'UMA) à des situations conflictuelles durables (Israël-pays arabes, Chypre-Grèce-Turquie, etc.),

- L'état de guerre ou de conflit larvé entre plusieurs participants de la conférence de Barcelone doit être exprèssement pris en compte car il limite *de facto* le cadre d'exercice de la future Charte.
- Le « surinvestissement » en souveraineté demeure un des traits distinctifs des Etats du sud et de l'Est méditerranéens. Les guerres de libération, pour certains, les tentatives de déstabilisation au cours de la guerre froide, pour d'autres, ou les conditions d'émergence de l'Etat furent des motifs qui ont contribué à rendre les PSEM extrêmement sourcilleux de leur souveraineté et de considérer les initiatives multilatérales comme des atteintes potentielles à celle-ci.
- La méfiance en une initiative une fois de plus exportée peut aussi jouer en défaveur de l'élaboration de la Charte. Du Dialogue Euro-Arabe avorté des année 1970-1980, au Nouvel Ordre mondial de l'après-guerre du golfe, en passant par les déboires du Processus de paix, les pays arabes, en l'occurrence, ont eu tendance à voir les initiatives multilatérales poussées par l'occident, plus comme des actions tactiques ponctuelles développées dans l'espoir d'un gain unilatéral, que comme un véritable investissement du nord dans une esprit positif de codéveloppement.

Comment transformer alors une initiative unilatérale fondée sur l'angoisse et l'obsession de la sécurité, d'une part, et reçu avec méfiance et scepticisme, d'autre part, en un système multilatéral institutionnel chargé d'assurer la paix et la stabilité de cette zone à haut risque ?

Une tel challenge est possible si les responsables qui président à son élaboration savent mettre en œuvre une démarche modeste, progressive et dotée des instruments d'action adéquats.

1. - La Charte : aspects politiques et juridiques

Une action en accord avec la tendance internationale visant à privilégier les accords régionaux de sécurité. Pendant de nombreuses années, les décideurs et les juristes de droit international se sont interrogés sur la pertinence de développer à la surface du globe les accords régionaux de sécurité. Certains trouvaient que cette multiplication de conventions affaiblissaient les pouvoirs de l'organisation universelle de sécurité (les Nations Unies) et que ces différents mécanismes faisaient double emploi avec les mécanismes généraux prévus aux articles ad hoc de la Charte. Peu à peu cette position a été révisée et, au contraire, tout le monde y compris les dirigeants successifs de l'ONU, sont convenus de ce que la création d'accords de sécurité régionaux idoines de par le monde, non seulement ne contrevenait pas au principe général, mais contribuait a contrario à son renforcement. Il y avait, en réalité, synergie et démultiplication des effets entre l'organisation centrale et l'organisation régionale pour une question donnée. Par ailleurs, on put rapidement constater que dans certaines occasion le recours aux Nations Unies étaient plus porteurs car celles-ci étaient plus distanciées par rapport au problème alors qu'à l'inverse, dans d'autres, l'organisation régionale jouait un vrai rôle de proximité. « La question de la régionalisation du règlement des différents est d'actualité et d'une importance critiques », précise Alvaro de Soto, « On n'a pas d'autre choix que de renforcer les organisations et les accords régionaux. On ne peut pas compter sur l'ONU pour résoudre tous les problèmes.(...) C'est pourquoi il est essentiel que les Etats membres réfléchissent sur les divisions de responsabilités et qu'ils fassent le nécessaire pour que les organisations régionales aient les moyens de mener une diplomatie régionale que l'ONU n'est pas en mesure d'accomplir. »[5] L'élaboration d'un Charte euro-méditerranéenne est donc dans le droit fil de cette délégation de compétence souhaitée par les Nations Unies elles-mêmes. Tout est ensuite question de contenu.

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[5] Conseiller politique principal du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, La régionalisation du règlement des différends, in *Actualités des conflits internationaux*, Yves Daudet (dir.), Rencontres internationales de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques d'Aix en Provence, Editions Pédone, Paris, 1993, p. 97.

1. 1. - Les principes

1.1. 1. - Une démarche d'abord politique

Les réserves qui ont été avancées dans l'introduction doivent conduire les rédacteurs de la Charte à une démarche prudente. L'approche doit donc être, en premier lieu, comme les « *guidelines* » distribuées à Stuttgart le préconisent, politique. Il ne peut s'agir que d'un mouvement consensuel, non contraignant à l'origine et basé sur l'adhésion volontaire des ses membres. Cette démarche volontaire n'exclut pas que s'installent progressivement dans la Charte des éléments contraignants mais ceux-ci devront faire l'objet d'une approbation unanime. En l'état, seul le respect des grands principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et la Déclaration de Barcelone doivent être posés comme a priori au moment de l'adhésion. Le volet 1 de la Déclaration doit constituer la base de référence, de principe et symbolique de la Charte.

Cependant, l'acte constitutif, la Charte doit être posée de façon solennelle qui entérine les acquis de Barcelone et qui en manifeste l'institutionnalisation. A cet égard, une telle institutionnalisation ne peut passer que par une réunion des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements partenaires du Processus de Barcelone. L'entrée préalable de la Libye dans le processus apparaît un élément décisif pour la réussite future de la Charte. L'unanimité doit en constituer la règle (mais ses modalités devront en être précisées).

L'indivisibilité de l'ensemble euroméditerranéen et notamment de la Méditerranée, elle-même, doit être réaffirmée. La force potentielle du Processus de Barcelone réside dans le lien entre Union européenne et Méditerranée et l'affirmation que la sécurité et la stabilité de l'un des protagonistes est corrélative à celle de l'autre. Cette notion de **destin partagé** doit se retrouver nommément dans le Préambule de la Charte.

Ce rattachement de la Charte aux objectifs du volet 1 et presque exclusivement celui-ci, de Barcelone, est un élément important pour la réussite du projet. La future Charte doit viser, d'abord et avant tout, l'organisation d'un cadre de **coopération politique et de réduction des tensions interétatiques**. Le volet 2, même si la sécurité économique est un enjeu essentiel difficilement séparable du premier, concerne d'abord la gestion de l'assistance économique de l'Union à

l'endroit des PSEM. Cette situation d'assistance, au même titre que les autres programmes de coopération internationale (PHARE, TACIS, Lomé), maîtrisée unilatéralement par l'Union et gérée par la Commission dans une approche bilatérale pays par pays doit demeurer, par essence, sous contrôle communautaire exclusif et ne peut faire l'objet d'une gestion collective dans le cadre de la Charte. Il y a donc un double niveau dans Barcelone qui doit être reflété dans la Charte : un volet coopération politique et de sécurité qui doit en constituer le cœur et un volet coopération/assistance qui en est exclu.
Les questions assez hétérogènes incluses dans le volet 3 « domaines social, culturel et humain » ne devraient être intégrées dans la Charte que progressivement, et ne pas faire l'objet d'une mention explicite *ab initio* sinon pour préciser que les partenaires se réservent le droit d'en convenir ultérieurement ou de créer, en tant que de besoin, des groupes de travail ad hoc qui pourront devenir autant de commissions. En revanche, certains éléments du volet 3 ; cités également au volet 1, pourraient être utilement rattachés à la Charte : on pense notamment à ceux concernant le terrorisme, la drogue ou la criminalité transnationale.

1. 1. 2. - Les avantages d'un acte institutionnel : fixer et durer

« L'organisation internationale se distingue de la Conférence diplomatique », note Daniel Colard, « par sa permanence et par l'existence d'organes propres dotés de « pouvoir propres ».[6]Si la conférence de Barcelone et son programme de travail semblait la voie la plus favorable pour développer un processus à l'origine fort peu évident de cohabitation des extrêmes, celui-ci ne peut avoir d'impact durable que dans un minimum d'institutionnalisation. Le temps ne fait, en la matière, rien à l'affaire. La Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe a mis dix-neuf ans pour devenir une « Organisation » (CSCE, 1975 - OSCE, 1994). Cependant, dans le cas euroméditerranéen, point ne faudrait trop tarder, car les tensions peuvent être telles entre certains partenaires qu'elles pourraient mettre à bas un processus peu structuré. On l'a déjà dit, la Déclaration de Barcelone appelait « la possibilité à terme de mettre en œuvre à cet effet un pacte euro-méditerranéen ». Cette idée n'est pas neuve, Malte a pu en de nombreuses occasions faire des propositions, les premiers travaux de la CSCM

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[6] *Les relations internationales de 1945 à nos jours*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1996, 6ème édition, p. 97.

ou du 5+5 ont apporté leur pierre.[7] Il a été jusqu'au candidat Président de la République Française, Jacques Chirac, alors candidat à l'élection de proposer un tel pacte dans ses propositions de politique étrangère: L'institutionnalisation est donc le socle de tout véritable développement productif dans la durée.

«L'organisation intergouvernementale », note Claude-Albert Colliard, « trouve son origine dans la conférence diplomatique, vieille institution des relations internationales utilisée pendant longtemps sur le seul plan politique et transposée. Les textes constitutifs, quels que soient les noms employés, Charte, Pacte, voire Constitution, définissent la structure institutionnelle. Selon les organisations, elle est variable et plus ou moins complexe. »[8] Dans le cas particulier, la conférence diplomatique fondatrice est la conférence de Barcelone. Ses principes sont fixés dans la Déclaration du même nom. Une nouvelle conférence solennelle doit désormais en délimiter le cadre institutionnel et les compétences. Il devra être simple. Les obstacles à surmonter dans l'élaboration ne seront pas minces. L'évolution par étapes de la conférence diplomatique vers l'organisation intergouvernementale est classé par le professeur Serge Sur dans le modèle « d'institutionnalisation progressive » des organisations internationales ; (on peut classer dans cette catégorie la CSCE/OSCE ou le GATT devenu Organisation mondiale du Commerce, OMC).[9]

Cependant, imaginer un cadre allégé dans une premier temps ne veut pas dire un cadre creux et figé. Au contraire la force des organisations internationales bien construites demeurent dans leur souplesse et leur capacité d'adaptation (un peu comme les constitutions bien faites). C'est pourquoi il convient de prévoir un cadre souple et modulable que l'on pourra faire évoluer une fois les habitus de coopération acquis. Serge Sur considère que « l'organisation ne repose pas sur des bases constituées une fois pour toutes même si elles comportent une possibilité d'évolution interne, mais passe par une succession de phases et de *mutations successives.* »[10]

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[7] Victor-Yves Ghébali, The Geographical Dimension, in Victor-Yves Ghebali and Brigitte Sauerwein, *European Security in the 1990s : Challenges and Perspectives*, UNIDIR, United Nations, New York/Geneva, 1995, voir notamment Mediterranean Problems, p. 122-133.

[8] *Institutions des relations internationales*, Dalloz, Paris, 1990 - 9ème édition, p 691.

[9] *Relations internationales*, Montchrestien, Paris, 1995, p. 315.

[10] ibid, P 314.

Il convient donc de laisser à l'organisation la capacité de se développer. La rédaction de la Charte est à cet égard, déterminante pour l'avenir.

1. 2. - Les organes

« Le nombre et la structure de ces organes varie suivant l'importance de l'organisation, le but qu'elle poursuit, la complexité de ses tâches. » constate avec pertinence Daniel Colard[11] Dans le cas de la Charte euroméditerranéenne. Il conviendrait de s'en tenir, dans un premier temps à un format simple :

1. 2. 1. - Organes pléniers

- un organe politique exécutif : la conférence des Ministres des affaires étrangères (modèle coopération politique de l'Otan) décidant à l'unanimité. Le cas échéant, à l'occasion d'actes solennels, la conférence des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements pourra lui être substituée.

- un organe administratif : Un Secrétariat général léger dirigé par un Secrétaire général. Initialement, il ne semble pas souhaitable que le Secrétaire général ait la dimension d'un Secrétaire général de l'Otan ou du nouveau Secrétaire général/Monsieur PESC ouvert au traité d'Amsterdam, mais se rapproche plus de la dimension essentiellement administrative et technique de l'ancien Secrétaire général du Conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne (avant Amsterdam) ou du Chef du Secrétariat du programme Euréka. Il est en effet indispensable qu'il n'y ait pas de confusion aux des opinions publiques entre l'échelon politique (le Conseil) et l'échelon administratif (le secrétariat général). La place occupée par le comité des hauts fonctionnaires chargé du suivi de Barcelone devra être analysée. En effet, faudra-t-il considérer que ce comité demeure l'organe informel de travail agissant pour le compte du Conseil des Ministres et préparant les réunions plénières ou cette fonction devra-t-elle être assurée par le secrétariat général ? A notre sens la première interprétation semble la plus pertinente. Il aura un très gros travail intergouvernemental à conduire avant chaque rencontre solennelle et il n'est pas sûr que le secrétariat général puisse assure les tâches politiques l'accompagnant. Il n'est pas sûr, non plus, que cela soit souhaitable.

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[11] *Les relations internationales de 1945 à nos jours*, op. cit., p. 97.

Par ailleurs, la question mérite d'être posée d'envisager que la DG1b assume les fonctions de Secrétariat général. Sa compétence et son expérience en matière de coopération euro-méditerranéenne n'est plus à prouver. Elle est a priori l'organe capable de démarrer instantanément le jour où la Charte rentrerait en application. Bien sûr, la DG1b étant un élément administratif de la Commission européenne, sa dissociation organique ne manquerait pas de poser des problèmes techniques et aussi politiques. Toutefois, cette alternative utile, pourrait être envisagée dans une phase transitoire de constitution du Secrétariat général. En effet, il faudra aussi trancher la question du siège de l'organisation et la participation de fonctionnaires internationaux issus des PSEM, dans une deuxième phase.

- le Dialogue parlementaire euroméditerranéen : prémices d'une Chambre consultative euro-méditerranéenne. La question d'une représentation parlementaire consultative devra faire l'objet d'un débat. Le succès du dialogue parlementaire euroméditerranéen, à travers les conférences interparlementaires successives, montre, s'il en était besoin, la nécessité d'une meilleure association de la représentation populaire aux décisions de l'exécutif. Il serait alors possible d'envisager une chambre consultative rattachée à la Charte, dont les membres seraient issus des représentations parlementaires nationales (comme l'Assemblée de l'UEO ou de l'Atlantique Nord, par exemple) et qui pourrait travailler sur des sujets d'intérêts communs et donner des avis ou produire des rapports sur la demande du Conseil de la Charte. Ce type d'institution interparlementaire joue un rôle très important d'information et de communication, d'abord pour les parlementaires travaillant en son sein, puis pour les messages que ceux-ci peuvent répercuter dans leurs pays d'origine. Le risque de dérive (autosaisine et condamnation de tel ou tel Etat partenaire) pourrait être évité en verrouillant les mécanismes de travail de cette nouvelle assemblée et en assurant un répartition équilibrée des « blocs » européens et PSEM, avec une attention particulière aux situations respectives de la Turquie et d'Israël.

1. 2. 2. - les organes subsidiaires :

La vitalité d'une organisation internationale se pèse aussi à la vigueur (et non au nombre) de ses organes subsidiaires. Ils sont souvent les outils de travail de l'organisation. « Une constatation fondamentale s'impose », note Claude-Albert Colliard « : Les organisations internationales sont des êtres vivants. Les statuts constitutifs les créent, ensuite elles jouissent d'une vie propre. Il ne s'agit pas

simple ment du phénomène juridique de l'attribution de la personnalité morale, il s'agit de la possibilité qu'elles ont de créer tous les organes qui leur sont nécessaires pour accomplir leurs mission. »[12] Ces organes subsidiaires doivent permettre à l'organisation d'accomplir au mieux , et en tant que de besoin, les missions qui lui ont été attribuées par les Etats partenaires dans la Charte constitutive. Dans le cas présent, ils doivent correspondre au souci principal posé par la Charte d'assurer un espace de paix et de sécurité euro-méditerranéen et donc d'en être les instruments d'exécution et de développement idoines.

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[12] *Institutions des relations internationales*, op. cit., p. 693.

2. - Les instruments de la Charte

Pour jouer pleinement son rôle de stabilisation de l'espace euro-méditerranéen, la Charte doit disposer d'un certain nombre d'instruments opérationnels : Commissions, groupes de travail ou comités. Certains pourront prendre la forme d'organes subsidiaires comme nous l'avons évoqué plus haut. Ils doivent être, à notre sens, orientés sur les missions principales dévolues à la Charte : prévention des conflits et réduction des tensions.

2. 1. - Un mécanisme de prévention des crises et des conflits

Le principal contenu de la Charte, en plus de constituer un forum officiel de dialogue et de concertation, serait axé sur la recherche de mesures de confiance et la diplomatie préventive et serait un cadre à la prévention des tensions et des conflits ainsi qu'à leur règlement. On rechercherait alors la mise en place, en premier lieu, d'un code de conduite et de règlement pacifique des différends ; ces mesures s'inscrivant au fur et à mesure de leur faisabilité politique.[13]

Les experts travaillant sur la sécurité en Méditerranée ont abordé à plusieurs reprises la question de la prévention des conflits. Un certain nombre d'éléments peuvent être isolés de ces travaux qui, à la fois, montrent le caractère spécifique de l'approche prévention des crises et conflits en Méditerranée et la difficulté de la mettre en œuvre.

Dans l'ensemble, l'analyse est pessimiste. « Il ne faut pas attendre grand chose de la prévention des conflits » notent deux experts égyptiens assez lucides.[14] A leur sens celle-ci, si elle devait émerger, ne saurait venir que d'un tiers (Etats-Unis ou Union européenne étant les deux candidats potentiels). L'élément de coercition doit, selon eux, jouer de façon essentielle dans cette question sinon insoluble.

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[13] Ambassadeur Jean-Pierre Courtois, Eléments sur le projet de Charte de paix et de stabilité, intervention au Séminaire de Wilton Park, « Le dialogue euro-méditerranéen » (19-22 octobre 1998) p 5.

[14] Gamad Abdel Gawad Soltan, Abdel Monem Saïd Ali, The Middle Eastern Experience with Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention, présenté à Rome, *Euromesco Group on Confidence-Building, Preventive Diplomacy and Arms Control*, Rome, 5-6 juillet 1997, p. 24.

D'autres experts comme Roberto Aliboni ou Mariano Aguirre mettent en avant la question fondamentale des conflits infra-étatiques (dont l'Algérie est montré comme l'archétype). Ces auteurs considèrent que cette dimension infra-étatique est l'élément caractéristique de l'espace méditerranéen, bien plus que la dimension inter-étatique, ; c'est-à-dire les conflits entre pays (comme la querelle israélo/arabe, par exemple).[15]

Par ailleurs, la plupart des experts (dont l'auteur) défendent l'idée que les situations de crises en Méditerranée relèvent d'abord, de problématiques non militaires et/ou non diplomatiques (démographie, crise économique, crise d'identité, urbanisation sauvage, etc.) et donc ne sont pas à même d'être traité selon un *modus operandi* classique de prévention des crises et conflits, sauf à considérer, selon certains (Aguirre, Daguzan, Rapport EuroMeSCo[16]) que la prévention des crises au sens méditerranéen du terme passe par la résolution des problèmes génériques évoqués plus haut ; ce qui ne sera pas une sinécure, en dépit des efforts européens déployés via le processus de Barcelone.

Ainsi, Roberto Aliboni n'hésite-t-il pas à qualifier le processus de Barcelone de « Macro mesure systémique et structurelle de prévention des conflits » .[17]

Cependant, les experts ne rejettent pas la démarche et les instruments classiques de prévention des conflits comme les paragraphes antérieurs l'ont montré. Ils mettent cependant en avant les caractères :
- de progressivité dans l'évolution des phases ; une culture de la prévention est à mettre en œuvre dans une zone du monde qui en est largement dépourvue,

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[15] Roberto Alboni,Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euromediterranean Partnership, p. 4, Mariano Aguirre, Conflict Prevention and Prevention Diplomacy in the Mediterranean, papiers présentés à Rome, *Euromesco Group on Confidence-Building, Preventive Diplomacy and Arms Control*, Rome, 5-6 juillet 1997, 14 p.

[16] Roberto Aliboni, Abdel Monem Saïd Ali et Alvaro Vasconcelos, *Rapport commun des groupes de travail sur la coopération politique et de sécurité et sur le contrôle des armements, les mesures de confiance et la prévention des conflits*, EuroMeSCo, 1998, non publié, 47 p. Jean-François Daguzan, La Méditerranée en quête d'une organisation politico-stratégique, *Défense Nationale*, n°10 Octobre 1997, p. 14-30.

[17] Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control..., op. cit., p. 3.

- de subsidiarité de la démarche de Barcelone par rapport aux processus existants (selon le principe établi dans la déclaration de Barcelone) ; mais cette question mérite d'être discutée tant la paralysie desdits processus est grande,
- de compatibilité avec des initiatives en cours ; ainsi la démarche méditerranéenne ne vient elle pas concurrencer ou se superposer avec l'initiative lancée par le Parlement européen et Michel Rocard, en 1995, de Réseau de prévention des conflits (*Conflict Prevention Network* - CPN) et établi à Bruxelles en 1997 sur financement de l'Union européenne et, ce, même si CPN a une vocation globale ?
- de retour d'expérience ; les experts égyptiens déjà cités font valoir avec raison que l'expérience des accords bilatéraux de prévention des incidents, notamment (Egypte/Israël ou Israël/Syrie, etc.) doit être à prendre en compte (téléphone rouge, annonce préalable de mouvements de troupes ou de manoeuvres, zones d'exclusion, etc.).

Cadre politique général de dialogue et de coopération, la Charte doit revêtir également des aspects opérationnels. La prévention des conflits apparaît comme un des éléments essentiel à développer. A cet égard, on pourrait s'inspirer de la convention de Stockholm du 15 décembre 1992 établie dans le cadre alors de la CSCE. Cette convention qui respecte le caractère intergouvernemental de la CSCE/OSCE, permet à des Etats membres de rechercher une procédure de conciliation souple.
La convention établit une Cour sous la forme bien connue d'une liste de personnalités qualifiées désignées soit comme conciliateurs, soit comme arbitres.(...) Elle peut être saisie par voie de compromis et doit se dessaisir si un autre mode de règlement a été utilisé ou apparaîtrait obligatoire pour les parties » ; précise Geneviève Burdeau.[18]
Ce mode de règlement qui avait pu être trouvé trop intergouvernemental par certains observateurs au moment de sa création, semble a priori tout à fait adapté à la spécificité euro-méditerranéenne.

La création d'un *'mécanisme politique d'urgence'* similaire à celui créé par la réunion du Conseil des Ministres de l'OSCE des 19 et 20 juin 1991 à Berlin pourrait être également envisagé. Ce mécanisme, conçu pour apporter une réponse rapide à une crise brutale, pourrait aussi avoir pour mission de réduire

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[18] La diversification des procédures de règlement des différends, in *Actualités des conflits internationaux*, Yves Daudet (dir.), op. cit., p. 159.

les risques de guerre ou d'actions offensives unilatérales (représailles) causées par une interprétation erronée de tels ou tels faits.
Enfin, à partir des différents modèles existants (et notamment celui de l'OSCE) un *centre d'information régional pour la stabilité en Méditerranée,* suivant en cela la recommandation de la conférence inter parlementaire de Malte (point 18), pourrait être créé dans un premier temps. Ce centre pourrait ensuite évoluer, en profitant de l'expérience des ACRS, vers un *Centre régional de gestion des crises*. L'accent devrait être mis tout particulièrement sur le travail spécifique concernant l'après-"alerte avancée" *(Post Early Warning),* autrement dit sur la recherche de la réduction des crises dans ses premières heures. [19]

2. 2. - Un code de bonne conduite et l'établissement de mesures de confiance

L'établissement d'un code de bonne conduite doit être également au cœur de la Charte. La base de ce code est toute entière contenu dans le volet 1 qui précise les engagements auxquels souscrivent les parties signataires. Cet aspect comme le constate Fred Tanner est le plus souvent négligé par les analystes.[20] Cet ensemble de contraintes librement acceptées qui vont de règles de comportement interne (pluralisme, respect des minorités, etc.) à des règles de bons voisinages (en commençant par la non agression pour aller jusqu'à la suffisance militaire) rappelle beaucoup le code de bonne conduite de l'OSCE du Document de Budapest de 1994, même s'il est moins détaillé que ce dernier. La question est de savoir s'il est possible d'aller plus loin. Le code de conduite politico-militaire de l'OSCE intègre et détaille dans son point 7 (paragraphes 20 à 33) le principe de contrôle démocratique des forces armées ; on peut se demander s'il a un sens dans le cadre du partenariat vu les situations respectives de certaines relations armées/pouvoir en Méditerranée. Mais la question est tout aussi valable pour certains pays de l'OSCE.

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[19] Jean-François Daguzan, Les implications d'un pacte de stabilité dans le désarmement en Méditerranée, in Antonio Marquina (ed.) *Les élites et le processus de changement dans la Méditerranée,* FMES/CREST/UNISCI, Madrid, 1997, p 281-303

[20] Voir Fred Tanner, An Emerging Security Agenda for the Mediterranean, *Mediterranean Politics*, N°3 Vol. 1 Winter 1995, p. 279-294.

Les mesures de confiance à caractère opérationnel direct devront faire l'objet d'une commission spécialisée. On ne les détaillera pas plus avant dans la mesure où elles sont traités par d'autres experts du groupe, pour le moment.

Enfin, les colloques ou séminaires tenus sur les questions de défense en Méditerranée, ces dernières années, ont aussi clairement fait apparaître qu'un des problèmes majeurs posés aux riverains des deux rives était celui des fausses perceptions (identification de menaces non fondées, craintes instinctives, mauvaise interprétation d'actions militaires, méconnaissance de phénomènes culturels, etc.). Le travail sur les perceptions apparaît alors comme un enjeu majeur de réduction des risques dans cette zone.[21]

2. 3.- Disposer de capacités d'action sub-régionales

La Charte doit mettre en place la possibilité éventuelle de développer, sans circonvenir au principe d'indivisibilité, d'actions de « coopérations renforcées » (ou *actions communes* pour reprendre les dispositions prévues à l'article J-1 al.3 et J-3 du volet PESC du traité de Maastricht[22]) limitées à certains Etats ou groupe d'Etat et pouvant, soit prendre une dimension géographique sous-régionale (Méditerranée occidentale), soit une dimension thématique (eau, par exemple). Cette formule a pour intérêt de laisser se développer des coopérations n'intéressant pas tous les partenaires en même temps (ce qui sera souvent le cas). Il faudra ainsi envisager des modalités d'abstention constructive dans les mécanismes de prise de décision. Les Etats partenaires non intéressés s'abstenant de gêner l'adoption de mesures auxquelles ils ne sont pas parties prenantes. Bien sûr, la possibilité de réintégrer le train de telle ou telle coopération devra rester ouvert.

2. 4. - Créer une commission juridique de consultation

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[21]Jean-François Daguzan, Un pacte de stabilité en Méditerranée : un point de vue français, *Méditerranée : le pacte à construire,* Collection Strademed n∞ 3, Publisud/FMES/ CREST/UNISCI, Paris, 1997, p. 193-209.

[22] Procédure plus simple que celle du Traité d'Amsterdam et mieux adapté à la spécificité euro-méditerranéenne qu'il faudra peut être encore simplifier.

Un dialogue sur "l'espace commun de légalité", mériterait également d'être entrepris.[23] Il peut toucher la réflexion sur les questions aussi diverses que l'environnement, la coopération policière, les questions de droit comparé, mais aussi, ultérieurement, le droit international et les questions juridiques liés aux différends et conflits de la zone (processus de paix, Sahara occidental, Gibraltar et Ceuta et Melilla, contentieux chypriote, Mer Égée, etc...) que les pays signataires de la Déclaration de Barcelone n'ont pas souhaité voir, dans un premier temps, pris en compte. Cette coopération juridique ne devrait, en aucun cas prendre la forme ou être interprétée comme un quelconque tribunal international mais, plutôt, comme un forum de débat et d'échanges qui permettrait de faire avancer des dossiers difficiles dans la sérénité. ouvrir des espaces de négociations euro-méditerranéens : Par ailleurs, les négociations en cours dans différents endroits du bassin pour la résolution de certaines crises (Sahara, Chypre, etc.) ne donnent pas les résultats attendus. Peut-être faudrait-il chercher à mettre en œuvre des espaces de négociations nouveaux, qui pourraient s'inscrire dans les attributions de la Charte, et dans lesquels les Etats concernés travailleraient dans une ambiance plus sereine et dans la durée. L'enjeu de stabilité en Méditerranée est tel que les Etats européens et méditerranéens peuvent se retrouver dans une médiation plus riche que ne peut l'offrir, à l'heure actuelle, les Nations Unies ou des négociations bilatérales souvent stériles car « plombées » de trop de méfiance.

2. 5. - L'action en matière de désarmement

Peut-on engager les compétences de la Charte en matière de désarmement ? Au vu des résultats pour le moins médiocres, des différentes initiatives dans lesquels sont engagés de nombreux partenaires notamment des PSEM, il semble difficile qu'il faille *ex abrupto* ouvrir une compétence explicite en matière de désarmement. Cependant, la réduction des arsenaux, la suffisance et la non prolifération étant au menu du volet 1 de la Déclaration de Barcelone, il serait sans doute opportun d'envisager un groupe de travail ad hoc qui pourrait étudier la situation existante et peut être proposer des voies d'ouverture susceptibles de débloquer les processus de négociation existant et, pour l'heure paralysés. La

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[23] Voir Ambassadeur Marc Bonnefous, Vers un nouveau concept de sécurité, in *La Méditerranée occidentale, un espace à partager*, FMES, Toulon, 1991, p. 114-115 ; et aussi, Jean-François Daguzan, Coopération régionale et sécurité collective en Méditerranée, in *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine* N° 4 ? 1992, p 574-575.

Charte pourrait se voir utilement transférer la gestion du registre régional de déclaration des transferts d'armes de la part des Nations Unies. De la même façon, on pourrait envisager de suivre les avancées des diverses instances chargées du désarmement et qui concernent spécifiquement ou incluent les partenaires méditerranéens (Conférence du désarmement, NFZ, contrôle des technologies, etc.).

2. 6. - La contribution Euromesco à l'analyse des risques et tensions et réseau d'alerte

Le réseau ces centres euroméditerranéens de politique étrangère et de sécurité doit être partie prenante des mesures de prévention de la Charte. L'utilité du réseau a été rappelé, à plusieurs reprises par les différentes conférences euro-méditerranéennes. Le rôle de celui-ci devrait défini dans le cadre de la Charte et ses objectifs et modalités d'action mieux précisées. En dehors de sa capacité naturelle de « boîte à outil » conceptuelle, Euromesco pourrait un rôle important dans l'appréhension rapide de crises ou tension euro-méditerranéennes sous-jacentes.
Un système simple pourrait facilement être mis en œuvre :
Dans l'hypothèse où un membre du réseau considère que, à son point de vue, des éléments probants d'une crise lui semble désormais caractérisés, il rédige une courte note (une ou deux pages) qu'il diffuse à l'ensemble du réseau.
Les membres du réseau se sentant concernés critiquent et abondent la note (réfutation, remarques, supplément d'information, etc...).
Si un consensus semble être reconnu par les membres du réseau qui se sont impliqués dans l'affaire, on recherche l'élaboration d'un papier commun (de la même taille que la première note).
Ce papier, une fois adopté par les participants, est signé par ceux qui le désirent et remis au Secrétariat général qui décide de l'usage à en faire (diffusion au Conseil, aux médias, etc.).
Cette méthode a pour avantage :
- la souplesse, réaction immédiate à un événement et peu de papier,
- la rapidité, pas plus d'un mois, et si possible moins, pour la mise en forme,
- l'impact, car un papier conjoint signé de 5, 10 ou plus centres de recherche reconnus ne peut que marquer celui qui le reçoit.

On peut aussi envisager les cas ou le Secrétariat général ou le Conseil des Ministres saisit le réseau d'une mission d'étude.

Il serait également fructueux de développer la pratique de la "diplomatie de séminaire" (*Seminar Diplomacy),* méthode de travail discrète, particulièrement adaptée à la complexité méditerranéenne, et qui pourrait être conduite sous le couvert des centres de recherche Euromesco (Workshops, séminaires restreints, etc.) dont « l'irresponsabilité » des experts et le caractère informel des rencontres peut favoriser l'avancement des idées et la liberté de parole, sur l'incitation du Conseil et le contrôle du Secrétariat général.

Conclusions :

Un processus forcément modeste mais ambitieux sur le long terme.

Les effets pédagogiques de l'institutionnalisation

Jean-François Daguzan

(6)

Halki International Seminars 1999

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

EURO-MED CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

EURO-MED CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

Abstract

This study examines the concept of conflict prevention with a specific emphasis on conflict prevention at a regional level (the Euro-Mediterranean area) in post-Cold War relations. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy. This study offers a set of clearly defined rules, principles, and mechanisms that form the basis of a strategic planning doctrine that can be applied whenever such crisis situations emerge. The research project clarifies the distinction between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of any particular crisis. It also spells out the short, medium and long-term phases of setting up such a Centre that include creating a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime crisis information and early warning network and agency (EMMA) and also investigating the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EMMC). The study concludes by articulating clearly what the objectives and functions of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) will be given developments taking place in the European Union's common and foreign and security policy and the more general geo-strategic changes taking place across the Mediterranean.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the concept of conflict prevention with a specific emphasis on conflict prevention at a regional level (the Euro-Mediterranean area) in post-Cold War relations. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy. This study offers a set of clearly defined rules, principles, and mechanisms that form the basis of a strategic planning doctrine that can be applied whenever such crisis situations emerge.

Since the launching of the Barcelona Process in November 1995 the twenty-seven Foreign Ministers agreed on the need to develop and sustain Partnership Building Measures. While recognising the constraints that currently exist, a commitment was also made to focus on the concept of global stability and the need to develop common perceptions of the factors that contribute to it.[*1]

The Annex to the Chairman's Formal Conclusions at the Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial meeting in Stuttgart in April 1999 provide a specific framework for elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability for the first time. The guidelines emphasise that the Charter will serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration.[*2]

The Annex stipulates that the establishment of an enhanced political dialogue, in appropriate institutional framework and on adequate levels, will have priority. It is also stated that the dispositions regarding partnership-building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional co-operation and preventive diplomacy will be developed in an evolutionary way and progressively strengthened. It is within this context that the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) should take place. The primary function of the Centre will be to enhance political dialogue in order to prevent tensions and crises as outlined in the annex. This will include establishing specific arrangements for conflict prevention and elaborating upon partnership building measures that promote crisis prevention.

The Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability already spell out the parameters within which the modus operandi of a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention Centre can be set up. These include: encouraging consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings, developing procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice, encouraging judicial settlement of differences and disputes, acceding and adhering to appropriate international conventions, and setting up a structure of workshops that identify root causes of instability and tension.

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

The first step that needs to be taken prior to the setting up of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) is to identify the circumstances in which effective action could be considered and the means most suited to a given situation, in order to prevent a conflict breaking out or escalating. The concept does not of course presume that a conflict will necessarily break out.

An operational definition of prevention means intervening at the right moment to prevent social, ethnic and political tensions from developing into violent conflict. In practice this means pressuring a state to start negotiating with the relevant groups or communities concerned and to introduce the structural reforms needed to defuse the crises.

There is no doubt that this is a demanding task. Adequate resources are required to identify and monitor inequalities and tensions between different linguistic or ethnic communities in addition to the analytical capacity to pinpoint the causes and potential development of the situation. A particular effort must be made to ensure that the analysis, diagnosis and recommendations for action remain unbiased and objective.

Conflict prevention therefore consists of concerted actions whose aim is to deter, resolve and/or halt disputes before they erupt, that is to say before any escalation of internal or external violence occurs.[*3]

Conflict prevention requires accurate knowledge, a precise assessment of the problem and 'mobilization', which are complex in organising due to the varied nature of interethnic conflicts. It is therefore essential to be able to distinguish symptoms of instability as a set of distinctive preliminary signs such as repressive measures, the radicalization of political rhetoric or excessive arms purchases.

The difficulty in distinguishing the possible variables that could lead to a conflict breaking out hampers decisions on the measures to be taken. Conflicts often evolve in a manner that often contradicts predictions. Certain preventive measures sometimes have the opposite effect to that expected. This is quite often due to the fact that an incorrect interpretation of the aim of an external intervention occurs.

It is clear that more than one preventive measure can be adopted in any given situation and that what may at first seem the most appropriate or have proved effective in other instances may prove unsuited to a given situation in practice. On the other hand, the need to adapt to each specific case does not imply that having a set of clearly defined rules, principles and mechanisms is an invalid approach.

Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always somewhat possible to define in advance a general strategy for identifying the causes as well as the means to be employed in any intervention. A first step in this direction is to define clearly the objective of intervention. Conflicts are a fact of life, due to the combative nature of our species. A conflict free society is unimaginable. The

challenge is to find peaceful solutions instead of remaining neutral while conflicts are resolved.[*4]

Two preliminary questions that also need to be addressed are how can conflicts be prevented by extraregional actors and how can a state or international organisation make decisions that will defuse tensions before the outbreak of violence?

A basic problem with conflict prevention is that international relations until recently have been governed by the fundamental principle of non-interference by individual states or by the international community in any country's internal affairs. Since the League of Nations was created in 1919 and some would argue even since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has been an essential part of the law by which countries conduct their relations with each other. As this principle is enshrined in the UN Charter, bilateral negotiation has been the sole possibility open to a state or international organisation wishing to act inside another state.

NATO's war in Kosovo was the first direct challenge by an alliance of serious countries to the internal untouchability of dictators. Although NATO accepted that Kosovo was part of the sovereign country labelled Yugoslavia, it was not prepared to allow Mr. Milosevic carry out his campaign of ethnic cleansing.[*5]

One must therefore ask whether the recent decision by the international community to intervene within the borders of a sovereign country creates a more conducive atmosphere in contemporary international relations for the establishment of a conflict prevention centre in the Mediterranean?

ACHILLES HEEL OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

Overcoming problems associated with co-ordination are important, but they will add up to nothing if not accompanied by political will. The problem with the concept of conflict prevention is that it raises as many ambiguities as it seeks to resolve. The prevention of conflicts should not be confused with the management of conflicts, during the stage of the outbreak of hostilities and armed confrontation and the resolution of conflicts following the cessation of hostilities.

Political choice is inherent in conflict prevention – it often implies adopting a political position, which excludes the idea of political neutrality: there can never actually be truly neutral mediation between parties as numerous post-Cold War conflicts have demonstrated.

Political will is therefore absolutely crucial in conflict prevention. Its absence can often be attributed to a lack of means, too high costs or the lack of vital interests. In any case far from being an abstract mechanism, conflict prevention is a reflection of the consequences of the actions of government. The failure of conflict prevention measures often results from the absence of common perceptions, the primacy of special political and economic interests and insufficient political will as it does from the inadequacy of available conflict prevention mechanisms. Given the heterogeneous make-up of the Mediterranean area, specific attention needs to be dedicated this point.

The decision to act quite often does not result from a direct attack on a state's vital interests (territorial integrity, economic interests) and not even from the first signs of a potential conflict, but rather from the perception of a momentum that is contrary to the interests of international or regional stability.

It is also clear that the psychological and financial costs of taking no action, even if they are difficult to quantify, are much higher in the long run.

The traditional approach of the concept of prevention which only covers diplomatic mediation, is limited in that it does not take into account all the various political options which include the option of using force. In contrast, an approach that is too all embracing runs the risk of becoming entangled with a state's overall foreign and security policy.

Some observers argue that the role of conflict prevention should not be given too high a priority for a number of reasons. These include the fact that there is an absence of a major risk of destabilisation at the international level, the sometimes hypothetical nature of predictions that a conflict will break out, non-interference in internal affairs, and constraints imposed by reduced defence budgets.

It is also a fact that prevention is a daunting political task for any country or international organisation to undertake. Prevention means intervening before there are many casualties, hence before public awareness of the problem takes place. By definition successful prevention means that nothing happens which means that there will be no public opinion and no political benefits to be derived from success.[*6]

OBJECTIVE OF THE EURO-MED CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The main objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre is to nurture a political, economic and cultural dialogue amongst Euro-Mediterranean partner countries. A Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention will therefore have to focus on intensifying sub-regional co-operation in the Maghreb and the Mashreq if it is to contend effectively against security challenges across the Mediterranean area.

When setting up a conflict prevention centre it is worth considering two prerequisites. The first stems from the fact that conflicts are multidimensional in nature. The second is that it is in the interest of the international community jointly to solve conflicts and overcome bureaucratic obstacles through the creation of a single conceptual and institutional framework.[*7]

The conflict prevention mechanism that should be adopted needs to be specifically designed to tackle existing and potential risks and threats. Such contingency plans should focus on developing crisis-management principles and procedures for the entire Mediterranean area.[*8]

A concept that should be considered is that of creating flexible forces that can be deployed in each security eventuality that emerges. In order for this to become operational multilateral agreements on intelligence exchange and air space surveillance, and substantial investments in facilities for the reception and sustaining

of peace-enforcing and peace-keeping units, needs to occur. Sensitive regional defence issues should be tackled at a later date.

One example of a type of conflict prevention force that can already be introduced at this point in the partnership process is that of investigating the feasibility of setting up an early warning communications network across the Euro-Mediterranean area. At the moment there are no elaborate mechanisms to contend with security crises such as an accidental collision at sea between transport tankers crossing through the choke points such as the Straits of Sicily, or the alarming rate of degradation which is currently taking place in the environmental sector. One must also mention the proliferation of drug consignments which are reaching ever deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean, and the accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to north which risks destablising the legal structures of the state.

A concerted effort should be made to immediately take incremental steps towards setting up an information mechanism that can assess the significance of such security issues and their likely impact on Euro-Med relations in the near future. Once this has been realised the co-operative maritime security network can be instructed to draw up policy positions on security issues that are regarded as the most serious.

Ideally, one should also investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency (EMMA) that would be mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with objectives similar to those carried out by a coastguard. The EMMA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety and maritime pollution. At a later stage it could also include monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants.

Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partner states that wish to participate. In order to ensure that such a security model can become operational in the shortest period possible, the EMMA should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation.

Any two or more EMP members can start co-operating in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to maritime safety without having to wait until all partners are ready. This will enable the EMMA to evolve along subregional lines before it becomes feasible to establish a fully fledged Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date.

Areas where co-operation can be strengthened include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil tankers, and monitoring the activities of non-Mediterranean fishing boats that are operating in the Mediterranean with a particular emphasis on over-fishing.

At a later stage the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership member states should investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EMMC). The EMMC would be mandated to carry out stop and search exercises in four principal areas: maritime safety, maritime pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the transport of illegal migrants. Such an early warning and crisis prevention mechanism should be introduced in accordance with the principal of consent and open to any of the Euro-

Mediterranean partner states that wish to participate in such a flexible soft security arrangement. In order to ensure that such a security model can become operational in the shortest period possible, the EMMC should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation.

For example, any two or more EMP members can formulate co-operative alliances in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to narcotics trafficking without having to wait until all partners are in a position to introduce such measures.

In addition to strengthening political and security channels of communication, the establishment of such a Euro-Mediterranean early warning and conflict prevention network will assist in cultivating more intense crisis management mechanisms in an area where these are lacking. In order to ensure that such a flexible security arrangement moves beyond the conceptual stage in the shortest time-frame possible, its primary mandate may be limited to the following codes of conduct: fact-finding and consultation missions, inspection and monitoring delegations. Such traditional rules of engagement may also be supplemented by operations that include the facilitation of humanitarian relief particularly in times of natural disasters.

At a later stage, situation centres may be set up around the Mediterranean to monitor activities under this mandate.[*9] Consideration should also be given to opening the doors of the maritime security arrangement of EuroMarfor to its southern Mediterranean neighbours (at least offer observer status in the short-term). This will help dispel the negative perceptions that have been generated since the establishment of this maritime security force. Once the EMCPC is operational this force can become the actual confidence building enforcer of EMMA.

Arriving at such a threshold will ensure that elaborate forms of confidence building and crisis prevention measures that seek to further advance regional disarmament as spelt out in the guidelines of the Charter for Peace and Stability will be functional. The introduction of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability will also assist in creating a climate where the partner countries can develop command and control mechanisms to intervene as early as possible in crisis situations. Acting only after an aggressor has acquired territory or access to natural resources is to force the unwelcome choice between a massive military response and a major strategic debacle. The later the international community and security organisations intervene, the larger the cost and the less chance to restore stability.

Conflict prevention should be regarded as a series of political options ranging from the non-coercive to coercive measures – diplomatic, political, economic, military instruments appropriate to the evolution of a dispute before it erupts into conflict in the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.** (Article 33, para.1 of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice).[*10]

FUNCTIONS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre should be based on Article VIII of the United Nations Charter. This calls for the creation of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies, and their activities are consistent with the purposes of the UN.[11]

The initial objectives of the conflict prevention centre should focus on the following: the formulation of principles and codes of conduct to shape the relations between participating states. These principles would include those of the Barcelona Declaration and therefore be similar to the principles found in the Helsinki Final Act. These include:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
- Avoidance of threat or the use of force;
- Inviolability of frontiers;
- Territorial integrity of states;
- Peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Non-intervention in internal affairs;
- Respect for fundamental rights and fundamental freedom, including the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief;
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- Co-operation among states;
- Fight against terrorism, organised crime and drugs;
- Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

Once the conflict prevention centre is fully operational a more intense set of objectives should be undertaken. These include:

- Monitoring political, military, and economic matters of interest to countries and the Euro-Med Partnership process itself;
- Supervising and operating communications among focal points which have already been established as a CBM;
- Maintaining and updating background information for crisis prevention and management;
- Being prepared to provide facilities in case a contingency staff is set up with respect to a given crisis or conflict;
- Supporting briefings to the public and private bodies;
- Providing a continuous flow of information to members according to mandates;
- Providing information to media

At this stage a decision will have to be taken on what the scope of instruments will be at the disposal of the Centre. These would range from fact-finding and observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure and the deployment of troops.

The introduction of economic and diplomatic sanctions can be supplemented by the use of force if there is an escalation of violence.[*12]

A distinction of "soft" and "hard" types of measures needs to be conducted in order to ensure that the application of such measures corresponds to the types of disputes to which they are being applied. A basic formula that can be adopted is one in which non-coercive strategies are adopted in the early stages of a dispute whereas coercive strategies are applied when hostilities have escalated. A short, medium, and long-term based strategy is appropriate irrespective of the intensity of the dispute. Particular attention needs to be given to long-term implications if any action taken is to be regarded as credible.

In order for a conflict prevention mechanism to be effective it is also important to be able to distinguish between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of any particular crisis. An adequate conflict prevention strategy presupposes an ability to identify the immediate internal causes of the dispute which can be classified in four categories: structural (weakness of the state's authority, ethno-geographic distribution); political (the nature of the political system, interethnic relations, elites); economic and social (discrimination); and cultural (cultural rights and mutual perceptions).[*13]

Attention must then be directed towards the underlying causes (historical memory and perceptions, relational models) that form the fertile ground in which the immediate causes flourish. Analysis of these causes will make it possible to define the means to be applied in a conflict resolution approach.

When it comes to time-scales – whereas the immediate causes can be tackled in the short-term, the underlying causes call for more long-term measures. Yet both should start together in order not to undermine medium to long-term preventive measures.

When it comes to the internal and external dynamics of a crisis situation – a decision needs to be taken as to whether they should be addressed together or separately? Even though it will ultimately depend on the willingness of the indigenous parties to find a lasting solution to crises as they emerge, a comprehensive solution calls for an approach that combines both the internal and the external dimensions of a crisis. In other words, conflict prevention measures should be regional in nature as any internal conflict will inevitably have a regional dimension and implications.

The CPC should also be in a position to put forward proposals for the further elaboration of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and other security-related issues of arms control, and in particular the proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean area of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.[*14]

Arms control should be regarded as including not only arms reductions or disarmament, but also measures to strengthen regional security and the diminishment of the use of military force as an instrument of national policy. The objectives of CSBMs are to prevent war by misunderstanding or miscalculation, to reduce the possibility of surprise attack and to reduce the ability to use military forces for the

purpose of political intimidation or for carrying out foreign policy. It is therefore essential that this take place in a transparent and thus predictable manner.

CSBMs can be further categorised into two levels of analysis: technical-military CSBMs, which are at the tactical operational level of military policy and political-military CSBMs, which can be considered to be declarations of intent concerning the planed use of force.

CSBMs could include the following:

- Exchanges of information between military establishments;
- Prenotification of military movements;
- Prenotification of major military movements;
- Establishing a treaty for the prevention of accidents at sea;
- Establishing a Search and Rescue agreement that would incorporate the concept discussed above in relation to the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard;
- Declaratory statements of intent. This includes identifying the relevant participants, identifying and defining the zone of operation, examining the preconditions for negotiations and implementation, and assessing alternative methods of verification compliance and prospective arms control agreements.*[15]

The EMCPC should also serve as a centre of excellence when it comes to organising seminars and conferences on topics that support regional stability across the Mediterranean area. The intention would be to promote education and training in support of conflict prevention and arms control, and to function as a communications and data base centre. These seminars could be composed of government and military officials and specialists from think-tanks and academia.*[16] Such an exercise could follow the structure of the already existing confidence building measure, the Euro-Med Information and Training Seminars for Diplomats.*[17]

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

The purpose of the new body will be to enhance stability and security across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The EMCPC will be a forum within which regional participants can take stock of and review all other activities contributing to peace and security in the area.

The EMCPC framework will not replace already existing conflict prevention initiatives such as the Middle East peace process, nor would it replicate the measures already considered and the arrangements already adopted by participants.

When it comes to an appropriate conceptual framework for regulating the Euro-Med conflict prevention centre's actions these should take into account the following administrative and institutional procedures. At a political level the establishment of a democratization process over a period of time that would include setting up institutions, a constitution, an electoral system, human and minority rights and the

media needs to take place. Similar actions also need to take place in the economic field (privatization, the banking system, budget) and the military dimension (civil-military relations, defence industry, arms control).

Both conditionality and accountability need to be clearly defined concepts when it comes to economic and financial assistance. The possibility of sanctions (negative) and an incentive scheme (positive) should be attached to the implementation of reforms. Criteria for membership into international security institutions such as Nato, the OSCE, and the WEU should be clearly spelt out.

One should also examine the use and participation of the armed forces to humanitarian missions and tasks. The goal of this endeavour would be to indicate the relations between armed forces and civilian institutions to arrive at a more rational and efficient use of their various specialist capabilities.

In a region as heterogeneous as the Mediterranean area is, the main sponsor of the Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre, the European Union, should act as a mediator, facilitator and/or guarantor. The role of decision-making and action should be left as far as is possible to the main actors directly involved in a crisis. This will assist in guarding against the perception that the EU is trying to impose its political will upon the Mediterranean area.

The EU has a wide range of mechanisms in the economic, political and social domains that will enable it to influence decision-makers at the local level when it comes to complying with preventive measures. It is only once the majority of local actors, both at governmental level and the public at large, perceive that more will be gained by compliance, that preventive measures will be able to attain their true objective.

This is not meant to exclude the participation of extra-regional powers in the EMCPC. On the contrary, all those actors that affect the region's security dynamics should be encouraged to join as partners. A formula for involving the United States in the Centre is essential if the EMCPC is to be regarded as a credible conflict prevention mechanism.

When setting up the structural design of the EMCPC it is crucial that a series of guidelines be taken into consideration to ensure that the new regional body is able to function smoothly. Basic questions that will have to be addressed include: who will be responsible for commissioning missions, which unit or committee will be responsible for deciding upon operations, and which component of the CPC will be accountable for the implementation of measures that are adopted?

Given the geographical and geopolitical proximity of the European Union to the EMCPC it seems logical to examine the various obstacles that the EU itself has had to overcome in order to gradually develop an effective common foreign security policy structure. The recent appointment of a High Representative and the setting up of a policy planning and early warning unit offer interesting insight into the type of mechanisms that the EMCPC can adopt at an early stage of development.

The numerous teething problems that conflict prevention or similar post-Cold War operations have encountered throughout the 1990s also offers plenty of food for thought when it comes to drawing up a EMCPC command and control structure. Should the regional CPC adopt a Contact Group type of approach to regional security challenges or does it make more sense to adopt a UN Security Council or OSCE type of decision-making process? Is it perhaps more feasible to introduce a limited version of NATO SitCen?[*18]

It is also essential that the EMCPC's relationship to the eventual Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability is also made clear from the start. The numerous roles that the EMCPC can play in this regard include those of enforcer of the Charter, co-ordinating body of measures introduced as a result of the evolution of the Charter, or an agency that monitors actions undertaken by security networks that are set up once the Charter is introduced. This will assist in removing any risk that proponents of the Charter for Peace and Stability may perceive the EMCPC as a regional security arrangement through a competitive lens.

The EMCPC should also tap into the large number of already existing academic institutions, public-policy institutes and non-governmental organisations, such as the EuroMeSCo network of public-policy institutes, that are tackling the technical and analytical dimension of conflict prevention. The bringing together of researchers and specialists from different Mediterranean countries to monitor regional developments, warn concerned parties of potential conflict situations and suggest alternative policies that might further their prevention will help to ensure that the proposed centre will become one of excellence in the shortest time-frame possible.[*19]

LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT PREVENTION

The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre is certainly an initiative that will help manage security and stability across this very heterogeneous region of the world. The setting up of such a regional framework will also dispel perceptions that the Mediterranean has been neglected by the international community since the end of the Cold War. The risk of such a view settling in at the start of the new millennium is particularly high given that post-Cold War great powers and international organisations have now upgraded their attention in an adjacent region of the Mediterranean, namely the Balkans.

It would also be a strategic error if the United States and the European Union dedicate political and economic resources to the Balkan stability pact at the expense of other important strategic areas, including the Mediterranean area. Foreign policy strategists that are seeking to establish peace and stability around Europe should introduce policies that seek to balance regional interests and not turn regional security into a zero-sum-game.

It is precisely because of the importance of such a regional security initiative that the creation of the EMCPC needs to be implemented in a coherent and consistent manner. First, the setting up of the EMCPC should be gradual. No country should feel undo pressure or even force to participate in the initiative but allowed to contribute to the

endeavour at their own pace. Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region will have to recognise for themselves that it is in their own self-interest to become actively engaged in such an exercise. Failure to do so will prevent them from being able to forge closer political and economic ties with one another and strengthen security ties with international institutions such as the Europe Union.

Second, the European Union must guard against promising the Mediterranean area more than it can deliver. The introduction of the EURO, the enlargement process, and development of a common foreign and security policy already means that the EU plate will remain very full for the next few years. The EU is thus better off offering the region a conflict prevention framework that does not totally rely on its services to function.

In order for the creation of the EMCPC to be successful it is essential that the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries of the Mediterranean become more vocal, open, and engaged in the post-Cold War regional security environment that is evolving around them. Otherwise they will have no one but themselves to blame for being marginalised from the wider security framework that is emerging. With the EU due to compile a common strategy document on the Mediterranean by mid-2000 the timing to adopt such a stance could not be better.

In retrospect, a number of additional lessons can already be learnt from past conflict prevention attempts. These lessons should serve as a guide when setting up a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre.

The first is that individual governments acting alone to prevent conflicts are ineffective. National biases and interests are far too strong. It is more logical that analysis and proposed solutions should come from an ad hoc unit created for this purpose, which is international in its composition. The setting up of a conflict prevention unit by the EU in early 1997 is a good example of the type of model than can be adopted.

A second lesson is that appropriate mechanisms should be set up for political, not charitable reasons. This will help ensure that the political will is available when the time comes to set the structures in motion.

A third important point is that of identifying prevention with discretion. Measures taken to prevent the escalation of conflicts need to be kept as low key as possible to give confidence building measures a chance to flourish.

Fourth, parties to the conflict should be aware of the fact that the cost of conflict exceeds the cost of avoiding it.

Fifth, third parties should be convinced that certain developments are just a prelude to serious conflict which might affect some of their valued national interests, and that the cost of preventive action is lower than attempts at conflict resolution afterward.

Sixth, third parties should have the capacity to anticipate conflict and intervene in a timely and proper manner.[*20]

Ten years after the end of the Cold War it is in both the EU's and the countries of the Mediterranean's interest to strengthen relations. Steps that can be taken to realise this include processing in the shortest-time frame possible the EU membership applications of Mediterranean candidates, upgrading relations with Turkey, and developing a more proactive Euro-Mediterranean partnership process that includes the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre.

Two positive turn of events in the western and eastern sectors of the Mediterranean also offer external powers such as the EU an excellent opportunity to move ahead with attempts to establish a conflict prevention network across the Mediterranean. At a meeting in Algiers earlier in 1999 North African countries decided to try and reactivate the moribund Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) that was created in 1989 and seeks to create a common market between Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya. An UMA summit is being planned for late 1999.[21]

Further east, interest in moving ahead with the Middle East peace process has continued to increase since the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister and chances for a comprehensive regional peace have never appeared better. This positive pattern of regional dynamics therefore offers a window of opportunity to advance a conflict prevention network in a geo-strategic area where it is necessary. In addition to the intrinsic value of such an initiative, the establishment of a EMCPC will also increase visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean Process as a whole, a factor that to date remains lacking. It is only through such credible partnership building measures that the EMP will remain sustainable long-term.

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17) *Chairman's Formal Conclusions*, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, April 15th-16th 1999, paragraph 13.
(In the course of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process, the necessity for shaping a culture of dialogue and cooperation among the European member states and its Mediterranean Partners has continually been emphasised. As one of the results, the European Commission has entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, to run a semi-annual Information and Training Seminar for Euro-Mediterranean desk officers of the 27 partner countries. The first six Euro-Med seminars in October 1996, March 1997, November 1997 and May 1998, November 1998 and April 1999 consisted of a series of presentations with a primary objective of familiarization with the Euro-Mediterranean Process. Subject areas examined were: the EU institutional setting and decision-making patterns, the question of how to deal with the EU in practical terms, and the selected aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its implementation. An additional feature in recent years was the Euro-Mediterranean Internet Forum, a project that the European Commission entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies to design and to operationalise. This project aims at facilitating the flow of information between the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and became fully functional at the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in Malta).

18) Aliboni, R., op.cit., April 1998.

19) Soltan, G., and Monem Said Aly, op.cit., and Aliboni, ibid.

20) Soltan, G., and Aly, Monem Said, ibid., p.32.

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Early Warning in the Euro-Mediterranean Context: Conceptual Questions, Procedures and Instruments

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The concept of early warning is becoming increasingly relevant in the post-Cold War world due to the re-ascendance of regional and primordial types of conflict. While it would be imprecise to claim that the nature of conflict has changed at the end of the Cold War—it would be more correct to assert that some classic forms of conflict have re-emerged—a marked novelty in the global attitude towards conflict in general can be clearly noted. In particular, intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state for reasons of redeeming humanitarian disasters or human rights abuse has become frequent. The definition and explanation of the sociological origins of this new worldwide trend are clearly beyond the scope of this research, but it is important to note that an undoubted normative evolution in the conduct of world affairs has taken place. This socio-political change has defined new priorities in international relations, inter alia, by placing unprecedented importance on problems of conflict prevention, as opposed to respect for state sovereignty. In this context early warning, as part of the process of conflict prevention, constitutes a prescriptive policy choice, which is normative par excellence. In fact, more than at any time in the past, axiological considerations have come to constitute a sufficient policy making base.

The processes responsible for the transformation of the international normative system and the reconsideration of the concept of state sovereignty have also pushed new actors to the forefront of international relations. While classical theories of international conflict have traditionally developed on the basis of analyses of inter-state interactions, modern explanations have tended to include also various non-state actors. It is in this context that considerations of early warning should be defined and analyzed, as they transcend the faculties of the state and make necessary recourse to sub-state actors. In this sense it is particularly important to consider the current transformation of the international system when explaining the concept of early warning.

When applied to the Mediterranean, early warning assumes a distinctive dimension, as does conflict prevention, because of the intertwining history of conflict in the area. As will be discussed later, among the pre-conditions for the successful application of early warning is absence of large-scale hostilities, which, given the idiosyncrasy of the region is not always the case. It is clear, therefore, that in such historical and political conditions the net effect of the application of early warning and conflict prevention would be null, if not counter-productive. Furthermore, as already stated, the conduct of early warning is a normative policy-choice, which

implies establishing an intricate network of coordinating bodies united by a common political will to prevent an impending conflict, and for that reason interested in cooperative monitoring of a risky area. In this sense, applying early warning and conflict prevention in the Mediterranean context looms out as a genuine conceptual and policy challenge. The purpose of this paper will thus be to establish whether application of early warning is relevant in the Mediterranean, and if so, what plausible policy procedures could be suggested for it.

Theoretical dimensions and definition of terms

Early warning of a conflict should be considered part of conflict prevention theory. It should be immediately specified that neither early warning nor conflict prevention policies per se guarantee the absence of conflict or a linear policy of conflict-avoidance on the part of the potential belligerents or an interested third party. Early warning is the first stage of conflict prevention, whose actual success is conceptually independent of the will to carry it out. Early warning thus consists in predicting impending violence before it breaks out based on a set of specific indicators that are theoretically and empirically known to lead to open conflict. While the selection of indicators that could be considered the harbingers of violence is subject to a debate, the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention are based on predictive reasoning and counterfactual theory.

Counterfactual theory examines the causal interaction between predetermined elements and complex, i. e. multi-dimensional outcomes that result within a fixed time frame. When applied to prognosis related to future events, counterfactual theory uses known (e. g. observed or observable) antecedents, which it presents as structurally linked to, i. e. inducing, one (or more) eventualities within a stated time lapse. From the point of view of counterfactual theory preventive action can be understood as logically connected inverted sequence of events. As already mentioned, the very essence of preventive action calls for intervention on the part of the actor intended to engage in conflict prevention before violence has erupted. The "preventor", therefore, will have to act on the basis of a set of early warning indicators, which in their interaction allow a presumption of impending violence. What is implied here is that there can never be an absolute certainty that the conflict will actually break out, nor that the particular action applied to prevent it will certainly produce the desired outcome.

The prediction of early warning will never be as precise, as say, weather forecasting, which has the

> technological capability to identify hurricanes and other natural disasters with a high degree of accuracy. Nor will predictions of ethnic conflict be able to rely as much on statistical evidence as, say, economic forecasts, that warn of recessions based on widely accepted leading economic indicators. Rather, the prediction of ethnic conflict can be linked to the process of medical diagnosis of diseases, for which there exists no conclusive physical test. In such cases physicians make a positive diagnosis based on the appearance of clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through testing, some merely observable.[1]

It is important to realize that attempting to predict social, political, or psychological phenomena through counterfactual reasoning can never have the technical precision of a mathematical estimate based on a known dataset. Behavioral occurrences function according to consequential logic, which has not yet been explained in a theory-conducive schematic way. Counterfactual explanations of socio-political events will thus have the axiomatic value of what is known based on observation, but not the scientific weight coming from the understanding of its organic content.

Another particularity of counterfactual reasoning as applied to social conflictual behavior is the impossibility to produce a prognosis, which has veracity percentage close to that of weather forecasting, due the fact that, unlike in the theories of the natural sciences, the ceteris paribus assumption cannot be applied. In the socio-political reality it is impossible to determine the change of one element by holding the others constant, because it is precisely the interaction of the variable under scrutiny with the others that determines the direction of its change. A highly complex systemic setting characterizes, for example, ethnic or civil wars, where it is not so much the identification of a certain number of risk factors that is important to predict the outbreak of violence, but their interaction in the new situational environment that has been produced. Therefore, in determining the final picture, it is impossible to focus only on one systemic element of the conflict puzzle, because it can only make sense when analyzed in combination with the others. As Robert Jervis notes, "changes in one unit or the relationship between any two of them produce ramifying alterations in other units and relationships [which results in a] high degree of complexity as causation operates in ways that defeat standard forms of common sense and scientific method."[2]

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[1]Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausnik, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Towards a Predictive Model," *Parameters*, US War and Army College, vol. xxvi, N° 1, Spring, 1996, p. 23.

[2]Robert Jervis, "Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity," in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological*

It can therefore be concluded that even if counterfactual theory presents some fundamental elements, which will most likely turn extremely useful as methodological tools in the more complex development of this research, such as analyses on the consequential logic of early warning indicators, it cannot by itself provide a satisfactory methodological approach to the topic of conflict prevention. As a result, it should be borne in mind that the theoretical premises of early warning are still quite new particularly in the field of international relations, and there are still many conceptual controversies to open, a fact which impedes the construction of a secure policy based solely on theoretical premises.

Establishing structural parameters for early warning

Having defined early warning and having located it in the realm of international relations theory, two other structural components need to be briefly clarified before evaluating the plausibility of the concept's application in the context of the Mediterranean. The first concerns establishing what are the early warning indicators that need to be observed in order to predict an impending conflict, and the second has to do with establishing a generic procedure for policy application of early warning. With regard to both parameters, it should be noted that very little related literature is available that deals directly with this *problematique*. Therefore, much of the discussion to follow will be based on inductive speculation of different branches of international relations theory and will be subject to serious refinement in a more specialized form of research.

For the purposes of this study, however, three categories of early warning indicators will be put forward, keeping in mind that while important, as specified above, their individual components and linkage will not be derived and explained here. Another necessary limitation of the scope of this study is that the choice of these categories over others, in the absence of specialized data research, can be justified on a quite rudimentary basis, namely, one of common international relations axiomatic affirmations, contextual self-evidence, and personal discretion.

First among the early warning indicators to consider is the type of regime in the state under consideration. A classic thesis in international relations theory holds that democracies do not fight among each other. Furthermore, due to transparent collective decision-making based on the principle of representation through periodic elections, democracies tend to respect

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Perspectives (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 309.

fundamental human rights more than other types of regimes, thus minimizing the probability for the occurrence of violence due to social dissatisfaction.

Scholarly discussions of conflict prevention have given rise to much controversy about whether democracy is really structurally conducive to the avoidance of violence.[3] Based on the footnoted sources, it could be claimed that there indeed seems to be evidence that democracies possess more war–avoiding tools than alternative state organizations, creating a structural environment, which seems to facilitate the effectiveness of various conflict prevention strategies, including early warning.

There is a need to differentiate, however, between democracy as a state of affairs and democratization as a process directed at it. While the former, in its stable and complete form, is indeed less prone to aggressive violence, the latter constitutes a structural change which tends to be accompanied by major systemic cataclysms, often conducive to conflict. Nonetheless, even democratizing states tend to favor peaceful settlements of contrasting relationships, rather than violent ones, despite the inherent structural weakness implied in various transition regimes.[4] The presence or the absence of a democratic state system, therefore, can be considered to constitute an effective early warning mechanism.

Besides examining the type of regimes, an analysis of regional geopolitics and related conflict precedents could also be considered to constitute a valid early warning category. A recent history of conflict in a geopolitical environment where territory, resources, or places of high social symbolic value are still disputed, most likely bides for incoming violence, particularly if the regimes in place in the prospective belligerents are not democratic.[5] It should be noted that despite sporadic affirmations to this effect, the linkage between conflict history based on geo-politics and the outbreak of violence is intuitive, rather than straight-forward. Again, the reason for the lack of a straight-forward scientific method lies in the unavailability of empirical data ,

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[3] C. Layne, "Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace" and D. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" International Security 19:2, Fall 1994; "Correspondence: The Democratic Peace," International Security, 19:4, Spring 1995; T. Risse, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4, December 1995.

[4] Michael Lund, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall" in Peter Cross (ed.) *Contributing to Preventive Action* Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook 1997-98 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1998),.p. 19.

[5] R. J. Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," *European Journal of International Relations* 1:4, December 1995.

due to the recent ascendance of conflict prevention, and consequently, early warning in the realm of international relations theory. For the purposes of this study the geopolitics-conflictual-history-unresolved-disputes-high-likelihood-for-violence pendulum will be assumed to be an effective early warning mechanism, even if some valid reservations, such as the strong influence of the local leadership against possible conflict recurrence, could be put forward. It should be noted, however, that the character of these reservations is even more difficult to conceptualize than the dependency already established, which finds some theoretical backing in social psychology.[6]

The third category of early warning indicators is even more controversial than the one already dealt with, and has very little conceptual support in main-stream political science theory. It has to do with a certain cultural proclivity towards conflict, which renders some nations more war-prone than others. Such arguments, which are quite often over-shadowed by more conventional *real politik* explanations for the occurrence of violence, are often quoted, for example, in relation to the Balkans (a notable reading in this respect are British parliamentary debates from the end of last century through the first decade of this century), the Middle East, or some parts in Asia. It is clear that this category holds very little scientific backing of any kind, and is in itself so controversial to predispose an ideological rather than theoretical debate, even if some scholars have actually considered cultural predisposition a valid conceptual explanation for the sequence of events.[7] It was deemed necessary to include it in this brief early warning taxonomy for the sake of completeness, rather than conviction. As large part of the theoretical premises of this research, this category is subject to empirical verification.

Procedures and instruments: a speculation

The final theoretical part of this research concerns the analysis of possible ways of operationalizing early warning in a given context. In fact, the above categories of indicators may serve as such, only if related mechanisms of information gathering and processing are in place. In this research structural passages of turning isolated facts into early warning indicators will be examined.

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[6] R. W. Mack and R. C: Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict-Toward an Overview and Synthesis",*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, 1957, pp. 212-248.

[7] Beate Winkler, "Intercultural Conflicts and Approaches to Solutions", *Peace and the Sciences*, March 1996, pp. 5-6.

As already mentioned beforehand, early warning awareness tends to imply a normative choice of a conflict prevention activity. Therefore, in order to conduct any early warning activity, a violence avoiding determination on the part of a particular institution must be in place. Furthermore, most of the indicators contained in the broad categories examined above, such as large-scale human rights abuse, require a certain time frame to determine with certainty. As a result, early warning requires an elaborate organization of an authority that is aware of preventive mechanisms, has the faculty to commission monitoring and data gathering, and, finally, considers that the information gathered and processed can be used in a way to prevent impending violence. This implies possessing the necessary decision-making instruments, support and operation control mechanisms, area and policy expertise, and most importantly, the corresponding political influence to both carry out the early warning monitoring per se, and ensure that the information passes to authorities in a position to take appropriate action to prevent an expected conflict.

It is evident that these are particularly difficult conditions to fulfill, especially having in mind that early warning warrants expedient action, if violence is to be prevented. Here the question arises as to who could plausibly commission, coordinate, and make use of early warning capacities in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Clearly, until quite recently early warning faculties institutionally structured as just described, have been the privilege of states with regard to their internal affairs. Only with the beginning of the current decade have some international early warning capabilities been put in place, mostly on an ad hoc basis and availing of the national technical means of individual states. As a result it can be noted that conducting an early warning activity on a regional or international level, even if some partnership agreements are in place, is a very delicate and controversial endeavor.

First, signaling some early warning indicators, e.g. human rights abuses or unstable political regimes in place, even if conducted with the necessary transparency and within the framework of an established agreement, might create suspicion among neighbors and contribute to tensions, rather than dissipate them by creating suspicion and mistrust.

Second, it would not be realistically feasible to set up an independent data gathering center on a regional/international level because in the absence of independent information gathering

network, countries would have to rely on their own intelligence sources for collecting and verifying data. Most states would consider evaluations related to civil relations within a neighbor a state secret and would be reluctant to share it with others. The political implausibility of intelligence sharing, especially in regions such as the Euro-Mediterranean, is quite evident.

Third, while information gathering and other early warning monitoring on the part of international non-governmental organizations, including think-tanks, humanitarian organizations, etc. is possible without consent on a governmental level, it should be noted that such activities could at times be considered directly or indirectly threatening the power of the regimes in place, and will most probably be hindered by governments in every way. It suffices to recall how international monitoring groups were thrown out of Iraq or Serbia to understand how important the collaboration of official authorities is to verify what is going on within a state.

Fourth, given the considerations just listed, which render the practical application of early warning extremely difficult to generalize, it should be pointed out that some "politically neutral" niches are nevertheless available for the conduct of early warning activities. These include humanitarian and natural disasters, such as famine, control of refugee flows, earthquakes, epidemic decease, etc. It could be presumed that in such cases political and power considerations will not be in contradiction with a concerted preventive action on a regional and international level.

Early Warning in the Euro-Mediterranean Context

Operationalizing the concept of early warning in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean area is a challenging undertaking, especially on a sub-regional level. The main difficulties stem from political considerations, which often run against inter-state cooperative arrangements necessitated to carry out early warning activities at a governmental level. Furthermore, such hindrances also make the work of NGOs particularly difficult, as already explained above.

With such premise in mind, it should nevertheless be pointed out that there is space for the conduct of early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Possibilities can be explored on two levels: one, that of exploiting existing institutional and political niches, and the other, that of

suggesting how these could be elaborated, political circumstances permitting, to organize a more comprehensive system of early warning in the region.

Early Warning Based on Already Available Instruments

There are some possibilities for the conduct of early warning activities through what has been called the "Barcelona process", initiated in November 1995 by 27 states of the region, which agreed to a declaration of a multi-faceted partnership aimed at "giving their future relations a new dimension based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity."[8] More specifically, the signatories agreed to work towards the creation of a common area of peace and security, whose realization can only be possible through collaboration, including one on early warning issues. Naturally, the Declaration has no binding force, and at this stage of regional relations it would be unrealistic to pretend that. However, it should be noted that on the one hand, in the background of the changing normative environment on a global level, declaratory statements of the Barcelona type have a strong moral as well as political weight on the basis of which a legally binding agreement can be envisioned in the long run.

On the other hand, given the difficult diplomatic situation particularly of the Middle East Peace Process,[9] even statements of declaratory nature of the Barcelona type are extremely important in that they lay the ground for stronger commitments by getting adversaries to talk. Quite beyond the moral commitment, the Barcelona process contains some real perspectives of arriving at a political consensus for conflict prevention through creating precedents of cooperation through learning based on mutual trust. Naturally, this aspect can be compromised by incidents eroding the fragile basis of good will, which permitted the launching of the Barcelona process. In any case, confidence building, or rather, partnership building, as it came to evolve after Barcelona, is undoubtedly a complex process which would only allow the needed political basis for the conduct of early warning for conflict in the very long run.

Having established that the both the political and the normative premises for early warning in the Euro-Mediterranean area realistically allow for the effective application of the concept in an

[8] Text of the Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27 and 28 November 1995, preamble.

[9] Even if in practically all documents of the Barcelona process, it is explicitly stated that it is not supposed to be linked in any way to the MEPP, in practice many scholars and officials agree that there is a clear inter-dependence between the two. See interview with Patrick Laurent, *Euromed Special Features*, N° 6, 1999.

indeterminate point in the future, it is nevertheless possible to identify several specific points on which, political circumstances permitting, and based on a regional consensus, early warning can be conducted even at present, albeit on an ad hoc basis.

In its chapter on political security partnership the Barcelona declaration contains clauses on democratization, respect for human rights and territorial sovereignty, disarmament, cooperation in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, all of which will be difficult to encode in legal terms, given the current political situation in the region. Subsequent specifications of this chapter in the documents issued by the Euro-Mediterranean conferences in Malta and Stuttgart deepeened these aspects, particularly by producing at the latter, an informal set of guidelines for the elaborating a Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability. What is notable in the Guidelines for the Charter is the proposal to agree on an annex devoted to partnership building measures, which draw on all three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and their further elaboration. What can be inferred from this decision is that security aspects can be built also on the basis of the chapter on economic and financial partnership and that of social, cultural, and human affairs.

One of the most important expressions of such indirect security building is, for example, the meeting of the Steering Committee of the Pilot Project for the "Creation of a Euro-Med System of Prevention, Mitigation and Management of Natural and Man-made Disasters" in 1998 near Rome. It was attended by almost all Barcelona partners, who agreed to share tasks related to the cooperation in emergency situations, such as earthquakes, forest fires, oil fires, oil splits, water table uprise, ground deformation, emergency medication, etc. Several lower-level meetings have been held since stressing on aspects of training, information sharing, and common actions in view of reacting to emergency situations which have arised as a result of natural disasters.

As mentioned above, information sharing between some of the Euro-Med partners might be problematic because of the necessity to rely exclusively on national technical means, the same used for intelligence purposes. However, progress made so far makes it plausible to believe that cooperation in disaster situations has the potential to become a real break-through in the region, where natural emergencies at times cannot be handled effectively but in cooperation with neighbors and partners. In this sense early warning acquires a broader meaning, namely, while

not looking for armed conflict and violence indicators, interested parties are nonetheless preparing to act in practically analogous situations.

Anna Spiteri presents an elaborate system of early warning and emergency action through an Integrated Resource Management in the Euro-Mediterranean region, which could facilitate rapid decision-making when facing impending disasters.[10] In sum, the author envisions a "sectorial spill-over"[11] from an essentially technical collaboration in disaster prevention to a cooperative security arrangements, in which early warning for conflict will be an integral part. Such proposals might sound as rather banal reverberation of neo-functionalism, but it has to be recalled that security has become to be seen as a rather broad concept only in the 1990s, and it is not at all unrealistic to imagine spillover of cooperation from issues of environmental security to issues of soft security, and more generally to security understood in its classic sense. It is in this perspective that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership should be understood.

The same is valid for conflict early warning considerations. While at present information and technology sharing on early warning indicators are likely to create tensions, rather than reslove them, it is not too optimistic to expect that some cooperative experience in the field of disaster management might lay the ground for it in the future. Intentions in this respect were also expressed by partners when regional cooperation issues were discussed in Valencia this January. The guidelines for the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability also foresees a gradual approach in strengthening the process of security cooperation overtime[12]. Naturally, it is fundamental not to overshoot cooperative intentions ahead of realistic political possibilities. In that it is vital to carry out all security-enhancing initiatives in the region, prime among these being the MEPP.

Some Suggestions for Practical Deepening of Early Warning in the Future

Suggesting concrete institutional strengthening of the Charter is the natural approach to suggest, but without the necessary political setting, as reiterated repeatedly above, such suggestions will

[10] Anna Spiteri, "Remote Sensing: The Tool of Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Towards Peace in the Mediterranean" in Fred Tanner (ed.) *Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East* (Malta: Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, December 1994), pp. 143-151.

[11] The term in its conceptual essentially functional meaning was coined by PhilippeSchmitter, Professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

[12] See point II.b of the Guidelines.

remain purely academic speculations. Political climate permitting, however, a gradual approach should be adopted to give the Barcelona process more vigor. It is considered here that it would be superfluous to propose the creation of new institutions because the texts of the three declarations is almost exclusive in setting the terrain for successful and well-organized early warning activity. Therefore, efforts should be concentrated on giving the Barcelona documents more legal as well as political weight.

The gradual approach suggested here is aimed at arriving eventually at binding political accords between the partners, which would constitute a genuine institutionalization of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Clearly, at present this is not a feasible option, but incremental efforts could be made, based on stronger institutional settings, such as the one available through the OSCE, which would lay the terrain for a consistent reinforcement based on cooperation. As mentioned above, areas not directly related to security, but ones involving common needs transcending regional borders, such as reacting against natural disasters should be explored first. Some have also suggested a classical functionalist approach aimed at arriving at comprehensive security framework in the Euro-Mediterranean region through socio-economic development and soft security.[13] Such approach is thoroughly compatible with the establishment of functioning early warning capabilities in the area.

In more concrete terms, the gradual approach could be structured in the following way, naturally in the presence of the needed political will. First, on the example of the Guidelines to the Charter on Peace and Security, partners should prepare a similar document specifically aimed at regional early warning, but encompassing all three chapters. It should be particularly complete in areas where regional cooperation, such as data gathering, rapid alert, technical and humanitarian aid in cases of natural calamities, which necessarily involve sub-regions, rather than individual states. The objective is to gradually arrive at an autonomous institutional setting for early warning.

The role of the EU Commission here might be crucial, especially in encouraging the setting of a regional early warning center. The chances for its success will be greater, if at first the center's objectives do not explicitly include conflict prevention, since the current political circumstances

[13] Roberto Aliboni, "Re-Setting the Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda" *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXIII, N° 4, October-December 1998, p.13.

in the region would hardly allow it, but instead focus exclusively on technical cooperation in disaster relief. Besides a small coordinating unit (e. g. a Secretariat), on-field fact-finding missions and regional experts with the necessary expertise should constitute its stuff. Even if initially predicting political violence will not be one of the objectives of such a center, the structure needed for early warning for conflict, as described above, is essentially inter-operable.

At a subsequent level it might be suggested that one or more of the aspects of this early warning for natural disasters should be considered as separate agreements with binding force. For example, it may be agreed that if it is established by the center's experts that country A is directly threatened by a natural disaster, while countries B and C are indirectly threatened by it, all should collaborate to redeem the costs. Some participation from all states in the region could also be envisioned as mandatory, by creating a common disaster relief fund, for instance. Given the fragile geological nature of the Mediterranean,[14] it would seem that a similar arrangement would render concrete results from its very inception.

The next step of setting up an early warning unit for the Euro-Mediterranean area would be to introduce strengthened mechanisms of consultation on some security problems not involving particular political controversies, such as poverty relief or organized crime. At present, however, even topics of this kind are quite controversial to handle, and it is unlikely to expect to arrive at a consensus between Partners in order to extend to such an extent the center's responsibilities.

Much improvement in putting such suggestions into action could be achieved if the EU's early warning capabilities are strengthened independently, and within the framework of the CFSP. The EU's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPWEU) that is being set up might be very helpful in this respect. For example, it might be proposed to use its technical and institutional setting at an initial stage, before it is agreed by Partners where and how to set up a Euro-Mediterranean Early Warning Center.

In the medium-longer run, some strictly security mechanisms for the Euro-Mediterranean might be drawn on the example of the OSCE: These could include trigger mechanisms for consultation on pending security problems, whereby a Partner would have the right to raise a problem it considers a security concern for the area. Another mechanism, modeled on the

structure of the OSCE could be one for consultation on emergency issues of military nature, whereby a group of Partners can convene a meeting at a governmental level and jointly decide on a particular course of action.

Finally, it should be noted again that in such hypothetical proposal for establishing and strengthening the Euro-Med early warning mechanisms, the role of the EU is fundamental. First and foremost, it can offer some help through its own institutional structures, which are quite advanced due to the structurally different nature of the Union, as compared to that of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is also not at all far-fetched to expect and to demand that the EU make available some of its resources in the setting and strengthening of a Euro-Med early warning unit, not least, because the EU's own security hinges on that of the Mediterranean. Given the geo-political belonging of the EU's Southern rim to the Mediterranean area, the expected EU institutional reforms might envision some funding devoted to the Euro-Mediterranean security as part of the CFSP. If the gradual approach adopted here is followed, initially such support should not require the commitment of large amount of funds, as it would only concern the setting up of a small permanent unit of technical experts dealing with natural calamity forecasting, and the affiliation of some known regional specialists, who could advise on the broader security context. For this purpose some of the already existing structures throughout the region can be used. Only at a much later stage, based on a qualitative change in the political situation in both the EU and the Mediterranean, this small unit may have to be significantly reinforced also by committing more resources to it.

Some conclusions

What emerges from this brief overview of conceptual and policy problems of early warning applicability in the Euro-Mediterranean is that the global normative predisposition has hardly been more conducive to the conduct of conflict prevention activities. Nonetheless, having established that early warning itself is a positivist approach to the conduct of state affairs, one that has only recently started to take prevalence in contemporary international relations, major applicability difficulties emerge.

First, at a conceptual level, most of the premises of early warning are axiomatic, rather than

[14] Spitteri, p. 144.

theoretical, due to the virtual lack of empirical verification of the basic hypotheses. As an integral part of conflict prevention, the concept of early warning needs to mature through the verification of its validity based on the classic scientific method. In the meantime, however, several early warning categories can be isolated from classic social science theories, which can be analyzed on the basis of counterfactual and predictive methodologies with a relatively satisfactory percentage of veracity.

Second, at a general institutional level, favorable political circumstances consisting in generating regional leaders' will for cooperation, are an absolute must for the successful conduct of any fact-finding and information-gathering activity pertinent to early warning for conflict. If political will on the part of the governing structures of the region concerned is hesitant and inconsistent, strategies should be devised to cultivate and strengthen it on the basis of cooperation precedent and learning and confidence building. Only in such way can linkage be created from general awareness of conflict incipience to early action to counter it. Even if not directly related to early warning, such strategies are fundamental in order to set the ground for conflict prevention proper. In relation to these findings, it was also established that while important with regard to policy implementation, non-state actors of different kind cannot satisfactorily conduct early warning missions without cooperation on the part of the governments concerned.

With regard to the Euro-Mediterranean area some propitious pre-conditions were created with the launching of the Barcelona process, which have been gradually strengthened. While political reality in the area clearly impedes the adoption of legally binding commitments for the moment, much can be done in boosting cooperation precedents and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust. Such strategies should be incorporated to make part of a aggregate (i. e. based on all three chapters of the Declaration) step-by-step approach in the area, where most of the results should be expected in the long run.

In more concrete terms, the broad institutional framework of Barcelona allows the build-up of mutual trust through cooperation in politically-neutral areas of common concern, such as disaster relief, famine, and economic development. A small center with a relatively modest resource pool, quite within the financing possibilities of the EU Commission alone, might institutionalize

this initial stage of the process. In the medium-to-long run such center may start to deal with early warning proper, should political circumstances create a propitious environment for such activities. In the long run binding agreements for collaboration to this effect might be feasible.

Such concerted multi-track approach aimed at the establishment of early warning capabilities as part of a broad strategy of area cooperation and integration should be seen as an investment in the regional security and stability. It is in such context that actors capable of rendering concrete results aimed at boosting regional security should be encouraged to get directly involved.

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BACKGROUND PAPER FOR EUROMESCO HALKI SEMINAR, SEPTEMBER 1999

'CBMs and CSBMs and Partnership Building Measures in the Charter'

by

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& Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, University of Reading

(Drafted August 1999)

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'CBMs and CSBMs and Partnership Building Measures in the Charter'

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I - Introduction: the Charter in Context

The building of confidence is a complex process. In essence, it is based on ensuring that the right combination of psychological elements (above all trust and predictability) are articulated through the most appropriate instruments in a context conducive to the gradual development of realizable and verifiable goals, over time. Because nothing can be achieved overnight (hence the notion of 'process') the shared goals of those who are party to the process have to identified and built in to the process from the start, as well as revised (and even renewed or reoriented) at opportune moments. What may have seemed an appropriate set of instruments to meet a set of defined ends in one set of circumstances may likewise require a re-assessment in another, or be expressly redesigned to fit the potentially shifting goals of the participants. The larger context within which which the process is situated may also change over time, and in fact – given the ineluctable march of history - is unlikely to remain stable, or in the same place as when the original process was started.

The task facing the drafters of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability encompasses all of these difficulties or challenges, yet they are not always made explicit. The vocabulary of partnership or confidence-building does not directly address shared goals (such as 'mutual threat reduction') because the Mediterranean remains a loose and fluid framework for security cooperation. Shared goals are hard to define, perhaps ironically, because of the absence of regionwide conflict, as well as the breadth of the areas covered by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative as a whole. At the same time, this absence of conflict (which does not apply so cogently at the sub-regional level) has offered considerable opportunities to the EMP to make innovative strides towards new forms of security cooperation. Instead, since its inception in 1995, the EMP has been slow to realize its potential, above all in translating into practice policy objectives formulated in theory to encompass a variety of policy sectors. The lack of a clear sense of prioritization between objectives has also relativised the importance of security goals in, for example, the realization of economic or trade policy objectives.

This is not a problem which is unique to the EMP, as this paper will argue, but to the formulation of cross-sectoral policy as a whole in the articulation and practice of the EU's foreign and security policy. If the officials in Europe's foreign minstries and the European Commission charged with coordinating the different aspects of Europe's external relations identify economic factors as at the core of a given region's tensions, for example, it does not necessarily mean that they themselves have any direct

influence on the kind of economic policy which might alleviate or assist in the reduction of tensions. In turn, trade ministry officials are not always working to a brief which cites the promotion of security as a key priority. Even officials working on arms control issues in ministries of defence, for example, may not be aware that the EMP is also engaged in this field, within a framework usually only articulated at the highest (and as a result, most abstract) levels of policy coordination.

These are structural problems, at the national, as well as EU and inter-governmental level of European foreign policy-making which are only beginning to be addressed[1]. However, for the purposes of confidence-building in the Mediterranean, it means that the most elevated ambitions may almost inevitably fall foul of the practical difficulties associated with their application on the ground, whether this occurs at the level of the EU's bilateral relations with individual southern partners, or in coordinating resources within Europe to make an impact at the regional level as a whole. It also means that in the absence of clear parameters and incentives for their realization, the creation of more structured instruments, such as confidence-building measures (CBMs) or confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) would seem to be premature.

This author has in fact argued elsewhere that the elaboration of CBMs and CSBMs for the Mediterranean region may even be detrimental to their intent in suggesting that the potential for conflict exists, or underlies the process[2]. They may, however, have some utility where confrontational attitudes have structured sub-regional relations in the past, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, or between the Arab states and Israel. Even here, however, clear guidlelines for what is to be included in the confidence-building process is of the essence, as well as desired end-goals, such as the establishment of early warning systems, a gradual reduction of arms stocks and prior notification of military manoeuvres and so on. For some of this work, however, frameworks already exist, such as the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group associated with the Middle East peace process, which may enjoy a revival in the new atmosphere of regional cooperation which has followed on from the change of government in Israel in 1999. For the EMP to have an impact on such developments is likely to be indirect, rather than direct, and efforts might better be concentrated on less structured approaches to improving and strengthening regional relations across and within the Mediterranean.

In this respect, what continues to be required is greater mutual familiarization within and between the various EMP partners, where even the apparently united European (EU-15) bloc do not always share positions or priorities with the conviction joint policy statements often seem to convey. To this end, the formulation of more modest and more open-ended partnership building measures (PBMs), introduced in an exploratory fashion at the EMP Malta summit of 1997 may be more adept in the short run. Even if end results are limited, the very process of increasing transparency and, in many cases, making an honest admission of what may or may not be achievable holds the key to establishing the groundwork for building confidence.

An elaboration of these observations will follow in the concluding section of this paper. Before this, the argument will proceed by briefly considering how the context

for the EMP has changed both internally and externally since its inception in 1995, with particular relevance to the constraints and limitations facing the more ambitious proposals for regional political and security cooperation envisaged within the Euro-Mediterranean Charter. To illustrate some of the concerns currently being expressed in the southern Mediterranean, the paper will also draw on views gleaned (without attribution) during a research visit to Morocco in June 1999. Finally, there will be a number of suggestions for the type of measure, or approach which might be adopted to lay the groundwork for promoting and maintaining confidence in the Mediterranean region into the next century.

II – The Changing Security Environment

The preparatory work for building confidence goes beyond the Mediterranean region itself, where the linkages of the EMP to other security processes are still in their infancy. External observers of the EMP follow-up process might be mistaken in – and even forgiven for - thinking that the venture has existed in almost total substantive isolation from other contemporary developments, particularly in the sphere of security relations in and around Europe. For those who study European security questions from the 'inside out', as it were, there is usually only passing reference to the EMP as an instrument for the promotion of peace and stability - for example in the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999[3] - and where its aims and principles are praised, its parameters and content are left significantly undefined.

Even where the Mediterranean is cited as an 'area of special interest' in key security fora such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the reasons or particularities of this special interest are rarely spelt out in any detail, much less the incentives or rationale for including designated partners, more sparsely represented in NATO's bilateral Mediterranean Dialogue(s) than the multilateral EMP[4]. It is as if citing the need for a Mediterranean 'volet' for Europe's security relations on its southern periphery has been sufficient to infuse life into what follows[5]. In turn, the 'special interests' of southern (ie non-NATO, non-EU) partners are almost never encapsulated in a single place or set of policy directions, not least because they have no equivalent security fora within which to express collective positions of a regional nature. Within the EMP, of course, there are self-evident political difficulties associated with the formation of any collective security position between partners as diverse as Israel and the Arab 'bloc' and Turkey, half in the 'north' (through NATO membership) and half in the 'south' (outside the EU).

One of the main goals of the EMP and its Charter has been to redress this imbalance, precisely by providing a mechanism or framework in which all partners can participate in defining a set of collective security goals across ('north-south') as well as within ('south-south') the Mediterranean region. According to the criteria agreed at the Stuttgart EMP Foreign Ministers' Conference of April 1999, these goals are to be governed or ruled by the principle of consensus, and to include measures to which all can feel comfortable with ascribing within a shared context of the indivisibility of security for all partners (ie one partner's security should not prejudice another's) and of its comprehensive character[6]. This would appear to offer plenty of scope for

devising, for example 'codes of conduct' to avoid, manage or dispel situations of conflict.

That few such measures have emerged since 1995 should give its proponents pause for thought. Just as the EMP appears to be confirming its wide and ambitious terms of reference across a wide array of issues and sectors, the political and security process has come under increasing pressure to produce results as it approaches its fifth year by the end of 1999. The largely unspoken fear is that the whole political and security dimension of the EMP will run out of steam if it fails to elaborate on existing initiatives soon. For the purposes of building incremental confidence, this growing urgency increases the temptation to skirt around difficult structural questions, even where it remains evident that the key underlying imbalances of the process remain in place[7]. Simultaneously, both the inner and external landscapes of the EMP have been shifting, fortunately not all in ways which constitute a negative influence on the future direction the Charter and its instruments might take.

As a consequence, this paper will argue, it is important to return, if briefly, to basic principles to determine the priorities as well as purposes of security cooperation under the EMP. Confidence can only be built where deeds – however incremental and limited - match words. The corollary of this is that confidence is in fact undermined by the articulation of intent incapable of resulting in substantive actions, in potentially damaging ways:

- The failure to meet existing expectations runs the risk of creating future expectations of a substantially less cooperative or pliable nature;
- Creating instruments (such as CBMs) to address security concerns which are not well-defined makes end results hard to attain or even ascertain;
- The exploratory nature and innovations of the EMP process run the risk of being seen as a weakness not a strength, because expectations are not tailored to realistic outcomes.

III – From Barcelona to Stuttgart : Straitjacket or Framework?

Since the mid-1980s, there has been considerable discussion of, and indeed planning for what a southern dimension of Europe's security lanscape might encompass. The fate of the Hispano-Italian proposal in 1990 to create a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) is well-known, while the less ambitious 'dialogue' processes embarked on by the Western European Union (WEU) since 1992 and NATO since 1995 have enjoyed more formal success. The latter initiatives were in place at the time of the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995, thus obviating the need for the chapter on Political and Security Partnership of Barcelona to replicate the activity of exchanging views over predominately military and/or operational aspects of security cooperation. Instead, the Barcelona process has sought to complement this type of pre-existing initiative.

The rationale for the EU as an organization to have embarked on Mediterranean security cooperation at all would appear to have been to bring something new to bear

on an area where few broader security initiatives have yet taken root. The innovation of Barcelona, which many have rightly identified as its main conceptual strength, was precisely to make security a broader, more cross-sectoral and integrated set of issues than its traditional articulation within the spheres of military and defence cooperation. As Richard Youngs writes:

> 'In designing the Barcelona process, the EU's philosophy was that economic and political objectives were symbiotic: economic reform would bring in its wake political reform, which would give a further boost to economic performance, the latter helping to stem any potential for unsustainable levels of migration and thereby enhancing security objectives.'[8]

Seeking common ground for security cooperation has formed the core of much activity under the EMP umbrella since 1995. However, in the most advanced aspects of the EMP's work under the economic and financial provisions of Barcelona, the political and security dimensions have remained implicit and divorced from what, at best, could amount to a new security vision for the region. It is also to be regretted that many of the discussions already taking place under the Barcelona umbrella, on cooperative approaches to managing drugs, crime, environmental disasters and so on have barely filtered beyond the committees in which they have been discussed. Academic observers and analysts are often justly upbraided for being behind the times in their easy criticism of what does or does not appear to be going on within the Barcelona follow-up committees[9]. Nevertheless, what might be termed the 'competitive advantage' of the EMP – namely, its potential to build a regional security model based on 'soft' or non-military aspects of security relations - does not appear either to have been fully exploited or even well-publicised as one of its strengths.

The preamble to the Barcelona Declaration stated that the EMP sought to contribute to the success of other initiatives rather than replacing them. However, the chapter on the Political and Security Partnership said little if anything about divisions of labour with other processes. In the follow-up to Barcelona, it remains unclear where - and indeed whether - initiatives under the EMP are to be led by the partnership, or merely shadow or support existing regimes or approaches. In the sphere of arms control, for example, the wording of the Barcelona Declaration suggests no more than a supporting role for the EMP in the pursuit of greater regionwide adhesion to and respect of existing international agreements, such as the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its chemical and biological equivalents (CWC and BWC). If a region-specific arms control regime were envisaged, it was merely to advance the more global cause of limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, it is still open to question whether setting up a region (or Mediterranean-) specific focus for these more global regimes might not dilute their purposes through limiting their coherence or applicability. Mark Heller, among others, has argued that limiting an arms control regime to the 27 (soon to be 28, with Libya) partners to the EMP, excludes from the security equation threats of equal, if not more, concern to the national security policies of individual partners. In the case of Israel, for example, both Iraq and Iran are outside the EMP region, but remain crucial to what Heller terms

Israel's 'security space'. In terms of regional security cooperation, according to Heller, 'states view arms control as an instrument of national security rather than a theologicial desideratum, and they will formulate their approach to possible EMP arms control polices through the prism of their own security concerns and threat perceptions.' [10]

As the current author has argued elsewhere[11], there is a disjuncture between the broadly defined – but by no means uniform, or uniformly held – security concerns of the European partners to the EMP and their southern partners. It is no secret, for example, that the Barcelona process was instigated to respond primarily to the security concerns of its European proponents, to which the individual concerns of the southern Partners have been added and accommodated, during negotiations for the original Barcelona Declaration and in the subsequent meetings of high level officials. The vocabulary of inclusion - or partnership - should not blind observers to the fact that for most of the EU's southern Partners, regionwide security cooperation is secondary to the economic, financial and trading opportunities offered by Barcelona, primarily at the bilateral level. Progress in the spheres of economic development and structural adjustment may in some senses be dependent on the southern Partners' acceptance of some form of multilateral regionwide cooperation over political and security matters. They are not, however, central to the southern region's own more individually conceived notions of what constitutes security.

There is a qualitative as well as quantative distinction between the approaches of the European partners and their southern counterparts to security questions. Fifty years' experience of security cooperation between European states and North America (at least for NATO members) has led EU governments to evolve clearer distinctions between what pertains to national security in its internal dimensions (such as forms of civil disorder or domestic terrorism, for example) and the external management of security (namely, threats to the cohesion and security of the whole, originating from outside the alliances (NATO or the WEU) formed to defend their members against such eventualities).

For most of the southern partners to the EMP, not only have internal security questions generally been equated with regime security in a more existential sense than in the democracies of Europe, but also, external security cooperation has generally implied higher levels of internal, or domestic interference than they have been ready to accept. Where regional cooperation at the 'south-south' level has touched on shared security concerns, the depth of horizontal engagement has always stopped short of the kind of joint defence planning now common to NATO or WEU member-states. Where political or diplomatic relations are at stake, regional organizations such as the Arab League have steered clear of any encroachment on the sovereign rights of individual members to determine their own domestic security agendas. Few reciprocal defence arrangements, such as the Arab Maghreb Union's article on the collective defence of one of their number if under external attack have ever been invoked.

All this is well-known; where it impinges on the building of confidence across and within the Mediterranean, however, is at the point at which the political aspirations of

the Barcelona Declaration imply levels of conditionality, especially in the sphere of human rights or democratic accountability. Regardless of how effective, or even operational this feared level of conditionality may in fact be for southern partners to the EMP[12], '(w)here they have accepted forms of conditionality in the economic sphere – to which most have become reluctantly accustomed in their dealings with the IMF and other external creditors over debt repayments from the late 1970s onwards – they are extremely reluctant to accept similar levels of intervention in their political and security affairs'.[13]

It might be argued that the principle of consensus on which the EMP Charter is to be based goes some way towards mitigating southern fears of imposed conditions. The principle of consensus has, however, also watered down a number of the more progressive initiatives proposed under the political and security chapter of EMP, which individual partners have been able to veto. The holistic vision of Barcelona outlined by Richard Youngs should, at least in theory, go some way towards balancing the different approaches to security cooperation adopted by individual partners, and some of this thinking was reflected at the Stuttgart summit. The 'Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability'[14] have, in fact, explicitly included 'economic, social, cultural and human aspects [of cooperation] where they affect and determine peace and stability.'[15]

Far from being additional determinants, these factors are in fact at the heart of tackling the biggest security concerns in the region, particularly if one considers the human, social and economic roots of 'terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking...illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings'...also listed in the 'Guidelines'. How, then, are these areas and issues to be incorporated into a model which situates political dialogue alongside measures to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 'arrangements for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation'? Is it a question of priorities, or can these different levels of security cooperation co-exist and to equal effect? Can they be integrated at all, and if so, how?

Until some of these issues are addressed, it is perhaps no wonder then, that the follow-up to Barcelona has been somewhat tentative in attempts to establish the basis for the creation of a region of peace and stability:

- Firstly, it is not entirely within the power of the EMP partners to establish where the parameters for political and security cooperation might reasonably be expected to stop and start.
- Secondly, the southern partners to the EMP are largely consumers, rather than instigators of a security policy to which they are reticent to adhere wholeheartedly.
- Thirdly, and added to this is the question of regional coherence, which despite assurances to the contrary, has yet to strike all partners to the process as of equal functional utility, as illustrated by the case of arms control outlined above.
- Fourthly, the process has yet to make explicit the integrated (for which read holistic and symbiotic) objectives of Barcelona, in ways which are acceptable to all partners, on the basis of the principle of consensus.

IV - European Defence and Security Creeps Southward

The clarification of some of these objectives may well take place in the broader European security debate, to which the EMP needs to make more specific reference. The political and security dimensions of the EMP have always been linked, if reluctantly at first, to the vicissitudes of the Middle East peace process. What has yet to be fully recognized is the extent to which operational, as well as 'architectural' or institutional developments in the wider European security arena have changed and will continue to change the parameters within which the whole Mediterranean security debate takes place. The aftermath of the Kosovo operation of 1999 above all will intrude on the next steps to be taken by the Barcelona process, for the simple reason, as noted above, that the EMP is itself posited on exploring new dimensions in Europe's security relations to the south of the EU area.

The main impact of the Kosovo operation is that considerably more questions are being asked about applying the right instruments at the right time and in the right places than four years ago, when the very notions of 'peace-enforcement' or peace support operations (at least under direct NATO auspices) were considered daring. In the period following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (from May 1st 1999), the EU is now seeking to consolidate for itself a 'capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to NATO.'[16] This affirmation of a fully-fledged security and defence capacity does not, however, mean that the EU is yet in a position to make much impact in this sphere.

One of the largely unacknowledged weaknesses of the inclusion of traditional security mechanisms under the EMP is that both at the time of the Barcelona Declaration and subsequently, the EU has been less than comfortable with engaging directly with military and defence agendas. This is a function partly of the predominance for most European states of NATO in the diplomatic as well as military aspects of defence and security policy-making, and to a lesser extent, the WEU. It is also a reflection of the fact that, despite the wording of the Maastrict Treaty, defence cooperation has been the least developed area of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In contrast, where the EU has enjoyed most coherence and collective experience – namely, in external economic, financial and trade cooperation policy – no explicit reference to security was made at all in the second chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. The wording of the preamble, rather than the content of the Declaration, was deemed sufficient to posit this objective.

The time for considering the security implications of economic policy may be premature, where the inverse, namely, the economic implications of (and for) for security policy is still the preferred approach or order of priorities. Nevertheless, calls for more integrated approaches to security planning have been increasing. Indeed,

prior to the Kosovo operation, it was the Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, who appealed in early 1999 for a 'Partnership for Prosperity' for the Balkans[17], in acknowledgement of a broader set of causal factors than the frequently cited ethnic tensions for conflict in the region. Genuine attempts to coordinate economic, social, political and diplomatic objectives across the board are still in their infancy, although, at the conceptual level, the Barcelona process might be considered a pioneering venture in the field. In the short run, however, the EMP will continue to be limited in its reach by its status as a pre-emptive expression of the CFSP. Until the CFSP is adapted to new circumstances, the main significance of this for the EMP is that its European partners will be unable to forestall what has yet to be decided amongst them within the EU, as well as between the EU and other security regimes represented primarily by NATO and the WEU.

The form that some of these inter-relationships may take is already at the planning stage. At the Cologne European Council meeting of June 1999, influenced by developments at the St. Malo meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers during the autumn of 1998, the General Affairs Council of the EU was charged with formulating proposals for the 'inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks' [namely, peace keeping/peace support operations, conflict prevention and crisis management], with a view to taking the 'necessary decisions' by the end of the year 2000. The WEU would then 'as an organization...have completed its purpose', its operational capabilities having been subsumed under an EU decision-making umbrella[18]. Having all but resolved the future of the WEU, this still leaves the area of EU-NATO cooperation largely untouched, except insofar as the EU's desire to increase 'effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency' between the two organizations is concerned. It is perhaps a coincidence that pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty, the new Secretary-General of the European Council and High Representative for the CFSP is in fact the erstwhile NATO Secretary-General, D. Javier Solana Madariaga, but the conundrum of where the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO meets the CFSP of the EU still requires further fine-tuning.

In this respect, the future relationship between the United States and the EU in the European arena will be the key issue of 'hard' (military/defence) security coordination, above all over the thorny question of burden-sharing. The US presence in the Mediterranean, linked as it is to American security objectives in the broader Middle East will continue to impinge on Europe's – above all the EU's - ability to articulate an independent role in formulating traditional defence mechanisms (including CBMs and CSBMs). This is not least because the inclusion of the US in most arms control regimes as well as in the provision of security guarantees to its allies (Middle Eastern as well as European) will remain a sine qua non of their success or failure. Europe, in other words, will be able to articulate positions, but not implement them alone for some time to come.

The debate in the second half of 1999 is still open-ended, and concentrated mostly on the implications for future operations. At the core of these discussions, however, are

the key military and defensive functions of security policy, which because implicit to the conceptualisation of most security questions, are often the hardest to move away from. This presents a challenge to the EU's initiatives in the field since, as mentioned above, defence is one of the areas least defined and least developed within the CFSP. Defence and military cooperation is also likely to be the area most subject to critical thinking in the aftermath of Kosovo, with potential impacts on the new parameters set for the EU's external relations in general.

The Kosovo campaign has in fact changed the nature of Europe's security 'architecture' and institutions from alliances prepared for defensive and peace-keeping actions towards more proactive methods to secure their joint aims. Joint planning, in other words, has moved into the sphere of the joint operation. The fall-out from this, especially in assessments of the future applicability of 'humanitarian actions', means that some coherence is indeed, slowly, entering the field of defence and security cooperation within Europe. At the national level in the UK, for example, the Department for International Development (Dfid) has already been strengthening policy coordination and operational links with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in ways which may find echoes across Europe. However, for some of the reasons outlined at the beginning of this paper, it may be some time before this kind of cross-ministerial coordination trickles down to the Mediterranean.

This in fact opens a renewed opportunity for the EMP to contribute to the debate, especially in highlighting areas where, for example, economic, social and cultural routes to security cooperation are more appropriate to the envisaged outcomes than more traditional forms of security cooperation. The new administrative and decision-making capacities envisaged for external security and defence policy coordination in the post-Amsterdam Europe may also create opportunities for the EMP to become more accessible to its non-European partners as well as more streamlined then is currently the case. Jorg Monar, in particular, has described how the current dualistic nature of EU decision-making has effectively separated external economic policy from foreign and security policy formulation, with detrimental effects on the integration, as well as the articulation, of 'soft' (that is, non-military) security objectives[19].

Given the pertinence of this dislocation to hindering the objectives of the EMP, the projected reforms of the EU's institutions, and above all the Commission, due to be outlined by the newly appointed President of the Commission in early 2000, could also benefit from the imput of some of the EMP's experience over the past five years. One immediate conclusion drawn by many observers of the EMP is that the Commission is under-staffed to the point of being unequal to the task of fully addressing the array of tasks facing it, before one even considers the capacities of southern partners. Both might benefit from a greater devolution to the region of the management and implementation of policy, as well as, more contraversially, increasing non-governmental, (or 'civil society') involvement in this process[20].

One immediate area in which the EMP's European partners might engage to build confidence will be in reassuring their southern neighbours about the future potential for 'proactive' defence or humanitarian operations to be launched on Europe's

borders. For those to the south of the Mediterranean, the Kosovo campaign of 1999 has undoubtedly raised a number of apprehensions, especially among those routinely questioned about their human rights records. It was the first NATO operation explicitly to override the principle of sovereign inviolability in favour of humanitarian objectives. For many on the European side of the debate, this has been a cause for celebration in extending the boundaries of international humanitarian law towards the active protection of human rights, but it has also raised a series of questions about where and how far this precedent will reach. While the future of Kosovo remains to be definitively settled, and the political and economic costs of the conflict and post-conflict reconstruction effort remain to be counted, repetitions of this operation further afield are extremely unlikely. As a means of encouraging human rights reform, however, the EU might be better placed to create non-military incentives for change and improvement.

In short, the challenge facing the EMP is to demonstrate the viability as well as desirability of non-traditional approaches to security policy coordination in a region where relations are not primarily governed by potential conflict. Approaches might include:

- An acceptance, in the short term, that security cooperation of a traditional defensive or military nature does not fall within the competence of the EMP and the Charter, and is unlikely to do so until the WEU's competences in this sphere are fully integrated within the EU's decision-making structures;
- As a corollary to this, an acknowledgement that few 'hard' (that is military) security initiatives will succeed in the absence of US engagement, and thus might best be pursued through the relevant United Nations organizations and multilateral arms control regimes, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (where applicable and acceptable), or the renewed multilateral process in the Middle East;
- Delaying the elaboration of CBMs and CSBMs until these inter-relationships are resolved or their respective competences become clearer (a point implictly accepted under the Charter's 'Guidelines' of April 1999, in deferring the advancement of CSBMs until 'the appropriate time' (under Objectives (b));
- Conducting a '5-year' assessment, drawing on the experience of EU delegations in the EMP region, EMP southern partners themselves, as well as from the relevant directorates of the European Commission, of successes and failures in the coordination of 'soft'security policy objectives to date. The aim would be to feed conclusions into the process of EU institutional reform while it is taking place from early 2000, rather than wait until such reforms have taken place;
- Undertaking missions to the EU's southern Mediterranean partners to explain the dimensions of European security and defence policy coordination as they impinge on the economic, financial and human aspects of the Barcelona process. The primary objective should be to present the uncertainty, fluidity and limitations on internal European policy coordination before these difficulties result in disappointed expectations in the southern Mediterranean; a secondary objective would be to present the EU as an organic and evolving organization, rather than a 'fortress' with a united and impenetrable façade;

- Building confidence by fulfilling existing obligations before embarking on new and potentially unrealizable objectives; initiatives which respond to a presumption of potential conflict in the region should take second place in the EMP's order of priorities to the promotion and exploration of shared interests of a clearly indivisible kind. Examples of the latter include the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Plan (SMAP), and the pilot project on cooperation between civil protection services, launched operationally in June 1998.

Where these proposals include all parties to the EMP, they might be considered as initial 'partnership building measures' (PBMs), which – as in the case of the '5-year' assessment, could be included in the drafting of the Charter. For the others, the onus to create incentives for renewed security cooperation rests primarily on the European partners.

V -The Moroccan Experience Qua Testing Ground

If this sets the parameters for the future of European security concerns, what then do southern partners wish to see from the EMP process in general, and the Charter in particular? The following observations are drawn and amalgamated from a wide range of interviews conducted with officials, the business community, journalists and academics in Morocco in June 1999. They are not meant in any way to be representative of official government positions. However, they do point to areas where the EMP has proved disappointing to date, and where more constructive work in confidence-building might be conducted.

Whether these views are illustrative of attitudes throughout the whole southern Mediterranean region is open to question, although they may find resonances over specific issues across the region. What they do clearly point to is the need for attention to detail rather than generalities, to explanation rather than an assumed common understanding of various policies and issues, and to the need for the process to be accessible to those who are most affected by its impacts. Finally, the bluntness of some of the views expressed is also intentionally reproduced, as a means of illustrating the gaps which often exist between articulated intentions and the impressions gained by those on the receiving end. These are that:

1) Little is generally known about European efforts to forge a partnership with southern Mediterranean states; where this has been discussed or investigated by interested parties, response times from Brussels and elsewhere have been slow; promises for money have evaporated or been interminably delayed; questions and requests, in short, remain unanswered or badly answered, and the process in general is too distant and impersonal.

2) From the European side, the overriding obsession appears to be with security in general and immigration (generally deemed to be illegal in any form) in particular. This prism colours most of what has been envisaged by the EU, with the effect of building little trust among southern partners who can neither discuss matters of concern to themselves (for example, how the EU functions internally), nor bring

alternative views to bear on Europe's negative perceptions of the movement of peoples within and beyond the region.

3) If Europe were serious about tackling the root causes (economic and social above all) of potential regional instability, it would devote considerably more time, energy and resources to addressing these problems. The fact that it does not means either that it will do the minimum to ensure that the overspill effects within Europe of migration, terrorism/radicalism, crime and drugs are kept in check, or that it will not do very much of any significance at all. Appeals to alleviate debt, for example, have fallen foul of the EU's own provisions that only 15% of debt repayments can be redeployed to domestic regional investment programmes, for example. Foreign direct investment is seen to be largely the concern of the private sector in Europe, with little official impetus or incentive to back it up.

4) In contrast, at the bilateral level, there has been quite a lot of activity. Most of this, however, takes the form of competition between European states - which, as in the case of the award of a new mobile telephone network licence in Morocco - might even run against the united European approach of the Barcelona process. Europe's lack of a strategic vision is in fact striking when set against the latest American proposals (set out by US Under-Secretary of State, Eizenstadt) for an open-border, regionwide market based on economies of scale to be formed in the Maghreb. At the level of individual state concerns - between Morocco and Spain over migration and fisheries, for example - governments have been swift to set up joint commissions to investigate and negotiate solutions. None of this activity, however, falls ostensibly within the rubric of the EU's relations with the region; in theory, the soon-to-be-defunct EU-Morocco fishing accord is to be re-negotiated by Spain on behalf of the EU; in practice, everyone knows it is essentially a bilateral affair to which the rest of the EU will accede once Spain has satisfied its demands.

5) In the broader context of European security developments, NATO's bombing campaign against the Former Yugoslav Republic over the Kosovo issue has caused apprehension. There was not as much dissent in Morocco over NATO's stated objectives as there was in the case of the US/UK bombing of Iraq from December 1998. However, questions remain about the effective limitation on NATO's use of force towards alleged humanitarian ends, especially where NATO states have made only limited appeals to the sanction of the United Nations for their actions and where considerable 'collateral damage' was inflicted upon civilian populations. In states such as Morocco, where western governments and international non-governmental organizations (I)NGOs (such as Amnesty International) continue to point to concerns over human rights (highlighted also in general terms in the Chairman's Conclusions to the Conference of EMP Foreign Ministers at Stuttgart in April 1999), the fear has been voiced (if not widely held) that western military establishments might resort to an apparently arbitrary use of force to effect change on humanitarian grounds.

6) The impact of the above is that the southern partners are wary about opening up at the political level as much and as rapidly as the financial and free trade aspects of Barcelona have required them to do at the economic level. Some states, most notably

Tunisia, even argue that they cannot liberalize on all fronts at once, and have used economic arguments to justify time-lags in tackling genuine political reform. The combined effect of the Algerian crisis since 1992 and the race towards the Free Trade Area by the year 2010 has actually been quite useful in supporting a centralized political clamp-down in certain EMP states. In the case of Morocco, political openness in some respects (notably, in the press and the creation of NGOs and small enterprises) has shielded the continuation of political 'business as usual' in others (most notably, through the approval required of the ubiquitous Ministry of the Interior over a wide sphere of policy).

7) Where Europe has been less than generous - for example in continuing to limit North Africa's exports of agricultural goods and products - the impression gained is that southern partner states like Morocco can best protect themselves by going through the motions of instigating a process of democratic reform, while retaining a veil over the realities of power and the governing structures of state. This is not always intentional, but arises from the structural problems associated with depersonalising the exercise of political and economic influence, especially where the two spheres are closely linked. Identifying chains of command can also be difficult for those seeking to reform them; even critics of the status quo differ in their assessments of what is really going on, and who or what is really governing any aspect of policy. The EU needs to be sympathetic to the size and nature of the political problem and assist in long-term, rather than abrupt and piecemeal change.

VI - Conclusions - The Way Forward: Partnership Building Measures (PBMs) and the Charter

It is clear from the arguments advanced so far that the multefaceted ambitions of the EMP cannot be realized in the short term, not least because they are dependent on developments eleswhere. These are taking place, primarily and simultaneously, within the EU itself, but also - with direct relevance to the advancement of Mediterranean political and security cooperation - within the trans-Atlantic dimensions of Europe's overall security policy coordination.

Rather than pre-empt or predict the outcomes of these shifts and developments, the Charter might reflect this context by trimming its wings and current ambitions, the better to incorporate future measures of the CBM variety when - and even if – the time is ripe. Limiting the initial parameters (and envisaged instruments) of the Charter does not necessarily mean, however, that the EMP should lose any of its potential dynamism as a whole. In fact, the holistic vision of the EMP presents governments with a formidable challenge in coordinating policy across a number of spheres which have hitherto not been well-integrated in expressions of their foreign policy in general. Here too, the challenge is larger than the EMP process itself, reaching into spheres of domestic policy coordination under the direct and sole responsibility of individual governments. Communication across ministries, the assimilation and integration of (occasionally conflicting) policy objectives at the appropriate level, their translation into coherent policy at the local and national levels, and their cohesion through compromise at the EU intergovernmental level constitute a series of bureaucratic,

human and technological hurdles facing all EU states on a daily basis. However, as the instigators of the EMP, EU governments might first, and as a priority, focus on how and through what channels they might best articulate the symbiotic goals of the EMP from the domestic level upwards, in order to identify areas for special attention.

The 'Guidelines' for elaborating the Charter reflect some of this thinking, where the main objective is to 'contribute, through a comprehensive and balanced approach, to the strengthening of peace and stability.'[21] Further elaboration of this objective also concentrates on evolving a 'coherent' approach to the primary objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, across all three of its chapters. Given that the EU enjoys more leeway for initiating or supporting policy in the economic and financial, human and social dimensions of the Barcelona process, the starting point for evolving a 'coherent' approach to security might best be found in these areas. Put another way, this means concentrating primarily on developing policies with positive 'soft' (non-military) security outcomes. Only when a firm basis for cooperation has been established in there areas should the EU venture into 'hard' or substantive diplomatic security approaches.

Because they are politically sensitive, and deemed by most southern partenrs to be potentially 'intrusive', hard security instruments will inevitably be harder to devise. Even if only some of the partners are engaged in a process of conflict resolution, for example, the principles which govern any type of engagement under the EMP will require the consensus of all 27 (or 28) members of the EMP[22]. The compromises required to achieve this 27 (28) party consensus are unlikely to produce instruments with much flexibility, effectiveness or even utility, particularly given other alternatives, such as appeals to the United Nations, to the United States (as global and regional arbiter) or to international law. This, in effect, has been the story of the political and security dimensions of the Barcelona process since 1995.

What follows are some broadly depicted suggestions and recommendations for the kind of 'partnership building' in which the EMP might most fruitfully engage, and which might be included in some form in the future Charter or in its work programme follow-up. Some of the 'measures' put forward might be too unstructured or open-ended to warrant the label PBM; as a term, however, PBM was specifically introduced to substitute for the more structured, and historically loaded connotations associated with CBMs and CSBMs. The further development of PBMs thus presents another, dual-sided, opportunity to EMP negotiators: not only to reorient security thinking and practice away from its traditional basis in assumed conflicts and underlying defence planning, but also to create instruments which reflect a more global shift away from a world of 'hard' security responses at the eleventh hour to the more grey-tinged but pre-emptive possibilities of inter-related 'soft' security objectives and mechanisms.

(a) Trading 'Hard' for 'Soft' Security Priorities:

- (i) Partnership Building Measures should concentrate first and foremost on increasing mutual familiarity and understanding across and within the Mediterranean region. The clear priority – or 'leitmotiv' - of the Charter should be

to expand the still fragile basis on which regional cooperation is currently posited, in preference to activities predicated on joint, or sub-regional planning for conflict prevention and crisis management. These should assume a secondary level of importance, applicable only – as the wording of the Charter 'Guidelines' already indicates – on a 'volontary and consensual basis'.

- (ii) Dedicating the EMP's energies towards positive outcomes through constructive engagement would serve the dual purpose of establishing a stronger framework for cooperation in its widest sense (that is, not just over security issues, traditionally defined, but across the whole spectrum of the EMP) while pre-empting precisely the kind of mistrust and mutual threat perceptions which, for want of other channels, may eventually give rise to conflict.
- (iii) Conversely, the vocabulary of conflict prevention and crisis management should be used with great circumspection. Contrary to intentions, and in the absence of any capacity or willingness within the EMP to address existing conflicts, the very use of this vocabulary at this stage of the EMP's development serves only to reinforce the idea (prevalent among many security analysts) that belligerent tensions are latent to inter-state relations within the Mediterranean region. Most of the region's problems, regrettably, arise at the internal or 'domestic' level, and it is here, rather than at the inter-state level that polices to protect human lives should be developed.
- (iv) Crisis management should, as a result, concentrate more on joint ventures geared towards shared humanitarian and social goals, not mutual dispute settlement. One approach, which might be developed further as a PBM, is an extension of the 2-year pilot project for cooperation between civil protection services referred to above. Could this project, under EMP auspices, have had a role to play in the recent Turkish earthquake disaster, for example? Or, is the reality that in cases of sudden emergencies, governments are still more likely to offer aid and assistance on a bilateral, government-to-government basis? Explorations by the EMP in this direction could nevertheless be productive, not least because they respond to real rather than imagined needs. Developing early warning systems for natural disasters of the kind already foreseen in the case of the Turkish earthquake, along with contingency plans and units ready to react at short notice, may not only increase the viability of joint responses, but also serve to promote the continuing benefits of exchanging expert advice and technical assistance across a number of sectors within EMP partner states (for example, in developing national fire, ambulance and rescue services).
- (v) The concentration of EMP's energies on the human and social consequences of natural disasters could result in less duplication of efforts engaged in elsewhere. The whole sphere of arms control issues could, as a result, be addressed in novel ways. The political dialogue could, for example, concentrate on incentives towards allocating defence budgets to more humanitarian ends, along the lines ostensibly being followed in Europe. To borrow from the suggestions of Captain Stephen Jermy, drawing on instruments already available under the Maritime Doctrine of the British Royal Navy:

'A number of generic activities spring to mind. The first is Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), encompassing the use of military forces in non-military tasks such as disaster relief, search and rescue, salvage and pollution

control. Second is Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), encompassing the use of military forces in non-military tasks such as fisheries protection, anti-smuggling and anti-piracy. This will be of special relevance where international norms are being inforced. Finally, Arms Control has socio-economic relevance in this division through reduction in defence expenditure freeing up resources for other security sectors, in areas such as social and environmental programmes.'[23]

- (vi) A more structured role than this for the EMP's European partners in the detailed promotion of arms control regimes is, as mentioned above not only premature, but largely inappropriate given the EMP's subsidiary position relative to the monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms evolved and exercised by EU governments in other international fora. This is not to say, however, that consistent with its holistic vision, the EU should not make the appropriate connections and balance of objectives between arms sales to the Mediterranean region (often competitively promoted by ministries of trade and defence within individual EU states) and the goals of arms control and reduction pursued by the same ministries of defence and the collectively by the EU as a whole. Inconsistencies in respect of these often competing objectives – especially over the retention of nuclear arsenals by France and the UK – have and will continue to bedevil attempts to persuade or enforce compliance on international arms agreements with southern Mediterranean states.

(b) Human Partnerships

- (i) The harsh reality facing European governments is that a large number of the expectations raised by Barcelona have been disappointed by delays in the implementation of projects, caused in large measure by the late allocation and initial disbursement of the MEDA funding line, and the suspension of a number of agreed project funds in 1998-9 pending the European Parliament's investigations into the role of European Commissioners' oversight over a number of Commission funding lines, including MEDA. This disappointment has not been universal, but adds to the impression expressed in Morocco that the decision-making and disbursement procedures for the MEDA funding are too distant and centralized to respond to local needs. The back-log of unfulfilled funding initatives should thus be addressed by EU governments as a priority, not only as a gesture of good faith, but as a partnership-building measure in itself.
- (ii) In the reform process taking place at the Commission level, more thought might be given to decentralization of these procedures, whereby EU in-country delegations can be allowed greater discretion over small funding initiatives, above all those destined to increase the accessibility of the EU to local communities. Activities associated with increasing mutual familiarization across and within the Medterranean region already exist; what is currently lacking is the ability of in-country Commission representatives to respond swiftly and with flexibility to local initiatives requiring small levels of funding at relatively short notice. At a time when centralized funding lines in Brussels have not been immune from questions of accountability, reforms to increase transparency within the Commission could be tailored to encompass delegated autority within the Mediterranean region.

- (iii) One approach might also be to set up joint commissions composed of an EU and in-country membership, not only to oversee small funding initiatives, but also to sustain a continuing two-way process of communication between the EU and individual southern partners over a variety of 'partnership-building' issues. This dialogue or exchange of views 'on the ground' could also be fed into the work of the multilateral high officials' meetings on political and security issues.
- (iv) More staff is required on the European side. The Commission cannot manage projects under all three chapters of Barcelona at once, in ways which are at one and the same time appropriate to the circumstances of individual southern EMP countries, which reflect the state of progress in bilateral association agreements, and which correspond to the overall vision set forward in the Barcelona Declaration. Since the Barcelona Declaration also incorporates a desire (under its third chapter) to increase links across civil societies, more thought might perhaps be given to increasing non-governmental participation in the implementation of initiatives. This would be in addition to increasing the number of Commission officials (or 'temporary agents') attached to the relevant directorates-general.
- (v) To date, non-governmental involvement in the political and security dimensions of the EMP has remained limited in scope and confined largely to an advisory role. This could now be explictly extended to exploring the cross-sectoral dimensions of security cooperation, perhaps through a series of designated case studies related to the 5-year assessment exercise proposed above. One existing proposal which has been favourably received by the Commission but not yet officially approved or implemented is a 'scoping study'of the environmental impacts of the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) proposed by a regional coalition set up under Friends of the Earth Middle East[24]. The utility of devolving this kind of task to 'external' agents is, paradoxically, that non-governmental actors might be better placed than officials engaged in specific areas to identify where connections are or are not being made at national and local levels of policy-making, even before the EMP dimension comes into play. This is an area, too, where the EU's post-Amsterdam Treaty reforms might increase the participation of non-governmental regional and security specialists in the EU's new strategic planning processes (including the Political and Security Committee, and Institute for Security Studies, inherited from the WEU).
- (vi) More explicit links might be made between the multilateral and purely bilateral policy initiatives embarked on by individual European partners. It is obvious, for example, that Spanish security concerns are more directly linked to those of Morocco than to those of Jordan, if only for reasons of proximity. Where joint commissions to manage shared security-related concerns have been set up at the bilateral level, examples of cooperative measures which might have general applicability elsewhere could be 'pooled' at the EMP level. The aim would not be to divulge the potentially confidentional nature of bilateral exchanges, but to demonstrate more clearly where sub-regional cooperation may be more appropriate to addressing substantive issues than under the EMP umbrella. It would also, hopefully, reduce the duplication of efforts at several levels, especially if more thought were given to how these initiatives converge with (rather than diverge from) the EMP's overall objectives.

- (vi) The 'soft' security issues of most concern to the EU states are themselves the subject of a complex set of inter-governmental negotiations as well as agreements devised and implemented within the European 'acquis', under the auspices of the European Parliament as well as the Commission. At the same time, the management of these issues – above all, migration and the policing and combatting of drugs and organized crime – are all subject to political pressures and sensitivities at the national level of policy-making, which makes the evolution of EU-level decision-making all the more complicated and subject to constant external pressures. Over migration policy, in particular, and for differing national political reasons, not all EU member-states are signatories of the Schengen accords aimed at harmonising refugee, asylum and visa policies across internal European borders. This complexity needs to be explained to Mediterranean partners in terms of the difficulties associated with building and sustaining common positions within Europe, in ways which limit the coherent expression of EU external policy positions. At the same time, the imput and views of southern Mediterranean partners requires some functional response within those areas of European policy which directly impinge on their ability to fulfill their obligations under Barcelona. One of these is the swift and streamlined granting of visas to southern Mediterranean business delegations needing to visit Europe to market industrial goods and products or seek bilateral sources of investment for joint or new business ventures.
- (vii) The whole arena of migration policy, which ranges across the whole spectrum of policy-making is both the Achilles heel and the 'golden egg' of the EMP. It is the main issue – or set of issues – which finds its place within all three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration, but which too often appears to be rooted in the minds of the EMP's European partners as a question of control rather than opportunity. What is now badly needed is more open discussion of the real dynamics of migration. Until now, preventing uncontrolled population movements across the Mediterranean has constituted the core preoccupation of much of Europe's security planning, the main taboo being even to consider re-opening the question of admitting legal migrants. Yet, as one interlocutor in Morocco commented:
    - conditions of illegality in fact encourage those who arrive in Europe to stay clandestinely, for fear of retributions not only from European authorities but also from their home authorities if they are forcibly returned;
    - a closed-door approach to new migration also discourages exchanges between the 'best' of the societies on either side of the Mediterranean, since the most qualified migrants are likely to leave for North America or elsewhere. This leaves the unemployed and unqualified to smuggle themselves and others into Europe, creating a situation which, at best, does little to promote cross-cultural understanding and, at worst, perpetuates negative mutual impressions.
- (viii) This discussion presupposes that migration is a fact of life, of historical as well as contemporary importance which cannot be contained except at great cost to the interior ministries, coastal guards and navies of 'fortress Europe'. More enlightened policies – such as youth and student exchanges under reciprocally managed arrangements, with in-built incentives to return home - might at least be

open to discussion under the EMP umbrella, not least to dispel the myth rife within southern EMP societies that 'only inanimate objects are welcome in Europe'. Disaggregating different aspects of population movements – such as visa policies, temporary or permanent migration, asylum seekers and – worse – the control of terrorism, would also go some way towards limiting the security dimensions of these issues to their proper place. This can only be achieved by first broaching the subject at the level of national governments, where progress is likely to be slow. However, the EMP might well play a significant role in introducing southern Mediterranean views to these debates, in ways which contribute to reinforcing the sense of partnership in addressing and managing these quintessentially human issues.

- (ix) Another area where more imagination might be required is in reinforcing cooperation within the EMP over human rights issues. This is another sphere where the European partners appear to be the instigators of policy and the southern Mediterranean governments the reluctant consumers. This is not to say that all or even most EMP partners are insensible to human rights concerns, nor that European states themselves are entirely innocent of human rights violations. It is merely to state that the mechanisms and policies required to make progress in this area do not clearly pertain to the EMP sphere. Most significant improvements in respect of human rights have occurred where individual governments, local human rights organizations or INGOs (such as Human Rights Watch, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, or Amnesty International) have highlighted the plights of individuals and communities, whose cases are then taken up at the bilateral level between individual European governments or European presidency delegations and the governments of the states in question. In contrast, the discussion of human rights at a general and unspecific level is unlikely to be able to proceed beyond current initiatives – now largely completed – to list international human rights instruments and undertakings adhered to by all parties to the EMP.
- (x) An alternative approach, and one already subscribed to under MEDA Democracy as well as the Stuttgart Chairman's Conclusions is to concentrate the multilateral focus of the EMP on the promotion of the rule of law. In many ways, the creation of a legal framework is a precondition for ensuring the rights of citizens, including their rights to due process through independent courts. A concentration on the rule of law, as a precursor to democracy, could also serve to promote the effective separation of powers within existing governments, as well as submitting the region's militaries to civil, if not yet democratic, scrutiny. The rule of law also features in all chapters of the Barcelona Declaration, but is of key relevance in the economic and financial dimensions of cooperation, of most immediate concern to the southern partners to the EMP. George Joffe has written cogently of the need for predictability under the rule of law as a precondition for encouraging and sustaining foreign direct investment in the southern Mediterranean[25]. In this respect, there are clear incentives to be created based on financial and economic criteria, as well as linkages to be made across the chapters of Barcelona. The principles of predictability and accountability might be cited as minimum requirements for engagement at the EMP level, as well as forming a basis on which the provisions of the Charter are further elaborated. The corollary

is that to emphasise too many unrealizable objectives at once – above all, democracy – is to lose sight of the core of the whole partnership-building initiative; which is to create a firm basis on which to make progress in other spheres on a steady and incremental basis.

- (xi) Finally, no progress in human relations is ever possible without taking at least some risks. For the southern partners of the EMP, the risks involved in restructuring their economies to meet the challenge of the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone in the year 2010 are already apparent. The risks taken by European partners, as views from Morocco seem to confirm, are less apparent. This is not necessarily how they appear in Europe to those who predict dire outcomes if the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean fail, citing the combined effects of high demographic growth rates, widescale unemployment and massive migration northwards. Far better, then, to take the small risk now of a managed approach to migration and the building of confidence across societies, than face the potentially unmanageable consequences of only limited contacts between the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

NOTES

[1] See Jorg Monar 'Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy' in *Mediterranean Politics* Volume 3, No. 2, Autumn 1998. Monar describes how the limitations on national policy coordination outlined here are amplified by the 'dualistic nature' of EU external policy formulation, external economic policy being the responsibility of the Commission and Council of Miniters, foreign and security policy being conducted under the parallel (but functionally disconnected) inter-governmental strucures of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (pp. 42-43).

[2] Claire Spencer 'Building Confidence in the Mediterranean' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 2, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 23-48.

[3] Presidency Conclusions – Cologne European Council – 3 & 4 June 1999 (PRES/99/1500), para 88 (under http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/daily/06_99/pres_99_1500.htm)

[4] See NATO Press Communique NAC-S(99)65 24 April 1999 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept – Approved by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.' (under http://nato.org.int...)

[5] For the sake of comparison, see the detailed arrangements already in existence in the Barents, Black Sea and Baltics regions, which although (or perhaps because?) smaller than the Mediterranean 'groups' or partners assembled by NATO, the WEU and the EU, are considerably more advanced. See (Ed) Andrew Cottey *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building security, Prosperity and Solidarity for the Barents to the Black Sea* (London: MacMillan, 1999).

[6] See 'Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability', Annex*Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Stuttgart 15-16 April 1999), Chairman's Formal Conclusions.*

[7] At the risk of over-stressing the point the core imbalance might be summarized as the military and diplomatic prowess of the EMP's northern (EU-15) partners, organized across a number of inter-governmental frameworks (EU, NATO, WEU,

OSCE), facing the comparatively atomized, nation-state based and non-collective security thinking and practice of the EMP's southern partners.

[8] Richard Youngs 'The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: the Need for Prioritization' in *Mediterranean Politics* Volume 4, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp.17-18.

[9] Richard Youngs comments: 'Just about everything Barcelona is routinely criticized for not covering is being addressed to some degree. Current work includes cooperation on drugs, crime, education, transport, energy, the environment, investment, agriculture, governance, the transfer of technology, training, tourism, fisheries, statistics, space technology, EMU, economic transitions, health, population and cultural heritage.' Richard Youngs 'The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: the Need for Prioritization' in *Mediterranean Politics* Volume 4, No. 1, Spring 1999, p.17.

[10] Mark A. Heller 'WMD and EMP Policies of Arms Control and Limitation: An Israeli Perspective' *Second Draft, June 1997* EuroMeSCo paper (unpublished), p.1.

[11] See, inter alia, Claire Spencer 'Rethinking or reorienting Europe's Mediterranean security focus?' in (Eds Parks and Rees) *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe* (London: Longman's, 1998, pp. 135-154)

[12] Richard Youngs, among others, has been critical of the lack of linkage between the EMP's financial and economic dimensions and human rights, for example. Viz. art.cit. supra

[13] Claire Spencer 'The Mediterranean Region in European Security' *(working title)* (forthcoming in (Ed) C. Spencer, Centre for Defence Studies/Brassey's, London *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1999*).

[14] See 'Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability', Annex to *Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Stuttgart 15-16 April 1999), Chairman's Formal Conclusions.*

[15] Ibid

[16] 'European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence', Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne Council, 3 & 4 June 1999 (as note 3 above), article 1.

[17] Javier Solana Madariaga 'NATO's New Roles and Missions' (Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, London, March 1999)

[18] See European Council Declaration, Annex III, Doc cit, article 5.

[19] Jorg Monar, art. cit

[20] For an elaboration of these suggestions, see 'Conclusions' below.

[21] 'Guidelines....' (as above), Objectives, (a)

[22] This, at least, appears to be the implication under the 'Guidelines', which allow partners to engage in preventive diplomacy, crisis management measures and post-conflcit rehabilitation 'on a voluntary and consensual basis *in the framework of the Euro-med Partnership* (emaphasis added).

[23] Captain Stephen Jermy, RN, 'Mediterranean Security, the Maghreb and Europe – an opportunity for Co-operative Security measures?' (mimeo, autumn 1998)

[24] See FoEME-MFTZ Project, e-mail communication to MFTX Monitor List, (mftz@foeme.org), 27 July 1999; (web-site: www.foeme.org/mftz)

[25] E.G.H. Joffe (1997 EuroMeSCo paper, reference to follow)

ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING

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ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING

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> "Israel will strive, as first steps, to conduct a regional security dialogue and to implement confidence-building measures that will increase openness and build trust and cooperation thereby making a significant contribution to ease tensions, reduce the prospects of surprise attacks, diminish the levels of suspicion and prevent armed conflict. The trust that will be built, and the parallel progress in the bilateral peace process between Israel and its neighbours , will enable the beginning of negotiations on more ambitious arms control measures."

Israel's Approach to Regional Security, Arms Control, and Disarmament, Statement by H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel Before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, September 4 1997

For almost half a century, the foundations of military strategy and national security remained relatively constant in both global and regional terms. The Cold War divided the world in half, between the West and East, with smaller states receiving weapons, training, economic assistance, and other forms of backing from their respective superpower patron. The nuclear stalemate deterred global conflict, but conventional warfare at a regional level was quite frequent.

In the 1990s, the combination of a number of factors led to fundamental changes in regional stability and threat perceptions, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and for Israel. The Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab-Isareli peace process, and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons all led to basic shifts in the nature of security and stability.

As a result of these changes, in most cases, the ability of individual states to maintain their security by acting unilaterally has decreased, while the role of regional security structures is increasing. In Europe, a number of regional security frameworks have been created, including the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Western European Union, which has established its own multilateral military capabilities (EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR). In both Bosnia, and, more recently, Kosovo, NATO has become a source of peace-enforcement, acting "out of area" in a sustained manner. In addition, NATO has become the pre-eminent force for regional peace-keeping in the former Yugoslavia. Regional security structures are also being discussed for Asia (in the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum), South Asia (India and Pakistan), and Africa.

The central elements of regional security are based on shared interests in regional stability and cooperation, as well as an agreed framework and "rules of the game" for dealing with differences and conflicts without the threat of violence.[1] Specific instruments include confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce tensions and prevent conflict among the states in the region, cooperative monitoring, crisis management and de-escalation, cooperation against sources of instability (such as terrorism and rogue states), regional peace-keeping forces, and arms control agreements. Arms control treaties and suppliers regimes (agreements on export limitation among the major suppliers of weapons and technologies) have become central elements of international relations, covering nuclear weapons and tests, chemical and biological agents, the transfer of ballistic missiles and related technology, land mines, and, in some areas, conventional weapons.

In Europe, many of these elements have been implemented, while in other regions, the process is only beginning. In the Eastern Mediterranean

and Middle East, consideration of regional security structures coincided with the 1991 Gulf War and with the Arab-Israeli peace process that began following the 1991 Madrid Conference.[2] The Madrid meeting also created the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), which is one of five such multilateral working groups involving the participants in the Madrid process (the other groups dealt with economic cooperation, the environment, water, and refugees). The United States played a central role in the establishment and early meetings of the ACRS, and American representatives sought to emphasize the goal of replacing unilateral security structures with regional security in the Middle East.

In addition, the European multilateral organizations have initiated "Mediterranean security dialogues" with the objective of extending the concepts of regional security to this region. NATO, the OSCE, the WEU, and the European Union ("the Barcelona process") all have such programs with somewhat different emphases and participants.

As a result, the major states in the region, including Israel, recognize that these initiatives will have important implications for their national security and for regional stability. In response, they have developed policies with respect to regional security, confidence and security-building measures, and arms control. As will be discussed in this paper, the Israel perspective and policy are based on the consideration of the potential benefits of such measures, as well as the realistic limitations resulting from the political and military environment.

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[1] Michael N. Barnett, "Regional Security after the Gulf War", Political Science Quarterly, 111:4, (1996/7)

The Framework for Regional Security

The first phase in the development of a regional security system, whether in Europe or the Eastern Mediterranean, is agreement on a series of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and the implementation of these measures. CSBMs are defined as measures that allow for reduced tensions, greater cooperation, and increased stability, without creating substantial security risks for the countries involved.

In general, CSBMs include measures to prevent surprise attack, crisis communication and de-escalation, and general cooperation and exchange of information. The 1990 Vienna Agreement commits the members of the OSCE to the exchange of various forms of "military information" including the numbers of major weapons platforms (tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, etc.), and annual calendars of "notifiable military activity", including information on planned exercises. The regulations governing on-site inspections and the assistance provided to, and activity of the observers, are delineated in detail. The OSCE also operates a conflict prevention center in Vienna, which is responsible for "early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management", and a database and communications network.[3]

In addition to CSBMs and CBMs, arms limitations and control agreements can play a central role in regional security systems, particularly in areas that are characterized by a long history of intense conflict. The concept of arms control is based on the search for common interests and mutual benefits that can be achieved, despite continued disagreement in some

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[2] During the 1950s, the United States and Britain sought to develop the Baghdad Pact, modeled on NATO, as a regional military framework directed against the Soviet Union and local Communist and allied movements. This framework was short-lived and largely unsuccessful.

areas. The basic assumption behind arms control is that within the context of a conflict, such common interests exist, and that they can be codified in the form of agreements and treaties, or, in some cases, mutual tacit restraints. Arms control was central to the development of the post-Cold War European security system, beginning with the 1987 agreement on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces. In 1990, the Conventional Forces - Europe (CFE) Treaty placed specific limits on the conventional capabilities of the states in this region, and also established limits for deployments in specific areas and theaters. In both agreements, the verification mechanisms, including on-site inspections, the exchange of observers, and the possibility of overflights under the 1992 Open Skies Treaty are based on cooperation among the parties, are highly intrusive, and provide a high degree of assurance that the provisions are being honored on all sides.

Regional Security Efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

While it is often tempting to attempt to transfer the lessons of the CSCE to the Mediterranean, the structural differences are far greater than any similarities. In contrast to the dual or bipolar structure of the CSCE, based on the East-West divisions of the Cold War, the structure of the Mediterranean and Middle East is far more complex, in which different conflict zones are in linked interdependently. While North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria), the and the more northern region (Turkey and Syria), as well as the Gulf States (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.) are geographically distinct, the conflict zones overlap. Each

[3] OSCE Handbook, p. 12, *Annual Report 1996 On OSCE Activities*, Organization for Security and Co-Operation In Europe, The Secretary General, Vienna, 15 January 1997

zone has its own dynamics, and each is influenced by and influences the other zones. This creates a highly complex environment for efforts to develop confidence building and regional security in this region or regions.

The multiple asymmetries exacerbate the multipolarity and overlapping conflict zones. From Algeria to Iran, the states range from those with large territorial expanses to very small mini-states such as Israel and Kuwait, with no strategic depth. Other large asymmetries exist with respect to population size, economic capabilities, and political structures. These factors increase the complexity and obstacles to confidence building measures.

In addition, while post-Cold War Europe agreed on fundamental political principles, and all members of the CSCE accepted the centrality of the transition to democracy and the importance of human rights. No such consensus exists in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The fundamental changes that began under Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, with the development of *perestroika* and *glasnost,* and the opening to the West, have no parallel in this region.

In this region, over fifty years of intense ethno-national conflict, terrorism, and war have left a very high level of distrust. In contrast, while the Cold War was characterized by tensions and war threats between the major powers and two military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), direct combat was avoided. In this environment, the transition that began with the Helsinki process and the creation of the CSCE was relatively smooth.

There is also a very large gap in the perceptions that are characteristic of the states in the region. There is little communication or mutual understanding between the leaders and populations of opposing states.

Central events such as the 1967 Arab-Israel war are viewed from entirely different perspectives from Israel and from the Arab states, and the extent of this gap is not even understood.

In the Mediterranean and Middle East, the existing threat level is high and increasing. From the violence that characterizes the conflict in Algeria, to the threats of weapons of mass destruction under development or in the stockpiles of many other states, including Saddam Hussein's Iraq, present a constant threat of conflict. Terrorism is still endemic in the region, in many cases supported by state sponsors.

In this environment, the role of deterrence increases, and this provides the background for the Israeli emphasis on the combination of conventional deterrence and the ambiguous nuclear option. The security dilemma, in which the deterrence capabilities that are developed by states such as Israel, are perceived as the source of threats to other states in the region, created a complex challenge for the development of any regional security system, and illustrates the need for confidence building measures.

The Foundations of CBMs and regional security

The basis for a system of CBMs and CSBMs in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East can be traced to the limited deployment zones and verification measures that were created in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights following the 1973 war. In the Golan, the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement and limited deployment zones are monitored by the UN forces (UNTSO and UNDOF), which inspect the military forces in both the Israeli and Syrian limited force zones every 14 days, and reports on any violations of the agreements. In addition, under the terms of the agreement,

the UN has undertaken special inspections on short notice, during periods of tension, to insure that the terms are being honored and that additional forces beyond the agreed limits have not been introduced into these zones. In the Sinai, following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, a special Multilateral Force (MFO) was created and is staffed by personnel from many countries in order to monitor and verify the terms of the agreement regarding limited force deployments.

Although these agreements and the associated verification mechanisms constitute CSBMs, they did not lead to further development of regional security or additional CSBMs. The next step in this process took place after the 1991 Gulf War, when the Bush Administration prepared a Middle East Arms Control Initiative. This initiative included proposed regional limitations and mutual verification in the areas of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, missiles, and also for conventional arms stockpiles.[4] This proposal did not advance very far, and was incorporated in the multilateral working groups on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) that met following the Madrid Conference.

The participants in the ACRS meetings included the North African countries, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain, but, notably, not Syria, which refused to join the multilateral talks, nor the regional rogue states -- Iran, Iraq and Libya. (In addition, a number of extra-regional states participated, including the US and Russia, as co-sponsors, Japan, Canada, Australia, India, China, and a representative of the European Union.) Without the participation of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, the

ability of ACRS to develop a regional security framework was limited from the beginning.

Substantively, the ACRS concept was based on the European experience, including the OSCE and the CSBMs that were developed in this context. Thus, the first item on the agenda for ACRS was the negotiation and implementation of CSBMs. In May 1993, the ACRS working group agreed to a number of inter-sessional activities in this area, including workshops and demonstrations of the CSCE's system of military exchanges of information and prenotification of certain military activities; communications CBMs; incidents at sea, and search and rescue; and declaratory CBMs and long-term objectives. In addition, representatives of the states have participated in site-visits to NATO bases and observed exercises to learn about the measures adopted by the CSCE. In November 1993, the participants agreed to a regional communications system, linked to the CSCE network.[5]

However, in 1994, the ACRS negotiations slowed (or stopped) in the wake of Egyptian demands for immediate discussion of the Israeli nuclear capability and agreement on a timetable for negotiation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Some Arab officials have also called for Israel to include some statement or action regarding its ambiguous nuclear deterrent option in the context of a CBM.[6] However, from an Israeli

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[4] Fact Sheet on Middle East Arms Control Initiative, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, May 29 1991

[5] For detailed analyses of the activities of the ACRS working group, see Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Vol. I, Arms Control and Regional Security, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin, editors, Garland, New York, 1995; Gerald Steinberg, "Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East", Survival, Spring, 1994; Joel Peters, Building Bridges: The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Talks, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994; Peter Jones, "Arms Control in the Middle East", Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1997

[6] See for example, Abdallah Hammudah and Sawsan Abu Husayn, "Interview with Foreign Minister Amr Musa", *Al-Sharq Al-awsat* (London), 24 August 1995, p.7 in FBIS-NES-95-167 (29 August 1995), p.9; Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks:

perspective, the nuclear deterrent option is a vital factor in national security policy, and changes in this policy would have far reaching implications. As a result, such changes are outside the context of CBMs or other declaratory measures. This difference in perspective has been a basic obstacle to resuming discussions in the ACRS forum.

In addition, other frameworks for discussion of regional security have been created, including the Mediterranean Dialogue in the context of the OSCE, and the Euro-Med process of the European Union. The participants in both groups are limited geographically -- the OSCE dialogue includes Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Algeria, and the Euro-Med also includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, as well as non-EU members Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. Discussions in these frameworks focus on environmental and economic cooperation, and in these may contribute to the development of CBMs in these areas. However, they are unlikely to lead to breakthroughs regarding the development of regional security.

Arms Control Efforts in the Middle East

As noted, arms control agreements are also important pillars of regional security arrangements, and were central to the development of the post-Cold War European security system. In 1987, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, eliminating nuclear armed ballistic missiles from Europe, marked a major milestone in the development of this system.

In the Middle East, the first arms control efforts began in 1948, when the US imposed a unilateral ban on arms sales to Israel and Egypt, and the

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Progress, Problems, Prospects", Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, Policy Paper 26, 1996.

UN declared an embargo on weapons transfers to all of the combatants as part of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. These efforts were largely ineffective. After the armistice, the US, France, and Britain announced a coordinated effort to "regulate the flow of arms" to the region. This Tripartite Declaration was formalized in May 1950, and led to the establishment of the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee. However, the extensive regional interests of all three powers in the region, and the competition between them, undermined the effectiveness of the Declaration. In reality, the major effect of the Declaration was to prevent Israel from obtaining weapons during this period. Later efforts to regulate arms exports to the Middle East were also unsuccessful.[7]

Although various Middle Eastern conventional arms control measures were proposed during the 1960s, particularly after the 1967 war, they had little impact. During this period, the focus shifted to nuclear arms limitations, both globally and also in the Middle East. The Egyptian government began to focus on the Israeli nuclear policy, and introduced a number of initiatives that were designed to pressure Israel into accepting safeguards and limitations on the Dimona nuclear center, and to isolate Israel politically.

In the 1974 annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Egypt and Iran proposed the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This issue has been discussed continuously since then, not only in the UN, but also in the meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other frameworks. All the states in the region, including

[7] Yair Evron, "The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East," Adelphi Paper 138, IISS London, UK, 1977; Gerald M. Steinberg, "The Middle East", in Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Richard Dean Burns, editor, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993; Michael Oren "The Tripartite

Israel, have declared themselves in favor of an NWFZ, although the terms of reference vary. The Egyptians seek immediate agreement, and verification by the IAEA in the context of the NPT (essentially reducing the regional NWFZ to a branch of the NPT). Under the Egyptian proposal, Israel would be forced to accept safeguards on the Dimona complex (thereby ending the policy of nuclear ambiguity initiated by Ben Gurion). Israeli policy links discussion of a NWFZ to the prior establishment of regional peace agreements including all states in the region, agreement and implementation of arms limitations in other areas, including conventional weapons, and verification would be based on mutual inspection and independent of the IAEA and NPT structure.[8]

In 1988, following another Egyptian initiative, the United Nations General Assembly created a committee to examine the issue. The report was published in October 1990, and explicitly examines the terms required for "effective and verifiable measures" which would facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ. The committee discussed the problems of defining the states to be included, suggesting that all the members of the Arab League, as well as Iran, Israel and perhaps Pakistan be included. The report also discusses the need for a system of "verification and control", noting the weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards in guaranteeing compliance with the terms of the NWFZ. The UN report concluded that the negotiation of a NWFZ must be related to other

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System and Arms Control in the Middle East, in Arms Control in the Middle East, edited by Dore Gold (Boulder, Colo. Westview, and Tel Aviv University, JCSS Study No. 15, 1990)

[8] Avi Becker, "A Regional Non-Proliferation Treaty for the Middle East", Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy, Louis Rene Beres, editor, Lexington, Ma., Lexington Books, 1985

measures "to reduce the danger of hostilities and to strengthen Israeli confidence that a true and lasting peace was being built."[9]

As noted above, after the 1991 Gulf War, the US proposed extensive arms control measures for the Middle East. The 1991 Bush Initiative included a call for talks among the five major suppliers (the US, Russia, France, China, and the UK) of conventional arms on guidelines for limits on transfers of conventional arms and for a "general code of responsible arms transfers", and indeed, some meetings were held but no agreements were reached.

In addition, there have been some discussions on regional ballistic missile limitations, and the Bush Initiative called for "a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface-to-surface missiles by states in the region with a view to the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals." The potential for a regional ballistic missile limitation agreement was also considered briefly in the ACRS framework.

In the 1980s, following the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran and against the Kurds during the first Gulf War, and the revelations regarding the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons and missile programs, the Egyptian government introduced the concept of a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the "Mubarak Plan"). In all other respects, including verification and demands regarding immediate Israeli acceptance of the NPT, this proposal maintained the traditional Egyptian positions regarding verification and Israeli accession to the NPT.

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[9] Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East. Report of the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, A/45/435, 10 October 1990. See also Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 1992.

As noted, verification is a major factor in arms control negotiations in general, and in the Middle East, in particular. The Iraqi case demonstrated that in closed states with large areas in which to hide illegal facilities and materials, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, based on the NPT and the IAEA, is limited in its capability to detect and deter violations of safeguards and agreed limits. Furthermore, even the far more intrusive UNSCOM system of inspections was blocked by Iraq, while some members of the UN Security Council, notably Russia, and to a lesser degree, France, urged relaxation of the sanctions despite Iraqi blatant non-compliance. In response, it is clear that for the Middle East, in particular, a dedicated regional verification regime, consisting of all the states in the region, is necessary for effective verification and safeguards.

As a result of these factors, in combination, the discussions of arms control in the Middle East became political contests between Egypt and Israel, with little substantive activity. In many ways, this is similar to the political confrontations between the US and Soviet Union over arms control in the 1950s and 1960s. In the case of the Middle East, these confrontations take place in annual meetings of the United Nations First Committee and General Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency, ACRS, and specialized meetings such as the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference.[10] In addition to effort to isolate and pressure Israel politically, the Egyptian campaign was also designed to reduce the Israeli

[10] Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", NonProliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1996; see also Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, MIT Press, 1997

military capabilities to what Egypt viewed as "normal proportions", forcing Israel to relinquish its qualitative and technological superiority.[11]

The ACRS process reached an impasse in 1994, during a meeting in Doha, Qatar, in which the participants discussed a declaration of principles to serve a role similar to that of the 1975 Helsinki Final Statement. Disagreements between Israel and Egypt over the language of the section on nuclear weapons led to the suspension of the ACRS talks. Since then, Egypt has consistently refused to participate in CSBMs or discuss other issues.

Israeli Policies on Regional Security

The Israeli government has historically viewed regional security and arms control proposals with major misgivings and skepticism. Previous efforts, including the Tripartite Declaration of the 1950s and the NPT/IAEA regime for nuclear proliferation, were unsuccessful from the Israeli perspective.[12] At best, arms control was seen as an idealistic irrelevance to the Middle East, and, at worst, a means of depriving Israel of its deterrent capability or isolating it politically and diplomatically.[13] Israel was and is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (among an increasingly smaller group of non-signatories) and was not an active participant in global arms control negotiations. Despite the pressure from both the states in the region, led by Egypt, and from the rest of the world, successive Israeli governments have rejected the efforts for force an end to the nuclear option by adhering to the NPT, and this position is unlikely to change.

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[11]Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, *In the Eyes of the Arabs: Israel's Nuclear Image* (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1994)

[12]Michael B. Oren, "The Tripartite System and Arms Control in the Middle East: 1950-1956", in Arms Control in the Middle East, Dore Gold, editor, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990)

As the political and strategic role of arms limitation initiatives increased, Israeli national security interests were increasingly effected. The Bush Initiative and the beginning of the ACRS process forced Israel to abandon its traditionally passive role an develop specific policies in response. In addition, the expansion of the nuclear proliferation regime, including the nuclear suppliers' agreements, and the formation of other suppliers' groups increasingly effected Israeli security interests, its relations with the US (the primary supporter of these activities), and access to advanced weapons and technology. In 1987, the US led the formation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which created a suppliers' group in this area as well. The purpose was to limit the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Third World states, and Israel was pressed by the US to accept the terms of the MTCR. In addition, the growing awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons led to the formation of the Australia Group (a suppliers' regime in the area of chemical agents), and also the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As a result, the Israeli government developed a comprehensive policy for regional security and arms control, based on three objectives. First, CSBMs and arms control are seen as directly linked to the peace process.[14] Progress is closely coupled to the negotiations, and change in Israel's nuclear policy will come at the end, after all the states in the region explicitly accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state, and formal peace agreements are signed, and not through other forums unlinked to these changes. Second, limitations

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[13] Shalhevet Freier, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and Effective Verification", in Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations, Volume XVI, No. 3, 1993, pp.66-91.

must provide a tangible reduction in the military threat, conventional and unconventional, to Israel. Continued instability and crises in the region are incompatible with arms control. Third, limitation agreements must include realistic provisions for verification and solutions to the problem of "breakout" (the sudden unilateral abrogation of limitations, leading to a weapons capability within a very short period).

In early 1993, after intensive debate, Prime Minister Rabin and the cabinet adopted this policy, emphasizing confidence and security-building measures, as well as limits on chemical and biological weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons. The policy reaffirmed the decision that any change in Israel's nuclear status would come at in the last and distant stage of the process.[15] The Rabin Government agreed to sign the CWC, although ratification was contingent on the policies of the Arab states and other factors.

In January 1993, Foreign Minister Peres presented a comprehensive summary of this policy. He noted the priority of measures designed "to build and nurture mutual confidence between states, ... to diminish the levels of suspicion, hostility and conflagration", and discussed applications in the area of preventing surprise attacks and in crisis management. "No nation in the region will enjoy genuine security unless all nations feel secure. Accordingly, we have formulated our policy on regional security and arms control, once peace has been attained." Peres specifically endorsed "a mutually verifiable zone, free of surface-to-surface missiles and of chemical, biological, and

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[14] Ariel E. Levite, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East", in Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East: Proceedings of the Cairo conference (18-20 April 1993). New York : United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1994.

nuclear weapons. ... To reduce the conventional arms race and military buildup and prevent non-conventional proliferation, the suppliers and exporters should cease their counterproductive policies of indiscriminate arms sales." He explicitly noted that "Arms control negotiations and arrangements should be mutually agreed upon and include all the states of the region. Implementation and verification mechanisms, the establishment of comprehensive and durable peace, should be region-wide in their application. Priority in this process ought to be assigned to systems whose destabilizing potential and effects have been proven through their use in wars and have inflicted mass casualties." [16]

These principles have been repeated by many different officials. In 1995, David Ivri, who served as Director-General of the Ministry of Defense and headed the Israeli delegation to ACRS gave a major policy speech in which he reiterated the Israeli policy. Ivri noted that arms control and regional security arrangements are "an integral part of the effort to bring peace, stability and security to our entire region." Repeating the emphasis on the establishment of CSBMs as a first step, Ivri called for agreement on naval measures such as the prevention of accidents at sea and cooperation in search and rescue (SAR); on pre-notification of exercises and large scale troop movements, as well as clarification of unusual military activities. and dialogue between national security academies and general staff colleagues, and other educational military institutions. He also reiterated the Israeli position on a NWFZ, stating that "Israel will endeavor, upon the establishment

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[15] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993 (Jerusalem: Foreign Ministry)
[16] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993 (Jerusalem: Foreign Ministry)

of relations of peace, that the states of the region should jointly establish a mutually verifiable zone free of ground-to-ground missiles, of chemical weapons, of biological weapons, and of nuclear weapons."[17]

On October 3 1996, Foreign Minister David Levi restated the Israeli position before the United Nations: "After peaceful relations and reconciliation have been establishment among all states in the region, Israeli will endeavor to establish in the Middle East a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, based on mutual and effective verification. Negotiations to establish such a zone will commence following the signing of bilateral peace accords between Israel and all states in the region."[18]

In 1997, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Eytan Bentsur, addressed the Conference on Disarmament, providing a broad overview of Israeli policy on arms control issues, in which these positions were updated and the Israeli approach to regional security was explained in detail. Bentsur repeated the Israeli goal "that the day will come within a regional security framework encompassing all countries of the Middle East will be realized to provide a cooperative multilateral response to all the security problems of the Middle East."[19]

Crisis management and measures to prevent surprise attack remain the highest priority in the Israeli perception of the CSBM process. In his

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[17] David Ivry, The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty As A Model For Regional Security And Arms Control Arrangements In The Middle East, Annual Conference of the Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Amman, Jordan, September 10, 1995

[18] Speech delivered by Foreign Minister David Levi, United Nations General Assembly, October 3 1996 (text provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem)

[19] Israel's Approach to Regional Security, Arms Control, and Disarmament, Statement by H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel Before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, September 4 1997

formal statement of Israeli policy, Bentsur termed CSBMs as first steps, designed to "increase openness and build trust and cooperation thereby making a significant contribution to ease tensions, reduce the prospects of surprise attacks, diminish the levels of suspicion and prevent armed conflict. The trust that will be built, and the parallel progress in the bilateral peace process between Israel and its neighbours , will enable the beginning of negotiations on more ambitious arms control measures." [20]

Recent events have reinforced the emphasis placed on such measures, as well as demonstrating their importance. In 1996 and 1997, tension following the movement of a Syrian helicopter-borne brigade from Beirut to the area below the Israeli early warning station at the foot of Mt. Hermon in the Golan triggered a series of crises and alerts. On both sides of the border, Syrian and Israeli forces were reinforced. In addition, a member of the Israeli intelligence network claimed (falsely) to have evidence of a planned Syrian attack. At this stage, Syria requested an immediate inspection by the UN forces to insure that Israel was honoring the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement. After this inspection, the level of tension decreased and the crisis was resolved peacefully.

Another important aspect of the confidence building process is the mutual understanding of different security concerns and threat perceptions. In the ACRS process, discussions of such concerns and perceptions began, but did not make much progress. In this and other frameworks, Israel has noted the impact of the asymmetry of geography, demography, and force structures in the region, and the need to address these asymmetries as part

[20] Israel's Approach to Regional Security, Arms Control, and Disarmament, Statement by H.E. Mr.

of any regional security process. Geographically and demographically, Israel as well as other small states face distinct security requirements. Larger states such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran have both a large measure of strategic depth in which to absorb conventional attacks as well as large populations for continuing a conflict. These countries also have very large standing forces, while Israel relies on the mobilization of reserve forces in order to provide a defense against large scale conventional attack. In discussions with Syria regarding possible disengagement agreements linked to a peace treaty, Israel has suggested that Syria reduce its standing forces significantly (currently twice as large as the Israeli standing army) to lower the potential for surprise attack.

As noted above, limits on the Israeli nuclear capability are seen as part of the final stage in the peace process, and policy makers have rejected pressures to sign the NPT and acceptance of inspection of Dimona that are independent of an end to the threats to national survival and continued rejection of Israeli legitimacy on the part of some states in the region. They argue that if Israel gives up this deterrence option, the Arab states would turn to war again. (Indeed, some Israeli analysts and leaders argue that the nuclear potential was a major factor in convincing Sadat and other Arab leaders that they could not hope to eliminate Israeli militarily. [10]) Thus, although Israel has endorsed the concept of a NWFZ in principal, actual discussions and negotiations on this issue are the last stage of the process, as outlined in the government's policy statements.

Eytan Bentsur, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel Before the Conference on

The Obstacles to Regional Security in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

In Europe, the CSCE provides a very visible example of successful conflict amelioration and the development of institutions and frameworks for conflict resolution and prevention, based on careful balancing of diverse national interests. However, as noted above, the political conditions that allowed for the establishment of a useful regional security framework in Europe do not exist currently in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The sweeping agreements in Europe only became possible after fundamental political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's rise to power, his decision to make political and economic changes, and the policies of "glasnost" and "perestroika" began a process that led to the end of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. This, in turn, ended the confrontation with the US and the West, increased openness and individual freedom within the USSR, and, in the longer term, resulted in the demise of the Soviet empire. These were essential conditions for the success of the CSCE, and without the radical changes within the Soviet Union, these regional security agreements would not have been possible.

Politically, many states in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East are still in the pre-perestroika era, and the conditions for that were central to the CSCE process do not yet exist. Conflict still dominates over cooperation, and the concept of security based on shared interests in stability and peaceful transition, and "the language of assurance"[21], rather than on threats and

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Disarmament, Geneva, September 4 1997

[21] Michael N. Barnett, Regional Security after the Gulf War, Political Science Quarterly, 111:4, (1996/7), p. 597, 599

violence, is not widely accepted. The essential requirements for arms limitation and tension reductions measures have not been created. Some key states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran are refusing to participate in the ACRS process, and in some cases, and seeking to sabotage these activities. Among the Arab states and the Palestinians, the concept of a shared Arab identity is still powerful, and such an exclusive perspective is inconsistent with regional security frameworks.

Finally, many of the sources of instability in the region are the result of internal political, religious, social and economic conflicts. While such domestic turmoil has and could still lead to violence between states, these sources cannot generally be addressed by regional security structures.[22] Under these conditions, efforts to implement more ambitious regional security measures are premature.

The immediate objectives of the CBM process

In order to succeed, the CBM/CSBM process in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East must be based on an incremental process of creating institutions for communications, crisis management (including additional hot-lines between national capitals), measures to prevent surprise attack, and other CSBMs. The joint naval search and rescue exercises that took place in January 1998, involving forces from Turkey, the US and Israel, with Jordanian observers, provides an example of the type of CSBM that can be implemented. On this basis, additional states from the region can be expected to participate in the future, as the core of a regional structure

[22] Michael N. Barnett, Regional Security after the Gulf War, Political Science Quarterly, 111:4, (1996/7), p. 598

develops gradually, consistent with the broader political and security-based environment.

With official contacts limited, track two meetings involving academics, journalists, union leaders, and professional groups can play a central role in changing perceptions, and helping to remove misunderstandings. Functionalist cooperation in less sensitive areas, such as economic and environment projects, can create a basis for mutual tolerance, and even, eventually, perhaps shared perceptions and recognition of mutual interests. Such tolerance building measures are central for the process of conflict prevention and eventual resolution.

As noted above, the instabilities and mutual fears of surprise attack need immediate attention. The Golan crisis in the Fall of 1996 demonstrate the fragility of the situation and the need for measures to prevent surprise attack. The OSCE's measures regarding pre-notification and limitations of military exercises provide an important model for the Middle East, and should be given increased attention. Similarly, agreed measures for crisis management and the operation of a crisis management center similar to the OSCE's center would also mark a major contribution to preventing war and extending the long-term basis for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region. In addition, agreement on a code of conduct, as has been discussed under the auspices of the European Union's special Middle East representative would be an important measure towards increasing mutual acceptance and legitimacy.

The European experience provides a strong foundation for contributing to the development of these CBMs and CSBMs. However, if the focus of

efforts goes beyond these measures, to more complex measures, without the necessary preliminary agreements and cooperative experience, the results could be counterproductive. Thus, the European involvement must be considered carefully and cautiously.

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The "enduring rivalry" between Greece and Turkey: can 'demoratic peace' break it?

By

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Draft paper prepared for the panel on "**Greece – Turkey: Prospects for Cooperation or Confrontation?**" at the Halki International Seminar on "**The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea**" to be held from September 12 - 16, 1999 on the Dodecanese island of Halki.

Introduction:

The purpose of this paper is not to provide and evaluate the long list of inter-state disputes between Greece and Turkey. Instead, the paper will focus on how it might be possible to break out of this pattern of conflicts and break or undo a rivalry that has endured half a century of relentless efforts at conflict resolution. The first part of the paper will address the causes or rather the processes that make the rivalry so unrelenting. Why is it that Greece and Turkey can not cooperate? The second part of the paper, on the other hand, will explore the possibility of whether the notion of 'democratic peace' might be a possible path towards creating an environment conducive to cooperation. The paper will conclude that though techniques such as confidence building measures, inter-governmental dialogues, mediation etc... are very important they may not succeed in achieving more than conflict reduction or management. What is really required is a sort of paradigmatic shift allowing a conducive environment for the notion of 'democratic peace' to take root.

Greece and Turkey locked in a 'prisoner's dilemma':

'Prisoner's dilemma' is a game theoric model often used to demonstrate how individuals under certain circumstances fail to take a decision that would ensure the best pay-off for both sides because they simply fail to cooperate. A prevailing sense of mistrust or lack of

confidence in the other side leads both individuals to defect rather than cooperate. This occurs even though rational decision making would dictate them to cooperate and be much better off than when they fail to cooperate or defect from cooperation. The classic manifestation of 'prisoner's dilemma' occurs when two criminals are apprehended by the police and are interrogated in isolation from each other. During the interrogation each are given the option of receiving a lighter sentence if they made a confession that would result in the conviction of the other one to a full sentence. Whereas if both criminals remained silent, in other words cooperated with each other, the police would be denied any information that could lead to their conviction and hence both would go free, the best outcome for both. The dynamics of the game as such leads each criminal to confess, in other words to defect, as each on their own fear the other to be cooperating with the police. The fear of the other side leads both sides to opt for a course of action that generates an outcome well short of the best pay-off, that is both going free, that would be dictated by rational decision making.

'Prisoner's dilemma' is frequently used to explain the lack of cooperation between states as each state constantly suspects the other side will defect and leave the side who makes the first step in a worse off situation than if they too had chosen to defect.[1] The temptation to defect on the part of decision-makers becomes clearer if one adopts Putnam's two level game approach to diplomatic negotiations.[2] According to Putnam decision-makers operate with two sets of constituencies. One constituency is their counterparts and the other one is their domestic constituencies (e.g. parliament, public opinion, interest groups etc...). Hence decision-makers are engaged in two-sets of games and often feel the pressure to reconcile both. When this is combined with the 'prisoner's dilemma' a situation emerges where a decision-maker is forced to play a conservative game one that does not involve risks. The worst outcome for a decision-maker would be one where the decision-maker initiates a cooperative action that is not reciprocated or responds positively to the initial cooperative move by the other side to find that back at home powerful domestic constituencies are unwilling to support him. Hence, this complicates the situation for those decision-makers who may be willing to engage in a dialogue or a bargaining process. Furthermore, the

[1] For a definition of 'prisoner's dilemma' and discussion of its use in analysing international relations see J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pflatzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Harper and Row Publishers, N.Y., 1990).

[2] R. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games" *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-460.

decision-makers also find themselves concerned about the international ramifications of "being seen as giving in or compromising" particularly if there exists an environment where cooperative moves are thought to be seen as a weakness. This is seen as leaving the country vulnerable to demands from other countries.

In the case of Greece and Turkey long years of conflict has depleted the goodwill and trust that had once been nurtured by Venizelos and Ataturk in the 1930s and had endured until the late 1950s. Since then, in both countries developed powerful political, military as well as economic constituencies against dialogue and cooperation. Such constituencies also nurtured a whole world view or world map characterised by slogans such as "Turks have no other friends than Turks" and "Greeks do not have a brother nation". These slogans were also accompanied by elaborate conspiracy theories depicting a world ganging up on them. In the case of Turkey, Greece was depicted as a country longing to achieve the 'megali idea' and conquer Istanbul while in Greece Turkey came to be seen as wanting to revive the Ottoman Empire and bring back at least a good part of Greece under its control. (Until the recent Galatasaray-PAOS game, any basketball or football match between teams from both countries were ideal grounds to see posters carrying these slogans and hear them being exchanged with considerable vigour).[3] Powerful and influential 'mind-guards' also ensured that any attempt to question the validity of these slogans and conspiracy theories were punished at best by labelling their advocates as 'naïve' or at worst by calling them 'traitors'. This deep mistrust and finely nurtured suspicion of the other side created an environment were decision-makers had their hands tied even if they in person may have sought cooperation in an effort to address and hopefully solve conflicts between the two countries. On the other hand, where decision-makers, such as for example the efforts for dailogue of January 1988 led by Andreas Papandreu and Turgut Ozal known as the 'spirit of Davos', did break away from the established taboos, these efforts did not bear significant fruits. Similarly, until very recently efforts at introducing 'confidence building measures' did not yield major break throughs either. The example of Imea/Kardak crisis in 1996 demonstrated how a group of self-declared mind guards (on this occasion journalists) could simply destroy any progress that might have been achieved and then even bring the two countries to the brink of war.

[3] See reporting by Yorgo Kirbaki in the Turkish daily *Radikal* 3 September 1999.

How to break out of this 'prisoner's dilemma'?

The logic of 'prisoner's dilemma' suggests that after repeated 'games' the players will go through a learning process and recognise that the best pay-off, getting off the hook, can only be arrived at by cooperating, in this case by remaining silent under police interrogation, and not defecting. In other words the nature of the game associated with 'prisoner's dilemma' is such that in the long run rational thinking will prevail. Furthermore, in 'prisoner's dilemma' third parties can play an important role too by encouraging the two parties to better communicate and help them cooperate by changing their cost-benefit calculations. Hence, in the case of Greece and Turkey one would have expected that after almost half a century of conflict both sides would have discovered that cooperation promises better pay-offs for both sides. Furthermore, a long string of third parties such as the United States and the European Union have tried to mediate and nudge the parties towards cooperation. Neither process have worked in the case of Greece and Turkey. Why?

A number of interrelated reasons could be cited. Firstly and most importantly, 'prisoner's dilemma' assumes the nature of the conflict to be a 'non-zero sum' game. That is a conflict where both sides could win, that is 'get off the hook'. In the case of Greece and Turkey the socialization process of decision-makers and often the society at large is such that the conflicts between the two countries are seen as part of a 'zero-sum' game. If one side wins the other side inevitably looses. This has also been reinforced by the fact that as the nature of the 'game' between the two countries forced decision-makers to defect, they have justified the defection by blaming the other side for not giving in, in other words for not accepting to 'loose'. This has had the effect of reinforcing mutual mistrust and lack of confidence as well as seeking evil intensions in any positive move (in terms of breaking out of the 'prisoner's dilemma) that the other side might make. Such a process in turn has prevented a constructive 'communication' to develop. A kind of communication that could first help to transform the game from a 'zero-sum' game to a 'non-zero sum' one but also one that would help both sides appreciate that cooperation could benefit both sides. Simultaneously, this also has a tendency to strengthen the socialisation process that creates constituencies that depict the game as a 'zero-sum' game and police anyone who might attempt to defect from their ranks. The behaviour of the other side is always filtered through the lenses that this socialisation process creates.

The involvement of third parties to break the dead-lock has not worked either for similar reasons. Often such an involvement aiming to alter the pay-off matrix in a manner to encourage cooperation at best has not been credible or at worst has had the effect of aggravating the conflict. The United States has been an ally of both countries at least since the days of the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Both during the Cold War as well as after it American foreign policy makers have considered the conflicts between Greece and Turkey to be detrimental to U.S. interests. They have initiated many efforts to reconcile both parties but the most they seem to have achieved is to keep the two parties from becoming actually involved in a war. One major reason is that the two parties have not seen the U.S. as an 'honest broker'. Greece has often viewed the U.S. with suspicion and feared a U.S. bias for Turkey because of the strategic importance attributed by U.S. decision-makers to Turkey and its military capabilities. Likewise Turkish decision-makers have also suspected the U.S. for favouring the other side. They have viewed the U.S. executive as being controlled by the 'Greek lobby' in the American Congress.

The European Union too has attempted on numerous occasions to play the role of an 'honest broker' however so far has failed to achieve much. Primarily, because Turkish decision-makers and the public at large have viewed the EU to favour Greece. The fact that Greece is a member of the EU and is actually part of its decision-making process has reinforced this view. Many in Turkey have seen Greece using the EU against Turkey. Hence, the EU rather than having a positive role is seen as being a co-conspirator with Greece. This in turn has an effect of aggravating the situation as the pressure to close ranks against a perceived threat from a world in which 'Turks have no friends other than Turks' mount. Therefore both in the case of the U.S. as well as the EU third party intervention has not had the effect of altering pay-off calculations in a manner that gives cooperation a chance. On the contrary it could be argued that it has had the opposite effect of making the parties even more suspicious of each other and become even more entrenched in their positions.

Could 'democratic peace' break the dead-lock?

There is a growing body of literature arguing that democracies do not fight each other. The reasons are complex and multifaceted. Furthermore, it is difficult to say that there is a complete consensus in the academic literature as to whether and why 'democratic peace'

occurs.[4] Nevertheless, two important reasons can be cited which make war less likely while enhancing the chance of cooperation.[5] First, norms and practices that liberal democracies have developed as a part of their political culture when dealing with domestic conflict help them to manage and resolve conflicts among themselves without resorting to force. Second, structural and institutional factors play an important role in restraining democratic leaders from moving their countries towards war. These leaders have to mobilise broad support, including that of government bureaucracies, the legislature and many interest groups. This provides time as well as arguments to seek resolve conflicts through cooperation rather than force.

Greece's democracy since 1974 has come a very long way. Accession and eventual membership to the European Union have played a critical role in consolidating Greek democracy. Government in Greece is becoming fast transparent and increasingly accountable. Greek political culture is changing too as old 'taboos' are weakened if not challenged. A good example in point might be Yorgo Papandreu's remarks about Turkish speaking Muslims in western Thrace. Greek policy for a long time had been the denial that there were any Turks in western Thrace (somewhat reminiscent of the Turkish policy of calling Kurds 'mountain Turks'). Papandreu was highly criticised by conservative circles but the fact that he did not have to retract his remarks is an important test of how far Greek pluralism and democracy has evolved. The recent massive humanitarian response to the earthquake in Turkey may well be product of a Greece that has become so much more open, plural and transparent, a Greece where established opinions are more easily challenged and where civil society is much more capable of expressing and organising itself. Developments in Greek politics since the earthquake seems to point at an interesting dynamics where to be seen as helping Turkey seems to be making political bonus encouraging politicians to ride the wave of sympathy for Turkey.

In terms of progress of democracy, Turkey is less promising. Turkey has been trying to democratise since 1946 with three major interruptions caused by military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. There is no doubt that in terms of parliamentary democracy Turkey

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[4] For a critical review see S. Chan, "Mirror, mirror on the wall ... are freer countries more pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 28, pp. 617-648; W. J. Dixon, "Democracy and Management of International Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 42-68.

[5] B. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 45 and 39.

is well advanced. However, in terms of a pluralist democracy with a strong civil society and transparent governance Turkey still has room for improvement. In the last few years civil society has been expanding and making its voice increasingly heard. The earthquake has brought civil society to the forefront especially in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency in organising a response to the crisis. Furthermore, the government has been criticised for its sluggishness in responding to the crisis but also for having failed to prevent violations of building regulations that aggravated the crisis. This has led to ever growing calls for greater transparency and accountability from the government. The search and rescue assistance together with relief assistance that flowed into Turkey from the international community may have undermined the strong grip that conservatives have enjoyed over Turkey's relations with the external world. For decades they had advocated a world-view where Turkey is surrounded by evil enemies and the external world could not be trusted. The response to the earthquake has simply shattered the validity of this view and even forced many politicians to acknowledge this assistance as well as recognising the role and importance of the contribution made by civil society. Yet, clearly time will show whether these 'gains' will be consolidated particularly considering that within the government there were circles that did try to block international assistance as well as criticise civil society groups. Massive public calls for their resignation went simply unheeded.

It is at such a juncture that the issue of membership to the EU becomes critical in terms of assisting in Turkey a transition towards pluralist democracy. The Luxembourg summit decisions of December 1997 that did not include Turkey among the list of prospective candidates for membership came as a great disappointment to many. Furthermore, the fact that this was accompanied by arguments that made the EU look like a club of Christian countries aggravated the despair of many. Advocates of civil society and greater democracy felt let down and argued that the EU's decision only helped groups in Turkey that did not want to see Turkey neither become more democratic nor become part of Europe. Interestingly, the Turkish state elite (the military, bureaucracies such as the foreign ministry) as well as the leadership of mainstream secular political parties have always been supportive of membership to the EU. They have actually seen it as a natural outcome of Ataturk's westernisation project. However, a deep sense of insecurity in respect to the Kurdish problem as well as political Islam has made this elite shy greater political liberalisation. Yet, it is highly likely that a signal from the EU that could be interpreted as opening the way to an eventual membership would help to weaken the resistance from this

elite to greater pluralism and democracy in Turkey. The timing is particularly critical not only because of the positive political climate resulting from the earthquake but also because of the point that the Kurdish problem in Turkey has come. The apprehension of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, and his decision since his trial to end armed struggle opens a possibility to address the Kurdish problem. Here too how the membership issue is played out can be critical. Undoubtedly, a resolution of the Kurdish problem would remove one of the most important obstacles in the way of greater democracy and pluralism in Turkey.

Prospect of transition towards greater democracy is not the only reason why the EU ought to give a serious consideration to Turkey's membership. A Turkey that achieves its transition to greater democracy and pluralism would also be a Turkey that would be much more likely to solve the 'prisoner's dilemma' and help break the 'enduring rivalry' with Greece. However, the clear assumption here is that the recent outpour of goodwill from Greece will enable those circles in Greece who prefer to cooperate rather defect in the search for solutions to the many conflicts between the two countries to prevail. The 'magic' here seems to depend on ensuring that decision-makers willing to cooperate find domestic constituencies that will support their efforts but as a corollary also encounter a greater number of constituencies that demand from them cooperation rather than defection. This situation would also benefit the EU for four reasons. It would smoothen decision-making within the EU on issues concerning Turkey. Secondly, it would also relieve the pressure of constant likelihood of conflict and war on its south-eastern flank. A pressure that has a high political and economic cost attached to it. Thirdly, the reconciliation of Greece and Turkey can contribute as much to southeastern Europe security and prosperity as the French-German reconciliation has done to western Europe. Fourthly, by anchoring Turkey in a zone of 'democratic peace' the EU together with Greece would be in a much better position to encourage regional cooperation in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.

Conclusion:

The desire to solve the conflicts between Greece and Turkey has attracted many academic, civil society and diplomatic efforts. With the end of the Cold War, references have been made to mechanisms aiming to reduce tension and increase confidence between the two

countries and especially between their decision-makers.[6] However, the 1990s have probably been characterised as a period during which conflicts between the two countries have intensified rather than be resolved or let alone be reduced. The nature of the relations between the decision-makers of both countries has forced them into a game that can best be described as a modified version of the classic 'prisoner's dilemma'. The best way to come out of this dilemma may actually be to encourage the development and consolidation of an environment that is conducive to the notion of 'democratic peace'. This would bring about a paradigmatic shift in the manner in which decision-makers and the public actually see the relationship and relate to the conflicts between the two countries. It is in this context that the EU has a critical role to play in its capacity to consolidate democracy and pluralism. It has helped Greece come a long way in this respect. It could also have a similar impact on Turkey. Margarita Papandreu had recognized this at a seminar at Princeton university when she remarked that "Greek politicians are making a big mistake. If there is one country that should try to help Turkey join the European Union it is Greece".[7] The earthquake in Turkey followed by the one in Greece appears to have unleashed a surprising degree of mutual solidarity, generosity and goodwill between the two countries. Greek government officials and politicians have been actively riding the wave while in Turkey some politicians have been desperately trying to hang on to old habits and ways. Hence, consolidating democracy and pluralism in Turkey may well be the critical factor to support the forces of 'democratic peace'. The earthquakes for all the damage and pain they have inflicted may also have brought some good. They seem to have unleashed tremors that could bring the needed paradigmatic shift to resolve the conflicts between the two countries. Opening the way to eventual Turkish membership to the European Union might well be the key to sustaining this paradigmatic shift needed to achieve 'democratic peace' between the two countries.

[6] See for example the review and suggestions by T. A. Couloumbis "Greece in a post-Cold War environment" http://www.greekturkishforum.org/articles.htm.

[7] Quoted in commentary by S. Alpay in *Milliyet*, 24 February 1998.

Ilter Turkmen

14 September 1999

Turkey-Greece

Prospects for cooperation or confrontation

Since the creation of the independent state of Greece in 1830,most of the history of the relations between Turkey and Greece has been one of hostility,confrontation or tension.The underlying cause of this is very simple:The clash of national interests exacerbated and compounded by historical perceptions.

In particular,for Greece, until 1922 the main impulse of its national policy has been to continually extend its territory at the expense of Turkey.The gradual corrosion of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th and early 20th century has inevitably whetted the ambitions of Greece.

The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 has been a crucial landmark.It was designed to resolve on a permanent basis the territorial issues.Or at least such was the perception at that time.It also prompted another agreement,the agreement on the exchange of populations,which,although in most cases resulted in pain for the individuals concerned,was at that time considered the only effective way of eradicating forever the possibility of new confrontations.The leaders of the two countries proved to be right in opting for such a radical solution.The fate of the minorities which remained on both sides of the border as an exception to the agreement on the exchange of populations has sadly confirmed it.

The post -Lausanne era in Turkish-Greek relations was,for at least twenty years ,extremely cordial.Although the misgivings and prejudices of the past never disappear completely among nations,the two countries succeeded then in cooperating bilaterally and multilaterally in a very constructive manner.They shared the same concerns about the dangers to peace in Europe between the two World Wars and promoted initiatives for peace and stability in the Balkans.In 1936, at the Montreux Conference on

the regime of the Straits, the Greek delegation fully supported Turkish positions.

During the Second World War,Turkey faced a mortal danger when the Greek mainland and islands were occupied by Nazi Germany.The Turks felt great sympathy for the plight of Greeks and relief was sent regularly.Later,the civil war which broke out in Greece deeply worried Turkey since the destabilisation of Greece was considered a threat to the stability of Turkey itself.Perhaps I should also mention that Turkey never entertained the idea of opposing the cession of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece by Italy.

In the face of Soviet pressure exerted against both countries Turkey and Greece benefitted jointly from the Truman Doctrine. They joined together the Council of Europe and NATO.This friendship was shortly after rudely shaken by the eruption of the Cyprus problem,and from it sprang directly or indirectly,a series of other disputes which still remain unresolved.

When the Cyprus issue acquired the dimensions of a fundamental conflict,two avenues were open to Turkey and Greece:To partition the Island in conformity with the underlying philosophy of Lausanne,or to search a solution based on the coexistence and cooperation of the two communities ,which will require,to be lasting,an unflinching commitment by the two countries to uphold it.The second option was tried and miserably failed.

Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war in 1967 and in 1974.In 1967 a compromise formula was found in extremis under which the Greek forces were withdrawn from the Island.The 1974 crisis could not be resolved diplomatically and Turkey intervened militarily.This intervention altered fundamentally the de facto situation of the Island and changed profoundly the parameters of the problem,a development which Greece resented deeply and challenged ever since.

The problems which proliferated as the ramifications of the Cyprus dispute,in particular in the Agean, led as well to several crises.In 1987 a dangerous military confrontation was averted at the last minute.The most critical confrontation happened of course in the beginning of 1996 over the Kardak rocks.It demonstrated the extent to which peace between the two countries could be disrupted suddenly by accident,misunderstanding and miscalculation.

There were several attempts to prevent confrontations and agree on some confidence building measures.In 1976,the Security Council of the United Nations called on the two parties to initiate direct negotiations over

their differences.Turkey and Greece subsequently signed an agreement in Bern on November 1976,under which they decided to hold negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf.They also undertook to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the continental shelf.

In the second half of the 1980's President Özal engaged with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou a bilateral confidence -building process,the so called Davos process.Özal went so far as to make unilateral and unreciprocated gestures,such as the abolition of visas for Greek nationals.

There were several other initiatives in recent years:

In 1996,after the Kardak crisis,the Turkish Prime Minister made an opening,indicating that Turkey does not exclude third party solutions,based on mutual consent,for the overall settlement of all Agean issues.

On July 1997,following an iniative by the US Secretary of State,Turkey and Greece signed the Madrid Declaration,committing themselves to refrain from unilateral acts in the Agean.In the Turkish view this Declaration implies a commitment directly related to the preservation of the six -miles limit for territorial waters.

On February 1998,Turkey made new proposals to Greece,containing the following points:

-To formalize the Madrid Declaration of July 1997;

-To develop and implement mutually confidence building measures in the Agean in collaboration with the Secretary-General of NATO;

-To implement the Wisemen process,a process envisaging the formation of a group composed of Turkish and Greek personalities who will have the task of elaborating suggestions on possible solutions to the existing problems.

These proposals were not received favorably by the Greek Government.A similar approach was attempted in March 1998 and again failed.

Since 1982,the membership of Greece in the European Union gave a new parameter to Turkish-Greek disputes.Greece undertook to use her new position to put more pressure on Turkey.It blocked practically all financial assistance to Turkey,even the programs associated with the establishment of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkeyin 1995.In the European Parliament it promoted and sponsored several resolutions criticizing and condemning Turkey.

Cyprus which was in the back burner in the direct relations between Turkey and Greece after 1974 was rekindled after 1997,when Greece

decided to challenge Turkey no longer only politically,but also militarily.A military agreement was concluded with South Cyprus involving a joint strategy and joint bases on the Island.Greece also fully supported the purchase from Russia and the deployment of S-300 ground to air missiles.A new confrontation was averted by the decision of the Greek Government to place the missiles in Crete.

The most important irritant in recent years has been connected with PKK and its leader Öcalan.Several Greek parliamentarians were active in providing political support to the terror organization.The Turkish authorities also affirmed that PKK recruits were trained in camps in Greece and that even a considerable array of arms was delivered to the terrorists.When Öcalan,under strong pressure exerted by Turkey was expelled from Syria,Greece endeavored to find a safe haven for him and gave him temporary asylum in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi,where he was captured and brought to Turkey.This episode which had also serious reverberations in domestic Greek politics,provoked an angry reaction in Turkey and a new crisis erupted.

At a time when relations were going from bad to worse,the developments in the Balkans enabled the two countries to realize how much their interests in this part of the world are convergent.The two countries sponsored and joined several multilateral cooperation schemes such as the South East European Cooperation Process,the South East Europe Cooperative İnitiative,the South Eastern European Defense Ministers Group,the Black Sea Economic Cooperation,the Royaumont process,the Multilateral Balkan Peace Force and of course the Stability Pact after the fighting stopped in Kosovo.

The two countries,although espousing different approaches during the Kosovo crisis,never gave credence to the view that this issue could,if unresolved,lead to a Turkish-Greek conflict.

There has apparently also been in Greece recently,at least in some circles,an awareness that to exclude permanently Turkey from the EU could in the long become detrimental to Greece's own interests

In any case,even before the August 17 earthquake in Turkey prompted a spontaneous outburst of feelings of sympathy and solidarity between the two peoples,the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Greece had initiated a process of discussions on possible measures designed to increase mutual confidence and promote cooperation in various fields.They had agreed to take up the issues of Tourism,Environment,Culture,Organized Crime,Drug Trafficking,Illegal Migration,Terrorism,Trade and Cooperation in the Multilateral Regional

Field.It seems that meetings on all these issues between respective delegations are proceeding so far satisfactorily.

After reviewing the tempestuous and tortuous course of Turkish-Greek relations,it is time to ask ourselves:"Where do we go from here:to again confrontation or cooperation?"

It is tempting to think that the worst is over and that after so many crises during which the two countries risked seriously a catastrophic war between them, a new era is beginning.Psychology plays a large role in national perceptions.The earthquake in Turkey,followed three weeks later by the earthquake in the Athens area,has certainly created,on both sides of the Agean an abhorrence of any man -made disaster.The shared tragedy and the human warmth generated by the catastrophe has created a new atmosphere dispelling many stereotypes and prejudices.The media in both countries which had played not an insignificant role in inflaming passions during crises suddenly became the greatest proponent of friendship and reconciliation.Greeks and Turks have realized how mutually interdependent they are,that an environmental disaster in one country can affect both of them.Even if this atmoshere does not continue with the same intensity,it will certainly leave an enduring mark.Governments must endeavor to keep alive the momentum by bold actions .

Much will depend on what happens in Helsinki at the end of this year regarding the Turkish candidacy.If the candidacy for accession is finally accepted,I am sure this will provide Turkey with a new vision which would greatly facilitate the solution of existing problems and not only in the context of Turkish-Greek relations.After all, one of the great merits of the European Union has been to provide a framework in which a permanent historical reconciliation was possible between traditional enemies. Nobody should underestimate the profound effect that the opening of the perspective of full membership will have in Turkey.

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Halki International Seminar-Tuesday, 14 September 1999.

Greece-Turkey. Prospects for Cooperation or Confrontation ?
- a review of recent developments-

Summary of presentation by Ambassador (ret.) C. Zepos

Relations between Greece and Turkey entered a new promising phase for better understanding and rapprochement after the opening in July, well before the earthquakes hit the two countries, of "talks at high officials' level" on a number of topics. These included a fairly long list of areas where new ventures of cooperation, could lead to confidence building between the two countries on a wider scale. The list also included sensitive issues as illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism.

This new turn in greek-turkish relations is seen by an ever growing segment of the Greek public opinion as an opportunity to place major issues of contention, primarily the issues on the Aegean and on Cyprus, -with regard to which relations of Turkey with the E.U. occupy a central place- on a new perspective, with a view to their peaceful settlement. Progress on non controversial topics leading to hitherto ignored forms of cooperation and on "soft" security issues should broaden the fields of confidence and consolidate a common understanding, which would encourage the governments of two countries to address efficiently the major issues.

An assessment of this new turn in greek-turkish relations should be made in the light (one might argue, in the shadow) of the tensions created not long before by two very grave incidents, namely the attempted deployment in Cyprus of the S-300 missiles and the Ocalan affair. However, the Kossovo crisis and NATO military action against the F.R. of Yougoslavia acted as a catalyst to a new evaluation of security requirements to both Greece and Turkey.

The initial decision to meet legitimate defence requirements of the Republic of Cyprus by deploying S-300 missiles, made in Russia, was opposed in Greece and Cyprus itself by a gradually growing current of thought, which was arguing that such decision would entrap the Greek side to the logic of military escalation, as opposed to the genuine urge for the demilitarisation of Cyprus . In the same line it was further argued that the installation of these missiles might undermine progress leading to the accession of Cyprus to the E.U. and thereby to a peacefully sought, just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem. This current of thought prevailed eventually and the unnecessary tension, on that account at least, was diffused.

The Ocalan affair brought relations of the two countries to their lowest ebb. A series of grave misunderstandings and of mishandling of an extremely sensitive issue - which made the present Greek Government face its most serious internal crisis- lead to a misrepresentation of the will of the Greek people as, allegedly, it supported partition or division in Turkey. Suffice here to stress the deeper meaning of genuine feelings and acts of solidarity which that same people manifested towards the Turkish people after the earthquakes, a fact which in itself disproves effectively allegations propagated a few moths earlier in the course of the Ocalan affair.

If reason, better judgment and an inherent trend to good neighbourliness and solidarity in the face of distress prevailed and kept at peace the two countries, by instinct one might say, on the other hand the Kosovo crisis brought to the surface their inner concerns on such vital aspects of their respective policies as the safeguard of territorial integrity, sovereignty, protection of human and minority rights. Each country had different reasons to look, and in differing priorities, at the major issues which were at stake in the course of the Kosovo crisis. For different reasons each one of them remained loyal to the Alliance. But one could argue that a common denominator, in the form of new security requirements in the Balkans surfaced, which implied the necessity of a common new thinking and new approaches to present realities. These were dictated both by decisions taken in the military framework of NATO's new role in the area, as well as by the E.U.'s long awaited political and economic initiatives to redress the ravaged regions of the Balkan peninsula.

Such developments and their obvious magnitude affected relations between Greece and Turkey and matured in a form which awaited only the "good chemistry" in the personal relationship between the two Foreign Ministers to lead to proper initiatives. The gist of them lies in their common acceptance in the development of the on going "talks", in a process which reflects the spirit of dialogue and the building of confidence. It also points at the need to activate, beyond government contacts, the private sector, with a view to giving substance to commonly agreed ideas on ventures of mutual benefit.

In this prospect the role of non -governmental organisations cannot be sufficiently stressed. Responding to such requirements and as far as Greece is concerned, a "Hellenic International Development Cooperation Department" was established recently in the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aiming at coordinating and assisting NGOs in the performance of humanitarian assistance programs, but also in the economic and social development of third countries (outside the E.U.).

As the climate between the two countries improves one may express a concern whether it might erode, as the emotions and impression created in the wake of

the catastrophic earthquakes may retreat. The answer to such a risk lies in the ability of the two countries to mobilise in ever growing degrees the involvement of the peoples to this process, by the encouragement of NGOs to this effect. In the final analysis it calls to bolder steps to modernising existing institutonal frames within democratic systems, which may even require radical constitutional reforms.

Civil society may not and should not substitute itself to government responsibilities. But under certain conditions it can sustain a movement towards policy options and decisions which shall be more consistent with publicly professed principles on freedom, peace and justice. It should not therefore be excluded from broadening a debate even to issues of major political importance, which lie in the centre of the concerns of the people.

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER INTERCOLLEGE

Halki International Seminars

TEN YEARS OF FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION **1999**

SESSION 99.3B

The Emerging Security Environment in the Mediterranean

CYPRUS AS A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPE

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Halki - Greece
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CYPRUS AS A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPE

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout its history Cyprus has been under the influence or direct control of the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus' location, at the junction of three continents and at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean, has through the centuries made the island an attractive asset to powers wishing to dominate or have influence in this area. The last two in a long line of conquerors and rulers were the Ottomans and the British. From 1571 to 1878 Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire and thereafter and until 1960 it was a British Colony. Even when it became an independent state in 1960, Cyprus' sovereignty was limited with Britain, Greece and Turkey acting as guarantor powers. Indeed, Cyprus' curtailed independence together with cold-war mentality and politics explain events in Cyprus during the period 1960-1974 which culminated in the overthrow of President Makarios and the Turkish invasion and occupation of almost 40% of the island. In a sense the current abnormal situation can be seen as a struggle to clarify who controls Cyprus, with Turkey trying to maintain the strategic control of the island which it gained by its 1974 invasion.

The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union but the Cyprus problem is one of its legacies that has remained unresolved. Despite the fact that this conflict was treated as basically a bicommunal problem, the Cyprus issue has several other much more important dimensions. More specifically, the Cyprus issue is fundamentally, an international and a European problem. It is also one of the Greco-Turkish disputes and as such is naturally of great concern to the US and NATO.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that the process of Cyprus' accession to the European Union, although an independent issue in itself, has been *de facto* interrelated with the Cyprus problem and EU-Turkish relations. The EU is thus in a unique position to influence future developments in all these issues.

This paper suggests that the way the EU handles Cyprus' application for membership as well as the Cyprus problem will affect to a great extent not only the future of this island-state but also fundamental objectives of the EU itself. Furthermore, it will also have an impact on other critical issues such as security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and relations between the EU and Turkey and between Greece and Turkey. In addition, it is almost certain that it will also have an impact on the future path of Turkey.

In the next section a brief account of the background and the context of this discussion is provided. This is followed by an analysis of the reasons which make Cyprus a challenge and an opportunity for Europe and finally, in Section IV, some concluding remarks are put forward.

II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Naturally questions of security in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond are of great concern to the EU. It is also no surprise that several analysts point out that in the context of post-Cold War developments the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean is growing[12] as it is at the apex of two geostrategic triangles:

(a) in the north and northeast with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea[13] and

(b) in the south and southeast with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The Eastern Mediterranean is also a focal point for existing and emerging energy routes as well as a meeting point of east and west, of the economic north and south and of three major religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Given that the concept of security in the post-Cold War era is broadened to include economic and social parameters, the Eastern Mediterranean will be critical to European security and prosperity. That is why the potential accession of Cyprus to the EU as well as the resolution of the Cyprus problem should not be exclusively perceived as Cypriot concerns and objectives.

Several issues - although separate from each other - have come to be interrelated, and consequently efforts have been undertaken to address them concurrently. The Cyprus problem, the accession negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU, Greco-Turkish relations and relations between the EU and Turkey constitute four of these issues. Apart from entailing dimensions which could seriously upset peace, stability and security in the broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cyprus problem also poses a threat to the cohesion of NATO as both Greece and Turkey are members. Escalation of tension and the outbreak of violence in Cyprus would almost certainly lead to a Greco-Turkish war. Such a conflict would be especially damaging at a time when the alliance has only recently accepted three new members from CEE and is also in the process of redefining its role.[14] Moreover, the Kosovo crisis serves as a reminder of the fact that when simmering crises are not addressed promptly and effectively they lead more often than not to catastrophic results.

There is no doubt that the EU can have a critical impact over developments in Cyprus in the years to come. Cyprus' accession as well as the Cyprus problem are essentially European issues the outcome of which will inevitably affect the Union itself. In its relations with the EU, Turkey aims for, at minimum, a substantial upgrading of relations and, at maximum, accession itself. This range of objectives allows for flexibility and provides room for an activist policy on the part of the EU.

III. CYPRUS: A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPE

The Eastern Mediterranean has always been a critically important geostrategic region. In the aftermath of the Cold War the changing geopolitical map of the area between South-Eastern Europe and Central Asia has brought new security and economic challenges to the fore, focusing even greater attention on the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the EU for its own strategic, economic and political interests cannot afford to remain indifferent to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has, in one way or another, to be involved in the new evolving security patterns and geoeconomic and geopolitical arrangements. Far from being a headache, Cyprus' accession to the EU, could in various ways help the Union to advance its own interests.

Cyprus which lies at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean is carrying out accession negotiations with the EU and is expected to join the Union early in the next decade, even though some Union members would not like Cyprus to join before the Cyprus problem is resolved. Yet, this very problem constitutes a great challenge and a great opportunity for the EU. The Cyprus problem is inextricably linked with security issues in the Eastern Mediterranean and, by actively involving itself in its resolution, the EU will have made a great step towards forging a common foreign and security policy. It will also have established a credible presence as an actor on the world stage, and, through the accession of Cyprus, will have advanced itself as a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

One of the major arguments of those who support the view that there should be a resolution of the Cyprus problem before membership is that it may not be advisable for the EU to "import" a thorny problem such as the Cyprus question. Nevertheless, this view is rather short-sighted: whether Cyprus is a member of the EU or not, the Cyprus problem remains by definition a European problem. Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the

accession of Cyprus to the EU prior to a solution of the Cyprus question entails considerably fewer risks and problems for the EU than the reverse. The membership of Cyprus would imply, among other things, that a possible conflict in the island could be contained, but in the event of a crisis in Cyprus before membership, the threat to regional peace and stability would be much greater. The accession of Cyprus to the EU even in the absence of a solution to the Cyprus question would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus.

It should also be taken into consideration that it would be counterproductive if Cyprus is penalized for Turkey's policies in Cyprus. The EU went along with the US in undertaking military action in Yugoslavia to punish and reverse - as it was claimed - ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. If in the case of Cyprus the EU considers the unresolved political problem as an obstacle to accession, this would be equivalent to rewarding aggression and ethnic cleansing and simultaneously punishing the victim. This course of action in addition to posing moral dilemmas for the EU as it contradicts fundamental and cherished principles, also entails dimensions which may be contrary to the long-term interests of the Union itself. Among other things, the credibility of the Union as a political entity will suffer if it allows non-members to determine EU policy or effectively have veto power over EU decisions.

It should also be noted that although on several issues the interests of the EU and the US converge, they are not always identical. Certainly, in the case of Turkey and of the Eastern Mediterranean the interests of the EU and the US do not appear to be identical. The US would like to see Turkey as part of the EU as soon as possible. The EU itself does not reject the prospect of Turkish membership of the Union. But a fundamental difference between the EU and the US is the importance they attach on the criteria for membership, the *acquis communautaire*. Perhaps this difference originates in the different conceptions of the EU held by the Union and the US. The US basically views the EU as an economic entity

and as a reliable associate in the Euro-Atlantic partnership - a partnership with American leadership. The EU itself remains loyal to the Euro-Atlantic partnership, acknowledges the American leadership role up to now but would ideally prefer a partnership based on equality in the new century.

As far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, it should be recalled that during the Cold War the US influence in the area was dominant. Indeed, the 1974 Turkish operation in Cyprus could hot have taken place without American tacit approval to say the least. From an American perspective the subsequently established Turkish strategic control of Cyprus - a country that was non-aligned and "unreliable" in western eyes - was in line with perceived US interests.

In the post-Cold War era though, with the EU moving toward the assumption of a role which goes beyond an economic association and with the Eastern Mediterranean being critical for post-Cold War European security and prosperity, the stakes in Cyprus and the region assume a different perspective. Within this context an accommodation between the interests of the US and the EU will have to be found.

The EU wishes to see the economic, social and political modernization of Turkey. Such modernization, however, cannot occur if Turkey gets the message that it has a blank cheque from the Union. More specifically, if the EU tolerates the violation of human rights in Turkey and also punishes Cyprus for the Turkish aggression against the island, then the EU is contributing to further destabilization and turmoil in the area. On the other hand a firm European policy would advance stability in the area and induce changes in Turkey in the right direction. Such a policy could stress that close EU-Turkish relations depend on the willingness of Ankara to move toward closing the domestic democratic deficit and respecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of neighbours. These changes clearly imply that Turkey should give up its revisionist policy in the Aegean and likewise fundamentally alter

its policy on Cyprus.

The accession of Cyprus to the EU entails great advantages for the Union as it will extend its strategic control in the vital area of the Eastern Mediterranean. Certainly, it is in the interest of the EU to have direct control in the Eastern Mediterranean instead of relying on the goodwill of non-members. Furthermore, Cyprus' accession to the EU would not only symbolize but would also substantiate the Union's commitment to closer ties and cooperation with the broader Mediterranean region. In this regard the Union's enlargement in the Mediterranean will also have the effect of balancing to some degree the impact of the EU enlargement toward CEE.

In addition to issues of security, a Federal Republic of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, may well have a pivotal role to play in advancing economic, social and political cooperation in the 21st century in the Mediterranean and beyond. The Cypriot economy has a successful record of development and dynamic expansion and lessons from the Cypriot experience would be of value to the EU's Mediterranean policy.

While the EU has embarked on the implementation of an agenda calling for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the EU is most likely to seek in the near future closer cooperation with two other blocs: in the northeast with the Russian Federation and the independent Republics of the ex-Soviet Union and in the south and southeast with the Arab and broader Islamic world.[17] Such cooperation may be rendered necessary both for economic as well as for political reasons. In such a network of cooperation Cyprus would be a primary focal point not only geographically, but also economically, politically and socially. Because of its history, civilization, development and good relations with all countries in the region, Cyprus can be a very important and useful partner in the EU. Cyprus as a regional and subsequently an international economic, academic, and medical center could advance the objectives of the EU in the broader region.

Furthermore, at a time when the EU and the West in general are trying to promote democracy, the market economy and multiculturalism, Cyprus could be a model in the Mediterranean and beyond. In other words, because of its experiences and its political and economic system, Cyprus could indeed play a key role in promoting these objectives.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although the resolution of the Cyprus problem prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU is desirable, it should not be regarded as a precondition to Cyprus' accession because it would amount to giving Turkey veto power over EU enlargement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a policy would also be tantamount to rewarding Turkish aggression. Given that the Eastern Mediterranean is of great importance to the European post-Cold War security system, the accession of Cyprus to the EU would be a step in the right direction. Furthermore, a united Cyprus as a member of the EU will be an asset to the Union.

The potential role of the EU in resolving the Cyprus question and promoting security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean will have to be assessed within the context of the aftermath of the conflict over Kosovo and its wider repercussions. If the EU moves into forging and implementing a comprehensive foreign and security policy, it will definitely be in a position to play a significant role in Cyprus. If on the other hand the EU is restricted to a purely economic association, then its potential to intervene effectively in efforts to solve the Cyprus problem would be limited.

The broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean - with its natural connections and interrelationships with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea on the one hand and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf on the other - is quite volatile. A peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem would remove a serious source of potential conflict. On account of the on-going accession negotiations between Cyprus and the EU, Turkey's desire to be

considered as a candidate for membership and the fact that Greece, one of the countries involved in the Cyprus dispute, is already a member, the EU is placed in a unique position to influence developments over Cyprus in a way that would facilitate the resolution of the Cyprus problem thus promoting security and stability in the area.

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Libya's Inclusion in the Euro Mediterranean Partnership.
(Draft Copy) – NOT FOR QUOTATION

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With its 2,000 kms of coastline and its proximity to the shores of Southern Europe, Libya is of significant strategic importance in the Mediterranean region. Until recently however, Libya has been all but excluded from the various security initiatives in the region, and has been denied a place in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the NATO Mediterranean Initiative and the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue. This exclusion is due to Libya's status as a pariah nation and its alleged role in a series of terrorist attacks, including the bombing of the UTA and Pam Am 103 flights.

However, all this is about to change. Tripoli's decision to hand over the two Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Netherlands in April of this year has led to the suspension of the UN sanctions that were imposed in 1992, and has resulted in Libya's being granted observer status of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. On 15th and 16th April 1999 Tripoli's Minister to Italy, Mr Al-Abaidi attended the Stuttgart meeting of foreign ministers in this capacity. The Euro-Mediterranean partners have also stated that once the UN sanctions are lifted completely and providing Libya signs up to the acquis, Libya will be welcomed as a fully-fledged signatory of the initiative. In view of this change, this paper will attempt to assess just how much of a threat Libya actually poses to European security, what effect Libya's inclusion in the partnership will have, and whether its inclusion in the EMPI will be enough to alter the security environment in the Mediterranean.

Rogue State – Perception or Reality?

Libya has long been labelled by the west as a 'rogue' or 'pariah' state. Western, and most notably American, policy-making circles have identified the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, who has been espousing anti-imperialist, pro-Arab rhetoric since he took power in a bloodless coup in September 1969, as being a major threat to world peace and stability. In a press briefing of 2 December 1997, US State Dept spokesman, James Rubin said, "We have no illusions about the Libyan regime and the Libyan's regime's willingness to mask what it's doing in one area with cover stories. We have never been fooled by that in the past, and we will certainly do what we can to make sure that out efforts are devoted to knowing what goes on in Libya."[1] But just how much of an effort has actually been made to find out what is really going on in Libya? Admittedly it is difficult to obtain reliable information about this somewhat impenetrable country, but many in the west seem content to view Libya as a rogue state without asking too many questions. However, if one looks beyond the stereotype, how

[1] US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing 2 December 1997.
(http://www.fas.org/news/libya/971202)

much of this pariah image corresponds with reality? Is Qadhafi the threat to world peace and stability that some policy-makers and journalists would have us believe?

i) The Military Factor

To begin with Libya's military capabilities, Qadhafi has been branded a fanatical stockpiler of non-conventional weapons. In his essay, "Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective", Pascal Boniface cites Robert Waller, who commented "Few issues generate more apprehension in European policy circles than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in North Africa, where Libya is the leading proliferator."[2] On closer inspection however, it becomes apparent that Libya's military capability is in fact extremely limited. Libyan conventional forces are weak, mainly because of the constraints of a sparse population, but also because of the financial limitations brought about by the combination of sanctions and the decline in the world price of oil. Qadhafi seized power himself in a military coup in 1969 and his main concern as regards his conventional forces is to secure their loyalty to prevent his being ousted in the same way. These conventional limitations have made Qadhafi keen to secure Libya by building up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. The US has identified these WMD programmes to justify their antipathy towards the Libyan regime. However, as with Libya's conventional weapons programmes, its WMD projects are also undeveloped and severely hampered by a lack of resources.

Libya has had a long-standing goal of acquiring nuclear weapons, and is trying to develop its own nuclear programme. Reportedly there is a nuclear research centre at Tajura that contains a small nuclear reactor, but Libya is far from having the capacity to develop its own operational nuclear missile and the programme remains at the embryonic stage. Libya's biological weapons programme is in a similar state. According to Dr Joshua Sinai, a Senior Analyst with the National Security Studies and Strategies Group at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Libya has developed an unconfirmed number of toxins and other biological agents, but has not yet succeeded in placing these agents in any weapons.[3]

Qadhafi's chemical weapons programme is slightly more advanced and is considered to be the country's most successful WMD project. According to the US Department of Defense Libya produced significant amounts of blister and nerve agent during the 1980's.[4] Qadhafi also proved his willingness to use chemical agents when he allegedly employed them against Chadian troops in 1987. Libya's chemical weapons production is thought to be centred at two main plants, one in Rabta and the other in Tarhunah, although Libya maintains that the Rabta facility is a pharmaceutical plant. One should perhaps remember the recent mistake made by the US in bombing a suspected chemical weapons plant in the Sudan that turned out to be purely for pharmaceutical use. Although the chemical programme has been developed beyond the research stage, Dr

[2] Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective. Pascal Boniface
[3] Dr Joshua Sinai. Ghadaffi's Libya: the patient proliferator. Jane's Intelligence Review December 1998 p.27
[4] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.htm

Joshua Sinai argues that those chemical weapons Libya has been able to produce are of low quality and have poor fusing and lethality.

In terms of ballistic missiles, again Libya displays a very limited capability and there has been little development in recent years. Qadhafi only possesses ageing Scud B surface to surface missiles that have a range of a mere 300km. He has expressed his desire to develop a missile with a range of over 1,000 km and there are currently two known major ballistic missiles programmes trying to develop longer range weapons – the Al Fatah and the Al Fajer al Jadid. However they too remain at the early stages of development and rely on foreign expertise for their advancement. Therefore the range of targets that Qadhafi can actually hit remains extremely limited, and it is Libya's regional neighbours, rather than the West that are in the potential firing line.

There have been recent claims by the press that Libya's Great Man Made River Project is a front for non-conventional weapons build-up. This immense and impressive undertaking is designed to bring water from Libya's southern deserts through more than 3,200 km of pipes to the parched and densely populated coastal towns of the north. Qadhafi conceived of this project as a means of making Libya self-sufficient, through irrigating land in order for Libyans to be able to grow enough food to support themselves. Western newspaper reports have accused Qadhafi of using the network of pipes for military purposes i.e. storing weapons or covertly moving troops or equipment. However, Western officials and international contractors working on the project have dismissed these claims. The London based firm Brown & Root Overseas Ltd issued the following statement, "The pipeline system is not capable of catering for mass movements of vehicles, despite the large diameter of the pipes involved, as there is no provision for ventilation or exhaust fume extraction."[5] Added to this is the fact that much of the pipeline is full of water that is under considerable pressure that would require tremendous effort to pump out.

Although, like many things in Libya, it is difficult to determine the exact nature of Qadhafi's military capabilities, it seems apparent that Libya is not the threat it is made out to be. In the German newspaper 'Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung' Hans Leyendecker wrote on 18 September 1998, "The Libyans have completely failed with their arms programmes so far...in contrast to what some shrill warnings want to pretend. The chemical weapons factories in al-Rabta or Tarhunah fortunately do not work. The biological weapons program is a flop, and for almost 20 years Qadhafi's helpers have tried in vain to hit a target at a distance of a few hundred kilometres. The dictator reportedly paid 1 billion marks for the development of a missile. However, the experts quarrel about whether the Libyans have meanwhile managed to equip the missile at least with a modern turbopump." [6]

If one compares Qadhafi's military capacity with that of those states that accuse him of being a threat, then Libya is very much at a disadvantage. Next to the 288 nuclear warheads that Britain possessed in 1997, and the four nuclear missile-launching

[5] 'Libyan GMR Claims Ridiculed', The Middle East, February 1998.
http://www.africalynx.com/icpubs/me/feb 98/meca0202.htm
[6] Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 18 September 1998. Report by Hans Leyendecker "A Veteran of Arms Dealing" (http://wnc.fedworld.gov)

submarines that France possessed at that time, Libya's stunted nuclear programme seems somewhat insignificant. In 1986 the US and Britain displayed their military superiority when they bombed Tripoli killing around 100 civilians, including Qadhafi's daughter. This was a supposed retaliation for a bomb attack on the La Belle night-club in Berlin which killed US military personnel, although the attack was ordered by President Reagan just ten days after the Berlin bombing, and well before any implicating evidence had been proven. In retaliation for the attack on Tripoli Qadhafi launched two missiles at a US communications facility on the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa, off the coast of Sicily in the same year. In comparison to the US and British attack, Qadhafi's retaliatory gesture seems somewhat inconsequential, and had it actually hit its target, it would most likely have killed illegal North African migrants, on their way to Italy! With his country under attack from American and British bombs, is it any wonder that Qadhafi reportedly commented that had he had a missile that could have reached New York, he would have fired it?

The US and Britain have also deemed Libya a threat because of its support for international terrorism, and during his time in power Qadhafi has proffered support for a wide range of revolutionary movements, although it is worth noting that three of these organisations, the PLO, the ANC and the IRA, have now become more-or-less recognised as legitimate political entities. The US State Department maintains that Qadhafi continues to support radical Palestinian groups, and continues to harass expatriate Libyans abroad. However, Qadhafi has now renounced his support for international terrorism and has demonstrated his willingness to co-operate over a range of issues, including allegedly assisting the British government by supplying information on IRA suspects. In her essay 'Political and Economic Developments in Libya in the 1990's' Mary-Jane Deeb argues that since 1992 Libya has not been linked to any major terrorist incident [7], and indeed it seems that Qadhafi is currently more concerned to present himself as a peacemaker in Africa, attempting to mediate in a number of conflicts including the Sudan and Ethiopia. In view of this is it still possible to condemn the Libyan regime as being a state sponsor of terrorism? Also if one is to believe the allegations made by former MI5 employee, David Shayler, then Qadhafi has also been subject to assassination attempts by the British intelligence services. It is therefore understandable why Qadhafi sees himself as a victim of international terrorism perpetrated by the west.

ii) The Personal Factor

On a personal level, Qadhafi is frequently cited as a mad evil eccentric bent on the destruction of the entire Western world. This view of the Libyan leader has been expressed not only by the West, but also by some of pro-western Arab leaders. In April 1975, in an interview with the Kuwait daily, As-Siyassa, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt is quoted as saying, "Qadhafi is 100% sick and possessed by a devil which makes him imagine things." The British and US media have perpetuated this image of Qadhafi and adjectives such as 'mad-dog', 'crazy', 'possessed' and 'terrorist' colour articles about the Libyan ruler. Not only has Qadhafi been branded a figure of malevolence, he

[7] Mary-Jane Deeb, Political and Economic Developments in Libya in the 1990's. From North Africa in Transition. Ed Yahia Zoubir (University Press of Florida 1999)

has also become a figure of ridicule, partly for his unique political philosophies, his taste in exotic clothes and his all-female team of bodyguards. A BBC report of August 1998 calls him "The maverick Libyan leader with a taste for haute couture"[8], and Barbara Crossette of the New York Times describes him a "an unpredictable loner"[9] and a "quixotic colonel."[10] The phrase 'maverick Libyan leader' crops up with alarming regularity, and it seems that in the minds of some journalists it has become an indivisible phrase with which to describe Colonel Qadhafi.

This image of Qadhafi does of course have some basis in reality. Over the years the Libyan leader has displayed a tendency to indulge in eccentric behaviour and often appears to act on personal whim, such as the time he decided that all the buildings in a certain part of Tripoli should be painted revolutionary green, and over night they changed colour at his command. His rhetoric is often extreme, and his hatred for imperialism strong. He has said of the US "America treats Libya the way Hitler treated the Jews. America wants to occupy...the north of Africa. It wants to hand over Egypt and Syria to Israel, so that a Greater Israel is established." This is typical of the language he uses to describe those he perceives as his enemies. Qadhafi has worked hard to generate his own personal myth and uses grand gestures to compliment his rhetoric. For example, at the recent conference of the Organisation of African Unity Qadhafi refused to stay with the other guests at the Sheraton Hotel because he viewed it as a symbol of imperialism, preferring instead to set up a Beduoin style tent inside the grounds.

However, placed in historical and cultural context it is possible to trace a logic in some of Qadhafi's actions and behaviour that suggests he is less of an irrational leader than he is made out to be. Ever since he took power in 1969 Qadhafi has had to hold together a country that has no strong sense of national identity. He has had to create an effective system of governance and to sweep away any legacy of colonial or monarchical rule in order to justify his position as leader of the revolution. Libya itself is a colonial creation; what we now consider as Libya used to be three very separate provinces – Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, and these continue to be very distinct regions today. Tribal identity remains very strong in Libya and this partly explains Qadhafi's attempts to promote pan-arabism as a unifying factor.

Even after Libya formally gained independence in 1951 there was little opportunity for a strong Libyan identity to emerge as the country was ruled by a corrupt and ineffectual King, propped up by British neo-colonialism. This helps to explain why Qadhafi is so fiercely anti-imperialist, for he grew up at a time when the British and Americans were using Libya as a military base and were supporting a corrupt monarchy as a bulwark against radical Arab nationalism. Oil wealth was flooding into the country, but little of this was filtering through to the Libyan population, especially to the Beduoin tribes, from which Qadhafi came. Having witnessed his country be exploited by the Italians, the British and the US, Qadhafi's deep suspicion of imperialism is understandable, and his willingness to draw on the past and make full use of it in his rhetoric in order to maintain his power base is entirely logical.

[8] Profile: The Libyan Maverick. BBC 24 August 1998 http://news.bbc.co.uk
[9] New York Times. 11 April 1999
[10] New York Times 26 October 1997

iii) The Domestic Factor

Qadhafi's tirade against western imperialism is fierce, but should not be taken at face value. It is meant for a domestic audience that Qadhafi needs to keep on his side in order to stay in power. It is one of the tools that the Libyan leader uses to maintain the oppressive dictatorship he has imposed and led for the past thirty years. Qadhafi has cleverly crafted a political system that leaves power concentrated very firmly in his hands. He has dismissed western style democracy as fraudulent, claiming that it is unfair for any citizen to be represented by another person, and has set up an elaborate system of People's Councils and Congresses where every citizen is a member of a popular assembly. This allegedly preserves individual sovereignty and allows the population to participate at the local level, and was implemented in order to replace traditional hierarchical structures. Qadhafi calls himself 'Brother Leader' giving himself no other title of leadership. However, behind the façade of popular participation, Qadhafi remains most definitely in control. He has managed to maintain his tight grip on the Libyan people through the existence of a network of Revolutionary Committees that act as a sort of security force and control the population through terror and intimidation.

However Qadhafi's hold on power is not without its challenges, and he has encountered opposition that at its most extreme has surfaced in a series of assassination attempts. Although Qadhafi has tried to eliminate this opposition by cracking down hard on his citizens, it continues to emerge and to restrict his freedom of action in other spheres.

- **Opposition**

The main opposition to Qadhafi's leadership comes from the existence of rival tribes that are hostile to his rule. Most of these are located in the Cyrenaica region, where the most unrest has occurred in recent years, much of it in the main town of Benghazi. Libyan society is still very much run along tribal lines, and the fact that this structure is of a long and deep-rooted nature that precedes any notion of Libya as a nation state makes it the greatest threat to Qadhafi's rule. Qadhafi has tried to protect his position by surrounding himself by members of his own tribe, the Qadhafa, but this has only served to deepen tribal divisions and increase resentment. A measure of the level of threat that Qadhafi feels from these opposing tribes is evident in the implementation in March 1997 of the 'Charter of Honour'. This recommends collective punishment for a variety of crimes so that if one member of a tribe commits, or is suspected of committing an offence all other members of that tribe are liable for punishment.

Another source of opposition that is less of a threat, but still a cause for concern, comes from the Islamists. Qadhafi has tried hard to wipe out all traces of hostile Islamist elements in Libya, and citizens suspected of Islamist sympathies are routinely rounded up and subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. There are sporadic clashes between the Libyan security forces and Islamist groups such as the al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al Muqatila (the Islamic Fighting Group). Qadhafi has been especially worried by the potential for Islamists in Libya to link up with activists in neighbouring Algeria or

Egypt. Like the former King of Morocco, Hassan II, Qadhafi has tried to invest all religious authority in the state in order to lessen the potential for effective Islamist opposition. From time to time Qadhafi 'ups' the Islamist credentials of his regime in order to gain a firmer grip on his opposition. For example, on the 3 April 1993 Colonel Qadhafi called for stricter interpretation of the Sharia (Islamic law) including the introduction of amputation for theft and public flogging for adultery. Although these punishments have not actually been carried out, they serve to improve Qadhafi's standing as a Muslim leader.

Although the opposition in Libya is not yet organised enough to pose any serious challenge to Qadhafi's hold on power, it does restrict his options, and also helps to explain his apparent erratic behaviour. His implementation of radical new policies at short notice creates an unpredictability that serves to strengthen his domestic position by keeping Libya in a constant state of flux and chaos. This makes constructive opposition to his rule more difficult to organise and sustain. The gross human rights abuses that Amnesty International has highlighted in their country reports on Libya are typical of a leader who is concerned about his weak domestic position. This is highlighted by the fact that Amnesty International has reported that human rights in Libya improved during the late 1980's, but following the imposition of sanctions in 1992 that weakened Qadhafi's position, human rights abuses increased significantly.

- Economy

Qadhafi is also currently having to contend with the constraints of a weakened economy. This is partly due to the international sanctions that were imposed in 1992 for Libya's failure to co-operate over the UTA and Lockerbie bombings. The sanctions included a ban on international flights, and on the import of arms, military expertise and oil-related equipment for refineries and transport, and has also meant that Libyan assets abroad have been frozen. Reports of the cumulative cost to Libya of these sanctions range from $24,000 million to $26,000 million[11]. However, Libya's crude oil is of high quality due to its low sulphur content, and the embargo did not extend to the banning of exports of this and so the Libyan economy has not been crippled in the way the Iraqi one has. Libya exported its full OPEC quota of around 1.3 million barrels a day during the period of sanctions, and in this time investment in the oil and gas sectors did not cease, and in contrast to other North African nations Libya has negligible foreign debt.[12] Therefore, although the embargo has had a negative impact, it is not as large a one as may have been expected. However, overall the Libyan economy is in a bad state and this is due to a combination of factors of which sanctions are only a part. It has also suffered many years of mismanagement under a highly centralised socialist system. This has prevented the development of an effective private sector and the state continues to control around 70% of the economy. It has also resulted in the growth of a thriving black market.

However, what has really brought the Libyan economy to its knees has been the huge decline in world oil prices. Dirk Vandewelle has described Libya as a 'distributive

[11] Middle East Economic Digest 18 June 1999
[12] Middle East Economic Digest

state'[13] i.e. its economy is dependent on oil income and therefore its leader has a certain freedom of action because he is not reliant upon his people for income generation. Oil accounts for around 95% of Libya's export earnings and around 50% of government revenue. The immense oil wealth that Libya enjoyed enabled Qadhafi to transform Libyan society and to improve the standard of living of his population soon after coming to power. It allowed him to create a bountiful welfare state that provides free health care and education, and ensures access to water and electricity. Libya's literacy rates at around 60% are much higher than those in other parts of North Africa, such as Morocco where they are a poor 40%. However, Libya's reliance on a single commodity means that the nation's economic well-being and Qadhafi's ability to service the needs of his people are completely dependent on world oil prices. Therefore he has encountered many problems in recent years, and economic hardship has increased the unrest and hostility to his rule. As a result of the low prices for crude oil, growth in Libya's GDP has averaged less than 1% a year over the past three years. In 1998 Libya's oil earnings fell by 1.270 billion dinars or 35% from a budget forecast of 3.633 billion dinars.[14] This financial crisis has meant that Libya has had to tighten its belt. The unemployment rate is currently around 30% and, as in other North African states, this problem is compounded by a fast growing young population. The public sector is bloated with employees and salaries have long been frozen. This serves to increase unrest in the population and places further constraints upon Qadhafi's actions.

- Effects on policy

These domestic restrictions have affected Qadhafi's policy decisions in several ways. Firstly he has tried to eliminate opposition not only at home but also abroad. This has soured relations between Libya and other states. Indeed, it was the Yvonne Fletcher incident that resulted in Britain's breaking off diplomatic relations with Libya in 1984. This incident occurred when the young British policewoman was accidentally shot outside the Libyan People's Bureau when Libyan officials from inside the building fired at Libyan students demonstrating against the Qadhafi regime. The regime's persecution of its citizens outside of Libyan territory is one of the reasons given by the United States for their reluctance to deal with the Libyan leader. However, Qadhafi's attempts to wipe out his opposition both at home and abroad, although by no means condonable, reflect rather his domestic weakness and acute sense of vulnerability.

Secondly, Qadhafi has tried to cloak his weakness in political rhetoric. For example in September 1996 he suddenly expelled thousands of Palestinians from Libya. The justification for this action given by the Libyan authorities was that it was a protest against the Oslo peace accords in which Qadhafi thought the PLO had sold out on the Palestinian cause. However, as Mary Jane Deeb argues in her essay 'Political and Economic Developments in Libya in the 1990's'[15] the Palestinians were most likely expelled for economic rather than political reasons. It was in 1996 that Libya's balance of trade began showing a deficit of $1.7 billion and the economy could no longer

[13] Dirk Vandewalle. Libya Since Independence. Cornell University (1998)
[14] Reuters 11 December 1998
[15] Mary-Jane Deeb, Political and Economic Developments in Libya in the 1990's. From North Africa in Transition. Ed Yahia Zoubir (University Press of Florida 1999)

support such a large number of foreign workers. It was for this reason that Tripoli expelled the Palestinians along with thousands of Sudanese and Egyptian workers.

All the time Qadhafi is in a weak position at home and the west continues to persecute him, then he will have to find a way of justifying his isolation to his population. One way to do this is to portray Libya as a victim of imperialism and to whip up some excitement through tirades of revolutionary rhetoric. In order to secure the image of himself as leader of the revolution, Qadhafi has had to continue to be seen to be a warrior against imperialism, especially against Israel and the US. However, the bombast does not correspond with Qadhafi's actions. Libya has maintained stable trading relations with many of the nations he has publicly denounced, such as Britain, as Libya has to import food and other goods to survive. Qadhafi's political rhetoric is therefore meant for a domestic audience and is used to secure his own position. It reflects the fragility of his rule, and yet is used by the west as evidence of Qadhafi's rogue leader credentials. All the time the west fails to understand or respect what Qadhafi can feasibly carry out in terms of his domestic constraints, then he is unlikely to be able to co-operate with their demands.

A Useful Adversary?

It seems then that the notion of Libya as a maverick state with a crazed and irrational leader who is a threat to the developed world is somewhat of an exaggeration and that the Colonel's prime preoccupation is to secure his own position as head of the Libyan regime. In his essay 'Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective', Boniface claims that as far as Libya is concerned, "perceptions overshadow reality." So why has this image of Libya been promoted and perpetuated?

One reason is that in the post Cold War world now one threat has been removed it is inevitable that another will be found in its place, and so in western policy-making circles, the Soviet threat has been replaced by the threat of maverick states. In his Worldwide Threat Assessment Speech of February 1996, the Director of the CIA, John Deutch, commented that in the post Cold War era, "Free nations of the world are threatened by rogue nations – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, that have built up significant military forces and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction." [16] Foreign quarrels are always useful to create a diversion from domestic troubles. Indeed President Clinton proved this with his timely bombing of Sudan and the sudden high profile given to Usamah Bin Laden in 1998. Libya is a relatively soft target whose military capabilities mean that it will not be able to bite back with much vigour. It is also a state that is isolated enough not to cause major repercussions throughout the Arab world should it be targeted. In his essay 'The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act: Dealing with Libya as a Rogue State', John Valentine writes "the relative capabilities of Libya are negligible when compared to the United States...The various actors are motivated by the need to see the Libyan threat as a grave concern; in actuality the threat is very limited. Congress and the President are motivated by the constituents' (and the media's) heavy emphasis on terrorist threats...Backing down from such rhetorical commitments

[16] Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence, John M Deutch. 22 February 1996.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1996/dci_speech_022296.htm

not only reduces credibility abroad in the eyes of potential aggressors, but also undermines domestic political credibility by showing signs of weakness in dealing with demonised threats such as Iran and Libya."[17]

There is also the issue of money. At a time when Congress is keen to rein in defence spending, the US Defence Department has to find a reason to justify its continued existence. All the time the Departments of State and Defence can identify pariah states and rulers such as Qadhafi, then they can convince taxpayers of the necessity of maintaining a military machine capable of dealing with these potential threats. It is therefore expedient for some groups in the western security community to continue to promote the image of Libya as a pariah nation.

The United States and Europe

i) Political Divergence

This view of Libya as a rogue state has mostly been pushed by the US and by Britain, and was especially promoted at a time when both countries had right-wing governments – those of Reagan and Thatcher. However, following Qadhafi's willingness to co-operate over the UTA, Lockerbie and Yvonne Fletcher incidents, there seems to be a consensus among British and other European policy-makers and journalists that the Libyan leader is genuinely seeking reconciliation with the west. Qadhafi is slowly being welcomed back into the international arena. Whilst still cautious, Britain seems to be demonstrating a more conciliatory approach towards Qadhafi, and there is a definite warming of relations. Britain's willingness to compromise over the Lockerbie issue and to agree to Libya's demands that the trial take place in a neutral country allowed Qadhafi to co-operate with the west without appearing to capitulate in front of his population. This mood of co-operation also led the way to the resolving of the Yvonne Fletcher incident, which in turn led to the resumption of diplomatic ties between Britain and Libya which manifested itself in July 1999 in a joint statement of co-operation. British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, commented "It's always much better to have a basis for dialogue, for communication, the channel to talk to each other. On that basis I think the statement helps us to take forward relations with Libya, and is perhaps possibly helpful in making Libya a member of the international community, a country which can take part in its norms, and therefore makes that community perhaps a little less dangerous."[18] Britain seems to be using Libya as a test case for rehabilitating former rogue states, and in a BBC article Robin Cook also said "if you can bring former pariah states into dialogue that must help make the world a safer place." [19]

This new accommodating approach by Britain echoes the more realistic view that other European states such as Italy, Germany and Spain have long held towards Libya. These nations have maintained stable trading relations with the Qadhafi regime for many years

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[17] Valentine, J: The Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act: Dealing with Libya as a Rogue State. http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/libya.htm

[18] Bloomberg. 'UK's Robin Cook on New Diplomatic Ties with Libya' 7 July 1999

[19] Special Report, Lockerbie 10 years on. BBC News. http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid_389000/389183.as

and are keen to bring Libya back into the fold. In July 1998, despite the fact that the Lockerbie suspects had not yet been handed over, Italy and Libya signed a pact that would formally bring the two nations closer together and allow them to collaborate to reduce instability in the region. Ironically the Italians who are closest to Libya, who were actually targeted by Qadhafi, and who are just about within the range of his missiles, are keenest of all European nations to trade and build bridges with the Qadhafi regime. Italy has long wanted to have a normalised relationship with Tripoli and Qadhafi has officially 'forgiven' them their colonialist past. The day after the two Lockerbie suspects were handed over Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, visited Tripoli and also stated "The hand-over of the two men creates the conditions for Libya's full reintegration into the international community."[20] Other European nations such as Ireland, Germany and Spain have also shown a willingness to take advantage of the new opportunities being offered in Libya. Europe therefore is keen to normalise relations with Qadhafi on a political level, not least to facilitate economic transactions.

This however is in stark contrast to the United States that continues to ostracise the Libyan regime. The State Department has stated "Much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the community of nations...we have taken a different route, emphasising the need for Libya to take positive actions to end its support for terrorism and meet all the requirements of the UNSC resolutions before unilateral or multilateral sanctions can be lifted."[21] The Clinton administration has said it won't allow sanctions to be lifted entirely until Libya has co-operated with the Lockerbie court proceedings, paid compensation to the families if the suspects are convicted, and demonstrated its renunciation of terrorism. This last condition is extremely vague and just how it can be measured remains questionable, and also leaves the US with the option of not restoring full relations with Libya should the case be resolved in line with their demands. The families of the Lockerbie victims in the US have become a powerful lobby group in the US. The fact that the year 2000 is election year, also suggests that despite this being a good time to reassess policy towards Libya, no US candidate will be willing to take such a potentially unpopular step. In a BBC article, Former Assistant Secretary of State, John R Bolton said, "The unilateral American sanctions will remain in place, and if the Clinton administration so much as made a move in the direction of normalisation there would be a firestorm in Congress." [22]Also, Qadhafi has been so demonised in the US, and the need for Libya to be contained has been promoted so strongly, it seems unlikely that any administration would deal with Libya whilst Qadhafi is still in power. However, if Libya's profile is raised sufficiently within Europe and the rest of the international community, the US may ultimately be forced into showing a more flexible attitude towards Libya.

ii) Economic Divergence

This clash between Europe and the US exists on the economic as well as political level. The US introduced a complete trade embargo on Libya in 1986 and has decided to

[20] Alexander's Oil and Gas Connections, News and Trends. Volume 4, issue 9, 11 May 1999
[21] Statement by Ronald E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Asia, 22 July 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990722_neumann_libya.html
[22] Special Report, Lockerbie 10 years on. BBC News.
http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid_389000/389183.as

uphold the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 which forbids any company to invest more than US$ 40 million in either of these two 'pariah' nations. This act applies to non-US companies but has been flouted by a number of European nations including France and Italy, and is likely to continue to be ignored. This American attempt at extra-territorial legislation has created tension between the US and those nations whose companies have continued to invest large amounts in these countries. It has also upset the American business community that is fighting to return to Libya. Much of Libya's oil industry was built by US firms, such as Conoco and Marathon, and the potential for American companies could be enormous, as Libya needs US parts in order to regenerate many of its refineries. Some American companies have managed to circumvent the embargo and have continued to trade with Libya through subsidiaries and holding companies based abroad, mostly in Malta, but many are frustrated at loosing out to European competition.

Another source of tension that exists between the US and Europe on the economic level is the issue of the UN sanctions. Despite the essentially political nature of these restrictions, the fact that European companies have continued to trade with Libya throughout the embargo has not been viewed in a favourable light by the US. Despite some inconveniences, business has continued more-or-less undisrupted since 1992. Ronald Asprey of a British-Libyan business group said in a Reuters report, "Contrary to perceptions there has never been a break-off in trade, and we've been buying their oil." [23] Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya since the Yvonne Fletcher incident in 1984, the UK has remained Libya's third largest trading partner, with $239 million imported from Libya in 1998 against exports to Tripoli of $381[24]. Former colonial power Italy is Libya's largest trading partner with imports of $4,460 million in 1997, and exports of $1,010 million. The Italian company ENI who are the largest foreign investors in Libya are currently involved in major exploratory work of Libya's natural gas reserves, and the two nations have forged a strong economic bond. They have also decided to build a gas pipeline between Libya and Sicily that may also be linked with other North African states. Germany is Libya's second largest partner, and in 1998 imported $1,314 million worth of Libyan goods and exported $513.[25] German companies have also been accused of providing expertise to help Libyan WMD programmes. Europe then has continued to trade with Libya on a bilateral level whilst the US has tried to isolate Qadhafi both the economic and political levels.

The Security Environment

This divergence of views between the US and Europe creates the potential for a clash over policy in the Mediterranean. Whether the difference of opinion over Libya will be enough to have a serious impact on NATO / EU relations in the Mediterranean is still unclear. However, it does highlight the problems of interaction between the different institutions concerned with security in the region. US dominance of NATO means that the organisation is likely to continue to cite Libya as a major threat. In a speech of 10 February 1998, the Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, Winston Wiley, said "In 2010, NATO allies will face the prospect that a hostile state, terrorist group, fanatic

[23] Reuters 8 July 1999. 'UK firms race to Libya as relations open up'
[24] Middle East Economic Digest
[25] Middle East Economic Digest 23 April 1999

religious cult, or other extremist group will use or threaten to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against coalition forces or civilians." He then goes on to identify Libya as a potential challenge in this vein.[26] All the time the US remains hostile to the Libyan regime the presence of the NATO Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is likely to mean that Qadhafi will continue to feel the need to defend himself against the western security community. The US is unlikely to want to include Libya in any security arrangement, and despite Qadhafi's praising President Clinton as a "good man", it will be difficult for him to sell the idea of being involved in any NATO operation in North Africa to his population. Qadhafi has deep suspicions about NATO and in a television speech in 1997 he said, "They are building bridgeheads to land NATO troops in North Africa, and they call it partnership for peace. This partnership is a word which, as far as the revolutionaries are concerned, should be translated as bridgeheads to land NATO troops in the Arab world, from Palestine to the Maghreb." [27] In view of the US and British continued bombing of Iraq and the recent events in Kosovo, where NATO, outside of international law, arbitrarily intervened in a sovereign state for 'humanitarian' reasons, can only serve to make nations such as Libya feel vulnerable to a similar kind of attack. Also, the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR rapid deployment forces for humanitarian missions or peacekeeping duties in the Mediterranean region that were created in 1995 and answerable to the WEU, cannot have eased Qadhafi's concerns of a threat emanating from Europe. As he has been identified as a serious military threat in the region, who else were these forces designed to react to if not to him? If Qadhafi is feeling vulnerable it is more likely that he will use the income from the anticipated mini trade boom to try to build up his WMD programmes.

The current development of a common European defence and security initiative may lead to increased tension between the US and Europe over Libya. If Europe no longer cites Libya as a threat that needs to be contained it remains unclear how it will square this with the US position. As the initiative is expected to maintain a transparency and close linkage with NATO, it is unlikely to make any perceivable difference to Qadhafi in terms of military security in the Mediterranean.

Therefore the clash of views between the US and Europe limits the extent to which Libya's inclusion in the EMP can alter the security environment. Despite this however, there is scope for Europe to work to improve the security environment in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Libya on the political, economic and social levels and to help reduce the atmosphere of suspicion and misunderstanding.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative – Why Include Libya?

Despite this divergence of views between the US and Europe, Libya's inclusion in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a positive step for many reasons. Libya has the largest stretch of Mediterranean coastline, stands between Egypt and Algeria, and is where the Maghreb and the Mashrek meet. It is a vital actor in North African regional organisations, and plays a major role in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). In terms of collective security it is hard to envisage

[26] Transnational Threats to NATO in 2010. Winston Wiley. 1998 European Symposium, National Defence University. http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/speeches/428149198.htm
[27] Profile: The Libyan Maverick. BBC 24 August 1998 http://news.bbc.co.uk

how the EMPI can be truly effective if it fails actively to include Libya. It seems paradoxical that Libya can be identified as the only military threat in North Africa, and yet it is not a member of the very forum meant to contain it. Colonel Qadhafi himself said at a Tripoli meeting "there is no Mediterranean without Libya and no stability without Libya". He also commented "it would not be in the interests of the Mediterranean, or peace, North Africa or the Middle East to isolate Libya."[28]

All the time Libya remains excluded from the EMPI it will continue to feel isolated and victimised. This only serves to increase Qadhafi's sense of isolation and sense of vulnerability and therefore stimulates his desire to build up his defences, including his WMD programmes. This makes him more of a potential threat. Pascal Boniface has commented, "Singling out a possible adversary in advance helps to create it. Stirring up the spectre of this threat in the western world strengthens the conviction in the Arab and Muslim countries that no sustainable and equitable agreement is possible with the western world."[29] This could well apply to the situation in Libya.

One of the stated objectives of the Barcelona Declaration is to turn "the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity." Surely then it is better to engage Libya in dialogue in the hopes of lessening the mutual threat perception that currently exists. The European Parliament's rapporteur on the EMPI, Jannis Sakellariou is keen for Libya to be included and is quoted in Le Soir of 4 September 1998 as saying "Dialogue is desirable when problems arise. The philosophy behind the geostrategic Euro-Mediterranean partnership does not demand that partners be found who are innocent in every respect....compliance with UN resolutions is not a condition, otherwise Europe would have had to exclude from the partnership countries such as Turkey and Israel that have been flouting resolutions for years." [30] Libya's inclusion will further dialogue, help to limit the mutual misunderstandings that exist between Libya and Europe, and make Libya less of a menace to its neighbours.

The fact that the Libyan economy is about to open up is another area where there is potential for the EMP to make a positive contribution. Throughout the past decade Europe's relations with Libya have been carried out almost exclusively on the level of bilateral trading and its ability to engage on any other level has been very limited. However, the suspension of sanctions and the current state of the Libyan economy means that Europe is currently in a position to take advantage of this situation and try to encourage the implementation of some of the pledges of the Barcelona Declaration. Qadhafi is desperate for foreign investment and is keen to diversify the economy so as to make it less reliant on world oil prices. In July 1998 the Libyan Prime Minister called for Libya to pursue investment in agriculture, fisheries, tourism, mining and gas. Western diplomats have expressed hopes that Libya is moving towards a more market–orientated economy. Libya is trying to reinvent and repackage itself, and according the Financial Times it is currently trying to find a public relations company in order to promote itself as tourist destination.[31] However, a number of regulatory and fiscal issues

[28] The Times (Malta) 'Libya's safety valve' 27 May 1997
[29] Pascal Boniface. Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective
[30] Brussels Le Soir 4 September 1999, p.7. 'Will Europe Rehabilitate Libya?' http://wnc.fedworld.gov
[31] Financial Times 4-5 September 1999

are likely to continue to act as barriers to foreign capital[32] and Qadhafi needs to implement far reaching reforms in order to make Libya a more attractive prospect for investors. He maintains a suspicion of foreign investment in so far as he is concerned to prevent Libya's suffering a similar fate to that of the Asian tigers. This means that Libya is unlikely to be included in emerging market funds, whose investments have played a significant role in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.[33] According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Libya also maintains a poor investment risk rating of a 'D'.[34] However, Libya has been actively pursuing European investment, and at a conference in Tripoli in September 1999, Colonel Qadhafi welcomed foreign capital and reassured participants that there were adequate laws in Libya to protect investors. Libya has also begun a review of the 1995 Petroleum Law that is expected to improve transparency and introduce international bidding practices.[35] Outside investment is likely to dilute the state's tight grip on the economy and to dilute the power of the state. It could also help create a more regulatory environment. Therefore the incentives for Qadhafi to reform are currently in place, and Europe could take advantage of this to try to improve the human rights situation in Libya via economic development.

Effects on Regional Cohesion

Not only does Qadhafi stand to gain from Libya's inclusion in the EMP, and acceptance in the international community, there will also be benefits for the region as a whole, not least for Libya's neighbouring North African states. The Maghreb states have been keen for Libya to be included in the Euro-Mediterranean Process since its creation, but until now their wishes have been blocked by the European members who refused to admit Qadhafi. The new leaders in the Arab world, King Abdullah of Jordan, King Mohamed of Morocco and President Bouteflika of Algeria have all shown a willingness to develop good relations with Colonel Qadhafi. Including Libya in the EMP may pave the way for better political and economic cohesion among the North African states, and may even lay the foundations for more block to block relations with Europe.

All the time Libya remains excluded and is cited by western governments as a potential adversary, then it is under the potential threat of attack from the west. This leaves Libya's neighbours in a vulnerable position. Firstly if Libya were attacked, popular opinion in other North African states would necessitate that their leaders support their Arab neighbour. This kind of popular support was seen in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia during the Gulf War and in Morocco at the time of 1998 bombing of Iraq, when popular demonstrations unsettled the regimes in each of those states. Also if Libya's ability to retaliate is limited by its short-range missiles, it may conceivably choose to launch an attack against an ally of the west that falls within its firing range.

Europe is also likely to gain from Libya's inclusion. On the political level, as mentioned above, to include Libya is to make it less of a menace and to reduce the mutual suspicion. Normalised political relations will mean that Europe will be in a better

[32] Middle East Economic Digest 18 June 1999
[33] Financial Times 3 September 1999
[34] Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Risk Service. Libya, 2nd Quarter 1999
[35] Middle East Economic Digest 18 June 1999

position to take advantage of the economic possibilities that Libya offers, such as regeneration of the oil industry, the as yet fairly untapped gas reserves, and the huge planned development projects. There will also be rich pickings to be had in the fields of mobile telephone networks, aviation and the construction industry.

Libya's inclusion in the EMP may also open up the possibility for links to be made with Libyan civil society and this may create the impetus to improve the human rights situation there. This is likely to be a difficult task in such a restrictive society, and one that is especially likely to be sensitive to what it may perceive as western interference. If Qadhafi signs the EMP acquis it would be most unlikely that he would adhere to all the pledges, any more than the Algerian, Israeli and Tunisian leaderships have done. However to engage in some sort of dialogue on this level and to encourage active participation of Libyan civil society is a step in the right direction. It also puts in place a framework that may help to smooth the transition process once Qadhafi is no longer in power.

Conclusions

Colonel Qadhafi is not the threat to world peace and security that he is made out to be. His capabilities are extremely limited and he faces huge domestic constraints. His being cited as a pariah leader has done nothing to improve the security environment in the Mediterranean, and has not helped the Libyan population. The US can brand Libya a maverick nation because it is far enough away from it. Those nations who are Libya's closest neighbours, namely North Africa and Italy, are keen to maintain good relations with Qadhafi and to bind him into trading agreements. It appears therefore that the notion of rogue states only serves to benefit those who employ the term.

Isolating a state such as Libya creates an unfavourable and hostile environment. The US tactic of ostracising Qadhafi has failed to constructively improve relations between the two nations. The resolution of the UTA, Lockerbie and Yvonne Fletcher incidents however have proved that dialogue is preferable to isolation, and have demonstrated that co-operation on both sides can resolve specific problems. Britain and France's recent dealings with Libya show that the right pressure, applied effectively, that does not take away the dignity and domestic leverage of the leader in question can be successful. Many have hailed the UN sanctions as a triumph of policy. However, the situations were only resolved because the pressure was combined with a number of other factors that gave Qadhafi a certain amount of leverage. He gained substantial kudos from the support he received from Nelson Mandela and also from the many African nations who were prepared to break the sanctions. Also the fact that the west was prepared to compromise in accepting Libyan demands that the trial be held in a third country enabled Qadhafi to maintain his dignity in front of his domestic audience and to take something to the negotiating table.

Whether a regional dialogue such as the EMP can be wholly effective remains questionable. Any organisation that includes Israel and Turkey as well as Libya may prove a difficult forum in which to solve problems with Qadahfi. However, the EMP at least sets up a framework for inclusion, within which bilateral dialogue can take place. It also completes the EMP map and opens up possibilities of working with rather than

against Libya. Respecting Qadhafi's domestic constraints, not adhering to the stereotype image of him, and trying to include rather than isolate him are all likely to improve relations and regional cohesion.

Much of the ridicule attached to Qadhafi is born out of ignorance and a failure to understand both the historical and domestic constraints he is facing. Libya is more than just its leader and it is time for Europe to take this opportunity to make up for lost time and to make an attempt to understand this country. The more relations between Libya and the international community can be normalised, the smoother the transition to his successor is likely to be. It is surely time to put the stereotyped view of Libya behind us and to include Libya as a respected and useful Euro-Mediterranean partner.