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Istituto Affari Internazionali



NATO Office of Information and Press



Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale

***THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE***

Italian Chamber of Deputies
Sala della Lupa
Rome, January 25, 1999

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA


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BIBLIOTECA

**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE**

Istituto affari internazionali
NATO Office of Information and Press
Centro studi di politica internazionale
Roma, 25/II/1999

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- 3. Nato new role in crisis management / Guido Venturoni (10 p.)
- 4. Nato and the development of the European security and defense identity / José Cutileiro (3 p.)
- 5. New Nato, new Europe: new division of labour / François Heisbourg (16 p.)
- 6. Nato enlargement after the first round / F. Stephen Larrabee (18 p.)
- 7. Dichiarazione del rappresentante del Ministero degli Affari esteri della Federazione russa sulla questione dell'adeguamento del Trattato CFE (2 p.)
- 8. Saluto di Luciano Violante (5 p.)
- 9. Nato: its 50th anniversary, the Washington Summit, the next century / Javier Solana (6 p.)
- 10. Discorso di Massimo D'Alema (6 p.)
- 11. Intervento di Carlo Scognamiglio Pasini (11 p.)



Stefano Silvestri

Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali,
Rome

Michael Stürmer

Professor, Institute of History, Friederich-Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg

Thanos Veremis

Director, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy ELIAMEP, Athens

Discussion

17.00 Coffee break

17.15 **FINAL SESSION**

A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE

Introductory statement:

Luciano Violante

Chairman, Chamber of Deputies, Rome

Keynote address:

Javier Solana

Secretary General of NATO, Brussels

Closing address:

Massimo D'Alema

President of the Council of Ministers, Rome

18.30 End of the Conference

The working languages will be English and Italian.
A simultaneous translation will be provided.

Segreteria Organizzativa:



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


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THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE



Italian Chamber of Deputies
Sala della Lupa
P.zza Montecitorio
Rome, January 25, 1999

PROGRAMME

08.45	Registration of participants	12.00	SECOND SESSION NATO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY
09.15	OPENING SESSION <i>Introductory statement</i> Valdo Spini Chairman, Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Rome		<i>Chair:</i> <i>Marta Dassù</i> <i>Director, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Rome</i>
09.30	FIRST SESSION NATO'S NEW ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT <i>Chair:</i> <i>Cesare Merlini</i> <i>President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome</i> Robert Blackwill Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Wesley Clark Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, NATO, Brussels John Roper Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London Guido Venturoni Chief of Defense Staff of Italy, Rome. Chairman Designate of NATO's Military Committee <i>Discussion</i>		José Cutileiro Secretary General, Western European Union, Brussels James O. Ellis Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, NATO, Naples François Heisbourg Chairman, Center for Security Policy, Geneva Pierre Lellouche Member of Parliament, Defense Committee, Paris Umberto Ranieri Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome <i>Discussion</i>
		13.30	Lunch buffet at Chamber of Deputies
		15.00	THIRD SESSION NATO'S ENLARGEMENT PROCESS <i>Chair:</i> <i>Valdo Spini</i> <i>Chairman Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Rome</i>
11.15	Coffee break		
11.30	<i>Keynote Address</i> Carlo Scognamiglio Minister of Defense, Rome		Stephen Larrabee Senior Staff Member, RAND, Washington

LISTA PRESENTI + RELATORI

NATO 25/01/99

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
1	Abdel Latif	Nehad	Ambassador	Embassy of Egypt
2	Albonetti			
3	Alexandris	Alexis	Centre for Analysis and Planning	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4	Alhadeff	Jan		(On. V. Spini)
5	Anderson	John	Defence Section	British Embassy
6	Antonelli	Vittoria	Socia	CESPI
7	Arnone	Tiziana	Assistente	De Gasperi Foundation
8	Augias	Natalia	Giornalista	RAI
9	Augias	Natalia	On. Spini	
10	Bacchetti	Fausto	Ambasciatore	
11	Baduel Glorioso	Fabrizia	ex (former) European Parliamentarian	
12	Balanzino	Sergio	Ambasciatore-Vice Segretario Generale	NATO
13	Balestiero	Leopoldo		Oerlikon Contraves Spa
14	Balfour	Rosa		CESPI
15	Barbanti	Segio	Ufficio Nato	Ministero Affari Esteri
16	Bartomeoli	Alessandro	Tenente Colonnello	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
17	Battisti	Luciano	Generale	
18	Bekes	Peter	Ambassador	Embassy of Slovenia
19	Bellinzona	Carlo	Direttore	CE.MI.SS
20	Benini	Marzia	Funzionario	Embassy of United States of America
21	Bensoni	Alberto		
22	Berg	Goran	Ambassador	Embassy of Sweden
23	Bernassola	Angelo	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
24	Bertini	Leonardo		(On. V. Spini)
25	Biasco	Francesco Saverio	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
26	Birbaum	Gunter	Ambassador	Embassy of Austria
27	Blackwill	Robert	Professor	John F. Kennedy School of Government
28	Boba	Silvia	free-lance	
29	Bonfiglio	Carmelo		Marina Militare
30	Bonvicini	Gianni	Direttore	Istituto Affari Internazionali
31	Bottai	Bruno	Ambasciatore	Presidente Dante Alighieri
32	Bouزيد	Lakhdar		Embassy of Algeria
33	Boyd	Charles G.	Member	National Security Study Group
34	Brutti	Massimo	Sottosegretario di Stato alla Difesa	Senato della Repubblica
35	Caccamo	Michele	Colonnello	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
36	Cagiati	Andrea	Ambasciatore	Circolo di Studi Diplomatici
37	Calamia	Pietro	Diplomat	
38	Calia	Carlo	Coordinamento Asia-AEAE	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
39	Callahan	Robert	Information Service	American Embassy

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
40	Cappuzzo	Umberto	Generale	
41	Carfagnini	Mauro	Segreteria DGCS	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
42	Casa	Giovanni	Giornalista	RAI-Televideo
43	Castellotti	Giorgio		Comitato Atlantico
44	Castellotti			
45	Casu	Antonio	Funzionario	Camera dei Deputati
46	Ciccarello	Nicholas	US Defense Attaché	American Embassy
47	Cingolani	Laura	Giornalista	ADN Kronos
48	Coccia	Maurizio		
49	Coen	Federico	Onorevole	
50	Colajanni	Luigi	Responsabile Esteri	Democratici di Sinistra
51	Colombo	Emilio	Presidente	Comitato Atlantico Italiano
52	Cremasco	Maurizio		Istituto Affari Internazionali
53	Cricorian	Maritza	Segretario	Istituto Affari Internazionali
54	Cucchi	Giuseppe	Generale	Presidenza del Consiglio
55	Cunningham	James		Embassy of the United States of America
56	D'Alema	Massimo	Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri	
57	D'Angelantonio	Serafino	Rappresentante Permanente in Italia	Aerospaziale
58	Dassù	Marta	Direttore	Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale
59	de Azevedo Marques	Gina	Giornalista	Pubblico
60	De Costa	Derek	ES	Cincsouth
61	De Donno	Marcello		Marina Militare Italiana
62	de Franchis	Amedeo	Ambasciatore-Rappresentante Permanente d'Italia	Consiglio Atlantico
63	De Lisi	Simona		(On. V. Spini)
64	De Mistura	Staffan		Organizzazione Nazioni Unite
65	de Robertis	Anton Giulio		Università di Bari
66	de Santis	Nicola	Responsabile Relazioni Esterne della NATO per l'Italia	
67	Di Capua	Domenico	C.F.	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
68	Di Francesco	Tommaso	Giornalista	Il Manifesto
69	Di Gaetano	Donato		Confindustria/ Luiss
70	Di Paola		Capo di Gabinetto	Ministero della Difesa
71	Di Placido	Lorena		SIOI
72	Di Torrice	Massimiliano		Asea Brown Boveri spa
73	Dioukarev	Paval		Embassy of Russian Fed.
74	Dobre	Mihail	Second Secretary	Embassy of Romania
75	Domecq	Jorge	Capo di Gabinetto del Segretario Generale	NATO
76	Dunn	Keith A.	Member	National Security Study Group
77	Durond	Jean Michel	Ministro Consigliere	Ambasciata di Francia
78	Dyott Fontenelle	Americo	Ministro Consigliere	Ambasciata del Brasile

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
79	Ellis	James O.	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe	NATO
80	Ennifar	Azouz	Ambassador	Ambasciata di Tunisia
81	Esposito	Raffaele		Marconi Communications
82	Esterga Jos	Ivan		Embassy of Slovak Republic
83	Falautano	Isabella		Istituto Affari Internazionali
84	Farella	Raffaele		Istituto Affari Internazionali
85	Fede	Ernesto	Giornalista	RAI
86	Fedi	Ernesto	On. Spini	
87	Ferraro	Angelo	Generale	Guardia di Finanza
88	Ferro	Luigi	Vice Preside	Associazione Amici della LUISS
89	Feuillatre	Cécile	Giornalista	Agence France Presse
90	Ficocelli	Giuseppe	Segretario Sen. Scognamiglio	
91	Gaber	Viktor	Ambassador	Embassy of Macedonia
92	Gagnoni	Andrea	Rappresentanza Militare Italiana	Quartier Generale NATO
93	Gallach	Cristina	Addetto Stampa del Segretario Generale	NATO
94	Galletta	Riccardo	Maggiore	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
95	Garavoglia	Guido	Ufficio Stampa	Camera dei Deputati
96	Gargiulo	Paola		Camera dei Deputati
97	Garribba	Pasquale	Sotto Capo Stato Maggiore Aeronautica	Aeronautica Militare
98	Gawronski	Jas	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
99	Gecse	Attila	Ambassador	Embassy of Hungary
100	Geromin	Luca		CEMISS
101	Geromin	Luca	Ricercatore	CEMISS
102	Geromin			
103	Giovine	Umberto	Onorevole	Camera dei Deputati
104	Giusti	Serena		(On. V. Spini)
105	Goracci		Vice Segretario	Camera dei Deputati
106	Gordeev	Valerijan	First Counsellor	Embassy of Russian Fed.
107	Gori	Luca	Ufficio NATO	Ministero Affari Esteri
108	Gorski	Maciej	Ambassador	Embassy of Poland
109	Gozzano	Francesco	Giornalista	L'Avanti della Domenica
110	Gramaglia	Giampiero	Giornalista	Agenzia Ansa
111	Grazioso	Andrea		(On. V. Spini)
112	Greco	Ettore	Vice Direttore	Istituto Affari Internazionali
113	Griccioli	Marcello	DGAP Uff. V	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
114	Guariglia	Riccardo	Counsellor	M.A.E. DGAP
115	Guarnieri	Umberto	Capo Stato Maggiore Marina	Marina Militare
116	Gubert	Renzo		Senato della Repubblica
117	Guizzi	Vincenzo	Vice Segretario	Camera dei Deputati

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
118	Gusmaroli	Franca		Aspen Institute Italia
119	Hamrin	Harald	Ministro	Embassy of Sweden
120	Heisbourg	Francois	Chairman	Centre for Security Policy
121	Helm	Gustav	Addetto Militare	Czech Repp.
122	Heshmat	Khaled	Second Secretary	Embassy of Egypt
123	Hodges	Doyle	Special Assistant	CinCsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
124	Hoffman	Matei		German Embassy
125	Hoffmann	G.	Seg. Siracusa	
126	Holanda	Francisco		Ambasciata del Brasile
127	Huynen	Paul	Counsellor for Political Affairs	Embassy of Belgium
128	Iozzo	Alfonso		Compagnia di San Paolo
129	Jacov	Marco	Professore - Scienze Politiche	Università Roma Tre
130	Jean	Carlo	Arms Control	OSCE
131	Jelenic	Zelko	Addetto Difesa	Croatian Embassy
132	Joeruut	Jaak	Ambassador	Embassy of Estonia
133	Jovanovic	Josif	Addetto Militare	Embassy of Yugoslavia
134	Kalmokov	Sergei		Embassy of Russia
135	Katz	Noam		Embassy of Israel
136	Kleopas	Myrna	Ambassador	Embassy of Cyprus
137	Kobacki	Jerzy	Addetto Difesa	Embassy of Poland
138	Koporossy	Claudio		Oerlikon Contraves Spa
139	Labrosse	Daniel	Consigliere Politico	Ambasciata di Francia
140	Lagorio	Lelio	On. Avv. ex-Ministro della Difesa	
141	Lanzara	Ademaro		Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
142	Larrabee	Stephen	Senior Staff Member	RAND
143	Laurin	Gilbert	Sez. Politica	Canadian Embassy
144	Lazarov	Dimitar		Embassy of Bulgaria
145	Lazio	Giorgio	C.F.	Centro Studi Difesa
146	Lecea	Fernando	Generale	Comandante NATO Defence College
147	Lecea	Fernando	LTen. Gen. Comandante	NATO Defence College
148	Lehner	Ulrich	Direttore	GCSP
149	Lekic	Miodrac		Embassy of Rep. Fed of Yugoslavia
150	Lellouche	Pierre	Member of Parliament	Defence Committee
151	Lenzi	Giovanni	Segretario Comm. Esteri	Senato della Repubblica
152	Licalzi	Marianna	Sottosegretario di Stato	Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia
153	Loren	Donald	Executive Assistant	CinCsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
154	Lotto	Agnese	Segretario particolare Senatore Brutti	
155	Lucarelli	Sonia		Forum Problemi Pace e Guerra
156	Lucioli	Fabrizio	Segretario Generale	Comitato Atlantico

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157	Maccanico	Antonio	Presidente Comm. Affari Costituzionali	Camera dei Deputati
158	Magnolini	Giovanni	Dipartimento Esteri	Democratici di Sinistra
159	Maida	Pierfranco	Air Aide	CinCsouth (Amm. O.J.Ellis)
160	Manca	Vincenzo	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
161	Mancino	Nicola	Presidente	Senato della Repubblica
162	Manetti	Chiara	Studentessa	
163	Manfroni	Pier Valerio	Tenente Colonnello	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
164	Mariani		Ammiraglio	Segretario Consiglio Sup. Marina Militare
165	Mariani			
166	Martellini	Maurizio		Landau Network-Centro Volta
167	Martin	Victor	Com.-Assistente Personale del Segretario Generale	NATO
168	Martinelli	Dante		Ambasciata di Svizzera
169	Martinez	Javier		Embassy of Spain
170	Martinez-Fresno	Nicolai	Ambasciatore	Consul General Spagna
171	Martini	Giuliana	Funzionario	Embassy of United States of America
172	Mazzù	Marco	Giornalista	ADN Kronos
173	Mazzuca Poggiolini	Carla	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
174	McKechnic	Malcom	Sez. Politica	Canadian Embassy
175	Meghar	Hocine	Ambassador	Embassy of Algeria
176	Mele	Alberto	Sicurezza C.C.	CinCsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
177	Melluso		Brigadiere Generale	Marina Militare
178	Melluso			
179	Meloni	Alba		Cespi
180	Meloni	Alba	Socia	CeSPI
181	Menotti	Roberto		CESPI
182	Merlini	Cesare	Presidente	Istituto Affari Internazionali
183	Mestiri	Nacem	Consigliere	Ambasciata di Tunisia
184	Migliaccio Guerra	Pietro		IRI
185	Migliavacca	Paolo	Giornalista	Sole-24 Ore
186	Milaneschi	Roberto	Consigliere	Senato
187	Minuto Rizzo	Alessandro	Cons. Diplomatico Ministro Difesa	Ministero della Difesa
188	Mirachian	Laura	DGAP Uff. II	Ministero degli Esteri
189	Missiroli	Antonio		WEU - Institute for Security Studies
190	Mocini	Vincent	Us Defence Attachè	American Embassy
191	Molinari	Maurizio	Giornalista	La Stampa
192	Muratbekov	Alim	Terzo Segretario	Ambasciata del Kazakhstan
193	Mykhailov	Valeriy		Ambasciata Ucraina
194	Napolitano	Maria Grazia	Giornalista	ADN Kronos
195	Nelli Feroci	Ferdinando	Consigliere Diplomatico	Ministero Beni e Attività Culturali

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196	Nenci	Silvia		Istituto Affari Internazionali
197	Nicosia	Luca	Giornalista	ADN Kronos
198	Niedda	Giuseppe		Camera dei Deputati
199	Nocilla	Damiano	Segretario Generale	Senato della Repubblica
200	Nones	Michele	Professore	Istituto Affari Internazionali
201	Onida	Fabrizio	Presidente	ICE
202	Orozco	Adolfo	Addetto Militare	Embassy of Spain
203	Orsello	Gian Piero	Presidente	Ist. Italiano Studi Legislativi
204	Oschep	Anton	Addetto per la Difesa	Ambasciata d'Austria
205	Ostillo	Massimo	Deputato Parlamentare	Camera dei Deputati
206	Ottavi	Agostino		
207	Palasinski	Jackec	Giornalista	Wprost
208	Palombo	Mario	Senatore-Comm. Difesa	Senato della Repubblica
209	Panes	Enrique	Ministro Consigliere	Ambasciata di Spagna
210	Parrulli	Fabrizio	Maggiore	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
211	Pastore	Ferruccio	Socio	CeSPI
212	Paternò	Francesco	Giornalista	Il Manifesto
213	Piacentini	Valeria	Professore	Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
214	Pietroniro	Francesca		(On. Lo Russo - Camera dei Deputati)
215	Pisanu	Giuseppe	Presidente Gruppo Parlamentare Forza Italia	Camera dei Deputati
216	Plesner	Liselotte		Royal Danish Embassy
217	Podagelis	Romanas		Embassy of Lithuania
218	Pogaci	Mehdi	Defense Attachè	Embassy of Albania
219	Poidomani	Simona	Giornalista	ADN Kronos
220	Poidomani	Giorgio		
221	Politi	Alessandro	Consulente	
222	Pollice	Carmine	Generale di Brigata	Aeronautica Militare
223	Porcari	S.		Comitato Atlantico
224	Posen	Barry	Member	National Security Study Group
225	Pozzi	Mauro	Major General (retired)	Former Strategic Analyst-SHAPE
226	Prat	Juan	Ambasciatore	Ambasciata di Spagna
227	Prat	Juan	Ambasciatore	Amb. Spagnola
228	Prosperini	Paolo	Membro di Gabinetto	Ministro Letta
229	Quesada	Monique	Uff. VI (US/Italy Exchange Program)	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
230	Ragionieri	Rodolfo		Forum of the Problems of Peace and War
231	Ran	Shamai	Addetto Difesa	Israel Embassy
232	Ranieri	Umberto	Sottosegretario di Stato	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
233	Rhi-Sausi	José Luis	Cosiglio Direttivo	CeSPI
234	Rigillo	Riccardo		Scuola Sup. di Pubblica Amministrazione

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
235	Rivera	Jim	Security	CinCsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
236	Robertson	Kathleen C.	Member	National Security Study Group
237	Rodriguez	Jose	Addetto Difesa	Embassy of Spain
238	Rogati	Elio	Funzionario	Camera dei Deputati
239	Romano	Andrea	Assistente On. Ranieri	Ministero Affari Esteri
240	Ronca	Stefano	Capo Ufficio NATO	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
241	Rondonotti	Giuseppe	Free Lance	
242	Roper	John	Associate Fellow	Royal Institute of International Affairs
243	Rossi	Mario	Generale di Corpo d'Armata	
244	Rubbia	Antonio	Onorevole	
245	Ruffolo	Giorgio		(On. V.Spini)
246	Sadykov	Barlybai		Embassy of Kazakhstan
247	Sansoni	Silvano		CEMISS
248	Sansoni	Silvano	Ricercatore	CEMISS
249	Sardellone	Gianluca		SIOI
250	Sarsini	Davide	Giornalista	AGI
251	Saves	Christian		Ambasciata di Francia
252	Schuette	Rolf		German Embassy
253	Scognamiglio	Carlo	Ministro della Difesa	
254	Selva	Gustavo	Vice Presidente Gruppo AN	Camera dei Deputati
255	Serra	Maurizio	DGAP Ufficio RSP	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
256	Sevcikova	Hana		Embassy of the Czech Rep.
257	Shaw	Michael B.	Ltn Commander, US Naval Reserve	Embassy of United States of America
258	Sica	Mario	Ministro Plen.	Ministero Affari Esteri
259	Silvestri	Stefano	Vice Presidente	Istituto Affari Internazionali
260	Siracusa	Sergio	Comandante Generale	Arma dei Carabinieri
261	Siracusa	Sergio	Comand. Gen. Arma dei Carabinieri	
262	Solaini	Pietro	Presidente	CASD
263	Solana	Javier	Secretary General	NATO
264	Solaro	Antonio	Giornalista	AVGI-Athens
265	Soula	Michel	Vice Capo di Gabinetto del Segretario Generale	NATO
266	Spini	Valdo	Presidente Comm. Difesa	Camera dei Deputati
267	Stamm	Ludolf		NZZ
268	Stano	Giuseppe		
269	Sturmer	Michael	Professor	Institute of History, Friederich-Alexander University
270	Suban	Stefano		
271	Tabacik	Andrej		Embassy of the Slovak Republic
272	Tavano	Luciano	Tenente Colonnello	Centro Alti Studi Difesa
273	Tempesta	Franco		Ministero Affari Esteri

	SURNAME	NAME	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
274	Tempestini	Francesco	Onorevole	Camera dei Deputati
275	Terracini	Giulio Mario	Senatore	Senato della Repubblica
276	Terzuolo	Eric		Embassy of United States of America
277	Tolmachev	Valery		Embassy of Kazakhstan
278	Tonne	Gabriele	Assistant Editor	The International Spectator
279	Torlonia	Leopoldo		Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
280	Toscano	Roberto	Ministro Plen.	Ministero Affari Esteri
281	Train	Harry D.	Member	National Security Study Group
282	Triulzi	Umberto		Ipalmo
283	Troccoli	Giuseppe	Vice Segretario Generale	Camera Deputati
284	Troiano	Giorgetta	Servizio Storico-Ufficio Studi	Ministero degli Affari Esteri
285	Tzinaetis	Vassilios	Addetto Difesa	Embassy of Greece
286	Varricchio	Armando	Capo di Gabinetto	Ministro
287	Vecchio	Filippo	Ufficio Stampa	Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
288	Veltri	Francesco		Pubblica Informazione Afsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
289	Venturoni	Guido	Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa	
290	Verderame		Ambasciatore - Consigliere Diplomatico On. D'Alema	
291	Veremis	Thanos	Director	Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
292	Violante	Luciano	Presidente	Camera dei Deputati
293	Vittorelli	Paolo	Direzione	Democratici di Sinistra
294	Vosino	Giuseppe		Sicurezza C.C.-CinCsouth (Amm. J.O.Ellis)
295	Wolf	Arne		German Embassy
296	Yatsenkivskyi	Volodymyr	Ambasciatore	Amb. Ucraina
297	Zadra	M. Cristina	Uff. Legislativo -Gruppo Verdi	Senato della Repubblica
298	Zampini	M.	Segretario Generale	Camera dei Deputati
299	Zecchini	Salvatore	Dip. Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione	Ministero del Tesoro
300	Ziffer	Guido		IRV
301	Zoldan	Bruno	Comandante della Capitale	Esercito Italiano

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 19251
28 GENN. 1999

BIBLIOTECA



1

*Il Presidente della Commissione Difesa
della Camera dei Deputati*

VALDO SPINI

UN RUOLO ATTIVO DELL'ITALIA

**“Cinquantesimo anniversario Alleanza Atlantica: una nuova Nato per
una nuova Europa”**

**Camera dei Deputati - Sala della Lupa
Roma, 25.1.1999**

Non è senza significato che la prima delle iniziative organizzate per ricordare il cinquantesimo anniversario dell'Alleanza atlantica si svolga in Italia, a Roma.

L'Italia si trova in una situazione geopolitica di grande rilevanza.

Le tensioni e i conflitti che si sono purtroppo verificati nei Balcani sono praticamente sulla porta di casa nostra.

D'altro canto il nostro interesse per il fianco Sud della Nato, cioè per un Mediterraneo in cui i popoli delle tre grandi religioni monoteiste, la cristiana, l'ebraica e la musulmana possano convivere in pace e in armonia sta nella stessa collocazione del nostro Paese. Dobbiamo esprimere tutto il nostro sostegno perché gli accordi di pace per il Medio Oriente siano rispettati e portati avanti.

Oggi il tema dell'adesione alla Nato, per la gran parte delle forze politiche, non è in questione in Italia. Invece, ci proponiamo di dare il nostro attivo contributo italiano di idee ed esperienze per la definizione del nuovo ruolo che le mutate circostanze storiche hanno portato e porteranno la Nato ad assumere.

Vi è naturalmente in questo la competenza del governo, ma il ruolo di indirizzo politico spetta al Parlamento, in cui è auspicabile che i grandi temi di politica estera e di sicurezza del Paese siano non solo e non tanto l'oggetto di un confronto pregiudiziale tra maggioranza e opposizione, ma anche il frutto di una considerazione oggettiva - bipartisan - degli interessi di lungo periodo del Paese.

E' quindi positivo che oggi il Parlamento italiano ospiti un'iniziativa così importante e qualificata. Una iniziativa che, partendo dalla realtà di questi cinquant'anni, e ormai a un decennio dalla fine della guerra fredda, apra una

riflessione sul destino e sul futuro di questa organizzazione, a poche settimane dal vertice di Washington.

Tre sono le linee di riflessione che vengono proposte e tutte di immediata attualità. Il nuovo ruolo della Nato nelle missioni di pace; le iniziative per la Identità di Difesa e di Sicurezza Europea; l'allargamento della Nato stessa.

Dopo la caduta dei blocchi, si è aperto infatti un vuoto nell'Europa centro-orientale che occorre colmare da un lato con il processo di allargamento, ma dall'altro sviluppando tutte quelle iniziative che, a partire dalla "Partnership for peace", hanno coinvolto e coinvolgono la Russia e l'insieme dei Paesi dell'ex Patto di Varsavia, in una considerazione comune dei problemi della sicurezza in Europa.

Vanno citati in proposito il PJC (Permanent Joint Council) tra la Nato e la Russia, il NUC (Nato Ucraina Council) e l'EAPC (che comprende 44 paesi Nato e uno non Nato, lo Euro Atlantic Partnership Council).

Ma la caduta dei blocchi ha fatto esplodere drammaticamente tensioni nazionali, etiche e religiose, non sopite, nei Balcani, e con esse la Nato ha dovuto e deve misurarsi. Ciò è avvenuto e avviene in Bosnia-Erzegovina. Ciò sta avvenendo in modo drammatico nel Kosovo.

Nel contempo, il progredire dell'Unione Europea, l'ampliarsi delle sue competenze (Trattati di Maastricht e di Amsterdam) e la necessità di rafforzare la PESC tramite la messa a disposizione di un'opzione militare, ha posto il problema di una assunzione comune di responsabilità sui temi della politica estera e della sicurezza da parte dei Paesi europei stessi.

L'Unione Europea - specie dopo che 11 delle sue nazioni hanno deciso di adottare una moneta unica, l'Euro - non può essere quello che un tempo si diceva della Germania occidentale, gigante economico ma nano politico.

In un mondo caratterizzato da una sola superpotenza di rango planetario, gli Stati Uniti, è necessario che si affermino responsabilità regionali (cioè continentali) e l'Europa ha il dovere storico di corrispondere a questa esigenza. La Nato costituisce la sede in cui questa evoluzione europea può svolgersi nel quadro di una collaborazione e cooperazione fattiva con gli Stati Uniti. Il che non toglie che l'Europa si possa dotare anche di iniziative di difesa europea autonoma (come l'Eurofor e l'Euromarfor).

All'indomani della caduta del muro di Berlino e della dissoluzione del Patto di Varsavia, la Nato si è trovata di fronte ad un mutamento radicale del suo ruolo da quello di un'organizzazione di difesa contro un avversario ben individuato, la potenziale minaccia del Patto di Varsavia, a quella di un'organizzazione di sicurezza collettiva contro minacce esterne che non sono così determinate e individuabili.

Di fronte al venir meno del "nemico" istituzionale, la Nato ha reagito rinnovando e adeguando il proprio ruolo.

La prima grande trasformazione è stata l'utilizzazione della Nato come strumento di intervento dell'Onu in funzione di "peace keeping" in Bosnia Erzegovina, con le missioni Ifor, Sfor1 e Sfor2. La Nato è intervenuta così al di fuori delle sue frontiere e delle esigenze di difesa dei suoi membri. L'efficienza della sua catena di comando ha consigliato le Nazioni Unite di utilizzarla per garantire l'applicazione degli accordi di Dayton.

Il fatto rilevante è stata l'apertura delle missioni anche a contingenti militari di Paesi non Nato, in primo luogo la Russia, che per il coordinamento di questa partecipazione, ha installato una sua missione militare nello stesso Quartier generale dell'Organizzazione, lo Shape.

La missione della Nato in Bosnia ha avuto successo dal punto di vista militare nel fermare i combattimenti, ridurre gli armamenti e avviare un processo di pace. Non altrettanto chiaro è quanto sarà possibile il successo della parte politica degli accordi di Dayton, cioè il ritorno dei profughi alle loro abitazioni, la rimescolanza etnica e religiosa. La finalità di assicurare in tutta l'Europa la convivenza e la tolleranza tra diversi popoli, etnie e fedi religiose costituisce un obiettivo irrinunciabile per la comunità internazionale.

In questo senso la missione continua, ma non è facile neppure vedere il momento della sua fine. Ma già nella stessa area dei Balcani la Nato affronta un nuovo, rilevante impegno. Si tratta del Kosovo, dove si sta sviluppando un nuovo conflitto interetnico, quello tra serbi e albanesi. Nel Kosovo l'Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (Osce) ha già inviato circa mille "verificatori" (ma dovranno diventare duemila) destinati al controllo del ritiro delle forze serbe dalla regione. Non vi è alcun dubbio infatti che la responsabilità storica della tensione in atto compete a Belgrado e a Milosevic che ha messo fine unilateralmente all'autonomia del Kosovo. Bisogna peraltro che siano ambedue le parti - i serbi e gli albanesi del Kosovo - a comprendere che la migliore delle soluzioni è quella negoziale.

Nella vicina Macedonia, la Nato ha installato una "forza di estrazione" in grado di evacuare, se necessario, i verificatori stessi in caso di pericolo. In Kosovo la Nato misura nuovamente la capacità di assumere le proprie responsabilità nell'impedire la guerra e affermare la pace. Ma la "forza di estrazione" in Macedonia - che costituisce un esempio di CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) indica un progresso sulla strada dell'identità comune di difesa e di sicurezza europea.

Storicamente la prima missione militare di pace in Europa, condotta senza la utilizzazione di truppe americane, è stata proprio l'operazione Alba, a guida italiana in Albania.

Ma Alba non poté avere la paternità di nessuna delle organizzazioni politiche europee, per la mancata partecipazione di alcuni grandi Paesi dell'Europa stessa. Tuttavia, militari di tredici nazioni, con un comandante italiano e un vicecomandante francese portarono avanti con successo quella

che non è stata una missione solo di soccorso umanitario, bensì di ripristino delle condizioni per la normalizzazione politica ed istituzionale in Albania. Oggi la "forza di estrazione" in Macedonia, a guida francese, rappresenta la prima esperienza di missione militare della Nato senza la partecipazione diretta di truppe americane.

Certo, la vicenda del Kosovo può sembrare la "cronaca di una guerra annunciata", come del resto sottolinea in una recente intervista il Segretario Generale della Nato, Javier Solana, parafrasando il titolo di un romanzo di Gabriel Garcia Marquez. Dobbiamo quindi impedire l'espulsione di fatto della popolazione residente, l'affermarsi di una nuova spartizione attraverso una catena senza fine di violenze e di uccisioni.

Speriamo che le cose si svolgano in Kosovo secondo gli accordi convenuti e che l'aggravarsi della situazione non richieda nuovi interventi militari.

E veniamo alla dimensione europea della Nato.

Nel campo della costruzione della Iesd vi sono, in questo ultimo periodo, interessanti sviluppi.

Finora tutte le iniziative in materia erano finite per impantanarsi nel triangolo istituzionale Nato, Unione Europea, Unione Europea Occidentale (una specie di triangolo delle Bermude per la difesa europea), tutte le iniziative in materia. Nel vertice di Berlino del 1996, la Nato aveva elaborato la dottrina di una difesa europea "separabile ma non "separata". In altre parole, la possibilità di utilizzare le stesse strutture Nato da parte di missioni dei soli Paesi europei.

Ma chi doveva dirigere politicamente e militarmente queste missioni? Si parlava dell'Unione Europea Occidentale come "braccio" dell'Unione Europea per le questioni della difesa e della sicurezza. Ma le competenze dell'Unione Europea in tema di difesa e di sicurezza non erano chiare.

Nel dicembre scorso a Saint Malo, la Francia e la Gran Bretagna hanno adottato una dichiarazione congiunta in cui hanno ribadito che l'Unione Europea doveva dotarsi di una "capacità autonoma di azione" in tema di difesa, come del resto sancito dal Trattato di Amsterdam. Una dichiarazione importante, perché accomuna due grandi nazioni europee che hanno avuto spesso diversità di vedute in tema di difesa europea. Nello stesso tempo si pensa alla possibilità dell'assorbimento della Ueo nella Ue in modo che quella diventi una specie di agenzia di questa, evitando duplicazioni e semplificazioni dei relativi rapporti istituzionali. Vi sono in corso negoziati tra Ueo e Nato ed è augurabile che si concludano, prima del vertice di Washington.

Il processo di allargamento della Nato è stata una delle decisioni cruciali per il futuro della Nato e della sicurezza regionale europea. Le procedure per l'allargamento sono a buon punto, tutti i Paesi membri

dell'Alleanza hanno depositato i documenti di ratifica riguardanti i nuovi Paesi, Repubblica Ceca, Polonia ed Ungheria. Queste nazioni stanno svolgendo gli adempimenti necessari con l'obiettivo di diventare membri a pieno titolo prima del vertice di Washington del prossimo aprile.

Come è noto, l'Italia ha sostenuto che il processo di allargamento dovesse coinvolgere anche la Slovenia e la Romania, oggi la stessa Bulgaria. Un particolare interesse riveste la Slovenia, sia perché Paese confinante sia per l'esempio di stabilizzazione che darebbe nei Balcani. E ci aspettiamo che l'impegno per l'ulteriore allargamento vada avanti.

L'allargamento è stata la prova concreta - molto autorevole - della volontà degli Stati Uniti di non abbandonare il loro impegno in Europa. Naturalmente vi sono in proposito differenti opinioni. Vi è chi pensa ad un'assunzione integrale della difesa da parte europea, il che significherebbe da parte europea sopportare tutti i costi oggi in buona parte coperti dagli Usa. Ma, a parte l'argomento, diciamo così, mercantile, vi è un argomento più politico.

La permanenza Usa in Europa è garanzia di stabilità anche per i Paesi non membri dell'Alleanza Atlantica. Inoltre, l'allargamento ha portato con sé ulteriori legami con la Russia e gli altri Paesi dell'Europa Orientale, coinvolgendoli nella sicurezza collettiva europea con istituti come il Consiglio Nato-Russia.

Le relazioni euro-americane nell'Alleanza Atlantica sono per l'Europa una potenzialità molto importante per affermare il proprio ruolo e far sentire la propria voce sui temi politici della sicurezza del nostro continente. Il problema è un altro, e cioè che nella Nato l'Europa sappia parlare con una sua voce comune e che nella Nato vi sia - di conseguenza - più Europa.

L'insieme di questi problemi e di queste nuove tendenze deve portare alla definizione del nuovo concetto strategico della Nato.


Per la Nato si tratta di difendere la stabilità dei Paesi membri dai rischi e dalle minacce di destabilizzazione che possono venire dall'esterno. Si passa da un concetto di difesa ad un concetto di sicurezza, quest'ultimo naturalmente non è restringibile solo agli aspetti militari. Un obiettivo che si consegue se la Nato allarga essa stessa la sua capacità di dare cooperazione e stabilità.

La seconda questione che si pone è l'ambito di azione della Nato stessa. E' un ambito di azione che deve riguardare la zona Euroatlantica. Non si tratta di un'organizzazione chiamata ad intervenire in ogni parte del mondo, ma che ha una responsabilità ben precisa nell'area euro atlantica, intesa in senso completo, cioè anche attraverso un'adeguata considerazione del fianco Sud nel Mediterraneo.

Va citata al riguardo l'importanza del "Dialogo Mediterraneo" che coinvolge altre sei nazioni di quell'area. Ma, anche qui parafrasando il Segretario generale Solana, la Nato non è il gendarme del mondo.

La terza questione è l'Identità di difesa europea. La sua affermazione implica diverse conseguenze tra cui la finalizzazione in tal senso del ruolo del vicecomandante europeo della Nato, nonché lo sviluppo dei legami politici con la Francia anche in vista di una sua possibile reintegrazione nell'organizzazione militare dell'Alleanza Atlantica.

L'augurio è che questa Conferenza possa dare, cinquant'anni dopo, un importante contributo alle ulteriori iniziative per la difesa della pace, della democrazia, della civile convivenza, della stabilità nell'area euroatlantica, perché questi valori possano progredire in tutto il mondo.





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*Il Presidente della Commissione Difesa
della Camera dei Deputati*

AN ACTIVE ROLE FOR ITALY
by Valdo Spini

"50th Anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance: a new Nato for a new Europe"
Chamber of Deputies - Sala della Lupa
Rome, January 25, 1999

It is certainly meaningful that the first of the events organised to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance should take place in Italy, in Rome.

Italy's geopolitical situation is of great importance.
The tensions and conflicts in the Balkans are taking place just round the corner.

Our interest in the South flank of Nato, that is to say in the Mediterranean basin where the peoples of the three major monotheist religions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - can live together in peace and harmony is due to the very location of our country. We must voice all our support to ensure that the Middle East peace agreement is adhered to and developed further.

Today the issue of Nato membership is no longer in doubt for the majority of Italy's political forces. But Italy wants to actively contribute ideas and experience to develop the new role which the changed historical situation has led and will lead Nato to take on.

Here of course there is the responsibility of the Government; however, it is Parliament which is responsible for policy-setting and it is to be hoped that the big issues of the country's foreign and security policy should not only be the subject matter for debates on conditions between majority and opposition, but also the result of an objective bipartisan consideration of the country's long-term interests.

It is therefore good that today the Italian Parliament hosts such an important event. Looking back on the reality of the last fifty years and ten years after the end of the cold war this is an event which starts a reflection on the destiny and future of this organisation just few weeks before the Washington summit.

There are three main notions put forward in this reflection and all three of them are extremely topical: the new role of Nato in peace missions; the Initiatives for the European Defence and Security Identity and the enlargement of Nato.

The demise of the blocs left a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe which must be filled through the enlargement process on the one hand and through the development of all those initiatives on the other which, starting from the "Partnership for Peace", have involved and indeed involve Russia and the whole group of countries which belonged to the Warsaw Pact in a common consideration of security problems in Europe.

In this connection mention should be made of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the Nato-Ukraine Council (NUC) and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), composed of 44 Nato countries plus one which is not a member of Nato.

The demise of the blocs caused the outburst of national, religious and ethnic tensions in the Balkans, which were not dormant, and it is these tensions that Nato had and indeed still has to deal with. This is what happened and is happening in Bosnia Herzegovina. This is the tragedy which is taking place in Kosovo.

In the meantime as a result of the further integration of the European Union, the growth of its responsibilities (with the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties) and the need to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy through the availability of a military option the European countries are faced with the problem of taking on common responsibilities in the field of common foreign and security policy.

The European Union - especially after 11 of its member states agreed on the adoption of a single currency - the Euro - cannot be what used to be said once of West Germany - an economic giant and a political dwarf.

In a world where there is only one global superpower, the United States, regional (that is to say continental) responsibilities need to become

established and Europe has the historical duty to meet this requirement. This European evolution can take place within Nato in a framework of effective collaboration and cooperation with the United States, which does not necessarily mean that Europe cannot decide to take autonomous European defence initiatives (such as Eurofor and Euromarfor).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, Nato was faced with a radical change of its role that had to be different from that of a defence organisation with a clearly identified enemy - the potential threat posed by the Warsaw Pact - and had to become an organisation of collective security against external threats which are not so clearly defined and identifiable.

Faced with the disappearance of the institutional "enemy", Nato reacted renewing and adjusting its role.

The first major change came about when Nato was used as an instrument for the UN peace-keeping operations in Bosnia Herzegovina with the Ifor, Sfor1 and Sfor2 missions. Thus Nato intervened outside its frontiers and beyond the defence requirements of its members. The effectiveness of its command chain induced the United Nations to use it to ensure that the Dayton agreements were adhered to.

The important fact was the participation in the missions of military contingents of non-Nato countries, the first of which was Russia, which in order to coordinate its participation established its military mission in the Nato headquarters - SHAPE.

From a military point of view Nato's mission in Bosnia was successful as it stopped the fighting, reduced armaments and started a peace process. What is not clear is to what extent the political part of the Dayton agreement will be successful, namely the return of refugees to their homes and ethnic and religious mingling. Ensuring that everywhere in Europe different people can live together and there is tolerance of different ethnic groups and religions is an objective which the international community cannot renounce.

Seen in this light the mission goes on and it is not easy to predict when it will end. However in the Balkans Nato is engaged in a new important task. A new interethnic conflict is developing in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Osce) has already sent about 1000 monitors (but the number will have to be increased to 2000)

whose task is to monitor the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the region. There is actually no doubt that Belgrade, that is to say Milosevic is historically responsible for what is happening, as he unilaterally put an end to Kosovo's autonomy. However, it is necessary that both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo understand that the best solution is negotiations.

In nearby Macedonia, Nato has established a "pull-out force" capable of evacuating, if necessary, the monitors in case they are in danger. In Kosovo Nato is once again taking stock of its capacity to take on its responsibility in preventing a war and securing peace. But the "pull-out force" in Macedonia - which is an example of the Combined Joint Task Force - shows that progress has been made towards a common European defence and security identity.

Historically the first military peace mission in Europe, conducted without the use of American troops, was Operation Alba, led by Italy in Albania.

But Operation Alba was not born under the auspices of any of the European political organisations because some of the big European countries failed to participate. However, the military of 13 nations led by an Italian commander and a French deputy commander successfully conducted a mission whose aim was not just to deliver humanitarian aid, but to re-create the conditions to normalise Albania's institutional and political situation. Today the pull-out force in Macedonia led by the French is the first Nato military mission without the direct participation of US troops.

The events in Kosovo may certainly resemble the "Chronicle of a War Foretold" as was underlined in a recent interview by Nato's Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana, paraphrasing the title of a novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez. We must therefore prevent the local population from being driven away and a new division from becoming established through a never ending chain of violence and killings.

Let us hope that things in Kosovo evolve in accordance with the agreements and that the worsening of the situation will not require new military actions.

Let us now turn to the European dimension of Nato.

In the setting up of Iesd there have been interesting developments lately.

So far all initiatives in this field ended up in the quagmire of the institutional triangle - Nato, European Union, Western European Union - (similar to the

Bermudas triangle as far as European defence is concerned). At the 1996 Berlin summit, Nato had developed the doctrine of a European defence as "separable but not separate". In other words it meant the possibility to use Nato structures in missions involving European countries only.

But who is to lead these missions politically and militarily? There was talk of the Western European Union as the European Union's arm in defence and security matters, but the European Union's responsibilities in defence and security matters were not clear.

Last December in Saint Malo, France and Great Britain adopted a joint declaration in which they once again stressed the fact that the European Union must be equipped with an "autonomous action capacity" for defence, as laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. It was an important statement in which two big European nations, which have often had different opinions on European defence, took a common stance. Another possibility is for the Western European Union to be taken over by the European Union with the former becoming a sort of agency of the latter, thus avoiding duplication of efforts and facilitating institutional relations. Negotiations are currently underway between the Western European Union and Nato which will hopefully be concluded before the Washington summit.

Nato's enlargement process was one of the crucial decisions for the future of Nato and the regional security of Europe. The enlargement procedures are going well and all Nato countries have handed in the ratification papers concerning the new members: the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. These nations are taking the necessary steps with a view to becoming full members before the Washington summit in April.

As is known, Italy maintained that the enlargement process should include Slovenia and Romania as well, and today even Bulgaria. We are particularly interested in Slovenia, both because it borders on Italy and because of the stabilisation example it would set in the Balkans. We expect the commitment to a further enlargement to go on.

The enlargement is tangible evidence - and very authoritative - of the US willingness not to abandon its commitment in Europe. Of course there are different opinions on the matter. There are those who think that Europe should take upon itself the whole responsibility for defence matters, which would mean that Europe would have to bear the burden of costs, which at

present are largely borne by the US. However, leaving these so-called business considerations aside, there is a political case for enlargement.

The US presence in Europe also ensures the stability of countries which are not members of Nato. Moreover, the enlargement led to the forging of additional links with Russia and the other countries of Eastern Europe, involving them in the collective security of Europe through bodies such as the Nato-Russia Council.

Euro-American relations within the Atlantic Alliance are for Europe an important potential to consolidate its role and make its voice heard about the political issues of security in our continent. But the problem is a different one: Europe must be able to speak with a single voice within Nato and therefore there should be more Europe within Nato.


All these problems and these new trends must lead to the development of a new strategic concept of Nato.

Nato's concern is to defend the stability of the member countries from possible external destabilization risks and threats. There's a shift from a defence concept to a security concept and the latter of course cannot be reduced to sheer military aspects. This is an aim that can be achieved if Nato itself enlarges its capacity to give cooperation and stability. The second question is the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is a scope that must encompass the Euroatlantic area. Nato is not an organisation called upon to take action in every part of the world, but it has a clearly defined responsibility within the Euroatlantic area - understood in the full sense of the expression - and hence it must duly consider the South flank in the Mediterranean.

In this connection mention should be made of the Mediterranean Dialogue which involves six more nations in that area. But here too, and again paraphrasing Secretary General Solana, Nato is not the world's policeman.

The third question is the European defence identity. Establishing this identity would lead to a number of consequences among which the definition of the role of Nato's European Deputy Commander, as well as the development of political links with France also with a view to its possible re-integration in the military organisation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Our hope is that after fifty years this conference may give an important contribution to further initiatives for the defence of peace, democracy, peaceful coexistence among peoples, stability in the Euro-atlantic area and for the advancement of these values in the whole world.





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**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE**

Italian Chamber of Deputies
Sala della Lupa
Rome, January 25, 1999

Paper on

***Nato's New Role
in Crisis Management***

by John Roper
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

This year is, of course, in many ways a continuous birthday party for NATO, when we are celebrating the remarkable achievements of its first half century and looking ahead to its potential to develop as a unique instrument for multinational military cooperation in the very changed circumstances of the twenty-first century. Our discussions should not though be purely laudatory, however deserved praise is but should examine critically the particular contribution NATO can bring to the network of international institutions that must be mutually reinforcing if they are to cooperate in working effectively to help their member states achieve peace and security, both in Europe and perhaps in a wider environment.

A critical examination of NATO's new role in crisis management may therefore shock some as being somewhat irreverent and inappropriate at a birthday party, but although I wish to raise a number of difficult questions from an independent position outside the institutions of the Alliance, I hope I will not be seen as playing a role similar to Hans Christian Andersen's small boy who revealed the non-existent character of the Emperor's new clothes. Perhaps to reassure I should begin with my conclusion; I believe that NATO, as an extremely effective instrument for military cooperation, can usefully contribute to crisis management in integrating the efforts of its member states, sometimes in cooperation with other partners, but that in order to prevent misunderstandings and false expectations it should define its capabilities with care, and accept that it is only going to be as successful as its member states permit it to be.

NATO's functional dynamism.

NATO has, in the decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall, demonstrated that while, unlike the European Union, it is not institutionally dynamic and does not see any deepening of the pattern of cooperation between its members, it is functionally dynamic and can transfer the professional and technical skills and competences of military cooperation which have been developed among its members in the area of collective defence into a wide range of other functions of armed forces. It has therefore been recognised by its members, as well as by both those who will join in the course of 1999 and those who would like to be considered for membership, as the primary instrument of multinational military cooperation. All its members recognise that

it provides military 'value added'; military forces working together within NATO can be significantly more effective than they would be on their own.

NATO and its member states have also recognised that in this range of military activities which go beyond collective defence the instrument of military cooperation has to be used much more flexibly. The Cold War model of collective defence was based on the assumption that all the members of NATO would provide the maximum contribution from their armed forces to this task,¹ and that NATO would provide the framework of military cooperation and command structure in which they would operate. The range of operations involving our armed forces which we are now contemplating may still involve all of the members of NATO as in IFOR/SFOR, or it may involve a much more limited number of members as in the extraction force deployed into Macedonia at present. The provision for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) presents an institutional arrangement for such flexibility whereby a subset of NATO members may be involved in a particular operation and they or, as in IFOR/SFOR the whole membership, can be joined by other countries. There is even provision whereby such an operation can be under the political control not of the North Atlantic Council but, if the countries involved were exclusively European, by the WEU Council. It would still however make use of the NATO Command Structure and where appropriate other NATO assets.

NATO and crisis management in the Cold War.

Before turning to a discussion of NATO's new role in crisis management, it is worth recalling that crisis management as such is not new to NATO as during the Cold War it already had two roles in crisis management. 'Crisis management' for NATO during the Cold War was one dimension of its relationship with the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. It referred to the measures to be taken to prevent any conflict from becoming violent and the plans to bring it to a conclusion if it were to occur. In the Cold War NATO, as the focus for all its member states in dealing with the dominant problem of foreign and security policy facing them, had therefore a centrality both in the

¹ Subject to the qualification that the extra-European members might in a global conflict have other extra-European commitments.

development of the political measures of conflict prevention as well as the planning for the military measures for concluding a crisis as quickly and satisfactorily as possible if it were to become violent. At a time when crises were primarily seen as involving the two blocs. NATO, was seen as having an effective monopoly in Cold War crisis management, apart from possible bilateral super-power communications.

The second way in which NATO has played an effective, but much less public part, in crisis management, both during the Cold War and subsequently, has been in attempting to reconcile differences between its member states. The case to which most attention has been given over the years has been that of Greco-Turkish relations, but reference can also be made to discussions in the margins of ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council which helped to end the "Cod Wars" between the United Kingdom and Iceland in the 1970s. A great deal of time has been spent within various Alliance bodies on trying to deal with Greco-Turkish disputes, both insofar as they affected efficient Alliance military arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and more directly to prevent conflicts between two members of the Alliance. Successive Secretaries General and Chairmen of the Military Committee have spent a great deal of time on this problem. Although they have been successful in preventing a deterioration of the relationship, almost certainly this still remains a problem of internal crisis management for the Alliance. NATO's relatively unpublicised work in this field is a good illustration of the general principle that organisations rarely get credit for successful conflict prevention, it is only when conflict prevention fails that people notice.

Contemporary crisis management.

Since the end of the Cold War 'crisis management' has been used rather loosely in discussions in NATO, sometimes to mean Alliance intervention in conflicts beyond the territory of NATO allies and sometimes more widely to refer to any action other than the traditional Alliance role of territorial defence. These usages may be both too narrow and too wide. They are probably too narrow as they concentrate too heavily on the military component of crisis management, which, while important, is certainly not the only component or necessarily the central one. They are too wide in that they go beyond NATO's own terminological definition of crisis management. This is

"The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict, and contain hostilities if they should result."²

As a definition this seems perhaps a shade austere, it lacks, in particular, any reference to post-conflict crisis management which has certainly come within the practical range of NATO's crisis management activities in Bosnia.

More importantly it refers to "the coordinated actions" which indicates that in practice crisis management is a complicated combination of political, military and possibly economic operations in which, unlike the situation in the Cold War, NATO is not likely to be the only operator nor in many cases the explicit coordinator. This contrast to the Cold War situation, where NATO would have been the crisis manager to one in which it is contributing to the military component of crisis management, is demonstrated by the frustrations of the situation in Yugoslavia from 1992-95 in terms of relations between UNPROFOR and NATO³, or in the more straightforward but still complex relations between IFOR and the High Representative in Bosnia after 1995⁴.

It might be useful to obtain indicators of the intensity of crises - a crisis-Richter scale - which might give some indication of the relevant importance of crises. During the Cold War NATO developed very sophisticated "warning indicators" to alert its members to the risks of conflict. It is not known whether something similar is now being undertaken with respect to potential crisis situations. There is possibly a case, if this were to be undertaken, for at least some of the outputs to be put into the public domain. During the Cold War there was effectively no question but that member states would respond to aggression against the territory of any member state, in the present situation there is a much greater need to inform not only governments but also the "political class" or more widely public opinion of the costs and benefits of the alternative responses to a developing crisis. Such a direct publication of information

² NATO's Military Agency for Standardisation November 1998.

³ cf Michael Rose, "Fighting for Peace", London 1998

⁴cf Carl Bildt, "Peace Journey: the struggle for Peace in Bosnia", London 1998.

will seem revolutionary to the classified culture of those who deal with matters of security, but there is a parallel with the debate going forward as to how far the international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) should give early warning of potential economic and financial crises.

The reference to financial and economic crises indicates that there are obviously some crises in which there is normally no military component required in the response. Within the total range of crises there may be others where the response is almost exclusively military, counter-proliferation cases would seem on some occasions to come into this category. The majority of cases however, sometimes referred to as complex emergencies, could very well have politico-diplomatic, humanitarian aid, post conflict social and economic reconstruction, and state-building dimensions as well as the military and paramilitary dimensions.

There are significant problems of the integration of these various dimensions of the response to a crisis, with the management of crisis management becoming particularly complicated when the different organisations and agencies involved have different organisational cultures. The particular mix of organisations is likely to vary from crisis to crisis and while the military structure of NATO give it considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, flexibility and deployability, some aspects of its military culture may not be immediately appreciated by those contributing the civilian components of crisis management.

The most complicated problems will arise with the politico-diplomatic dimension of crisis management. This in fact has three parts:

- the political direction of the crisis management operation,
- the negotiations with the parties directly involved locally in the crisis, and
- the negotiations at the United Nations, or OSCE, for international legitimisation of the action.

It is perhaps useful to make a distinction between two broad types of crises in examining patterns of management. There are some crises that can be characterised as acute, while others can be described as chronic crises, with the former showing considerable risk of an early conflict or actual hostilities, and the latter including post-

conflict crisis management situations requiring long term attention. The more acute the crisis the less likely that heads of government and ministers in major NATO allies will be to allow responsibility to be transferred to others, at the most we are likely to see this being dealt with the type of Contact Group *directoire* with which we have become familiar in former Yugoslavia. In the case of chronic crises, when the risk of hostilities is much reduced, major countries may still wish to take initiatives but these will require to be approved in wider multilateral bodies, either the governing bodies of organisations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the OSCE Council or multilateral *ad hoc* bodies such as the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) established by the Dayton Agreement.

As far as political negotiations with the parties locally are concerned⁵, there will again be a variation between acute and chronic crises and a diversity of negotiators. The more serious the crisis the more likely that a US negotiator will be required, both to guarantee the support of the United States for whatever is negotiated and because of the political power of the United States to frighten the parties into coming to an agreement. In less acute crises the Contact Group or its equivalent may appoint a negotiator who may also be endorsed by the OSCE or the European Union. In a chronic crisis or in post conflict crisis management this function may be left to a long term resident representative of the "international community" such as the High Representative of the PIC in Bosnia Hercegovina or Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General as in Macedonia or Cyprus. In other circumstances of long-term crises the High Commissioner for National Minorities and Long Term Missions of the OSCE can play an important part.

The third part of the politico-diplomatic dimension of crisis management is to achieve international authority for the crisis management operations from the United Nations Security Council, or possibly the OSCE Council. This will be primarily the responsibility of the members of the organisations involved sitting on the Security Council. Although

⁵ There may well be other local negotiations undertaken by other crisis managers, including those by the military force commander and his staff with the local military, humanitarian agencies with local authorities etc.

the Permanent Members have a particular role in this, the support and involvement of the elected members is also important.

This discussion of the politico-diplomatic dimension will have illustrated that while, as we shall see, the North Atlantic Council, or in some circumstances the Western European Union Council, have an important political function in their responsibility for the control of the military dimension of crisis management if it is provided using the NATO framework, there are a number of others involved in different structures dealing with other aspects of the politico-diplomatic element of crisis management.

The spectrum of crisis management actors in complex emergencies.

As the discussion of the politico-diplomatic dimension of crisis management has demonstrated there are a multitude of actors in crisis management. Managing the crisis managers may often be as difficult as managing the crisis. As well as the various international and regional organisations who may be involved, individual states may have their own diplomatic missions and humanitarian activities. A variety of non governmental organisations are likely to be involved and the role of the press in affecting international attitudes to a particular crisis cannot be ignored.

While, as has been said, NATO is seen by its members as their preferred instrument for multinational military cooperation, there are other organisations which have played a role in the military and paramilitary⁶ element of crisis management in Europe in recent years. These have included forces directly responsible to the United Nations (UN) such as the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP), and United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) as well as *ad hoc* multinational forces sanctioned by the United Nations such as the Italian led "Operation Alba" in Albania in 1997. While the European Union's monitors in various parts of former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ECMM) have worn white coats the vast majority of them have had military backgrounds as have a significant number of the OSCE's 'verifiers' deployed into Kosovo from November 1998. In both cases their

⁶ In paramilitary I am including the function of military and civilian observers and verifiers as well as the functions of *gendarmes* and *carabinieri* type units which go beyond the civil police function.

tasks involve local negotiations with the armed forces as well as reporting on military developments. Finally the OSCE has since 1995 deployed officers in Bosnia to ensure the implementation of the arms control sections of the Dayton agreement. Humanitarian agencies have a growing role in crisis management. in particular, because recent crises both in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood have generated significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. Therefore one of the factors driving Western European concern about crises is the risk that unsolved crises will lead to an influx of refugees. Here the United Nations, with its High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Union, with its ECHO operations, have provided much of the resources, they have worked both directly and in cooperation with non governmental organisations (NGOs) to implement their programmes. NATO has itself developed within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) an Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) which exists to extend long standing NATO activities in the field of Civil Emergency Planning to the wider area of the 44 members of EAPC and coordinate their response capabilities to ensure prompt and effective offers of disaster assistance to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (UN OCHA). How far this will be able to contribute to the humanitarian dimension of crisis management is to be seen, but its existence within the NATO structure might ensure a better interface between the military and humanitarian elements of crisis management.

Post conflict crisis management is central to NATO's IFOR/SFOR experience in Bosnia, and must be seen as also incorporating elements of crisis prevention as it is intended to break the cycle of social tension which could otherwise lead to further hostilities. It will involve measures of economic and social reconstruction as well as the development of a functioning political system which can ensure that social disputes can be resolved within the democratic process rather than leading to renewed violence. This will bring in a wide range of organisations, in Bosnia-Herzegovina it has involved on the economic side the World Bank, the European Union, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the bilateral programmes of individual countries. On the social side the development of effective and respected local civil policing is crucial, here the UN sponsored International Police Task Force has had the central role in Bosnia, the UN and now OSCE have taken responsibility

in Eastern Slavonia and WEU has done so in Albania. As far as the development of political and judicial institutions are concerned, the experience of Bosnia sine 1995 has shown how difficult this is, but various organisations, including the OSCE in election monitoring and the development of Ombudspersons, and successive High Representatives, Carl Bildt and Carlos Westendorp, and their staffs have contributed. This overview of the range of organisations playing a part in contemporary crisis management has been to indicate that NATO's role in crisis management is going to be one among a number of actors and not necessarily even *primus inter pares*.

NATO's comparative advantages in crisis management

There is a clear case for NATO playing a major role in contemporary crisis management, certainly in the military element and possibly in the coordinating function, although this will depend on the nature and the scale of the operation.

NATO's main comparative advantages are that it brings together virtually all the Western countries who collectively possess an overwhelming preponderance of military, economic and political power. In particular, it builds on the traditional patterns of military cooperation between the United States, Canada and Western European countries. This unequalled military capacity has a formidable deterrent capability as was seen in October 1998 when President Milosevic agreed to negotiate over Kosovo when faced with the decision by NATO to undertake air strikes.

The experience of working together for decades in NATO has given political leaders of Allied countries a confidence in NATO's command systems and structures. There is in all Allied countries a growing reluctance to put the lives of the young people of our armed forces at risk, particularly in the management of crises that do not immediately effect a country's vital interests. If force has to be used and the young people of our armed forces have to be placed in harm's way, countries want to know that the risks to them will be minimised because the command and control systems are tried and trusted. This NATO, with its half century of experience of cooperation, provides in a way which no other international military structure does. The recognition of this fact in every Alliance country is an extremely important asset for NATO.

NATO has the further advantage in that it is a standing "coalition of the potentially willing" including the single most powerful military power, the United States. This gives

it very considerable power projection capabilities and is a massive force multiplier for the contribution of the European Allies. The United States has very considerable political hesitation about military intervention on its own and the presence of Alliance Partners at its side provides political reassurance, even if it sometimes complicates the military management. NATO is the American instrument of choice for coalition warfare.

The development of CJTFs as discussed earlier provides NATO with a growing flexibility in the arrangements of its operations in crisis management. The evolution of planning for operations in the last decade has seen a significant move from the traditional large forces of the Cold War period to tailor-made units for specific functions as for example in the extraction force currently deployed Macedonia which has been described as a "reinforced battalion".

The recognition of NATO's comparative advantage has been confirmed by the decision of the European members of NATO to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO rather than create parallel structures outside NATO. Although the fact that any use by Europeans of NATO structures and assets in CJTF responsible to WEU would require agreement by all members of the Alliance gives the United States (as well as Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey) a right of veto over such European action, the use of such a veto would cause such a major crisis within the Alliance that it seems unimaginable.

While there is no doubt therefore of NATO's considerable comparative advantages in terms of the military element of crisis management, there may still be questions about whether a relatively large, and growing, multinational organisation can take the responsibility for the political aspects of acute crisis management. Political leaders in major NATO countries will want to take the lead themselves in these cases. While there is an acceptance of multinational military command there is not yet a readiness to delegate policy determination and political negotiation to a multinational organisation.

New role, new problems.

NATO's potential to act in crisis management will bring with it new problems and new areas for tension among its members. In this as in much else "there's no such thing

as a free lunch". Three areas where there are likely to be arguments are about where NATO should act as a crisis manager, about what is the requirement for international authority for crisis management, and variations in national styles of crisis management and peacekeeping arising from different levels of equipment and different military culture.

While some public discussion would suggest that NATO and its member states are desperate to acquire the role of world policeman, any closer examination of reality would show that the reverse is closer to the truth, there are political as well as capacity constraints on any such development. At the time of the 1991 Gulf War the then US Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, is reported to have said,

"I think caution is in order . . . This happens to be one of those times when it is justified to . . . send American forces into combat to achieve important national objectives. But they are very rare. Just because we do it successfully this once, it doesn't mean we should therefore assume that it's something we ought to fall back on automatically as the easy answer to international problems in the future. We have to remember that we don't have a dog in every fight, that we don't want to get involved in every single conflict . . ."7

More recently a German scholar has written, "NATO is still a long way from defining itself as a coalition of those willing to export stability to regional theatres outside Europe"⁸. How far it has moved in that direction will perhaps be seen by the decisions of this spring's Alliance Summit in Washington. However, in terms of crisis management, it is only necessary to mention some possible regions to see how restricted is the area under serious consideration. Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific, and Africa south of the Sahara since the Somalia intervention of 1992, are all

⁷ Dick Cheney quoted by David Broder in the *Washington Post*, February 27 1991. I am grateful to David Yost for this quotation.

⁸ Joachim Krause, "Proliferation risks and their strategic relevance: what role for NATO?" *Survival*, vol 37 (Summer 1995), p.147

in the "very unlikely" category as is, for most people, the territory of the former Soviet Union. This seems in practice to exclude everything except South Eastern Europe and the countries bordering the Mediterranean, with the possible extension to the Gulf. Even in South Eastern Europe there are considerable restrictions. The example of "Operation Alba" in 1997 suggested that even among the European members of NATO there was no agreement on multilateral military activity in Albania, and recent developments in Kosovo have shown that further problems arise from NATO's acceptability in all situations. Many external commentators would feel that it would be preferable to have a NATO ground force in Kosovo verifying compliance with such agreements as have been reached, and if necessary having the capacity to enforce them, than to rely on the more dubious option of unarmed OSCE "verifiers". But if this is not acceptable to the Serbian authorities, then, irrespective of whether or not NATO member states would have been prepared to provide such forces, it would have been impossible to deploy them in the absence of a UNSC resolution which appeared difficult to obtain.⁹

The issue of UN Security Council authorisation is both a legal and a political problem. NATO in its Brussels Summit Declaration of January 1994 offered "to support, on a case by case basis, in accordance with our own procedures peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE." While this does not explicitly exclude undertaking crisis management actions in the absence of such authority, and indeed it can be argued that NATO has under Article 51 of the UN Charter no requirement of a mandate to come to the assistance of a member or non member who is the victim of aggression, there is great reluctance to act in the internal affairs of another state without UN authority. As the decision on "Act Ords" for air strikes against Serbia in October 1998 has shown this is not a total bar but an issue remains on which we are far from consensus within the Alliance. The implications of acting without UNSC authority for the future of the Russia-NATO relationship add a further dimension to the complication of this question.

⁹ It seems that irrespective of the willingness of the North Atlantic Council to provide 'Act Ords' for specific and time restricted bombing strikes without explicit UNSC authority, it would be more difficult to do this in the case of a substantial ground presence for a period of time.

A third group of problems in the military dimensions of crisis management can arise from differences in military capability and operational culture among NATO member states. Problems of interoperability are nothing new for NATO, but in a period of once again growing US defence budgets and shrinking European resources we may find new problems arising here. The evaluation that "(D)espite spending two thirds of what the United States does on defense, European NATO countries have less than 10 percent of the transportable defense capability for prompt long range action."¹⁰ is frequently quoted but has not yet lead to many policy changes. Experience in Bosnia since 1995 has shown very different styles in peacekeeping in IFOR/SFOR, in part a function of equipment differences but also to national priorities on force protection. Bosnia has been, in fact a relatively benign environment, these differences in styles of operation and quality of equipment might have presented more problems if the situation had been more hostile.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that there will be important tasks in the future for which NATO is particularly well equipped. As we have seen given the complexity of the tasks of conflict management and the range of actors it is not clear that NATO will always be the crisis manager itself. Indeed to revert to the NATO definition of crisis management given at the outset it is not clear who will be the coordinator of actions in various crisis management situations. NATO has professionally and technically considerable advantages which can enable it to make major contributions to the military component of crisis management in the future. Whether or not it will do this will depend on particular political situations and the willingness of its members to make use of their primary instrument for military cooperation.

¹⁰ Michael O'Hanlon, *How to be a Cheap Hawk*, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution 1998, p.76

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**BOZZA D'INTERVENTO DELL'AMMIRAGLIO
GUIDO VENTURONI**

*"THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE"*

ROMA. CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI. 25 GENNAIO 1999

NATO NEW ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

AT THE END OF HIS MOST FAMOUS NOVEL "IL GATTOPARDO", THE ITALIAN WRITER TOMASI DI LAMPEDUSA WROTE "EVERYTHING HAS TO CHANGE SO THAT NOTHING CAN CHANGE"

IT MAY SOUND AS A CYNICAL STATEMENT BUT THERE IS A DEEPER TRUTH IN IT WHICH CAN BE READ FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE OR SEEN IN A POSITIVE WAY AND THAT, IN MY VIEW, WELL APPLIES TO THE ALLIANCE FUTURE. AS NATO ADAPTS ITS ROLE AND FUNCTION TO THE POST-COLD WAR NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

IT MEANS THAT NATO HAS TO UNDERGO A MAJOR ADAPTION PROCESS IF SHE WANTS TO REMAIN RELEVANT TO THE CHALLENGES AND RISKS FACING HER IN THE 21ST CENTURY.

NATO HAS MUCH TO CHANGE SO THAT ITS FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING VALUE – THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AS THE BEDROCK OF OUR SECURITY – DOES NOT CHANGE.

THIS CONSIDERATION LEADS ME DIRECTLY TO THE CORE OF OUR TO DAY DISCUSSION.

WHILE THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS UNDERGONE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, STILL WE ARE FACING A TURBULENT PERIOD OF TRANSITION IN THE PERIPHERAL AREAS OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJACENT REGIONS.

ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE IS UNLIKELY TO BE THREATENED BY A MAJOR CALCULATED AGGRESSION, IT IS A FACT THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND

ON ITS PERIPHERY FACE SERIOUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTES.

WE ARE BEARING SAD WITNESS, TO NAME ONE, TO THE BALKANS SINKING INTO CHAOS, FIRSTLY IN BOSNIA ADN NOW IN KOSOVO

INSTABILITY IS FUELLED BY INCREASING POLITICAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES AND FAILING ECONOMIES. WITH A PERCEPTION BY SOME STATES. AND REGRETTABLY ALSO BY A NUMBER OF NON-STATE PLAYERS. THAT VIOLENCE. EVEN OF THE HIGH INTENSITY AND ATROCITY. CAN SERVE THEIR PURPOSES AND ASPIRATIONS.

IT IS A VOLATILE AND CHALLENGING ENVIROMENT CHARACTERISED BY COMPLEX. MULTI-FACETED AND MULTI-DIRECTIONAL RISKS. WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO FLARE UP AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE INTO LOCALIZED OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE AND BITTER DEEPLY-ROOTED CONFLICTS. SOME OF WHICH CAN SPILL OVER OUTSIDE THE LOCAL REGIONS WHERE THEY ORIGINATED INTO OUR TERRITORY OR IMPACT UPON WIDER AREAS OF INTEREST.

LOCAL FLARES CAN EVOLVE INTO REGION-WIDE INSTABILITY AND UNSECURITY. WHAT IS PARTICULARLY WORRYING. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. IS THAT THERE ARE. GENERALLY. NOT EASY POLITICAL FIXES TO END SUCH CONFLICTS AND THERE IS LITTLE PREPAREDENESS ON OUR SIDE TO ACT PREVENTIVELY. WICH IS PROBABILY THE BEST WAY TO KEEP CRISES UNDER CONTROL.

CRISIS CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT REQUIRE A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH EMBRACING ALL POLITICAL FIELDS. BE IT DIPLOMATIC. INSTITUTIONAL. FINANCIAL. SOCIAL. ECONOMIC. HUMANITARIAN. OR ENVIROMENTAL.

BUT SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IS STILL TO COME.

WE MAY THEREFORE SEE AN EVER-INCREASING REQUIREMENT FOR THE POLITICAL USE OF THE MILITARY TOOL IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO QUELL A FIRE OR CONTAIN A CONFLICT. SOME OF THEM OF LENGTHY DURATION, LIKE IN BOSNIA, AND COVERING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

BESIDES REGIONAL CONFLICTS STIRRED UP BY ETHNIC OR OTHER INTERNAL RIVALRIES, THE WIDENING RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY IS EMERGING AS A MATTER OF SERIOUS AND GROWING CONCERN.

WHILE IN THE 90^S SOME PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF NON - PROLIFERATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, INCLUDING THE INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, NEVERTHELESS MAJOR CHALLENGES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROLIFERATION REMAIN, ESPECIALLY AT THE SOUTHERN AND THE SOUTH-EASTERN PERIPHERY OF NATO AND IN ADJACENT AREAS.

SOME STATE AND NON-STATE PLAYERS CONTINUE THEIR EFFORT TO ACQUIRE WMDS AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY.

COMMODITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED TO BUILD THESE WEAPONS, ARE BECOMING LESS UNCOMMON.

FURTHERMORE OUR SECURITY INTERESTS CAN ALSO BE AFFECTED BY OTHER RISKS OF A WIDER NATURE INCLUDING TERRORISM, THE POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION OF THE FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES AND OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND SABOTAGE.

IN MEETING THOSE NEW RISKS, WE FACE NEW CHALLENGES.

GIVEN THAT THE PRINCIPAL RISKS TO OUR SECURITY STEM FROM POLITICAL INSTABILITY, ETHNIC RIVALRIES AND ECONOMIC FRAGILITIES, OUR POLITICAL EFFORTS SHOULD AIM TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND TO ENSURE SOUND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THROUGH CAREFULLY STRUCTURED INITIATIVES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

IN OTHER WORDS WE HAVE TO CARRY OUT A CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY WHICH TACKLES THE ROOT CAUSES AT THE SOURCE.

CLEARLY THIS IS THE FIELD OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND BY NO MEANS A PRIMARY MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY BUT THE MILITARY CAN PLAY A SIGNIFICANT, IF ONLY SUPPORTING ROLE, THROUGH INCREASED COOPERATION, TRANSPARENCY, CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BUILDING.

THIS IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP-FOR PEACE-PROCESS BY WHICH NON NATO NATIONS OR EVEN FORMER ADVERSARIES BECOME PARTNERS COOPERATING IN MILITARY FIELDS.

ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED AS A WELL PRESERVED INNER SECRET GARDEN BY THE NATIONS TO BE OPENED UP ONLY TO BEST FRIENDS.

MAKING THEM OPEN TO A WIDER NUMBER OF PARTNERS AND FORMER RIVALS IS THE BEST MANIFESTATION OF A NEW CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BUILDING CLIMATE.

UNDER THIS RESPECT, MILITARY COOPERATION CAN BE REGARDED AS THE FRONT RUNNER OF A CRISIS-PREVENTION STRATEGY AND A PRIMARY TOOL OF THE PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY.

BUT THESE ACTIVITIES CANNOT BE A MONOPOLY OF THE ALLIANCE. ON THE CONTRARY INTER-ACTION WITHIN AND AMONG ALL THE ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES WHICH MAKE UP THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IS ESSENTIAL. IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE STABLE ENVIRONMENT WE DESIRE, IT IS THE WELL KNOWN PRINCIPLE OF THE "INTERLOCKING AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING INSTITUTIONS".

BUT WHILE PREVENTIVE ACTION IS THE KEY TO A MORE STABLE AND SECURE LANDSCAPE, WE NEED TO BE SOBER IN OUR EXPECTATIONS, BECAUSE OUR VALUES ARE NOT YET THE VALUES OF ALLS: TOO MANY COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD AND EVEN IN AND AROUND EUROPE DO NOT YET FULLY SHARE THEM.

TO BRING ABOUT A SHIFT TO DEMOCRACY IN COUNTRIES WHERE THERE IS NEITHER RESPECT FOR HUMAN BEINGS NOR THE RULE OF LAW WILL NOT COME EASY. THEREFORE WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO MANAGE CRISES WHEN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FAILS, AS UNFORTUNATELY IT TOO OFTEN DOES, LIKE IN THE BALKANS OR IN THE NEAR-MIDDLE EAST, IN THE CAUCASUS AND IN AFRICA.

CONSEQUENTLY CRISES MANAGEMENT MUST BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF THE ALLIANCE NEW STRATEGY IN THE PURSUIT OF COMMONLY SHARED SECURITY INTEREST IN AND FOR EUROPE AND OUR NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES.

THIS BY NO MEANS, IMPLIES A GLOBAL NATO, LIKE SOME SAY, BUT RATHER AN ALLIANCE WHERE COMMONLY SHARED INTERESTS ARE COLLECTIVELY ADDRESSED BESIDES AND BEYONDS THE CORE ENDURING FUNCTION OF THE COMMON DEFENCE GUARANTEE.

THEREFORE IN THE EVENT OF CRISES AFFECTING THE COMMONLY PERCEIVED SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS, OUR MILITARY FORCES MUST

BE CAPABLE TO COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE NATO POLITICAL ACTION WITHIN A BROADER APPROACH TO SECURITY. THEY MUST ALSO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CAPABILITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THEIR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION, IN COMPANY WITH OUR PARTNERS.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY LESS DEMANDING THAN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. WELL-TRAINED AND WELL EQUIPPED FORCES, SOME OF THEM AT A HIGHER LEVEL OF READINESS THAN BEFORE AND IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO MEET ALL POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES, SOMETIMES EVEN SIMULTANEOUSLY, AS IT MIGHT PROVE THE CASE IN THE BALKANS, ARE ESSENTIAL IN PROVIDING THE REQUIRED MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO A POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

ONE OPERATIONAL ANSWER TO THIS MILITARY REQUIREMENT IS THE CJFF CONCEPT WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS FLEXIBILITY AND DEPLOYABILITY, PROVIDES THE ALLIANCE WITH AN IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE FULL RANGE OF ITS NEW TASKS AND MISSION FROM COMMON DEFENCE TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

COMING TO THE CONCLUSION OF MY REMARKS ON NATO'S ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TOO DRAW SOME CONCLUSIONS WHICH, I BELIEVE, CAN WELL APPLY ALSO TO THE ON-GOING CRISES IN THE BALKANS, AND IN KOSOVO IN PARTICULAR.

FIRSTLY MILITARY FORCES CAN AND OFTEN ARE AN INDISPENSABLE AND EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT BUT THEY CAN SERVE THIS PURPOSE ONLY WITHIN A CLEAR POLITICAL STRATEGY TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

IN THE SECOND PLACE MILITARY FORCES SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED OR EMPLOYED BECAUSE WE "NEED TO DO SOMETHING", THAT IS, WITHOUT A MISSION WITHIN THEIR REACH AND AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL POLITICAL GOAL.

MERE PRESENCE IS NOT "PER SE" A MISSION, WHILE IT ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE. IT MAY GENERATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS.

IT MAY RAISE FALSE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE ACTUAL LEVEL OF COMMITMENT AND IT MAY FORCE A LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH WAS NOT ORIGINALLY DESIRED OR THOUGHT OF.

THIRDLY IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO TRY TO KEEP AND TO ACT AS A PEACEKEEPER WHEN AND WHERE THERE IS NO PEACE.

IT DOES NOT HELP BRINGING PEACE WHILE, ON THE OTHER SIDE CAN ENDANGER THE LIFE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH IN TURN CAN COMPLICATE AND ESCALATE THE CRISIS.

NON-COERCIVE OPERATIONS, THAT IS PEACEKEEPING UNDER CHAPTER VI ARE NORMALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH COERCIVE, THAT IS CHAPTER VII OPERATION. THE SAME FORCE OR SIDE-BY SIDE FORCES CANNOT EXPECT TO BE TREATED AS BOTH A NON COMBATANT AND A COMBATANT SIMULTANEOUSLY.

FOURTHLY STRONG POLITICAL WILL AND CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IS VITAL WHEN COMMITTING ALLIED FORCES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE LONG-TERM POLITICAL GOALS.

SHORT OF SUCH CONSENSUS, MILITARY OPERATIONS MAY BOG DOWN IN ENDLESS DISAGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEEPLY AFFECT THE COHESION AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE.

LAST BUT NOT LEAST A PEACE FORCE MUST BE OR PERCEIVED TO BE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING AND BE ALWAYS ON THE TOP OF THE POTENTIAL ESCALATORY LADDER OF THE CRISIS.

THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATO WITH RESPECT TO OTHER SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE IS ITS DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND CONSULTATION MECHANISM, ITS INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL, ITS WELL ORGANIZED AND WELL TRAINED MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THE LONG STANDING ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT A WIDE ARRAY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, INCLUDING LARGE SCALE, HIGH INTENSITY MISSIONS.

AS LONG AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT ITSELF, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF ALLIANCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS AND THE RAPID TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL ANNUAL NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISES REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP, VALIDATE AND IMPROVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES.

THE MILITARY SIDE IS IMPROVING ITS KNOWLEDGE, PROCEDURES AND CAPABILITIES.

IN THE POST EXERCISE ANALYSIS, THE "LESSONS LEARNED REPORT" INDICATED THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS DERIVED FROM CMX 98:

- . THE KNOWLEDGE PROVIDED ABOUT NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS ABOUT ITS CONSULTATION AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:
- . EXPERIENCE GAINED IN EXERCISING CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS, INCLUDING CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION:
- . INFORMATION ON PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISES:


. TESTING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS AND CAPITALS.

FOR THE NEAR FUTURE CRISES MANAGEMENT EXERCISES. SUCH AS CMX/CRISEN 2000, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESDI AND THE ENSUING OPERATIONAL NATO/WEU LINKAGE. INCREASED PARTNERS PARTICIPATION WILL BE IMPORTANT TO ENHANCE CO-OPERATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PARTNERS' CAPABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

ALL THESE CAPABILITIES CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROVIDED THEY ARE PROPERLY USED AND SUPPORTED BY A STRONG AND COHESIVE POLITICAL WILL.

IN SEVERAL CASES NATO CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE.

IT DID IT IN BOSNIA. LET US HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO THE SAME IN OTHER REGIONAL CRISES AS WELL.-.





**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE**

"NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defence Identity"

Remarks by José Cutileiro, Secretary-General, Western European Union

**Italian Chamber of Deputies
Rome, 25 January 1999**

Madame Chairman, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

One important feature of the new NATO is its recognition that it is not alone in the security world. Its tasks of defence and security building are supplemented and reinforced by others, including those who work to create security by non-military means. In individual crises NATO has more and more taken its place within groups of institutions playing different but complementary roles. One thinks of the Dayton Agreement, and the present arrangements in Kosovo. Enlargement is another case where NATO fulfils its mission within a wider historical process, of continental scale and many-sided impact. It is not surprising against this background that the question, among others, of direct dialogue between NATO and the EU has once more come to the fore.

At present, however, NATO's closest relationship with any other institution is its partnership with Western European Union in building ESDI. That closeness is partly historical because the West Europeans' decision to exchange mutual guarantees in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 directly paved the way for the trans-Atlantic guarantees in the Treaty of Washington. For many years and even decades after that, while the Europeans concentrated on their military destiny in NATO, WEU was dormant at best. But the dynamics of détente and above all the end of the Cold War have by degrees reawakened the issue of a distinct European personality in defence. And most recently, the possibility has come within our grasp of attaining it in a way that both draws upon and strengthens the vitality of NATO itself.

The key to a successful ESDI is mutual respect and complementarity between the North Atlantic defence endeavour and the drive for an integrated Europe. The two can be reconciled because European nations now seem more united than ever before in recognizing NATO as the framework for collective defence, including the defence of Europe. They also accept that when today's security challenges impact on European and North American interests together, it is the Alliance which will lead in military responses to the crisis. And precisely because the Europeans have worked hard in NATO to carry their proper share of national and multinational force development, they know that the best assets and capabilities will often be found within the Alliance framework for carrying out

operations even under the Europeans' own control. Secure in these understandings, NATO for its part has been able to accept – and indeed greet as in its own interest – the idea that its European assets and capabilities might be lent to WEU for use under purely European leadership.

It is WEU's task today to explore this potential. As things stand already, I believe our institution could cope with the direction and control of a European operation using NATO assets if it had to. But we are working continually to improve our readiness, first by exploiting the NATO defence planning process to test the Europeans' individual and collective capacity for crisis management and to identify the gaps that need fixing. Secondly by dovetailing our military planning processes – one of many fields where WEU's separate European military staff works in close confidence with its NATO partners. Thirdly by preparing consultation modalities to let us work with NATO from the earliest moments of a crisis and establish together whether and how the Europeans should take on a distinct role. Fourthly by negotiating a framework agreement on all the practical questions needing solution when we borrow, use and return NATO assets and capabilities. There are milestones in all these areas to be reached by the Washington Summit but we will go on after that – last but not least – to hold the first ever joint NATO/WEU crisis management exercise in the year 2000.

What Europe gains in this process goes wider than WEU itself because we have also been busy, in parallel, tightening WEU's relations with the European Union. The Amsterdam Treaty establishes the principle of the EU using WEU as a military instrument in pursuit of broader European strategies: and we can already see that, in practice, the EU is where the political will for a European joint military action will most likely emerge. As things stand there is nothing to stop WEU receiving such a political mandate from the EU and going to NATO for the tools to carry it out. We can do that not least because our organization now provides a place for all non-EU European Allies as well as all non-NATO EU members: allowing all these different Europeans to share in WEU operations launched with either or both institutions, and thus very much reducing the risks of veto or incomprehension that might otherwise arise at either end.

Madame Chairman,

The Europeans have plunged now into a new debate on their defence vocation and particularly on the merits of solutions more integrally linked with the EU. WEU itself is preparing to contribute with a process of reflection on European defence and security that was launched late last year. I welcome the emphasis many European leaders have put on directing this study towards real things and not towards institutions for their own sake. The truth is that we shall get more and better European actions if we can build a stronger CFSP. If we can bring our national defence capabilities up to scratch, make our multinational units truly operational, and start taking serious steps towards a European armaments base. If we can find the political imagination and suppleness to go on working with all the kinds of European State who have a legitimate stake in this field. And above all, if we hold firm in our recognition of NATO's role and maintain the complementary partnership with it for which, in my belief, NATO itself is and will remain entirely willing.

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**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE**

Italian Chamber of Deputies
Sala della Lupa
Rome, January 25, 1999

Paper on

***New Nato, New Europe:
New Division of Labour***

by François Heisbourg
Center for Security Policy, Geneva

**« The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance: a New NATO for a New Europe »
Italian Chamber of Deputies, Rome, 25 January 1999**

NEW NATO, NEW EUROPE: NEW DIVISION OF LABOUR

**by François HEISBOURG, Chairman,
Geneva Centre for Security Policy**

There is no example in History of a multilateral security and defence alliance lasting half a century, and enduring well beyond the demise of the threat it had been designed to meet. Indeed, NATO has not been content with « enduring »: it has been an unqualified success. This applies of course, first and foremost, to its primary mission during the Cold War. NATO successfully countered the massive threat of Soviet forces arrayed in the heart of Germany. It is all too easy today to succumb to the temptation of belittling that threat given our current knowledge about the economic failure of the Soviet Empire: but we should not draw from that knowledge the assumption that this weakness extended into the military realm. What we learned at the end of the Cold War, notably through CFE data and verification, or from the thorough analysis of the military data found in the ex-GDR does not disprove NATO's reading of the military situation during the great confrontation, to the contrary. NATO's record of successful deterrence is not one whose outcome was pre-ordained. All Europeans, and that includes our Russian friends, have been fortunate that the Alliance got it just about right.

More surprisingly, given the historical record of multilateral alliances disappearing as soon their ostensible purpose has been fulfilled, NATO has not only survived the first decade of the post-Cold war era, it has actually entren-

ched its position in the European security system. Having retained its relevance for European security, it is today the only meaningful multilateral political-military organisation, serving also as the basic vehicle for transatlantic security and defence co-operation. This remarkable accomplishment was to a large extent the consequence of NATO's role in Bosnia. If large-scale and forceful involvement by NATO was belated, it was also decisive. Indeed, the tardy nature of that decisive engagement may have contributed to the scale of NATO's political success, since the passage of time had given all other institutions the opportunity to demonstrate their worth, or their lack thereof, in the face of the Bosnian challenge.

We know what it does; we need to know what it's for

Such a track record can all too readily lead to complacency. Such an attitude would be badly misplaced, for there is a serious risk that NATO's next half-century will be rather less glorious than its first. NATO's basic purpose in the post-Cold war era is still undetermined: in a sense, we know what NATO does, but we don't know what it's for. Before looking into the merits of this proposition, it is worthwhile asking whether it isn't just good enough to enjoy a situation in which we know what NATO does, even if we don't have a clear statement of purpose *à la Lord Ismay* (i.e., keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in) : in other words, to borrow language from political science, we would have a NATO based on « performance legitimacy ».

Unfortunately, such an approach would be hazardous, for two basic reasons. First, it would make the Alliance's fate beholden to even fairly limited failures of performance: and who would exclude setbacks in performance as winter's end

approaches in Kosovo? Indeed, performance legitimacy is an expression well-known to students of countries such as Suharto's Indonesia. Second, and possibly more importantly, NATO is a multilateral alliance whose stock-in-trade includes the use, or the threat, of force, which is possible only if it is seen as legitimate by the members: a return to the law of the jungle will not keep NATO's members together. This consideration ties in with the debate on the legitimacy of the use of force as viewed by the broader international community). In other words, in a fifty-year perspective, NATO cannot satisfy itself with statements of purpose which are either exceedingly vague (of the 'contributing to peace, stability and democracy' variety) or which are really about implementation (e.g., enhancement of force projection capabilities).

The debate on the future purpose of NATO has several dimensions. In capsule form, we have at one end of the spectrum the proponents of a « global NATO ». An extreme example of this is provided by some of the Rand Corporation's visions of a trade-off between the US security guarantee for Europe in Europe, and a European agreement to systematically support US out-of-area operations (in effect vindicating long after the fact, de Gaulle's invocation of the Vietnam war as one of reasons for France's 1966 withdrawal from the integrated command structure, for fear of being dragged into such US expeditions). A global NATO would have as a logical companion the marginalisation of the UN Security Council as the main source of legitimacy for military expeditions undertaken outside of article 51 of the UN Charter. At the other end of the spectrum, we have a minimalist, territorially-focused, article-5 (NATO/WEU) centred vision, of the sort implied in past French or German statements. The appropriate answer may lie between the two, but where?: the « middle » ground

is very broad indeed.

Nor is it clear what is the desired place of Russia in NATO's long-term scheme of things. Is it conceivable that Russia may some day join NATO? If the answer is even tentatively and conditionally 'yes', what would that entail vis à vis China and Japan? And if the answer is likely to be 'no', what conclusions would that imply, not least in terms of NATO enlargement to the Baltics and Ukraine? This is an issue on which there understandably is no common, principle-based agreement.

The answers to these and other issues matter, although some of them may be finessed, delayed, or side-stepped. The « NATO vs. Security Council » debate can probably be fudged, as long as the practice of certain members, notably the US, remains within tolerable bounds of the position of others. Enlargement can, and may well be slowed down, thus delaying the moment of truth concerning Estonia or Ukraine. Russia's parlous state makes it easy, indeed mandatory, to exclude any consideration of Russia's long-term vocation as a NATO member. We would be rather more embarrassed if Russia had successfully reformed herself into a democratic and prosperous, yet assertive great power... But for the foreseeable future, loose nukes and Primakovian visions of a Moscow-Delhi-Beijing triangle are the order of the day.

However, one set of issues relevant to NATO's purpose will need to be addressed substantively, and the earlier the better. NATO's division of labour between the United States on one hand, and its European partners is neither satisfactory nor durable. If there isn't a deliberate transatlantic effort to transform the current sharing of tasks, the basis for the Euro-American compact could erode surprisingly quickly, not least in view of the normal change of elected

leaders. This prognosis applies most completely if NATO were to vastly broaden the geographical and functional scope of its out-of-area tasks, but the menace is tangible even if NATO sticks to the current « post-Bosnia » status quo. After recalling the present state of burden-sharing, and describing its alliance-splitting potential, it will be argued here that a stronger European defence identity is a necessity for the Alliance's future career, and that such a prospect should be encouraged by the Americans.

Hard-power America, soft-power Europe

In a capsule, NATO is today characterised by a polarisation of means and attitudes, with the US as the wielder of unrivalled military power, whose virtues Washington readily underscores and Europeans who emphasise the importance of non-military instruments and whose military capabilities are no match to those of the remaining superpower. Naturally, there are departures from this schematic description. To mention some: France and Britain acted forcefully in Bosnia in June-July 1995, i.e. before the US and NATO launched operation « Deliberate Force »; similarly, a number of European countries, not least of which Italy, launched the successful « Alba operation » in Albania in 1997; and the Europeans, in a French-led NATO operation, have put together the so-called « extraction force » in Macedonia. European armed forces may not be of super-power scale, but overall they are definitely not puny, when they are compared to what they have to face on prospective battlefields: the scale of comparison should be strength of our enemies at least as much as that of our American friends! Similarly, it is not shocking that European military spending should be

around 60% of that of the US: America's leadership (and its associated costs) is world-wide –in Asia-Pacific, in the Indian Ocean, in Latin America...; it is not a role one which Europe pretends to displace.

These points do not however cancel out the broad pattern of a hard-power US and a soft-power Europe. Europe does not tend to take the lead in suggesting or organising the prompt use of force in post-Cold War crises: when the « hour of Europe » (to use the words of the Luxembourgish Foreign Minister who was then exercising the European Community presidency) struck in ex-Yugoslavia in 1992, it ended with a whimper rather than with a bang; and the Europeans have not, or not yet, proven their willingness or ability to orchestrate large coalitions of forces. Even a comparatively modest operation such as « Deliberate Force » in Bosnia in the summer of 1995 could not have been mounted at the time by the Europeans alone, unless they had been ready to take much greater risks both in terms of casualties and of collateral damage. If overall European defence expenditure is probably at an acceptable level in the aggregate, it must also be said that much of that money is dreadfully misspent. Collectively, NATO's European members count 2.5 million military personnel, versus 1.4 million Americans in uniform. Even if many of the European soldiers are individually cheap conscripts, the bloated force structures entailed by this surfeit of largely conscript personnel are collectively expensive, with the corresponding infrastructure, training, and cadres (conscripts need professional officers and NCOs), which crowd out much-needed spending for the sort of equipment needed to cope with the requirements of the post-Cold War era. Germany, with procurement and R&D spending at around 20% of its defence

spending (versus 40%-plus in France or the UK) provides a by no means unique illustration of this situation). The net result is that with these 2.5 million military, Europe defence is hard-pressed to field the few dozens of thousands of soldiers required in theatres such as the Gulf War or the Balkans, and are heavily-reliant on American C3I and logistics to get the job done, even if some countries do better (the U K and France) than others.

There are legitimate reasons for this less-than-optimal state of affairs, not least the fact that Europe is a collection of Nation-States, with the attendant consequences on decision-making, on force structures, on defence procurement...Even where a degree of division of labour exists between countries, the overhead resulting from the existence of national defences remains, whether or not the countries involved are NATO-integrated (with the partial exception of Germany, which has transferred many of Defence Staff functions exclusively to CINCENT). Whatever the reasons, the poor bottom-line remains. Furthermore, in the absence of major initiatives in Europe, things could get worse, on the procurement side(upstream) as well as at the operational level(downstream) as the United States gathers the fruits of its impressive defence-industrial reorganisation and its sustained investment in the Revolution Military Affairs (RMA).

This European-American polarisation is not seen as satisfactory on either side of the Atlantic. One could well argue that there is nothing new here: American calls for a greater European share of the burden were prevalent during the Cold War. I am actually old enough to remember the Mansfield Amendment and the anxieties that it created. Furthermore, some US denunciations of European fecklessness have a flavour of *Schadenfreude* about them: when Secretary of

State Baker made the break-up of Yugoslavia an item of European, rather than American interest (spring 1991), it was not, presumably, with the hope that the Europeans would act decisively; nor does Richard Holbrooke's belittling of Europe's role in Bosnia (as portrayed in his latest book) appear to imply a heartfelt wish that Europe should take charge: that much is clear from Carl Bildt's observations on that volume in the « New York Review of Books ». However, it would be a mistake to apply too great a discount on recent expressions of American displeasure. Recent congressional statements, including from heavy-hitters –such as Senators McCain, Warner and Lieberman at the February 1998 *Wehrkunde*– cannot be shrugged off: unlike some of their colleagues who may be tempted to look inward, such men are by no means isolationists; indeed, they are in the American internationalist tradition. But their attachment to multilateralism has its limits, even if these are narrower for the UN than for NATO .

As the memories and the habits of Cold War co-operation fade , the current division of labour will become less well tolerated by the US. A deterioration of trade and monetary relations, prompted by the global economic downturn on one hand, the assertion of the Euro on the other could function as a detonator of an American rejection of « status quo NATO ».

Nor are the Europeans much more inclined to accept some of the unpleasant aspects of the current system. Washington appears to take for granted that Europe's soft power contribution will continue to be available without the Europeans getting a greater say in the corresponding areas. European checks to the Palestinian Authority ; the bulk of aid and investment to the countries of the former Soviet Empire ; keeping the UN afloat ; financial support to Bosnia:

Europe provides the money-bags, but without playing a commensurate political role. In an era where security depends more on soft power than was the case during the Cold War, it is unlikely that the Europeans themselves will want to sustain such a status quo.

Europe's responsibilities

Righting the current division of labour within the Alliance will be essentially a European responsibility for one obvious reason, to which must be added a new and still tentative one:

1) although NATO's diplomatic and political role has become relatively more important than was the case during the East-West stand-off, defence remains its core business. Notwithstanding a real and growing soft-power component, at heart NATO is a hard-power organisation. Soft power, such as EU funding of the sort described above, or the setting of standards of international conduct tends to use other vehicles: EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN, the Bretton Woods institutions.... Within NATO as such, hard-power is of the essence; and in this area, it is primarily the European contribution which requires an overhaul;

2) the establishment of the Euro, and its possible emergence as a global rival of the Dollar, may well lead the Americans, and induce the Europeans, to raise Europe's collective political profile. This could happen for four (real or virtual) reasons:

-- the EU (for even if the Euro is not -yet- the currency of all of the EU's members, it is by treaty a venture which commits the EU as such), by virtue of managing a currency potentially comparable in weight to the Dollar, will find thrust upon it a new responsibility in terms of global affairs. The US will no doubt

remind the Europeans of that reality if the Euro is run without due regard to the extra-European consequences;

--as the Euro becomes an instrument of international payment, notably for oil imports and aerospace exports, it is quite possible that tension will arise on specific contracts (e.g., airliner sales to China) as the Dollar-Euro alternative will become an element of US-European trade competition. Political tension won't be far behind;

--the great freedom which the US had to tailor Dollar rate policy without having to pay due regard to others was possible only because the Dollar was the currency equivalent of the « only superpower ». This will cease to be the case.

--the Euro's advent may (a heavy conditional is in order here) have a positive effect on Europe's short-term growth rate, thus making it easier to protect defence spending from the austerity resulting from the global economic slowdown; and the Euro will (no conditional here) have a positive effect on the long-term growth-rate by enhancing Europe's capability to adapt to, and benefit from, globalisation.

Although all of these items are in the realm of soft power, they have hard-power implications. Overall, they will increase the pressure for improving Europe's hard power capabilities in NATO.

What could and what should Europe do in this regard? Greater European unity and assertiveness would enhance NATO's effectiveness if it led to the following accomplishments:

-- force structures capable of operating where crises affecting NATO actually occur: manpower-light, firepower-heavy forces along British lines should be-

come the norm. This calls for military, downsizing in most European countries, of the sort the French are undertaking: French armed forces are being cut from 500 000 in 1995 down to 350 000 in 2002. Although the need to downsize and restructure is generally acknowledged, there is an extraordinary diversity of situations within the EU, with the UK at one end of the spectrum, Italy and Greece at the other:

	Britain	Italy	Greece
manpower (thousands)	213.8	325.2	162.3
manpower/population	0.36%	0.56%	1.53%
defence budget (\$mill.)	35 736	21 837	5 552
\$ per military person	167 116	62 002	34 208

source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1997-8

There is plenty of scope for convergence here.

- substantial improvements in the « Bang for the Buck (or the Euro) » ratio: defence-industrial rationalisation and regrouping is a matter of utmost importance and urgency if the Europeans want to keep up with the state of technological art. This has a direct bearing not only on Europe's material ability to project force when required, but also on the political feasibility of participating in foreign operations: European public opinion would probably not display a great willingness to play the role of low-tech/high risk military auxiliaries to RMA-reconfigured US forces keeping out of harm's way.
- politically heavy-weight and procedurally effective European decision-making. The WEU does not have the heft required. What weight it might

have had (and we should not forget that it was able to appear on the scene in 1988 -with the co-ordination of mine-warfare activity in the Gulf- and in 1992, in the Adriatic and on the Danube), appears to have diminished, possibly because of the dilution caused by rapid enlargement to various categories of membership.

Current practice and institutions do not meet these criteria. The most worthwhile accomplishments have until now been essentially ad hoc (e.g. Franco-British, joint action in Bosnia in June-July 1995), purely national (such as French or Spanish force restructuring), piecemeal (e.g. the creation of the Eurocorps, or specific co-operative armaments programs) or the work of industrial actors (defence-industrial rationalisation). Overall Europe's fragmentation has been perpetuated, along with the unsatisfactory nature of the status quo.

Meeting the criteria for greater European hard-power effectiveness is obviously a matter of political will: in this regard, at least, there has been progress. For example, Germany has carefully moved out of its cocoon and is now an active player in Bosnia; this is no mean achievement, particularly when viewed in retrospect (during the Gulf crisis in 1990, it was with extreme difficulty that Germany managed to honour her NATO commitments towards Turkey in the framework of SACEUR's Allied Mobile Force; and it was inconceivable to operate out-of-area) . There is general agreement between the major European countries to facilitate cross-border defence-industrial restructuring, even if implementation has proven painfully slow. And there was an impressive array of countries ready to participate in the planned NATO bombing operations against Serbian forces in the Autumn of 1998.

However, political will needs an appropriate vehicle through which to

express itself if it is to be reasonably consistent. This where British initiative in the fall of 1998, and its subsequent Franco-British expression at the Saint-Malo Summit (4 December 1998) mark a potentially major break with the past. At the politically important rhetorical level, we have language in which the British clearly embrace the notion of a common European defence policy, with the French foregoing the traditional « Europe vs. America » subtext. In institutional terms, the European Union —a body with some heft— is now considered by Britain, France, and Germany as the vehicle of choice, thus abandoning attempts to give substance to the much weaker Western European Union. Nor would this institutional change entail a watering down of mutual defence commitments —a risk in view of the neutrality of four EU members— since the corresponding machinery would be based on existing mutual defence treaty language (notably article 5 of the WEU treaty, which is comparable to NATO's article 5). As is the case for the Euro, not all EU members would have to be part of the defence policy-governing body for it to be an EU institution.

In the fullness of time, an EU council of Defence Ministers could perform at least three types of tasks:

- co-operation (with the Foreign Ministers) in the face of crisis situations, picking up where WEU ministerials and EU Foreign Ministers meetings leave off;
- the promotion of convergence of defence policies and force structures (with implementation being conducted at the national level and as part of the NATO force planning process);
- the co-ordination of the expression of demand vis à vis merged defence firms which will carry considerably more weight than current suppliers. If the European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC), which is supported by the Defence

Ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, is created, its military sales will be twice as large as the whole of Germany's defence procurement budget. This clearly calls for a similar concentration of the expression of demand. In this context, it would make sense to broaden the scope of OCCAR: this Joint Armaments Co-operation Organisation, established by treaty between Britain, France, Germany and Italy, is supposed to act as an integrated (in effect, supranational) contractor for co-operative programmes. That mandate could be extended to national programmes agreed upon by the Defence Ministers.

It is by no means a forgone conclusion that such ambitious developments will come to fruition. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the Blair initiative is « for real ». Tactical concerns, political differences, institutional problems could yet cause this attempt, as previous ones, to abort. However, the British initiative, and its subsequent franco-british translation in the Saint-Malo declaration deserves to be dealt with on its merits, not on the basis of suspicions concerning its context. Furthermore, priorities need to be kept in the right order: Cartesian rigour may be offended by the close succession of the franco-british declaration (December 4) and of British participation in Desert Fox (Dec. 17-20); but it is more important to get European defence reform right than to square it in philosophical terms with a second-order event against a third-rate dictatorship. Last but not least, American attitudes will have real weight. In the field of security, European unity is, as yet, a mere seedling, which Washington could probably stifle by playing on national differences.

America's Responsibility

Washington will have to decide whether it wants to encourage a European defence identity. Europe's readiness to allay American fears in at least three areas may influence US attitudes:

--Washington fears the spectre of a « European caucus » to which the North Atlantic Council would be made hostage. The fact that all European members of NATO are not EU members and that all EU members are not NATO members would presumably hinder the emergence of such a caucus, IF attempts were made to create one. That « IF » deserves its capitals, since the British -as well as others- do not exactly support the notion of a caucus.

--the fear that defence industrial restructuring would lead to a Fortress Europe is as prevalent in the US today as it was before the establishment of the Single European Market in 1992. Aside from the fact that armaments are an area in which there is a Fortress America, not a Fortress Europe, the reality is that the trend in Europe is towards greater, not lesser cross-border competition. At some stage, it would make sense for Europe to take the lead in suggesting to open discussions --in an ad hoc rather than in a NATO framework, given the largely economic and commercial content of the corresponding agenda-- to identify and subsequently remove structural impediments to freer transatlantic armaments competition and co-operation. This would imply massive changes in US rules and practices, something which will presumably not be given due consideration in America as long as Europe's main defence contractors have not transformed themselves into the equals of Lockheed, Boeing, and Raytheon.

—the US considers, with good reason, that NATO's command structure and capabilities should not be duplicated. This is no longer a moot point in Europe. Since NATO's Berlin summit (July 1996), France, which has had difficulties with this contention in the past, is no longer making it an issue.

In summary, the US should display empathy towards initiatives such as the Saint-Malo declaration. At the time of writing, this is a quality lacking in most official American statements, in which predominate qualifiers of the « provided such initiatives don't reduce Alliance cohesion and effectiveness » variety. Washington should quietly endorse such European attempts at greater cohesion: a positive American signal would help the Blair initiative get off the ground, particularly in those European capitals, including London, which have traditionally been most attentive to US concerns. The US knows how to provide such quiet and helpful support when it sets its mind to it: for instance, the first Clinton administration expressed positive neutrality towards a European venture such as the Eurocorps -as opposed to the Bush administration's openly voiced reservations.

We know what the alternative is to greater European unity: it is called the status quo, and that is not a sustainable programme for NATO's next Fifty years./.

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**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
A NEW NATO FOR A NEW EUROPE**

Italian Chamber of Deputies
Sala della Lupa
Rome, January 25, 1999

Paper on

***Nato Enlargement
after the First Round***

by F. Stephen Larrabee
RAND, Washington

At the Washington Summit in April, NATO will formally admit three new members: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Together with future enlargement of the European Union, the integration of these three countries into NATO will significantly diminish the prospect that Central Europe will again become a source of international tension and geopolitical rivalry. It will also resolve Germany's historical security dilemma. Germany will now be surrounded by a group of democratic, peaceful allies, rather than be the most exposed edge of the Western security community.

However, the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO does not end the process of enlargement. At the Madrid Summit the Alliance agreed to maintain an "open door" to new members. Several countries--Slovenia, Romania, and the Baltic states--were singled out as potential candidates, though no explicit guarantee of membership or timetable was given.

This raises a number of new policy dilemmas for NATO. How should the enlargement issue be handled at the Washington Summit? If NATO does not issue invitations to any new members at the Washington Summit, how can the credibility of its "open door" policy be maintained? Who should be invited to join in the second round and when should it take place? What will be the impact of any further enlargement on relations with Russia and Ukraine? What effect will further enlargement have on NATO's cohesion and military effectiveness?

Finally, and most importantly, how does enlargement contribute to NATO's overall transformation and new missions? This question needs to be addressed before the second round takes place. The answer will significantly influence both the timing of the second round as well as which countries are included in it.

These dilemmas underscore the need for NATO to develop a coherent strategy for managing further enlargement. Otherwise, NATO could face new security dilemmas as difficult, if not more difficult, as those it faced during the initial round.

NATO'S DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT

In approaching the issue of further enlargement, NATO will have to balance five competing demands:

— **The Need to Maintain NATO's Cohesion and Military Effectiveness.** As NATO enlarges, it must be able to maintain its core competencies and military effectiveness. New members need to be able to contribute not only to NATO's old missions but to new ones as well. Collective defense (Article V) will remain a core mission. However, most of NATO's operations in the future are likely to involve crisis

management missions like those in Bosnia. Thus one of the key criteria for selecting new members ought to be how well candidates can contribute to these new missions. This would help to give NATO enlargement a stronger strategic rationale as well as preserve NATO's core competencies.¹

-- **The Need to Keep the Open Door Credible.** NATO will need to find ways to ensure that the open-door policy remains credible. If NATO postpones a second round of enlargement too long, many prospective members may begin to lose hope of ever attaining membership. This could undercut democratic forces in these countries and spark a destabilizing search for new regional alignments.

-- **The Need to Digest the First Round.** The fate and timing of the second round will, to a large extent, depend on how well NATO succeeds in integrating the first three new members. If they perform poorly and do not live up to expectations, this could diminish the willingness of NATO members--and particularly the U.S. Senate--to support a second round of enlargement. Thus a lot will depend on how well the first new members meet their membership obligations.

-- **The Need to Maintain a Viable Partnership with Russia.** As in the first round of enlargement, NATO will need to take into consideration the impact of enlargement on relations with Russia. Moscow will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities and NATO should be careful not to overburden the Russian political process. This could spark a dangerous backlash in Russia. At the same time, NATO will need to maintain momentum in the enlargement process and ensure the credibility of its open-door policy. If NATO acquiesces to Russian demands or accepts Russia's attempts to draw new "red lines," this could have a negative political impact on many prospective aspirants, especially the Baltic states, and reinforce imperial nostalgia in certain parts of the Russian political spectrum.

-- **The Need to Maintain Internal Consensus.** Finally, NATO will need to maintain an internal consensus within the Alliance. At the moment, there is no consensus within NATO about who should be included in a second round or when the next round should take place. Some members, such as France and Italy, have pressed for the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania in an early second round. Others, such as Denmark and Norway, favor including the Baltic states. NATO will have to balance these internal pressures to forge an Alliance-wide consensus.

¹See Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "NATO Enlargement After the First Tranche," *Strategic Forum*, Number 149, October 1998, pp. 1-4.

This is likely to take time and involve a certain degree of internal bargaining. Pressures for a Southern enlargement will have to be balanced against pressures for a Northern opening. Some countries such as France may also link enlargement to other issues, such as NATO reform and internal adaptation, complicating the enlargement calculus. But as the process of enlargement unfolds, NATO should not lose sight of its larger interests. Enlargement should not simply be reduced to a game of internal "horse trading" devoid of a larger strategic rationale. Otherwise it could end up weakening rather than strengthening NATO.

ENLARGEMENT AND THE NEW NATO

As Western policymakers grapple with the dilemmas posed by further enlargement, the first question that needs to be addressed is how enlargement relates to NATO's broader transformation. Enlargement is an important part of the adaptation process, but it is not the only--nor even the most important--element of this overall adaptation process. The basic purpose of this transformation is twofold: (1) to help stabilize Europe, especially Central Europe; (2) to build a more effective partnership between the U.S. and Europe which would allow the Alliance to deal more effectively with new security threats, including those beyond NATO's immediate borders.

The two goals are, in fact, closely linked. A more stable and secure Europe will be a better partner for the United States and be more capable of helping to manage the new security challenges that NATO is likely to face in the coming decades. Many of these new challenges--indeed most of them--will be outside the NATO area, either on NATO's periphery or beyond its borders. Enlargement is needed both to help stabilize Europe and as a stepping stone to building this new partnership and a new NATO.²

In effect, the task confronting NATO is really one of what can be termed "double enlargement": (1) Enlargement I is to enlarge the structure and institutions of the transatlantic partnership to the new democracies of Eastern Europe; (2) Enlargement II is to enlarge the horizons, functions, and agenda of the transatlantic partnership beyond the

²See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September-October 1993, pp. 28-40. For a more comprehensive discussion, see David Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

European continent to those areas and issues where the U.S. and Europe have shared common interests.³

The two enlargements, however, are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. A Europe successfully on its way to being knit together as a coherent political economic entity will be far more capable of helping the new challenges that the Alliance is likely to face in the coming decades. Thus Enlargement I is an indispensable step not only toward creating a more stable security order in Europe but also toward building a more outward looking Alliance, one not only more capable of addressing threats to its borders but also managing crises beyond its borders.

There is, moreover, an important linkage between enlargement and NATO's new missions. If it is to live up to its promise--and maintain public support, especially in the United States--NATO needs to remain an effective military alliance. That was one of the key messages that emerged from the Senate debate on NATO ratification. Thus NATO needs to both enlarge *and* take on relevant new missions. This is the best way to ensure that it remains a militarily effective alliance well into the 21st Century and also disarm critics who argue that enlargement will dilute NATO and turn it into a talk shop.

Clarifying NATO's strategic purpose will also help manage and structure the enlargement process. Potential new members will not only have to be able to contribute to NATO's traditional missions such as collective defense but also to NATO's new missions such as crisis management and peacekeeping. Thus one criterion--but by no means the only criterion--for judging potential candidates for membership ought to be how they contribute to NATO's *new* as well as its traditional missions. This would provide a yardstick for measuring aspirants' performance and readiness for membership.

A candidate's performance alone, however, does not automatically ensure membership. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for membership. Membership also needs to be in NATO's *strategic interest*. Some candidates may score well in a number of key areas--democratic reform, viable market economy, civilian control of their military, etc. However, a good "scorecard" alone does not automatically guarantee membership. There still must be a strong consensus within NATO that admitting a particular candidate is in NATO's strategic interest.

³Ronald D. Asmus, "Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership After the Cold War," in Gompert and Larrabee, pp. 19-50.

THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE

NATO also needs to be clear about the strategic rationale behind the next round of enlargement. The first round of enlargement was designed to help stabilize Central Europe and prevent the emergence of a security vacuum that could rekindle historical geo-political rivalries. With the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO, this goal has largely been achieved. What is the strategic rationale behind the second round?

Conceptually, one can envisage two options. The first is a "Southern" option. This would be designed to stabilize and enhance security in Southeastern Europe. This is strongly favored by a number of countries, particularly France and Italy, but also Greece and Turkey. A second option would be a Northern option designed to extend stability to the Baltic states and anchor them more tightly to Europe. This option is strongly favored by Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Poland.

In the initial post-Madrid period the prevailing view was that the next round would probably involve an expansion to the South. Expanding to the Baltics was regarded as too risky particularly because of the feared impact on relations with Russia. However, the enlargement landscape has changed significantly in the period since Madrid.

Romania was considered a prime candidate for the second round in the initial period after Madrid. But its chances have slipped somewhat since Madrid, due in large part to the continued infighting within the ruling coalition, which has led to a slowdown in economic reform.⁴ Whether Romania is admitted in the second round will largely depend on whether it succeeds in putting its internal house in order.

At the same time, Bulgaria's chances have improved somewhat as a result of its strong economic and political performance since the May 1997 elections, which resulted in the emergence of a more democratically oriented reformist government in Sofia. However, Bulgaria still has a long way to go before it is ready for membership. Military reform, for instance, has barely started.⁵ Moreover, admitting Romania without Bulgaria could leave Bulgaria isolated and could have a strongly negative impact on the prospects for Bulgaria's democratic evolution.

⁴See "La Roumanie s'enlise dans la crise économique et monétaire," *Le Monde*, November 26, 1998. Also "La Roumanie est en proie au mécontentement social en l'absence de réformes économiques," *Ibid.*, November 17, 1998.

⁵See Jeffrey Simon, "Bulgaria and NATO: Seven Lost Years," *Strategic Forum*, Nr. 142, (date??), pp. 1-6.

Slovakia's prospects, by contrast, have also improved. As long as Vladimir Meciar was in power, Slovakia's chances of NATO (or EU) membership were virtually nil. But the election of a new democratic government in Bratislava has cast Slovakia's candidacy in a new light. The new government, headed by Mikulas Dzurinda, has embarked upon a significant reform path and made membership in NATO and the EU a top priority. If Slovakia continues on its reformist course, it could become a strong candidate for NATO membership down the line. Moreover, Slovak membership would open up a land corridor to Hungary--an important consideration if NATO ever needed to reinforce Hungary in a crisis.

Austria could also emerge as a possible candidate. The present Austrian coalition is divided, with the conservative Peoples Party favoring Austrian membership in NATO and the Social Democrats opposed. However, the situation in Austria is very fluid. Public opinion is shifting and it is quite possible that Austria might decide to apply for membership in the next few years, especially now that Hungary has become a member.

Austria clearly qualifies on economic and political grounds, and if it were to apply, there would be strong pressure to admit it. Austria's weak point, however, is defense. Austria spends less than one percent of its GNP on defense--well below the NATO average (two percent). Thus, it would have to significantly increase its defense spending before it could seriously be considered for NATO membership. The last thing the Alliance needs is a new free rider.

Finally, Lithuania has emerged as a possible dark horse contender for a second round. Vilnius has made NATO membership a high priority and has moved vigorously to modernize its military forces. This has led some observers to suggest that Lithuania should be included in a second round. Lithuania's membership is also strongly supported by Poland.⁶

THE BALTIC DIMENSION

The question of Lithuania's possible inclusion in the second round raises the larger issue of how to manage the aspirations of the Baltic countries. All three Baltic states have openly declared their desire to join NATO. However, Baltic membership in NATO raises a number of special problems:

— **Russian Opposition.** Russia is strongly opposed to Baltic membership in NATO. While the Alliance should not give Russia a veto over NATO's enlargement, the

⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," *The National Interest*, Fall 1998, pp. 13-17.

Alliance does have to take Russian concerns into account. Admitting the Baltic states--or at least admitting them too quickly--could cause a crisis in relations with Russia.

-- **Defensibility.** The Baltic states' geographic proximity to Russia makes any defense of the Baltics almost impossible. However, extending an Article V commitment to them that could not be carried out could seriously undermine the credibility of NATO's security guarantee.

-- **The Russian Minority.** The presence of a large Russian minority on the soil of the Baltic states and unresolved minority issues with Russia make many NATO members reluctant to admit the Baltic states into NATO. While Latvia and Estonia have recently relaxed their citizenship laws, Russia continues to complain of discrimination against the Russian minority in both countries.

-- **Kaliningrad.** The close proximity of the Baltics to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad further complicates the Baltic issue. *Kaliningrad was one of the most highly militarized regions in Russia during the Soviet period.* While Russia has been gradually reducing its military presence in the region, there is still a high concentration of Russian military forces there. Moreover, the collapse of Kaliningrad's economy has led to a dramatic increase in crime, smuggling, and drug activity.

-- **Low Military Capability.** Unlike the other East European states who inherited armies from the Soviet period, the Baltic states had to create armies from scratch. As a result, the military capability of the Baltic states is very low. It will take many years before they will be in a position to match the capabilities of even the least advanced NATO militaries.

To avoid the complications associated with NATO membership, some observers have suggested that the Nordic countries should assume responsibility for the security of the Baltic states. The Nordic countries, however, reject this approach. They do not want to see Baltic security decoupled from European security. This is also the reason they have rejected Russian calls for creating a special security zone in the Baltics. Moreover, a Nordic security guarantee, as the Nordics themselves well know, would not be credible.

Others have suggested that the Baltic states should join the EU--but not NATO--and that this would solve their security problems. Clearly membership in the EU would help to diminish the prospect of outside attack or intimidation. Once they were members of the EU, any attempt by Russia to put pressure on the Baltic states would have serious implications for Russia's relations with the EU.

However, if there were a serious threat to the security of any Baltic state, the EU does not have the military capability--at least not at the moment--to respond to such a

threat. It would have to turn to NATO. Thus, in the case of a serious threat to the Baltic states NATO would eventually become involved.

Estonia's entry into the EU will raise this issue even more starkly. Once Estonia is in the EU, it will be eligible for membership in the WEU. The WEU has a security guarantee (Article V of the Brussels Treaty) which is even more iron-clad than NATO's. But the WEU does not have the capability to carry out a military response without drawing on NATO assets. Thus, NATO could be drawn into any Baltic crisis "through the back door."

In short, it is an illusion to think that EU membership and NATO membership can be neatly separated. EU membership will enhance the security of the Baltic states. But it by no means solves all their security dilemmas. Indeed, in some ways, it raises the security issue even more starkly, and highlights the close connection between EU and NATO membership.

A stronger EU security and defense identity, along the lines proposed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in no way resolves this problem. Even if the EU were able to build such a capability, it would still need--for the foreseeable future --to draw on NATO assets in any crisis. Moreover, a crisis in the Baltics would almost invariably involve Russia and thus require U.S.--and NATO--involvement if Western actions were to be credible. Thus, the NATO membership issue cannot be avoided.

At the same time, given Russian sensitivities, the issue of Baltic membership must be managed carefully. Russian efforts to draw "red lines" should be categorically rejected. Russia cannot be allowed to have a veto over the security options of individual countries just because they were once a part of the former Soviet Union. The Baltic countries, like other East European countries, have a legitimate right to choose their own security orientation. At the same time, Russian security concerns need to be taken into account. NATO should avoid actions that unnecessarily exacerbate their concerns.

The real obstacle to Baltic membership in NATO, however, is not Russian objections--though these are important--but the low level of military preparedness of the Baltic states. The fact is that the Baltic states have a long way to go before they are militarily ready to join NATO. Defense spending in all three countries, especially Latvia, is well below the NATO average.⁷ Equipment and training are also significantly below

⁷In 1997, Latvia allocated 0.67 percent of the GNP for defense. The figures for Lithuania and Latvia were 1.5 percent and 1.2 percent respectively.

NATO standards. These deficiencies will need to be addressed before the Baltic states can be seriously considered for NATO membership.

The possible inclusion of Lithuania in a second round, moreover, raises a broader policy dilemma: Should the Baltic countries be brought in--if at all--as a group or separately? There has been a tendency to see the countries as a group and lump them together, largely because they were annexed by the Soviet Union at the same time. However, the three countries are actually quite different.

Estonia is the most advanced economically. Estonia has also greatly benefited from its proximity to Finland which has acted as Estonia's patron. However, the existence of a large Russian minority--nearly 30 percent of Estonia's population--has complicated relations with Russia, which continues to claim that the Russian population faces systematic discrimination by Estonia as a result of stringent citizenship laws introduced in 1991 and 1992. These laws, however, have been amended since to conform to OSCE and EU norms.

Latvia's situation is somewhat different. With its three ports it is a major center for Russian trade, especially oil exports. It is also the most Russified of the three Baltic republics and the worst hit by corruption and Mafia activities. The Russian community accounts for nearly 40 percent of Latvia's population and almost half of the population of Riga, where it dominates the business world, especially trade with Russia. The degree of Russian influence in the economy is worrying to many Latvians, who fear that Russia may indirectly seek to subvert Latvia by controlling its economy.

Lithuania is really much more of a Central European country than a Baltic country and was for centuries dominated by Poland. For historical-cultural reasons it has tended to look increasingly to Poland for support in its efforts to establish closer ties to Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially NATO.

Lithuania is also a much more homogeneous society--80 percent of the population is Lithuanian. The Russian minority is relatively small (under 9 percent of the population). This has made it easier for Lithuania to regulate its relations with Russia than has been the case with Estonia and Latvia, both of which have large Russian minorities.

Over time a process of differentiation has begun to take place between the three Baltic states and the initial solidarity, so evident in the early post-1991 period, has begun to erode. Estonia has increasingly sought to pursue a separate path in relations with the EU, while Lithuania has tried to hitch its wagon more closely to Poland's star in the hope that this would improve its chances to gain entry into NATO. Latvia, on the other hand,

has lacked a clear Western patron (though Sweden has tended to play this role by default). This has left Latvia feeling somewhat alone and isolated.

The EU's decision to open accession negotiations with Estonia in early 1998 could accelerate the process of differentiation. Over the long run, Estonia seems likely to look increasingly to the Nordic states, especially Finland, while Lithuania will probably seek closer ties to Central Europe, especially Poland as a way of accelerating its entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially NATO. If this trend continues, it could increase Latvia's isolation.

THE NORDIC CONNECTION

How the Baltic issue is managed will also depend on the course of the security debate within the Nordic countries, especially Finland and Sweden. As in Austria, the end of the Cold War has eroded the concept of neutrality and raised new security dilemmas for Sweden and Finland. Both countries have taken important steps away from neutrality by joining the EU and the PfP. While neither country has officially expressed a desire to join NATO, behind the scenes a debate has emerged among policy elites in both countries regarding the prospects for and desirability of eventual NATO membership.

This debate has gone furthest in Finland, in part because neutrality was imposed on Finland whereas in Sweden it was voluntary. Some Finnish commentators, such as Max Jacobson, former Finnish Ambassador to the UN and a leading security expert, have suggested that Finland will have little choice but to join NATO, not because Finland faces any particular threat to its sovereignty but in order to ensure that it has a "seat at the table" on matters that directly affect Finnish security interests.

In Sweden, as well, voices in the media and the Moderate Party have begun to raise the issue of NATO membership. Carl Bildt, the leader of the Moderate Party, has openly called for Sweden to join NATO. The need for defense cuts has also caused some members of the Swedish policy elite to question whether Sweden can afford to remain outside the Alliance over the long run.

This is not to suggest that Finland or Sweden are about to join NATO in the near future. This is unlikely. But the security outlook in both countries is slowly shifting, as both seek to adjust to the changes unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Thus, the prospect that both countries might at some point opt to join NATO can no longer entirely be excluded, particularly if Austria decides to join.

Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO would cast the whole Baltic issue in a new light. In particular, it could help to defuse the "defensibility" argument. If NATO

was ready to assume an Article V commitment to Finland with its long border with Russia, then there would be less reason not to extend a similar guarantee to the Baltic states.

However, for the time being, there are strong advantages to having Sweden and Finland outside the Alliance. Their non-membership provides a certain "cover" for the Baltic states and reduces their exposure and vulnerability. If Sweden and Finland were to join the Alliance, many of the other objections to Baltic membership--Russia, the low level of Baltic military forces, diminished Alliance cohesion, etc.--would still exist. Moreover, with Sweden and Finland inside NATO, the Baltic states would be left more isolated and exposed. This could exacerbate their security anxieties.

Instead of pushing Sweden and Finland to join NATO, Western policymakers may be better off trying to reduce the difference between members and non-members and intensifying military cooperation with the Baltic states in a variety of areas, particularly through enhanced PfP. This could help defuse the saliency of the membership issue and would buy time for the European security environment--and Russian attitudes--to evolve. Such an evolution, in turn, could make it easier to manage the issue of Baltic membership in NATO.

THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

Russia is an important part of the enlargement puzzle. In many ways, NATO's dilemma in the second round remains the same as it was during the first round of enlargement: How to enlarge in a steady, deliberate way without provoking a rupture of relations with Russia. However, Russia is considerably weaker today than it was during the first round. As a consequence, it is less able to act as a partner. At the same time, it has fewer means to thwart NATO's further enlargement.

This does not mean that NATO can or should ignore legitimate Russian security concerns. This would be unwise and counterproductive. NATO has a strong interest in Russia's democratic evolution and in developing a cooperative relationship with Moscow. This is essential for NATO to be able to pursue a viable enlargement policy as well as its ability to achieve a number of the other important foreign policy goals, such as conventional arms control.

Moreover, Russia will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities. This argues for a slow purposeful approach to the second round, rather than a hasty new round of enlargement. However, Russia should not be given a veto over NATO's enlargement.

NATO should make clear that there are no "red lines" and that continued efforts to draw such lines will only lead to Russia's isolation from Europe.

At the same time, NATO should reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to all European states--including Russia--that meet the criteria for membership and accept the basic values on which membership is based. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted, Russia cannot be expected to accept NATO enlargement if at the same time it is excluded from the process forever. For the foreseeable future, Russian membership in NATO is not a realistic option. It would require major changes in Russia, in NATO and the European security environment. But we cannot predict what Russia or the European environment will look like in thirty or fifty years. Thus, it would be wrong to needlessly antagonize Russia by ruling out Russian membership out of hand.

For the time being, however, Russian membership in NATO is not a realistic option. Russia has not asked to join, and if it should apply in the near future, it would not meet most of the basic requirements for membership. Thus, there is little reason to lose much sleep over what is--and for a long time will remain--merely a theoretical problem.

NATO's main attention should be devoted to trying to make the NATO-Russian relationship, particularly the Permanent Joint Council, established in May 1997, more effective. The criticism of some observers such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) dilutes the NATO Council's power and gives Russia a veto over NATO's decision making are unfounded, as NATO's actions in Kosovo underscore its objectives. Russia was not able to prevent NATO from taking action in Kosovo.

Indeed, the danger is just the opposite: that Russia and NATO may not exploit the PJC's full potential and that, as a result, it will languish and become a dead letter. Thus, both sides need to find ways to reinvigorate the PJC and ensure that the PJC remains an effective mechanism for expanding cooperation.

PARTNERSHIP WITH UKRAINE

NATO also has a strong interest in helping to preserve Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. An independent Ukraine serves as an important buffer between NATO and Russia, giving NATO important strategic warning in the event of a resurgence of an aggressive militaristic Russia. If Ukraine's independence were to be weakened or compromised, this could have important implications for NATO's military posture and could bring the shadow of Russian military power to Poland's border.

Ukraine has not applied for NATO membership and is not likely to do so in the near future. But it has signaled a strong interest in closer cooperation with NATO. It was the first CIS country to join PfP and at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 it signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO. The charter goes beyond anything NATO has signed with any other CIS country except Russia. While it does not contain an explicit security guarantee, the charter provides for a broad expansion of cooperation in a number of important areas, including exercises, training, education, and technology. NATO also recently established a liaison office in Kiev, giving it a permanent presence in Ukraine.

For the time being, this probably marks the limits of NATO's relationship with Ukraine. Kiev is not likely to apply for membership in the near future (though some Ukrainian officials do not rule it out over the long run). And even if Ukraine did apply, Kiev has a long way to go before it would qualify for membership. Moreover, the impact of Ukrainian membership on Russia would need to be considered. Russia would regard Ukrainian membership in NATO as much more threatening than inclusion of Poland or the Baltic countries.

It is important, however, that NATO find ways to enhance cooperation with Ukraine and support its aspirations for independence. In particular, cooperation through PfP should be intensified. Polish membership in NATO also offers a useful mechanism for intensifying ties to Ukraine. Poland and Ukraine have recently established a joint peacekeeping battalion. This could provide a building block for expanded cooperation. The trilateral military cooperation between Poland, Germany, and Denmark could also eventually be expanded to include Ukraine. Ukraine could be invited to participate in exercises with the three countries and to send liaison officers to the headquarters in Stettin (Poland).

At the same time, NATO members need to encourage Ukraine to accelerate the pace of its economic reform program. Unless Ukraine addresses its economic problems more seriously, its chances of being integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions are dim. Without more consistent reform, Ukraine will become increasingly dependent on the Russian market and find it difficult to maintain its Western orientation.

NATO'S ENLARGEMENT OPTIONS

As NATO approaches the Washington Summit, it has a variety of options for managing enlargement:

— **Slovenia Only.** In this option NATO would enlarge to Slovenia only. This option has several advantages. It could be done relatively easily and quickly: Slovenia is a small country and incorporating it would not pose major problems for NATO. Slovenia's membership would also reinforce the credibility of NATO's open-door policy, and demonstrate NATO's sincerity about its readiness to admit new members beyond those admitted in the first round. At the same time, it would buy time for NATO to digest the first round and provide time for other aspirants to undertake the reforms necessary to make themselves better qualified candidates for membership. It also would not antagonize Russia, while demonstrating to Moscow that enlargement was an ongoing process. Finally, it would provide a land bridge to Hungary, allowing NATO to reinforce Hungary more easily in a crisis.

Enlarging to Slovenia only, however, has a number of disadvantages. Given Slovenia's small military (about 10,000 men), admitting Slovenia does not really add much to NATO's military potential or ability to carry out new strategic missions. Moreover, it might be seen by many countries as an "easy out," thus undermining its original intention of reinforcing the credibility of the open door. Finally, if Romania were not admitted at the same time, it might create problems with France, Romania's strongest patron, at a time when, strategically, the Alliance needs to rebuild bridges to Paris.

— **Slovenia, Slovakia, and Austria.** In this option NATO would admit Slovenia, Slovakia, and Austria together. This option would enhance stability in Central Europe and complete the Alliance's Central European opening: the entire Central European region would now be a part of NATO. It would also ensure land access to Hungary in a crisis. Finally, Austria's inclusion could accelerate the debate in Sweden and Finland about joining NATO.

Admitting Slovenia, Slovakia, and Austria, however, also has a number of drawbacks. It would not add much to the Alliance's military capabilities or ability to carry out its new missions. None of these countries have very capable military forces. Indeed, Austria and Slovenia could prove to be free riders. Moreover, while sentiment for NATO membership is growing in Austria, Austria has not yet applied for membership and it is not clear if and/or when it will.

Finally, it is not clear how permanent Slovakia's recent democratic opening is. Does the recent victory by the new democratic coalition represent a true break with the past? Or will it prove short-lived and result in the return of neo-communist and authoritarian forces, as happened in Bulgaria after the victory of the democratic forces in 1991? Finally, admitting Slovenia, Slovakia, and Austria would disappoint many of the

Southern members of the Alliance, especially France and Italy, and could exacerbate internal tensions within the Alliance.

-- **Slovenia and Romania.** In this option, the Alliance would admit Slovenia and Romania together. This would provide an opening to the South, and satisfy the demand of some Southern members for a better geographic balance within the Alliance. It would also give the Alliance a stronger foothold in the Balkans and provide a staging area for peace operations in the region. Finally, it could help to "lock in" Romanian democracy and foster closer rapprochement between Hungary and Romania, who would be forced to cooperate even more closely as NATO members.

However, this option also has a number of disadvantages. Despite considerable progress, Romania is at present not ready for NATO membership. Continued political bickering within the ruling coalition has led to a slowdown in reform. If the current coalition does not get a better grip on the economy, it could collapse or be forced from office, leading to a return of the neo-communists, led by former President Ion Iliescu. Moreover, admitting Slovenia and Romania without Bulgaria would leave Bulgaria exposed and could have a negative political-psychological impact in Bulgaria, undercutting support for the reform course undertaken by the democratic government in Sofia. It would also have a negative impact on the Baltic states, several of which at least are as qualified for membership as Romania.

-- **Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.** In this option the Alliance would bring in Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria together. This option would help to stabilize the Balkans and also avoid Bulgaria's isolation. In addition, it would close the geographic gap between Romania and Turkey, creating a contiguous NATO Southern region. It would also end any Russian hopes of using economic pressure and leverage to regain a foothold in Bulgaria.

However, this option would have all the disadvantages of the previous option, plus some additional ones. The most serious disadvantage would be its impact on the Baltic states, who would feel left out and increasingly vulnerable. It might also encourage Russia to believe that NATO had accepted a new "red line," making the Baltic area off limits to NATO enlargement. In addition, as noted earlier, Bulgaria is far from ready for NATO membership. Waiting for Bulgaria to catch up would make NATO enlargement--and the integration of other candidates--dependent on the pace of reform in Bulgaria.

-- **A Baltic Opening.** A very different possibility would be to admit only the Baltic states. This would help stabilize the Baltic region and make clear to Russia that there are no "red lines." It would also put pressure on the EU to put Latvia and Lithuania

on a fast track to membership along with Estonia (which has already been designated as a candidate for early membership). Finally, it would accelerate the debate in Sweden and Finland about NATO membership. If the Baltic states were in, Sweden and Finland would probably feel there was less reason not to join.

This option, however, has serious disadvantages. First, it could provoke a crisis with Russia, putting at risk many of the small but important improvements in NATO's relations with Moscow. Second, militarily the Baltic states are not ready for NATO membership. As noted earlier, they need to build up their militaries and bring them up to NATO standards. This will take considerable time. Third, the Baltics are difficult to defend militarily, short of stationing nuclear weapons on their soil, which few NATO members would be willing to do. Thus, bringing them in at an early stage could significantly weaken the credibility of NATO's security guarantee (Article V). Moreover, given current attitudes in the U.S. Senate, it would probably be difficult to get Senate support for Baltic membership at the moment.

— **A Southern and Northern Enlargement.** In this option, NATO would admit one or two countries from the South--say Slovenia and perhaps Romania, if it is ready--together with one Baltic country, perhaps Lithuania, which is the most militarily advanced of the Baltic states at the moment.⁸ This would help to stabilize both the Balkans and the Baltic region, and avoid an internal squabble between proponents of a Southern opening, such as France and Italy, and those who favor bringing in the Baltic states, such as Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Poland. Each would achieve a key part of their strategic agenda. Adding one Baltic country would make clear to Moscow that there were no "red lines."

At the same time, it would be less provocative--and thus easier for Moscow to accept--than admitting all three Baltic states at once. Russia would undoubtedly object, but it would be hard for Moscow to reasonably argue that the inclusion of one Baltic country posed a serious threat to its security, especially if that country was Lithuania, since Lithuania is the Baltic country with whom Moscow has the best relations.

One of the disadvantages of this approach would be that it would leave Latvia more exposed. Estonia and Lithuania have strong regional patrons (Finland and Poland respectively). Latvia, by contrast, has no regional patron. Nor does it currently have a clear prospect for early membership in the EU or NATO. Moreover, it is the most

⁸See Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," pp. 16-17.

vulnerable to Russian economic pressure because of its strong dependence on trade with Moscow.

Thus, in order to avoid Latvia becoming even more vulnerable to Russian pressure, some special compensation package would need to be devised for Latvia. One possibility would be to put Latvia on the fast track for EU membership along with Slovenia. Latvia's economic performance is nearly as good as Estonia's--thus there are solid grounds for putting it on the EU fast track. Doing so would strengthen Latvia's security and send a strong signal to Moscow that any attempt to put pressure on Latvia would have adverse consequences for Moscow's relations with the EU.

CONCLUSION

All the options discussed above have advantages as well as disadvantages. Which one NATO chooses will depend to a large degree on NATO's strategic purpose--which is evolving. Will NATO remain an integrated political military alliance or will it evolve more in the direction of a regional security alliance? Or will it retain elements of both?

The answers to these questions will have important consequences for how enlargement is structured. They need to be sorted out before the next round of enlargement begins. Once NATO has decided its strategic purpose, it will be easier to structure the next round of enlargement and decide which countries should be included in it.

Moreover, NATO needs time to digest the first round of enlargement before it initiates a second round. It is important that this first round be perceived as successful. Otherwise, support for a second round, especially in the U.S. Senate, could diminish. Many U.S. Senators fear that further enlargement will dilute NATO's military effectiveness. They need to be shown that this is not the case--that enlargement will enhance, not weaken, NATO's military effectiveness. This is another reason why getting NATO's strategic rationale--and missions--sorted out is important.

Finally, Russia will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities. While Russia should not be given a veto over further expansion, proceeding with a second round too quickly--before Russia has had a chance to digest the impact of the first round--could inhibit, rather than facilitate, this process. This is all the more important because Russia is nearing the end of the Yeltsin era. His successor may not have the same stake in good relations with the West that Yeltsin had.

These factors argue for a deliberate, measured approach to further enlargement--one that gives NATO time to sort out its strategic priorities and digest the first round and

also gives Russia time to adjust to the new strategic situation, while making clear that NATO enlargement is a continuing process.

At the same time, NATO needs to enhance the credibility of the open door. Otherwise many aspirants will lose hope and could begin to search for new security arrangements or other alternatives. Simply reiterating the wording in the Madrid communiqué about the door being open will not be enough. Without naming specific names, NATO needs to lay out a clearer road map at the Washington Summit, which goes beyond the Madrid declaration and identifies concrete steps that will be taken to ensure that the door truly remains open.

NATO should also announce at the summit that it will review the performance of aspirants at a special summit in 2001, with an eye to identifying specific candidates for a second round if their performance in the interval warrants it. Foreign air defense ministers should be tasked with preparing a progress report, which could be presented at their ministerial prior to the special summit similar to the Report on Enlargement published by NATO in September 1995. This would help enhance the credibility of the open door and give prospective candidates an incentive to undertake the necessary reforms to improve their chances for membership. It would also buy time for NATO to digest the first round and give Russia time to gradually accustom itself to the fact that NATO enlargement is an ongoing process.

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Dichiarazione del Rappresentante del Ministero degli Affari Esteri della Federazione Russa sulla questione dell'adeguamento del Trattato CFE

A Vienna e' terminata la sessione autunnale delle trattative sull'adeguamento del Trattato sulle forze convenzionali in Europa.

Il 2 dicembre 1998 nel corso della riunione del Consiglio dei Ministri degli Affari Esteri dell'OSCE ad Oslo i paesi-partecipanti hanno convenuto di affrontare i problemi-chiavi dell'adeguamento nei primi mesi del 1999. La parte russa intende che il progresso decisivo alle trattative deve essere raggiunto prima dell'accesso ufficiale alla NATO dei nuovi membri.

Questo e' condizionato, in particolare, dal fatto che l'allargamento dell'Alleanza creera' una minaccia al Trattato CFE vigente basato sui principi del mantenimento della parita' delle forze tra i due gruppi dei paesi-partecipanti. Se i nuovi membri della NATO non dichiareranno della loro adesione al gruppo dei paesi che hanno firmato o aderito al Trattato di Bruxelles del 1948 oppure al Trattato di Washington del 1949 e non corrisponderanno alle quote sugli armamenti di questo gruppo, sara' danneggiato tutto il sistema di equilibrio che costituisce la base dell'OSCE e saranno minati i suoi meccanismi di gruppo. In virtu' della specificita' delle disposizioni di questo documento sara' leso alla parte russa il diritto di eseguire sui territori dei nuovi membri della NATO le attivita' d'ispezione nello stesso volume come sui territori degli altri membri dell'Alleanza. Tutto cio' mettera' in dubbio l'ulteriore esistenza dell'attuale Trattato CFE.

Tale sviluppo della situazione porta in se una minaccia agli interessi della sicurezza della Russia in relazione all'indebolimento della vitalita' del Trattato CFE. In condizioni della mancata risoluzione dei problemi-chiavi dell'adeguamento la parte russa sara' costretta di prendere le misure corrispondenti per difendere i suoi interessi, compresa la convocazione della

Conferenza straordinaria dei paesi-partecipanti per esaminare le circostanze eccezionali riguardanti il Trattato CFE e la loro influenza sulla sua validita'.

Deve essere chiaro che se un gruppo dei paesi viola coscientemente il Trattato, esso non ha ragione di contare che gli altri partecipanti lo rispetteranno scrupolosamente.

La Russia si basa fermamente sul fatto che il raggiungimento tempestivo delle intese di principio sui parametri principali del futuro Trattato CFE permetterebbe ai paesi-partecipanti di adempiere il Trattato vigente tenendo conto di queste intese e di non ricorrere alle procedure di carattere straordinario durante il periodo entro la fine delle trattative sull'adeguamento e la conclusione di un accordo rinnovato.

La parte russa conferma la sua disponibilita' di seguire questa strada. Spetta ai membri della NATO.

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Camera dei Deputati

IL PORTAVOCE DEL PRESIDENTE

**CINQUANTESIMO ANNIVERSARIO DELL'ALLEANZA
ATLANTICA: UNA NUOVA NATO PER UNA NUOVA EUROPA**

Roma, 25 gennaio 1998

(Sala della Lupa)

Saluto del presidente della Camera dei Deputati, on. Luciano Violante

Innanzitutto, con il Presidente del Senato Nicola Mancino, intendo ringraziare gli organizzatori di questo convegno per avere scelto una sede Parlamentare per riflettere insieme in ordine al futuro dell'Alleanza Atlantica a 50 anni dalla sua costituzione.

Vedo in questa scelta anche il riconoscimento dell'opportunità di rafforzare i rapporti tra Nato e sedi parlamentari, a partire dall'Assemblea dell'Atlantico del Nord. Come è stato sostenuto nel rapporto del senatore statunitense Roth, *La Nato nel XXI secolo*, tenuto all'Assemblea dell'Atlantico del Nord nell'ottobre scorso, l'efficacia e la vitalità politica della Nato dipendono in ultima analisi dal sostegno dei parlamenti e dell'opinione pubblica dei paesi membri. Analogo concetto è stato espresso dalla collega Boothroyd, speaker della Camera dei Comuni, nel novembre

scorso ad Edimburgo nel corso della seduta dell'Assemblea dell'Atlantico del Nord.

Non si tratta di clausole di cortesia.

Anche stamane, nel corso di numerosi ed autorevoli interventi, si è sottolineata l'esigenza di una ridiscussione dei nuovi compiti della Nato, in attuazione degli originali valori fondativi ma consapevoli del grande mutamento del contesto internazionale. E' evidente che questi nuovi compiti, qualora, come è prevedibile, comportino un aggiornamento delle regole costitutive, richiederanno deliberazioni parlamentari. Ed anche se tali deliberazioni non saranno formalmente richieste saranno inevitabile approfondimenti ed indirizzi parlamentari impegnativi per i governi.

Si aggiunga che, se come è stato anche qui auspicato, auspicio che condivido, l'Europa riuscirà a presentarsi unitariamente sul fronte della politica della Difesa e della politica Estera, questo richiederà variazioni nel budget della difesa di molti Paesi. Entrambe le eventualità, una politica comune europea su questi fronti e l'incremento delle spese per la difesa richiederanno necessariamente oltre alla responsabilità dei governi, le responsabilità dei parlamenti e delle singole comunità nazionali.

Si discute, a proposito dei nuovi compiti, di terrorismo, di criminalità organizzata e di problemi che potranno venire dal Mediterraneo.

Il terrorismo è un pericolo concreto e presente per le nostre democrazie. Una riflessione comune sul terrorismo si impone, anche per le storie diverse che hanno avuto le diverse organizzazioni che oggi praticano il terrorismo, e per la difficoltà di un'accezione comunemente condivisa di

questo fenomeno e delle relative risposte. Anche per questo obiettivo sarebbe utile un impegno parlamentare.

Una sola parola sulla questione della criminalità. Per meglio dare l'idea della potenza delle attuali grandi organizzazioni criminali prendo in prestito alcune immagini della strategia bellica. Non c'è mai stato nella storia recente dell'umanità un esercito tanto numeroso, quanto quello costituito dagli appartenenti alla criminalità organizzata, con una pari facilità di ricambio di caduti e prigionieri, con una pari capacità di armamento; con una disponibilità finanziaria pari al 2% del PIL mondiale; così capace di utilizzare mezzi, sedi, apparecchiature, servizi ed istituzioni dell'avversario, cioè nostri, degli Stati democratici ed avanzati; così mimetizzabile con il nemico, che sarebbe costituito, sempre, dagli Stati democratici ed avanzati. Si aggiunga che in alcuni paesi di recente democrazia, la grande criminalità abusa della mancanza di esperienza e della fragilità delle nuove istituzioni, e riesce ad insediarsi con tutte le sue forme, dalla violenza alla corruzione, condizionando anche taluni aspetti della vita delle nazioni. Secondo il rapporto 1997 delle N.U. il traffico di stupefacenti genera da solo 400 miliardi di dollari, pari all'8% del commercio mondiale. Questi sono i dati. Spetterà poi a chi ne ha la responsabilità, a partire dal prossimo incontro di aprile a Washington, trarre da questi dati le decisioni compatibili con la struttura della Nato. Io sottolineo che la grande criminalità è oggi un grande problema politico internazionale e non più solo un ingombrante problema nazionale, giudiziario o di polizia.

Il presidente Spini ha richiamato stamane con particolare efficacia l'esigenza di guardare al fianco Sud. Il Mediterraneo è una grande occasione per l'Europa e per tutto l'Occidente; non è solo un rischio. Può

diventarlo se alcuni di noi da questa parte del mondo si ostinassero a considerarlo tale. Indipendentemente dalle scelte che si vorranno prendere, abbiamo il dovere di costruire una grande azione diplomatica dell'Europa verso il Mediterraneo, il vicino Medio Oriente ed il cosiddetto Grande medio oriente. Nel 2020 meno del 20% della popolazione mondiale vivrà nei paesi sviluppati. La mancanza d'acqua in Medio Oriente potrebbe provocare grandi conflitti. Nel mondo ci sono circa 200 bacini fluviali che attraversano più nazioni, dei quali 57 in Africa e 48 in Europa. Se un Paese pensasse di sbarrare nel proprio territorio le acque di un fiume che sinora ha diviso con altri, saranno inevitabili nuove tensioni e nuovi conflitti, tanto più che l'acqua è più necessaria del petrolio. In alcune regioni dell'Africa e del Medio Oriente l'accesso alle risorse idriche è già minacciato. Progetti di dighe in Europa Centrale e in Turchia sono all'origine di forti tensioni.

I rischi, insomma, non sono più quelli di 50 anni fa; ma possono essere non meno gravi. Ed una ridiscussione dei compiti della Nato per i prossimi decenni è ineludibile.

Al fine di concorrere a questo processo, difficile ma entusiasmante perché riguarda il nostro futuro immediato e la vita dei nostri figli e nipoti, potrebbe essere utile convocare una Conferenza straordinaria che riunisca delegazioni parlamentari degli Stati rappresentati nell'OSCE (organizzazione dove sono rappresentate l'U.E., la UEO allargata agli osservatori e la NATO) dei paesi dell'Europa centro orientale e la Russia, se possibile.

Le delegazioni parlamentari nazionali dovrebbero essere composte dai rappresentanti delle commissioni esteri e difesa dei parlamenti e dai rappresentanti delle delegazioni presso le Assemblee internazionali. Prima della Conferenza si potrebbe organizzare un dibattito nei parlamenti

nazionali con i rispettivi governi al fine di definire posizioni e primi indirizzi.


Prima di chiudere permettetemi di rivolgere un ringraziamento a tutti coloro che in questi cinquant'anni a volte con duri sacrifici hanno difeso nella Nato i valori della democrazia, delle libertà individuali e dello Stato di diritto.

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**SPEECH BY DR. JAVIER SOLANA,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO**

**THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE**

**"NATO: ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY – THE WASHINGTON
SUMMIT – THE NEXT CENTURY"**

ROME, ITALY

MONDAY, 25 JANUARY, 1999

THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
"NATO: ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY – THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT
– THE NEXT CENTURY"

SPEECH BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, DR. JAVIER SOLANA,
ROME, 25TH JANUARY 1999

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fundamental, structural changes in international relations generally take place slowly. The effects of those changes can take even longer to materialize. I am reminded of something Chou-Enlai said on a visit to Paris in the 1950s. When asked what he thought of the effects of the French Revolution, the Chinese Prime Minister paused, reflected, and then said, "It's too soon to tell".

In April, the Alliance will celebrate its 50th anniversary with a Summit meeting in Washington, the city where the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. On that occasion we will celebrate the achievements of the organisation that has already ensured the longest period of peace in Europe.

In doing so, we will also take note of the essential contribution NATO has made to the fundamental transformations to which we are witness today.

This is in many ways a period as formative as the years after the Second World War. Nothing could illustrate this better than the launching of European Monetary Union three weeks ago. It is visible proof that the face of Europe is changing –and that much of the goals set by our predecessors half a century ago – by De Gasperi, Adenauer or Monnet – have been realised.

Today, the vision of a united Europe is no longer just a vision. Nor is the goal of a Europe whole and free still a seemingly-unattainable objective. As the process of European integration deepens and widens, our continent will finally overcome the remnants of its erstwhile division. At the end of this turbulent 20th century, we can say that Europe has seized the chance for a new beginning it was given 50 years ago.

If the story of European integration is a success story, it is not because of Europe alone. North America must get equal credit. It was North America's role in Europe that helped plant the seeds of European integration. The democracies of North America helped in protecting those of Europe against an existential threat, but they also persuaded – indeed urged – the Europeans to get their act together and unite. Today, Europe and North America have evolved into the strongest community of like-minded nations anywhere. Their ability to shape the strategic environment has never been greater. It is a community that others are eagerly awaiting to join. It is a community that is preparing for the 21st century.

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NATO, the Atlantic Alliance, has been the centrepiece of this community from the very beginning. It has never been just a military Alliance – it has been an Alliance of values as well. It has never been concerned only with the defence of territory, but also with the defence of common values. What unites us are shared interests, not shared threats. That is why this Alliance has remained so strong beyond the end of the Cold War. And that is why this Alliance has been able to change the security landscape in Europe for the better.

NATO's 50th Anniversary, therefore, gives us every reason to celebrate this historic achievement. Yet celebration must not be mistaken for complacency. The project of managing security is far from over. Indeed, the 21st century will confront us with a set of entirely new challenges, for which we need to be prepared:

Globalisation, for example, offers our societies the opportunity to become more creative and prosperous; but it also makes them more vulnerable. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may result in new threats to our territories and societies. And perhaps most immediately, regional conflicts will confront us with a cruel choice between costly indifference and costly engagement.

Now that the Cold War is over, we are faced not with one single all-embracing threat but with a multitude of new risks and challenges. Many of them are here in the southern region of the Alliance, and particularly in the Balkans. In the former Yugoslavia the collapse of communism has not brought democracy and the move towards integration, as elsewhere in Europe, but rather disintegration, ethnic intolerance and the use of force to impose solutions. In this new strategic context, Italy has become, even more than in the past, a key member of the Alliance. None of our efforts to stabilize the situation in Bosnia and now Kosovo would be possible without the solidarity, political guidance and active contribution of Italy.

Our air and naval operations to support the United Nations in Bosnia, and today to support the OSCE in Kosovo, all depend on the use of Italian bases and facilities. If force has to be used tomorrow to bring about a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo, Italy's support will be a crucial factor.

In the Kosovo crisis, NATO is engaging, as is the rest of the international community, to try bring an end to hostilities. The current state of constant violence and political oppression cannot continue.

NATO must be ready to act if that is the only way to bring about a political solution to this crisis. Our objectives will be clear. First, to help prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused by refugees and displaced persons fleeing the violence – a catastrophe that we narrowly averted last autumn. Second, to help to protect the human and civil rights of the people of Kosovo; and third to help to achieve a political settlement for Kosovo based on a large measure of autonomy for this region within the frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Kosovo is not only an immediate crisis – it is also an illustration of the complexity of today's security challenges. We cannot overcome these challenges with yesterday's formulas and recipes. For NATO, thus, celebrating its 50th anniversary can only

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mean looking ahead: getting ready for the challenges of the next century. NATO's evolution throughout the 1990s laid the groundwork. The Washington Summit will bring together the different aspects of NATO's adaptation and set out the way ahead.

At the Washington Summit, we will welcome for the first time the Heads of State and Government of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as full members of the Alliance.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a most striking change in the Euro-Atlantic system. In just ten years, these countries have made a startling, and historic transition. They have become vibrant democracies; they have thriving market economies; and they are, once again, active members of the international community. In becoming NATO members, these countries definitively rejoin the European family; and in so doing, they demonstrate concretely that there are no more dividing lines in Europe.

This is only a stage along the way to NATO's further enlargement. Our policy in that respect is consistent: NATO's door remains open to countries willing and able to contribute to Allied security.

Moreover, we are working on a package of measures to be approved by the Summit, designed to bring Partner countries closer to the Alliance and to help those countries who aspire to future membership in meeting NATO standards.

The Summit will also strengthen our cooperation and involvement with countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic region spanning from Portugal to Finland, from Canada to Central Asia. We have created mechanisms to this end.

First, a forum for consultation and cooperation bringing together Allies and Partners, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It has proven its value most recently in connection with the crisis in Kosovo.

But it can do more: areas like regional security cooperation, for example, need to be explored further.

Second, a programme which, in its fifth year, has become an indispensable means of helping our Partner countries to restructure their armed forces and to improve their ability to work with NATO in responding to crises, including in Bosnia. We call it Partnership for Peace.

One key area where this programme has proved invaluable in dealing with an immediate crisis situation is in Albania. From the outset of the Kosovo crisis, NATO held emergency consultations with Albania.

Subsequently, we have given Albania practical assistance; for instance we have established a NATO Cell in Tirana; we have held an exercise last summer; we have provided support for the training of Albanian border guards and we have developed a programme for transporting stocks of ammunition into safe storage centres under government control. At the Summit, we will present a framework that will allow Partners to become even

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more involved in defining our programme. For instance, we will extend Partner involvement in political consultations, decision-making, command arrangements and planning for NATO-led crisis response and peace support operations. Interoperability between Allies and Partners will also increase.

The Washington Summit will also highlight the importance of the NATO-Russia relationship. Russia may be a country of many contradictions: it may be uncertain of its role in this emerging new Europe; but one thing is clear: there can be no security in Europe without a stable Russia. Political and economic turmoil in Russia can have a wider effect. Indeed, in the Russian Government's latest national security assessment, they identified economic difficulties as their number one security challenge.

Indeed, if we want to help bringing this country into the European mainstream, there is only one chance: that North America and Europe do this together. The EU and the US account for roughly 60% of the world economy. The close coordination of these two solid economic centres is essential if Russia - and others - is to be helped in a meaningful way.

Helping Russia is not an act of charity, but of enlightened self-interest. For if we want to manage the challenges of the 21st century, we need to have Russia on board - a stable, democratic, self-confident Russia, a Russia that can make a major contribution to European security. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council provide us with the opportunities to achieve such a relationship. They have set the stage to cooperate with Russia on issues which may pose the greatest security challenges of the future - proliferation, environmental damage, nuclear safety, or terrorism. Again, a dramatic change in relations, in a very short period of time!

The Summit will also give the emerging NATO-Ukraine relationship a strong boost. With NATO's help, a stable, democratic Ukraine can become a net contributor to security and stability in Europe.

The Summit will also take stock of our Mediterranean dialogue. If our aim is to shape the security environment in the wider sense, then we cannot ignore the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Even if the main challenges in this region are economic and political, NATO can provide useful functions by dispelling mistrust and encouraging multilateral solutions to regional security. If NATO's track record vis-à-vis Eastern Europe is any guide, then we will also be able to generate new relationships with the nations to our South.

Our Mediterranean dialogue will grow in importance. We have established a Mediterranean Cooperation group to conduct a regular political dialogue with 6 Mediterranean countries. We have been cooperating with 3 of them in the military field in our SFOR mission in Bosnia. At the Summit, we will consider how we can develop this dialogue further. But, in doing so, we will be receptive to what our 6 Mediterranean dialogue countries want. They must also tell us how far - and how fast - they wish to go in terms of both political and military contacts with the Alliance.

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As we continue to strengthen our key co-operative relationships and programmes with non-NATO countries, we have also been putting the finishing touches on a far-reaching adaptation of the Alliance itself. It includes a reformed command structure and a new headquarters concept. This adaptation will keep NATO strong and able to function as a coherent politico-military alliance in a very different security environment. NATO's internal adaptation will allow us to provide for our collective defence and contribute to collective security. It allows us to continue to meet our fundamental collective defence commitments, yet also to deploy forces in support of peace missions. By the time of our Summit, this work will be completed.

But the Summit will go beyond taking stock of NATO's adaptation. It will also launch new initiatives that will further improve NATO's military effectiveness. For example, we are preparing a defence capabilities initiative, to improve interoperability and sustainability among Alliance forces. This initiative will help ensure that the military forces of Allies remain on the same wavelength, and are able to move distances effectively and quickly.

We are also preparing a Summit initiative on weapons of mass destruction. As I pointed out before, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be a major challenge of the next century. These weapons can pose a risk not only to our national territories, but also to our troops which may be involved in peacekeeping missions. Sharing information among Allies on the proliferation problem should thus be the first step towards a more comprehensive strategy to deal with this problem.

But in order to implement this agenda successfully, one more ingredient is required: a new transatlantic bargain.

Today, we see a European Union with a common currency, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and a commitment to take in new members beyond the present 15 EU countries. It is only natural that NATO, too, will reflect this evolution. That is why our Alliance must have a stronger European personality, where North American and European Allies have the means to decide how best to act in response to each challenge. The success of Operation Alba demonstrates the importance of European capabilities, and I congratulate Italy on the leadership role it played in that operation.

The development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance will enable NATO to support European-led operations. Not only will this prevent duplication, it will also contribute to a more mature transatlantic relationship, where roles and responsibilities are shared more equitably. To achieve such a new transatlantic bargain is perhaps NATO's greatest challenge. But it also offers the greatest payoff: a dynamic NATO within a vibrant transatlantic community.

All these elements of NATO's adaptation will be tied together at the Washington Summit into one single, coherent framework: a revised Strategic Concept. This document will also be published at the Washington Summit.

In essence, the Strategic Concept will synthesize NATO's many innovations with its enduring tasks and principles. NATO's new roles in crisis management and

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non-proliferation will feature prominently in this new Concept, as will the new mechanisms of partnership and cooperation. The Strategic Concept will thus be a key document to explain and guide the activities of the Alliance in the years ahead.

This is a formidable agenda. It will bring NATO more in line with the security environment of the next century. It confirms that the Washington Summit will be far more than a celebration of past achievements. It will be a major opportunity to look ahead and chart NATO's course into the 21st century.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

It may well be too soon to determine the effects of the French Revolution. But let me dare to assess the changes of the last ten years, and look into NATO's future. The NATO of the 21st century will be a promoter of security: taking on new missions to manage crises; tackling new risks; and, perhaps most important, working with every country in the Euro-Atlantic area to build security through cooperation.

In so doing, we will go a long way towards fulfilling the vision of De Gasperi, Acheson and all those other wise men who set this Alliance on track - a mere 50 years ago.

Thank you.

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DISCORSO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO AL CONVEGNO

“ IL CINQUANTESIMO ANNIVERSARIO DELL'ALLEANZA ATLANTICA: UNA NUOVA NATO PER UNA NUOVA EUROPA ”

Roma, Camera dei Deputati
25 gennaio 1999

E' certamente una coincidenza non fortunata che una tragedia come quella in corso in Kosovo raggiunga una nuova fase critica proprio nel momento in cui la NATO sta celebrando il suo 50esimo anno di vita. Proprio questa crisi in atto, d'altra parte, conferma le funzioni emergenti della nuova NATO – il suo ruolo centrale, cioè, nella gestione delle crisi europee del dopo guerra fredda. E al tempo stesso ripropone all'Alleanza transatlantica dilemmi non semplici.

Nei suoi primi 50 anni, l'Alleanza atlantica è stata un'alleanza politico-militare di grande successo: un'alleanza che è riuscita a garantire - vincolando Stati Uniti ed Europa in un Patto di difesa comune, attorno al ruolo centrale del famoso articolo 5 - la sicurezza del Vecchio Continente, in un'epoca caratterizzata dal confronto Est-Ovest. La NATO ha al tempo stesso favorito – assieme alla Comunità europea – la costruzione di rapporti pacifici fra paesi che uscivano da due guerre mondiali. Se oggi parliamo dell'Unione europea come di una “comunità di sicurezza” è grazie al tessuto di rapporti cooperativi costruiti attraverso l'integrazione nelle istituzioni multilaterali euro-occidentali.

La fine della guerra fredda – per usare l'espressione convenzionale con cui indichiamo la svolta sistemica avvenuta alla fine dello scorso decennio – ha di fatto privato la NATO del suo vecchio nemico; ed ha al tempo stesso consentito di riunificare, con la Germania, il cuore del Vecchio Continente. Se la NATO si fosse fermata a godersi i frutti di questo successo sarebbe anche, molto probabilmente, decaduta larga parte della sua importanza. Ma non è stato così: messa di fronte alla svolta internazionale del 1989, e alla natura dei nuovi rischi cui l'Europa è oggi di fronte, la NATO ha avviato un processo importante di trasformazione: un processo che è ancora in corso e che dovrà trovare una ulteriore definizione nel “nuovo Concetto strategico” che sarà varato al vertice di Washington dell'aprile 1999.

Il modo migliore per celebrare la NATO, quindi, non è soltanto di ripercorrere il passato; ma piuttosto di guardare al futuro, di riflettere su un'Alleanza che, giunta ai suoi cinquant'anni, è alle prese con un rinnovamento di fondo. Chiariamo subito i confini di questo rinnovamento: le vecchie funzioni di difesa comune, per quanto apparentemente residuali, restano centrali in un sistema internazionale caratterizzato da forti elementi di incertezza e nel cui ambito la solidità del rapporto fra Europa e Stati Uniti costituisce una garanzia insostituibile. Questo è ciò della vecchia NATO che rimane intatto nella nuova NATO.

Si aggiungono, come hanno dimostrato i fatti dell'ultimo decennio, due novità di fondo:

Primo, l'adattamento *interno* dell'Alleanza, in funzione dei nuovi compiti di peace-enforcement o peace-support: abbastanza paradossalmente, e come ha dimostrato il test

della Bosnia, la NATO è diventata un'alleanza operativa, e non più solo dissuasiva, solo dopo la fine del confronto fra blocchi. Da questo punto di vista, la NATO si sta in effetti adattando alla nuova natura dei rischi cui l'Europa si trova esposta: rischi a bassa intensità ma molto più diffusi che in passato; legati a conflitti interni agli Stati, e non più soltanto fra gli Stati; generati da spinte etniche e dalla ripresa dei nazionalismi. Di fronte a rischi del genere, non sono solo le capacità militari della NATO che contano – anche se questo è un dato essenziale; è anche la volontà politica degli alleati di assumersi crescenti responsabilità nel campo della gestione delle crisi.

Secondo, il suo adattamento *esterno*, che ha trovato espressione nella strategia di allargamento verso l'Europa centro-orientale, e nella costruzione di nuovi rapporti con la Russia -punti su cui tornerò poi.

Insomma: oggi certo non celebriamo una NATO invecchiata; ma discutiamo di una NATO già cambiata e ancora alle prese con un processo di complicato adattamento.

Lo stesso vale per l'Europa. L'Europa ha pochi anni in meno della NATO; ed è a sua volta alle prese con un processo di profondo rinnovamento, di cui il varo dell'EURO costituisce il segno più tangibile. L'Euro è, per l'Europa, quel che la Bosnia è stata per la NATO: un battesimo del fuoco, figlio di una decisione politica senza precedenti. In generale, è in atto un radicale aggiornamento delle due principali istituzioni multilaterali su cui si è retto, per quasi mezzo secolo, il nostro sistema continentale.

La tesi che vorrei argomentare, in proposito, è molto semplice: la nuova Europa ha bisogno di una nuova NATO almeno tanto quanto la nuova NATO ha bisogno di una nuova Europa. Se fosse altrimenti, l'Europa dell'EURO sarebbe assai meno sicura, le due sponde dell'Atlantico potrebbero tendere ad allontanarsi e le prospettive generali di stabilità del sistema internazionale del prossimo millennio si farebbero assai più incerte.

Le ragioni non sono solo geopolitiche, le ragioni ad esempio indicate da Henry Kissinger (che non può certo essere considerato un personaggio incline a eccessivo idealismo) in uno scritto di alcuni anni fa: “senza l'America, l'Europa si trasformerebbe in una penisola all'estremità dell'Eurasia, incapace di trovare equilibrio e ancor meno unità. Senza l'Europa, l'America diventerebbe un'isola al largo delle coste dell'Eurasia, condannata ad una sorta di politica di equilibrio di potenza che non rifletterebbe il suo spirito nazionale”. Certo, le ragioni sono in parte anche queste.

Ma sono al tempo stesso più complesse. Le sintetizzerei nel modo seguente:

1. **Primo**, con la fine della guerra fredda si è chiusa anche un'epoca segnata da una certa divisione del lavoro o dei compiti fra gli alleati occidentali: l'epoca in cui l'Europa occidentale ha potuto dedicarsi quasi esclusivamente al proprio sviluppo economico al riparo dell'ombrello americano - per usare una espressione politologica che segnò anche, nella versione nazionale che ne diede ormai circa 25 anni fa Enrico Berlinguer, l'accettazione della NATO da parte dei comunisti italiani. Per tutto il secondo dopoguerra, insomma, i paesi europei – o almeno parte di loro, e fra questi sicuramente l'Italia - sono stati consumatori, piuttosto che produttori, di sicurezza. Quest'epoca è decisamente finita; si è aperta una fase in cui la NATO potrà funzionare solo se gli oneri e le responsabilità verranno più equamente distribuite sui due lati dell'Atlantico. La vecchia divisione del lavoro non è più realistica, in una situazione in cui la forza economica combinata dei paesi dell'Unione europea è oramai equivalente a quella degli Stati Uniti ed in una fase in cui l'EURO ha fatto la sua comparsa, assieme al dollaro, sulla scena internazionale. Come è stato scritto giustamente in uno dei papers presentati a questo Convegno, la vecchia divisione del

lavoro non é in fondo soddisfacente: non solo per l'Europa ma neanche per gli Stati Uniti.

Questo assunto contribuisce a spiegare perché, nel dibattito ancora in corso sul nuovo concetto strategico della NATO, il governo italiano attribuisce grande rilevanza al tema dello sviluppo di una identità di sicurezza e difesa europea all'interno della NATO. L'Italia vede infatti nello sviluppo di una identità di difesa europea - e più in generale di una politica estera e di sicurezza comune europea - anche un contributo positivo e costruttivo alla sicurezza transatlantica: una forza coesiva e non divisiva. A breve termine, si tratta intanto di riuscire ad attuare le decisioni enunciate al Consiglio atlantico di Berlino sulle cosiddette "combined joint task forces", di varare cioè meccanismi operativi che rendano possibili l'esistenza di "forze separabili ma non separate": per uscire dal gergo dei comunicati NATO, si tratta di creare le condizioni perché gli europei siano in grado gestire crisi minori nelle aree di instabilità ai propri confini, utilizzando assets della NATO, anche nel caso in cui gli Stati Uniti non intendano partecipare direttamente all'operazione.

A medio termine, si tratta di fare sì che il dibattito che si è riaperto quest'anno sulla difesa europea - anche grazie alla svolta enunciata in autunno da Tony Blair sull'atteggiamento inglese, di cui abbiamo discusso al vertice di Pörschach e di cui ho discusso con Blair in un nostro incontro recente a Londra - faccia progressi sostanziali, consentendo anzitutto una graduale integrazione dell'UEO nella UE. Questa semplificazione istituzionale imporrà di fatto di stabilire legami diretti, che per ora non esistono, fra l'Unione europea e l'Alleanza atlantica.

Al di là di tutte le difficoltà che potrà incontrare la discussione intra-europea su questi temi, è stato dimostrato con sufficiente chiarezza - in particolare dalle lezioni che abbiamo appreso nella gestione del processo di disgregazione della ex-Yugoslavia - che senza darsi effettivamente una politica di sicurezza comune e senza acquisire maggiori capacità militari, l'UE non sarà neanche in grado di esercitare una funzione di stabilizzazione efficace sulle aree confinanti.

In conclusione: il governo italiano è convinto che lo sviluppo di una identità europea di difesa rafforzerebbe i rapporti interatlantici anche perché risponderebbe al problema di superare una divisione del lavoro ormai obsoleta fra gli alleati, consentendo allo stesso tempo una gestione più efficace delle crisi attuale.

2. **La seconda**, ed essenziale ragione, per cui i due termini del problema - la nuova Europa e la nuova NATO - vanno in effetti collegati, è che la gestione delle nuove crisi richiede strumenti integrati: politici, economici e militari. Lo dimostrano, ancora una volta, le lezioni della Bosnia - dove la NATO è intervenuta attuando il mandato delle Nazioni Unite ed in accordo con una serie di altre istituzioni internazionali. E dove pacificazione e sforzi di ricostruzione si combinano. Lo ha dimostrato la gestione dell'Operazione Alba. E lo indica la complessità di una crisi come quella del Kosovo, con l'intreccio fra la presenza sul terreno dei verificatori dell'OSCE (protetti dalla "forza di estrazione" spiegata in Macedonia con forze europee della NATO), le iniziative del Gruppo di Contatto per spingere - o per meglio dire *costringere* - le due parti a negoziare, e le pressioni militari dell'Alleanza atlantica, senza cui l'iniziativa diplomatica non avrebbe sufficiente forza. Una crisi destinata a produrre - se non verrà risolta rapidamente- nuove tragedie interne, con le loro ripercussioni esterne (rifugiati, rischioso effetto domino sull'Albania, sulla Macedonia, la Bosnia stessa). La natura complessa dei problemi di sicurezza del dopo-guerra fredda ci indica insomma - come è ricordato giustamente in un altro dei papers presentati al Convegno - che la gestione delle crisi attuali non può prescindere, per avere successo, da una combinazione degli sforzi, da una stretta interazione fra una varietà di

istituzioni. E' il famoso problema della complementarità o collegamento fra istituzioni diverse che ha suscitato così tanti dibattiti – e devo anche ammettere delusioni notevoli – in questi ultimi anni: ma la cui soluzione potrebbe essere facilitata da relazioni più dirette fra la nuova Unione europea e la nuova NATO.

3. Questo problema mi conduce ad un terzo punto che volevo toccare: se il legame interatlantico funzionerà efficacemente sul piano regionale, ciò potrà anche contribuire a costruire le basi di un sistema internazionale più stabile.

Se ci poniamo da questo punto di vista – dal punto di vista, cioè, sia della sicurezza globale che del rafforzamento del multilateralismo – è sicuramente da auspicare che le nuove funzioni dell'Alleanza nelle missioni non articolo 5 possano contare sulla forma più ampia possibile di legittimazione internazionale. E' indubbio, al tempo stesso, che l'Alleanza debba tutelare le sue capacità operative e la sua credibilità di fronte a situazioni e circostanze non pienamente prevedibili a priori. Si tratta quindi di trovare una soluzione equilibrata fra queste due esigenze: non certo per indebolire la efficacia della NATO, ma anzi per consentire di guardare alla nuova NATO come ad una delle componenti di un ordine internazionale più giusto e sicuro. Su un piano generale di ragionamento, il rispetto dei diritti umani fondamentali, della legalità internazionale ispirata ai principi delle Nazioni Unite, di un multilateralismo leale e responsabile, dovranno cercare di essere combinati per favorire l'ulteriore evoluzione della NATO in una forza collettiva di sicurezza e di stabilità.

Non va comunque trascurato quello che già accade: una parte del processo già in corso di riforma della NATO è infatti la predisposizione di meccanismi di stretta cooperazione con le altre maggiori organizzazioni internazionali. Da questo punto di vista, l'Alleanza ha dimostrato capacità di agire non solo con un alto grado di "operatività" ma anche in modo "cooperativo", e cioè aggregando istituzioni e Paesi (anche non membri dell'Alleanza, come la Russia) attorno a iniziative di pacificazione su vasta scala e di lunga durata. Anche da questa capacità dipenderà in larga misura l'efficacia dei futuri interventi di pacificazione della NATO.

4. L'ultimo punto che volevo toccare – discutendo ancora di rapporti fra nuova Europa e nuova NATO – è la questione dell'allargamento: come ovvio, dipende dalle risposte a questa questione, e dal modo in cui verrà strutturato il rapporto con la Russia, la futura architettura della sicurezza europea sul piano continentale. Le priorità del nostro governo, in materia di allargamento della NATO, sono chiare: il processo di allargamento alle nuove democrazie non può che essere necessariamente graduale, ma è un processo che dovrà restare "aperto" e senza preclusioni. L'Italia sta partecipando attivamente alla ricerca di una posizione comune sui prossimi passi da compiere in questo settore, tenendo conto in particolare della delicatezza dell'area del Sud-Est europeo per la stabilità regionale e continentale. Per cui salutiamo con grande soddisfazione l'ingresso storico di Polonia, Ungheria e Repubblica Ceca nella nuova NATO; e al tempo stesso aggiungiamo che – come già stabilito al vertice di Madrid – la porta deve restare aperta a successive adesioni (Slovenia, Romania ed in prospettiva Bulgaria). La storia della Comunità europea ci insegna, del resto, che la integrazione nelle istituzioni multilaterali ha generalmente funzionato da moltiplicatore dell'evoluzione democratica e della stabilizzazione interna ad una serie di paesi.

In tale ottica, peraltro, non si deve guardare soltanto all'ampliamento della *membership*; si deve invece tenere presente l'intero ventaglio di iniziative intraprese dell'Alleanza verso tutti i Paesi europei che abbiano espresso la volontà di partecipare

a forme di dialogo e collaborazione con la NATO. La creazione di un Consiglio permanente congiunto NATO-Russia, di una partnership con l'Ucraina, e di un foro di dialogo multilaterale attraverso lo "Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council": sono tutti elementi correlati di una strategia di rassicurazione, apertura e stabilizzazione.

In modo specifico, è certamente cruciale – per il futuro della sicurezza europea nel suo complesso - riuscire ad impostare su basi più solide i rapporti di cooperazione con la Russia. E' una direzione in cui il governo italiano si è molto impegnato negli ultimi anni, e che io continuerò a sviluppare con la mia prossima visita a Mosca. Come dimostra la crisi economica vissuta dalla Russia, ricette semplici non esistono: sono necessarie nuove strategie internazionali – in particolare sul piano economico - e sforzi nazionali costanti.

Concludendo su questo punto: il processo di allargamento delle due principali istituzioni euro-occidentali dovrà consentire di proiettare una sfera più ampia possibile di sviluppo e di stabilità verso l'Europa centrale e verso il Sud-est. Dal punto di vista dell'intreccio fra le due dinamiche, si può anche sostenere che l'allargamento dell'Unione europea finirà in parte per compensare le direzioni geografiche dell'allargamento della NATO; ma le basi e la coerenza interna di una futura Europa allargata ne verrebbero notevolmente consolidate se i due processi non si divaricassero troppo.

La posizione geopoliticamente esposta della nostra penisola, e la sua storia plurisecolare di interscambio con i popoli circostanti, determinano infine anche una particolare sensibilità per le questioni del bacino mediterraneo, che intendiamo porre costantemente all'attenzione dei nostri alleati anche in sede NATO, utilizzando le sedi appropriate quali il foro di dialogo e cooperazione costituito dal "Dialogo Mediterraneo", avviato negli ultimi anni con sei Paesi mediterranei che non sono membri della NATO.

Tutto quanto ho detto fin qui dimostra un dato di fondo: se è indubbio che la discussione interna alla NATO sia una sorta di specchio (o di metafora, come è stato detto molte volte) dei rapporti fra gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa, è negli interessi reciproci la creazione di un rapporto più bilanciato – in termini di oneri e di responsabilità – fra le due metà dell'Atlantico. Come ho cercato di mostrare, non si tratta una ricetta per l'indebolimento ma per il rafforzamento della nuova NATO.

Questo quadro impone anche all'Italia nuove e specifiche responsabilità, quale membro della nuova Europa e della nuova NATO. Nei decenni passati, l'integrazione nelle due organizzazioni, e la loro complementarità, ha costituito il principio orientativo di fondo della politica estera italiana. Ciò rimane vero oggi, esattamente come mezzo secolo fa. Ma è vero in un modo che ha ormai poco a che fare con le vecchie rendite di posizione: l'Operazione Alba ha dimostrato del resto con molta chiarezza come l'Italia sia un paese in grado e disposto – able and willing – di assumersi responsabilità dirette. Per rafforzare questo orientamento, il paese nel suo insieme deve fare un salto di qualità sui temi della sicurezza: e deve accettare che la politica di sicurezza non sia un costo residuale ma un impegno vitale per il futuro.

In un contesto segnato da nuovi rischi e da forme endemiche di instabilità, la posizione dell'Italia è profondamente cambiata, anche per ragioni di collocazione geografica: di fatto, l'Italia è particolarmente esposta alle ripercussioni delle crisi nelle aree in cui si proiettano le nuove missioni della NATO. In altre parole: nella nuova NATO, più che nella vecchia NATO, l'Italia è un paese di prima linea, con interessi vitali nella pacificazione, nella proiezione della stabilità, nello sviluppo

democratico ed economico ai confini immediati dell'Alleanza.

Se l'Italia è quindi centralmente interessata all'evoluzione della nuova NATO, questa evoluzione ha anche bisogno che l'Italia sia in grado di assumere un ruolo più attivo.

Questa traiettoria è già cominciata: lo ha dimostrato, come dicevo, l'Operazione Alba. Ma lo dimostrano anche la nostra partecipazione alla forza multilaterale schierata in Bosnia; o la nostra partecipazione alla Forza di estrazione in Macedonia. L'Italia è poi parte attiva in una serie di progetti sub-regionali, quali la Trilaterale con Slovenia e Ungheria che ha prodotto un risultato tangibile con la creazione di una brigata mista, e la Forza di pace sud-europea istituita pochi giorni orsono.

L'Italia sta anche compiendo uno sforzo complessivo di graduale ristrutturazione del proprio strumento militare, al fine di renderlo adeguato alle esigenze di proiezione rapida di forze, con caratteristiche di elevata flessibilità e professionalità, e con un'alta capacità di integrarsi con contingenti alleati.

E' indubbio che il processo di adattamento delle nostre capacità militari non sia ancora stato completato. Ciò vale anche – in misura maggiore o minore, se guardiamo ai singoli paesi - per l'Europa nel suo complesso: come risulta da un ben noto studio della Brookings Institution, le spese per la difesa dei paesi europei nel loro complesso raggiungono il 60% circa di quelle americane; ma con una capacità di proiezione delle forze europee che è soltanto del 10% di quella degli Stati Uniti. Quando parliamo di nuova NATO e di dimensione europea nella nuova Alleanza, dobbiamo quindi porci con coraggio il problema delle capacità operative dei paesi europei, e di una loro crescente integrazione.

Nel corso degli anni '90, in sostanza, si sono create alcune delle premesse di uno stadio finalmente "maturo" nei rapporti fra Italia e Alleanza Atlantica: uno stadio che non potrà che essere consolidato da una attenzione sempre più attiva e da una partecipazione sempre più informata del mondo parlamentare alla discussione di politica estera.

Lo sviluppo di rapporti solidi fra gli alleati europei e gli Stati Uniti all'interno dell'Alleanza atlantica consentirà, secondo noi, di promuovere gli interessi comuni e al tempo stesso di rafforzare il multilateralismo anche al di là della cerchia dei Paesi-membri.

Questa visione, per il futuro, nasce in realtà da un passato lontano. Da questo punto di vista, è ancora utile – e si tratta del resto di un omaggio giustificato - ricordare il senso originario che l'allora Presidente del Consiglio De Gasperi attribuì al Patto Atlantico. Ricordo quelle parole, chiudendo il mio discorso, proprio perché mi sembrano, cinquantanni dopo, di grande attualità: il Patto atlantico, diceva allora De Gasperi "può costituire una definitiva tutela dell'indipendenza del nostro Paese, come può divenire un'espressione pacifica della solidarietà americano-europea [...]; e si tratta – aggiungeva De Gasperi - di una integrazione concreta dell'ONU, nel quadro della quale esso può agire come Patto regionale equilibratore".

Questo approccio sembra in effetti anticipare parte dell'evoluzione delle funzioni dell'Alleanza, per come si è dispiegata nell'arco di ben mezzo secolo; e ci permette di continuare a guardare in avanti.

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

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BIBLIOTECA

CONFERENZIALE

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Istituto Affari Internazionali**“Il 50° anniversario dell’Alleanza Atlantica:
Una nuova NATO per una nuova Europa”****Camera dei Deputati
Roma, 24 - 25 gennaio 1999*****Intervento del Ministro della Difesa,
Sen. Carlo Scognamiglio Pasini***

Signore e Signori,

sono particolarmente lieto di poter pronunciare il discorso di apertura di questo Convegno che, primo in Italia, intende celebrare il 50° Anniversario della nascita dell’Alleanza Atlantica.

Come tutti sappiamo, il Trattato dell’Atlantico del Nord, meglio conosciuto come il *Trattato di Washington*, venne sottoscritto il 4 aprile 1949. L’inizio della guerra fredda all’indomani del secondo conflitto mondiale aveva spinto le democrazie occidentali a stringere un’alleanza politico-militare con la quale affrontare congiuntamente le sfide ed i pericoli della nuova era. Contrastare il riaffermarsi di regimi totalitari e dittatoriali in Europa, difendere la pace e la libertà e favorire il consolidamento delle istituzioni democratiche divennero così compiti fondamentali per i paesi aderenti al Patto Atlantico.

Nel corso degli anni, ed anzi dei decenni, la NATO è riuscita, malgrado momenti di crisi particolarmente acuti, non soltanto a scongiurare un nuovo conflitto a livello mondiale, ma anche a gettare le basi per una sincera ed estesa collaborazione tra gli Stati Uniti, il Canada ed i paesi del Vecchio Continente, che ha contribuito a rendere possibile uno sviluppo economico ed un benessere straordinari.

Il crollo del muro di Berlino nel 1989 e la successiva disgregazione dell'Unione Sovietica hanno dato il via ad una serie di riflessioni sul ruolo e sulla ragion d'essere di un'organizzazione che trovava il suo fondamento nella contrapposizione politico-ideologica dei due blocchi. Ma l'invasione irakena del Kuwait, la tragedia della Bosnia-Erzegovina dopo il collasso jugoslavo, numerosi altri conflitti locali e regionali in Europa e nelle regioni adiacenti, hanno abbondantemente dimostrato che la missione della NATO è tutt'altro che esaurita.

In seguito al mutato scenario geo-politico, l'Alleanza Atlantica ha dovuto aggiornare i suoi obiettivi e le sue strategie per poter affrontare con la stessa determinazione le sfide ed i pericoli del dopo guerra fredda e del 21° secolo: conflitti locali e regionali alimentati da estremismi di ogni tipo, terrorismo, catastrofi umanitarie, violazioni dei diritti umani, proliferazione di armi di distruzione di massa, fenomeni questi che sempre più si intrecciano con le criminalità, i traffici illegali, l'immigrazione clandestina.

Il Summit di Washington previsto per la fine di aprile di quest'anno, oltre che a celebrare solennemente il cinquantenario della

sua creazione, servirà anche per fare il punto della situazione sul processo di trasformazione e di adattamento interno dell'Alleanza Atlantica, un processo che, insieme a quello dell'allargamento, non è ancora compiuto.

Signore e Signori,

il 1999 è davvero un anno di portata storica. L'ingresso nell'Alleanza di tre paesi dell'Europa orientale, un tempo appartenenti all'ex blocco sovietico, sta diventando una realtà. Polonia, Ungheria e Repubblica Ceca, che sin dal crollo del muro di Berlino hanno accolto i principi della democrazia e della legalità e scegliendo l'economia di mercato hanno radicalmente migliorato la loro situazione interna, diventeranno membri a pieno titolo della NATO.

La prospettiva dell'allargamento dovrà tuttavia rimanere aperta, con l'obiettivo finale di conseguire maggiore stabilità e sicurezza soprattutto in quella parte del Continente ove, nel corso dei secoli, si sono periodicamente accesi focolai di crisi e di conflitti che hanno messo a repentaglio la pace in Europa. Ragioni di ordine politico ed economico, oltre che di sicurezza, inducono a sostenere questa scelta: un processo che dovesse restare incompiuto e dividere i "candidati" rischierebbe di creare scontento, di generare conflittualità ed instabilità tra i paesi in attesa; le popolazioni di quelli in ritardo mal sopporterebbero i gravosi quanto necessari processi di aggiustamento, senza l'indicazione di una reale prospettiva di adesione.

Peraltro, l'esigenza del mutato contesto geo-strategico internazionale implica un attento riesame delle funzioni e finalità dell'Alleanza. La prospettiva cui ci troviamo di fronte è appunto quella di decidere in che misura trasformare la NATO da alleanza di difesa collettiva, - tale era infatti la sua caratteristica principale durante la guerra fredda, - anche in strumento di intervento della comunità internazionale per mantenere o imporre la pace nelle aree di crisi: una funzione del resto che la NATO sta già da tempo esercitando in Bosnia Erzegovina nella quale sta proseguendo la missione Stabilization Force (SFOR).

E' anche vero però che missioni di questo tipo non dovranno né potranno perpetuarsi all'infinito. Citando ancora l'esempio della missione SFOR, la NATO sta ormai studiando i tempi e i modi attraverso i quali ridurre la propria presenza onde evitare che si crei una cultura di "dipendenza" nelle autorità ed istituzioni locali, ed accrescerne invece la capacità di provvedere autonomamente alla sicurezza e all'ordine della regione.

La NATO non intende rinunciare alla sua funzione principale, quella prevista dall'articolo 5 del Trattato di Washington di difendere collettivamente ogni stato membro in caso di attacco. Essa dovrà però concentrare attenzioni e risorse su missioni, possibilmente avvallate da un mandato ONU o OSCE, che non rientrano direttamente nella portata dell'articolo 5, finalizzate a promuovere la stabilità e la sicurezza in Europa e a rispondere in maniera efficace alle sfide del 21° secolo.

In questo senso, il *nuovo concetto strategico* dell'Alleanza, che si sta sviluppando per far fronte alle attuali minacce del mutato contesto internazionale, se da un lato dovrà riconfermare i tradizionali principi e caratteristiche dell'Organizzazione militare della NATO, dall'altro, e proprio attraverso le missioni e le azioni militari che escono dalla portata dell'articolo 5, dovrebbe mirare ad assicurare all'Europa una stabilità ed una sicurezza che vanno ben al di là della semplice difesa territoriale. Le operazioni di peace-keeping e di peace-enforcing, gli interventi per la gestione delle numerose crisi locali e regionali necessitano comunque di una base giuridica. E' per questo motivo che la NATO cercherà, in linea di principio, di ottenere per le sue missioni ed azioni un'appropriata copertura dalle Nazioni Unite o dall'Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (OSCE).

L'anno che è iniziato vedrà inoltre un ulteriore rafforzamento della collaborazione tra l'Alleanza Atlantica e la Federazione Russa, fondata sull'"Atto sulle reciproche relazioni, cooperazione e sicurezza tra la NATO e la Russia", sottoscritto nel maggio di due anni fa a Parigi. L'ottimo lavoro svolto in Bosnia dalle truppe alleate a fianco di quelle russe ha dimostrato che la Russia può dare un valido contributo alla definizione di una nuova architettura di sicurezza in Europa.

Maggiori attenzioni saranno rivolte anche al rapporto NATO-Ucraina e allo sviluppo di programmi di cooperazione con altri paesi dell'Europa orientale e sud-orientale che non fanno parte dell'Alleanza.

In particolare si rafforzerà l'iniziativa della "Partnership for Peace", finalizzata ad accrescere l'interoperatività, ma anche la trasparenza e la fiducia, tra le truppe NATO e quelle dei relativi partner. In tale contesto si proseguirà nella ristrutturazione delle Forze Armate di questi paesi e nell'elaborazione e realizzazione di missioni di pace multilaterali, sull'esempio di quella del Kosovo.

Ma auspichiamo e ci impegneremo affinché aumenti sensibilmente anche il ruolo e la responsabilizzazione degli *Europei* nella costruzione di uno stabile e duraturo ordine internazionale. Con l'entrata in vigore del Trattato di Amsterdam, la nomina di un'alta personalità responsabile per la politica estera e di sicurezza comune e la costituzione di una *cellula di allerta e pianificazione*, verrà anche confermato e rafforzato il ruolo della UEO quale elemento essenziale per lo sviluppo di una *Identità Europea di Sicurezza e di Difesa* (IESD) nell'ambito della NATO. L'Europa non può rimanere unicamente una potenza commerciale, contando esclusivamente sulle leve economiche e politiche per gestire le problematiche di sicurezza. Le leve politiche ed economiche sono insufficienti senza un'efficace capacità militare che le sostiene.

In quest'ottica, lo sviluppo dell'IESD compatibile e coerente con il vincolo transatlantico, è un requisito per fornire significato e sostanza ad un rinnovato rapporto euro-americano e per consentire agli europei di utilizzare, all'occorrenza, anche assetti e mezzi della NATO nel quadro del concetto di impegno di capacità operative "separabili ma non separate". L'IESD riconcilia dunque un crescente ruolo all'Europa per

la sicurezza e difesa con la stabilità del rapporto transatlantico. Implica, al contempo, un più alto grado di coerenza tra l'adattamento dell'Alleanza Atlantica, quale si va configurando nel *nuovo concetto strategico* della NATO, e una crescente responsabilità politica, di sicurezza e di difesa per l'Unione Europea.

In quanto concetto politico, l'IESD fornisce un senso di identità ed una direzione di marcia, aiutando l'Unione a modificarsi all'interno di un quadro internazionale di sicurezza in movimento.

In quanto insieme di capacità ed articolazioni operative, l'IESD rappresenta il ponte che collega l'Unione Europea all'Alleanza Atlantica. La IESD non mette a repentaglio la sicurezza Atlantica, ma al contrario la rinforza grazie alla sua doppia funzione di pilastro europeo dell'Alleanza e di braccio operativo dell'Unione Europea.

Nel corso del semestre di Presidenza italiana dell'Unione dell'Europa Occidentale, il nostro paese ha perseguito e dato nuovo impulso all'opera di progressivo rafforzamento delle interazioni tra la UEO e l'Unione da un lato e tra la UEO e la NATO dall'altro. E' nostra intenzione realizzare i presupposti per rendere operativa, al momento della sua entrata in vigore, la disposizione dell'articolo J.7 del Trattato di Amsterdam che prevede la UEO quale componente dell'Unione nei processi di definizione e di attuazione degli aspetti della politica di Difesa e di Sicurezza comuni. In tale quadro la realizzazione di una Identità Europea di Sicurezza e di Difesa, compatibile e coerente con il quadro dell'Alleanza Atlantica, sta iniziando a prendere forma, anche attraverso la definizione delle modalità di collaborazione tra NATO e la

UEO. L'Italia sta perseguendo con ogni impegno l'obiettivo del rafforzamento della cooperazione con la NATO. Le nostre iniziative si sono rivolte verso la finalizzazione di un accordo quadro UEO-NATO per il trasferimento, il monitoraggio e la restituzione degli assetti e delle capacità della NATO utilizzabili in operazioni a guida UEO. In questo settore abbiamo compiuto notevoli passi in avanti che dovrebbero portare alla firma dell'intesa UEO-NATO, - il "Framework Agreement", - nei primi mesi di quest'anno. L'Identità di Sicurezza e Difesa Europea servirà dunque a rafforzare l'efficacia della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Europea, mettendo a disposizione degli Europei uno strumento operativo per il perseguimento di obiettivi ed interessi di sicurezza comuni e condivisi.

Un altro importante obiettivo che la NATO del nuovo millennio dovrà perseguire è il miglioramento dell'interoperabilità tra le Forze Armate, in particolare tra quelle dei paesi europei.

Rispetto a quelle degli Stati Uniti, *le capacità militari* degli alleati europei non sono così limitate come erroneamente si crede, ma mancano di mobilità, di proiettabilità e di alcune essenziali componenti operative di *intelligence*, di Comando, controllo e di trasporto strategico, al punto da ridurre fortemente il loro potenziale complessivo.

Per realizzare un'efficace strategia unificata dell'Alleanza sarà quindi necessario proseguire il cammino verso una più stretta interoperabilità e coerenza operativa tra le Forze militari. In particolare, al fine di ridurre il crescente *gap* tecnologico ed operativo tra le capacità europee e quelle statunitensi, i Ministri della Difesa europei hanno

recentemente iniziato a concentrare la loro attenzione sul problema dell'armonizzazione della domanda militare, ossia dei requisiti operativi e dello sviluppo di una coerente pianificazione a livello europeo delle acquisizioni militari. Durante il semestre di Presidenza italiana dell'UEO, ai margini del Consiglio ministeriale di Roma del 16-17 novembre 1998, questo Ministero ha organizzato un seminario "sulla cooperazione europea nel campo dell'Industria della Difesa": i Ministri della Difesa e dell'Industria, insieme al Commissario europeo Bangemann ed i più importanti manager delle industrie europee per la Difesa hanno affrontato il problema della ristrutturazione e della razionalizzazione della base industriale della difesa, cioè dell'offerta, che consentirebbe di massimizzare le qualità dei bilanci della Difesa, che in tutta Europa sono sottoposti a forti pressioni per comprensibili ragioni che tutti conosciamo. Gli stati maggiori, a loro volta, dovrebbero compiere un'analogia azione di semplificazione dal lato della domanda.

La revisione delle strategie e degli strumenti dell'Alleanza impone dunque un parallelo ripensamento delle strategie e degli strumenti degli alleati europei. Il contributo europeo alle operazioni di gestione delle crisi e di sostegno alla pace potrà essere decisamente maggiore se sostenuto da una credibile ed efficace forza militare.

Signore e Signori,

alle soglie del nuovo millennio gli Stati Uniti, il Canada e gli alleati del Vecchio Continente sembrano adeguatamente preparati ed

attrezzati per affrontare con successo le sfide ed i rischi del 21° secolo. L'Alleanza Atlantica ha dimostrato di essere un indispensabile strumento non solo di intervento militare e di gestione di crisi locali ed internazionali, bensì di collaborazione e di mutua assistenza tra i paesi membri ed i numerosi partner associati. In seguito al mutato contesto politico internazionale, essa ha saputo rinnovarsi ed ha saputo opportunamente adeguare i suoi scopi ed i suoi obbiettivi strategici. Certo, la NATO si trova tutt'ora in una fase di non facile transizione ed adattamento verso una sua definitiva collocazione nel nuovo scenario mondiale: sebbene sia chiaro che l'Alleanza non possa né debba diventare un'organizzazione a carattere globale, - funzione che spetta alle Nazioni Unite, - restano ancora da stabilire i limiti ed i confini geografici entro i quali circoscrivere l'intervento Alleato. Ad ogni modo, l'Organizzazione dovrà essere in grado di reagire in maniera dinamica e flessibile per far fronte alle minacce ed ai pericoli derivanti da regioni anche periferiche all'Europa, ma che potrebbero estendersi al Continente. L'Italia, a causa della sua posizione geo-strategica, è particolarmente suscettibile a questi pericoli, come a quello della proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa.

Inoltre, il forte potere d'attrazione esercitato dell'Alleanza, che ha portato alla realizzazione della prima fase di allargamento, è destinato a durare ed anzi aumentare. Dopo la Polonia, l'Ungheria e la Repubblica Ceca, numerosi altri paesi dell'Europa orientale e sud-orientale, - alcuni dei quali hanno ormai raggiunto gli standard politici, economici e militari richiesti, - stanno chiedendo con insistenza l'adesione nella più

robusta istituzione di sicurezza e difesa collettiva. A tale proposito vorrei ricordare l'importanza dei paesi dell'Europa sud-orientale, e penso in primo luogo alla Slovenia e alla Romania, per la realizzazione del prossimo allargamento.

Il Summit di Washington dovrà dare un caloroso benvenuto ai tre nuovi alleati, prendere in giusta considerazione le aspirazioni di altri qualificati paesi democratici, oltre, naturalmente, a definire il nuovo concetto strategico della NATO ed assicurare una maggiore interoperabilità ed efficacia alle forze armate dei paesi membri. Si tratta quindi di un appuntamento della più grande importanza.

Il futuro della NATO che ho brevemente tratteggiato si presenta in una prospettiva di grande innovazione e trasformazione. E' necessario che l'Alleanza sappia cambiare in profondità se vorrà preservare l'essenza di ciò che è stata in questi ultimi cinquant'anni: la pietra miliare della sicurezza euro-atlantica, garante della pace e della democrazia nel nostro Continente.

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