TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

IMPACT OF THE NEW NATO ON NORTH AND SOUTH PERSPECTIVES

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Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean
Impact of the New NATO on North and South Perspectives

Co-hosted by CSIS and Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais in collaboration with RAND

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Agenda

Monday, May 24

9:30	**Coffee**
10:00	**After the Washington Summit and the Kosovo War: A New NATO?**
	Uwe Nerlish, IABG
	Simon Serfaty, Director of European Studies, CSIS
Discussants	Phillip Gordon, NATO Office, National Security Council
	William Hopkinson, Head, International Security Programme, Chatham House
12:00	**Lunch**
	Aaron Miller, Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator
14:00	**The European Vision of the Mediterranean**
	Presentation of the report on "The Mediterranean and the New NATO"
	Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali
	George Joffé, Deputy Director, RIIA, Chatham House
Discussants	Steve Cambone, Director of Studies, INSS
	Mark Heller, Jaffee Centre
15:30	**The Southern Mediterranean Vision of the Mediterranean**
	Abdel Monem Said Aly, Director, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
	Azzam Mahjoub, Researcher
Discussants	Jean-François Daguzan, Fondation recherche stratégique
	Shireen T. Hunter, Director, Islamic Studies, CSIS

Tuesday, May 25

9:30	**The United States' Vision of the Mediterranean**
	Ian Lesser, Senior Analyst, Rand
Discussants	Kamel Abu Jaber, President, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
	Patrick Clawson, Director of Studies, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
	Stefano Silvestri, Vice-President, IAI
11:00	**The Euro-American Agenda toward the Mediterranean**
	F. Stephen Larrabee, Senior Advisor, RAND
	Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, IEEI
Discussants	Hans Binnendijk, Director, Institute of National Strategic Studies
	Martín Ortega, WEU/ISS
	Mohamed Mahmoud Vall, Director of the Europe/America Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
12:30	**Lunch**

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THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN VISION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

BY
ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY

I. INTRODUCTION

The post cold war era has witnessed fundamental changes in world affairs . The collapse of the USSR and the second Gulf War , the third technological revolution , and the trends of globalization , have released forces of change in the regions of the world including the one south and east of the Mediterranean sea with its extension to the rest of the Middle East . At the heart of the change has been a series of initiatives taken by the US and Europe to safeguard their particular interests , create an area for stability and growth , and integrate the region into the world capitalist order . One of the major initiatives has been the Euro - Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) . This Partnership is not taking place in a vacuum , but rather it is occurring under tenuous changes on the two sides of the sea in addition to their relations with the only remaining world superpower the United States of America .

In this paper , it will be argued that the outlook of the Partnership - and more broadly speaking, of EuroMed relations- remains reasonably open to positive developments provided that the partners are ready to make difficult choices and hard decisions . The cost for such developments should be judged by the cost of the possible deterioration in the current state of relations as a result of the collapse of the Arab - Israeli peace process , different types of crises in the Gulf , and the spread of forces of instability taking the shape of Algeria , Turkey , or both (Sudan) . Also the cost should be judged by the impact of their Partnership on their relations across the Atlantic particularly on NATO and the American role on the Middle East and the Gulf .

One key element in nourishing the EMP is the resolution of the Arab - Israeli conflict which proved so far as a major impediment for the progress in other areas of concern to the parties . Fortunately , the decade of the 1990s has witnessed a peace process that accomplished building blocs such as the Oslo accords , the Israeli - Jordanian peace treaty , the progress in the Israeli - Syrian negotiations , the multilateral negotiations in the Middle East , and a series of

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic conferences . The EU was not far away from these developments . The evolution of the European experience itself from the European Community to the European Union made Europe more capable of defining foreign and security issues that require joint action . Since the Lisbon European Summit in June 1992 the Mediterranean area and the Middle East became part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) . The new active European position was triggered by the end of the Cold War , the results of the second Gulf war , the global trend of trans - continental economic interdependence , and the Madrid process for peace in the Middle East .

The European efforts in the Middle East went in three directions . First , after having an observer status in the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference , and after customary visits to the Middle East and declarations by the European Presidency , the EU appointed Miguel Angle Morationos as a special representative to the Middle East peace process . His mission has been defined to communicate with all the parties concerned with the Arab - Israeli peace process ; to monitor the peace negotiations among the parties and contribute to its success by mediating positions ; to communicate to the parties the necessity of respecting the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights ; to contribute to the implementation of agreements ; to monitor the moves of the parties that may sabotage the results of the permanent status negotiations ; and to report to the European Commission on all of the above .

Second , the EU supported the multilateral side of the peace process and sponsored in particular the regional economic cooperation committee which carried the burden of integrating the Middle East economies into the global economy . Also the EU was active in the Middle East economic conferences in Morocco , Jordan , Egypt , and Qatar . And beside funding and supporting many of these activities , the EU has been the largest financial sponsor of of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) that amounted to $ 650 million (1994 - 1999) in addition to emergency funding for the growing Palestinian needs that resulted from the Israeli closure of the Palestinian territories since 1996 .

Third , the EU launched a far reaching initiative under the banner of " The Mediterranean Partnership " in Barcelona in November 1995 . The Barcelona Declaration put forward three areas of cooperation : a) political and security cooperation in the areas of arms control , regional security , fight against terrorism , organized crime , and drugs ; b) economic cooperation by establishing a cross the Mediterranean a free trade area by the year 2010 , creating a favourable climate for investment , technology transfer , and protecting the environment ; c) cooperation in the areas of culture and social development in such a way that enhances democracy , civil society , and respect for human rights . The EU committed ECU 4685 million for the Mediterranean Partnership during 1995 - 1999 . In a way the EU initiative was complimenting the other Middle East initiatives whether in the multilateral negotiations or in the economic conferences by adding Syria and Lebanon to the process of Middle East transformation ; and

adding new areas for cooperation such as the fight against terror , crime , and drugs ; trade ; and political and social development .

However , despite this growing European record in the Middle East ; the record remains insufficient in seriously influencing the Arab - Israeli peace process . In fact , the deterioration in the process since the elections of the Israeli right wing government in 1996 was to affect negatively the Barcelona initiative . The European initiative to transform the Middle East from geo - politics to geo-economics could not escape the same fate of the American sponsored initiatives .

II. THE ARAB - ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

This in turn calls for a serious reexamination of the peace process .Indeed , it is high time after the very recent Israeli elections to rethink the process and find out the deficiencies that led to reaching the deadlock that in turn handicapped the smooth evolution of EMP in all its directions . These deficiencies can be summed up in the following :

First , the philosophy of the process is based on gradualism and the mutual learning of the honest intentions of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples to coexist with each other . Although this philosophy might have a merit and indicators to support , it gave those who oppose the process on religious or historical grounds the opportunity to sabotage it at a very small cost ; and thus raising serious questions among the majority about the intentions of the other .

The second deficiency is related to the frame of reference of the entire process which is often ignored in the negotiations to reach agreements , the negotiations to implement the agreements , and the negotiations to implement every item in the agenda for implementation . The Security Council Resolution 242 put clearly the formula for exchanging land for peace in which Israel will withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967 in exchange for peace which will allow for the Palestinians the right of self determination ; a principle that Israel accepted implicitly when it recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people . However , during the prolonged negotiations , Israel , more often than not , will ignore this frame of reference and act as if the West Bank and Gaza and the Golan are disputed areas in which it has the right to settle and annex on the ground of security , sometimes , or in religious or economic bases , in other times . .

The third deficiency is related to the structural imbalance of power that is surrounding the negotiations . Israel has secured itself a position of superiority in conventional and non-conventional weapons that led to a determination to have peace in the Middle East under the fear of the Israeli use or the threat of use of massive military power . In a way , Israeli settlement policy has been a reflection of this reality .Israeli peace under the Israeli gun which is the worst nightmare for Arab , Palestinian in particular , national security . In fact , in an interview

after interview , the outgoing Israeli Prime Minister will define Israeli peace with Arab countries , including that with Egypt , in terms of deterrence , power politics and Israeli military superiority , ignoring completely the notion of withdrawal from Arab territories as the basis for peace .

The fourth deficiency is a direct result of the obsession of the current leadership and elites in the region with geo - politics over geo- economics . For them , history is always defined in terms of the past not in terms of the future . There is no parallel in the Middle East to the founding fathers of the European Community . Even , when Shimon Peres , the former Prime Minister of Israel called for " a New Middle East " , his ideas were mocked not only in Arab countries but also in Israel . Consequently , the elements of geo - economics in the peace process , in terms of the multilateral negotiations or the economic conference or the Mediterranean initiative , were dealt with as a concession to take from Arab countries , as a test of will from Israel , and an area of crisis management for other countries . The end result for this deficiency has been the lack of strategic understanding among the leadership in the region about its direction and future ; and the absence of " zealots " who may crusade for Mediterranean partnership or Middle Eastern community .

The fifth deficiency has been that the peace process was always a government to government business while people were absent all together . Even when normalization was envisioned , it was so in terms of economic gains that may inspire Arabs and Israelis to accept each other . However , both peoples are not merely economic animals that look for gains in the open market of global capitalism . Nor are they indulgent only in the pursuit of happiness to the degree of over looking historical and cultural complexes that control their lives . For that , it was extremely difficult for Israelis to overlook the historical legacy of the struggle between the few Jews against the many gentiles who crushed their dignity over centuries . And as the present is a mere extension of the past , it was easy to imagine , the Arabs , their fellow Semites , as the extension of the powerful many who are determined to push them to the sea . For that also , it was more extremely difficult for the Arabs to overlook the historical legacy of colonialism that made a few of colonial soldiers dominating their lives for centuries by the sheer use of military power and technological prowess . Israel , here could fit neatly to confirm the bloody experience with its military and technological superiority and its close association to the West . An Arab will easily recall the question that was asked by an Algerian Sheikh when he was told that the French colonial troops had actually come to Algeria to spread Western civilization and modernity . The Sheikh asked : " But why have they brought all this gunpowder " . Hearing all the talk about peace with Israelis , a modern day Arab will ask the same question ; only replacing gunpowder by nuclear bombs .

The sixth difficiency is brought by the American paradoxical role in the negotiations . In one hand , the U.S the major mediator in the Arab - Israeli conflict from the October 1973 onward . It was the country that supervised the

Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty in 1979 . It was the country that designed and looked after the Madrid peace process whether in its bi - lateral or multilateral sides and in in 1994 accomplished another peace treaty between Israel and Jordan . Even when the Oslo accords were accomplished far away in Norway , the U.S was soon to take over the entire process . In fact , the U.S has guarded its position as the sole mediator in the process enthusiastically and looked suspiciously at any other mediating efforts from Europe or USSR or recently Russia as either a complicating factor to its efforts or outright subversive .

On the other hand , the U.S. , because of its domestic politics , is not a fair third party to the conflict . The influence of the American Jewish community in American politics is far reaching ; and , hence , more often than not , American national interests are defined in terms of Israeli interests . This , in turn , handicaps American mediating efforts in such a way that make it at times in need of mediation between the American administration and the American Jewish community ; and in other times between the U. S . and Israel . Furthermore , the U.S. is a global power , and after the end of the Cold War is the only remaining superpower with worldwide responsibilities and interests . The time and interest , consequently , that the U.S. administration can sustain for the Middle East peace process is not limitless . This factor is also complicated by the American presidential and congressional election cycles which create mediating vacuum in critical times of the negotiations .

Although the lack of progress in the Arab - Israeli peace process was a major reason in retarding the European initiative , other reasons remain valid . First , despite the growing process of the European integration , the EU is not a state that is capable of defining interests and formulating a coherent foreign policy . Therefore , EU policy towards the Arab - Israeli peace process has been following the least common denominator among European states . From an Arab point of view , while EU declarations on the principles of the Arab - Israeli settlement are satisfactory in general ; the EU ever closer relationship with Israel puts into question the credibility of these declarations . Furthermore , the EU member states did not speak with one voice when major issues in these declarations , like the Israeli settlement policy , were put to voting in the UN general assembly . This , in turn , was to put serious limitations on Ambassador Morationos mission in the Middle East . In fact , he has to keep his moves not only acceptable from the major parties to the Middle East conflict ; but also to make acceptable for major European powers .

Second , the EU attempt to stay close and complementarity to the US moves in the Middle East was an abdication of European responsibilities and in many ways interests . In many ways also , European efforts were involuntary being affected by the US domestic constrains which tend to formulate its moves according to the wishes of the Jewish lobby and hence the Israeli government . In his mandate to stay close to the US , the European version of Dennis Ross , as Ambassador Morationos usually would describe himself , could not depart ,

except in the margins , from the American text of peace making in the Middle East .

Third , the European efforts emphasized geo- economic concerns much more than geo - political agenda of the Middle East . In a region that still in the process of transformation , these efforts could not be sufficient . Neither the Israelis nor the Arabs could sacrifice their geo -political agenda on the alter of economic gains . In fact , European efforts should be facilitating the peace process and should not be a substitute to it .

Taking the deficiencies in the Arab - Israeli peace process and the limitations in the European behaviour into consideration , Europe is faced with a strategic choice in the Middle East between benevolent indifference and constructive response to Middle Eastern concerns . The case for benevolent indifference can be supported by the fact that Europe itself is undergoing a process of transformation of its own .In the last few years , the foreign policies of European countries and the EU have been concentrating on four areas : a) the consolidation of the European integration experience that it may very well take it to the 21st century for political maturation ; b) the consolidation of the world capitalist system through the administration of cross Atlantic and WTO towards the full globalization of the system; c) neutralizing possibilities of destabilising international security that may have resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union , and attempting to integrate the ex-Soviet bloc into the world capitalist order through the expansion of NATO and opening the door of the EU for Eastern European countries ; and d) preventing regional crises from disturbing world development as the possible case with the Bosnian War , the war in Kosovo , the Arab- Israeli conflict and the conflict in the Gulf .

The European attitudes towards the Middle East have put the Middle East crisis in the last area of concern . All in all European policies have been successful . As Israeli security and acceptance in the area have been attainable , and Gulf security and the cheap oil flows to the West , and Europe in particular , have been guaranteed , the European major interests have been secured . Over and above , the Middle East , with its level of development , does not offer a tempting lucrative market except in arms supplies which is also achievable . As the oil prices declined sharply and as the West has learned to deal with the energy crisis of the 1970s , the Middle East has become less important . Arms supplies , however , particularly from the US ,France and UK , have been flowing to the area in large sums in the past two decades .

The case for constructive response should , however , be more tempting . First , the Western need for the Arab and Middle Eastern oil will continue well to the coming century . A recent study by the Houston- based consulting firm indicates that world oil demand is forecasted to continue rising in the future . In East and South Asia alone demand is projected to grow by 3.5% per year through 2000 before levelling off to around 2% annually in the fifteen years to 2015 . The study expects the Middle East to provide a full 80% of this incremental demand ,

or about 8.5 mn b/d in the next 20 years , over and above what it is providing today . Also , the US Defence Department issued a report in May 1995 outlining " enduring strategic interests " in the Middle East . The study points out that the world will become even more dependent on Gulf oil in the early 21st century than it is today .

Second , the Middle East is undergoing a painful process of transformation that breeds violence and disintegration . No matter what the reasons for this state of affair are , the West particularly Europe will not be far away from the results . Fundamentalist , and nationalist violence of all sorts will not be confined to the Middle East region . The case of Algeria is not but a rehearsal for more to come . For their proximity to Europe geographically as well as historically , the events in the Middle East have always a spill over impact in the North of the Mediterranean .

Third , the Middle East has the potential of being a lucrative economic partner . It has been in the past during the oil boom days and it could be even more so in the future . With major economic reforms , which some of it is already underway , the Middle East market will be even more lucrative .

If Europe opted for constructive response , it will have to take more daring and active role than it is taking today . It is expected , however, that Europe will be able to do so the more its integrative process will mature . Yet , even now Europe could do more . What Europe can do for the resolution of the Arab - Israeli conflict ? . Naturally , any answer to such complicated question should meet the following requirements : a) it should contribute to basic European interests in the region ; b) it should be accepted by the parties concerned in the region and beyond ; c) it should be in harmony with the basic global transformations in the post Cold War era ; and d) the cost of the European role should be accepted because in politics , as in life , there is no free lunch . Any European effective role will require trade offs and a price to pay .The general guidelines for European actions are two folds : a) Europe should add teeth to its conciliatory positions towards both the Arabs and Israelis . European declarations should be supported not only be rewards for compliance of the major agreements but also by a gradual process of possible punishments in the case of non - compliance . Europe has the economic leverage to do exactly that ; b) Europe should reach a strategic understanding with the US regarding the Middle East as the case with Bosnia and Kosovo , Eastern Europe and the ex - USSR bloc . To come to that strategic understanding , EU should open dialogue with the US Congress and the American Jewish community . The purpose of this strategic understanding should be the faithful implementation of the agreements that was mediated and approved by both Europe and the US .

If these two guidelines were followed , Europe should harmonize with the US an initiative that include the following :

1 - Fast track negotiations for the permanent resolution of the Palestinian question on the basis of allowing the right of self determination for the Palestinian

people including their right for statehood .

2 - The faithful implementation of of the Oslo accords on time and in place .

3 - A moratorium on all settlement activities bending the resolution of the settlements issue in the permanent status negotiations . The guiding principle for these negotiations should be a firm implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 and the land for peace formula .

4 - An immediate resumption of negotiations in the Syrian and Lebanese tracks from the last point that was reached at in February 1996 . When negotiations are resumed , they should be in foreign ministerial level .

5 - A crack down on all terrorist organizations in Palestinian territories and in Israel . No party has the right to allow for making shrines or heroes for those who killed innocent civilians or make incitement against the religion or the culture of the other party . Terrorists should not have a veto power over negotiations which should continue .

6 - Resumption of the multilateral negotiations in all their aspects with the aim of establishing a Middle East economic community and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction .

7 - Activating the regional mechanism to face terrorism by both sides; a mechanism that was established in the Sharm El - Sheikh summit for peace making in the Middle East in March 1996 .

This package of simultaneous steps should allow for reversing the trend for conflict making to the trend of peace making . By accelerating the process for the final status negotiations , the time span for the fundamentalist opposition to sabotage it will be much less . This will be possible only , if the final goal for negotiations is clear and based on the total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories in exchange for total peace between Israel and Arab countries , and a two states solution for the Palestinian question ; hence the inevitability of a Palestinian state . In this respect , the moratorium on building settlements , the resumption of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks , the resumption of the multilateral negotiations , and fighting terrorism are prerequisites for a successful Israeli - Palestinian and Israeli - Syrian/Lebanese negotiations . In sum , an active and assertive peace process is a precondition for charting a better future for the Middle East which is another precondition to a healthy and growing EMP.

Fortunately , there are no major disagreements over this package between Europe and the U.S . However , the limitations in the American active role , as outlined above , give room for a more concerted efforts to harmonize policies towards the Middle East and the Mediterranean which are hampered by the lack of progress in the Arab - Israeli peace process . One possible avenue is to conduct a Dayton type conference to enforce not only the agreements on the Palestinian - Israeli track , resume all other bi - lateral and multilateral tracks ; but also to create a general strategic understanding on other major issues of strategic importance south of the Mediterranean . In a way , that could be an enlargement

of the Madrid process to include the different initiatives that are currently underway from the U.S , Europe , and lately NATO .

III. THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE

Another area that calls for cooperation and strategic understanding across Atlantic and across the Mediterranean is the issue of arms race particularly in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) . It should be recognized that there are multiple reasons for the possession of nuclear weapons and other types of WMD in the Middle East . These include existential disputes with other states in the region , perceived security requirement due to asymmetric conventional weapons buildup , and perceived needs to be able to raise the costs of intervention in the region by outside powers .

So far the European and American efforts has concentrated on the Iraqi and Iranian WMD capabilities while ignoring the Israeli ones which open the door for mistrust and lack of confidence in the moral standards of Europe and the US . It has to be said here that Israel has a very sophisticated and expanding WMD supported by a space based surveillance system , missile capabilities of the Jericho and Shavit series , and the only anti - missile - missile Arrow system . In addition to other factors that reflect the conflictful history of the Middle East , the Israeli WMD buildup has been behind the initiation of counter armament programs which are so far limited in size and scope in comparison to the Israeli already deployed systems . Most of the missile programs are based on the limited capability Scud - B/C systems . The Iranian programs are still in the experimental phase especially those heading to long range or heavy payloads as in the newly tested Shihab missile .

However , the Arab and Iran are actually subjected to severe measures by the International regimes prohibiting missile and advanced technologies proliferation on a selective bases . With the exception of Mauritania , Oman , and UAE , all Arab states are parties to the NPT . These three countries have no nuclear facilities that require international safeguards . The Iranian record in adhering to the international regimes controlling the proliferation of WMD is good compared to that of Israel . Iran did not only sign and ratify the NPT, CWC, BTWC , and sign the CTBT , but also it was the first country in the Middle East to notify and eliminate its CWs stockpiles under international supervision .

As the Middle East in the south and East of the Mediterranean is one of the most conflictful regions in the world since the second world war (with only 8% of world population , the Middle East has had 25% of the world conflicts) , the arms race particularly in WMD and missile technologies is highly destabilizing for the security of the Middle East and the Mediterranean regions . This calls for an attention of EMP , NATO Mediterranean dialogue , and cross Atlantic strategic understandings with the objective of creating a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East . Such WMDFZ must be a

key objective to which all countries of the region should dedicate themselves . Some African Arab states of the Middle East are already members of the African nuclear weapons free zone . The key task in the creation of a regional WMDFZ is not only to eliminate a particular WMD program of any given state in the region , but to devise a comprehensive system of security where all states in the region believe that they can give up the option of such weapons without detriment to their security .

IV. CONFIDENCE BUILDING

Cross Atlantic and cross Mediterranean cooperation and understandings will not succeed without a confidence building process across the sea and ocean . It has to be remembered that history is not recalled in the south Mediterranean in terms of cooperation but in terms of conflicts and invasions .One of the main features of Arab history is foreign domination . Ever since the Persian conquest in 525 BC of territories now known as the Arab Mashrik states and Egypt , foreign domination had been a marked feature of Arab history. Arab evolution as a nation States have occurred under the shadow of conflict with external powers . From the north, over the Mediterranean, came the Macedonians, Romans, Crusaders, and later the Spanish, Italian, French and British invading forces; from the north and east, Persians, Byzantines, the Mongols , Turks and finally Israelis, marched towards different Arab territories. This legacy moulded the fears of the Arabs. In contemporary terms, the threats to Arab security have been defined in terms of the fear of Western domination. The Arab struggle against British , French and Italian colonialism and US hegemony, operating under the disguise of the Baghdad Pact or the Eisenhower Doctrine, were long the main features of Arab security perceptions. Even more important, the creation , with Western support, of the state of Israel in 1948 constituted a major security threat to The Arab World .

Whether these perceptions matches the realities of the world of today in the post cold war era or not is not of concern here . What is of concern , however , is that these perceptions are an important factor that it has to be taken into consideration in constructing any EMP or NATO Mediterranean dialogue . The notion of the " Clash of Civilizations " , the new NATO Doctrine , NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and US and UK strikes against Iraq are raising concerns among different intellectual and political circles south of the Mediterranean regarding the future " hegemonic " plans of the west in general and the US in particular .

The EU and NATO attitudes and behaviour in the areas of the Arab - Israeli conflict , and the issue of WMD on the basis of one standard of morality and international law will be helpful in reducing these fears and perceptions which are the field day of all sorts of fundamentalism . Dialogue and cooperation with regional partners south of the Mediterranean , as the case with peace keeping in

Bosnia , will be helpful in eliminating bad omens and reducing fears .

However , for long term cooperation and understandings , there is no substitute for reconciling NATO future plans in and out of area with UN based international system . For south Mediterranean countries the UN system is perceived as the guarantor of a the promise of a more democratic international system that they can participate in its decision making process . Decisions of global strategic implications that are taken by NATO or the G - 8 are signals of a oligopolistic international order that works for the benefit of the rich and powerful .

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TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER KOSOVO

Simon SERFATY

A longer version of this paper is being written with Harold Brown, who served as Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and is now a Counselor at CSIS.

The War in Kosovo is about the unfinished business of Europe, namely: the many pre-Cold War legacies of ethnic and territorial conflicts, overidden after World War II by the competition between the two superpowers, but resurrected in parts of the Continent in the wake of the demise of one and the rise of the other; the inability of European states to attend to these conflicts by themselves, for lack of institutional unity, military capabilities, and political will; and Europe's vulnerability to conditions outside Europe, especially south of the Mediterranean in the Greater Middle East. By drawing attention to what remains to be done fifty years after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and on the year when the euro was launched, the war in Kosovo raises starkly some broader questions of transatlantic security relations on the eve of a new century: what missions and what forces, who leads and who pays? These questions are likely to dominate the security debate that is poised to erupt on both sides of the Atlantic when the air war over Kosovo ends or pauses.

An agreement will not be reached too soon, however. Should the air war continue into the summer -- that is, past the upcoming US-EU, EU, and G-8 Summits -- an increasingly destructive, indiscriminate, and aimless air campaign against Serbia and an openly devastated and mainly empty Kosovo will raise public doubts over the moral ambiguity of the war, and, therefore, its legitimacy and even that of NATO. Echoes of "destroying the village in order to save it."

Rejecting this outcome, and assuming, therefore, credible (though limited) success of the current military operations in the Balkans, at no further cost to the NATO allies and partners (meaning no ground war), a few elements of the upcoming transatlantic security debate can be identified for the future of transatlantic security relations after Kosovo.

II

As was the case before the war, NATO will remain, *faute de mieux*, the security institution of choice in Europe, with the United States playing the leading role as a matter of fact within the alliance, but also as a matter of perception outside the alliance. In addition, NATO will continue to be the principal vehicle for insuring against an outburst of geopolitical revisionism from Russia (possible but not probable), and as the best (or least undesirable) way to avoid renationalization of defense and security policies and organizations among its European members and nonmembers. But how will such NATO primacy and U.S. leadership be asserted after Kosovo (and Bosnia)?

Areas in which transatlantic security interests are at stake vary in importance, in geographic remoteness, and in the nature of the relations that the allies have with these regions. Based on these differences, the United States should keep the lead in traditional security relations with Russia. Whether the issue is concern about the possible leakage of weapons of mass destruction beyond Russian borders, or the development and deployment of theater ballistic missile defense, or, more broadly, how to encourage Russian development in the direction of democracy, a market economy, and a community of security with the West, Russia is too big, too strong, and too dangerous to be left to Europeans at this time. To be sure, the effectiveness of America's management of Russia since the end of the Cold War can be questioned, but such criticism should be cause for more transatlantic consultation about this country rather than a European argument against the U.S. lead or an American argument against the insufficiencies of EU policies.

Yet any U.S. lead on security matters toward Russia and other CIS countries (including Ukraine and Bielorussia) should ne reinforced by Europe's own contributions to their integration into the open, affluent, democratic, and peaceful space built in Western Europe during the Cold War. Thus, that the EU rather than NATO would take the lead in enlarging the Western space to the Baltic region, beginning with Estonia, strengthens the Western security commitment to that region without challenging Russia's security sensitivities. Throughout the unfinished part of Europe most generally, the roles of NATO and EU are complementary, even though EU or NATO membership for most of these states is neither likely nor desirable for the indefinite future.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are now NATO countries that are expected to join the EU by the year 2005 at the earliest (with Slovenia and Estonia). In security terms, they are full members of the Alliance, and the war in Kosovo merely confirmed the limits of their contributions. In economic terms, these countries are also in transition to being part of the West, as they actively prepare for the discipline of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. Prior to the next NATO Summit, in 2001, there should be a credible and open understanding of the processes of NATO and EU enlargement for other European countries as well: whether to complete regional clusters (in Central Europe with Slovakia, for both NATO and the EU), to widen the EU's reach (to the Baltic region, with both Latvia and Lithuania, but also in the Balkans), or to open the NATO door to states whose aspiration for EU membership cannot be immediately fulfilled but whose security contributions will have been demonstrated during the war (like Romania, Bulgaria, and other countries in Southeastern Europe).

Whether post-Kosovo decisions will reflect a sense of urgency, as was the case when the war in Korea accelerated the enlargement of an Alliance that had been started at 12, remains unclear. Suffice it to recall that while Moscow could ignore the inclusion of Greece and even Turkey into NATO in 1952, it responded quickly to the NATO second enlargement that brought the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955, with the Warsaw Pact emerging in a matter of days.

Conditions are more complicated outside of Europe, in the Maghreb through the Middle East and into the Persian Gulf. These complications are not due to differing goals, competitive interests, or adversarial policies among the members of the Alliance. On the whole, both sides of the Atlantic have common goals and compatible interests in the entire area. Rather, disagreements emerge over the choice of policies most likely to achieve these goals, especially when they entail the use of military force, or more precisely, U.S. military force. In short, while the United States and the states of Europe share common interests in the region, these interests are not shared evenly; and while this is true among the nations of Europe as well, intra-European differences are usually lesser than transatlantic differences. These differences strongly argue against the ability to develop a robust, credible, and dependable NATO strategy in these areas south of the Mediterranean. Indeed, if anything, the NATO operation in Kosovo has weakened a case that was already weak before the war.

Still, transatlantic policies in the Greater Middle East can at least be coordinated in such a way as to keep them compatible and make them complementary even when they cannot be identical. The 1991 Gulf War is a case in point. A forceful and focused U.S. leadership invites a sustainble followership from Europe, without diplomatic irritants and to the extent of their capabilities. The opening to Iran in 1998-1999 is another exemple of transatlantic cooperation, and so are patterns of Euro-Atlantic consultation in the Middle East, notwthstanding the most recent statement on the Arab-Israeli conflict issued at the EU Berlin Summit in March 1999, and the subsequent German letter on the status of Jerusalem. Like the United States, the states of Europe have too much at stake in that part of the world to relinquish their influence to their partner; but they also have too much experience and enough credibility in the region for the United States to deny them the exercize of that influence.

For the United States and the states of Europe, a constructive dialogue about these regions would begin with a "kinder and gentler" discourse about each other. Although the Europeans may not be indispensible to the resolution of America's major concerns in the Persian Gulf, they are not a part of the problem. Although American and European views of the Arab-Israeli conflict may not always coincide, they are usually not conflictual. Although Americans may not be directly relevant to the resolution of tensions in North Africa which are vital to some EU states, they are not a source of these tensions. To be sure, a constructive euro-atlantic dialogue for these regions, pursued by NATO and the EU, as well as some of their individual members, would not end rivalries and differences across the Atlantic and within Europe. Yet, it should be all too obvious that a consensus is more likely to emerge, and tensions less likely to escalate, if consultation precedes decisions; and it should be all too obvious, too, that these decisions will be enforced more effectively if they have the blessing of both institutions and their members rather than without it.

Policy coordination in these regions may also be sensitive to the outcome of the war in Kosovo. With both sides of the Atlantic likely to be generally dissatisfied when looking back at the prewar course of events, there should be more discussion of ways in which unity could be sought before a crisis erupts and, therefore, while it can still be avoided. Pending the availability of an institution that can speak on behalf of Europe, like the European Commission and the European Central

Bank, there should be a US-EU coordination council dedicated to defining and enforcing common or complementary security policies in these vital regions. How the EU side of such a council would be developed is a matter that should be left to Europeans, although it would be expected that its size would remain small and its membership would be kept relevant. That the idea of a *directoire* put forward by de Gaulle's France was at best premature does not make it irrelevant now even though the idea would need more refinement with regard to both its core membership and ad hoc members (the so-called *géométrie variable*).

Outside of Europe and the Mediterranean, Africa south of the Sahara is a traditional security issue for Europe. Unlike what Churchill used to claim, the imperial foray of European great powers was hardly undertaken in a fit of absent-mindedness. Americans cannot be entirely indifferent to this part of the world, of course, whether as a matter of heritage or on grounds or principle, and, for some states in Africa, as a matter of interests. Indeed, in the past the United States often spoke with a principled voice of reason and hope, and it did occasionally play a significant role -- though usually in close coordination with other European states. Still, in Africa, where NATO and its assets will never be of much relevance, the Europeans and their Union should continue to lead, with U.S. support. Conversely, in the other major region of possible flashpoints, Northeast Asia, Europe's immediate security interests are less tangible than those of the United States, and the region is too remote for the European allies to be able to contribute much to dealing with explicit security threats.

III

Now as always, security threats remain difficult to anticipate as to their nature, scope, timing, and location. Who could have anticipated the war in Vietnam in the 1960s, the oil wars of the 1970s, the dramatic upheavals of the late 1980s, and the conflicts in the Gulf and the Balkans in the 1990s? Nor, therefore, can the responses to such security threats, and the risks incurred in enforcing these responses, be specified in advance. Nonetheless, some principles of action can be laid down.

First, an explicit political endorsement by NATO is valuable and even necessary, whether the members act as an alliance or as an ad hoc coalition of the willing, in Europe but also in adjacent

areas, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, because the use of European facilities and NATO-committed and NATO-based forces is needed for effective U.S. operation in these areas or in the Persian Gulf, the active cooperation of European allies, even in the absence of a formal NATO position, will continue to be important. The United States may be a "peerless power," but even powers without peers do not welcome interventions without allies. Post Kosovo, there will be transatlantic tensions, but the unity maintained with the United States during the war should not be overlooked: it was achieved at a significant political cost as fragile center-left coalitions were tested by ancient anti-NATO, anti-force, and even some anti-American feelings.

Second, European military capability without U.S. participation, either within or outside the NATO umbrella, is very limited when needed for combat against a substantial opponent. During the earlier post-Cold War days, Europe tried but failed to meet its test of maturity in Bosnia: the EU's pace of economic and monetary integration has remained far ahead of military and political integration. Europe's new bid for a defense identity is now made especially serious by the lead role played by Britain. Working together with an openly cooperative France, Britain asserts and even reinforces the transatlantic credibility of a Common European Defense Initiative (CEDI).

As shown in Kosovo, Europe's capabilities are lacking, to say the least. The issue is not one of money: European defense expenditures total two-thirds those of the United States, but the resulting forces capable of operating outside NATO territory are at best one-tenth those of the United States. Even more than a matter of budget allocations, Europe's defense insufficiencies have to do with a lack of will and efficiency: the will, that is, to spend that money more efficiently, on systems that can be used rather than on systems whose principal functions appear to be preservation of jobs and duplication of American capabilities rather than to add to the capabilities of the West.

Third, although future combat operations will continue to be governed by political constraints they ought not be managed -- either in military strategy or in choice of bombing targets -- by a committee of 19 member states, and more to come. This is a challenge to common sense. The decision to use force, and its enforcement, should bear some resemblance to the contributions made.

In any case, Kosovo is likely to make future NATO decisions to act even more difficult because of the considerable risks that intervention has revealed for each of the member states. For one, Kosovo exposed the myth of wars that can be waged without pain. Wars still kill people, including both civilians and soldiers. The Gulf War helped give a contrary impression, not only because the levels of Western casualties were especially low but also because the enemy had been both demonized and de-humanized -- and, accordingly, could be killed without taking notice. In contrast, the Serbs are sufficiently viewed as a part of Europe and its history to be left with a Western identity even as they are bombed in the name of their demonized leadership. Future decisions to act will also be made more difficult to reach in common as the most likely theatres of possible conflicts are found farther away from Europe -- North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf, plus East Asia where even European states with global ambitions have no significant capability or political weight.

Thus, the war in Kosovo may prove to be both the first and the last NATO war. Instead, coalitions of the willing endorsed by the NATO political structure, using NATO-committed military assets (which means principally U.S. assets for any significant effort), and employing some, but not all, elements of NATO military structure are likely to be the option of choice in the future. In most cases, these would involve forces from all or most members with significant force projection capability (including Britain and France, aside from the United States), token forces from some of the other larger powers (including Germany, Italy, perhaps Spain and Poland), and base access and support from those whose geographical or other special conditions relative to the conflict might dictate (including the new NATO members). The other NATO countries might join in blessing the decision, but they would not be expected to participate in the execution of the operation and, therefore, in approving its detailed scenario of enforcement. A UN or OSCE blessing of the Article 4 security goal of the operation (depending on its geography) could be invoked where feasible, but the active role of either institution would begin essentially after the end of combat -- in political stabilization (peacekeeping, elections) and economic reconstruction.

During the next few years -- say, until the year 2007 which will mark the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties -- the United States will have to provide in many (or most) cases the airlift, the

command, control and communications systems, the satellite and airborne sources of surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence, and the system that ties them all together, even where the strike forces are principally or solely European. There is just no escape for either side of the Atlantic from this dependence, and rather than fighting it all countries should strive to accomodate it more readily and more credibly. As a result, for major efforts especially, the United States would need to be a central part of any coalition of the willing even if it fails to contribute any strike forces. This can create political tensions, especially in cases where European combat forces are involved and incurring losses while U.S. ground combat forces are not. Yet, even when Americans are not actively involved, they would inevitably remain the guarantor of last resort for any such coalition. As has been shown repeatedly in the 20th century (and not just for both World Wars) an America that is not present early in a war can, and will, join in later, if and when needed.

Nevertheless, in some cases the major European powers should take the lead (and bring the other Europeans along with them) in terms of setting the political agenda and carrying out the major military actions. This was the model in Bosnia until it proved insufficient in practice, and until a U.S. intervention became indispensible, first in the military context of NATO air strikes and next in the diplomatic setting hastily organized at Dayton. To this extent, Bosnia confirmed that Europe's time might be near but it was not yet here. Yet, Kosovo may help rewind Europe's clock: while the war points to one half of Europe's unfinished business in the East, the inability to wage and end that war without the United States points to the other half of Europe's unfinished business in the West.

In other words, after Kosovo and beyond (but together with) NATO, the states of Europe should pursue the development of their military capabilities with the same vigor as they pursued the development of their monetary capability. As was the case with the euro, there should be criteria of security convergence, including over such areas as the percentage of defense expenditures relative to the gross domestic product or, at the very least, percentage of the defense budget spent on such key line items as acquisition and modernization, or over such other areas as the limits of state control in the defense sector in order to expedite the emergence of a true "Europe-Defense," or, finally, such questions as the professionalization of Europe's armies. As long as the United States continues to

provide the bulk of the forces needed for NATO operations, small and large alike, and as long as Europe's voice continues to carry the cacophonic sounds of so many individual member states whose eloquence fails to mask their impotence, it will remain difficult to give principal policy responsibility to Europe and its Union.

The goal is not to achieve military parity across the Atlantic, but to come to enough European sufficiency to permit a devolution of responsibility and, accordingly, authority. Thus, in the case of Africa, except its northeast corner, Europe's ability to lead should come together with an ability to provide the bulk of any military forces, whether peacemaking or peacekeeping. In the Middle East, the power requirements are such as to give the United States a convincing claim for leadership, even though some parties in the region may occasionally attempt to manipulate transatlantic differences to their advantage. In parts of the Eastern Mediterranean, Britain and France have the historical connections and some power projection capability to play a political and perhaps at least a marginal military role. Finally, in the Persian Gulf, where the political differences between Europe and the United States may be a bit less, an ad hoc coalition with a clear U.S. lead is appropriate, as it was in fact before and during the Gulf War.

The movement toward a more equal division of both political authority and military capability between the United States and the other NATO allies is a fundamental element of the broad prescriptions suggested here. The two elements go together: until the European members can muster a convincing autonomous force projection capability, they will not be able to operate independently of the United States in situations where U.S. and European political interests either diverge or are so very different in magnitude as to justify one side of the Atlantic to act without the other. And where transatlantic political interests coincide but the views on supporting military strategy or tactics differ, a substantial European force projection capability will add weight to European views.

IV

After the war in Kosovo has ended on reasonably succesful terms, and even as the conditions of reconstruction and reconciliation in the region begin to be discussed, the postwar transatlantic

security debate will divide the two schools of Atlanticists and *séparatistes* (unilateralists) who have clashed often in the past. On each side of the Atlantic, there will be much criticism of the other, for the facts or failings of leadership and followership. As always, the states of Europe hope for access to more American power but on European terms; the United States, meanwhile, hope for an ever more united and stronger Europe that remains nonetheless dependent on U.S. preferences. For such a debate, the most compelling vision statement begins with an appeal to stay the course. More needs to be done in Europe by both NATO and the EU, and all their members, and it must be done on behalf of U.S. and European interests which are often, but not always, common. The war in Kosovo may leave much irritation and even anger in transatlantic security relations and intra-European political relations. But there was also much irritation and anger throughout the Cold War, while it was waged and as it was being won. In the Balkans and elsewhere, the post-Cold War uncertainties and instabilities need time to be cleared and satisfactorily resolved. Because the time needed will not be short, it would be well to start now.

May 18, 1999

These remarks are part of a larger paper that is still in an early draft form only, and for which we welcome suggestions for future revisions and corrections.

AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND THE INTERVENTION IN THE KOSOVO CRISIS: A NEW NATO?

Uwe NERLISH

Outline

1. Will there be a new NATO?

The trivial answer is yes, of course. NATO has changed all the time since 1950, it will continue to change: it is reflecting the reality of a changing set of interests and commitments on the part of a changing number of actors in a changing strategic environment.

2. Will the Washington summit outcomes and/or the Operation "Allied Force" in Kosovo and/or the outcome of that crisis shape the new NATO?

There is no trivial answer:

- The implementation of the Washington initiatives has hardly begun. Its outcome is uncertain. And even if results meet optimistic expectations they will hardly shape the NATO for the twenty-first century. In fact, no outcome will because NATO will continue to reflect the reality of the security interests of 19 plus *x* nations: it will continue to change or wither way. Yet there is also a set of specific needs for NATO in order to remain relevant. Some have to do with the outcomes of the Washington Summit; some have hardly been addressed.
- As for the Kosovo conflict, NATO is seen to have faced a choice between no intervention which would have marginalised NATO for the time being and exacerbated fissions within NATO and some intervention with diverging interests

> and expectations as to the pace, risks and outcomes of the intervention. And once the quick success many within NATO had anticipated failed to come true, NATO was once again facing a choice between continuing its restricted campaign at the risk of increasing domestic opposition, though with uncertain outcomes, and some version of unilateral ending or uncertain interruption of the military campaign that would have tended to leave NATO in even greater troubles. And at this stage, after nine weeks of air campaign, yet another choice is emerging: between changing the military strategy so as to engage in some version of ground campaign (i.e. securing a large safe haven to allow the return of refugees) which would almost certainly weaken political support in most, if not all member states involved, and, on the other hand, giving up on NATO's well-defined demands. There is a dim hope that Belgrade will give up before NATO has to make a tough choice.

The impact on NATO and the course of its development into some NATO 21 is heavily dependent on these choices and outcomes. The impact will be substantial, but the range of NATO futures resulting from this is wide. It does, however, include some positive NATO futures. If so, the impact of Kosovo is likely to be much more decisive than the impact of the Washington summit. The major Washington summit documents don't even refer to Kosovo even though it took place some five weeks after the campaign had begun (just like the key Rome documents from 1991 failed to reflect the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union or, in fact, the Gulf War). If Operation "Allied Force" turns into failure NATO's future role and standing will be severely damaged from many perspectives. If NATO prevails, it will boost NATO's development and the current experiences will carry way beyond the scope of what the Washington documents circumscribe.

So what is the answer? The key event is Kosovo, not the Washington summit. The Kosovo outcome will undoubtedly impact on NATO's future no matter what the

outcome turns out to be. If NATO prevails, it will give momentum to the Washington initiatives and, indeed, carry it further along. And, interestingly, in this case some of the Washington initiatives will be essential for NATO's developments, and they will so as milestones on a long way which will require a lot of laborious work before a sustainable alliance able to meet the challenges of the next decade or two will be in place.

3. So what then is the outcome of the Washington summit or rather, what can be expected to help shape NATO's ability to fulfil the purpose and tasks set out in the updated strategic concept? One way to answer this is to compare the outcome against earlier expectations of some major protagonists:

- Along with a mission statement the Strategic Concept was described aforehand by some as a blueprint for the twenty-first century. That is indeed difficult to do for individual member states, let alone for an Alliance of 16 or of 19 for that matter. Most of the actual achievements are aptly described as updates or as frameworks for future developments within or of NATO. And this is no minor achievement.
- Some proposals for the Summit simply have failed to make it. The Defense Industrial Initiative suggested by the US was without much of a chance given that MEADS, i.e. a system in limbo, was the only major trans-Atlantic system involving US efforts and funds and given that in the wake of the Thurmond Act the administration was and still is in the process of imposing absurd restrictions on industrial cooperation across the Atlantic.
- Some have not even been addressed properly or in sufficient measure and largely remained outside the context of Summit outcomes. E.g. the impact of implementing JV 2010 on coalition warfare and interoperability and in the final analysis on NATO's future ability to cooperate militarily and the resulting need for revamping NATO's force planning system constitute first-order unfinished business.

- Some rather implicit results were overshadowed and rendered inconsequential for the time being because of Operation "Allied Force" in Kosovo. This pertains in particular to the belated omission of Russia as the implicit major threat as expressed by the key task of maintaining a "continental balance" in the 1991 Strategic Concept. Russia's withdrawal from the permanent Joint Council, even though it may be of temporary nature, blurred the political relevance of this doctrinal change, however, without, of course, restoring in any sense the need for preparing against Russian aggression in the foreseeable future.

So what then did come out of the Summit? Surely the Marine Band in the Rose Garden would not appropriately play "I got plenty of nothing" as it did on April 4, 1949. These are the more significant results:

- The communiqué is important in that it reflects more subtly the most recent developments, in particular the potential role of the European Union as an actor: contrary to earlier NATO documents and even the language of the Strategic Concept, it establishes a framework for whatever achievements may come out of the EU Cologne Summit in regard to military capabilities and EU-led operations. In effect this means that at long last – following the UK – the United States accepts the EU rather than the abortive WEU as a potential major partner in military affairs, even if this is only the first step on a long journey. This change obviously reflects experiences from Operation "Allied Force".
- The new Strategic Concept highlights the importance of crisis management and crisis operations. In the shadows of the Kosovo intervention this is a statement of fact. However, some qualifications also are important. In the light of recent crisis response operations in the Balkans, it emphasises the importance of consensus (§10) and the need for concurrence with national constitutions of member states (§31). This can be read as a subtle way to bypass the tricky mandate issue. This is seen to pertain also to international affairs in case of humanitarian emergencies (§49). Political control (by whom?) is viewed as imperative at all stages (§32). And, at least in theory, most importantly, it states as an important aim for NATO

"to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage" (§48). This lesson could have been drawn from NATO's role in Croatia, Bosnia and for much too long in Kosovo. However, it remains doubtful whether the traumatic consequences from NATO's failure to act early with limited means and little suffering at that stage will apply in subsequent crises.

- The Defense Capability Initiative will become an interesting litmus test for both the United States (in regard to technological transfer and readiness for joint ventures) and major European countries above all the six "letter of intent countries" (in regard to their readiness to make the necessary changes in current force planning).
- The membership action plan is simply an elegant way to avoid the issue of second round-enlargement candidates. The WMD initiative has long been in the making albeit accompanied with European reluctance. Reinforcement of the PfP program and renewed backing for the EAPC reflect work in progress even if Russian uncertainties following Operation "Allied Force" add a new dimension.

The ESDI initiative (The "I" now reading as "initiative" rather than "identity") has been mentioned before.

- Given the Kosovo intervention, the potential ramifications of that, the Cyprus issue, domestic changes in Algeria and potentially (and with major implications for the peace process) in Israel, the Mediterranean set of issues was essentially left out as a major regional set of issues. Some discussions of the Mediterranean dialogue seemed somewhat disproportionate in this regard. In effect, Operation "Allied Force" with its implications for Italy, Greece, Hungary and some important PfP countries affects much of NATO's southern region, and an assessment of what the impact of the intervention will be on southern European Allies will be among the important lessons to be learned. In fact, the political processes triggered in all European NATO countries involved and indeed in the US are thorough and will result in a different political fabric of the Alliance.

The likelihood of further conflicts on the southern periphery of NATO gives importance to this issue.

What then is the third answer? I guess what one can say at this stage is that, while the summit has hardly shaped a new NATO, the manner in which NATO's major members will handle the result and implement the decisions taken at the summit will influence very considerably the way in which NATO will develop in the coming years.

4. It is not surprising to say that operation Allied Force and its consequences will have a substantially larger impact on NATO's future. To understand just how large that may be one needs to recall that NATO's development has been driven by crisis rather than consensus documents from the very beginning: without the Korean war NATO's military organisation would almost certainly not have been established. Without the Suez crisis political consultation in NATO would not have acquired its central political importance. Without the second Berlin crisis the American shift towards flexibility in response would have occurred with less drama and at a slower pace. Without the Cuban missile crisis the emergence of nuclear arms control as a central Alliance policy would not have occurred the way it has. Without the intervention in the CSSR harmonisation of allies policies towards the USSR would have become almost unmanageable. The impact of Vietnam was altogether destructive. The Gulf war gave new importance to military power after the demise of the Soviet threat and it was the first major application of force in conflict since 1945.

Against this background the Bosnian and in particular the Kosovo experience is bound to be a major driver in how NATO develops. If NATO prevails this will largely be positive albeit with many undercurrents that await future interpretation. If it fails NATO's future will become rather stark. I have referred to this before.

One important fact is that during the Bosnian and especially the Kosovo intervention NATO has already undergone profound changes that will last and unfold if NATO remains on a promising road. This pertains to force planning and operational planning, to jointness and combinedness in allied crisis operations, to the recognition of major military deficits, to budgetary constraints that will hamper force modernisation when it is most needed, to the role of Europe etc., etc.

So, yes Kosovo will shape the next NATO, but given the uncertainty of the outcome of Operation "Allied Force", no one can tell for sure at this point how NATO will look only a year from now.

5. While many issues remain unresolved and while stark uncertainties prevail NATO needs to define its new agenda. The Washington summit has pointed out some directions. But the hard work remains to be done:

- Europe needs to define the role of the EU in security and defence matters – a historic task indeed.
- The inherently unilateralist implementation of JV 2010 will need to be reconciled with more limited European efforts and aims to preserve or establish the capabilities for coalition operations.
- Given the practical priority of crisis operations over Article 5 operations, a growing need exists for US–European efforts to establish the preconditions for allied crisis operations: there will need to be a common approach prior to military action.
- NATO allies on both sides of the Atlantic will have to develop a framework for stabilising the Balkans with some chance for future prosperity and integration into the European mainstream.
- It will also need to prepare for a KFOR that will almost certainly be different from SFOR.

- It will want to rebuild constructive relations with Russia, which will above all depend on how Russia herself will develop.

These are just some of the outstanding issues. If NATO is in fact the sort of self-regulatory Euro-Atlantic system referred to at the outset of my talk it will cope in some way with this agenda. And this kind of laborious process is precisely the stuff from which the Atlantic Alliance has been made of all along. Given the current state of the United States and Europe there is no reason for despair.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE NEW NATO
THE EUROPEAN VISION: POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Roberto ALIBONI

The new strategic concept (NSC), approved by the Atlantic Alliance at the occasion of its 50th anniversary, emphasizes threats and risks put to NATO's broad security by a set of non conventional factors and the will of the Alliance to intervene to counter such factors in its peripheral and adjoining areas.

The Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas are obviously concerned by this new NATO agenda. In these two areas, security is dealt with today essentially by two policies: the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), with its bilateral and multilateral tracks, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). If the Gulf is included, a third policy must be taken into consideration, i.e. the U.S. military presence in the Gulf area. What could be the implications of the NSC on these policies, in particular the MEPP and EMP? In fact, because of their olistic approach these policies are strongly related to non-conventional security factors and thus more concerned by the NSC than the military presence in the Gulf.

For the time being, the NSC is nothing more than a declaratory policy obviously predicated on NATO traditional deterrence and containment concepts. Whether substantive policies deriving from the NSC will evolve according to NATO traditional strategic thinking or otherwise is something which remains to be seen. In fact, the debate inside the Alliance about the implementation of the NSC towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East is just opening and will have to address a number of well-known differences between Americans and Europeans. NATO unilateral intervention against Serbia cannot pre-empt the result of this debate, which concerns issues as important as the identification of Western policy responses in tune with

concrete requirements and situations in the areas concerned; the role of other institutions with respect to NATO; and that of the United Nations.

The report envisaged by EuroMeSCo aims at providing the European vision with respect to this evolution. This paper outlines the part of the report which will deal with political and security issues affecting Western relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In terms of NSC, it refers to the set of challenges set out in points 22-24 of the document approved in Washington D.C. These challenges are more specifically analyzed by individual papers distributed to participants separately. Which are in the European vision or perceptions the political and security issues characterizing relations across the Mediterranean? Which policy response do they require and which institutions are equipped to deal with them at the best?

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While heavily involved in the disputes and conflicts pertaining to the south-eastern areas of the European continent (Turkey and the Southern Balkans), the Western countries are not directly involved in those concerning the areas south and east of the Mediterranean Sea. Still, conflicts and tensions on the other side of the Mediterranean have an impact on their broad security for a number of reasons:

(1) The presence in the region of political players and ideologies, be they inspired by religion or nationalism, with an exclusive agenda with respect to the West. This attitude to exclusion is rooted in history, from the crusades to colonialism and the implantation of the Israeli state. Furthermore, this concrete experience of intrusion combines with a culture strongly predicated on the need of authenticity. Whether because of history, modernism or globalism, the West is perceived by many Arabs as part of the web of factors that give way to their problems. This broad anti-Western attitude makes those who want to cooperate with the West, like governments, liberal intellectuals and firms, walk on a tight rope. It fights and tends to limit Western access and influence as well.

(2) Independently of anti-Western attitudes, the great instability of the area, generated by varying kinds of conflicts and tensions, is in itself a limitation to access, which may affect investments and natural gas supplies as well as tourism.

(3) Tensions and conflicts in the area have considerable spill-over effects, particularly with respect to Europe, like immigration and displacement of people for political reasons as well as political terrorism; furthermore, they link with more general trends like internationally organized crime and trafficking.

(4) The high level of conflict, mistrust and tensions in the area brings about a high level of armaments both conventional and unconventional. Beside other factors, the poor economic performance of the region is more and more favoring the acquisition of WMD. Presently, WMD have less an offensive than a deterrent or interdiction purpose, particularly towards the West. In perspective, however, they may put threats to European countries. Today, they complicate attempts at solving or managing conflicts in the areas south of the Mediterranean Sea.

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In sum, in its security relations with the countries south and east of the Mediterranean Sea, the West is basically facing two challenges: (a) enjoying an easier and less intrusive access to the area, which also means that it has to inspire to and enjoy from Arabs more confidence; (b) seeking to tackle and manage the different kinds of spill-over effects coming from southern areas' instabilities.

As far the first point -i.e. access- is concerned, the most important political challenge is how Western countries can strengthen players open to cooperation without discrediting them domestically. Such domestic reinforcement, according to Western opinion, should essentially rely on governments' ability to establish more pluralistic and democratic polities. In the objective conditions of the region, however, new democratic political regimes can be established only over time. They need a gradual process in which external cooperation has to play a significant role. With respect to cooperation in the political and security field, if the present regimes on the other side of the Mediterranean and in the Middle East have to be helped to walk on

their tight rope and initiate change without being destabilized internally, the Atlantic agenda for cooperation should contemplate the following:

(a) First and foremost, the bilateral tracks of the MEPP must be completed and achieve fair political results in the eyes of all the countries involved. Western security cooperation makes sense from the point of view of both Arabs and Israelis if it is first of all in tune with their national security agendas. If it does and achieves positive results, further steps on the road to international and North-South regional security cooperation would become feasible by governments which would be basically strengthened by the success of the MEPP (whichever opposition is left to peaceful relations and tolerance among the countries concerned). The completion of the bilateral tracks in the MEPP would reactivate the ACRS. As soon as the substance of a regional cooperative security framework would be established in the Middle East, attempts at creating some North-South security cooperative framework would be made possible, whether within the PEM or with NATO (or both, if in the New NATO, at a point in time, the European Defense and Security Identity were consolidated);

(b) Second, North-South cooperation relating to security should be based on rules and goals that would reassure non-Western countries about their equal status in the frame of cooperation. Because of the asymmetries in military power and the global dimension of the Alliance, forms of security cooperation may be more feasible and implementable than a full cooperative security scheme (like the one seemingly envisaged by the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration). Whichever the form of cooperation, the experience made within the current North-South Mediterranean security "dialogues" (with the EU in the EPM, in NATO and WEU), in particular with the issue of the Euroforces, has made clear that what the Arabs expect from these "dialogues" is the possibility to share decisions actually geared to increase their security (rather to be made just aware that there are Western forces ready to intervene in crises). The way to deal with this difficult question is the institution of a strong multidimensional political cooperation, essentially devoted to preventive purposes, at first in a middle-long and, then maybe, in a short term perspective. In this sense, the way indicated by the EMP's institutions is the right one (the Ministers, the Senior Officials, the Euro-Med Committee, etc.).

(c) Third, whichever would be the framework of North-South Mediterranean security cooperation or cooperative security, it must explicitly and unequivocally rule out the enforcement of collective security, leaving its implementation to the UN Council of Security.

This scenario is the condition for the implementation of any regional policy of non-proliferation (see the paper on "Proliferation").

In this scenario, however, which Western institution would be the ideal partner of the countries across the Mediterranean Sea cannot be given for granted. From what it has just been pointed out in the above, it is clear that military cooperation should be based on a strong political cooperation, and that this cooperation would compel partners to make linkages between military and non-military issues, thus giving cooperation a broad and olistic character.
The EU-initiated EMP possesses such political and olistic characters, but it doesn't include the USA. NATO includes the USA and other important non-European partners, like Canada, but, even in its new version, it is neither a political nor an olistic institution. NATO could work as the trans-Atlantic political institution in the simple world of the Cold War. In the more complicated world of today, a trans-Atlantic body for political cooperation is just lacking.

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If the conditions of political access will improve, access in a broader sense will be eased, too. The Arab countries would become more available to multilateral economic cooperation, an attitude that is strongly conditioned today by existing conflict and other political factors. The improvement of geopolitical conditions would also make the "disruption of the flow of vital resources" and subsequent economic shocks less likely (see the paper on "Energy risks"). While the attainment of North-South security cooperation and the improvement of reciprocal political access will take time, however, spill-over effects are at work and deserve prompter policy responses.

These issues are contemplated by the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. The NSC lists more or less the same issues as challenges NATO has to meet. There are two questions here: (a) whether and to what extent the various spill-over effects have to be considered as challenges or risks or even threats, i.e. something the Western countries must be protected from; (b) whether NATO, a powerful military alliance, finds it worth it to deal with them. These points are considered in detail by the papers on "Terrorism, drugs and organized crime" and "Migration and refugees".

There is no doubt that immigration is not a threat nor a risk. It is a social and political challenge which affects national security in a very broad sense: unemployment or poverty are as much a risk or a threat to social cohesion and national security than immigration. There were, in the recent past, attempts at dealing with immigration with military means, like the use of the Navy by Italy in the Otranto Canal. This policy brought about the sinking of a boat of immigrants and their deaths and was consequently dismissed.

In the NSC, NATO limits the notion of this challenge to the "uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflict." This is clearly the description of the destabilizing Kosovar inflow in the FYROM, Montenegro and Albania as a consequence of Serb ethnic cleansing. Though in the NSC statement this event is pointed out in the context of a resounding rhetoric of threats to the West, in fact it belongs to the realm of the Petersberg-like task, in which a situation of extreme social disorder and danger may require the use of military instruments, similar to what happens in case of natural disasters, instead of or beside civilian agents. Whether NATO or WEU, both would be able to intervene to manage this kind of crisis. Maybe an inter-regional organization (i.e., one including southern Mediterranean countries) would suffice and generate better political results than NATO or WEU interventions.

It is worth recalling, however, that in the Mediterranean framework the WEU's Petersberg tasks are regarded with suspicion and substantially rejected by southern partners. The attempt at introducing in the EMP context a CBM providing

the use of military means to help in case of natural or man-made disasters has been approved but it hardly looks implementable and, if implemented, it will leave the country concerned with a maximum of freedom in assembling the team, thus eluding the multilateral character of the cooperation. We are back, here, to the arguments put forward in previous sections with respect to chances and ways of security cooperation in the North-South Mediterranean framework.

Organized crime and terrorism may require the use of military instruments but only on occasion and for very specific purposes. For example, the Italian government sent in the Army in areas affected by organized crime to enhance its own control of the territory and, at the same time, make it more difficult to criminal organizations. The essential job, however, was left to the police. The use of low-intensity violence and secrecy requires responses and instruments which do not correspond to the use of military force: instruments to be used are rather social control, the police and the intelligence (civilian or military).

There is no doubt that organized crime and terrorism are linked to armed conflict (and immigration) but they don't overlap with conflicts they relate to. While terrorism may have the same political sources of conflicts, organized crime and drug trafficking certainly take advantage of conflicts but they remain a challenge deriving from social factors. The fight against international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism relies on stronger inter-governmental cooperation rather than security cooperation in the military field. The most serious problem with international cooperation against terrorism is that political evaluations relating to terrorism are different. In the Mediterranean, many Islamists are considered political refugees by the European governments and chief-terrorists by Southern Mediterranean governments.

NATO and the WEU own some intelligence resources (but for substance have to rely on national services). Still, they are not the right instruments to fight international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, though in specific, case-by-case occasions they may. Besides this functional argument, the social nature of these issues as well as the strong governmental political cooperation they require suggest to

include them in an olistic scheme for broad security cooperation more similar to the EMP than NATO or the WEU.

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In conclusion, as it is well known since the NATO Rome Declaration, the kind of challenges coming from the countries south and east of the Mediterranean are strongly tied to political, cultural and social drivers. For these reasons they cannot be identified as threats and dealt with by military policies and instruments. Military instruments can be used, but for non-military purposes. However, even the cooperative use of military instruments, for peace-keeping or enforcing, may prove politically unfeasible in this area. In order to improve Western access to and manage trends deriving from disorder and instability on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, strategies of deterrence or containment are not helpful. The policy response which may fit with the Mediterranean environment is enhanced political cooperation in an olistic institutional scheme opening gradually the way to security cooperation.

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY: THE SOCIAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

George JOFFÉ

NATO's fiftieth anniversary celebrations, although marred by the Kosovo crisis, nevertheless managed to generate a new strategic statement of objectives to replace those adopted in the wake of the end of the Cold War in 1990. Although there was no specific statement concerning the Mediterranean and the statement itself was long on rhetoric and short on content, certain basic elements did emerge. The tasks of NATO today and, as it enlarges, in the future, seem to fall into three categories:-

(1) The maintenance of Article 5 obligations concerned with mutual defense, although as enlargement proceeds, there will be an increasing urge to redefine the locus around which the Alliance operates.

(2) Although this used to be the dominant themes of NATO's tasks, it now seems to have been superceded in importance by "out-of-area" activities which appear to be confined to the "Euro-Atlantic arena", loosely defined, so that it would include the littoral states of the Mediterranean, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and European Russia, and might even extend into the Persian Gulf – thus almost encompassing Zbigniew Brzezinski's original "arc-of-crisis".

(3) The new objective of "Humanitarian action" which was not an explicit element within the statement of NATO's strategic objectives but which is a consequence of the Kosovo crisis. This was implicitly included within the NATO agenda, largely as a result of the attention paid to the Kosovo issue, particularly by the British leader

Tony Blair. Indeed, this may now become a dominant concert of the Alliance, as a means of circumventing, in future, the restrictions of intervention which are implicit within the United Nations Charter and in international law, whether under Article 2 or Article 51.

It is worth noting, however, that the new strategic objectives did not meet American aspirations of NATO becoming a virtual global alliance reaching into the Pacific arena as well. The declaration did, nonetheless, adopt what appears to have been an essential American agenda in defining what out-of-area threats in the future may be. They certainly included elements that are a genuine "hard security" concern, of the type that NATO might consider within its military purview.

However, and more importantly perhaps, they also include a large number of factors that really form part of the issues of "soft security" for which military responses are not appropriate.

In essence, the topics intended to form part of the out-of-area agenda include:

- nuclear proliferation;
- weapons of mass destruction;
- energy security;
- international migration and refugee flows;
- terrorism and organized crime.

Of these, only the first two items can be considered to fall within the "hard security" agenda.

The Mediterranean

Interestingly enough, the six out-of-area items mentioned above also reflect the vision of what NATO's Mediterranean agenda might be.

Although the Washington document made no specific mention of Mediterranean affairs, a pointer to what might be involved emerged earlier this year in a report prepared by the RAND Corporation for the Spanish government. This report was itself a sequel to a report prepared a year earlier for the Italian government. The interesting feature of its conclusions was not only the fact that it identified the same out-of-area agenda as was discussed in Washington but also the fact that the soft security issues it mentioned also fall within the security basket of the Barcelona Process of the European Union – an attempt by the Union to create, to quote the November 1995 Barcelona Declaration, a zone of "shared peace and posterity" in the Mediterranean basin.

It can be argued, somewhat cynically, that the Barcelona Process – in security terms, at least, is, in effect, motivated by European anxieties about the potential contamination of the European continent from the South Mediterranean region. The major anxiety here has been the issue of economic migration but, associated with it, are fears of the spread of terrorism and organized crime linked particularly to drug and migrant trafficking. The European Union's answer has been to argue that the solution of such problems has more to do with economic development and socio-political change than with military responses. It is to such solutions that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, to give the Barcelona process its proper name, is addressed.

Economic Migration

European anxieties on this issue are not illusory, even if they are misplaced. At current population growth rates, the populations of the South Mediterranean rim will outnumber the European population within twenty-five years. If the economic situation of the counties in this region does not improve, their populations will continue to become

absolutely poorer and emigration is bound to become a major response. After all, there has been migration across the Mediterranean basin for economic reasons since the beginning of this century and European demand for unskilled labour spurred such population movements after the Second World War. Of the 10 million foreigners resident in Europe, 2.6 million come from North Africa and at least a further 2 million come from Turkey.

These populations are now increasingly integrated into European society, despite the growing xenophobia voiced by the indigenous populations of the continent. However, European states have made it clear , from the beginning of the 1980s onwards – and much earlier in some cases – that they are not prepared to see these migrant communities increase through further inward migration. The irony is that, given the general aging of European populations, within 25 year, Europe will significantly labour-short – by 56 million workers, according to German demographers, or by one-third of the labour force, according to French sources. Nonetheless, European states, in the short-term, are not prepared to encourage inward migration.

This concern is coupled to a further anxiety; namely that South Mediterranean states must resolve their development dilemmas for their own internal reasons of national and regional stability, despite the precarious physical environment in which they operate. This requires effective economic development and the European Union, true to its own nature, recommends a neo-liberal approach to the problem. Its approach is also conditioned by the sever budgetary constraints under which Brussels operates – with the European budget set at 1.72 per cent of European GDP – and the need to protect European agricultural interests.

Thus economic development – and, by extension, job creation and social service provision – is to be fostered by a series of bilateral industrial free trade area agreements with South Mediterranean partners in which the full force of European industrial competition will force radical restructuring and, it is hoped, entrepreneurial innovation

leading to generalised economic growth. Agricultural exports and human exports are, of course, excluded from the economic equation, event though these may be areas in which the countries concerned have genuine comparative advantage. It is not clear that this economic prescription will succeed, but it will certainly profoundly affect the South Mediterranean economies. Most important, it may well force South-South economic integration which itself could prove to be the real promoter of economic development and thus the inhibitor of future emigration flows northwards.

Political Stability

There can be little doubt that such approaches, however limited and misconceived they may be at present, offer a better approach to the issue of migrations control than does a potential military action by NATO. Indeed, if there is to be security control along the European borders as part of a response to the phenomenon, this would seem to be an issue for proper European administration and policing of it, not for military action. The same must be true for issues of political stability and it baleful mirror-image, terrorism. It is difficult, indeed, to think of a single occasion when military action alone has successfully resolved such threats. Israel, despite repeated actions against Palestinian groups, has been quite unable to prevent terrorism. Insofar as the issue has been resolved, it has been through political action addressing the root causes of the phenomenon, not the security measures which contained it – in which, in any case, military, as opposed to police or intelligence, action was often ineffective.

This has also been the European experience during the past thirty years. Furthermore, where security action has been required, it has been policy and intelligence-based action that has been the most effective. In this respect, the British experience in Northern Ireland and the Spanish responses to ETA terrorism in the Basque country bear study. The British Army has indeed been used in security responses but only as an adjunct to the civil power and the most important element in resolving the chronic crisis in Ulster has eventually been negotiation. The Algerian experience in North Africa only

reinforces the same point for, even if the Algerian army can restore security without major urban conurbation, it will not be able to maintain its position without concomitant political initiatives to resolve the crisis.

There is, in short, a fundamental problem in the Southern Mediterranean which has a very strong propensity to cause domestic violence and which can spill over into the region itself. It is not, as is usually argued, caused by political Islam, although violent responses using an Islamic rhetoric and doctrinally-sourced justifications are provoked by it. The basic problem is one of governance – that the populations of the Arab world and the minorities in Turkey and elsewhere feel excluded from the process of political action. In the Balkans the problem is posed differently, for ethnic nationalisms have been exploited not only to redraw national boundaries but also to justify political exclusion. This was, after all, the way in which the Kosovo crisis began and, had support been given after 1989 to the moderate Rugova wing of the Kosovo Albanian population, the current crisis might have been avoided.

Political exclusion cannot be corrected by military means alone or even primarily by military means – as the experience of Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement has shown. Nor can it be justified and maintained by military power alone on the grounds of ethnic exclusiveness, whether in the Balkans or in the West Bank. As a result, the European Union has laid considerable emphasis on the introduction of democratic governance as part of the Barcelona Process and this is a matter to which NATO cannot, by its very nature, effectively address itself. The willingness to establish authority in the South Mediterranean region which responds to such pressures depends in large measure on the external pressure applied to it.

Here, ironically enough, some of NATO's other tasks will actually make the process of reform more difficult, not less so. Military action has tended to reinforce regime control in the past, as the experiences of Iraq and Libya—and now Serbia—have made clear. In addition, attempts to control nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass

destruction and terrorism by military action tend to have the same effect unless the countries concerned are subject to military conquest—something which is not on the NATO agenda, it appears! The Barcelona Process, on the other hand contains specific measures designed to encourage and support good governance and official respect for human rights. Even though Europe may be timid in putting its weight behind such measures, the very fact that they exist acts as a pressure in itself for their implementation. In any case, as time passes, European statesmen are obliged, by domestic public opinion to factor them into the cross-Mediterranean diplomatic equation.

Civil Society

Indeed, the best antidote to political exclusion is the creation of the complex skein of autonomous structures and networks within the private social sphere that act to restrain government omnipotence inside democracies—civil society, in short. In this respect, NATO can offer very little for such developments are part of a diffuse and complex pattern of interaction across national boundaries, not of the violent or non-violent interactions between states and alliances of states. Such networks are built up from the development of contacts between trans-national non-state and sub-state actors, even if a state-structured diplomatic framework may act as hand-maiden. Thus the pressure exerted by human rights organisations in Europe and the United States has forced many governments in the Arab world to take greater care over citizens' rights. It has also stimulated the development of similar organisations within the countries themselves—as is the case in Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and even Algeria. Many such organisations are subject to intimidation and even threats of take-over by official bodies, but the fact of European interest also helps to hinder official repression

The issue of human rights is not the only one in which such developments can occur. Environmental issues are moving towards the top of the South Mediterranean agenda—an important concern in a region where the precarious and fragile nature of the environment must be taken into account in the process of economic development,

particularly in the areas of desertification and water use. Minority rights have also become a focus of civil action, whether for Berbers in North Africa, Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, or Christian Arabs in the Levant and Egypt. In all cases, the cross-Mediterranean links are an essential component that keeps such networks alive inside the South Mediterranean region and, once again, they form part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative.

Information, too, plays an increasing role in sustaining such sub-state trans-border networks. It should not be forgotten that television networks can be picked up across the Mediterranean basin, particularly now that satellite television, including Arabic speaking networks, is increasingly accessible. In addition, electronic links are improving and becoming more complex so that government control of them is becoming more difficult. And, in any case, the more traditional telecommunications links are exploited by migrant communities as they always have been, so that such communications networks reinforce each other. These patterns are highly subversive of government control and, because of the transfer of cultural archetypes across the region, reinforce demands for political inclusion.

None of this inchoate, subtle sapping of regime coercion can be achieved by military force. Indeed, as previous examples—Iraq, Libya, Iran and now Serbia—make clear, the reverse objectives are achieved. In all cases, popular support for regimes—which would otherwise be discredited by popular anger—has been reinforced by military action. Such reinforcement has been created, perversely perhaps, by a sense of popular anger at being victimised by outside powers for the faults of the oppressive regimes themselves and, as time goes by, the sense of isolation. The isolation in turn creates ignorance, thus providing an ideal environment in which the regimes themselves exploit the situation to reinforce their own stereotypes. And, even if NATO were to avoid direct military intervention of this kind, using better-adapted diplomatic techniques, it is unlikely to have the organisational experience and skills or the institutional memory to be able to do so effectively. In any case, other bodies and institutions (not least within the

Barcelona Process) already exist that can achieve such objectives—so why would NATO be needed here?

The Future

Two-thirds of NATO's proposed future out-of-area tasks, therefore, cannot be effectively carried out by NATO in its present form. Furthermore, even if it were to develop mechanisms by which such tasks could be undertaken, it would have to cease to be a military alliance of the kind currently in existence. In addition, institutions already exist that can perform such tasks and there seems little point in trying to adapt what is essentially a military alliance merely to mimic their functions. Even in some more specific "hard security" areas—those dealing with conflict resolution and peace keeping, or the WEU's "St. Petersburg tasks"—other institutions, such as the OSCE or even WEU (whether within or outside the European Union), already exist, to which NATO should, in the first instance, defer. It is, of course, true that such organisations may not have distinguished themselves in the past but this does not mean that NATO is therefore *a priori* a preferable option.

Even in the case of collective security in the Mediterranean—a key element of the Barcelona process—it is not clear that NATO is the best vehicle through which security can be delivered. Co-operative security cannot be achieved through these means because NATO has not yet found a vehicle through which it can be expressed—NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and vague promises of a southern "Partnership for Peace" merely excite southern anxieties over what is seen as European and American aggressive instincts. Nor can NATO offer collective security for the same reason, as the experience of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR made clear. In any case, the security arenas in the Mediterranean are not unitary in nature, for the problems of the Western Mediterranean differ from those of the Eastern Mediterranean and those of the Balkans.

More importantly, questions are now beginning to emerge in relation to the actual interests of NATO members in the Mediterranean region. American concerns over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant, for example, increasingly differ from those of Europe, even over the issues of nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. American interests in the Balkans, apart from compensating for European incompetence, are not immediately apparent. American anxieties over the security of the Western Mediterranean can only be primarily linked to issues of strategic communications and energy security, not to spill-over effects in Europe. And even American energy concerns are diminishing as the United States becomes less and less dependent on Gulf energy supply and its interests turn more towards the global issue of oil prices rather than Mediterranean access.

Such questions argue ever more insistently for a predominantly European response to hard security issues in the Mediterranean, both in terms of a Barcelona-type stability charter or pact and in terms of the future evolution of NATO. Of course, such suggestions mirror far larger concerns over the future of NATO but it seems increasingly inevitable that Europe will have to take a far greater responsibility for its own defence in future and that NATO will have to move much closer to the concept of a strategic European defence identity if Europe's concerns in the Mediterranean are to be effectively addressed. That also raises important questions over the future command structure of NATO, both in terms of military operations and political control as well as in terms of strategic direction. None of these issues properly form the subject of this comment, but NATO's Mediterranean interests do seem to underline the fact that, quite apart from the appropriate role of any kind of military alliance in the region, it is really only a European alliance that could effectively address regional concerns. And that, in turn, raises the question of how realistic and relevant the current trans-Atlantic nature of NATO—in this context, at least—really is!

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN EURO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Álvaro de VASCONCELOS

These notes are based on the assumption that transatlantic solidarity which lies at the foundations of European security (or the Euro-Atlantic area if you like) can not automatically be transposed to the Mediterranean area, and Mediterranean security in particular. Although they coincide in the broad definition of what the main issues are in the region, Europeans and Americans often disagree about the ways in which those issues should be tackled: the Arab-Israeli conflict is a notorious example. It follows that the Euro-American consensus has to be built, and that it will not always be easy to share a common vision.

Peripheral regions, central security concerns. The Mediterranean – or at least parts of it – is undoubtedly among the 'peripheral regions' to which NATO's April 1999 strategic concept refers. There is no consensus between Europeans and Americans, however, as to what the shape of such a peripheral space is, which each tends to define in terms of security concerns. For Europeans, the Mediterranean means the Maghreb (primarily) and the Middle East (the Near East, rather). Turkey is considered as a transition between Europe and the Middle East, half-European, half-Middle Eastern. For the United States, the Mediterranean extends to the Gulf, and the Maghreb is seen as a sort of pathway to the core region of the Mediterranean, i.e. the Middle East and the Gulf. In the new NATO definition of its area of interests, the Gulf is indeed the main potential source of disagreements between Europe and the United States.

A largely unchanged mandate. What are the practical consequences of alluding to 'peripheral regions' in terms of NATO's outreach? Does it mean that NATO would be able to intervene 'out of area', should the situation warrant its intervention? What would

the mandate be, in such an event? It is clear that to Europeans NATO remains a regional security organisation. Europeans will require a clear UN mandate as an indispensable precondition for any involvement of NATO beyond the European area.

Towards a security partnership. Another equally important assumption is that countries across the Mediterranean, in the Maghreb and the Middle East alike, should be treated as full partners in any security arrangements in which they are concerned. This is a pre-condition for the success of any Euro-American initiative towards the Mediterranean. Taking the Southern countries on board as full partners is the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean process which comprises all of the fifteen countries of the EU and twelve members from the South: all of the riparian countries with the exception of Libya so far. Because they are committed to the success of the EMP, Europeans are bound to increasingly take into consideration the points of view of their southern partners in any Mediterranean contingency and engage into a process of consultation.

Any working partnership, moreover, has to be built taking into account the vision of each individual or regional partner. Interests and objectives should be clearly defined, in order that common approaches may be reached wherever possible and existing problems solved.

The EU, the United States and NATO. Who is the main interlocutor of the United States in what concerns the Mediterranean? NATO-Europe? The European Union? Both, obviously. The institutional interlocutor will increasingly tend to be the European Union as the EMP progresses. The United States is a major actor in Mediterranean and especially Middle Eastern security, and the EU can not ignore this indisputable fact. An expansion of NATO towards the South does not follow, however. Rather, both these factors call for the transatlantic dialogue to be reinforced and, on the other hand, for a direct working relationship to be established between the European Union and NATO.

There are a number of points that can be derived from an analysis of the economic, political and security issues in the Mediterranean:

The nature of the challenges. Problems and challenges faced by the South are eminently political, economic and social in nature. They require responses on the political, economic and social sphere. This is not to ignore the vital link between security and the political, economic and social domain. The main objective behind the EMP is to extend the European 'space' of democracy and prosperity towards the South. Peace and stability within the Mediterranean will largely depend, therefore, on whether the EMP succeeds in achieving its goals.

Political and economic reform. Progress towards fully democratic states and the rule of law in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf has been slow and mostly hesitant. In some cases, a relapse into authoritarianism actually occurred, although this is not the rule and positive examples also exist. All countries concur, however, on the need to implement thorough economic reforms conducive to full integration into the world economy. A new consensus is emerging on development policies, furthermore, in which the link between political and economic reform clearly stands out. This is an area where there is room for reinforcing cooperation.

The power of perceptions. Perceptions are very much a part of the Mediterranean security equation. Public opinions in the North and in the South are pervaded by the sentiment that there is a potential threat originating in the 'other side' of the Mediterranean. Consequently, Southern publics are extremely sensitive to any military initiative taken by the North with a potential Mediterranean dimension. The extremely negative reaction in Arab countries to the creation of Eurofor and Euromarfor illustrates this point.

Security issues in the Mediterranean. These are first and foremost South-South problems. Conflictuality arises both from interstate and intrastate tensions and crises. The latter are currently predominant. There is currently no identifiable relevant security, let alone military threat either in the North-South or the South-North direction. This is not to say that security concerns of both should not be taken into consideration. So-called low-intensity threats such as proliferation and terrorism, furthermore, are a concern in the South as much as in the North or indeed more so.

Security problems in the South, furthermore, can have spillover effects in the North (e.g. terrorist attacks in Paris). They may also affect the normal flows of energy. Worse, they can cause massive humanitarian tragedies (e.g. Algeria) to which the international community can not, and indeed should not, remain indifferent.

NATO's Middle Eastern border. Turkey's security concerns arising from its borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq should be fully taken into consideration as an issue that affects the Alliance as a whole. Because of Turkish membership, NATO indeed borders on Middle East and the Gulf.

The institutional gap. In the South, there is a total absence of security institutions, and subregional cooperation arrangements alike, in contrast to the densely integrated and 'institutionalised' North. The institutional gap is also felt in the North-South or South-North direction, which neither the security basket of the EMP nor the multi-bilateral dialogues conducted by NATO or the WEU have succeeded in filling.

Multilateral dialogues. It will remain impossible either for NATO and the WEU to engage in a multilateral dialogue with the South or for the EMP to acquire a substantial security dimension without significant progress towards peace in the Middle East. The outcome of the May 1999 Israeli elections seems to create a more favourable

environment for the process to resume, and Europeans, Americans and Arabs should act swiftly and as much as possible coordinate their efforts to support progress in the MEPP. This would also help remove existing obstacles to subregional cooperation in the Middle East, a process that should be encouraged by all actors involved. If progress in the MEPP is achieved, on the other hand, it is likely that the Euro-Mediterranean Charter originally proposed by France to cover the EMP area will actually be agreed, thus enhancing the EMP security dimension.

Euro-American cooperation towards the Mediterranean. NATO is not, as indeed it should not be seen as, the only or even the main forum for Euro-American cooperation towards the Mediterranean. The agenda for Euro-American cooperation towards the Mediterranean clearly transcends the security realm, and so do the main challenges confronting the Mediterranean. It should therefore be pursued within a framework such as the Transatlantic Dialogue, where a comprehensive perspective can be developed and an agenda encompassing political, security, social and economic issues can best be pursued.

Three-sided cooperation. There is no institutional arrangement where the major players in the Mediterranean come together, i.e. the United States, the European Union and the countries of the South. The original Italian-Spanish proposal of a CSCM was not pursued, and there is currently no intention of putting a similar initiative back on the table. This may be the right time to do so.

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