WESTERN POLICIES AND THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA

American Council on Germany
Brookings Institution
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
French-American Foundation
Aspen Institute Berlin
Berlin, 4-6/VI/1999

a. Agenda
b. List of participants
1. "The consequences of Kosovo"/ John Steinbruner
2. "U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear security"/ Ken Luongo
3. "Denuclearization of the global security environment and Russia's nuclear policy"/ Yuri E. Fedorov

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WESTERN POLICIES AND THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA

American-European Conference

sponsored by the

American Council on Germany
Brookings Institution
Friedrich Ebert Foundation
French-American Foundation
and the Aspen Institute Berlin

with financial support from the **German Marshall Fund of the U.S.**
June 4-6, 1999 in Berlin

AGENDA

First Day Program: FRIDAY, JUNE 4, 1999

Delegates Arrive in the Morning

12:15	Pick-up at the Grand Hotel Esplanade for Transfer to Aspen Institute
13:00	**WELCOME** LUNCH and Opening Remarks Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher Director, Aspen Institute Berlin Dr. Robert Dahlberg Program Director, American Council on Germany Dr. Dieter Dettke Director, Washington Office, Friedrich Ebert Foundation
14:00	**RUSSIA IN THE WORLD: HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS** Chairperson: Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., George F. Kennan Professor, Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton Dr. Sergey Rogov, Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Moscow General Discussion
16:00	COFFEE BREAK

16:30 **RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, CHANCES FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, KOSOVO CRISIS**
Chairperson: Dr. Dieter Dettke; Director, Washington Office, Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center for Political and International Studies, Moscow
William Charles Maynes, President, The Eurasia Foundation
Ms. Odile Remik Adim, Undersecretary for Eastern European and Russian Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris
General Discussion

18:45 ADJOURN

19:00 Depart Aspen Institute for Bus Tour of Berlin by „Partner For Berlin"
Dinner at Restauration 1900, Prenzlauer Berg

22:30 Return to Hotel by Bus

Second Day Program, SATURDAY, JUNE 5, 1999

07:45 Light Breakfast in the Hotel

08:30 Bus Departs for Aspen Institute

09:00 **THE CRISIS IN RUSSIAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS**
Chairperson: Mr. Hans-Martin Böhmer, Country Coordinator, Russia Program, The World Bank
Dr. Alexander Bulatov, Head of World Economy Department, Moscow State University of International Relations
Dr. Ivan Szegvari, Senior Economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London
Dr. Peter Bofinger, University of Würzburg, Dean, Department of Economics
General Discussion

11:00 COFFEE BREAK

11:30 **RUSSIAN FINANCIAL AND BANKING CONDITIONS**
Chairperson: Dr. Robert Dahlberg, Program Director, American Council on Germany

	Mr. Andrei Kozlov, CEO, Russian Standard Bank Mr. Aleksandre Zurabov, Chairman of the Board, Russian Standard Bank Dr. Andrew Spindler, Financial Services Volunteer Corps, New York Group Discussion
13:00	BREAK
13:15	WORKING LUNCH: **THE FUTURE OF WESTERN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA** Dr. Wolfgang Roth, Vice President, European Investment Bank, Brussels Comment: Dr. Wilfried Thalwitz, Former Vice-President, World Bank, Washington
14:00	BREAK
14:30	**DILEMMAS OF RUSSIAN SECURITY AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY A DECADE AFTER THE COLD WAR** Chairperson: Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher Dr. Bruce Blair, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Dr. Yuri Fedorov, Institute for USA and Canada Studies General Discussion
16:00	COFFEE BREAK
16:30	**RUSSIA AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY** Chairperson: Dr. Bruce Blair Dr. Robert Nurick, RAND Corporation Dr. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, University of Milan General Discussion
18.15	ADJOURN
18.30	Bus Departs to Hotel Cecilienhof in Potsdam
19:30	DINNER AND DISCUSSION **THE PARALYSIS OF RUSSIAN POLITICS** Ms. Celestine Bohlen, Moscow Correspondent, *The New York Times* Comment: M. Dominique Dhombres, former Moscow Correspondent, *Le Monde*
22:00	Bus Returns to Grand Hotel Esplanade

Third Day Program, SUNDAY, JUNE 6, 1999

07:45	Light Breakfast in the Hotel
08:30	Bus Departs for Aspen Institute
09:00	**DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLICIES TOWARD RUSSIA** Chairperson: Mr. Michael Iovenko, President, French-American Foundation Panelists: Dr. Hannes Adomeit, Foundation for Science and Policy, Ebenhausen Dr. David P. Calleo, Director of European Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University Dr. Ettore Greco, Instituto Affari Internationali, Deputy Director, Central and Eastern Europe Dr. Robert Legvold, East Central Europe Institute, Columbia University Dr. Angela Stent, Department of Government, Georgetown University
11:00	COFFEE BREAK
11:30	**EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC DILEMMAS:** Chairpersons: Dr. Robert Legvold and Dr. Wolfram Schrettl, Director of International Economics, German Institute for Economic Research
	Group Discussion
	Conclusion: **Perspectives, Outcomes, and Policy Implications**
1:00	LUNCHEON
	Departure of Participants

(b)

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p. 1

THE CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO

Although the humanitarian catastrophe that has occurred in Kosovo is unfortunately not a unique event, it promises to be an unusually consequential one with major reverberations far beyond the immediate locus of misery. The violent displacement of the civilian population, it is prudent to assume, has put the viability of coherent government in question, not only in Kosovo itself but in Albania and Macedonia as well. Political stability and economic prosperity throughout the Balkan region will be enduringly affected by the manner in which those questions are or are not resolved. Moreover, NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has crystallized a sense of threat in Russia that is likely to affect the massive internal transformation occurring there. and Russia's acute sensitivity is reflected in quieter form throughout the world. The engagement of the most capable alliance with a small dissident state is necessarily a matter that commands general attention. Precedents will be set in the course of this experience. Broad implications will be drawn. The fundamental conditions of international security will be reshaped as the outcome unfolds.

With the conflict still in progress and no resolution yet in sight, it is of course difficult to discern what the extended outcome will be five years or a decade hence. A judicious combination of humility and courage is undoubtedly the prime qualification for attempting such a judgment. For those who dare to try, however, there are plausible grounds both for hope and for fear. An eventually constructive result is still conceivable but only with a substantial redesign of policy requiring the most difficult of political accomplishments -- the recognition and correction of some major misconceptions that have contributed to the tragedy. Alternatively, however, a cascading disaster is also conceivable and in fact is likely to occur if the ever powerful impulse for belligerent self-justification overcomes the practical interest in refined accommodation. It is customary in these situations to assume that results will fall somewhere in the murky middle, as does frequently happen. But in attempting to understand what has already occurred and to shape the eventual outcome, it is important to explore the coherent edges of the problem before attempting to contend with its bewildering and demoralizing ambiguities.

IMAGINING A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME

Whatever else a constructive outcome to the Kosovo crisis might involve, it would certainly have to reestablish and thereafter preserve the most fundamental standards of law so that citizens of the region are not systematically subjected to murder, robbery, rape, and violent expulsion from their homes. Those minimum essential features of human civilization have clearly broken down in Kosovo and appear to be endangered in the surrounding area. Their restoration is the most vital interest and the principal responsibility both for those directly

involved and for the international community as a whole. In designing a plausibly desirable result everything else would be subordinated to that objective, including all the questions of who is to rule by what form of government over what territorial jurisdiction.

In broad outline that basic purpose has been prominently articulated and widely accepted. On May 6, 1999 the G - 8 foreign ministers called for "the immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo," and urged that "effective international civil and security presences endorsed and adopted by the United Nations" establish an interim administration that would guarantee "the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons" as well as "unimpeded access" for humanitarian aid organizations. That statement implies a venturesome revision of traditional sovereign prerogatives, but it was welcomed in most of the world's constituencies. People everywhere abhor the brutalization that has occurred in Kosovo and register at appreciable distance the threat implied to their own well being. If that program is actually to be implemented, however, rather than merely proclaimed, then some important features of the situation will have to be understood better than they currently are.

It is not plausible to assume, for example, that the breakdown in Kosovo is so exclusively the work of Slobodan Milosevic that his removal alone would restore legal order or that some political bargain or inner conversion could make him a reliable agent of restoration. Convenient as it is to have a central demon to blame and guilty of criminal brutality as Milosevic may be, the dynamic of violence that has engulfed the region has almost certainly been generated by much more extensive causes. It is very doubtful at this point that Milosevic or any other Serbian political figure would be able to establish the consensual legitimacy in Kosovo necessary to assure the rule of law. He could have prevented the social disaster that has occurred had he pursued policies of political accommodation rather than divisive repression extending back over a decade. The international community might have induced such policies had it made a dedicated effort to do so throughout the Balkan region. But these are now forfeited possibilities. The amount of violence that has been inflicted and the massive grievances that have accumulated have generated an endemic pattern of conflict defined in ethnic terms that is almost certainly beyond the capacity of any of the affected communities to control with the means at their disposal.

Nor has there been from the outset any reasonable prospect that air bombardment could protect the population of Kosovo. The process of intimidation and expulsion to which they have been subjected is conducted by small units whose most relevant actions cannot be detected by remote observation and at any rate are too intricately interspersed with their victims to be controlled by that means. Even at the highest standards of feasible performance, air power cannot be directly applied to the fine scale of violence involved, and the commitment to use it therefore requires some indirect theory of effect having to do with general attrition of the military establishment and broader forms of social damage rationalized as coercive pressure on the political leadership. Indirect efforts of that sort have never been rapidly decisive and have always produced substantial social damage of their own. There has yet to be an uncontested instance in

any commensurate circumstance in which an indirect air campaign achieved its intended purpose rapidly and decisively enough to justify the extraneous violence inflicted. A constructive outcome in Kosovo requires that the indirect NATO air campaign be categorically terminated and never again used as an alleged instrument of civilian protection. .

Nor can the standard methods of diplomacy or political mediation be expected at this point to be the primary method for reestablishing fundamental legal standards. Negotiations will have to be pursued, of course, and the ultimate disposition of Kosovo will have to be determined by consensual agreement of its constituent communities. But the terms that would enable workable consensus to be achieved are not currently visible and cannot carry the main burden of reestablishing civil order. There is no political formula currently available that would harmonize the positions of the conflicting parties well enough to end the conflict and provide the basis for consensual government. The international community has not yet developed the conception of fundamental legal standards to the point that it would be assertively prepared to override the incompatible claims of sovereign prerogative and national self-determination. There is no local political leader or international mediator conceptually equipped to devise an agreed solution quickly enough and with sufficient authority to provide reliable protection for the now gravely endangered Kosovo population.

By default therefore it seems evident that if fundamental standards of law are to be reliably restored in Kosovo any time soon then the "presence" alluded to in the G-8 statement will have to be an appropriately armed international force mandated to establish comprehensive physical control of the Kosovo, to cease operations of all Serbian and Albanian armed units, to oversee the return of the population to their homes, and to guarantee that police and other basic civil functions are equitably performed. That presence would have to be introduced whether or not the current the Yugoslav government or the Albanian community representatives agreed to it, and it could not be subjected to their operational control. It would have to be specifically authorized and monitored as an action of the UN Security Council under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, with full authority and sufficient capacity to perform the mission decisively and to protect itself in doing so. NATO's full operational capabilities would be necessary to meet that standard but would have to be embedded in an arrangement with broader participation. Given its actions in the crisis to date, it is evident that NATO would not alone be trusted with the assignment. In effect the international community as a whole will have to administer Kosovo effectively and equitably for a sustained period of time if a constructive outcome is to be achieved.

But even that would not be sufficient. A constructive outcome would assuredly require more than simply a halt to social devastation and a restoration of minimum legal standards. Those essential conditions would have to be accompanied by a process of physical reconstruction and economic rehabilitation designed to accomplish a great deal more than simply restoring the conditions that prevailed as of last November. The genesis of the conflict, it must be presumed, has something to do with the endemic austerity and economic isolation of the region, and mastery of it will clearly require substantial improvement in those chronic

conditions. Indeed an outcome that is truly constructive in the sense that more good than harm is eventually done depends primarily on overcoming the historical separation of the Balkan region from the rest of Europe. Such an effort would have to be organized and financed on an international basis. The communities emerging from the Kosovo crisis will not themselves have adequate resources for reconstruction on that scale. They will require debt relief and new credit, but even more they will need much greater market access than has ever been granted to the Balkan region.

One can take some hope in the fact that the theme of economic reconstruction appears in the G - 8 statement. A "comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region" was one of the seven general principles advanced in the statement. But obviously it remains to be seen whether that theme will be developed to the unprecedented extent that a truly constructive outcome would require.

UNDERSTANDING THE DEEPER DANGERS

On the pessimistic side of the spectrum, the most common speculation about how the disaster in Kosovo might be compounded centers, naturally enough, on the immediate region. It is all too readily imaginable that a massively aggrieved Albanian diaspora might introduce into the Balkans some variation of the extended pattern of conflict associated with the displacement of Palestinians in the Middle East. It is also conceivable that the two situations might reinforce each other, might be mutually reinforced as well by the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey and Iraq, and might in combination infect the entire area with an endemic level of violence that would virtually preclude stable democratic government in most of the affected states. That in turn might so inflame the many interstate tensions within the region that the entire situation becomes a constant source of communal violence with periodic outbreaks of active warfare -- a political equivalent of the AIDS epidemic. None of the security policies currently in effect or currently being contemplated could be expected to cope with that situation.

But unsettling as that possibility certainly is, it is not the exclusive danger and probably not even the predominant one. The potential effects on Russia are yet more ominous simply because the situation in Russia is itself more ominous even though it is less immediately visible or at any rate less explicitly recognized. That is not because a general Balkan conflagration is likely to spread directly to Russia or because Russia could be expected to be aggressively involved in it. Both of those things could occur, but they would probably be marginal complications of the Balkan problem. The much greater danger is that the Kosovo crisis might so thoroughly entrench a siege mentality within the entire Russian political system and so decisively preempt policies of constructive engagement that the internal crisis within Russia itself reaches explosive proportions.

The path to comprehension of that problem begins with appreciation of some very stark economic facts. The aggregate Russian economy is extremely small for a society of 150 million people. Annual GDP is on the order of $165 billion at current exchange rates, and it has declined

by roughly half over the history of the Russian Federation. That process of decline is driven by deeply ingrained structural defects that have not even been measured let alone addressed by any reform program yet developed within Russia or anywhere else. The limited segment of the economy that produces products of economic value under international market conditions -- largely oil, gas and other resource commodities -- is being utilized to sustain a larger component of the manufacturing sector whose products are less valuable in economic terms than the resources they consume. That practice, which has been systematically preserved through a pattern of barter trade, protects nominal employment and the many basic community services traditionally provided by manufacturing enterprises and is politically compelling for that reason. It does not generate productive investment, however, and it retards rather than facilities the adjustment to market discipline necessary to support such investment. The longer it is sustained the more ruinous it will be in economic terms. At some point presumably a natural limit would be reached where the minimum requirements of economic subsistence could not be met and the fundamental elements of social coherence would come into question. There is no guarantee and in fact no reason to believe that such a limit would automatically produce a process of productive regeneration without conscious design.

The Russian government embedded in this situation quite simply does not have the financial resources to perform any of its basic functions, and no amount of political will or procedural reform could alone provide them. Its nominal budget for the current year is 500 billion rubles -- the equivalent of $20 billion at current exchange rates. Cash tax receipts are currently running at an annual rate somewhere between $8 and 12 billion. Debt service requirements alone are $17 billion for the year. There is no prospect that those debt requirements or any other major obligation can be met. As a result of that evident fact Russia is effectively severed from access to any new international credit.

The consequences for the military establishment are extreme. It does not have adequate financial resources to perform any of its traditional security missions and is being subjected to an inexorable process of internal decay that brings its basic ability to preserve internal coherence into question. The limited forms of international collaboration in which it participates do not provide any material assistance in performing its core missions or any reliable assurance that those missions would not have to be performed. It stands in implicit confrontation with an expanding NATO, and most of its embryonic mechanisms of cooperation with the alliance have been suspended in reaction to the air campaign against Serbia. That campaign is being read as evidence of a stark threat to Russia itself, and it is quite unrealistic to imagine that any amount of diplomatic visitation or rhetorical reassurance could overturn that impression. In Russia's reading of the historical record, NATO has reneged on political promises not to expand eastward after German unification and not to initiate offensive operations outside of its treaty area. That perceived record of betrayal will effectively eliminate for quite some time the ability of NATO to provide credible reassurance to Russia.

It is reasonably predictable that Russia will attempt to enhance its military investment in

response to the Kosovo crisis. That will almost certainly be seen as a security imperative and probably presented as strategy of industrial development as well. It may well put the entire process of formal arms control into indefinite suspension. In suitably modest form that reaction might well have a helpful settling effect within Russia by preventing more extremist reactions, but it involves two major longer term dangers. Russia is even less able than was the Soviet Union to support active military confrontation with the rest of the world. A sustained effort to do so could readily preempt the very extensive form of economic engagement that clearly will be necessary to extract the country form its deep and enduring economic crisis. And yet more ominously a military investment program operating under severe financial restriction can be expected to put heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to cover not only core deterrent functions but also the major missions normally assigned to conventional forces. That in turn would further entrench the inherently unsafe operational practice of depending on rapid reaction to attack warning in order to compensate for physical vulnerability of the deterrent force. Those developments would make the pattern of military deployment in Europe a great deal less benign than has been commonly assumed over the past decade -- not because of any impulse for aggression but rather for the far more serious reason that the extreme desperation of one side is not comprehended by the other.

EXTRACTING THE LESSONS

As best anyone can yet judge, the ultimate consequences of the Kosovo crisis are still to be determined and will depend upon actions yet to be taken. The meaning of the event will be much more apparent in retrospect and emotionally easier to absorb than it is at the moment. One cannot postpone the effort to extract major lessons, however, since that will necessarily be a guiding feature of the efforts that must be made to devise a tolerably safe and reasonably constructive result. And the most fundamental of the lessons, it is immediately important to recognize. have to do with the scope of responsibility and the determination of interest.

A disaster of the magnitude that has occurred in Kosovo inevitably evokes the ever powerful human instinct to assign blame and to indulge in recrimination. Fearing that instinct, all those who might be said to be responsible are currently very eager to deflect preponderant blame and to promote an interpretation of the event that enables them to do so. To the extent that the violence in Kosovo can be attributed to the individual criminals who clearly have been at work there and to historical animosities indigenous to the local cultures, the burden can be lifted from everyone else who has been involved. The deeper truth, however, is that there is plenty of blame to be shared. Massive crimes have occurred because there has been a systematic failure of prevention just as epidemics of infectious disease occur when there is a breakdown in public hygiene. Containing the catastrophe in Kosovo is closely related to determining what would have avoided it.

Even without the full power of retrospect, there is ample evidence available to address that question. The egregious brutalization of the Kosovo population has had many recent

precursors within the region and throughout the world. The artillery assaults on Dubrovnik and Vukovar in 1991, the systematic expulsions conducted by all the ethnic communities in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 and the mass execution of Muslim men by Serb militia in Srebrenica in 1995 set direct precedents with some of the same people involved. The genocidal slaughter of the Tutsi population in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated the danger on a yet greater scale. The members of NATO and of the international community generally tolerated these actions, were implicated in them and ratified the results despite the fact that in every case, it is now recognized, there was sufficient immediate warning of the incipient violence to have been able to prevent it. The level of effort and degree of risk entailed would not have been greater than that incurred in reacting belatedly to the consequences. Moreover all of these episodes emerged after a lengthy process of internal social deterioration that could have been substantially mitigated had the resources eventually devoted to reaction been provided in anticipation. The strong international interest in preventing massive communal violence eventually surfaced in reaction to these events but not until it was too late to act effectively.

If we are to avoid an indefinitely continuing repeat of that misjudgment, it is vitally important that this interest be more assertively formulated and more effectively defended. In a spontaneously globalizing economy with intensifying interactions across cultures and an inexorable diffusion of technology, common standards of law are of truly critical significance. They are the only plausible means of preserving fundamental order in a world that assuredly will not have any other form of comprehensive government any time soon. By their very nature the common standards able to provide this organizing effect would have to be equitably applied across all differences of culture, history, ethnicity, national sentiment or any other human distinction, and they would have to be defended everywhere if they are to be upheld anywhere. There is scope for reasonable argument about the content of such standards but not about the murder, rape robbery and arbitrary expulsion that has occurred in Kosovo. Such actions are not consistent with any legitimate claim to sovereign authority and present a severe practical threat to the international community as a whole. It is a compelling international interest to restore them whenever they have broken down to the extent that they have in Kosovo, and for that reason it is a compelling interest as well to act both in immediate and in more distant anticipation of such a breakdown.

Realistically it would require extensive and time-consuming effort to work out all the detailed specification that would have to accompany a doctrine of assertive international responsibility for fundamental legal standards. Obviously the world as a whole is at best at an early stage of that effort. But for exactly that reason it is important to recognize that the crisis in Kosovo is an occasion for intensifying that effort and that Russia is an even more critical venue. As a practical matter, most of the current citizens of Europe can reasonably expect to survive whatever ultimately happens in Kosovo. They cannot afford to be so assured about whatever happens in Russia and cannot consider current efforts there to be even remotely adequate.

PRACTICAL ASPIRATIONS

It is not plausible to expect that a decisively constructive outcome could be fashioned rapidly in either case. The level of political leadership and the degree of public responsiveness that would be required have not been demonstrated over the lengthy gestation of the overall crisis, and such qualities do not appear without notice. A stable political settlement in Kosovo, a credible program of economic engagement with the Balkan region and a comprehensive economic and security program for Russia all undoubtedly lie beyond a five year horizon. But fortunately there is also no obvious reason to believe that the situation will generate some violent explosion of volcanic proportions within that time. The larger opportunities and the major dangers both appear to be longer term matters. There probably is time to rise to the occasion.

But there will predictably be an immediate test of major significance. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people face exposure and starvation in Kosovo. Many of them will surely die unless the international presence projected by the G-8 countries is rapidly realized. One can hardly expect the plight of the Kosovars to move Milosevic but can plausibly hope that the members of NATO, who like to consider themselves leading democracies, will not prove to be as outrageously callous -- that they will finally commit their ground forces to rescue the victims the air campaign could not protect. An international ground intervention in Kosovo is presumably imminent, and it is important to consider whether that will set a constructive trend or a dangerous one.

The answer will depend on details of the operation. If the exercise is designed primarily to minimize the immediate effort and perceived risk for those who conduct it, as would have to be judged likely, then it might well involve some explicit or implicit partitioning of the province on the principle that separating the Serbian and Albanian populations is the key to containing the conflict. That method would allow the intervening force to concentrate its efforts on maintaining the boundaries of separation and to limit its involvement in the internal affairs of the respective communities. It is the primary method that has in fact been applied in Bosnia, despite the nominal vision of a unified state advanced in the Dayton agreement, and it is quite explicitly the method used since 1974 to control conflict between the Greek and Turkish populations on the island of Cyprus. The record, as most would read it, suggests that a minimized effort of that sort does control active communal violence, but it does not provide for social reconstruction and it must be indefinitely sustained. One can argue that an effort of that sort in Kosovo would be sufficient to provide immediate relief for the Kosovars and to contain the worst dangers of a regional conflagration, but it is very dubious that it would provide the basis for a constructive trend. Such a result that would have to be welcomed but is hardly the occasion for celebration. As with many things, immediate effort can only be minimized at the cost of longer term risk.

In the admittedly less probable event that immediate intervention in Kosovo is actually planned with longer term reconstruction in mind, as the G-8 statement suggests it should be, then it would have to preserve the administrative integrity of the province thereby setting a standard for controlling conflict based on direct engagement and consensual collaboration between the communities rather than on their functional separation. That would unquestionably involve an

effort of greater scope -- not merely the patrolling of a cease fire line but the assertive reconstruction of an integrated civil order. Thus a dedicated program would have to be undertaken to replace damaged infrastructure, both private homes and public services, on an equitable basis across the ethnic divisions of the population. Similarly the critical matter of reestablishing police functions and the judicial process in which they are embedded would have to be accomplished on a reliably equitable basis. The principle and effective practice of equitable management would be as important as the direct results of pacification and reconstruction. In order to conduct a more expansive effort of this sort the intervening parties would undoubtedly have to developed an appropriately refined distinction between the international responsibility to protect universal legal standards and the indigenous right to determine sovereign authority. In that sense the exercise would be more demanding. It terms of actual resource commitments and risk over time, however, a more expansive exercise it can plausibly claim to be less costly. The difference between an effort that is imagined to have minimal requirements and one that is more demanding in its aspirations is largely conceptual. The latter clearly entails higher standards and a more advanced form of political consciousness, but it can certainly be expected to save lives and probably money as well. An intervention of this more expansive sort is much more likely to set a constructive trend that would eventually enable it to be phased out.

As for the yet larger matter of reassuring Russia, perhaps the most important immediate aspiration is simply that of setting a credible rule that henceforth remote bombardment of the sort undertaken by NATO against Yugoslavia can only be undertaken by explicit authorization of the UN Security Council. The NATO operation has not been an acceptable exercise of the right of self defense, even though the objective in question can be said to fit that category. It is truly imperative for all the members of NATO, the United States foremost among them, to align their collectively predominant military capacities with international standards of legal procedure. Otherwise they will create incentives for the development of countervailing capabilities that could be extremely dangerous over time. Again, acts of desperation are far more dangerous to the dominant alliance than the massive acts of deliberate aggression that it was originally formed to prevent. If the alliance is to do more good than harm, then it must come to understand that basic fact better than it currently does.

[Kosovo turns]
- can stimulate the prolif. of nuclear weapons [illegible] in rogue states → destabilizing developments

(2)

Presentation to the Conference "Western Policies and the Crisis in Russia"
Berlin, Germany
June 4-6, 1999
Ken Luongo, RANSAC

U.S.-Russian Cooperative Nuclear Security

Introduction

- Since 1993 the U.S. and Russia have been working together to address the nuclear proliferation dangers that resulted from the collapse of communism.

- The agenda started with the Nunn-Lugar legislation (DoD funds) but now has expanded to include funding from the Departments of State and Energy.

- The effort made a significant early stride (1993-94) in facilitating the consolidation of the Soviet nuclear arsenal onto the territory of Russia, in promoting the non-nuclear status of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, and in funding the destruction of offensive ballistic missiles.

- From 1994-98 significant strides were made in improving the security of fissile material in Russia. This was done with a mixture of DoD and DoE money. Progress in this area had to overcome enormous difficulties, many of which were hangovers from the Cold War (including mutual distrust, secrecy of facilities, lack of relationships between U.S. and Russian officials).

- At present the relationship has moved to address the central issue of nuclear proliferation danger in Russia which is the size and under funding of its massive nuclear complex.

- But, the conditions and elements that made progress so rapid and successful during the mid-1990s are changing for the worse and could further worsen before they get better.

- These issues include the chill in the overall U.S.-Russian relationship, the deterioration of relationships between key ministers and ministries, increasing security in both countries, and increasingly hostile domestic political conditions for cooperative work (the latter two issues are being fed by the China spy scandal). In short while there are pockets of progress overall momentum is being lost.

Russia's Nuclear Proliferation Dangers

- The threat of proliferation from the Russian nuclear complex is real and it is acknowledged by senior Russian officials. This acknowledgment is in marked contrast to the early 1990s when Russian officials often denied that any problems existed.

- The complex currently supports approximately 127,000 workers and 600,000 dependents in 10 closed cities spread around the country.

- 30,000-50,000 of these employees are declared to be excess.

- There are 650 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium outside of weapons spread over about 40 locations and in over 100 buildings.

- There is another 700 metric tons of fissile material in weapons, and 200-1,000 of these weapons move through the complex yearly for dismantlement and refurbishment.

- Russia retains the capability to produce thousands of nuclear warheads per year.

- Government funding for nuclear weapons activities have dropped significantly over the past ten years, perhaps by as much as 50%.

- Workers are often paid months late. Current projections put the salary shortfall at around $400 million.

- The depreciated ruble has made the wages that are paid worth much less.

- It is difficult for nuclear workers to move to find new jobs because of Russia's depressed economy and the holdover Soviet system of subsidizing apartments and services.

- There have been cases of attempted smuggling of weapon grade materials from Russian nuclear facilities.

- Countries of proliferation concern are seeking access to key nuclear weapon ingredients including nuclear material, scientists, and technology.

- The Russian nuclear ministry (Minatom) has signed a number of contracts to perform work in countries of proliferation concern including Iran, India and China in an effort to generate cash and maintain their standing.

- New concerns are arising about the ability to ensure adequate, trained custodians of the nuclear complex in the next century and about the nuclear consequences of a regional break up of Russia.

U.S.-Russian Cooperative Activities

- Broadly stated, the objectives of U.S.-Russian cooperation is to prevent proliferation by theft and diversion and to irreversibly eliminate excess fissile materials and warheads.

- To accomplish these objectives U.S.-Russian cooperative security activities fall into five categories:

    - Securing Nuclear Weapons, Weapon-Usable Fissile Materials and Technologies

        - Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting
        - Nuclear Warhead Transportation and Security
        - Fissile Material Storage Facility Construction
        - Nuclear Warhead Protection, Control and Accounting
        - Export Control Regime Development

    - Limiting Fissile Material Production and Use

        - Core Conversion and Shut Down of the Plutonium Production Reactors
        - Core Conversion of Research and Test Reactors

    - Instituting Irreversible Nuclear Reductions

        - Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security During the Dismantlement Process
        - Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security Under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
        - Exchange of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stockpile Information
        - Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Transparency and Confirmation
        - Trilateral Initiative on Verifying Nuclear Material Released from Weapon Programs

    - Disposing of Excess Fissile Material

        - Purchase of Highly Enriched Uranium from Dismantled Weapons
        - Disposition of Excess Weapon-Grade Plutonium

    - Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians and Downsizing the Complex
        - The Nuclear Cities Initiative
        - Scientific Redirection Efforts

Program Accomplishments and Problems

- I would rank the activities above in the following order of success.

- The most successful activity has been the disposition of fissile materials because of the enormous success of the HEU purchase agreement. This agreement allows for the blending down of thousands of weapons worth of HEU every year and it generates real money. It has recently been placed on a firm footing by solving technical aspects of the agreement.

- Second is improving the security of nuclear materials. This is also the most important short-term objective. Concrete progress has been made in many aspects of this category of work. Transportation security has been improved for warheads. Work is occurring to improve the security of fissile material at almost all important locations. And the Mayak facility to store dismantled weapon components is in under construction. The cooperation on fissile material control has opened doors to expanded joint efforts. However, this area of cooperation is faltering at a time when there is still much more to be done.

- Third, is the effort to employ nuclear scientists. Progress has been made in providing work for individual weapon scientists through the International Science and Technology Center and more applied activities are moving forward under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program. However, many of the projects that the nuclear scientists are working on have little applicability to the long-term redirection of the ailing Russian nuclear complex. And, this fundamental issue must be addressed.

- Beyond these three examples of concrete progress, most other issues fall into the category of important efforts that have delivered little real action. These include:

    - Disposition of Russia's excess plutonium. This has been an issue since 1994 when the U.S. National Academy of Science called it a "clear and present danger". Yet virtually no excess plutonium has been eliminated in either the U.S. or Russia. One reason is that a considerable sum is required to perform the mission. Also, there are policy disagreements on the disposal of plutonium in nuclear reactors.

    - The development of a robust export control regime in Russia. It is an issue that has been on the menu for the past six years and where very little progress has been made. At present the development efforts in this area have been anemic and Russia's nuclear export activities have become a significant irritant in the Russian-American political relationship.

    - The limitation of fissile material production and use. This category of activities, while promising, has been short on delivery. Problems seem to constantly crop up in the effort to convert the plutonium reactor nuclear cores,the latest being a dispute over whether to use HEU, LEU or both as the new fuel. In the meantime the three reactors continue to produce one and one-half tons of plutonium per year. The effort to convert

the cores of the Russian-made research reactors from HEU to LEU, is also bogged down.

- Initiatives designed to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear weapon reductions. A broad agenda of cooperation in this area was agreed to by President's Clinton and Yeltsin in May 1995. However, only a few of these activities have produced any concrete results to date and the prospects for progress are not good. The U.S. and Russia have produced an unclassified list of their nuclear tests. This is progress. But efforts to exchange a larger set of data on fissile material production and stocks of nuclear warheads is stalled. Another area, the transparency of the nuclear warhead dismantlement process, was assisted by a low key laboratory-to-laboratory effort to work on the technologies that would be required for such a regime. However, increasing security concerns in Russia and the stalled START II/III process has impeded progress in this area.

- Cooperation on technologies under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This issue has primarily faltered on Russia's quest for advanced computers. When Russia asked for U.S. approval for the export of these computers, the request was turned down. When Russia got the computers over U.S. objections, the issue erupted into a major policy dispute. Now the U.S. Congress has weighed in and significantly limited U.S.-Russian cooperation under a test ban. The issue reflects the lingering distrust that exists in the U.S.-Russian nuclear security relationship.

The Nuclear Cities Initiative

- Most of the programs outlined above are designed to treat the outward manifestations of the nuclear proliferation danger present in post-communist Russia. However, they are not designed to address the underlying cause of this danger – the oversize and under funding of the complex.

- In order to get at these very difficult but essential issues the U.S. and Russia have launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). An agreement to cooperate on NCI was signed in September 1998. It is ambitious effort that is aimed at tackling two related problems. The first is to attempt to create alternative employment for weapons scientists so that some of the excess labor force can be absorbed in non-weapons work. The second is to assist Russia in the down sizing of the complex to reflect post-cold war realities. Russian officials have made clear that they will not be able to downsize unless there is alternative employment because of potential social unrest.

- The NCI is also unique because it must address social, economic and proliferation issues in order to be successful. In the U.S. the problem of the oversized complex was solved by providing billions in buyouts of excess workers and new work in stockpile stewardship and non-proliferation activities. In Russia it is clear that this kind of money will not be available either domestically or from the U.S. Congress.

- As a result, the program has initially limited its focus to three closed cities, Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70 and Krasnoyarsk-26. The goal is to expand to other cities in future years.

- The program was funded at $15 million in FY99 and the request for FY2000 was $30 million. Ultimately the program managers believe that $600 million is required. But,that amount of money is questionable since the Congress is now in the process of cutting the FY2000 budget back to $15 million.

- The NCI has essentially two thrusts of activity at present. The first is business development. The second is the creation of non-proliferation centers.

- The business development aspect has the most emphasis at present but it is also the most difficult objective to achieve. The business climate in Russia is not good, the people in the closed cities have limited business experience, the western business community is very skeptical of something called a closed city, and most of this activity is being managed by U.S. national laboratories which have little business experience. As a result, there has been some limited progress in this area but no breakthroughs. The project with the most success potential is the Open Computing Center at Arzamas-16. Here software development is being produced on contract to western firms.

- The non-proliferation centers hold promise They have been established at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 as well as at the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk. Funding is a mix of U.S. philanthropic foundations and NCI money.

- This is an area where non-governmental assistance created an opportunity that governments decided to utilize. And because of the NGO involvement, the end products of the projects will be openly available.

- The objectives of these centers are not that dissimilar from the activities of the U.S. national laboratories in the post-Cold War era. For example, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), a U.S. nuclear weapon design lab, the Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program grew from $30 million to $160 million per year during the period of 1990-1997, and many former weapons scientists have made the transition to this line of work. Similar shifts have occurred at most other U.S. national laboratories.

- The work to be performed by these new centers is important. For example, at the Analytical Centers for Non-Proliferation at RFNC-VNIIEF (Arzamas-16) and RFNC-VNIITF (Chelyabinsk-70) work will occur during the next year on the following projects:

    - Analysis of Strategic Stability Under Deep Cuts in Nuclear Weapons
    - Significance of R.F. Legislation on Closed Cities and Nuclear Weapons for Non-Proliferation
    - History of USSR Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure

  - RFNC-VNIIEF Quarterly Information Bulletin
  - Control of Alternative Nuclear Materials and Non-Proliferation
  - Review of Conversion Capabilities and Experience of RFNC-VNIIEF (including conversion opportunities for the warhead dismantlement plant at Arzamas)
  - Options for U.S.-Russian Cooperation Under a CTBT
  - Inspection Procedures for a Weapon Grade Plutonium Cutoff Treaty
  - detection of Undeclared Nuclear Weapon Activities Through Environmental Monitoring

- Initially these centers will employ tens of weapon scientists but the potential exists for these centers to grow in size and stature if the Russian government can be interested in their products.

- The area that has received the least amount of attention by the U.S. and Russian governments but has potentially the best chance for success is work on energy and environmental projects.

- Many of the weapon scientists inside the Russian complex possess generic engineering and technical talents that could be applied to major energy and environmental challenges of the 21st century.

- The Russian complex could be encouraged to develop its expertise in several vital energy/environmental areas including:

  - Research and development of radioactive waste clean-up technologies and techniques
  - Carbon management (includes: energy efficiency; renewable energy technologies; and technologies applicable for emissions trading)
  - Environmental science: modeling and measurement

- These areas could constitute a mix of business prospects and public sector programs. But is certainly the best way to soak up a significant portion of the excess labor force.

- What is clear at this point is that the current U.S.-Russian dialogue on NCI is not sufficient to make the program work and the issue is too important to let this effort fail. So, some additional steps are being taken.

- The first is an effort to create a university-NGO consortium on NCI issues that would focus on the issues outlined above. The planning meeting for this consortium will take place in Washington in mid-June.

- The second is the effort to create a European leg of the NCI. In early 1999, President Clinton wrote to the heads of European governments asking them to contribute more funds to help solve the proliferation problems in Russia. The responses were not encouraging.

- Last week a meeting was held in Como, Italy to begin to map out the content of a ENCI. The Italian government has become interested in the effort and is willing to put some modest but important funding behind the concept.

- The question is whether other European governments can be interested in participating.

- If they can be interested and some real funds can be generated then you would have three legs under the NCI - U.S.-Russian governmental activities, European-Russian governmental activities, and the University/NGO consortium as an idea factory that could work with all governments and collaborators.

- This may be a sufficient mass of activity to make the program effective. However, if just left to the U.S. and Russian governments the NCI effort at best will be anemic and at worse will fail. This will leave the proliferation dangers in Russia an unsolved and continuing danger well into the 21st Century.

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"DENUCLEARIZATION" OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT & RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

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Introduction

This paper discusses the role and mission that nuclear weapons may perform in the new world system emerging since the end of the «Cold War». It also focuses on Russia's basic official attitudes towards nuclear weapons as they are formulated in the governmental documents; describes the current discussion going on in Russia on nuclear weapons and their role in providing Russia's security especially in the light of the war on Balkans; and outlines some actual and potential repercussions of Russia's nuclear policy.

Is «Denuclearization» of Security Going On?

The developments happened after the Cold War are posing a number of important yet unanswered questions related to the nuclear weapons and coming global strategic environment. Conventional wisdom holds that with the end of the Cold War, there is now a certain «denuclearization» of security.

It seems meaningful because the nuclear weapons, being an instrument of deterrence of the "opposite side" or potential adversary, were the product of the Cold War. And in place of the integrated security environment that was formed by the bipolar confrontation with the dominating role of nuclear deterrence there are now a number of actual and potential regional and local focuses of controversies, antagonisms, and conflicts as well as locus of emerging power centers, coalitions and security regimes. This decentralized and intricate international milieu presents new types of opportunities as well as of dangers; and demands new approaches to national and international security. The nuclear powers, including Russia, are challenged by the urgent needs to adjust their foreign and security policies to the specifics of the changing strategic landscapes and maps. Such an adjustment presumes, in particular, diminishing role of nuclear weapons and, apart from anything else, development of new forms of usage of military force.

Really, it seems more and more evident that threats and dangers typical for the new emerging international environment can not be neutralized or prevented by nuclear weapons and, especially, by nuclear deterrence. Really, threats coming from terrorist and extremist organizations, drag-trafficking, organized crime, local and regional disturbances, conflicts and instabilities, obstructions of oil and gas flows et cetera can not be managed by hypothetical use of nuclear weapons or by threat of such use. Even international repercussions of an eventual turbulence in Russia (and this can not be

totally excluded) that is still a second nuclear power in the world are to be responded by means other then nuclear deterrence. It is also highly questionable whether nuclear deterrence could be effective in case if some rogue states and regimes are obtaining nuclear devices. So, the actual task is to develop forces and instruments adequate to these new threats and dangers though keeping nuclear arsenals for some cases of special emergency which are hardly predictable at the moment.

The NATO's operation against Miloshevich's regime confirms the thesis of current denuclearization of the global strategic environment. Three powers engaged into the war (or police operation) against Serbia - the USA, the Great Britain and France - have nuclear weapons but they simply can not - even if they wish to do that - use their nuclear forces or threat to use them in any way for political or military purposes in the Balkans. Russia, in its turn, was not able to stop NATO's operation despite being the second world nuclear power. This is the visible confirmation that nuclear status con not be a source of political influence at the international arena.

But at the same time all nuclear powers are keeping and improving their nuclear arsenals though in less numbers than before. The nuclear weapons are playing still significant role in their strategic planning and thinking. And what is more, new nuclear weapon states are emerging and hindering thus the ratification of CTBT and destroying the international non-proliferation regime.

These controversial trends can be explained by a number of reasons:

- the inertia of strategic thinking based on nuclear deterrence concept is really strong and can not be overcome in a decade after the Cold War ended;

- this inertia results not only from the mentality inherited from the Cold War period, but also from the fact that nuclear weapons physically exist;

- any effective elimination of nuclear weapons in the global scale demands cooperative and coordinated efforts and actions of all nuclear powers which, in their turn, presume a high level of mutual trust between them;

- if even one of nuclear states is founding its security policy on nuclear deterrence, other nuclear powers will not in any case refuse from the same strategy;

- nobody of strategic and military planners and communities can exclude some hardly predictable at the moment but unfavorable development leading to a restoration of a nuclear deterrence policy. Nuclear weapons are considered still as an ultimate guarantee of security in case if a new time of confrontation is coming;

- nuclear weapons are associated with high international status of a country possessing them;

- nuclear deterrence is still regarded as an effective instrument of security especially by states involved in local or regional conflicts; or those that feel themselves threatened by much stronger powers. In this light the NATO's operation against

Miloshevich's regime stimulates some rogue states, Iran first of all, to intensify their nuclear programs. The latter may believe that if Serbia has nuclear weapons NATO most probably would not use military force against it.

These are general factors that energize the interest to nuclear weapons among military and political elites both in nuclear and threshold states. They, however, can only partly explain the official Russia's attitudes in the nuclear field. So, the questions are what are these attitudes? What is the actual content of the Russian nuclear doctrine? What are the political roots and substance of it? What are the discussions on these problems in Russia today? What could be international repercussions of the current nuclearisation of the Russia's security policy?

Russia's Official Views on Nuclear Weapons

So, nobody, in fact, is ready to give up the nuclear arsenals while some would like to obtain them. However, the role of the nuclear weapons in the Western security thinking or, perhaps, in the Western security culture is now rather more modest than it was in the time of the Cold War. In Russia, conversely, the strategic thinking was developed in a quite different direction since the Cold War. Russian military, political, and bureaucratic elites consider nuclear weapons as more and more significant foundation of Russian security and - what could be much worse - as an instrument of ensuring Russian national interests.

Any nuclear doctrine is basically consists of, firstly, some general provisions that explicit political views and assessments of a strategic role and principal missions of nuclear forces and, secondly, operational plans of military use of particular types of nuclear weapons in particular circumstances. The latter as a rule are highly classified and not discussible outside a very narrow circle of highest military command and political leadership. But, the political aspect of a nuclear doctrine is usually more or less known and apart from anything else could be quite characteristic of the elite's vision of the outer world, the threats coming from outside and the methods that are able to neutralize them.

Immediately after the fall of the former Soviet Union there were some anti-nuclear attitudes among the democratic part of the new Russian ruling elite. The first Russian Foreign Minister Andrew Kozirev insisted, for instance, at the very beginning of 1992 that

> "The aim of the Russian diplomacy for the coming years is to strive for principal reductions of the nuclear weapons, for cutting down the arms race, to look for minimal nuclear sufficiency with the perspective of the total elimination of the nuclear arsenals" [i].

Such a perception was characteristic for the Russian political forces that were striving for a fast integration of Russia into the community of democratic nations, or at least her association with this community; and refused from traditional Soviet suspicions with regard to the Western world.

Kozirev's attempts to realize this concept in more or less practical way, for instance, to refuse from the nuclear parity with the USA, had provoked the irritated reaction of the military circles. The military newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" that is always expressing the attitudes of the top command of the Russian Armed Forces commented these Kozirev's attempts in the following way:

> "Really, why we need parity (especially under our economic circumstances) if the USA are not considered any more as our potential military enemy? But the question is what criteria of national security other than parity could be taken into account?" [ii].

So, since the first days of the post-Soviet period of Russia's development the traditional attitudes on nuclear policy were explicitly presented by some influential parts of Russian establishment.

The first official document that formulated some provisions of the future nuclear doctrine was "The Concept of Military Security of the CIS Member States" approved by the leaders of the newly independent states in Bishkek in October 1992. It was stated in this document that

> "to prevent a war by nuclear deterrence of the potential enemy" was to be among the principal tasks of the United Armed Forces of the CIS. The authors of this document has also underlined that "those powerful groupings of strategic offensive arms ... which are deployed along the outer borders of the Commonwealth during the days of peace ... are unlikely to undergo major reductions and will continue to present the principal military danger to the security of the Commonwealth" [iii].

That means in fact that it were the Western countries, and the USA first of all, that were considered as sources of military threat to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. There were hardly any doubts that the aforementioned "powerful groupings of the strategic forces" could belong only to a narrow circle of Western states, primarily to the United States. Since that moment the orientation on nuclear deterrence became the principal foundation of the official Russian nuclear thinking.

That thinking was further developed in "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" approved by the President in November 1993. Firstly, it was stated there that

> "the aim of the Russian Federation's policy in the field of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring the launching the aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies" [iv].

Secondly, the previous Soviet commitment to the no-first-use of nuclear weapons was factually denounced in that document. It was stated that Russia

> "... will not employ its nuclear weapons against any state party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons ... which does not possess nuclear weapons except in the cases of: (a) an armed attack

> against the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces, other troops or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess nuclear weapons; (b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces, other troops or its allies" [v].

That means in particular that Russia may use its nuclear forces first against any NPT member state who is an US ally, if this state is in armed conflict with Russia or its allies. It should be mentioned here also that the language of this document - such as "armed attack" or "invasion" - were not well defined. Strictly speaking, this formulation presumes, for instance, that Russia may use nuclear weapons in any armed clashes between Belarus and Poland when the latter joins NATO.

Thirdly, the new element of Russian nuclear doctrine formulated in the "Basic Provisions..." was refusal from the concept of "strategic parity" with the USA, which had been previously interpreted as the equality of "battle capabilities" of the strategic forces and which has been considered as the cornerstone of the former Soviet military doctrine. Instead, new concept of so called "intended damage" was envisaged as the basic aim of the Russian strategic forces. That means that their numerical and structural characteristics should be determined by the task of inflicting on the "potential enemy" some previously defined volume of damage.

The next - and perhaps the most principal - innovation to the Russian nuclear doctrine was the explicit utterance of the important role that tactical (or sub-strategic) nuclear weapons is playing in the Russia's military strategy. It was, for instance, openly stated in the Presidential Address "On National Security" in June 1996 that

> "The Russian Federation is consistently putting into practice the policy of nuclear deterrence. The maintenance of the Russian Federation's nuclear potential of the global level (Strategic Nuclear Forces), as well as of regional and local levels (operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons) at the sufficient level ... is playing the key role in the realization of this policy" [vi].

This motive was further developed by then the State Military Inspector Andrew Kokoshin who wrote in August 1996:

> "Not only strategic nuclear forces, but also operative tactical forces and tactical nuclear weapons are an important component of the nuclear deterrence forces. In the current circumstances, when there are no ability to build up general purpose forces powerful enough ... the nuclear shield is playing more important role among other military means of preventing aggression" [vii].

These official statements were accompanied in Russia with a great number of writings of high rank military and academicians where the significance of tactical nuclear weapons for Russia's security was argued.

It should be mentioned also that Russian ruling elite consider nuclear weapons not only as a mean of deterring someone's nuclear attack on Russia but also as an instrument of securing her national interests. It was stated in the Presidents Address "On National Security" that strategic stability should be guaranteed by

> "... the maintenance of Russia's ability to deter nuclear attack as well as actions encroaching upon her vital interests by ensuring her ability to inflict assured planned damage through retaliatory strikes" [viii].

That may mean that in a case where Russian leaders consider someone's move as endangering Russia's vital interests they could use nuclear weapons to deter or to neutralize them. The important point here is that there is no clear definition of what particular interests are considered as vital.

There are a number of controversial statements on the conditions in which Russia could use her nuclear weapons or could relay on nuclear deterrence. For instance it was stated in the latest Russian official document on national security that is "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" prepared by the Security Council of Russia and approved by the President in December 1997 that

> "The most important mission of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is ensuring nuclear deterrence in the interests of preventing both nuclear and as well conventional large scale or regional war, and also in the interests of fulfilling her ally's obligations. To fulfill this task the Russian Federation should has the nuclear forces able to assure the infliction of planned damage to any aggressor state or to any coalition" [ix].

That may means that Russia may use her nuclear weapons in a wide spectrum of circumstances because there are no definite explications what are "regional" or "large scale" wars, or what particularly is a fulfillment of "ally's obligations", and what are these obligations themselves. However, in the other part of this document it was stated that

> "Russia has the right to use all her forces and means, including nuclear weapons, if a threat to her existence as an independent sovereign state is emerging in a result of armed aggression" [x].

So, it is not quite clear whether Russia will use nuclear weapons only in case of threat to her existence as independent state, or also, for instance, if her ally's obligations are demanding to deter aggression against some other state.

Anyhow, it seems possible to summarize the political side of Russia's nuclear doctrine in the following way:

- nuclear deterrence is among the most important foundations of Russia's security, or even the most important of them;

- Russia's elite consider nuclear deterrence not only as a mean of preventing the nuclear attack, but also as an instrument of protecting country's national interests and assuring her ally's obligations;

- Russia could use her nuclear weapons first;

- sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are considered as important part of Russian nuclear arsenal and their use or threat of their use, perhaps, could be important part of Russian strategy.

The Roots of Russian Nuclear Doctrine

The basic and widely spread explanation of the principal importance that is attached to the nuclear forces by the Russian strategic thinking and security policy is that the orientation and leaning on them are aimed to counterweight the deterioration of the battle capabilities of the Russian conventional forces.

As an example, the advocates of Russian tactical nuclear weapons were insisting in the first half of the ninetieths that those systems are able to improve fundamentally the battle efficiency of air-defense, and of maritime anti-surface unit warfare, and of anti-tank capabilities and other defensive capacities of general purpose conventional forces and so on.

The other argument is that Russia is economically and technologically able to produce and deploy new types of tactical nuclear warheads, including their very-low yield varieties while it is not able to produce in necessary quantities so called "smart" or highly precise weapons of new generations.

The essential detail of the current Russian strategic thinking is also the idea that tactical nuclear weapons are of defensive nature and in that capacity can not pose any threat to the neighboring nations.

A number of Russian analysts believe, for instance, that tactical nuclear weapons may useful for a deterrence of regional powers like Iran, Turkey and so on if try to expand military into the former Soviet Union. Some of them (including sometimes figures from high ranks of Russian hierarchy) proposed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in a substantial numbers in Belarus, Kaliningrad and some other areas close to Poland and other new NATO member-states to improve Russia's military posture there in case of NATO's enlargement.

Next to that is interpretation of nuclear force as the fundamentally important factor of the Russian "great power status", and as well, the vision of the military power as the principal determinant of the international politics. Both these very traditional perceptions are typical for the Russian ruling elite. The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov wrote at the very end of 1996 that among the main tasks of Russian foreign policy is

> "the maintenance of strategic stability by retention and strengthening of the role of Russia as the important center of the emerging multipolar world. ...

> Russian efficient economy and, as well, Russian convincing military power, first of all sufficient strategic nuclear arsenal, are necessary for strengthening of the foundations of a multipolar world" [xi].

This type of argumentation demonstrates three fundamental peculiarities of the current Russian strategic visions and concepts since the early nineties. Firstly, that is an evident perception of the outer world as something menacing, as a source of large scale military danger that should and can be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Secondly, it is a recognition of nuclear forces as the only instrument of influence on the global and perhaps regional developments Russia has in the present conditions of her economic decline. Thirdly, sub-strategic nuclear weaponry is regarded by influential parts of Russian military and political elite as a relatively cheap potential battlefield weapon.

The question is, of course, who is the powerful enemy for Russia and from what particular moves should it be deterred? Numerous Russian articles contain an answer to this question. Such an enemy could be the West and first of all the USA and NATO. Moreover, "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation", that is the principal official document, alludes to that rather openly. It states that

> "the threat to the Russian national security in the military field is posed by the retention or creation by large powers (or by their coalitions) of powerful groupings of the armed forces in the regions neighboring to Russia. ... The eastward NATO's enlargement and its emergence as the dominating military-political force in Europe create the threat of a new division of the continent which is extremely dangerous in the conditions of retention in Europe the mobile strike groupings of forces, nuclear weaponry and, as well, insufficiency of the multilateral mechanisms of peacekeeping" [xii].

The emergence of such attitudes can not be explained in full by the inertia of political and military thinking inherited from the past or by the fact that the contemporary Russian military elite was formed intellectually during the Soviet days. The most substantial factor of the present Russian nuclear doctrine is that some numerous social and interest groups; influential economic and institutional lobbies can improve their positions in the society and in the power institutions of the country only in conditions of some "controlled confrontation" with the West. Among these groups and lobbies are the managers of Russian military-industrial complex, a part of military command, neo-communist and nationalistic opposition, fractions of the academic community and some others who are loosing their former dominating positions after the end of confrontation with the West. However, they has retained enough power to influence at least partly the shaping of the Russian military and nuclear doctrines, to portray Russia's greatness in terms of military and especially nuclear power and of restoration of a zone of its dominance at the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Impact of NATO's Operation in Yugoslavia
On Russia's Nuclear Strategy and Thinking

NATO's operation against Milishevich's regime has already influenced seriously Russia's strategic and security thinking; it stimulated a kind of "NATO-phobia" among Russia's elites. There are, of course, a number of various reasons for that. Partly, it is a result of perceptions and interpretations formed by intellectual and political frameworks typical for the Cold War. Partly, the rise of anti-Western attitudes can be explained by interests of the groups and lobbies that hope to improve their status in the political system of the country, to restore the influence they enjoyed under the *ancien regime*, and to enhance the budgeting of the Armed Forces and defense-related industry.

In April 1999 the highly secretive meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was held under the chairmanship of the President Boris Yeltzin himself. There were no official information about the decisions made at this session; it was announced, however, in semi-official way that Russia's nuclear policy was one of the important object of the discussion.

At the same time, high-rank officials of the Russian Defense Ministry have declared just after the bombings began that Russia should redeploy her tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and that the Ministry is preparing concrete proposals for corresponding governmental decisions. These declarations have produced irritated response from the President Lukashenka of Belarus. While being known as advocate of redeployment of some Russian nuclear weapons on the Belarus soil, he, nevertheless, has stated that Belarus is "the sovereign state" and that it is the President of Belarus who will decide whether Russia's nuclear weapons will be stationed in the country or not [xiii].

While Russia's official declarations on the impact of the NATO's operation against Miloshevich on nuclear policy are vague, the reaction of Russia's so-called "expert community" including people close to the military milieu is much more definite. The dominating rethorics (apart from those mentioned above) could be summarized in the following way:

- NATO's operation confirms that the USA and NATO are striving to establish their own political and military hegemony through, in particular, crushing such Russia's friends as Serbia and further NATO's expansion that seems inevitable in the light of Balkan War;

- the future confrontation between Russia and the USA is inevitable due to the American endeavor to turn Russia into an economic colony and a provider of raw materials; due to coming competition for markets, spheres of influence et cetera;

- local conflicts involving Russia and the West may escalate up to rather high levels and result in a direct military confrontation;

- in a view of that nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of Russia's security and a powerful instrument of assuring national interests;

- strategic armaments are not only an instrument of deterrence but may be used in a limited way; in this light such options as "demonstrating strikes", and some

"minimal use" are discussed in mass-media and in professional audiences; the basic idea is enlarging of a spectrum of possible use of strategic arsenals;

- tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons are regarded now as a battlefield weapon; new versions of nuclear warheads of various yield and types are to be developed and deployed;

- Russia should withdraw from the CTBT; and even promote proliferation of nuclear weapons creating thus some regional "counter-balances" for the USA.

Being, of course, non-official, these views, however, reflect some trends in Russian strategic thinking and, who knows, may influence official doctrine that is now reformulating.

The Repercussions of the Current Russian Nuclear Thinking

All that poses a number of serious questions. Whether nuclear weapons are able to compensate the weakness of conventional forces in the new strategic conditions where new types of threats are emerging? That is the first one of them. There are some reasons why it is doubtful. Really, nuclear weapons are able to deter a strategic nuclear attack, both total and limited, and to prevent or to repulse large scale offensive of the traditional type with the massive use of tanks and other armored weaponry and so on. However, today and in foreseeable future such threats are practically improbable for Russia which could be involved in some local instabilities, low intensity conflicts, civil disturbances, and other developments of the same kind and scale but hardly in a large-scale war.

And even if a conflict of traditional type and relatively large scale is emerging and involves Russia there are well known factors that make nuclear weapons ineffective in such a situation. First of all, the political leaders are challenged with an extremely difficult choice - whether to authorize a limited use of nuclear weapons with a risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation or to sustain a limited defeat. In some other cases "political costs" of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in a limited war may be so high that it will devaluated any military advantages.

But at the same time the orientation on nuclear weapons, especially sub-strategic, may be detrimental for crisis and international stability at regional levels. There are a number of reasons for that:

- Russian orientation on nuclear weapons as an instrument of preventing local conflicts and deterring regional powers like Iran, Turkey, Pakistan from penetrating into countries and zones that Russian elite regards as Moscow's sphere of interests may stimulate these countries to obtain nuclear weapons themselves;

- any Russia's attempt to improve her military posture in the area "between Russia and NATO" by deploying there nuclear weapons will lead to adequate measures from the NATO's side and thus will destabilize strategic situation there;

- Sub-strategic nuclear deterrence at a regional level could be effective only if the opposite side is convinced that Russia is politically and technically ready to use appropriate weapons. That means that nuclear warheads should be deployed in troops and have a high degree of readiness, that the personal should be trained to use them, and that official doctrine stipulating the use of them in regional wars is approved. Furthermore, sub-strategic weapons, especially air-based, could be very effective as an offensive weapons able to destroy several hundreds of really important targets (command and communication centers, air-fields, naval bases, strategic bridges, concentrations of troops, military armaments and hardware and so on) at the distance of several hundreds miles from the front line. That may provoke the other side to make a pre-emptive strike first.

- And, at last, being deployed in troops sub-strategic weapons could be used without an authorization from the political leadership.

Conclusion

Nuclearisation of Russian security thinking is the result of the influence of social, political and economic groups and lobbies which are interested in "controlled confrontation" with the West to retain their social status and the prevent the radical demilitarization of the Russian society. The reliance on nuclear weapons, however, is not adequate to the nature of actual and potential threats to the Russian security. At the same time the current Russian nuclear doctrine being implemented into practice may destabilize the security situation in the areas around Russia.

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[ix] "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation". - "Krasnaya Zvezda". - 27 December, 1997. - p.4
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